The case for moral realism: Morality and interests in understanding Australian foreign policy

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to make an original contribution towards understanding the position of morality in classical realism. To do so it develops the notion of “moral realism” as an explanatory framework to help understand why (and when) nations tend to act morally in their foreign policy choices. Three factors are identified that form the moral realist framework: (i) expectations of reciprocity between states; (ii) rational choice in calculating foreign policy decisions; and (iii) moral and material outcomes of foreign policy. The central argument of the thesis is that when states choose to act morally, they can stand to gain material benefits in return. To demonstrate this, the thesis applies moral realism to the foreign policy of Australia in three important areas: aid and development, humanitarian operations, and strategic alliances. It finds that – in the Australian case – moral outcomes were more likely when they also converged with material interests.

Scholarly interest in how morality can be theorized has increased following the revival of classical realism in contemporary International Relations theory. But instead of this revival being an opportunity to revisit classical realism’s insights on understanding morality by the consequences of states choosing to act morally, recent scholarship has been dominated by normative and critical school approaches. I argue that this has contributed to a misrepresentation of classical realism’s core methodological and theoretical principles. This is where this thesis makes its main theoretical contribution. It addresses the lack of classical realist perspectives by presenting a way of understanding morality that remains within classical realist theory and method. My own offering, which I term moral realism, is consequentialist rather than normative, and has been developed by a careful examination of the ideas of three key classical realist scholars – Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr.

Through an examination of Morgenthau, Kennan and Niebuhr, I detect three shared ideas used to characterize moral realism that are then applied to understand the foreign policy choices of states: expectations of reciprocity; rational choice; and moral and material outcomes. These three factors are then applied to a specific case study of foreign policy: in this thesis, to Australian foreign policy choices. This allows the thesis to assess whether or not moral realism is a valuable tool for understanding morality in foreign policy.

I find that moral realism is capable of explaining Australia’s foreign policy choices, and thus represents a valuable contribution towards understanding the role of morality in explaining its policy decision-making. I find that Australia was primarily motivated by calculations of expectations of reciprocity in each of the arenas under review. At the same time, a rational choice process helped inform when Australia chose to include morality as part of its foreign policy decisions. This indicates that moral and material outcomes were likely, which reinforced the core claim of a moral realist approach.
Declaration of originality

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Acronyms

Agence France-Presse (AFP)
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN)
Anglo-New Zealand Australia Malaya (ANZAM)
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)
Australian Associated Press (AAP)
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
Australian Centre of International Agriculture Research (ACIAR)
Australian Development Assistance Agency (ADAA)
Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB)
Australian Defence Force (ADF)
Australian Federal Police (AFP)
Australian Financial Intelligence Unit (AFIU)
Australian Indonesian Basic Economic Partnership (AIBEP)
Australian Indonesian Ministerial Forum (AIMF)
Australian Indonesian Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD)
Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB)
Australian National University (ANU)
Australian New Zealand United States (ANZUS)
Australian Defence Satellite Communication Station (ADSCS)
Australian Solomon’s Gold (ASG)
Australian Secret Intelligence Organization (ASIO)
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX)
Australian United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN)
Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA)
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan (BCOF)
Certain Maritime Arrangements in East Timor (CMATS)
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
Coal Bed Methane (CBM)
Coalition Government of the Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)
Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA)
Coalition of the Willing (CoW)
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Critical Security Studies (CSS)
Defence of Australia (DOA)
Defence Support Program (DSP)
Democratic Kampuchea (DK)
Department of Defence (DoD)
Department of External Affairs (DEA)
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIC)
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
Development Import Grant (DIG)
Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF)

Donor Interest (DI)

East Asia Summit (EAS)

Eastern Indonesian National Road Improvement Program (EINRIP)

English School (ES)

Enhance Cooperation Partnership (ECP)

European Theatre of Operations (ETO)

European Union (EU)

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC)

Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA)

Free Trade Agreement (FTA)

General Budget Support (GBS)

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)

Global Civil Society (GCS)

Good International Citizen (GIC)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Gross National Income (GNI)

Human Development Index (HDI)

Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)

Indonesian Infrastructure Initiative (IndII)

Indonesian Red Cross (IRC)

Information Security Agreement (ISA)

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)

Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMMS)
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)

International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK)

International Committee for Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICRC)

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

International Criminal Court (ICC)

International Development Agency (IDA)

International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)

International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Monitoring System (IMS)

International Relations (IR)

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC)

Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM)

Jakarta Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC)

Kampulan Mujahadin Malaysia (KMM)

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Joint Combined Training Centre (JCTC)

Joint Defence Facility Nurrungur (JDFN)

Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West)

Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA)

Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF)

Law Enforcement Cooperation Program (LECP)

Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)

Lower Development Countries (LDC)
Malaitan Eagles Force (MEF)
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
Military Liaison Officers (MLO)
Millennium Development Goals (MDG)
Mining for Development (M4D)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
National Archives of Australia (NAA)
National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA)
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC).
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
Non-State Actor (NSA)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Official Development Assistance (ODA)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (OTC)
Pacific Financial Intelligence Unit Project (PFIU)
Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC)
Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC)
Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)
Papua New Guinea (PNG)
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR)
Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
Recipient Need (RN)
Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI)
Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETLIN)
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)
Royal Australian Navy (RAN)
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)
Solomon Islands Road Improvement Program (SIRIP)
Space Based Infra Red Satellite (SBIRS)
Special Air Service (SAS)
Special Autonomous Regional of East Timor (SARET)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
Supreme National Council (SNC)
Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU)
Tuberculosis (TB)
Transnational Crime Units (TCU)
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
United Commission for Indonesia (UNCI)
United Development Party (PPP)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFIC)
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
United Nations Good Offices Commission (UNGOC)
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG)
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)
United Nations Trust Fund for East Timor (UNTFET)
United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA)
US Marin Corps (USMC)
Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR)
War on Terror (WoT)
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
World Food Program (WFP)
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Introduction

This thesis seeks to make a contribution towards understanding the position of morality in classical realism. To achieve this, I develop the notion of “moral realism” as an explanatory framework to help uncover why (and when) states are most likely to act morally in their foreign policy choices. Three factors are identified that form the moral realist framework: (i) expectations of reciprocity between states; (ii) rational choice in calculating foreign policy decisions; and (iii) moral and material outcomes of foreign policy. The main argument of the thesis is that when states choose to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, they can actually stand to gain material benefits in return. To demonstrate this, the thesis applies moral realism to the foreign policy of Australia in three important areas: aid and development, humanitarian operations, and strategic alliances. It finds that moral outcomes were more likely in Australian foreign policy when they also converged with its national interests.

Scholarly interest in how morality can be theorized has increased following the revival of classical realism in contemporary International Relations (IR) theory.¹ Specifically, there has been a growing research agenda in rediscovering how classical realist scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau, Edward Carr, John Herz, Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan, viewed morality in international politics. The modern revival can be traced back to the early to mid-2000s where contemporary IR scholars, like Richard Ned Lebow, Michael Williams, William Scheuerman, Campbell Craig and Sean Molloy introduced the notion that classical realists were not so easily characterized as “realist.”² These scholars challenged the assumption that classical realists were only concerned with the laws of politics derived from human nature,

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¹ This thesis refers to the body of work in this revival as the “classical realist revival.” This phrase is not unique to this thesis and has been mentioned by other scholars when referring to the recent re-engagement with classical realism in IR. For instance, see Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, “Why are revisionist states revisionist? Reviving classical realism as an approach to understanding international change,” *International Politics* 45, no. 1(2008), pp. 19-39 and Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: A neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation,” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1(2010), pp. 117-143.

which operated in a constant state of war. Instead, they argued that a curious dualism existed in the work of classical realism.

On the one hand, classical realists were focused on describing how the world worked according to power politics and were thus sceptical of the potential for progress in international affairs. Yet, on the other, they were critical of the status quo and made observations on how international politics ought to operate. These scholars also pointed out that the classical realist views on morality and power were heavily influenced by these scholars’ own individual experiences, biases and perceptions, leaving them open to Robert Cox’s claim that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”

The identification of this “normative” and “critical” thread was the start of a renewed classical realist research agenda that has been dominated by scholars who are used to being at odds with the realist tradition’s core methodological and theoretical principles.

In fact, so prolific have the contributions been from the critical theorists in particular that the “classical realist meets critical theorist” research network was established in 2012, with the stated aim of strengthening the convergence of classical realism and critical theory.

Other IR perspectives have also contributed to the revival. Scholars in support of the English School (ES), like Richard Little, for instance, have argued that the School is a “natural successor” of classical realism in that both perspectives make observations on how states interact in the absence of war. According to him, classical realists were focused on describing and prescribing the normative conditions of international society. Similarly, constructivists have also weighed in, with scholars like Samuel Barkin attempting to argue that classical realists understood the relationship between power and morality to be socially constructed, and hence are mutually constitutive norms of state behaviour. Even cosmopolitan perspectives, like those put forward by Richard Beardsworth, have argued that

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4 For more on this network see “Classical realism and critical theory,” Newcastle University (2012). Available at: http://research.ncl.ac.uk/classicalrealism/ (accessed 13 March 2014). All of the contributors are those that have identified various critical themes in classical realism such as Michael Williams, Sean Molloy, Felix Rosec, Hartmut Buhr and Oliver Juetsersonke. A scholarly contribution from the classical realist position is noticeably absent. These contributions will be discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter that follows.

5 Richard Little argued that the key concepts of the ES, such as international society, international justice, and world society and world justice lay at the heart of classical realism. For more see Little, “English School vs American realism: A meeting of minds or divided by a common language,” *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003), pp. 443-460.

on closer inspection, classical realists are not so strongly opposed to normative assertions of progress, respect for universal human rights and distributive justice in international politics. But despite the growing popularity of the classical realist revival as a research field, the contributions from classical realists themselves have been notably absent. This is somewhat surprising given that classical realism has a rich tradition of engaging with questions of morality, dating back to Thucydides *History of the Peloponnesian War*, which argued that considerations of morality and justice were important for a political entity to remain in power. Likewise, Niccolo Machiavelli – in both *The Prince* and the *Discourses on Livy* – emphasized the role of morality in contributing to the strength and good fortune of states. The general absence of contributions that take a classical realist approach to theory has arguably led to a distortion of how classical realist scholars really saw morality as a concept involved in strengthening the power of the state, and evaluated according to the consequences of states choosing to act morally. For them, morality was not normatively prescribed, and instead was part of the menu of foreign policy options states could choose in their pursuit of the national interest.

Not only has this led to a misinterpretation of classical realism, but it has also had the unfortunate effect of reinforcing the common caricature of realism as an immoral or amoral approach, ill-equipped to deal with the moral complexities of international politics. Even neoclassical realists, regarded as the closest contemporary to classical realists, have tended to dismiss or downplay morality in foreign policy decision-making, seeing it only as part of the agency variables that “intervene” on policy choices at the domestic level. Thus, it has very

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8 Books IV to VII of the *History* describe the aggressive expansion of the Athenians and their downfall at the hands of Syracuse, Sparta, and other Sicilians. It is in this description where one can detect an appreciation for the role of ethics, justice and morality in connection to power. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* transl. by Rex Warner, with an introduction and notes by M.I. Finley (London: Penguin Group, 1972). Indeed, the claim that Thucydides was concerned with morality and ethics has been made by others, like Julian Korab-Karpowicz, who argued that Thucydides *History* outlined how an Empire unrestrained by morality was prone to hubris and would inevitably fail. For more, see Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “How international relations theorists can benefit by reading Thucydides,” *The Monist* 89, no. 2 (2006), pp. 232-244.
9 Machiavelli’s views on morality where made clear in his description of the qualities of “The Prince” where he argued that a Prince must recognise where to be “good” and where to be “bad” according to necessity. For more see Nicollo Machiavelli, *The Prince and Other Political Writings* Stephen J. Milner transl. and ed. (London: J.M. Dent, 1995), pp.37-137. Similar observations can also be found in the *Discourses*, see in particular Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy* transl. by Harvey C Mansfield and Nathancorv (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 34-35.
10 Neoclassical realism has been regarded as the most recent adaption of classical realism since Gideon Rose coined the perspective in 1998. Rose described neoclassical realism as way forward for classical realism that
little effect on the foreign policy goals of states as these scholars largely regarded morality as a normative factor that, if followed, will likely lead to miscalculations in the state’s pursuit of power.\textsuperscript{11}

This is where this thesis attempts to make an original contribution. It addresses the lack of classical realist perspectives by presenting a way of understanding morality that remains within classical realist theory and method. My own offering, termed “moral realism” is developed via a careful examination of three key classical realist scholars – Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr. These scholars were chosen for their similarity in how they positioned morality in connection to power and its consequences in international politics, which enables a consistent line of thought in making my case for moral realism. Indeed, one of the very few classical realist inputs to the revival, by Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, highlighted the commonality between these three scholars on how they understood morality.\textsuperscript{12}

These scholars were chosen for this similarity in the first instance, but they were also chosen because they shared the same view on classical realism as a perspective that explains both how international politics operates, and how foreign policy decisions are made.\textsuperscript{13} In this regard, they reinforce my positioning of moral realism as a perspective that explains foreign policy choices. This clarification is important as, to date, the majority of contributions to the

\textsuperscript{11} There are two ways that neoclassical realists view morality. The first is that it is a permissive force used to sell policy to a domestic audience. In this regard, it is a rhetorical device created by the agent in response to systemic pressures. The second is that it is attached to normative principles of international law, human rights and international justice, which can suprervene on policy choices and lead to misperception of elites in responding to external pressures. For more on these see Randall Scwheller Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) and Jennifer Sterling-Folkner, “Neoclassical realism and identity: Peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait,” in Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jennifer Taliaferro ed. Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 99-138.


\textsuperscript{13} The best evidence to support this assertion comes from Morgenthau’s much-cited chapter “A realist theory of international politics” where he outlines classical or “political” realism as a theory of international politics and foreign policy. This chapter did not appear in the first edition of Politics Among Nations and was added to subsequent editions. Even though this chapter was added later, it was not new material for Morgenthau. This passage was a succinct summary of what was outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 of the first edition, as well as other material drawn from In Defence of the National Interest and “The evil of politics and the ethics of evil,” all of which discuss classical realist views on power, peace, morality and conflict in international politics. For more see Morgenthau, “A realist theory of international politics” in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 4th ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 1-14.
classical realist revival have overlooked the fact that classical realism is primarily a theory of foreign policy, and thus is concerned with describing how states construct their foreign policy – and how this is conducted on the world stage.

Through an examination of Morgenthau, Kennan and Niebuhr, I detect three shared ideas used to characterize moral realism. These are: expectations of reciprocity between states; rational choice in calculating foreign policy decisions; and moral and material outcomes of foreign policy. These three factors form the moral realist framework that is then applied to a specific case study of foreign policy: in this thesis, to understand Australia’s foreign policy choices. The application of moral realism to a case of foreign policy allows for an assessment of whether or not moral realism is a valuable tool for understanding the outcomes of morality in foreign policy choices. But before I move to a further explanation of what is meant by moral realism and the choice of Australia as an appropriate case to test its validity, it is important to define how this thesis conceives of morality, and how this differs from the perspectives identified above. This is necessary because it will inform how moral realism incorporates the classical realist view of consequential morality.

Decoding morality: Understanding morality in international politics

Defining or “decoding” morality in international politics is a difficult and slippery endeavour. But generally, the place of morality in IR theory can be thought of as operating along a continuum with two opposing ends. At one end are the cosmopolitan perspectives, like those put forward by Charles Beitz and David Held, which theorize that morality is an independent variable capable of determining international politics. Here, morality is defined as a categorical imperative and tied to the rational capacity of enlightened actors to learn, reform and modify their behaviour, with the goal of peace as their modus operandi. Human nature is essentially “good,” but individuals have been prevented from reaching their rational potential because of deficiencies in the social order. Individuals (and states) are considered moral actors and have the ability to treat others as ends in themselves. From this perspective, a

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14 For clarity of argument and descriptive consistency, in the main text of the thesis I will use the abbreviations “expectations of reciprocity,” “rational choice” and “moral and material outcomes” when referring to these categories.

moral order derived from abstract principles is possible and can be achieved by the rational progression of human nature. Applied to international politics, this means cosmopolitan approaches focus on prescribing how actors ought to interact, and point towards an emerging Global Civil Society (GSC), international solidarity movements and greater interdependence as evidence of a universal morality that independently motivates behaviour.

Reflexive approaches, like those primarily employed by constructivists, understand morality to be intersubjective and part of how actors and structures are socially constructed. While this means cosmopolitan and constructivist approaches view morality differently in relation to the process of cause and effect, they are similar in seeing it as a normative factor that determines state behaviour. For constructivists like Christian Reus-Smit, morality is part of a state’s identity, which is constructed from the values, beliefs, customs and traditions of collective group interaction over time. Morality is thus a social product that guides states on the “right” way to act, and is synonymous with normative principles of international law, international justice and universal human rights. This means that, despite its claim to intersubjectivity, constructivism maintains a commitment to rationality that places it close to cosmopolitanism on the theoretical spectrum.

Critical theoretical approaches to morality largely see it as part of their positivist and post-positivist critiques of both IR theory and practice. Scholars like Craig and Brown focus on how the researcher’s own values and perceptions of events can shape their approach to theory. Therefore, when theorizing about morality, scholars are prone to making conscious judgments on what actions are deemed morally good, or morally bad. This usually means that critical theorists are sceptical of cause and effect, critical of attempts to universalize concepts, and see morality as a biased concept, fashioned from the researcher’s own pre-conceived views of it. But having stated this, the critical contributions examined in the classical realist revival share similarities with cosmopolitanism and constructivism in their view of morality as a normative principle that prescribes how international politics ought to operate.

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18 Viewing morality this way can leave them open to a contradiction between relativism, where theory is always for someone, with themselves just another subjective morality, and universalism or prescriptive subjectivism.
The ES can be located somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Here, morality represents a set of codified standards or laws that can regulate (and in some instances, transform) both human and state behaviour. The ES view on morality is grounded in empiricism, meaning the laws and mores that govern international society, such as mutual respect for sovereignty, have been determined by the historical accumulation of what these states see as the “right” or “wrong” way to act. As a result, the ES is often presented as representing the “moral middle ground” between cosmopolitanism and realism. But, as this thesis will demonstrate, the contemporary ES, with inputs from Timothy Dunne, Nicholas Wheeler and Alex Bellamy (amongst others), has come to promote a normative conception of morality rather than an empirical one, and as a result the School leans more towards the cosmopolitan understanding of morality.

**From classical realism to moral realism: Morality and the national interest**

It is at the other end of this spectrum that one finds positivist perspectives that place anarchy, the state and “interest defined as power” as the defining principles of IR theory and practice. At the far end is neorealism, which sees morality as having no place in understanding international politics. Classical realist perspectives sit variously between the ES and neorealism. Neoclassical realism, as a bridge between systemic forces and agency variables, sits close to neorealism, while classical realism, as a perspective that derives its assumptions exclusively from human nature, can be found between the ES and neoclassical realism.

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19 The ES claim to empiricism and practical knowledge has meant that it is often characterized as employing a middle-ground ethic between positivist and rationalist theories of IR. For more see Molly Cochran, “Charting the ethics of the English School: What “good” is there in a middle-ground ethics,” *Review of International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 1 (2009), pp. 203-225. This point about a middle-ground ethic was elaborated further by Cochran in 2014, but was done in the broader context of positioning the ES as perspective that has always been concerned with normative theorizing. Interestingly Cochran also goes further and argues that the ES middle-ground ethic needs to incorporate “normative justifications” of the goods involved in pursuing either a solidarist or pluralist international society. More on the ES view of morality, including the solidarist versus pluralist debate will be discussed in the chapter that follows. For more on the tradition of normative theorizing in the ES see Cochran, “Normative theory in the English School,” in Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green eds. *Guide to the English School in International Studies* (West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), p. 196.

20 The pluralist nature of the ES makes finding agreement on a philosophical standpoint difficult, especially so given that many now see a constructivist stream in some of the School’s scholarship. This thesis argues in the succeeding chapter that British empiricism, put forward by John Locke and David Hume, is the approach associated with Bull and his views on moral action as learned behaviour that has been created by state experiences of what is the wrong and right way to act. However, I also argue that the current focus of the School on notions of international human rights, international justice and Non-State Actors (NSAs), has pushed it closer to the idealism associated with Kantian cosmopolitanism where morality is determined by obligation and duty towards a universal rule of law.

21 This thesis does not go into further detail on the views of neorealism. As a theory of international politics, neorealism is critical of approaches that derive their assumptions from human nature. Therefore, it would not be useful to include neorealist perspectives in a discussion on classical realism and how they understood morality.
Deriving assumptions from human nature means that classical realism understands there to be no difference between the statesperson and the state, and hence any analysis of morality is performed on the actions of states in the international system. And since classical realism is also a theory of foreign policy, this means that identification of any “moral” action is assessed on how a state conducts its diplomacy with other states. This distinction is important as it links to how classical realists understood the position of morality in international politics. As mentioned above, morality in the tradition of classical realism has been tied to improving the power of the state, and this has continued with the contemporary classical realists discussed in this thesis.

Morgenthau and Niebuhr, for instance, argued that morality could be found in the action of states in considering the interests of others when calculating what policy choice would achieve the national interest. But unlike cosmopolitan and constructivist perspectives, this consideration of the “other” was not determining, and was linked to the pursuit of interest defined as power. This means that instances of states including morality in foreign policy choice – for example, in choosing to commit resources to peacekeeping operations – were contingent on whether it achieved any real national interest benefits for the state itself. Such a view of morality naturally implies a certain level of rationality, where states have the capacity to reason that, in certain contexts and under certain conditions, it is prudent to include moral considerations, and pursue policy options that go beyond the narrow self-interest.

Classical realists also argued that this rationality was a limited one, as human nature existed in a constant state of war, which there was little hope of ever escaping. Rationality was thus determined by the ability to make rational calculations of whether it was within a state’s interest to consider the wellbeing of others. This notion of rationality engages with the classical realist assumption that individuals do not exist alone in human nature, and must, for their survival, interact with others. From this perspective, acting morally is not defined by states’ rational capacity to accept a universal moral standard, nor is it defined by their ability to modify or reform their behaviour. Instead, it is defined by a rational calculation on whether

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it achieves any real benefit for the state choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy calculations, and for the intended recipient of this policy decision.

In sum, the difference between the two ends of the spectrum can be defined as the difference between deontological ethics and consequentialist ethics. The former is used to judge morality in foreign policy on whether it reflects an inherent duty and adheres to a specific set of rules, and the latter is used to assess whether the inclusion of morality achieves the greatest good or greatest benefit. Assessing morality in foreign policy according to its consequences actually has quite a long history in classical realism and can be traced back to Machiavelli’s notion of prudence and virtue, where skilful rulers were expected to weigh decisions, including ones dealing with morality, against factors of proportionality, benefit to the state and civilian population, as well as whether it achieved any gains comparable to the costs involved.  

Similarly, Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan argued that consequentialism, or an “ethic of consequence,” which takes into consideration the effects of policy choices, was the best way to evaluate morality in foreign policy. Together, then, a limited consideration of the other and a concern for the consequences of morality in foreign policy defines the classical realist view of morality. But where does moral realism fit along the theoretical spectrum? And, crucially, what does it add to classical realism that sets it apart as a distinctive approach?

This thesis locates moral realism next to classical realism. It supports the classical realist assumptions of morality being conceptualized in relation to “interests defined as power,” and evaluated depending on whether it achieves any real benefit to the state choosing to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. But it also goes further than the classical realists in arguing that morality, as part of a state’s calculation of the national interests, can be a factor that achieves both moral and material outcomes. This is where moral realism connects considerations of the other with whether it has any real effect, both on the state’s national interest and the recipient state(s) that are the intended beneficiaries of the policy. This allows for an evaluation of moral realism that is based on empirical inquiry, as observations on

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whether a state is acting morally is determined by evidence of whether the state’s policy produced any outcomes, both moral and material.

Evidence of moral and material outcomes is useful for assessing whether motives match outcomes, and it is also central to defending the key empirical claim of moral realism: that when states choose to include morality as a part of foreign policy choice, they can actually stand to gain material benefits in return. The importance of assessing outcomes in moral foreign policy is hence two-fold. First, it allows for the use of evidence to support moral claims in foreign policy; and second, it reinforces the causal role of interests. In this way, moral factors form part of the rational calculation of foreign policy decisions and do not have the capacity to independently determine policy outcomes.

**Normative versus empirical designs of research: The “is” and “ought” of IR theory.**

Now that I have outlined how this thesis characterizes morality as part of a moral realist approach, it is time to examine how this thesis establishes the most appropriate research design and methodology for testing the evaluative potential of moral realism. A brief background on how this thesis broadly represents an empirical inquiry, and thus employs a descriptive (rather than normative) research design is important to clarify first, since it reinforces the value of moral realism as a tool for understanding foreign policy choices. This also sets moral realism apart from previous contributions towards the classical realist revival that I argue have misrepresented classical realism by seeing it as a form of “disguised” normative theory on the role of morality in international politics.

The above description on the ways to understand morality in international relations summarizes the views largely into deontological and consequentialist camps. As well as having implications for how IR theories conceptualize morality, these differences can denote specific methods of conducting research on morality in international politics. These are what we might call the “is” and the “ought” of IR theory and method. This divide has its origins in the separation of normative and empirical research that gained popularity during the first great debate between idealism and realism, which was particularly present in American IR.26

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26 It is not the intention of this thesis to make any evaluation on the merits of “American” or “European” influences during the history and development of IR theory. For more on this see Stanley Hoffmann’s, “An American social science: International relations,” *Daedalus* 106, no. 3 (1977), pp. 41-60. Nor is it my intention to engage with current critical theory debates on classical European émigré scholars and their role in IR. Instead, my point is to establish how moral realism broadly represents an empirical study. It has especially become
In this thesis, I argue that “ought” implies an inherently normative approach to morality, which can be used to summarize the majority of the contributions towards the classical realist revival. To conduct normative research in IR is to make statements about how international politics ought to be, by placing value on how actors behave, which includes whether their behaviour is right and wrong, good and bad. This type of research is typically guided by an assumption that morality is deontological and represents a set of principles that actors should follow at all times, under all conditions. So, for instance, normative perspectives would argue that international law is a universal good that all actors must follow regardless of the circumstances, and actors ought to do this because they have an inherent duty to adhere to these laws. But, as already established, in an international order still characterized by anarchy, this does not yet occur, and thus the main purpose of normative research in IR is to prescribe how the world can be better.27

In contrast, moral realism makes empirical assumptions. It does not make claims that states should be “moral” because it can lead to certain outcomes, it only describes the factors, conditions and consequences that occur when states include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, and when these appear, morality is more likely to occur in their decision-making, which makes it possible to derive inferences about the position of morality in international politics. Adopting an empirical approach makes sense for an investigation of morality primarily defined by the consequences of states choosing to include it as a factor that furthers the national interest. It also means that moral realism can account for why states can sometimes be seen to include morality in their foreign policy decisions in the one instance, and then fail to do so in another.

27 Charles Beitz argued that the normative purpose of IR theory is to discover moral standards that justify or promote change towards achieving a more equitable and just world, or, in other words, how to achieve progress in international affairs. For more see Beitz, Political Theory of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 1-15.
The design of the moral realist framework: Expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes.

Now that I have defined how moral realism conceptualizes morality and how I aim to position the perspective as following the classical realist tradition, it is necessary to briefly define the three themes of moral realism, which will be discussed in more detail in the chapter that follows. The three themes of moral realism (expectations of reciprocity, rational choice, and moral and material outcomes) reflect a holistic model for testing that is distinct from normative perspectives in a number of ways.

Expectations of reciprocity between states

The first category of moral realism is expectations of reciprocity. An expectation of reciprocity incorporates the classical realist view of considerations of the other. Moral realism argues that when states are seen to include morality by considering the interests of others when making policy choices, they are doing so because of an expectation that it will achieve material benefits in return. Thus, moral realism makes a distinction between acts of altruism that are judged to be moral simply by states performing them, and the motives driving states to act morally towards others. This means that the scope for states to consider morality in their foreign policy choices is actually limited, and only expected to occur when moral choices converge with the state’s pursuit of the national interest. An expectation of reciprocity between states keeps moral realism in line with the view of rationality found in common amongst Kennan, Morgenthau and Niebuhr. This is because the determining factor motivating state decisions is interests, and not an inherent duty or obligation to follow a set of moral rules.

Rational choice in the calculation of foreign policy decisions

This second category is rational choice. The reference to rational choice here is not specifically found in classical realism and is more commonly associated with quantitative economic models like game theory, which have been used to explain instances of state

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28 It is important to note here that in referring to reciprocity as part of the moral realist framework, I am not referring to the same notion of reciprocity put forward by neoliberal scholars like Robert Keohane. For neoliberal scholars, reciprocity is interpreted through the prism of rational states seeking mutual gain. Here, the benefits are determined by mutuality between states according to agreed upon norms and rules. From a moral realist perspective, expectations of reciprocity are determined by a calculation of the consequences for each state (the donor and the recipient) of a particular course of action or policy. This allows a moral realist to consider the effects a policy choice has on the “other” state. For a neoliberal interpretation of reciprocity, see Robert Keohane, “Reciprocity in international relations,” International Organization 40, no.1 (1986), p. 6-8.
competition and cooperation. However, other scholars like Colin Elmen and Michael Jensen have recognised that classical realism included “rational micro-foundations” in that foreign policy is understood to be decided rationally, once the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action have been considered. Morgenthau himself even stated that international politics was based on a “rational hypothesis,” where scholars could deduce meaning from the presumption that all actors acted in a rational manner. Simply put, rational choice, as part of a moral realist framework, explains that morality is contingent on time and place, and hence not expected to appear in state foreign policy calculations at all times. Thus, rational choice neatly follows an expectation of reciprocity, given that states have the option to choose to consider morality during the process of rational decision-making. Moral realism expects that when a state is seen to include morality as a part of foreign choice, they have done so because it was calculated to be in the state’s national interest.

Moral and material outcomes of foreign policy
The third and final category of moral and material outcomes draws out the ability of moral realism to reflect a valuable research tool for foreign policy analysis, and is where this thesis combines theory with practice. Normative approaches have tended to overlook the need to apply observable inferences to testable evidence. But since classical realists emphasised the moral consequences of foreign policy decisions, any approach that attempts to incorporate their views on morality must take into consideration the outcomes of state policy once implemented. Therefore, I argue that moral realism can help understand the results of a state’s decision to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices.

Here again, it is important to clarify that this was not a specific category employed by classical realists, and is one that is particular to the moral realist framework being advanced here. It is an important inclusion because it emphasizes the classical realist concern for the ethic of consequence when making policy decisions that include moral considerations. It does

29 Like reciprocity, the moral realist interpretation of rational choice is different to how a neoliberal scholar would understand it. Rational choice, from a neoliberal perspective, is based on the cost/benefit calculation of states pursuing absolute gains. States pursuing absolute gains are indifferent to the effects their actions have on other states and thus their calculation of expected benefits is based solely on what the donor state is predicted to achieve. A moral realist view of rational choice, in comparison, takes into consideration the effect a donor state’s policy has on the recipient state, which is part of the cost/benefit calculation of the expected benefits. A clearer account of the neoliberal view of rational choice can be found at Keohane, “Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations,” The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. S1 (2002), pp. 307-319.
this by linking policy guided by expectations of reciprocity with whether or not it leads to any moral and material outcomes. In this category, moral outcomes are evaluated on whether the policy actually has an effect in assisting the recipient state, and material outcomes are determined by whether it has any benefit for the state choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. This forms the rationale for exploring the moral realist claims that when moral and material considerations converge as part of a state’s foreign policy choice, it can actually stand to gain material benefits in return.

These three categories form the expectations, calculations and outcomes of a moral realist approach to understanding the position of morality in foreign policy choices. They stop short of the prescriptive theorising found in normative IR scholarship. An emphasis on moral and material outcomes is central to the moral realist framework being proposed because it incorporates the classical realist tradition of moral consequentialism. This is also distinct from neoclassical realism, which generally limits its investigations of morality to how it shapes the perceptions of elites in domestic discourses. The emphasis on reciprocity and rational choice fills an important gap in identifying how the classical realists theorized morality as a concept that is connected to states’ calculation of the national interest, and contingent on time and place. Hence, this is an empirical investigation, and while there is by nature some degree of qualitative analysis, this is also common in the social sciences.

**Method: Single focused case study**

So far I have defined how this thesis conceives of morality as part of the moral realist framework. It has also briefly defined the parameters of moral realism and how this fits broadly within the classical realist tradition of empirically focused research and morality determined by judging the consequences of policy. The next step is to outline how this thesis conducts its research and to what evidence the moral realist framework will be applied.

This thesis employs a discipline-specific single focused case study to construct a modified explanatory tool (moral realism) to understand foreign policy choices that sits at the crossroads of neoclassical realism and the more reflexive cosmopolitan, critical and ES approaches. To do this, I identify three different categories that define moral realism, which are used to explain the position of morality in Australian foreign policy. These are: expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes.
Once the moral realist framework has been established, it is then applied to three different policy arenas of Australia’s foreign policy: aid and development, humanitarian operations and strategic alliances. These policy arenas represent a broad sample of the potential for Australia to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. They encompass one where it is expected to find significant moral outcomes; one where there is an expectation of both moral and strategic outcomes; and one where the literature has expected only strategic considerations will occur. This allows for a more comprehensive evaluation of moral realism that accounts for potential criticism of focusing too narrowly on one policy area, or too broadly on a historical sweep of events.

*Defence of the single focused case study*

Moral realism argues that morality is observable in the state’s calculation of material interests, which means a discipline specific single focused case analysis is the most appropriate fit with the research design, given that morality is not normative. Thus, discourse and content analysis is not likely to yield anything interesting about the nature of morality tied to the national interest. Meanwhile, space constraints preclude the use of a comparative case study that may have shed some more light on the veracity of my claims, but nonetheless would have been too unwieldy for a project of this type. Essentially this thesis is an exercise in applied theory, with the primary purpose of evaluating the merits of moral realism as an explanatory tool.

Australia was chosen as the case study because there has not yet been a study that identified a moral realist framework and applied it to test Australia’s foreign policy choices. A survey of the literature on this reveals that views on morality could be summarized in two camps. On the one side were the ES and constructivists, who argued that it was possible to identify a specific type of diplomacy that is distinctly “moral.” These scholars argued that Australia’s unique geographic position, history of “activist” diplomacy, preference for multilateralism, and acceptance of a rules-based international order, indicated a particularly moral foreign policy. On the other side are the realist perspectives that were found to focus on Australia’s

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32 Together, the ES and constructivist scholarship on Australian foreign policy loosely represent the normative perspectives. Both of these perspectives argue for the importance of international society as a set of rules and norms that guide Australia’s foreign policy. For more see John Donald Bruce (J.D.B) Miller, *The Conduct of Australian Foreign Policy* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1969); Ramesh Thakur, “Australia’s regional engagement,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 20, no. 1 (1998), pp. 1-21; Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australian Foreign Relations* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991); Paul Keal ed., *Ethics and Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992); Alex Bellamy and Marianne Hanson, “Justice beyond borders?
policy responses dictated by the balance of power, and influenced by the relative constraints of being a middle power. For realists, this explained Australia’s need to establish alliances with “great and powerful friends” and to prioritize national resources primarily for the pursuit of its strategic and economic interests, which left little space for the inclusion of morality in Australia’s decision-making.  

The debate between normative and realist perspectives in Australian scholarship has been particularly distinctive in that it was generally resolved by an acceptance that Australian diplomacy could be found to follow the middle-ground or “international societal” approach. Yet, despite this consensus, others like Michael Wesley have argued that Australia’s diplomacy shows a concern for policy consequences that sits uncomfortably with the ES. Specifically, Wesley argued that Australia demonstrated a preference for prudence in constructing its foreign policy, and was generally sceptical of the capacity of institutions and ideas to change or modify state behaviour. This uncovers a gap in the literature which is where I position moral realism: with its focus on moral and material outcomes, as being useful in understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices.

Australia is thus an appropriate case study for what Arend Lijphart, Alexander George, Andrew Bennett and Harry Eckstein have termed “theory testing.” The selection of


34 This characterization of Australian foreign policy and Australian IR in general was first popularized by Martin Indyk in 1985 and has since been made by others such as James Cotton and Richard Devetak. See Martin Indyk, “The Australian study of international relations” in Don Aitkin, ed. *Surveys of Australian Political Science* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985); James Cotton, “Realism, rationalism, race: On the early international relations discipline in Australia,” *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (2009), pp. 627-647 and Richard Devetak, “An Australian outlook on international affairs? The evolution of international relations theory in Australia,” *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 55, no. 3 (2009), pp. 335-359.


Australia as a “most-likely” case for theory testing allows for the examination of a specific set of theoretical concepts (in this case, the three categories of moral realism: expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes) in order to develop generalized observations from specific examples of foreign policy.

George and Bennett’s three phases of theory-orientated case studies is used to examine the evaluative potential of moral realism as a tool for foreign policy analysis. Phase 1 establishes the use of moral realism as a theoretical framework that can interpret the reasons for the appearance of morality in Australia’s foreign policy. In this regard, Phase 1 identifies the gap or inadequacies of existing accounts of the evidence, such as those put forward by the ES and constructivism, and the merits of proposing modified or new explanations. In other words, Phase I establishes the aim of the thesis: to discover whether moral realism represents an appropriate analytical tool for understanding morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices. Once the appropriateness of moral realism as a new explanation becomes clear, this is then used for empirical testing, which is conducted on the case study evidence identified in this thesis as Australia’s foreign policy choices in the areas of aid and development, humanitarian operations and strategic alliances.

Next, in Phase 2 of theory testing, interpretations are made from the application of the moral realist framework to the case evidence. This allows for the authority of an explanation to be enhanced to the extent that the assumptions made by moral realism are found to be more or less consistent with the evidence, or more or less supported by available generalizations. This method has the added benefit of providing scope for “feedback” from observations and insights found from a moral realist examination, which provides the setting for Phase 3. Phase 3 is where the final analysis on the merits of moral realism is made and implications for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices are drawn from the evidence found. Once this process has been completed, I will be able to answer the research questions posed by this thesis, which are:

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37 The three phases are outlined in George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 73-125.
38 Ibid. pp. 73-89.
40 Ibid. pp. 109-125
Primary research question

Is moral realism an appropriate analytical tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices?

This question is supported by two secondary research questions:

Secondary research questions

1. Are moral and material considerations present in Australia’s foreign policy decision-making?

2. Does Australia stand to gain when morality is a part of foreign policy choice?

To answer these questions the thesis employs an array of empirical material compiled from primary sources that include documents from the National Archives of Australia, the Morgenthau and Niebuhr archives at the Library of Congress, as well as the Hedley Bull papers from Oxford University. Archival research is used in combination with other primary sources, such as parliamentary debates, legislation and policy documents, speeches and media releases, White Papers, treaties, and newspaper articles. I also incorporate semi-structured interviews conducted with key individuals within the Australian foreign policy community, as well as secondary sources such as books, journal articles, policy reviews, and seminar and working papers.

Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into 6 Chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the main contributions to the classical realist revival. It begins with normative approaches, and finds that these contributions, by inflating their reflexive and rationalist methodologies, have misrepresented how the classical realists understood morality. It then moves to the realist contributions and finds that these have been limited to neoclassical realists who have remained sceptical about the position of morality in foreign policy choices. I then present the moral realist framework as a realist contribution that more accurately incorporates the classical realist view of consequential morality. Finally, I draw out the three moral realist themes of expectations of
reciprocity, rational choice, and moral and material outcomes. These represent the moral realist framework, which are applied for testing in the empirical cases that follow.

Chapter 2 represents the start of the empirical analysis. This chapter applies the moral realist framework to understand Australia’s foreign policy choices in aid and development. I find that both moral and strategic calculations were present in guiding where Australia’s aid was directed and what types of aid it preferred, which indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely. This strengthened the moral realist claim that states can sometimes gain material benefits from choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. In Chapter 3 the same method is used to examine the motivations and outcomes involved in Australia’s policy towards humanitarian operations. Specifically, this chapter applies the moral realist framework to understand Australia’s decision to adopt a leadership role in implementing the humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste. It finds that in both instances, Australia was guided by a consideration for self-determination, as well as strategic expectations of material gain. This further supports the use of moral realism to understand Australia’s policy towards strategic alliances, which is done in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 I examine the US-Australian security partnership as Australia’s most important strategic alliance, and find that moral calculations as part of an expectation of reciprocity were sometimes present in how both states sought to achieve peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. This indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely and strengthened the potential for material gains for Australia.

Chapter 5 is where I conduct the final analysis. This chapter brings together the evidence found in the empirical cases, and in doing so provides a defence of moral realism in light of the evidence presented, and against potential criticism. I find that moral realism is capable of explaining Australia’s foreign policy choices and thus represents a valuable contribution towards understanding the role of morality in its foreign policy decision-making. Specifically, I find that Australia has been primarily motivated by calculations of expectations of reciprocity in choosing to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. This is supported by the existence of rational choice in informing when, and under what circumstances, Australia chose to include morality as part of its decisions. This indicates that moral and material outcomes were likely, which reinforced the core moral realist claim that when states choose to include morality in their rational decision-making, they can actually stand to gain material benefits in return. The key findings of the thesis and its implications for
understanding morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices are then provided in Chapter 6, which also identifies the potential problems with moral realism, as well as highlighting some avenues for future research.
Chapter One

The return of classical realism: Perspectives on morality, interests and inter-state relations.

International Relations (IR) scholars interested in the concept of morality have recently turned their attention to the way early classical realists understood the concept. This has led to a reinvigoration of efforts to theorise the role of morality in IR, as well as how this can be used to explain the position of morality in states’ foreign policies. In this chapter I chart the various perspectives in IR theory that have contributed to this debate. I begin with an examination of cosmopolitanism, constructivism and critical revivalism. Respectively, these represent the normative, reflexive and critical methods of forming assumptions about the nature and purpose of morality. I also examine the English School (ES), as a collection of perspectives that claim to represent a “moral middle ground” between cosmopolitanism and realism. Within this critique, I pay particular attention to the critical revival as the perspective that has dominated the return to classical realism. I find that these contributions share similarities in how they perceive morality as a set of normative prescriptions, and thus their attempt to revive the work of classical realists has actually led to a displacement of the realist tradition’s core theoretical assumptions.

The misrepresentation of classical realism has not elicited much of a defence from realist scholars themselves. Indeed, a cursory reading of the literature can leave one wondering: where have all the realists gone? Those who identify with a different theoretical school of thought have almost exclusively populated the return to classical realism. Hence, in contrast I propose moral realism as my own contribution towards the return to classical realism. I argue that realist thought can accommodate morality as a dependent variable linked to interest

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41 It is not the intention of this thesis to engage with liberal perspectives, such as classical liberalism and liberal institutionalism (neoliberalism). Scholars writing from these perspectives, like Michael Doyle, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, have tended to overlook the views of classical realism, engaging with them only to make passing critiques. In terms of considering the role of morality in international politics, classical liberalism has generally supported Kant’s notion that states are duty bound to pursue peace and cooperation. Here, morality is a categorical imperative, which has also informed the cosmopolitan perspectives of international relations discussed in this thesis. Thus, a discussion on classical liberalism would not add anything further to an analysis of morality in international politics, or to current debates on the views of classical realists. Neoliberalism, like neorealism, has very little to say about the role of morality, viewing it through the lens of cooperation. And since they shy away from theories of foreign policy, it is irrelevant to a discussion of both classical realism and morality.
defined as power, and that it is possible to observe states choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices that goes beyond simple rhetoric. This means that morality can be viewed as an important factor involved in achieving the instrumental foreign policy goals of states. This in itself is not a new claim. Classical realists have frequently advocated for a morality involved in the rational calculations of a state’s national interest, which is evaluated according to whether it achieves any outcomes. Where moral realism adds to this is in its argument that when moral and material interests are evident, states can actually achieve increased material benefits in return.

To achieve this I then conduct an analysis of the work of Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan, and in doing so draw out three common factors used to construct the moral realist framework. Specifically, I address the expectation of reciprocity between states, rational choice in the calculation of foreign policy decisions, and the outcomes – both moral and material – of foreign policy. This helps reveal that moral realism remains informed by notions of power and interest, and by traditional realist assumptions about the role of the state. This chapter therefore establishes the rationale for identifying the moral realist framework as an evaluative tool capable of enhancing our understanding of foreign policy. This forms the basis of analysis for the empirical cases laid out in the next three chapters.

**Cosmopolitan realism: The classical realist meets cosmopolitanism**

I begin with cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan perspectives argue for the existence of a universal morality tied to the rational capacity of individuals to treat others as “ends.” Applied to international politics, this means that cosmopolitan thinkers, like Charles Beitz, David Held and Andrew Linklater, have typically focused on notions of international justice, international law, self-determination and global citizenship, to argue that states should be guided by the pursuit of a moral order that works above the “morality of states.” For them, increased independence, the global structure of international law, and the advent of Global

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42 To maintain brevity, this thesis will restrict the analysis of cosmopolitanism to those that deal with a universal form of morality within the context of a pluralist state system. This allows for deeper analysis of morality under the critical revival, where notions of a transformative foreign policy agenda and the world state are recurring themes in new interpretations of classical realism made by critical theorists.

Civil Society (GCS), provided evidence of a shift from assessing morality through the prism of the security of the state, to one that focused on safeguarding the liberty of the individual.

Yet despite these attempts to locate a universal morality, the asymmetrical structure of power that has cemented the state as the highest moral and political authority in international relations has been a significant theoretical roadblock for cosmopolitanism. In order to work around this, some scholars have recently argued for a convergence between cosmopolitanism and classical realism.\(^4^4\) Richard Beardsworth, in particular, has argued for a “cosmopolitan realism” that accepts the political reality of global interdependence and engages with an expanded definition of the nature and effects of power.\(^4^5\) According to him, Morgenthau had a differentiated view of power in which qualitative and quantitative aspects were inextricably linked. Therefore, power has an inherently ethical dimension, and cannot be analysed without considering its relationship with various norms, values and morals.\(^4^6\) So rather than representing a fixed hierarchy with hard power at the top and soft power at the bottom, power is horizontal in nature, and can be transformed into a fluid variable that offers actors more choice in deciding what “type” is wielded.

If the properties of power can be shaped according to the political realities of the time, Beardsworth argues that this can be combined with the classical realist acceptance of the concern for the “other” during the struggle for power. Qualitative dimensions of “power as interest” are then defined by corresponding judgments on the quality of its motives. This means that for power to be an effective political tool in the pursuit of interests, actors must evolve from always relying on its coercive proprieties, as negative judgments can lead to consequences for the state’s position in world affairs. Morgenthau termed this quality of power “prestige,” but Beardsworth refers to it as “legitimacy.”\(^4^7\)

\(^4^5\) Beardsworth, “Cosmopolitanism and realism: towards a theoretical convergence,” pp. 81-82. Similar arguments on the use of “cosmopolitan power” in an interdependent world have been made by Giulio Gallarotti, who argued that Morgenthau understood legitimate power to be linked to whether others viewed it as being morally justified. For more see, Giulio M. Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 150.
\(^4^6\) Ibid, p. 82.
\(^4^7\) Morgenthau outlined prestige in the chapter “The struggle for power: policy of prestige,” in *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 69-82.
Legitimacy, from this perspective, is tied to morality through the state’s concern for how its power is received by others. Greater interdependence means the legitimacy of power can be determined as more inclusive when considering the effects political power has on the relationship between states. The struggle for power is reshaped as the struggle for the establishment of principled behaviour that evolves over time. And according to cosmopolitan realism, the social relationship between the individual and the other has progressed as the rate of interdependence increased. Eventually, this means the power structure of the state will give way to some form of world community.

However, in this context morality is not blended with power but conflated with it, tying power to the global legitimacy of states. Like the realist-constructivist adaptations of classical realism described below, this makes it difficult to determine what motivates moral considerations in foreign policy. Cosmopolitan realism assumes that states in search of legitimacy will naturally seek a power that transcends material forces. But Morgenthau, and classical realists in general, argued that ideational components of power were considered second order phenomena, and did not have the capacity to motivate state behaviour on their own. To be effective ideational factors must be supported by material strength, given the mistrust states hold for each other under a system of anarchy. In this environment, qualitative factors wield less weight than quantitative ones in order to ensure survival. And since classical realists also argued that anarchy is a permanent condition, the calculation of hard power interest will always out-weigh qualitative ones of morality.

This calls into question the validity of cosmopolitan realism in its claim that morality is a factor that can transform international politics. The assumption in reframing power to mean legitimacy is that states will be deterred from the use of violence for fear of moral opprobrium, and this reflects a moral good for inter-state relations that will eventually lead to the creation of a stable global community. But this overlooks the classical realist notion that moral principles are dependent on the context in which states choose to include them as part of their foreign policy calculations. Even if it is accepted that international relations is reaching an unprecedented level of interdependence, it is not necessarily given that states will always choose to avoid the use of force, and in some instances may employ force to achieve a

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48 Morgenthau neatly described this in his “Elements of national power,” where he ordered material qualities of power, such as geography, natural resources, military preparedness industrial capacity, as more important than qualitative ones relating to national morale, national character, quality of diplomacy and quality of government. See Morgenthau, “Elements of national power,” in Politics Among Nations 4th ed, pp. 106-158.
moral end, as in humanitarian intervention. There may also be some instances where the state’s use of violence is unavoidable (for example, in situations of self-defence), or to protect an ally. In these instances, the state will only decide on an alternative course of action if it determines that the consequences for the national interest over-rule any benefits gained in return.

The calculation of the national interest is thus important in determining the relationship between power and morality. More broadly, it draws out the problems with emancipatory perspectives, which fail to properly consider the motives compelling states to act in a moral way. Cosmopolitanism understands morality to be normative and best theorized as a prescriptive force where motives are replaced with the inherent duties and obligation states have to protect others. Classical realists, on the other hand, argued that if a state was to consider the needs of the other, over the needs of the self, then there must be a material incentive involved, or, put another way, an expectation of reciprocity that there will be some form of material interest achieved alongside the moral one. Such a difference means that attempts at merging the two approaches will produce the evaluative problems outlined above, and thus provide little in the way of understanding how the classical realists view morality, and more specifically, how one can identify morality in foreign policy choices. Indeed, a similar problem is encountered by constructivism, to which I now turn.

**Constructivism: Moral norms and the mutual constitution of identity and interests**

The advent of constructivism in IR theory corresponded with a general shift away from positivist approaches to international politics after the Cold War. Instead of conceiving events and their consequences through the prism of fixed structures and the relationship between independent and dependent variables, constructivism argues that international relations could more accurately be described by viewing these elements as mutually constituted. Material structures previously thought of as being permanent, like anarchy, could be transformed by discursive processes as they are contingent on the agents’ experiences and perceptions of them. Meaningful behaviour is thus characterized by the intersubjective acquisition of knowledge as actors developed their perceptions and identities by sharing their

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49 The concept of expectations of reciprocity will be examined later in the chapter where I discuss the areas of commonality between the three classical realists. Briefly, it incorporates the limited concept of rationality outlined in the introduction where I describe that it is possible to identify a consideration of the “other” in classical realism.

experiences with others. Social structures have the capacity to shape an actor’s identity and interests, as well as their behaviour, which allows constructivism to represent an alternative to both materialism and rationalism. Together this forms a “socially constructed” approach towards understanding international politics, whereby norms and ideas are important in establishing mutually constituted agents and structures.

Despite the claim to inter-subjectivity, constructivists, and Alexander Wendt’s characterization in particular, have treated interests and identity as separate testable phenomena that have specific roles to play in the process of social construction. This uncovers one of the main methodological flaws in the circular logic that operates within constructivism. In order to overcome the problem of conflating causal relations that reflexivity inevitably engenders, Wendt argued that interests are dependent on identity and each of them has their own distinct causal force, with interests being motivational, and identity being cognitive and structural. In separating identity and interests, Wendt is admitting they are not necessarily mutually constituted, and have quite different uses in explaining state behaviour. This leads one to ask: what, then, is the source of interests and identity if they are not formed through the intersubjective process?

Such criticism has been largely overlooked by the majority of constructivists currently dominating the field that have moved on from Wendt to focus instead on establishing whether ideational factors are significant in shaping state interaction. Specifically, constructivists have attempted to demonstrate that norms have independent causal effects that are separate from interests. Rather than engaging in debates on whether interests and identity are indeed mutually constituted, these scholars examine instances where norms independently guide state behaviour. This has been one of the primary research areas for the


52 Wendt was the founder of structurationism. He argued that the intersubjective process of social construction meant an actor’s perception of a structure and its corresponding constitution of the agent’s identity could change according to changes in shared understanding. Ideas and interests were then mutual constituted meaning constructivism could explain structural change, as anarchy was capable of being transformed through social practice. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p 1.


“social constructivist” strand of constructivism that focuses on arenas of international law, foreign aid, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, human rights and ethnic conflict.\textsuperscript{55}

It is here that constructivism clearly engages with the concept of morality, which is tied to state action in following certain norms.\textsuperscript{56} Constructivists generally begin this argument with the assumption that most states are part of a rules-based international society, and therefore exist in an environment where norms like respect for sovereignty and the rule of law are important in how states construct their foreign policies, and how they respond to global events. In an international society, norms establish the guidelines for behaviour, which can then become the motivation for states to act. Since these norms are the result of social interaction over what is considered “right” for states to follow, they are inherently moral, with the capacity to shape decisions in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{57} Christian Reus-Smit, who argued that states have an inherent moral purpose in conducting their international affairs, developed this view. This moral purpose was formed by tying the state’s identity to the way domestic norms, like those on procedural justice, were constitutive of the state’s political and social structures, which were then diffused into international society.\textsuperscript{58}

The main problem with this approach is that it assumes international society to be inherently cooperative, which limits the explanation of state behaviour to areas where state interaction will produce positive outcomes. This also uncovers the problem of where international society comes from, and how it is constituted. The circular logic of reflexivity means it is difficult to discern whether the state or international society came first, and whether the state constituted the society, or the society constituted the state. The state could just as well develop a moral purpose in waging war as it could in developing non-violent forms of political order, and this point leads to questions as to what motivates societies to identify with the state as the political unit. Here again, the illogics of reflexivist methodologies are


\textsuperscript{56} Wendt himself did not clearly refer to morality, and only briefly mentioned that constructivism had a normative purpose in promoting social change. Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,” \textit{International Organization} 46, no. 02 (1992), p. 417


revealed. Constructivists find this difficult to reconcile, as their ontology is one that disregards both rationality and materialism, leaving the source of what motivates an actor’s behaviour vaguely defined. Thus, a gap exists in conceptualizing the factors that motivate states to form these moral relationships, which then constitute the structures that are needed to maintain them.  

The impossible bridging of the ontological divide: Classical realism via construction.

Recently, constructivists have argued for a synthesis between classical realism and social construction that could bridge the divide between an actor’s motivation and the meaning attributed to them via social construction. Samuel Barkin has argued that a constructivist engagement with classical realists could be useful in demonstrating how these paradigms understood international politics to be socially constructed. Barkin draws on Thucydides, Morgenthau and Edward Carr to argue that these writers viewed human nature as a social practice where individuals ascribed value to power and interests through their interaction with others. In this context, morality is also defined socially as a factor involved in the formation of collective identities.

Barkin is correct to point out that classical realists understood human beings to be inherently social, and this allowed them to make a link between power and morality through consideration of the other. However, the difference is that classical realism saw morality as a factor that strengthened the power of the state, rather than one that could independently motivate it. This distinction uncovers the tension between universal conceptions of morality and the particularism preferred by classical realism. Constructivists see morality as a permissive force that stems from the desire of individuals to achieve self-actualization.

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59 To be fair to constructivists, they are not necessarily concerned with questions like “why are states moral?” and would answer criticism about motivation with the assumption that states learn, through social construction, that it is a social good to be moral. But this is a difficult argument to sustain given that it still requires an acceptance that individuals (and states) have the rational capacity to determine which practices lead to embedded normative standards, and which, from feedback of the group, are considered harmful. This point has also led some, like Amitav Acharya, to claim that constructivist IR has a “liberal” or “cosmopolitan” bias and prioritizes research in universal “western” norms, like human rights, distributive justice, and the just use of force, over others like norms of Islamism, collective rights and nationalism. For more, see Amitav Acharya, “How ideas spread: whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism,” International Organization 58, no. 02 (2004), pp. 239-275. These norms are also considered “good” because recognized principled agents promote them; such as the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which reinforces the liberal hegemony in constructivism.

through their interaction with others.\textsuperscript{61} In this regard, constructivism, like cosmopolitanism, assumes a higher degree of rationality where individuals are born with the reasoned ability to learn, and to develop social norms that reflect good or bad behaviour. Morality, using this reasoning, is inherently tied to ideas that have the independent causal capacity to transcend material constraints and is therefore not exclusively dependent on social construction. Such an interpretation of morality is then left supporting the same assumptions put forward by cosmopolitan approaches, which are deontological, and determine morality by adherence to a set of rules, obligations, rights and duties.

Classical realists, in stark contrast, argued that individuals are motivated to form groups for a shared purpose in achieving security. Over time, these groups develop internal mechanisms (rule of law, and social and political institutions) that regulate the group’s behaviour, but informing this is the pursuit of power that naturally separates societies into distinct “tribes” maintained by the individual members’ mutual interest in survival.\textsuperscript{62} The structural constraints of the relative balance of power mean that morality, while partly social, is contextual, and hence cannot be a factor that motivates an agent’s behaviour across time and place.

This highlights a further problem with reflexive theories: it shows that inter-subjectivity makes it difficult to identify a relational reference that explains why states are moral. It means that in terms of methodology, every action can be perceived as moral as the state is constructed as a moral agent. This leads into concerns about consistency when analysing morality in foreign policy, as it is unclear which factors need to be present to determine when a state is choosing to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. To work around this, some constructivists have argued for a loose convergence between social constructivism and the classical realist view of the relationship between power and morality. Yet the analysis conducted above has demonstrated that these two approaches have fundamentally different ways of conceptualizing this relationship. Classical realism sees this through the prism of the national interest, while constructivism views this through the prism of social norms.


The critical revival: Critical reflections on morality in classical realism

The constructivist and cosmopolitan engagement with classical realism has been brief, with little further being offered outside the initial contributions aimed at renewing academic interest in it as a field of research. The contributions from the “Critical School” of IR theory, however, have been much more comprehensive. They share some similarities with cosmopolitan perspectives, in that some studies focus on positioning morality in classical realism as a factor that embodies progress. Others have been part of a growing wave of post-positivist thinkers who argue that the classical realists’ own values, morals and experiences influenced the way the theory was constructed and how it was used.

Michael Williams was one of the first scholars of critical theory to propose a re-evaluation of how morality is viewed in classical realism, and he has specifically drawn on the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, Thucydides and Morgenthau. Williams has termed his contribution “wilful realism:” a characterization that speaks to his view that these scholars have been misrepresented in their claim to realism. This view can be divided into three parts: scepticism, relationality and power politics. According to Williams, wilful realism is sceptical of the merits of empiricism and self-determination based on ignorance towards the “other.” Key to this re-characterization is the acceptance of the limits of rationality and the recognition of the ability of knowledge to create relational properties in the construction of an actor’s own interests, by understanding the interests and ideas of others.

63 The Critical School of IR theory can trace its roots to the Frankfurt School of Political and Social Research, but gained specific popularity within IR during the 1980s as the discipline expanded to include a more “critical” approach towards the structure and function of positivist theories. The scope of literature claimed under the critical umbrella is much too broad to be given full attention in this thesis, ranging from the Marxists and neo-Gramscian views of Immanuel Wallerstein and Robert Cox, to the post-modern and post-structuralist perspectives made by Jacques Derrida and James Der Derrian. This thesis will instead restrict its analysis to the contributions that deal with morality in specific relation to classical realism.

64 Richard Ned Lebow has also been influential in igniting a return to the moral and ethical aspects of classical realism. He argued that classical realism offered a principled response to how neorealism understood order by combining the pursuit of both ethics and interests in state interaction. Lebow drew on Thucydides, Carl Von Clausewitz and Hans Morgenthau to discover whether it is possible to construct a framework of ethics that is tied to the states interest in pursuing order, rather than through traditional notions of justice. In attempting to do so, Lebow is adopting the reflexive methodology employed by Williams and others who conflate the means and ends of states. Here, there is a lack of understanding as to whether the state views order as the end goal or as a means to achieve their own interests. For more see, Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

within the international system.\textsuperscript{66} Therefore, for Williams, the separation between reason and construction maintained by classical thinkers is a false one, as political and social order is constructed through the interaction of knowledge and experience.

Wilful realism re-castes classical realism as a reflexive doctrine, given that notions of the other are reflected onto the pursuit of the national interest.\textsuperscript{67} In this regard, his contribution follows a similar epistemology to the realist-constructivist merging of interests with morality. But Williams goes further, and applies this to how classical realists understood an “ethic of responsibility,” and its importance in determining foreign policy outcomes. Classical realism views this ethic as being the source of prudence, where an appreciation for the outcomes of a policy guided by the national interest, allows states to exercise both moral and material restraint, thereby reinforcing the importance of rationality in the classical tradition. Wilful realism sees this relationship as a mutually reinforcing discursive practice. In other words, ideas and identity formation are important in shaping actors’ expectations of policy outcomes. The ethic of responsibility, previously understood as a concern for the effect policy choices have on others, is re-constituted into the actor’s own determination of the national interest.\textsuperscript{68}

The entry of reflexive thought into classical realism is open to much criticism, and the most important comes from the classical realists themselves who argued that it was theoretically unwise to conflate morality with the instrumental ends of states. The recalibration of the national interest into an intersubjective process invalidates the evaluative purpose of placing “interest defined by power” as the signpost for mapping foreign policy choices. Methodologically, this allows for consistency in analysing state behaviour, as the national interest is derived from human nature, and therefore not tied to the fluid construction and transfer of ideas. This enables classical realists to present a clearer conceptualization of morality as a second order phenomenon that is linked to the rational calculation of the

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, pp. 169-179.
national interest, and contextually dependent on whether it will achieve certain benefits in return.

**The world state: The normative purpose of classical realism?**

So far I have outlined how some critical theorists have attempted to reinvent classical realism as a reflexive doctrine. Next, I move to consider some of the post-positivist contributions that are now dominant within the revival. I start with Chris Brown who has argued that international relations is currently undergoing a “practice turn”, in which assumptions about how the world works should be drawn by those who have experience within it.\(^{69}\) In order to apply this to a reading of classical realism, Brown has linked Aristotle’s ideas of phronesis (prudence) and habitus (practice) to argue that Morgenthau and Kennan exercised practical reason based on their experience as advisors and policy practitioners.\(^{70}\)

According to Brown, Kennan’s experience as a diplomat stationed in Moscow – and as the architect of the Truman Doctrine – directly shaped the US policy of containment. In looking at Morgenthau, Brown goes further, suggesting that his experience as a lawyer under the Weimer republic was central to presenting political realism as a set of laws on how international politics should operate. This is consistent with other contributions from the Critical School, which merge the views, experiences and values of the observer with their approach to generating theory. This challenges the positivist framework of rational theories of IR, as the accumulation of the observers’ experiences is translated into practical knowledge on how state behaviour ought to be, and not how it is.

This re-interpretation has gained significant momentum in critical perspectives, with an emerging group of scholars claiming that realism is a theory of “moderate” progress (or more specifically one that outlines steps for global reform).\(^{71}\) Campbell Craig has argued that the core American realists – Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kenneth Waltz – were primarily guided by a normative purpose in arguing that the best way to achieve international security is in the

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\(^{70}\) The influence of Aristotle on Morgenthau has also been the focus of contributions made by Anthony J. Lang. For more see his *Political Theory and International Affairs: Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle’s: The Politics* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004).

absence of war. According to Craig, these scholars were conscious of the effect their perspectives had on public debate and, as a result, frequently made “judgments” on the state of international affairs from their own set of “good” and “bad” values. This was most obvious during the Cold War, when the fear of thermonuclear war was present in both public and academic discourses.

The American Cold War project of building a thermonuclear arsenal to deter Soviet expansionism, a policy strategy that Morgenthau, Waltz and Niebuhr supported, accelerated the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union. Yet Craig states that by the end of the 1950s, these scholars had come to question their support of this policy and their confidence in the explanatory power of realist theory. In particular, they demonstrated support for the possibility of a new world “leviathan,” as the only means of maintaining international peace and security. This prescriptive change was the result of what Morgenthau viewed as the impossible choice between advocating for the US to engage in a limited war with the Soviet Union and risk nuclear annihilation, or the US surrendering its superpower position and admitting defeat. Faced with these decisions, Craig argued that Morgenthau began to stray from his original assumptions that war is the result of the self-interested pursuit of power embedded in human nature, and instead determined it as a consequence of competing ideologies.

Similarly, Craig has argued that Niebuhr viewed war as the outcome of a sinful human nature that sorted individuals into “good” and “evil” categories. Here, he claimed that Niebuhr saw the US acquisition of the H-bomb and its potential use against the Soviet Union as a “just” policy action by a peaceful regime against an aggressive one. Hence Niebuhr and Morgenthau came to advocate a normative approach because they viewed war not as the pursuit of the national interest, but as a result of totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Such a normative understanding of foreign policy could not be reconciled with

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73 Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Waltz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). pp. 6-7. As I have mentioned, this thesis does not engage with neorealism and it is somewhat perplexing that Waltz is viewed in the same context as Morgenthau and Niebuhr who had quite different ways of understanding international politics, the former a structural realist, and the later two classical realists.
75 Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Waltz, p. 81.
the prospect of nuclear war and, as a result, both Morgenthau and Niebuhr suggested that a transformation of the international order was the morally and instrumentally preferred policy option.

But viewing classical realism this way has arguably led to a misinterpretation of what these scholars understood to be the end goal of rational decision-making: the national interest. To begin with, Morgenthau and Niebuhr were not concerned with whether war was good or bad, and therefore came to see that it should be avoided. For them, war was sometimes necessary, but should be chosen as the last resort because it led to instability and insecurity in the international system. A policy that heightened the risk of war when it could have been avoided was also foreign policy folly, as it increased the potential threats to the national interest. Indeed, they both argued that foreign policy guided by particular ideals (like the spread of democracy or human rights) led to moralizing, often to the detriment of the national interest. Hence, they were vocal critics of US involvement in Vietnam and were concerned about the creeping influence of democracy promotion as part of the Truman Doctrine. And while they did cloak their arguments in normative terms in order to sell their views to policy elites and the wider public – a point Craig himself admits – this did not affect their theoretical approach. Indeed, Morgenthau cautioned scholars to resist this temptation:

The human mind tends naturally to identify the particular interests of states, as of individuals, with the moral purposes of the universe. The statesman in defence of the national interest may, and at times even must, yield to that tendency; the scholar must resist it at all times. 76

In spite of this, others have since added support to the reform agenda of classical realism. Perhaps the most notable has been William Scheuerman, whose own contribution has been termed “progressive realism.” Like Craig, he draws on Morgenthau and Niebuhr, as well as Carr and John Hertz, to expand on the realist logic of world government. Scheuerman also begins where Craig left off, in that he argues for a reinterpretation of how these scholars understood the national interest, the balance of power and the nature of international order. 77


77 Scheuerman has also produced work that traces the intellectual development of Morgenthau in order to strengthen claims that he was “an uneasy realist.” According to Scheuerman, Morgenthau’s early career as a left-leaning lawyer and President of the Labor Law Court in Frankfurt during the Weimer Republic influenced
First, in relation to the national interest, he has argued that classical realist scholars were acutely aware that in an increasingly interdependent world, nations had to move beyond the narrow calculation of the self-interest. Technological advancement and growing economic and military interdependence meant the territorial divide between national and global interests had become harder to define, charging states with a greater moral responsibility to consider each other’s interests. In this regard, classical realists saw more flexibility in determining the national interest than what the fixed pursuit of power would allow. In other words, the national interest could be transformed alongside changes in the international order. And, over time, greater interdependency of national interests could lead to the emergence of a world community.

A more flexible national interest allows for a re-evaluation of the balance of power. Sheuerman suggests that Morgenthau and Niebuhr both agreed there were limits to the ability of the balance of power to preserve peace. The anarchy of the international system meant competing states could never be certain of their power calculations when it came to assessing their relative capabilities. Hence the security dilemma would always drive states to maximize their power, making the notion of an equilibrium within the international system an inherently unstable mechanism for achieving peace and security. This is why, according to Scheuerman, classical realist’s left room for the possibility of “institutional change” in achieving international order, as a way to compensate for this limitation. The current distribution of power (in the form of competing sovereign states) could potentially be replaced by a configuration of larger, and qualitatively different, units. And much like Craig’s analysis, Scheuerman takes this to mean support for the evolution of a world state as a more effective means of maintaining international order.

Yet both Craig and Scheuerman overlook the classical realist focus on rational calculation of the national interest. It might very well be the case that a state chooses to pursue global interests, for instance, in committing resources to humanitarian intervention, but this will always occur within the context of what gains can be expected in return. Even if it is accepted

his views on the potential for global reform and the development of a world government. For more see Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond* (UK: Polity Press, 2009). This work is useful in understanding the nuances of Morgenthau’s thinking, particularly in relation to the scholar’s knowledge of moral and legal theory. However, since Scheuerman focuses exclusively on Morgenthau and largely fails to link this to the assumptions held collectively by classical realists, it is not of value to this study.

79 Ibid. p. 33.
that the system itself can accommodate a transformation, as Scheuerman and Craig claim, this is unlikely to ever be achieved, because faced with situations where the necessity of the self-interest clashes with more lofty notions of world governance, states, according to classical realists, will always choose the former over the latter.\textsuperscript{80} This means that in the end, Scheuerman and Craig fall into the same trap as the constructivist and cosmopolitan interpretations of classical realism, in that they conceive morality normatively, and conflate this with the states’ national interest when determining what motivates them to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices.

Such a misreading of classical realism becomes clearer when applied to specific cases of foreign policy. Scheuerman has argued that the US, under President Barack Obama, has demonstrated potential in adopting a progressive realist foreign policy approach. Yet his evidence for this is based on speeches and interviews where the President referred to Niebuhr as a key influence in shaping his view on America’s role in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century.\textsuperscript{81} Absent is any reference to instances of foreign policy to suggest Obama is pursuing global reform. If this was provided, Scheuerman would probably find that – unlike his predecessor – Obama has been a much more pragmatic foreign policy realist, keenly aware of the limits in pursuing change in the international system, especially when charged with safeguarding the national interest. To demonstrate this, one only needs to look at the extensive list of foreign policy choices during his first three years in office (the time Scheuerman was writing). In his first

\textsuperscript{80} Much of the literature on the classical realist world state has been in response to revisions of Morgenthau’s \textit{Politics Among Nations}. The development of nuclear weapons led to increased debate on the merits of democratic peace and the need for a “world state” and “global community” to maintain international peace and security. Morgenthau’s participation in this debate was the addition of two chapters to \textit{Politics Among Nations}: “The World State” and “World Community.” In these chapters Morgenthau outlined the conditions for a world state, which must be supported by a world community. Many, like Scheuerman and Craig, have taken these additions as proof positive that Morgenthau supported the creation of a world state as the best way to ensure peace in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. These chapters are perhaps the most misinterpreted writings of Morgenthau. The two chapters, and parts of the subsequent chapter on diplomacy, are really highly sceptical of the potential for states to accept limitations on their sovereignty as a precondition for the creation of a world state. Morgenthau also argued that it was unlikely that national societies would accept a transfer of security from nation-states to an over-arching world authority. More pointedly, he argued “international peace through the transformation of the present society of sovereign nations into a world state is unattainable under the moral, social, and political conditions prevailing in the world in our time.” For more see Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations} 4\textsuperscript{th} ed, pp. 483-517.

year, Obama directed a troop surge in Afghanistan and increased the US’ use of drone strikes in northwest Pakistan. By his third year he had ordered the extra-judicial killing of Osama bin Laden, carefully crafted the US “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific, and signalled to American allies that they can expect a greater share of the responsibility in maintaining international peace and security, evidenced by the US strategy of “leading from behind” during the NATO-led intervention of Libya.  

In terms of areas where the US indicated a change in foreign policy, such as re-engagement with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the commissioning of the first Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR), these were done with the usual consideration of the hard power national interest involved. Increased cooperation with the ICC demonstrated reputational benefits by signalling US support for the international criminal law regime after criticism of its policies on Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs). However, this did not amount to any real change in US foreign policy, with the US participating in the annual Assembly of State Parties at The Hague only as an observer, and Obama stating that the US had no intention of re-signing the Rome Statute or submitting the Treaty for Senate approval. Likewise, the QDDR was a reflection of the need for the US to rely more on allied support or “burden sharing” in the areas of crisis management, conflict resolution and nation building. This was a foreign policy approach that elevated development and diplomacy alongside defence, in other words: “leading through civilian power”; and provided added support for US interests post-withdrawal of its military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

84 BIAs or Article 98 (2) non-surrender agreements of the Rome Statute were prominent during the Bush Administration. 102 agreements were signed guaranteeing the non-surrender of any US national from any state party to the Statute. During negotiations the US would often threaten to cut military and economic aid to the recipient nation if they resisted. This practice, introduced in the fiscal year of 2005, as the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818), dubbed the “Nethercutt Provision,” was not renewed by Obama when it came up for executive approval in March 2009. This ended the tying of US approval for foreign assistance to the signing of BIAs. The US has not negotiated any further BIAs since Obama took office in 2008, but all of the existing agreements remain in force. For more see the Americans Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court “The Obama Administrations evolving policy towards the international criminal court,” (2011) Available at: http://www.amicc.org/docs/ObamaPolicy.pdf (accessed 23 May 2014)
did not indicate a deeper shift towards an accommodation of so-called “global interests” in the making of US foreign and defence policy.

This demonstrates that while notionally being critical of universal theorizing, critical perspectives still maintain an emancipatory bias that tie state action to orders of morality that are outside the national interest of the state. This is visible in the more reflexive approach undertaken by Williams, and the post-positivist critiques employed by Craig and Sheurman. These scholars fundamentally misrepresented the way classical realist scholars understood the role of morality. Classical realists were wary of assigning states the ability to follow prescriptive abstract moral principles. Likewise, they were also critical of perspectives that attempted to locate morality by incorporating the observer’s own personal values and morals.

**The English School: Presenting a “moral” middle ground?**

This thesis will now discuss the various positions of the ES in order to counter its claims that it represents an extension of the classical realist view of IR.\(^{86}\) The ES is seen to occupy an uneasy place in IR theory. This depiction was best epitomized by Roy Jones’ call for the School’s closure, while simultaneously being the first scholar to define it as a distinct School of IR.\(^ {87}\) It can trace its intellectual lineage back to the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, and the works of Martin Wight, Adam Watson, Herbert Butterfield and Hedley Bull.\(^ {88}\) But scholars largely associated with other approaches, such as Barry Buzan, Andrew Linklater, Ken Booth, Ian Clark and James Der Derian, have also claimed ES affiliation.\(^ {89}\) This has led to some confusion as to what body of thought characterizes an ES perspective, and an internal divide within the school itself as to how to categorize the order of

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\(^{88}\) The Committee met three times a year for nearly three decades. Butterfield, Watson, Wight and Bull each held a Chair and over its thirty years of meeting published papers, essays, monoliths and books from the contributions of nearly 50 writers. For a more detailed history of the Committee see Brunello Vigezzi, *The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-1985): The Rediscovery of History*, transl. Ian Harvey (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 2005).

international society: whether as a world order (and therefore solidarist); or an international order (and therefore pluralist).\footnote{90}

However, despite this, it is possible to locate a starting point for how ES scholars understood the role of morality in international politics. Generally the School is classified as charting a moral middle ground between liberalism and realism, hence the label “Liberal-Realism” to describe its theoretical approach. This is mostly attributed to the work of Bull, and his oft-cited book, \textit{The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Affairs}.\footnote{91} Bull developed the concept of a regulating “international society” that moderated power politics in an anarchical system. In doing so, he presented an alternative framework for understanding order that was seen to go further than realism in its engagement with notions of justice, yet stopped short of the morally prescriptive views of Kantian liberalism.

In order to understand how this view on the nature of anarchy and the role of morality has shaped contemporary ES scholarship, it is useful to turn back to the British Committee. Following the end of WWII, realism’s (and particularly American realism’s) emergence as dominant framework in IR prompted criticism from several, mainly British, intellectuals that IR theory had taken a distinctly pessimistic turn. Indeed, this was the motivation behind Martin Wight’s seminal essay, “Why is there no International Theory?,” which argued that international relations lacked the philosophical richness found in political theory because it failed to include perspectives on the “good life.” \footnote{92} The Committee made contributions that sought to correct this by referring to the advent of human rights norms, the increased role of international institutions, greater interdependence and the establishment of mutual alliances.\footnote{93}

\footnote{90}{The search for solidarity in the ES literature has prompted an extensive 95-page bibliography of key works. This was commissioned by Buzan and consisted of 150 different writers split into three categories: central figures, regular contributors, and participants. For more see “English School: a bibliography.” Available at: www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/english-school/english-school-bibliography-feb-12.pdf (accessed 25th July 2013).}

\footnote{91}{Bull, \textit{Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics} (London: Macmillan, 1977).}


\footnote{93}{The edited volume by Butterfield and Wight is considered the defining text produced by the Committee, which included inputs by Michael Howard, D.M. Mackinnon and G. F. Hudson. These scholars outlined their views on natural law, the values of the international society and the type of orders that defined international society. For more, see Butterfield and Wight eds., \textit{Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics}.}
For these scholars, state interaction formed more than a zero-sum game analysed through the narrow prism of power as interests, and instead formed a cooperative society of states guided by a set of rules, laws and norms. More broadly, the research agenda of the Committee was to distinguish a body of thought that was concerned with more than describing the structures and forces of the international system, and could engage with broader questions on whether it was possible for actors to achieve both order and justice. Realism, with its focus on anarchy, was ill-equipped to consider the ability of states to pursue goals that were outside the realm of power and interests. Likewise, at the opposite end, the idealism of normative approaches placed too much faith in the capacity of individuals (as well as states), to represent their own moral compass. This left the ES with empiricism as its approach towards understanding morality, since its members were largely hesitant to make moral prescriptions about the role of states, and argued instead for their responsibilities as creators and managers of the order of international society. Empirical approaches towards morality within the ES drew their assumptions from natural law empiricists like Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf who argued that morality, like the natural world, could be observed and learnt through experience. Empiricism could explain why and how an international society of rules and laws had developed between states, despite their tendency towards conflict, by referring to their learnt experience in understanding that war should be avoided, and cooperation is preferable.

A great deal of the ES literature has also been occupied with the Grotian tradition of international order, which includes empirical assumptions about natural law, but also incorporates Wight’s views on rationality, the protection of individual liberties and the just use of force. The Grotian tradition in ES was first characterized by Wight who argued that it was in fact a rationalist approach, as it acted as *via media* between realism and revolutionism. According to Wight, Grotian rationalism accepted the state of nature, but also accepted that individuals were able to act reasonably towards each other. The international order was characterized by the pluralist state system dictated by the balance of

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95 Cochran, “Charting the ethics of the English School: What “good” is there in a middle-ground ethics?” pp. 203-225.
97 It is important to note here that the characterization of “Grotian rationalism” is Wight’s own characterization, which confuses the acknowledged empiricism Grotius is generally argued to have followed. Natural law empiricists were actually quite critical of an individual’s capacity for reason and instead abided by the notion of a “blank slate.” Individuals are essentially socialized into understanding what is right and wrong, good or bad.
power, which was inherent in nature and reflected a social fact. Thus, from this perspective, states were constrained by common rules derived from natural law. The focus on natural law as the source of international societal order links the ES with cosmopolitanism, as acts are considered moral if they conform or adhere to the laws of rational nature.

Bull was actually rather sceptical of the Grotian tradition, seeing it as conflating natural law with morality. As a study of his papers reveals, he was particularly critical of international law and the UN as the creation of these entities presupposed international solidarity, which made universal agreement the only effective means to obtain any moral authority to act in response to global insecurity. Given the anarchical nature of the international system and the internal structure of the UN itself, this was a near impossibility. More tellingly, in response to a publisher’s criticism that his *Anarchical Society* should include a separate chapter on the role of international institutions, he wrote:

I am very reluctant to do this because 1) as explained in the Introduction, I prefer to deal with international institutions under other headings rather than in a chapter devoted directly to them; 2) to treat the UN etc., as a factor making for order comparable with those to which the chapters are devoted in Part II, would be contrary to the general thesis of the book; 3) I am not very interested in international organisations, and do not have anything profound to say about them.

In this regard, he was similar to Morgenthau who, in response to a question on the UN and its capacity to promote human rights stated: “I have a tendency to deal only with important matters and so I leave the United Nations out.” Bull was also critical of scholars that he thought were too preoccupied with identifying the principles of just and un-just wars, and found the arguments that drew on Thomas Aquinas problematic. Here again, he demonstrated his distaste for arguments about natural law, since wars fought based on being “just” according to law dictated that only one state could be seen as following them. Therefore, “the

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99 Ibid.
protection of the law cannot be afforded equally to both parties.” And since the “interests of the society of nations requires victory of the side representing the law,” the only form of justice possible was essentially “victors justice.”

This challenges ES scholars who argued for the moral authority of international law, while still maintaining the existence of a pluralist state system. For them, the spread of common values amongst states created a relationship between duty and blame. Over time, international society developed a “moral force” that denoted a subjective condition of duty where states judged that others may be more vulnerable in their ability to interact in world affairs, and this vulnerability implied an obligation to act. This was then used to justify the ability of states to “intervene” when others were unable to help themselves.

Such a view has been the basis for arguments in support of the use of force to uphold human rights. Debates on humanitarian intervention proliferate through the various (and varied) literature of the ES. Here, scholars such as Timothy Dunne, Nicholas Wheeler and Alex Bellamy have focused overwhelmingly on building a case for the legitimacy of an international society that is independent of the sovereign state system, and has its own causal force. These scholars turned to Wight to argue that the current organization of international society was out of balance in that the same body of international law, which cemented human rights, also cemented the right of states to sovereignty and non-interference. The balance of power limited moral behaviour to the boundaries of the state and pulled the principle of state sovereignty further away from the moral duty to protect individual freedoms. And the moral purpose of international society was to correct this by reaching agreement on when it was justified to overrule the principle of sovereignty, and move it closer to the moral order that upholds individual rights.


103 Ibid. pp. 56-57

This characterization of international society inevitably leads to moralizing in state behaviour and the creation of “norm entrepreneurs,” as states are charged with selecting when and where intervention will occur against another state that is deemed to act immorally. Since states still operate in an environment of anarchy dictated by the balance of power, they will naturally consider their own interests above the interests of international society. The ES does argue that order comes from anarchy, through the behaviour of states that have agreed on certain standards of diplomacy, but these standards are mostly procedural, like following the laws governing the use of force, and do not relate to why states are motivated to follow these norms, and what happens when these norms clash with the interests of the state.

In most instances, states are found to act against gross human rights abuses when their interests are aligned, thereby selecting which norm (whether that be for instance the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the non-use of chemical weapons or the prevention of genocide), suits their interests at the time. Even if states were motivated solely by moral duty, it does not follow that they will always have the capacity to perform the actions necessary to achieve a successful intervention. In this regard, the moral obligation to act can sometimes impose a set of prescriptions on states that they can fail to properly fulfil, and a failure to achieve policy goals can have negative consequences on both the moral and material structures of international society.¹⁰⁵ As discussed earlier in relation to cosmopolitan perspectives, this argument rests on the existence of a set of agreed norms that all states accept as the standard for behaviour. A focus on whether states follow certain rules and laws overlooks the reasons why states are committed to upholding them. Some solidarist scholars, like Dunne, have drawn on constructivism to argue that states are “socialized” into accepting the principles of international society.¹⁰⁶ But this still does not address the motives of states in choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. In the end, solidarism confuses the means and ends of states, viewing the process that states follow when committing a moral act as the same as the end goal.

Bull held a somewhat different view. He argued that moral action stemmed from behaviour that occurred between states and could be analysed by identifying patterns from this behaviour. The condition of anarchy dictated that the balance of power restricted

¹⁰⁵ There may indeed be examples where the national interest and the norms of the international society align, and this can lead to benefits for both the state and the international society, but this still does not explain what compelled states to follow those norms in the first instance.
¹⁰⁶ Dunne, “The social construction of international society,” pp. 367-389
participation to the boundaries of the state and overtime their interaction produced a mutual recognition of co-existence. Therefore, the sovereign state system was essential to maintaining order in international society:

The great virtue that the states system has in relation to other possible forms of universal political organization is that a consensus in favour of it – however tentative – actually exists. If it were to break down under strain it might well be replaced by a neomedievalism or any other form of political order, but by a slide into chaos.\(^\text{107}\)

The independence of states afforded individuals certain protections that would have been difficult to achieve under a single government. Hence Bull supported pluralism and moral diversity over the establishment of any world or moral authority.\(^\text{108}\) The stability of the sovereign state system allowed for a general consensus to be made on what were the accepted rules and practices of international society. These then regulated the effects of the states search for power by conditioning states to exercise restraint. In this way, international society was quite limited and was dependent on the actions of states in agreeing to maintain and sustain it.\(^\text{109}\) It did not have the independent capacity to motivate states to pursue morally right policy goals. Therefore, international order was characterized by moral skepticism, as the norms of international society did not normatively prescribe state behaviour, which appears to place Bull closer to the assumptions of classical realism.

Yet Bull also argued for the existence of a certain type of “moral consensus” created by a select number of states that had a higher moral purpose, which went beyond the concern for their own actions in maintaining international society. Specifically, he argued that the great powers were bestowed with special rights and responsibilities in upholding the principles of international order.\(^\text{110}\) As the main contributors to the structure of the international society post-WWII, they had a distinct moral obligation to “right” any perceived imbalance. This


\(^{108}\) This further demonstrates the difference between Wight and Bull on how they viewed morality. For Bull, morality stemmed from behavior that occurred between states whereas Wight argued that an international society ruled by normative interaction would eventually transform into a world society. Meredith Thatcher and Coral Bell eds. *Remembering Hedley* (Canberra: Australian National University E-Press, 2008). Available at: [http://epress.anu.edu.au/hedley_citation.html](http://epress.anu.edu.au/hedley_citation.html) (accessed 1 February 2014).


\(^{110}\) Ibid. p. 196
meant that not only were these nations charged with the maintenance of the society, they were also responsible for any breakdown in its order.

The observations above now places Bull closer to solidarism, in arguing that since the great powers had the capacity to act, they also had an inherent duty to do so. As mentioned, this imposes a set of expectations on states that they are unlikely to ever fully achieve, given that the pursuit of power will outweigh any moral concerns for the stability of the international society. This, however, does not automatically dismiss instances where states (including the great powers), will consider acting in response to issues that affect international society. Rather, it means that this will always be motivated by the achievement of self-interested ends, and determined by whether the perceived benefits exceed the costs involved to the state’s resources, which is where moral realism departs from the ES in arguing that the primary motivation is the interest of the state, and not, in the first instance, the order of international society.

To summarize, Bull sat variously between rationalism and realism, which places him squarely in line with the British empiricism that originally informed the philosophical outlook of the School. Indeed he stated that his own view:

> Rests on the element of consensus in the actual practice of states, and it is on this rather than “human reason” that (in common with other contemporary “Grotians”) I rest the case for taking international society seriously. 111

Regardless, the solidarist stream has moved the ES closer towards the emancipatory agendas found in cosmopolitanism. Their view of morality is primarily normative, prescribing how the rules and laws of international society can represent norms on what states should do rather than what they can, or are willing to do. Such a conclusion demonstrates a disconnect between morality and its dependence on national interests that does much to counter claims

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111 This indicates that Bull also had a tendency to misrepresent Grotius as “rationalist” rather than a natural law empiricist. Hedley Bull Papers, “Letter to Social Science Editor Shaie Selzer of Macmillan Press,” Box 8, File 3, 14th November 1975.
that the ES represents the “natural succession” of classical realism within contemporary debates of how they understood morality in international politics. ¹¹²

**Neoclassical realism: Morality, norms and domestic discourses**

This chapter has so far focused on normative approaches towards the classical realist revival, and examined where they have misrepresented the classical realist understanding of morality. This section engages with contributions by realists – and specifically neoclassical realists, who represent the most contemporary classical realist perspective. It finds that neoclassical realism does not go far enough in capturing the emphasis on consequential morality by classical realist scholars. In particular, neoclassical realism fails to consider the position of morality in producing moral and material outcomes. This is important as the theme that distinguishes moral realism from current realist interpretations. After the critique of neoclassical realism, I then conduct my own analysis of key classical realist scholarship. In doing so, I identify more thoroughly the areas of commonality between Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan that subsequently show how this thesis conceives its moral realist framework.

The neoclassical turn in realist IR theory made room for the influence of first- and second-image factors in tying systematic forces to foreign policy outcomes. Such an approach enabled realism to reclaim the analytical integrity critics argued was absent from it following the failure of structural perspectives to predict the end of the Cold War. Rather than viewing anarchy as a constraint on the actions of states, neoclassical realists argued that it was a permissive force, which provided states room to develop their own unique approach to world affairs. Neoclassical realism opened the “black box” in order to make the methodological leap from a theory of international relations to a theory of foreign policy. In doing so it claims it can account for the presence of both material and non-material factors in foreign policy decision-making. ¹¹³

Neoclassical realism notionally achieves this by positing the state as the unit of analysis that connects systemic factors with domestic affairs (*Innenpolitik*). It has also expanded on classical realism by pointing to social resources like norms, rules and laws as important in

¹¹² Little, “Revisiting realism and the balance of power,” pp. 21-45

justifying policy decisions. These points of difference allowed neoclassical realism to assume states' foreign policies reflect rational choices, applying the causal force of relative power to politics at the inter- and intra-state levels. As a result, the distribution of power (as the independent variable) has the capacity to shape both morality and interests. This was an argument best represented by William Wohlforth and Steven Brooks, who stated that ideas change when material conditions do. Therefore, to explain the end of the Cold War, an examination of what prompted Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking was necessary. But rather than it representing an attempt to change the constitutive ideas of international society – as a constructivist approach would claim – it reflected a need for Gorbachev to address the massive economic power imbalance between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

However, the ability of neoclassical realism to make a connection between structural forces and the selection of potentially moral foreign policy responses is at times tenuous. This is, in part, reflected in the emergence of various different “strands” of neoclassical realism. Here, it is possible to identify three different types: orthodox, semi-orthodox and revivalism. The more conservative strands of neoclassical realism are close to Waltz, placing an emphasis on how states respond to systemic pressures. Considerations of morality are only useful to explain instances where elites made foreign policy decisions that appear to work against structural forces, as some have suggested occurred when the George W. Bush Administration launched the 2003 war in Iraq. The semi-orthodox, or middle ground approach, still holds structural forces to be the independent variable, but places a greater emphasis on non-material factors as “intervening” on policy in response to international stimuli. This

117 Tudor Onea identified these three strands in his article, Tudor Onea, “Putting the ‘classical’ in neoclassical realist theories and US expansion in the Post-Cold War,” International Relations 26, no. 2 (2012), pp. 144-145.
118 This type of neoclassical realism was supported by Randall Schweller. For more see Schweller, “The progressiveness of neoclassical realism,” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds. Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 311-349 and Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006)
119 For more on non-material factors as intervening variables on elite foreign policy choices, see Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro eds. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
incorporates contextual factors like timing and place to explain foreign policy behaviour in the absence of direct threats. Viewed this way, non-material factors are thus only helpful as tools to construct foreign policy at the domestic level, and have no added analytical value.

Revivalism, as put forward by Tudor Onea, claims to go further in arguing that the interaction of different polities needed to be considered when analysing foreign policy choices. This goes beyond the comparative analysis of economic and military capabilities favoured by conservative neoclassical realists, and includes the geopolitical position of states, the historical relationship between them, and the perception and capability of elites to accurately predict the behaviour of others. From this perspective, anarchy allows for more strategic diversity and might account for why states can seem to be motivated by multiple foreign policy goals (for instance, to gain a material advantage or to garner international prestige).

On the surface, revivalism appears to incorporate considerations of the “other” and ideas of reciprocity championed by classical thinkers. Yet in reality, this follows the already established neoclassical realist readings of foreign policy. The state remains the individual unit whose behaviour is dictated by the balance of power, and norms are tools for elites to shape foreign policy choices. It does not demonstrate how the state’s perception of interdependence represents a qualitative variable that could explain both moral and material outcomes. For instance, Onea used it to argue that the US policy of expansion after the Cold War was shaped by its interaction with the other great powers, as well as the shared perception of policymakers that it must maintain its leadership of the normative international order. He pointed towards US involvement in the First Gulf War and its push for the Dayton Accords as evidence of Washington’s desire to cement America as the “indispensable nation.” At the time, the US had been subject to international criticism by its European allies, which had an impact on how it conducted its foreign policy on issues of geopolitics and human rights. Therefore, perceptions of other states matter, but rather than viewing this as a domestic factor intervening on foreign policy choices from the bottom up, the qualitative measures of strategic interaction supervene from the top down.

120 Onea, “Putting the ‘classical’ in neoclassical realist theories and US expansion in the Post-Cold War,” pp. 152-156
121 Ibid. p. 152
122 Ibid. p. 153
The effect of this may be to move neoclassical realism away from focusing on domestic variables such as regime type, demographics and policy process. In doing so it arguably moves closer to the views held by the some social constructivists: it still treats morality normatively, but as a rhetorical device that supervenes on policy choices at the unit level. The point here is that neoclassical realists generally maintain systemic forces as the independent variable and view non-material factors, like morality, as a normative prescription about how states ought to act. And thus evidence of it in foreign policy decision-making is generally thought to contribute to greater uncertainty in the anarchical international system. This means that neoclassical realism accepts the consequential action of states and the function of morality as separate testable factors. Notions of morality only reflect the ability of elites to “sell” policies, and cannot be counted as state interest variables that lead to specific outcomes.123

Yet surely morality can go further than this: whereas a neoclassical realist would see Australia’s recognition of Timor Leste’s sovereignty (for instance) as a rhetorical device rather than a purposive strategy, one could argue that this was an example (amongst many others) of a convergence between moral and strategic objectives. On this basis, it may be possible to discern a much more “moral” realism as a way to understanding foreign policy choice. It is to this task that I now turn.

Towards a moral realist framework: Re-examining the “classics”

Classical realists argued that an approach that viewed morality independently of interests was unsatisfactory. At worst it decoupled morality from statecraft, rendering moral arguments as mere rhetoric to legitimate policy for domestic and international audiences. At best it did little more than explain why states sometimes make miscalculations, choosing value-laden paths dictated by “popular passions” over more sober policy made on the basis of rational egoism.124 Indeed, rather than putting morality into a separate normative analytical basket, classical realists deliberately framed their positions on morality within debates about the struggle for power. Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Kennan all dealt with the same question: whether the struggle for power was an empirical end, and hence embedded in human nature,

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or whether it was the means that derived from processes inherent in the creation of society.\textsuperscript{125} They also left room for moderation, law, order and justice, arguing that such moral factors had specific social faculties, and because the state was the highest form of social order they were also important in decision-making. According to Morgenthau, “universal moral principles, such as justice and equality” could only guide political action “to the extent that they have been given concrete content and have been related to political situations by society.”\textsuperscript{126}

Methodologically, this means that the relationship between interests (A) and morality (B) can only be understood by examining the moral and material outcomes that flow primarily from A. In contrast, rationalists merely state that A (interest) is not B (morality). This represents both the main methodological and theoretical problem with deontological morality. In arguing for the independent power of morality to explain how states ought to shape their foreign policy, rationalists and (some reflexive theorists) must also argue for the existence of empirical facts in order to justify the use of cause-and-effect analysis. In this instance, morality becomes a casual necessity used to both describe and prescribe state behaviour. As outlined earlier, arguing for morality in foreign policy according to necessity is theoretically difficult in an anarchical international environment where evidence supports the notion that states are primarily concerned with the pursuit of power.

Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Kennan – the philosopher, the political scientist and the policy practitioner – recognized this empirical reality and broadly argued for a consequentialist morality as the best possible account of morality in foreign policy that is constrained by the state of nature. Each of these scholars reached this conclusion in a slightly different way, but were nonetheless united in seeing morality as a factor linked to the state’s pursuit of power, which can then be assessed according to the consequences it is likely to produce. To provide some context as to how I draw out the moral realist framework, I will now briefly discuss how each of these scholars understood the place of morality in IR.

Niebuhr did recognize the existence of a certain type of morality operating above the state, but an imperfect human nature meant a universal form of it was impossible. As a theologian


\textsuperscript{126} Morgenthau, \textit{American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination} (New York: Methuen, 1952), p. 34.
and a political scientist, Niebuhr’s views on morality were heavily informed by Judeo-Christian ethics, as he argued that the pursuit of national interest could be moderated through the maxim “do unto others as you would have done to yourself.” He also privately felt that the highest expression of morality for rational beings was “mutual love” – or acts of giving and receiving between parties of equal worth. Yet he also acknowledged that this level of mutuality was unattainable in an international system composed of states with unequal material capabilities. Thus, a morality guided by reciprocity and evaluated by its consequences was the best way for states seeking to include it in their foreign policy choices. In his words, this reflected a necessary compromise since “a rational ethic seeks to bring the needs of others into equal consideration with those of the self.”

Kennan saw the role of morality somewhat differently. For him, anything moral to come out of American diplomacy that had produced the strategy of containment was centrally tied to US interests in Europe, and the need to balance against Soviet influence. This was best illustrated in his initial enthusiasm for the Marshall Plan, which neatly blended moral considerations for the security and development of Eastern Europe with US interests in stopping Soviet expansionism. In terms of conceiving morality, Kennan argued that an agent’s perception mattered in foreign policy decision-making because leaders tended to seek outcomes that they filtered through the prism of their own moral choices. But while an agent’s moral compass mattered, statesmen should be cautioned against relying solely on judging moral acts according to one’s own moral code of what is good or good, because this led to miscalculations in foreign policy. Kennan therefore made a distinction between the morality of individuals, who have the luxury of being principled actors, and the morality of governments that are foreign policy agents, and have a greater moral responsibility to protect


128Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 57.


130Kennan was one of the architects of the Marshall Plan after he was hired by Secretary of State George C. Marshall to head the Policy Planning Staff, a think tank charged with identifying the foreign policy issues facing the US, and how it should approach them. He came to be a critic of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan which he argued had become guided by liberal notions of the “democratic peace,” rather than by the achievement of the US’ economic and strategic interests. Kennan, Memories 1925-1950 (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), pp. 322-324.

the national society. Applied to whether a government should include moral considerations, for example, in intervening to protect others, this must be determined by whether it is in the interests of the nation and considered according to the consequences of acting versus the consequences of inaction.

Morgenthau, meanwhile, was closer to Kennan than Niebuhr in his scepticism about a statesperson’s ability to advocate for a morality as part of foreign policy that was divorced from his or her own ethical values. He argued that Niebuhr’s method of viewing morality reflected an incomplete road map for evaluating contingent political action that was dependent on time and place. When moral principles were applied to the realm of politics he saw them as useful only in the context in which they were called upon to operate. Instead Morgenthau emphasized the consequences of power for morality, and saw little room for a moral code operating above and outside the nation-state. Hence, he argued that morality was always a second-order factor in shaping foreign policy choices. He was criticized for advocating an immoral or amoral foreign policy, and for highlighting that moral factors are always at risk of being overruled in situations of necessity, with morality sacrificed for the preservation of the state. But in fact he and Niebuhr agreed on the importance of reciprocity and moral consequences in foreign policy, given the constraints of what is understood today as strategic interdependence.

The classical realists were correct to identify the logic of consequences – or the outcomes of policy decisions – as superior analytical tools. This is because transferring the moral characteristics of the individual to the state is a risky theoretical exercise. Morgenthau was particularly concerned with the methodological flaws in relational conceptions of morality that required the state to have self-reflexive properties, in which morality remained tied to the

132 Kennan, “Morality and foreign policy,” p. 208
133 Ibid, p. 209.
establishment of values. From an empirical perspective this relationship could only be understood if the moral action was predetermined to have a connection with a valuating subject. For instance, the idea that democracy promotion can be a preferred moral policy outcome comes about because it has already been tied to notions of right and wrong. The relationship between object and agent is tautological: in the same example above, democracy is good because it is moral and moral because it is good. This also demonstrates the dangers of conceiving morality as an ideology. Here the words of Morgenthau are useful:

Morality as an ideology makes it appear as though the interests and policies of an individual nation were the manifestations of universal moral principles. The part aspires to become the whole, and there is very little to counteract that aspiration. It is not so much morality, which limits individual interests, as it is the individual interests, which identify themselves with morality.

This is one of the many reasons why classical realists opposed the US intervention in Vietnam. Even contemporary realists associated with structural approaches were against the war in Iraq, which they perceived as moralizing. Anatole Lieven made this point in connection to the War on Terror (WoT), in which he foresaw that notionally “global” American values, presented as the reasons for US anti-terrorism policies, would come to be perceived as neo-imperialism. He has taken this further in his more recent work on Pakistan concerning the need for “developmental” realism. In doing so he is focusing explicitly on outcomes, in which morality in foreign policy choices must be evaluated relative to whether or not they advance a state’s material interests.

For Morgenthau, “the juxtaposition of the morality of political moralism and the immorality of the national interest is mistaken. It operates with a flawed concepts of morality”. See Morgenthau, “The mainsprings of American foreign policy,” p. 854.

Morgenthau Archives, “Towards a theory of international politics,” Lecture Series Texts Box no. 170, file no. 1, p. 23


The realism of Morgenthau, Kennan and Niebuhr was less interested in ascribing specific weight to morality. It was more heavily influenced by temporal and spatial conceptions of reality, in which various moral codes might operate at any given time. According to classical realists, morality did not produce causal “chains” of events whereby A causes B, and B causes C. Instead, they argued that it could be understood through causal sequences. This is based on the idea that all reality can be observed as sequence of cause and effect. Here, morality is seen as an interlinking factor that is part of how states calculate what policy is in their best interest, which is assessed according to whether it produces any real benefits. This means that morality may not always be present, and hence is not observed as part of a transformative chain where it is responsible for the overall end result of policy. But, at the same time, classical realists also saw that the placement of moral considerations into a separate analytical space to interests might not adequately capture how the two can interact:

There exists of necessity a relativism in the relations between the moral problems and foreign policy that one cannot overlook. This relativism is two fold. It is a relativism in time [...] when certain principles are applicable in one period of history and not applicable in another period of history and a relativism in terms of culture -- of contemporaneous culture -- in that certain principles are obeyed by certain nations, by certain political civilizations, and they are not obeyed by others.

This is why Morgenthau in particular was careful to include morality as a motivational force associated with the qualitative components of national power. According to him, “a foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles.” A morality in foreign policy derived from a

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147 Morgenthau outlined in his “elements of national power” the importance of quality of government, quality of diplomacy, national morale and national character, all of which included moral aspects. The quality of diplomacy and quality of government was guided by the need for governments to gain consent from the public for its foreign policy choices, and to achieve this government’s needed to include moral considerations to appeal to domestic audiences. Likewise, national morale and national character was linked to how governments acted in times of war and peace. For more see Morgenthau, “Elements of national power,” in *Politics Among Nations* 4th ed, pp. 106-143.
calculation of the national interest, as opposed to one that is derived from moral principles, is morally superior because it allows for greater consistency in how states act. Human nature dictates that states will always act in the national interest, and this is the only reliable signpost for understanding state behaviour. Of course, what states determine to be in their national interest may vary. For instance, a state may prioritize a relationship with a particular trading partner to be in its economic interests. Similarly, it may pursue an alliance partnership in order to achieve its national security and defence. However, while the type of interest being pursued varies, the end goal remains the same: the national interest. Tying morality to the interests of states can lead to problems of moral relativism, where all action conceived in the national interest is determined to be moral. As I discuss in more detail below, this is why classical realists also argued that morality in foreign policy must be evaluated according to the consequences it produces.

The analysis above has demonstrated that one can identify a distinct strand of classical realism that focuses on morality and its connection to material interests, and which preferences the logic of consequences. The identification of a moral consequentialist theme in classical realism is important to counter claims that what I am proposing here is still a traditional reading of political realism where states are primarily guided by the pursuit of the national interest and make foreign policy decisions according to whether it will maximise their power. The moral realist framework put forward in this thesis is not a rejection of these core realist claims, nor is it a revision or rewriting of classical realism. I only seek to show that an appreciation for morality in IR theory and foreign policy has always been present in classical realism and that it is possible to develop a moral realist framework from the views of these classical realists, and may even contribute to current debates on how best to conceive of morality in international politics. What then, specifically, might a moral realist view of foreign policy look like?

As I have mentioned already, there have been few attempts by realists themselves to articulate a moral realist position that reflects the views of the classical realists. Lieven has emerged as a champion of what he first termed “ethical” (and now “developmental”) realism.

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And others, such as Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, have put forward a potential moral realist research agenda that identifies a role for morality within the motives of states seeking to maintain international stability during times of change. But while this work has been valuable, the preliminary nature of the moral realist research project means that it has been mainly concerned with eking out basic commonalities on the place of morality in the classical realist literature. Hence the primary purpose of the next section is to present how I conceive of a moral realist framework, which can then be used to understand the potential for morality as part of Australia’s foreign policy in the case analysis.

Building a moral realist framework: Expectations, choices and foreign policy outcomes

When constructing a framework for moral realism, three themes are significant. First, classical realists focussed heavily on expectations of reciprocity when states develop their foreign policies. This acts as a bridge between morality on the one hand, and interests on the other. Put simply, considering the reactions of a target state to one’s intended choices constitutes action that is inherently moral. Second, morality can only be observed if we assume that states are capable of rational choice in calculating their foreign policy decisions. Although there has been much debate on the rational actor model, even amongst realists themselves, rationality was nonetheless central to classical realist thought. Finally, and as a result of this, it is possible to identify outcomes that are both moral and material. In other words, rather than viewing these as dichotomous, it is possible for states seeking to act morally to engender material gains as well.

Considerations of the “other:” Expectations of reciprocity between states

I begin with expectations of reciprocity because classical realists saw it as the factor that connected morality to interests. Both Morgenthau and Niebuhr pointed out that foreign policy is often constructed upon expectations of reciprocity at either the bilateral or multilateral

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150 Here, these scholars also turn to Edward Carr to argue that those states that seek to achieve a material gain from a particular order must make concessions to weaker nations in order to maintain it. This is not a straight principle of equality, but an ethic of responsibility that lies with both status quo and revisionist powers. Power and morality are not mutually exclusively and it is within the purpose of power to maintain order during instability in the international system. This means the national interest contains objective and subjective properties, or both power and principle. Such a way of conceptualizing morality is not particularly novel and this proposal commits the same errors identified previously when moral responsibility is placed exclusively on the great powers, as those that have the power to utilize their resources, and therefore have an obligation to do so. For more, see Sten Rynning and Jens Ringmose, “Why are revisionist states revisionist? Reviving classical realism as an approach to understanding international change,” International Politics 45 (2008), pp. 19-39.
levels of diplomacy. For these scholars, understanding the notion of reciprocity begins with considerations of the “other” that is tied to the basic classical realist assumption that individuals are both rational and social. Human nature is primarily defined by the struggle for power in an environment of scarce resources, which inevitably places self-interest as the key motivator for action. Yet this struggle for power does not occur in isolation. Every individual strives for power, meaning the aspirations of one individual naturally impinge upon the aspirations of another. This power dynamic results in the struggle against being used as the “means” by which others pursue their own ends. Thus, the balance of power can be seen to act as a check on an unrestrained human nature. According to Morgenthau, not only does this act as a limitation on power; but over time it leads to the creation of a certain moral order where a system of rules, ethics and laws exist that guide human behaviour more “objectively than the inner mechanics of power politics could do.”

In this context, the mutual experience in being subject to the whim of others converges to create an understanding that to survive in an environment of finite resources, one must be aware of how one’s behaviour affects the security of others. Morgenthau states that a concern for the interests of the other reflects the inherently dualistic moral and political nature of man:

Every man is the object of political domination and at the same time aspires toward exercising political domination over others. His back is bent under the political yoke, yet while he bends down he must be aware of somebody, at least in his imagination, who bears the yoke on his behalf. Man is the victim of political power by necessity; he is political master by aspiration. It is this aspiration, which drives him toward obscuring the fact of his political dependence, and giving it an ethical justification.

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For Morgenthau, self-interest was tied to morality in such a way that it reflected a curious dialectic whereby “the latter in spite of itself prevents the former from escaping its judgment and normative direction.”\textsuperscript{155} Individuals are still motivated by the desire to advance their own interests first, but in tying morality to the means involved in the struggle for power, there is limited room for progress through human rationality. This can be found in the expectations of reciprocity that he saw as underlying all social relations. Of course, it is not always the case that individuals will consider the well-being of others as part of these expectations. Reciprocity in this instance only requires that individuals develop a certain standard of behaviour that they would then have applied to themselves.\textsuperscript{156} In the realm of international relations, this does not imply consent: it only implies the rational capacity of states to seek a common ground on what course of action might be of mutual benefit. Morgenthau’s understanding of reciprocity stopped short of considering the potential gains by nations in pursuing this policy. However, when expectations of reciprocity are combined with the classical realist focus on policy outcomes, this can be taken further so that – in some circumstances – it is possible that states can actually gain material benefits when they choose to adopt reciprocity as part of their foreign policy choices.

Of equal importance to reciprocity itself is that it forms part of states’ expectations. The similarity between Niebuhr and Morgenthau on this point is uncanny, given that both came up with almost identical positions independently. Niebuhr saw morality as being connected to a broadening of the national interest that included an appreciation for the interests of other states. This was not always inherent in national interest calculations. Instead, like Morgenthau, Niebuhr’s conception of this was of a complex relationship between what he termed “mutual interests” and self-interest. Such a view attempted to lay bare the problems faced by more orthodox realist approaches that sought to separate the two into “high” and “low” politics.\textsuperscript{157} A state’s moral commitment to foreign aid, for example, brings with it economic advantages that are primary to the national interest. This means that both the moral and material considerations that inform these two sets of foreign policy goals are explicitly

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, p5.

\textsuperscript{156} At first glance this sounds similar Kant’s categorical imperative. Individuals treat others how they want to be treated because they have the inherent ability to see them as “ends.” This is different to what I am arguing here as classical realists primarily viewed the other as a means to achieve their own self-interested end. However this does not mean that in some instances, and under certain conditions, states do not have the ability to seek mutual interests when it is calculated to be in their benefit. The main difference then is that Kantians see the other as a necessity whereas classical realism does not.

linked, and separating them for methodological convenience is incorrect. Niebuhr understood this to mean that the highest form of morality possible occurs when states are governed by the “wise apprehension of concurrent interests,” rather than by sacrificing universal interests for the higher interests of the state.\textsuperscript{158} Prudence, therefore, is a modest but important indicator of progress in human reason that blends an appreciation for the limits of rationality embedded in nature, as well as sympathy for the tribalism that primarily dictates state behaviour.

To demonstrate this Niebuhr emphasized the existence of a mutual “bridge” between the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War, whereby each party recognized a shared responsibility not to wage nuclear war. Here, the collective interest was not served by a direct cause-and-effect relationship between each actor’s primary intentions. Rather it was viewed as a corollary, resulting from each state’s rational desire to survive. In this respect, expectations of reciprocity validate a core assumption of moral realism: that there are constraints on the possibilities of human nature. The convergence between partial and universal interests strengthens those views, which “emphasize the importance of the residual freedom of human rationality.”\textsuperscript{159} This reinforces the classical realist’s view of a limited rationality that can accommodate a consideration of the other, but only when there is an expectation that it will achieve the state’s interests.

In international relations this means that states still exist in an anarchical arena characterized by strategic competition. This said, international anarchy does not automatically preclude the existence of mutual interests, especially if we accept the logic of strategic interdependence. Using the example of foreign aid, it is unlikely that partnerships would form between states of equal power. Instead, they tend to be between strong states acting as patrons, and weak ones adopting the role of recipients. Some scholars would argue that this gives rise to notions of clientism, patrimonialism and even neo-imperialism. Yet this misses the point that most wealthy states are generally seeking to engender positive development outcomes by being aid donors. According to both Niebuhr and Morgenthau, the giving of aid is a political act, deriving from the national interest. As a result, aid has both strategic and moral benefits in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{158} Niebuhr Archives, “The moral issue in international relations.” \textit{Speeches, Articles and Books}, Box. 16, File unknown.  
\textsuperscript{159} Niebuhr, “Idealist and realist theories,” p. 82.}
that the giving of aid, in some instances, can improve the living standards of the recipient, and achieve the strategic goals of the donor.  

Choosing morality: The importance of rational choice in calculations of foreign policy decisions

The notion that morality is contingent on the effects of reasoned action informs the second key assumption of the moral realist approach articulated here: rational choice. As noted above, Niebuhr argued that a consideration of mutual interests in foreign policy reflected the surest conception of morality in state decision-making, but the necessity of self-interest and the limits of human rationality prevented this from being universally realized. This means that whether or not a state includes morality, as part of its foreign policy decisions is contingent on a calculated and rational choice to do so. It was here that both Morgenthau and Niebuhr outlined their distaste for political action based on notions of a universal morality or one that is derived from an actor’s own “good” intentions. Political actors have a distinct moral responsibility to act wisely that goes well beyond their personal moral aspirations. In other words they should act in accordance with the national interest. Foreign policy must first be defined in strategic or economic terms: a policy determined solely by moral principles is “a policy of national suicide” because it makes the transformation of international society the primary achievement, rather than the fulfilment of the national interest. Moralizing in such a way also leads to miscalculations in foreign policy decision-making that can render decisions both morally and materially defective. Hence any “universal” moral standard leaves little room for compromise as “one can compromise on the national interest, but one cannot compromise on principles.”

And yet contrary to the accepted wisdom on this topic, Morgenthau did not actually deny the existence of a universal morality. In fact, he argued that universal moral principles do exist, but pointed out that they cannot be applied to the behaviour of states in their abstract form. In this regard he differentiates between his views and the cosmopolitan ones discussed earlier, in that expectations of reciprocity are not universally realized by all states at all times and cannot be viewed causally, nor can they independently drive state behaviour. Instead, their

160 Morgenthau Archives, “Foreign aid for political purposes,” Lecture Series Texts, Box 1973 File. 5.
163 Ibid. p. 210
inclusion in foreign policy decisions must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of
time and place. This is an important distinction to make, as it strengthens the process of
rational calculation by allowing for the “weighing of these principles against the moral
requirements of concrete political action, their relative merits being decided by prudent
evaluation of political consequences to which they are likely to lead.”

Here again both Morgenthau and Niebuhr agreed that material capabilities, such as the
exercise of military power, are ineffective when unsupported by a strong moral and political
base. Along with Kennan and Walter Lipmann they were critical of America’s irreverence
towards Asia, which was seen as threatening its prestige. According to them, US foreign
policy during the Cold War had little regard for the cultural and social upheavals plaguing the
continent, preferring instead to focus diplomatic efforts on solidifying perceptions of its
superior military might. As a consequence, and like a policy determined primarily by moral
principles, policies undertaken solely as shows of force increase the risk of miscalculation.
For instance, Niebuhr argued that the contempt displayed by the US for India’s relationship
with the Soviet Union was misplaced, since New Delhi’s behaviour was motivated by a
developing state’s desire to “hedge its bets,” and not as a demonstration of support for either
communism or communist regimes. This episode was broadly consistent with
Washington’s general approach towards Asia, which severely damaged America’s ability to
develop strong relationships in the region, as well as encouraging a view of the US as a neo-
imperialist power.

Although he was not entirely at home with political philosophy, and more inclined to foreign
policy analysis, Kennan’s views on morality help establish the limits of reciprocity. Kennan
agreed with Niebuhr that US policy was being guided by a “legalistic moralist” approach that
was underpinned by an over-reliance on moral and constitutional schemes, with little concern
for the effect this style of diplomacy had on other states. He argued that American foreign
policy should be guided by the awareness that its own interests represent the limits of what

164 Morgenthau Archives, “Another great debate: the national interest of the United States,” Lecture Series
Texts, Box 98, File 3, p 988.
165 Niebuhr, “The limits of military power,” in Earnest Leafer ed., World Crisis and American Responsibility
Niebuhr on Politics: His Political Philosophy and its Application to Our Age as Expressed in his
can reasonably be achieved in its relationships with other states. Kennan followed Morgenthau and Niebuhr in understanding the constraints of human rationality, and the dangers – both moral and material – in devising policy based on universal ends. In the example of Asia during the Cold War, US policy reflected the sin of pride (for Niebuhr), or hubris (for Morgenthau and Kennan). Instead, they argued, a show of humility in dealing with prospective alliance partners would have yielded more success in shoring up long-term support for US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, President Barak Obama has adapted this style of diplomacy as part of the “pivot” towards the region, especially given that US alliance partners are expected to accommodate increases in military presence, in exchange for continued regional stability and security under a policy of offshore balancing.

The benefit to a state from including morality as part of its foreign choices is therefore often long-term rather than transient. It is also the case that the expected returns from this cost-benefit calculation may not always be provided by the recipient, and this can be described as “indirect reciprocity,” where second-order factors such as prestige can enhance the function of a state’s resources. This is particularly visible in the creation of alliance networks, where individual states realise they can stand to benefit by trading off asymmetrical wants for more lasting security.¹⁶⁷ Thus, when expectations of reciprocity are included in the rational choices of states they can bring coherence to domestic debates, and assist elites to sift good decisions from bad ones. Consistency and coherency in foreign policy reduces the risk of miscalculation and increases the likelihood of obtaining material gains in return.

The material benefits of choosing to include morality as a part of foreign policy choice: Moral and material outcomes of foreign policy

An expectation of reciprocity outlined how classical realists saw morality connected to states’ interest and rational choice outlined how they understood morality to be contingent on a state’s rational calculation in choosing policy. It is insufficient, however, for a moral realist framework to stop here and only describe the expectations of actors and the means by which they operate. Any useful framework for foreign policy analysis must take into consideration the outcomes of policy once they are implemented. Hence I argue that moral realism can assist our understanding of the results of foreign policy by connecting motives to outcomes.

This draws attention to the third and final theme in a moral realist framework: the potential for both moral and material outcomes to stem from policy choices.

As has been discussed above, Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan were united in their consequentialist approach to understanding morality in foreign policy choice. Morgenthau was particularly clear in this respect. He argued that:

There can be no morality without prudence, that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics.\(^{168}\)

Morgenthau’s views on moral consequences echoed Machiavelli’s notion of prudence as the highest moral value for states guided by the self-interest. Niebuhr was a little less clear on this, with some debate as to whether his Christian ethics meant he understood morality to be deontological, but evaluated through the consequences to which acting morally might lead.\(^{169}\) Despite this debate, Niebuhr still argued that when it came to interaction between states, the best possible form of morality was one that considered the consequences of policy choices.\(^{170}\) Likewise, Kennan argued that the inconsistencies of personal moralities amongst elites meant claims of states acting morally must be judged on the behaviour of states in deciding to include it as part of their foreign policy choices.\(^{171}\) In other words, morality must be evaluated by the consequences of policy decisions.

Classical realists preferred a morality characterized by the results of foreign policy because it properly accounted for the effect policy choices have on others, and minimized the type of moralizing which they cautioned would lead to negative or unintended consequences for both the national interest, and for any benefits achieved by the recipient nation. Hence, this theme

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\(^{168}\) Morgenthau, “A realist theory of international politics,” in Politics Among Nations 4\(^{th}\) ed, p. 10. The focus on weighing the consequences of moral action was also outlined in the less cited, but equally important to understanding Morgenthau’s views on morality, Scientific Man versus Power Politics where he described his distaste for “perfectionist ethics,” which attempted to argue that individuals infinite capacity for reason meant human nature was perfectible. For more see Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1946), pp. 202-203.

\(^{169}\) This debate was best outlined by Mark Hass in “Reinhold Niebuhr’s “Christian pragmatism”: A principled alternative to consequentialism,” pp. 605-635.

\(^{170}\) Niebuhr, “Foreign policy and moral problems,” in Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political Philosophy and its Application to Our Age as Expressed in his Writing, pp. 332-334.

\(^{171}\) Kennan, “Morality and foreign policy,” p. 209.
draws together the previous factors of reciprocity and rational choice in that a state’s expectation of achieving benefits in return for including morality as part of their foreign policy choices is premised on what outcomes such a policy is likely to produce, for both the state and the recipient. The classical realists did not specifically outline moral and material outcomes as part of their approach, and this is where I seek to expand on classical realism by positioning moral realism as a perspective that can connect state interests with policy outcomes, which can then be tested by foreign policy evidence.

A moral realist approach naturally focuses on the outcomes of foreign policy decisions because it is mindful of changes in the structure of the international system, and accepts that anarchy makes conformity to prior moral standards an impossibility. The nature of strategic interdependence dictates that morality has relational properties when it is exercised by an actor, and then has an impact on the state the policy is aimed at affecting. Against this setting morality can be viewed as a means of reinforcing structural properties, which can lead to certain benefits for states. Moral realism also accepts that it may not always be necessary for a state to be concerned with both its own position in the international system, and with the position of others. For example, a state could simply opt not to give foreign aid. Conversely, it could choose to take into consideration the needs of other states in providing economic and social development, when doing so could bring material advantages. Relative gains are still a distinct possibility, but elites can determine that small concessions might lead to enhanced material payoffs (for example, in shoring up alliance support, or in smoothing diplomatic relations towards the signing of Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs)).

Evidence of both moral and material outcomes is important because it establishes the central empirical claim of moral realism: that when states choose foreign policies that are both moral and instrumental, they can sometimes stand to gain material benefits in return. This can be more significant than if they had acted out of altruism alone, or equally from a desire to engender relative gains. In the case of weak actors, for instance, the prospect of state failure, commonly found in debates on the use of force for humanitarian purposes, can create further insecurities and security dilemmas. Spillover effects of poverty, instability and political violence thus create both moral motivations to ameliorate them, as well as strategic and economic interests in promoting stability. In some cases, this can also lead to material

outcomes in reconstruction contracts, increased trade and business links, as well as closer
defence cooperation. Therefore, when moral and material outcomes appear, moral realism
expects there to be evidence of a material gain in return for the state.

It is important to note again that moral realism as conceived of here is not explicitly
prescriptive. It does not advocate that states should consider morality in every calculation of
its national interest and, like the example of aid above, it may choose not to intervene to
protect human rights if the consequences from doing so are considered too high. It is also the
case that a state may reap benefits that were unexpected and not necessarily linked to the
motives determining its decision to act morally. The problem of unintended consequences is
one that has been extensively debated, in both moral philosophy and IR theory. From a
moral realist perspective, unintended consequences can interfere with the logic of linking
expectations of material benefits with moral and material outcomes. A state may, for
example, be found to participate in humanitarian intervention because they expect some
strategic benefit and any positive effect on the recipient state is an unintended advantage.
Comparatively, it might be the case that the intervening state has the interests and welfare of
the recipient as factor contributing towards its decision to intervene, and yet the intervention
may fail, leading to negative consequences. This means that a moral realist argument must
demonstrate a connection between an expectation of reciprocity and moral and material
outcomes before a proper evaluation of morality in foreign policy decisions is made.

Australia’s decision to intervene in the Timor Leste crisis is a good example to illustrate how
moral realism can address the problem of unintended consequences. As will be shown in
more detail in Chapter 3 on Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations, its decision
to use force in response to outbreaks of violence after the Timorese referendum for
independence from Indonesia was contingent on the expected consequences this policy was
going to produce. At the time, Australia was criticized for not intervening before the vote as

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173 For a select list see Jonathan Bennett, “Morality and consequences,” The Tanner Lectures on Human
Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007); Bernard
and Cornelius Friesendorf, eds. Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences
(Routledge: New York, 2010); and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Unintended consequences: Does aid
evidence indicated further conflict was inevitable following the referendum. But it had not yet secured the approval of Jakarta, and intervening without it would have been considered an act of war. This could have increased the potential for unintended consequences and led to unacceptable loses for Australia in severely damaging its most important strategic relationship, and not achieving much either in the way of ensuring peace and security for Timor Leste. When it did receive Indonesia’s consent, and the agreement of key Southeast Asian nations to join its multinational coalition, Australian decision-makers expected positive outcomes, both moral and material, which increased the likelihood of material gains. Moral evaluation as part of the category of moral and material outcomes is thus very much consistent with the classical realist concern for an “ethic of consequence.”

Together, expectation of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes establish moral realism as an empirical approach that is rooted in the traditions of classical realism. The focus on the consequences of moral policy makes the perspective distinct from other classical realist perspectives, like neoclassical realism, which still conceives of morality normatively and only important as a factor that shapes the perceptions of elites in domestic discourses. The emphasis on reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes fills an important gap in identifying how the classical realists theorized the position of morality in connection with the national interest, which is then evaluated by the expected moral and material benefits. Yet moral realism also goes further than the classical realists in stating that when states choose to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, they can sometimes stand to gain material benefits. Most importantly, this means that moral realism avoids making normative prescriptions about how states ought to behave, placing it firmly within the classical realist method of theory generation and application.

**Understanding Australian foreign policy: The case for moral realism**

Now that the themes of moral realism have been established, it is necessary demonstrate why Australia is a useful choice as the most likely single focused case study. There have been a number of thematic and chronological surveys attempting to identify a distinct type of “Australian” diplomacy. Realism and the ES have been the main theoretical contributions. Realist scholars have argued that Australia’s foreign and security policy has

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175 Martin Indyk was one of the first Australian scholars to sort Australian international relations scholarship
have been primarily concerned with maintaining the global balance of power and have highlighted the explanatory power of its alliances with “great and powerful friends.” William Tow, Coral Bell, Paul Dibb, Thomas Bruce Millar and Desmond Ball have been the key proponents of this view.\(^\text{176}\) They leave little room for the possible role of morality in state decision-making and have instead prioritised Australia’s ability to advance its strategic and economic interests in the face of potential threats.

ES perspectives, in comparison, have presented Australia as a revisionist power that sought to benefit from pursuing a normative international order. Scholars and policy practitioners such as John Donald Bruce Miller, Ramesh Thakur, Bruce Grant and Gareth Evans have argued that Australia’s size and wealth in natural resources, combined with its distinct activist diplomacy, meant it had the capacity to achieve more on the world stage.\(^\text{177}\) They pointed

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towards Australia’s history as an advocate for small and middle powers, its preference for multilateralism, and its role in international institutions as evidence of its ability to “punch about its weight” in resolving both regional and global conflicts. These scholars argued that Australia’s comparative affluence and geographic position in a region of developing states meant it had a responsibility to act as a “Good International Citizen” (GIC). This was not only the morally right approach to pursue; it was also one that would ensure Australia’s broader security and economic interests as an active participant in international society.

The combination of GIC and the pursuit of material interests has led to the commonly-held view that Australia’s foreign policy is best understood by referring to Bull’s “international society” approach. ¹⁷⁸ And yet despite this, Michael Wesley has argued that in the mists of the tug-of-war between the realists and rationalists, a certain amount of moral scepticism and appreciation for the consequences of policy choices has been maintained that sits uncomfortably with the Grotian-inspired rationalism of the ES.¹⁷⁹ In this regard, the realist-rationalist divide in Australian scholarship has been unique in that it does not appear to have followed the traditional “great” debates within the discipline of IR.¹⁸⁰

This makes Australia a most-likely case for the application of moral realism, as there is already evidence to suggest that morality has played a part in shaping Australia’s foreign policy decisions, but there has not yet been any work that applies a moral realist approach. Having strengthened the rationale for Australia as an empirical case, it is now prudent to justify the selection of aid and development, humanitarian operations and strategic alliances,


¹⁷⁸ As mentioned, Martin Indyk was the first to identify Australian scholarship as fitting within the English School. Others have since expanded on this claim. See, for instance, James Cotton, “Realism, rationalism, race: On the early international relations discipline in Australia,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (2009), pp. 627-647 and Richard Devetak, “An Australian outlook on international affairs? The evolution of international relations theory in Australia,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 55, no. 3 (2009), pp. 335-359. Devetak argued that it was impossible to identify a specific brand of Australian IR, however, he did concede that the Grotian principles of interdependence and respect for rule of law and norms was consistent across a broad range of Australian scholarship.


¹⁸⁰ Jim George has made this point in reference to the lack of interest in IR by Australian scholars. For more see Jim George, “International relations theory in an era of critical diversity” in Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke and Jim George, eds. An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 39.
as the policy arenas examined to answer the primary research question posed at the outset of this thesis.

**Australia’s foreign aid and development policy**

Australia has an established history of being a principle aid donor, being in the top 15 of aid donors based on Gross National Income (GNI). Yet despite this, there has not been a serious and systematic examination of the motivations and outcomes of Australia’s foreign aid policy from a moral realist perspective. Indeed, there is a general lack of substantive research within the literature on foreign aid that considers the potential link between motivation, and moral and material outcomes. Examinations of a country’s foreign aid policy have been centred on providing evidence to demonstrate the explanatory potential of Recipient Need (RN) versus Donor Interest (DI). This has often been done alongside studies focussing on what type of aid was more efficient, whether that be tied or conditional, financial loans or grants, and project-specific or more general budget support. The mode of delivery has also been an area of interest, with extensive research into the merits of multilateral modes versus bilateral ones. The assumption here has been that multilateral aid delivery through international institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) was more moral, because these bodies were not constrained by the national interest and could thus

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181 Australia has usually ranked between 13th and 15th on the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistant Committee (DAC) members. More information can be found through the OECD DAC statistics website at http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/ (accessed 4 March 2014).


focus their efforts on the singular goal of alleviating poverty. As a result, the literature in this area has tended to overlook the impact of strategic motivations in the bilateral delivery of aid.

In terms of where structural forces and strategic motivations have been considered, this has been done in reference to the policies of the US as the largest per capita aid donor. But limited studies have been conducted from an Australian perspective, and these have produced quite interesting results. Instead of finding exclusive support for DI, scholars like Rukmani Gounder have found evidence of both RN and DI in the delivery of Australian aid. But other than these early observations, there has been little further investigation into what this means for how Australia’s foreign aid and development policy can be properly understood. Recent scholarship has been concerned with how best to meet domestic budgetary constraints without affecting the national interests gained from maintaining a healthy foreign aid policy. As a consequence, the moral dimension has been lost amongst policy debates on whether Australia should give more foreign aid, or target this to where it has the capacity to achieve the most financial effect. There is thus significant space in the literature for a moral realist approach to help understand the motives and outcomes of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy.

*Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations: Cambodia and Timor Leste*

The second policy area I evaluate in terms of moral realism is humanitarian operations, and specifically, Australia’s participation in the missions into Cambodia and Timor Leste. The literature on humanitarian operations is generally divided between analysing instances where there has been a perceived failure to respond to gross human rights abuses, as in Rwanda and Darfur, or where intervention has occurred, and why and how this was justified on

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185 The general consensus from these studies is that the US favours DI over RN. Eliana Balla and Gina Yannitell Reinhardt, “Giving and receiving aid: Does conflict count?” *World Development* 36, no. 12 (2008), pp. 2566-2585.


187 For consistency this thesis uses Timor Leste, even though it was not referred to as such until East Timor became a sovereign nation in 2002.
humanitarian grounds. As a result, the majority of academic contributions have come from normative perspectives of IR where scholars have been preoccupied with establishing the legitimacy of each operation by referring to evolutions in international law, and to changes in the norm of sovereignty. This means that rather than examining the motives and context in which states will consider the use of force, scholars have sought to establish the legal authority of the interveners. In instances where the motives and outcomes of states have been included, they have usually been critical of states’ motives, citing imperialism and great power hegemony.

In relation to the two missions identified in this thesis there has been very little scholarship charting the actions of Australia, even though it played a considerable diplomatic role, and took the lead in implementing the military component of each operation. Here, investigations have focused on what effect the decision had on Australia’s regional standing and whether each mission upheld certain normative standards. Apart from Wesley’s engagement with a possible realist ethic of intervention, examination of the motives and effects of Australia’s policy decisions have been scarce, and have focused on viewing each case individually.

192 William Maley has presented a critique of Australia’s decision to intervene citing the “litany of errors” that occurred during the policy process leading up to the intervention. Here, he argued that Australia had misjudged and misunderstood its relationship with Indonesia during its involvement in the Timor crisis and this had an effect on its own diplomatic dealings with the country. However, Maley did not discuss the motivations behind Australia’s decision to intervene nor did he consider what it expected to gain in return. For more, see William Maley, “Australia and the East Timor crisis: Some critical comments,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2 (2000), pp. 151-161.
193 Wesley’s notion of a realist ethic attempts to create an international agreed framework for when and where intervention should take place. In other words, for states to “treat like cases alike.” He argued for the potential of transnational threats to represent a universal interest for states to be motivated to intervene. This would then lead
There has not been a study that includes a comparison of Australia’s actions in both cases. A moral realist analysis of both Cambodia and Timor Leste would then be potentially beneficial in terms of identifying the motives and outcomes of Australia’s foreign policy choices in these two humanitarian operations.

*Strategic alliances: Australia-US security partnership*

The third and final policy arena evaluated with respect to moral realism is strategic alliances, and specifically, Australia’s security partnership with the US. The inclusion of alliance politics is important as the moral dimension is often overlooked, and where it has been included, it has been in reference to the presence of establishing a “moral consensus.” Here the main assumption has been that states, which share similar ideas on political and social organization, are more likely to “align” in their responses to issues of international security. This is not only beneficial for each individual state, but also for the security and stability of international society. Therefore, alliances are seen as mechanisms that maintain international order and reflect a moral good.¹⁹⁵

Such a view of alliances has contributed to the proliferation of collective, common and cooperative explanations of security following the end of the Cold War. This came about in response to the continuation of alliances in the absence of a common material threat in the

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spread of communism and Soviet aggression. For many normative theorists, non-material factors such as shared identities held more explanatory weight when it came to what motivates states to form alliances and what is important for their long-term viability. These investigations have largely focused on the ability of alliances to contribute to overall international peace and security, and have disregarded the possibility of moral and material outcomes in the action of states in forming alliances. This has been particularly so for bilateral alliances, as multilateral ones are considered inherently more cooperative, and hence more moral. As a result, there is a gap in current understandings of bilateral security alliances and this becomes clear when looking at how scholars have traditionally perceived the US-Australian security partnership.

Much has been written about the importance of this relationship for Australia’s long-term security interests, which has been highlighted predominately by realist scholarship. But there are currently few clues as to whether morality has played apart in shaping Australia’s foreign policy choices within the partnership. During the 1980s debates on non-proliferation and disarmament, there was some mention of whether it was morally right for Australia to accept US extended nuclear deterrence as part of ANZUS, however this was primarily in reference to Australia’s ability to exercise an independent foreign policy and not on the potential for morality as part of Australia’s policy approach towards the alliance. Thus a moral realist explanation might be useful for discovering whether both moral and strategic

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196 Timothy Dunne, “‘When the shooting starts’: Atlanticism in British security strategy,” International Affairs 80, no. 5 (2004), pp. 893-909.
197 Factors of identity were used to explain the persistence and expansion of NATO after structural changes occurred with the end of the Cold War. For more see Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO expansion: A constructivist explanation,” Security Studies 8, no. 2-3 (1998), pp. 198-234.
198 Where studies have been conducted on didactic relationships, they have emphasised the notion that the deterrent effect of alliances, particularly those with defence pacts, are a good foreign policy choice for states seeking to maintain peace and further cooperation. For more see, Gerald Sorokin, “Alliance formation and general deterrence: A game theoretical model and the case of Israel,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994), pp. 298-325; Christopher Sprecher, “Alliances, armed conflict, and cooperation: Theoretical approaches and empirical evidence,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 4 (2006), pp. 363-369.
calculations were present in Australia’s decision to align with the US, and whether this has led to moral and material outcomes.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the central theoretical debates on how best to conceptualise morality in classical realism. Morality has occupied a precarious place in international politics, and recent interest in the concept has ignited a return to how the classical realists understood it. But rather than adding clarity to classical realism, contributions within the revival have misappropriated classical realism into normative IR. And in doing so, these perspectives have overlooked the classical realist concern for the roles of interests in motivating states to include morality as part of their foreign policy calculations, and the consequences these decisions are likely to produce.

The aim of this chapter was to strengthen the case for proposing moral realism as my own contribution towards this revival that attempts a more authentic reading of the position of morality in classical realism. To achieve this, I began with a critical examination of normative, critical and contemporary realists perspectives that have contributed towards the classical realist revival. The morally prescriptive views of normative and critical perspectives were found to be at odds with the empirical and descriptive focus of classical realism. The realist perspectives within the revival were notably absent and limited to a few neoclassical realists scholars who argued that morality was only useful as a rhetorical device that supervened on foreign policy choices at the domestic level. Neoclassical realism was found to not go far enough in analysing instances where states choose to include morality as a part of foreign policy choice, with the expectation that it will lead to both moral and material outcomes. This is where I positioned moral realism, with its focus on moral consequentialism, as an approach that properly represents how the classical realists understood morality in foreign policy.

I developed the moral realist framework by drawing out three areas of commonality between Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan. These were: the expectations of reciprocity between states, rational choice as part of foreign policy decisions, and the moral and material outcomes of foreign policy. Together, these three factors properly reflect the classical realist concern for seeing morality in connection with material interests, as well as their prioritizing of the logic of consequences over prescriptive universalism. An emphasis on the outcomes of
states’ foreign policy choices also allows moral realism to go further than the classical realists and claim that when morality and interests converge, states can actually stand to gain material benefits. This is the central empirical assumption of moral realism and one that sets it apart from classical realism as a distinctive approach. Finally, this chapter identified Australia as an appropriate case for the evaluation of moral realism as a tool for understanding morality in state foreign policy choices. It is to this objective that the following three chapters now turn.
Chapter Two

Moral realism and Australia’s foreign aid and development policy

Realism would seem an unlikely candidate for understanding the role of morality in a state’s foreign aid and development policy. With its focus on the national interest and the competition for power, realist explanations of foreign aid are often overlooked for normative ones that directly engage with moral questions. Yet it is a misconception to suggest that all aspects of realism are solely concerned with the material dimensions of state power, and the mechanisms to exercise it. It fuels a general caricature of realism: that blunt, rational state interests exclusively guide foreign policies. In this chapter, I argue that the moral realist framework I have developed can shed some light on how morality is viewed in a state’s foreign aid and development policy.

I start with an examination of the dominant perspectives on the role of morality in foreign aid and development, with the aim of drawing out a distinction between foreign aid based on perceived “good” intentions, and one that considers the outcomes of aid policy. This will make it easier to assess how easily moral realism can be applied to understand the evidence presented. I then chart the development of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy from a moral realist perspective, beginning with an evaluation of its early aid program under the Colombo Plan. I then move to analyse specific country aid relationships, as well as assessing which aid sectors (education, agriculture, and good governance), are prioritized in how Australia chooses to deliver its aid. In doing so, I draw out trends in Australia’s aid policy: for instance, the consistent attention paid to aid delivery to states in Australia’s region and the tendency for the sectors of aid to change according to the material interest being pursued. This evidence is used to conclude that moral realism is useful for understanding Australia’s foreign aid and development policy choices.

Defining foreign aid: Official development assistance

Before I begin my discussion on how the literature has approached foreign aid, it is important to define what this thesis means when referring to Australia’s foreign aid and development policy. Foreign aid is typically defined as Official Development Assistance (ODA), which describes all aid flows, including grants and concessional loans, between registered
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members and developing nations.\textsuperscript{201} ODA also characterizes the purpose of aid as “the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.”\textsuperscript{202} For an analysis of Australia’s foreign aid, this definition is not always sufficient, as Australia was not a member of the DAC until 1966, and its aid program began with the implementation of the Colombo Plan after WWII. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, any reference to Australia’s foreign aid before its membership to the DAC refers to those resources (whether food, equipment, technical assistance, infrastructure development or direct financial assistance)\textsuperscript{203} that are voluntary, and exchanged bilaterally between governments, with the stated moral purpose of reducing poverty by increasing economic and social development. This is broadly in line with how Australia has viewed foreign aid as advancing its national interest through sustainable development and poverty reduction.\textsuperscript{204}

**Understanding morality in debates on foreign aid: Intent versus outcomes**

There is a natural assumption that a state’s aid policy should include moral considerations. This is largely the approach taken by normative perspectives that emphasize the morality...


\textsuperscript{202} This clarification was made to exclude military aid as part of DAC members overall measurement of aid. As will be mentioned, there were some instances where Australia’s aid did not always fit the ODA standard on keeping military aid separate from development programs. This was most obviously in Afghanistan where the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was involved in the delivery of Australia’s aid. The debate on the “militarization” of aid is an important one as it can lead to the blurring of the moral dimension of aid. However, it is outside the scope of this thesis to fully discuss the implications of aid as a form of military assistance. In any case, it would not be particularly useful, as reporting for ODA during this time did not include reliable disaggregated data. It was later found that the total of ODA delivered by Australian aid in Afghanistan was less than half between 2006-07, which then increased to between 70% and 75% by 2012. For more see Stephen Howes and Jonathan Pryke, “Australian aid to Afghanistan: Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference Committee.” Development Policy Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific. Available at: http://observgo.uquebec.ca/observgo/fichiers/25713_aideaustralienne.pdf (accessed 2 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{203} The mode of aid that states provide can be important in determining the expectation of return and the outcomes of giving aid. Aid can be targeted to certain projects often involving experts and contractors from the donor nation, provided as relief or development assistance in concert with business and NGOs, given as low or no interest loans, or even injected directly into a recipient nations budget through General Budget Support (GBS). Yet while there are important distinctions to be made in identifying a state’s preference on the mode of aid, assessing these differences is beyond the scope of this thesis. This is for the very simple reason that the mode of aid makes no difference to the core premise that aid, guided by an expectation of reciprocity, can lead to both moral and material benefits.

\textsuperscript{204} This objective was clearly stated in the Simons Review on aid commissioned in 1997, which identified sustainable development and poverty reduction as the humanitarian purpose of Australia’s aid program. For more see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (henceforth DFAT), Australian aid, “One clear objective: Poverty reduction through sustainable development,” Committee of Review of Australia’s Foreign Aid (Simons Report), April 2007. Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/simons.pdf (accessed 25 February 2014). As will be discussed, development and poverty reduction had always been a clear expectation guiding Australia’s aid, which continued in its contemporary aid program.
involved in formulating policies that promote human rights, foster democracy and contribute to economic development. In doing this, they stress the value of common humanity and distributive justice as principles of the foreign aid regime that can bring about moral transformation within the international system. There are broadly two perspectives that hold this view: cosmopolitanism and constructivism.

Cosmopolitan thinkers like Charles Beitz and Lukas Meyer have argued that foreign aid can be analysed as the international extension of the Western domestic principles embodied in the liberal welfare state. Here, the moral dimension is attributed to the inherent obligation of the strong to aid the weak. These scholars typically highlight the perceived injustice of the international system for the developing world and the duty of the industrialised nations to correct this by adopting foreign aid policies that mimic the process of redistribution employed within their own borders. For them, the post-World War material redistribution recast the material wealth along recognisable ethical boundaries between donor countries and recipient states. And following the 1970s, the institutionalisation of aid as a multilateral practice further cemented the foreign aid regime into a collective order or a “global social contract.” As evidence, they point towards the steady increase of aid over the last 50 years amongst OECD donors, and the inability to account for the reasons for giving aid by referring to the political and strategic motivations of the donor. Instead, they argue that the moral duty of wealthy nations to give to less development ones – along with the spread of democracy, free-trade and international law – has led to the blurring of distinction between the Global North and the Global South, which will eventually produce the equalisation of global wealth.

This explanation of foreign aid leaves much to be desired. To begin with, the empirical record does not always present such a clear picture. The programs of social development that exist within the internal structures of the welfare state cannot be directly comparable to its

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205 See for instance, Alain Noel and Jean-Philippe Therien, “From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign aid,” International Organization 49, 3 (1995), pp. 523-553; Lukas H. Meyer, “Liberal cosmopolitanism and moral motivation,” Global Society 14, no. 4 (2000), pp. 631-647 and Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitanism and global justice,” The Journal of Ethics 2, no. 9 (2005), pp. 11-27. These scholars argued that aid reflected an international transfer of wealth that flows only one-way from the donor country to the recipient, thereby contributing to the eventual equal distribution of wealth. These perspectives do not pay attention to whether the donor country can benefit in return. In fact, cosmopolitanism views this aspect of aid to be one its main problems because it interferes with the transformative process by prioritizing the material interests of the donor, which reinforces the un-equal distribution of wealth.


207 Beitz, “Cosmopolitanism and global justice,” p. 17
ability to give aid on a global scale. States like Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, known for their generous social welfare programmes, do spend the most relative to their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). But the US, Japan and the UK, often criticised for their poor domestic welfare systems, have spent more on foreign aid in dollar amounts than the widely-praised Scandinavian countries.\textsuperscript{208} Regardless of the metrics used to identify the most generous aid donors, inside-out perspectives find it difficult to link the motives of why states give aid, with whether it actually achieves any benefits. This perspective is also out-dated and cannot account for the rise of developing aid donors like China, whose social and political system is at odds with the welfare model and yet is a rising participant in the foreign aid regime.\textsuperscript{209} Likewise, cosmopolitanism cannot properly accommodate the presence of South-to-South aid cooperation where the transfer of wealth is between developing countries.

Constructivist understandings of the moral dimension in foreign aid share similarities with cosmopolitanism in that they start by looking outside the economic and political interests of the state.\textsuperscript{210} David Lumsdaine has argued that the giving of aid arose from mutual humanitarian concerns amongst donor states. From this perspective, the giving of aid reflects a shared response or “identity” in relation to poverty and inequality, which over time turned the practice into a guiding norm for pro-social state behaviour.\textsuperscript{211} These shared identities combine with the common belief that long-term peace and stability can only be achieved if all members of international society were able to prosper. Foreign aid is thus a normative practice guided by an acceptance that developed states have obligations to resolve global economic injustice. Therefore, like cosmopolitanism, constructivists understand the giving of aid as a mechanism that transforms international order by closing the gap between rich and poor nations. As a result, constructivists have tended to gather evidence from states that share a common identity, such as the Scandinavian states identified above. In doing so, though,

\textsuperscript{208} In 2012, the US, the UK and Japan were the per dollar top aid donors. Japan has recently moved further down the list, and has been replaced by France and Germany. The US and the UK have remained the top two aid donors. “Top ten largest donors of foreign aid in the world,” Development Diaries (2013). Available at: http://developmentdiaries.com/top-10-largest-donors-of-foreign-aid-in-the-world/ (accessed 23 March 2014).


\textsuperscript{210} Martha Finnemore, The National interest in international society (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001).

they also frequently overlook the material factors involved in determining where aid is being delivered, and the state’s primary purpose in delivering it.

Whether viewing aid through the lens of obligation or identity, both cosmopolitanism and constructivism see it as a product of “good” intentions. In terms of practical application this places an idealised set of assumptions on the benefits of aid as it transcends the realm of foreign policy practice, charging aid with its own purpose and set of justifications. In doing so, normative approaches turn aid into a prescriptive force that establishes a standard of what states ought to do rather than what they can or are willing to do. The standard for judging the rationale and effects of aid is then confined to meeting the normative requirements of good intentions, which means normative perspective tend to avoid post-facto assessments of whether the giving of foreign aid actually achieves good outcomes. Therefore, what aid does is central to discovering where it fits in a state’s foreign policy and an emphasis on assessing the consequences of aid is important in judging whether it achieves its objectives, for both the donor and the recipient.

The realist turn: The moral and material outcome of foreign aid and development policy

In light of this, recent realist literature on the function of a state’s foreign aid has turned to evaluating the potential for moral and material outcomes rather than on the state’s moral intent. Specifically, Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, as part of their developmental realist agenda, have argued that an analysis of a state’s foreign aid policy needs to focus on programs of economic development that can produce visible evidence of equable results for the recipient nation. For them, the practice of developmental realism is much like the Cold War policies of the US in Europe, and East and Southeast Asia, where aid was used as a means to counter the spread of communism, promote economic development, and open new markets for foreign investment. The moral dimension is seen to compliment the material interests of the donor state by generating strategic and commercial advantages.

The work of Lieven and Huslman has been useful in contributing to what has traditionally been a one-sided debate on the moral aspects of foreign aid. Yet they arguably have not been

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extensive enough in fleshing out a set of principles that could be used to test the validity of their claims. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence of how a moral realist framework could explain the position of morality in a state’s foreign aid and development policy.

*Expectations of reciprocity*

Moral realism takes a similar approach to developmental realism in how it understands the motivations and outcomes of a state’s foreign aid and development policy, in that it understands it to be guided primarily by expectations of material benefits. But moral realism also goes further in stating that this expectation of reciprocity can have outcomes for the recipient state as well. In the first instance, where the aid is delivered is determined by whether it follows the state’s strategic interests. Here, geography can be a significant factor for certain states, like Australia, where its main recipients are in the Asia-Pacific, or it can follow certain military objectives, as was the case with US foreign aid delivered to Iraq in 2003 and to Afghanistan in 2001. Foreign aid policy guided by material factors thus increases the expectation of reciprocity, and can lead to certain benefits (described below) in improving diplomatic relations, and in helping to secure economic advantages.

*Rational choice*

It is important to note that aid will not always appear in the same form, and be directed to the same recipient. This is where moral realism can account for the variability of aid in a state’s foreign policy. In some instances, a state might adjust the type of aid, from a focus on economic development and education, to one that targets the improvement of good governance and transparency. In others, it might adjust the level of aid to a particular country, even deciding to stop aid all together. These shifts are indicative of a process of rational choice as to where the greatest expectations of reciprocity lie, because the returns for giving aid are calculated against the cost to the state in administering it. This is especially important in foreign aid, as leaders are often forced to justify the merits of aid to a taxpaying domestic audience. As well as accounting for policy change, rational choice can also explain why the benefits the donor receives from giving aid outweigh concerns for the interests of the recipient. Even though the donor may aspire to absolute standards in foreign aid policy, like

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universal primary education under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), this outcome is unlikely to ever be achieved, as it would require a greater amount of commitment than what the state, guided by its own interests first, is willing to give. Therefore, while moral realism expects there to be benefit for the recipient in giving aid, this is part of the state’s calculation that it will achieve its national interest in return.

Moral and material outcomes

Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice address the motivations for aid, and where aid is most likely to be directed. This leaves the effect of aid policy, or the moral and material outcomes. Consideration of the effect of aid is important because, in itself, the act of providing aid is neither good nor bad. In some instances, the delivery of aid can lead to aid dependency and further corruption. In others, it can lead to increased standards of living and growth. Hence, for moral realism, evidence of moral considerations must be found in the outcomes that result from policy implementation. I understand, of course, that evaluating the effects of aid on the recipient can be difficult, given the differences of opinion on what exactly counts as positive aid results, and the sometimes lack of reliable information on the progress of certain aid projects. But, in stating this, it is possible to identify instances where aid has lead to specific benefits for the recipient. For example, positive effects of aid have been found in the delivery of education and health programmes, with evidence that the building of schools and training of teachers directly increases the number of primary school enrolments. Similar results have also been seen in the implementation of health

214 It is important to note that in claiming that bilateral aid can have a positive effect on reducing poverty or increasing standards of living, I am not claiming that these are absolute outcomes. I acknowledge that some economic rationalists like Paul Mosley, John Hudson and Sara Horrell argue that foreign aid has little impact on a macroeconomic level. For more see Paul Mosley, John Hudson and Sara Horrell, “Aid, the public sector and the market in less developed countries: A return to the scene of the crime,” Special Issue: The Economic Analysis of Aid Policy 4, no. 2 (March/April 1992), pp. 139-150. Others like Richard Reichel have even argued that foreign can have a negative impact on the economic development of recipient states. See, for instance, Reichel, “Development aid, savings and growth in the 1980s: A cross-section analysis,” Savings and Development 19, no. 3 (1995), pp. 279-296. However, as will be demonstrated in more detail throughout this chapter, a moral realist perspective only seeks to show that in some instances foreign aid can contribute towards ameliorating the conditions that lead to entrenched poverty. Indeed, the academic literature on measuring the effectiveness of aid has shifted from relying on traditional macroeconomic indicators (such as GDP, savings and investment), as the most accurate depiction of the benefits of foreign aid, to instead focus on whether it has any impact on HDIs, which includes evidence of an increase of employment, access to health services and education, as well as women empowerment. See in particular, Peter Boone, “Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid,” European Economic Review 40, no. 2 (1996), pp. 289-329.

programmes with significant correlations found between these initiatives and the reduced rate of infant mortality.\textsuperscript{216}

The moral outcomes are one part of this category. A moral realist understanding of foreign aid must also demonstrate whether this brings material benefits for the donor. This further connects the expectations of reciprocity (as the material interests of the state) with the outcomes achieved once the policy has been implemented. So, for example, the decision to provide aid in the form of infrastructure development will often bring increased benefits to the donor state in the sale of donor materials, in the development of business links and in garnering international prestige. For the recipient, benefits can be found in local employment, the construction of vital infrastructure and, in some cases, the establishment of diplomatic communications where previously this was limited.

This is merely a preface to what a moral realist might say about a state’s foreign aid policy. To get a clearer picture, I now engage in an analysis of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy. This will set the scene for a closer evaluation of the moral realist framework and its potential to understand the position of both morality and interest in the construction of a state’s foreign aid and development policy.

**Expectations of reciprocity: Morality and interests in Australia’s foreign aid and development policy**

Australia’s early approach to foreign aid demonstrated an expectation of reciprocity in terms of where aid was delivered, and which aid sectors Australia preferred to target its resources. Australia’s geography dictates that it is crucial for its strategic environment to be economically stable. As a one-sided economy that relies on exports of raw materials, the internal strength of neighbouring countries is imperative for regional stability and the establishment of bilateral trade. These strategic, diplomatic and economic expectations have guided Australia’s aid towards the Asia-Pacific, which began with the inception of its official aid program under the Colombo Plan.\textsuperscript{217} The Colombo Plan was a Commonwealth bilateral


\textsuperscript{217} Before the Colombo Plan Australia had contributed to WWII reconstruction efforts in the form of “relief aid” to PNG which Australia administered up until its independence in 1975. This aid was limited to small grants, usually under $100,000. All values in this thesis are in Australian dollars, except where cited otherwise. It was not until 1951 that Australia began a “program” of aid to several nations.
foreign aid initiative proposed in 1950 and set in force in 1951. Australia played a significant diplomatic role in developing the plan, which was often termed the “Spender Resolution,” after former Australian Foreign Minister, Percy Spender, whose idea for a collective overseas aid program provided a framework for discussions in the first consultative meeting on the Plan in Ceylon.218

Following the end of WWII, the immediate foreign policy priority for Australia was to shore up US commitments to security in the Asia-Pacific. At the time, Australian policymakers were concerned about the lack of US interest in the region, as the majority of the world’s political and economic capital was focused on the reconstruction of Europe. Being a middle power, Australia relied on the security guarantee of “great and powerful friends” and the US was the obvious candidate. Security assurances were already being achieved by Australia with the signing of ANZUS 12 days after the Colombo Plan, but a related concern was the need to bolster this with US financial support in the region. A regional development programme was seen as a policy that would appeal to US attitudes of “burden sharing” and contribute to broader goals of economic development.219 This was eventually achieved when the US joined the second consultative committee in 1951 and pledged financial support to the Plan. In fact, it became the largest bilateral contributor of aid to both the Colombo Plan states and wider Southeast Asia. 220

Apart from the expectation that it would contribute to Australia’s strategy of US engagement, this was also a way for Canberra to advance its own approach to regional security. Australia had arguably maintained a certain level of irreverence towards the political and economic issues brewing in its own backyard, preferring instead to focus on securing its ties to the West. This changed after WWII as the process of decolonisation brought attention to the

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218 The Plan was originally amongst Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, Sri Lanka, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the UK. It then expanded into an international plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia and by 1954 included the US, Malaya (which became Malaysia and Singapore in 1963), Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Japan, Laos, Japan and The Philippines. In 1977, the name changed to “The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific,” to reflect the expanded membership and its increased activities in infrastructure, skills training, education and health promotion.


220 After the first five years of operation (1951-1956), the US had contributed SUS2 billion dollars. Australia had only contributed $72 million. During the major Cold War period (1951-1984), the US contributed over half the amount of aid distributed through the Colombo Plan, around US$42 billion.
potential threat of communism and state collapse. By 1950, the defeat of the nationalist regime in China, and evidence of insurgencies in Burma, Indochina, Malaya and Thailand, had signalled to Australian policymakers that its geographic proximity to politically and socially unstable neighbours meant it had to pay more attention to the region. As Spender stated in 1951:

> We have deep and far reaching interests in the Pacific. We have similar, strategic and otherwise, in the South and Southeast Asian region. No nation can escape its geography. That is an axiom that should be written deep into the minds of every Australian. Above all, it is in our interests to foster commercial and other contacts with them and give them what help we can in maintaining stable and democratic governments in power, and increasing the material welfare of their peoples. In doing so, we take the long view. We will be helping to provide them and ourselves with the best defence against the effective penetration of communism.\(^{221}\)

The Colombo Plan was one measure that Australia adopted in pursuit of these goals. In the beginning, the major recipients of aid were India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. At the time, Australia did not have a central institution that could implement and coordinate targeted aid programmes, which made it prudent to concentrate on nations where it had an established presence – on PNG as a trustee territory; on India, Pakistan and Sri-Lanka as Commonwealth states; and on Indonesia as the closest state to Australia. The attention paid to India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka diminished as Australia’s aid program developed to focus more on states closer to its own sphere of influence, and PNG and Indonesia went on to become Australia’s largest aid recipients.

Australia’s general approach to aid under the Colombo Plan was to implement “grass-roots” policies of economic development, such as technical cooperation and industrial production, as effective tools to promote nationalism, and deter the adoption of communist governments. The decision to focus on economic development was informed by both moral and material expectations. The material expectations, as described above, were linked to Australia’s desire to develop friendly relations with nations in an area of strategic importance and to participate

in an economically competitive market. The moral intentions were linked to expectations that local development programs would increase domestic consumptions levels, as well as improve the standard of living of recipient nations. Spender highlighted these dual expectations when he claimed that:

There are several reasons why this external assistance should be given. In the first place, on humanitarian grounds we cannot ignore the basic needs of such a large and important section of the world’s population. Secondly, a permanent improvement in world trade depends in a substantial degree upon the economic development and increased productive capacity of the countries of South and South-East Asia.222

Technical cooperation was a key aspect of Australia’s participation in the Colombo Plan and one where it achieved significant reciprocal benefits. As mentioned above, Australia had a fairly limited relationship with neighbouring countries and this was not helped by the image of a “racist” Australia amongst many Asia-Pacific states – a perception that was largely the result of its “White Australia Policy.”223 A program that allowed for an exchange of personnel and cultural experiences was viewed as one way for Australia to counter this image and reap some returns in the process.224

Australia provided the majority of its support through the Colombo Plan’s Technical Assistance Cooperation, which was divided into the awarding of scholarships for academic study and training awards for local skills training. It also included sending Australian experts in exchanges of technical expertise. The latter aspect of the aid program was particularly

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223 The White Australia Policy or the Immigration Restriction Act was a policy that restricted “non-white” immigration to Australia by implementing a number of discriminatory measures, one of which was to provide dictation tests to potential immigrants in a language that the applicant was not familiar with. The Act was introduced after federation in 1901, and existed in some form until 1973. It was introduced in response to fears of economic competition from Asian labourers and from a general anxiety of an “Asian invasion” that would threaten Australia’s traditional European based customs, values, traditions and lifestyle. For more see, James Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
224 The main material purpose of the Colombo Plan was economic, but it was also accepted that a qualitative expectation of the Plan was to counteract negative perceptions of Australia, both regionally and internationally, as a result of the White Australia Policy. This claim has been made by others, for instance see Alex Auletta, “A retrospective view of the Colombo Plan: Government policy, departmental administration and overseas students,” Journal of Higher Education Policy Management 22, no. 1 (2000), pp. 47-58.
profitable because it allowed Australia to achieve the greatest amount of benefit without the added financial expense of project aid, which required the sending of administrative staff, materials and grants. Quite often, Canberra ran into problems associated with the lack of information being provided by the recipient state on what was needed to successfully complete projects. Recipient governments were also not always forthcoming on how the capital aid was being spent and the administrative staff that oversaw these projects was not always educated on how best to use the equipment and goods provided. Therefore, technical cooperation represented comparable success for Australia in getting the most out of its aid program.

Expectations and outcomes of Australia’s aid preferences: Technical cooperation, education and agricultural development

In terms of technical assistance, Australia’s climate and reliance on primary industries meant it had expertise in agricultural irrigation, sanitation and agribusiness, all of which were useful for many of the under-developed Southeast Asian states that were similar in their reliance on agriculture. Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand and South Vietnam received 55% of the total $42 million of Australia’s technical assistance. The focus on agricultural development represented a twin gain for Australia, and followed the moral and material expectations outlined above.

It enabled Australia to contribute to reducing poverty, with agriculture as the primary source of employment, while also allowing it to carve out a niche area of development that would flow into Australia’s broader trade interests. By 1964, considerable gains had been achieved in economic development as overall GDP of Southeast Asia had increased by 8%. However, agriculture and rural development had failed to keep up with the demand of local populations and it was here that Australia saw the potential of aid in agriculture. In fact, this was an early aim of Australia and part of the original blueprints for the Plan in 1950, where the main areas of Australia’s involvement were earmarked for agriculture. Not only did this represent a unique area of development for Australia, it also led to further payoffs in

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226 All numerical values cited in this thesis are in Australian dollars, except where cited as otherwise.
expanded investment opportunities. In 1966 Australia introduced investment guarantee schemes designed to encourage direct investment through joint venture enterprises that were generated from the diplomatic and trade contacts achieved through its technical assistance.

Technical assistance in agriculture (or what is now commonly referred to as “food security”) has arguably continued to be a focus of Australia’s aid that has led to outcomes for both Australia and recipient states. A particularly good example of this can be found in the work of the Australian Centre of International Agriculture Research (ACIAR) established in 1982. This centre was partly funded by Australian aid, which during the 1980s and 90s represented around 3% of the aid budget. In 2013, Australia’s annual commitment had reached over $100 million.\(^{229}\) It worked to deliver projects in developing states to overcome production difficulties (including in livestock, aquiculture, fisheries and horticulture), with the overall aim of improving self-sufficiency for subsistence farmers.\(^{230}\) It utilised Australia’s expertise in agriculture science and agribusiness, with project delivery and research mainly taking place in the recipient country. Like the Colombo Plan, the majority of these projects were implemented in states in Southeast Asia and the Pacific with Indonesia being the largest recipient.\(^{231}\) The expertise provided produced quite significant returns for Australia as the majority of the research was focused on wheat improvement, which was Australia’s highest agricultural export, worth 16.3% of Australia’s trade (or approximately $6 billion).\(^{232}\) A report on a sample of 48 of 600 bilateral projects administered by the ACIAR calculated the

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229 This may seem small, but ACIAR is one of the largest contributors of agricultural research for development globally. In 2010-12, ACIAR was in charge of SUS120 million, which has been estimated to represent 13% of global ODA in agricultural research. This is in comparison to the 3-4% of global ODA that Australia’s total aid represents. Robin Davis and Stephen Howes, “Fowl or fish? A submission to the review of ACIAR,” Development Policy Blog, The Development Policy Centre, 29 January 2013. Available at: http://devpolicy.org/fowl-or-fish-a-submission-to-the-aciar-review-20130129/ (accessed 25 February 2014).


231 This was because of its strategic importance and because of the ability of aid to assist a relatively large population living in poverty. In Indonesia the agriculture sector accounted for 40% of employment and yet contributed to only 14% of GDP. Programs that focused on lifting the productivity of Indonesia were therefore thought to produce moral and material outcomes. Indeed, Australia has already benefited with real returns in investment on agricultural research in partnership with Indonesia estimated at 13%. More on the nature of Australia’s aid to Indonesia will be described later in the chapter. Information on Australia’s Indonesia ACAIR country program can be found at the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, “Indonesia: achievements,” (2013). Available at: http://aciar.gov.au/country/indonesia/view/achievements (accessed 10 January 2014) and Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, “Indonesia, country program,” (2013). Available at: http://aciar.gov.au/country/indonesia (accessed 10 January 2014).

financial return to be estimated at around $2.5 billion, which is equal to the cost of investment since the inception of ACIAR. The real returns are potentially higher given that the sampled 48 projects represented only 7% of the measured benefits.\textsuperscript{233}

The other part of Australia’s technical assistance – the scholarship program – is regularly regarded as the most successful aspect of Australia’s technical cooperation, and seen as an invaluable tool in Australia’s strategy to become more engaged in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{234} Over the course of the Colombo Plan, an estimated 40,000 students were awarded scholarships to study in Australian universities, some of whom went on to be high-level public servants and ministers in their own governments.\textsuperscript{235} Australia’s approach to the scholarship program was also distinctive in that it preferred to have the students undertake their studies in Australian universities, rather than support subsidised university fees in the home nation. Australia pursued this approach because it anticipated a greater return in the capital spent by these individuals while studying, and through the exchanging of cultures at the domestic level.\textsuperscript{236} It also enabled Australia to reach a wider range of nations through the Commonwealth supported exchange schemes in the US and Africa.\textsuperscript{237} Some 6,500 Asians and 300 Africans had trained in Australia by the end of 1967, and Australia had become second to the US in the number of training places it awarded. Further flow-on effects were also had in stimulating the interest of private citizens. By June 1960 the number of private students studying in Australia from Colombo Plan countries had tripled to 7,918.\textsuperscript{238}

This focus on education continued in Australia’s aid program to the point where education became Australia’s largest aid sector. Its total aid investments in education are set to reach

\textsuperscript{234} This claim has been made by others, see for instance, Lyndon Megarry, “Regional goodwill, sensibly priced: Commonwealth policies towards Colombo plan scholars and private overseas students, 1945–72,” Australian Historical Studies 38, no. 129 (2007), pp. 88-105.
\textsuperscript{235} “APPROPRIATION BILL (No.1) 1966-67,” HoR, 29 September 1966. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=APPROPRIATION%20BILL%20students%201966-67%20Decade%3A%221966%22%20Year%3A%221966%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2229%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 9 January 2014).
\textsuperscript{236} “Australian relations with development aid committee and organization for economic cooperation and development., P.J Flood The Secretariat Department External Affairs on ”Aid: one percent or not?” 21 August 1967.
\textsuperscript{237} NAA, A1838 724/5 Part 9, “Australian relations with development aid committee and organization for economic cooperation and development.”
\textsuperscript{238} NAA, A1838 2020/1/12 Part 2, “Colombo plan progress reports” and “Australian Colombo plan aid reaches $36m,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 April 1961.
$1.158 billion by the end of 2014, with the expectation of Australia becoming one of the largest bilateral donors in education by 2015-2016.239 Here again, the awarding of scholarships has been a key part of the education aid program and was expected to lead to significant moral and material payoffs. In 2013, Australia invested in 6,000 Australia Awards Scholarships and Fellowships. This initiative was largely established in response to the commitments made as part of the “Australia in the Asian Century” White Paper, which emphasised the need for Australia to broaden its public diplomacy to include the Indo-Pacific area.240 As part of this push to broaden relationships with Indo-Pacific states, the Abbott government announced in 2013 the creation of the New Colombo Plan. This time, the scholarship exchange program went in reverse, with Australian students being sent to study and work in partnered Asian countries.241

Technical assistance and education were important aspects of achieving Australia’s early diplomatic objectives in its participation of the Colombo Plan and its wider aid program. There were also economic and financial outcomes sought by Australia, although these were not as originally significant. The exportation of goods into Asian countries as part of the Colombo Plan was expected to increase the prospects of long-term markets for Australia, but this was not tied to an increase in direct two-way trade. Instead, the economic potential of aid was focused on securing the co-operation of manufacturers and the use of Australian goods and services. In the beginning, Australia preferred to deliver the entirety of its aid in the form of grants that were notionally “untied” to certain conditions or performance targets by the recipient. This had the benefit of allowing these nations to set their own pace of development without having to factor in repayment of the loans and, for Australia, it had the advantage of opening channels of dialogue for further trade and investment, as these grants were mainly

given in the form of food aid and equipment.\textsuperscript{242} For example, after only two years of operating, Australia had provided the value of $6.84 million of flour and wheat to India, which was then sold in local markets, with the proceeds going to development of the Tungabhadra water conservation and hydroelectric project. This type of food aid was successful because it allowed Australian exports to diversify into foreign markets, and it had the dual developmental effect of assisting in food shortages as well as being a source of revenue for much needed infrastructure projects.\textsuperscript{243}

The heavy focus on grants and food aid began to change during the 1970s. For over two decades Australia had shied away from providing direct cash loans to recipient states (with the exception of budget support to PNG), for the simple reason that its capacity to shell out large sums of money was limited, and it was decided that it could achieve more of its aid objectives by focusing on technical cooperation and food assistance.\textsuperscript{244} Following the establishment of Australia’s independent aid agency, Australia’s Development Assistance Agency (ADAA)\textsuperscript{245} in 1974, Australia slowly began to introduce aid through Development Import Grants (DIGs) and loans, as a means of increasing the potential commercial returns

\textsuperscript{242} The delivery of aid was also premised on the lack of internal structures and resources in the Southeast Asian nations and not necessarily related to the costs of imports of capital goods for projects. These were also not determined by the forward forecast of balance-of-payment deficits and not related to debt repayments. This meant that if, or in fact, \textit{when}, a nation forecasts a surplus, it does not entitle it to redirect financial assistance through taxation or loans. This was done to allow for the delivery of long-term development projects that were not tied to the overall health of the nation in GDP terms and it also allowed Australia some flexibility in adjusting the amount of aid it provides in case of structural changes to its own economic situation. NAA, A1838 708/13/4. “Colombo Plan for cooperative economic development, reports, publications and printing,” Department of External Affairs Notes on the London Meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, 6 September to 4 October 1950.

\textsuperscript{243} Similar grants were given to Pakistan and Sri Lanka where the sale of Australian wheat and flour contributed to the establishment of tuberculosis clinics and major infrastructure, such as roads and bridges. Richard R. Casey, “Colombo plan helps towards peace and plenty in Asia,” \textit{The Sydney Morning Herald}, 14 Monday 1953. Available at: http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/18401132 (accessed 20 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{244} During the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a debate over whether or not Australia should shift the focus of its aid to long-term low interest loans in order to better control the price of its commodity aid. Yet this was largely rejected in favour of grants. As a net importer of capital, Australia did not have the capacity to sustain a significant loan program and would have needed to establish a separate fund. The use of grants also generated significant goodwill in recipient nations and contributed to a more favourable climate for increased diplomatic relations. The potential loss of prestige and the lack of financial capacity meant that proposals for a major shift to loans were dismissed. NAA A1838 740/4/5 “Colombo Plan –loans,” Draft for Mr Hay, 13 February 1958 and NAA, A1838 735/2 Part 1, “Australia’s foreign aid program,” Draft Working Paper Australia’s Contribution to International Assistance, W. Brady Department of External Affairs, 21 May 1961.

\textsuperscript{245} Australia’s aid agency has gone through several incantations. It changed to the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) and was integrated into the Foreign Affairs and Trade department in 1976 by the Fraser government. It had a name change again under the Hawke government and became the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) in 1987. In 1995, the Keating government renamed it the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). In October 2013, AusAID was dissolved by the Abbott government and was integrated into DFAT. For the remainder of this thesis, in order to maintain consistency, I will refer to Australia’s aid delivery mechanism as “AusAID.”
associated with its aid.\textsuperscript{246} Australia’s dependency on primary exports meant it shared the same disadvantages as under-developed nations in being susceptible to rises and falls in commodity prices. This meant that when commodity prices were low, potential dividends were also low, thereby limiting the amount Australia could receive in return for its aid contributions. Hence, it was accepted that grant aid should be supplemented by concessional or “soft” loans that allowed the receiving country to borrow money from Australia at a discounted rate. This also had the benefit of allowing Australian export companies to remain competitive with those in other donor countries.\textsuperscript{247}

One of the most significant examples of this shift in the commercial priorities of aid was the establishment of the Development Important Finance Facility (DIFF) in 1980, which came to represent 8\% of Australia’s overall aid budget.\textsuperscript{248} The DIFF also corresponded with an institutional change in the management and objectives of Australia’s aid that culminated in the first official aid review in 1983, called the Jackson Report.\textsuperscript{249} The Report emphasized more specifically the economic interests of Australia’s aid program and the need to incorporate a holistic approach to foreign aid delivery that focused on country programming.\textsuperscript{250} And the DIFF did just that. It combined development objectives, such as increased employment and the construction of infrastructure, with macro-economic principles

\textsuperscript{246} Development Import Grants (DIGs) for the purchase of development orientated goods and services from Australia were introduced in 1978 and represented half of Australia’s bilateral food aid. The remaining half was provided as untied cash payments to the International Development Association (IDA). Loans were introduced later in 1980 as part of the Development Important Finance Facility (DIFF), “APPROPRIATION BILL (No. 1) 1978-79,” HoR, 26 September 1978. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=APPROPRIATION%20BILL%20Development%20important%20grants%20%20(No.%201)%201978-79%20Decade%20Year%20Month%20Day%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20;rec=1;resCount=Default (accessed 18 January 2014).


\textsuperscript{249} The Jackson Review was the first comprehensive review into Australia’s aid program. Previous studies of its aid objectives were made in the Harries Report, which focused on Australia’s relationship with the Third World. Here, aid was viewed in the context of where it fits in Australia’s broader strategic and geopolitical approach to Lower Developing Countries (LDCs). It did not cover in depth the function and purpose of Australian aid. For more on the Harries Report see Owen Harries Australia and the Third World: Report of the Committee on Australia’s Relations with the Third World (Harries Report) (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, September 1979). The Jackson Report was conducted by Sir Gordon Jackson and commissioned by former Foreign Minister Bill Hayden.

\textsuperscript{250} Previously, Australia aid had been provided to countries on an “ad hoc” basis as each type of aid, whether that be granting of scholarships, project aid, technical assistance or food aid, was administered by separate branches of government.
of subsidised imports, finance credit and concessional loans. 251 The program ran until 1996 and had significant benefits for both Australia and its recipient nations. 252

DIFF aid was originally distributed exclusively to ASEAN as it was expected to achieve the twin goals of promoting export market competitiveness for Australia in the context of a rising Asia, and assist in Australia’s aid objective of alleviating poverty in its direct sphere of influence. Eventually this was broadened to make all recipients of Australian aid eligible, but the majority was still going to Southeast Asia, which by 1989 was receiving 90% of DIFF aid. 253 In terms of its success, a review by AusAID found that 47 of the 51 projects being administered across 13 different countries were effective in delivering economic and social advancement for the recipient nations. 254 In the case of Indonesia, for example, which received 46% of total DIFF funding, the Steel Bridges Project assisted in the transportation of local goods for trading and access to social facilities that lead to an increased rate of economic return for Indonesia from 7% to over 200%. 255

251 The DIFF was described as a “tied aid mixed credit” scheme that sourced finance from grants provided by AusAID, and export credit financing provided by the Export Finance and Insurance Cooperation (EFIC) of Austrade. These funds were then bundled together into a concessional loan with the rate of interest and repayment schedules determined by negotiation between Australia and the recipient nation. DFAT, Australian Aid, “A review of the effectiveness of the development import finance facility,” (January 1996), p 5. Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/diffrevw.pdf (accessed 14 January 2014).

252 DIFF was abolished in 1996 after considerable parliamentary debate that focused on the potential blurring of Australia’s aid objectives with its commercial ones. This decision also prompted a senate committee inquiry into the pros and cons of cancelling the program. In the end, the decision to cancel the scheme was based on budgetary constraints. A key part of the liberal party’s campaign to win government was to cut spending. For more on this see “Foreign affairs, defence and trade legislation committee – department of foreign affairs and trade program 6 development cooperation,” Senate, 23 September 1996. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee%20%20Department%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20and%20Trade%20Program%20%20Development%20Cooperation%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221996%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2218%22%20rec=1;resCount=Default (accessed 14 January 2014); and “Matter of public importance – overseas aid,” HoR, 18 June 1996. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Mat%20er%20%20Public%20Importance%20%20Overseas%20Aid%20%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221996%22%20Month%3A%2206%22%20Day%3A%2218%22%20rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 14 January 2014). Yet, interestingly, while the scheme was cancelled, four recipient nations – Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and China – were given approval to proceed with certain high priority projects, such as mining and infrastructure development. The money for these projects was incorporated into the 1996/97 aid budget allocation for each nation.


254 In terms of overall estimates, two-thirds of the projects were found to have achieved 75% of their intended development outcomes. Op cit, footnote 240.

The DIFF also represented increasing recognition that Australia’s aid had the potential to deliver investment opportunities and commercial benefits for Australian businesses. In this, the scheme proved quite successful. In combination with the EFIC and the $285 million of AusAID funds, the 51 projects identified above generated direct expenditure in Australia estimated at around $709 million. These returns increased when follow-on business and expected follow-on business were also included. Follow-on business, which was financing already tendered by Australian businesses, was estimated at $263 million. The expected follow-on, which was the amount expected in the following year of the survey, was estimated at $397 million. This meant the overall total business generated for Australia was $1.37 billion, or roughly five times the amount spent on aid.

The scheme also had further economic payoffs in keeping Australian businesses viable during the early 1990s recession. Westinghouse Brake and Signal, an Australian subsidiary of the British railway and signalling company, stated that had it not been for the DIFF-financed Rail Signalling project in Thailand in 1989, it would have had to shift the majority of its operations off-shore, resulting in significant job loses. In other instances, it expanded the market reach of Australian businesses involved in infrastructure development. Indeed, projects that involved construction were the most funded with transport and communication representing 46% and 11% respectively. It was noted by Ian Berckelman, Managing Director of Labax International, which was working in Indonesia to establish environmental conservation projects that “the DIFF scheme was the only tool that Australia had to enable it to secure infrastructure projects in the developing countries in Southeast Asia.”

After the DIFF program ended in 1996, Australia went back to delivering its aid entirely in grant form, which apart from the loan provided to Indonesia after the 2004 Tsunami, has

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256 Ibid.
257 These businesses had already been granted tender by the DIFF and were administering these projects by the time further funding proposals under the DIFF scheme were cancelled by the liberal government when they took office in March 1996. Therefore, the total expected return amount of $1.37 billion was unaffected.
remained the principal mode of delivery for Australia’s aid. In 1997, the Liberal government under Prime Minister John Howard commissioned the Simons Review of aid that sought to streamline the purpose of Australian aid to represent one clear objective: the reduction of poverty through sustainable development.\(^\text{260}\) Previously, under the Labor government, it was thought that Australia’s mixed motives approach to aid, which tied the humanitarian objectives with Australia’s strategic and economic interests, was diluting the effectiveness of Australia’s aid and detracting from the overall aim of reducing poverty. Thus, a policy framework that redirected Australia’s aid towards the one singular goal was expected to better assist in getting the most out of Australia’s aid dollar. Yet as I will demonstrate below, in practice, nothing much changed. Australia continued to pursue the commercial benefits of aid that were evident in the introduction of nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction where the expectations of economic returns were substantial, particularly in infrastructure development.

*The delivery of Australia’s aid program: The prominence of bilateralism*

As well as favouring grants, Australia has preferred to deliver its aid bilaterally. This has mainly been because it was the expected to be best way for Australia to extract the most, both morally and materially, from its aid program. The flexibility of government-to-government ties allows for increased diplomatic relationships and business contacts.\(^\text{261}\) When multilateralism was being considered at the start of the aid program, it was thought that “Australian aid would lose its identity if too much was channelled multilaterally,” as aid filtered through multilateral channels made it difficult to distinguish the objectives of the donor from that of the institution.\(^\text{262}\) This was of particular concern for a country the size of Australia, which made a small contribution in aid relative to the contributions of other donors. Its geographic position in a region traditionally populated by a diverse mix of developing nations also added to the overall difficulty of identifying the achievements of aid towards Australia’s national objectives. Hence, it was generally preferred that Australia conduct its aid relations with each recipient state individually, and this is where the annual


\(^{262}\) NAA, A1838724/5 Part 9, “Australia’s relations with developmental aid committee and organization for economic cooperation and development,” Record of Discussion with Mr E. M. Martin Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and Senior Offers of the Department of the External Affairs and Commonwealth Departments, 1968.
consultative meetings during the Colombo Plan were useful for policymakers to conduct what is now termed “serial bilateralism.”

Indeed, the political preference for bilateralism has continued throughout the history of Australia’s aid program. By the mid-1970s, only 7% of Australia’s aid budget was going through multilateral channels, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Program (WFP). The percentage amount remained relatively steady at under 10% until the mid-2000s when it started to increase reaching an average of 30% by 2012-2013.

![Australian ODA: Bilateral vs Multilateral](chart.png)

*Sources: OECD/DAC and World Bank*

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While this may seem like a significant increase, and fuel assumptions that there was a diluting of Australia’s national interest priorities, the majority of this aid was “non-core aid.” Approximately 58% of Australian multilateral aid is non-core, which is aid that has been earmarked by a country’s aid agency for specific projects chosen by the donor. This gives the donor more control over where and how the money is spent, and for Australia, this has been very much inline with its strategic and commercial expectations flowing from its aid program. The largest multilateral recipient of Australian aid was the World Bank Group where Australia directed the bulk of its funds to the Pacific and Southeast Asia, with the majority going to joint programs in Indonesia and the Mekong. In sum, Australia has delivered its aid budget on a bilateral basis as a means of ensuring the greatest amount of strategic, economic and political return.

**Australia’s strategic approach to foreign aid: The expectations, calculations and outcomes of its policy choices**

So far I have provided a general view of Australia’s aid program, with the intention of drawing out early material determinants of where aid went, and how this could be explained by referring to an expectation of reciprocity and rational calculation of the benefits to Australia’s national interests. Yet this is not enough to paint a convincing story. There are still questions as to whether the strategic focus has remained in Australia’s foreign aid and development policy and to what extent the dominant types of aid such as agriculture, education and infrastructure development, have prevailed. For the remainder of this chapter I attempt to answer these questions. In doing so, I will evaluate whether the expectations of reciprocity informing Australia’s foreign aid has produced both moral and material outcomes, and whether this has also led to material gains for Australia.

I start with the Pacific because Australia is currently the largest bilateral contributor of aid in the Pacific, representing 60% of the overall aid delivered to the region. This is estimated at $1.1 billion, or around 25% of Australia’s total aid budget. On the surface, this seems like

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265 Australia also ranks low amongst other OECD nations in its participation within the multilateral aid system. As of 2010, its total use of multilaterals was estimated at 37% of gross ODA (this includes bilateral aid administered through multilateral institutions as intermediaries, meaning the real amount is much lower). The DAC average is set at 40%, placing Australia 18th out of the 23 OECD members.


a significant amount, one that is often heralded as demonstrating Australia’s generosity. But a closer look at the breakdown of Australia’s aid to the Pacific shows that this claim is quite misleading. Nearly 50% of Australia’s aid to the Pacific was delivered to PNG where Australian aid represented 70% of its ODA. A further $196.5 million was directed to the Solomon Islands where Australian aid increased from just $33.5 million in 2003 to a high of $258,358 million in 2010.268 This decreased to $196.5 million in 2013 after Australia moved its aid delivery from the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), to a country strategy and decreased again to $176.4 million at the end of 2014.269 Yet despite this, Solomon Islands was Australia’s third largest recipient of aid after PNG and Indonesia.

The initial increase of funding was part of Australia’s commitment to RAMSI. Over 8000 Australian personnel from the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) served in the country between 2003 and 2013.270 Australia’s aid to Solomon Islands through RAMSI was part of the government’s growing recognition that a breakdown in law and order can have significant effects on development and overall prosperity. In the words of then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer:

The links between development and security has never been greater. The tragic events of Bali in October 2002 as well as the deterioration of law and order in Solomon Islands demonstrate the consequences of instability in undermining growth prospects and hard-won development gains…. Where insecurity prevails and the rule of law is weak, individuals’ vulnerability to conflict and crime increases and poverty is exacerbated.271

The government’s focus on the connection between conflict as a cause for low development and poor development as a facilitator of conflict was solidified in the 2002 policy paper

268 Ibid.
“Peace, Conflict and Development Policy,” which merged the principles of conflict prevention, reduction and post-conflict peace-building with the traditional goals of overseas development as a means of reducing poverty. The new policy acknowledged that Australia’s geographic proximity to areas of intense civil conflict meant it had to reconsider how it approached issues of regional security. In this way, it also represented a shift in how Australia determined the security of its strategic environment, viewing “failing” and “failed” states as having an effect on regional order through the spread of diseases, Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and increased flows of refugees and asylum seekers. The connection between failed states and the threat of terrorism was a particular security concern. Indeed the mission into the Solomon Islands corresponded with Australia’s support of the War in Iraq as part of the broader “War on Terror” (WoT). For Australia, failed states offered a place for terrorist organizations to conduct training, store arms, base communications and generate business to further fund terrorist acts. And the collapse of law and order in Solomon Islands demonstrated to Australian policymakers that the threat of terrorism was close to its borders. Indeed, there was evidence of this becoming an immanent possibility with Solomon Islands police armouries being raided by rebels and local gangs.

Evidence of a weakened state in Solomon Islands was also present. The GDP had halved during the six years prior to 2003, averaging around US$500 million. Economic growth had declined by 14% in 2000, and a further 9% in 2001. Social welfare infrastructure had ceased to function efficiently with limited funds going towards vital health services. Power generation had also stopped, affecting the water supply and power to hospitals and schools. Kidnapping, murder and rape had forced nearly 2000 to be internally displaced. The Solomon Islands’ police force was unable to control further civil unrest and in most cases

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275 John Howard, “PM statement: Solomon Islands,” HoR, 12 August 2014. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Solomon%20Islands%20Security%20Decade%202000s%22%20Year%202003%22%20Month%202008%22;rec=7;resCount=Default (accessed 17 February 2014).
were instigators of the violence. Australia’s involvement in Solomon Islands was guided by clear moral and material expectations. First, there were direct security concerns that a total collapse of Solomon Islands would have a direct physical impact on Australia. Second Australia feared that the Islands would become a “hub” for regional insecurity. Alongside the material expectations informing Australia’s decision was the moral expectation that it would assist RAMSI in achieving its goals of ensuring law and order, good governance and respect for human rights. In this way, the shift in viewing weak states as a security threat also corresponded with a shift in how Australia determined the best way to achieve the moral purpose of its aid program. These factors indicate that Australia’s aid and assistance to the Solomon’s were guided by expectations of reciprocity in achieving its national interest in maintaining regional stability.

This does not cancel out the benefits to Solomon Islands, and here moral outcomes in line with its moral intentions, can indeed be found in the initiatives Australia implemented to improve the social situation on the ground. Education was an area that produced positive outcomes. Through its fee removal initiative, Australia assisted more than 145,000 primary school children to gain access to education. Assistance in education also included the awarding of 177 scholarships for students to study at Australian universities. Other development gains were also had in decreased child mortality. Australia’s training of midwives meant an estimated 85% of women in the Solomon’s are able to give birth with a skilled midwife. Through the Solomon Islands Road Improvement Program (SIRIP), Australia assisted in the maintenance of 344km of roads, which contributed to the short-term employment of around 207,000 Solomon islanders, 55% of whom were women.

A clear material gain for Australian from its development assistance was the establishment of

277 Downer, “White paper on foreign affairs and trade: Advancing the national interest,” Speech, Q & A at the launch of the foreign and trade policy, Canberra, 12 February 2003. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Ale


279 Bob Carr, “Response to question without notice,” Senate, 21 August 2012. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=8;query=solomon%20islands%20aid;rec=4

business links and increased trade. Indeed, in 2010, Australia’s Parliamentary Secretary for Trade Juliet Elliot stated that: “RAMSI had been very good for our trading relationship,” and “an important factor in business confidence.” 281 Before the Malaitan Eagles Force (MEF) instigated a coup in 2000, Australia had over 100 businesses in the Solomon’s, 30 of which were based there. 282 But by 2002 the country had been declared insolvent and only between 5-10 of the 100 businesses remained. Two-way trade had also decreased to just $56 million in 2001-02 after being on the increase to over $106 million. 283 A total collapse in law and order therefore represented significant economic losses for Australia, and was a source of reciprocity in its commitment to restore stability to the state. After ten years of RAMSI this started to pay off. 284 In 2013, two-way trade had increased to $233.5 million. This trade relationship was in Australia’s favour with Australia being the Solomon’s principle source of imports, estimated at 27%, in comparison to its export destinations, where Australia was ranked second at 11.2%. 285

The commitment to reconstruction was a key part of Australia’s aid contribution and corresponded with its economic expectations of aid. This led to further material gains in business opportunities with the awarding of contracts by Solomon Islands’ government, such as the Brisbane telecommunications provider, CBO Telecommunications, which by 2013 had completed a $3.25 million metro area network rollout that connected 85 government offices

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282 The Malaitan Eagles were a secessionist group led by Andrew Nori that seized of Honiara and demanded the resignation of then Prime Minister, Bartholomew Ulufa’alu. Ulufa’alu later resigned in exchange for his release and Manasseh Sogavare was elected. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Coup in Solomon Islands,” BBC News, 5 June 2000. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/778009.stm (accessed 18 February 2014).
284 In 2014 the Lowy Institute released a comprehensive report on the success, failures and lessons of RAMSI. There was some criticism that Australia’s overall $2.6 billion spent on the mission significantly outweighed any benefits achieved. This was particularly the case in the ability of the Solomon Islands police force to maintain law and order independently of the regional mission. In terms of the effectiveness of Australia’s aid Jenny Hayward Jones argued that the focus on aid in “good governance” has not been beneficial, as the domestic population did not respond well to social and civil administration being dictated by foreign forces. However, Hayward Jones did conclude that the operation was a success in restoring law and order and Australia’s aid did assist in ensuring stability in Solomon Islands, which contributed towards an 80% growth in Solomon Islands economy. For more see Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Australia’s costly investment in Solomon Islands: The lessons learned,” Lowy Institute for International Policy (May 2014). Available at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/hayward-jones_australias_costly_investment_in_solomon_islands.pdf (accessed 24 May 2014).
across the capital Honiara.\textsuperscript{286} Mining was a particular area of increased business for Australia, given the large amount of untapped mineral wealth in zinc, lead, nickel and gold. In 2005, Australian Solomon’s Gold (ASG) won the tender for the development of the Gold Ridge mine. In 2012, Australian-based gold produce and explorer St Barbara Ltd acquired Allied Gold, and took over operations of the mine.\textsuperscript{287} In 2011 it reached full production capacity and was estimated to produce 95,000 ounces of gold each year.\textsuperscript{288} For Solomon Islands this provided opportunities for short-term local employment with 85% of the 600 workers being locally employed.\textsuperscript{289}

The remaining aid to the Pacific, now around $400 million after inclusion of PNG and Solomon Islands, was scattered across the remaining 13 islands of the region.\textsuperscript{290} Rather than reflecting an overall concern for the stability and prosperity of the Pacific, it indicates that Australia had quite specific expectations guiding where the aid went. Indeed, from the beginning of its aid program Australia had shown very little interest in the region. During the Colombo Plan, there were national interest gains in Australia developing closer ties with Pacific nations, especially as the majority were isolated from the great-power competition dominating Indochina. But Australia’s material commitment was not sufficient to make this a reality. After ten years of operation, Australia had only awarded 17 student scholarships to the Pacific under the Colombo Plan’s technical assistance program.\textsuperscript{291} The majority of its financial and diplomatic capital was directed to PNG, which up until 1966 was the only recipient of Australian aid to the Pacific. Even then, the amount of aid to Pacific nations did not noticeably outweigh the amount given to PNG until 2005, and as explained above, this was largely the result of Australia’s humanitarian mission to Solomon Islands.

\textsuperscript{287} This allowed St Barnara’s commercial mining interests to spread across the Pacific, as its assets already included the Simberi mine in PNG. “St Barbara Limited – profile,” (2008-2014). Available at: http://www.stbarbara.com.au/profile/profile-subtitle/ (accessed 17 February 2014).
\textsuperscript{289} Juliet Elliot, “Address to the 4th Australia- Solomon Islands business forum,” Speech, 9 October 2012. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=1;query=solomon%20islands%20aid;rec=1 2;resCount=Default (accessed 17 February 2014).
\textsuperscript{290} This included the $106m spent on “Regional Pacific,” which supported regional initiatives such as the Australia Pacific Technical College (APTC). For more see DFAT, Australian Aid, “Regional Pacific,” (2014). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/rp/Pages/home.aspx. (accessed 13 January 2014).
\textsuperscript{291} NAA, A/1838 277/2/7, “Aid scheme for the Pacific Islands,” A.H. Tange Secretary of the Department for External Affairs, 4 August 1961.
Since independence from Australia in September 1975, Australia’s aid to PNG has more or less remained on the increase. For the majority of Australia’s aid program, PNG received the largest amount of ODA, being awarded an average of $350 million per annum. Since 2008, it has been Australia’s second largest aid recipient, with a budget worth over $500m in 2013, which increased to $527 million by the end of 2014. Between 1975 and 2013, Australia spent a hefty $16.5 billion on development to PNG. Australia’s aid to PNG therefore stands out amongst its other aid recipients for its size and longevity, and requires further attention to understand why it occupies such an important place in Australia’s foreign aid and development program. This is particularly so as much of the scholarship on Australia’s aid to PNG has been quite critical, stating that it has done very little to improve the lives of everyday Papuans and has contributed to ongoing corruption of the PNG government.

Even as recently as February 2014 Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated: “despite the fact that Australia invests about half a billion dollars each and every year into Papua New Guinea it will not meet one of its Millennium Development Goals. In fact, it is going

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294 The criticism is mainly centred on how the aid is delivered. The majority of Australia’s aid to PNG had been in GBS with little or no oversight by Australia or an external auditor on where and how this money was being spent. This was phased out in the mid-1990s and since then, Australia has technically provided no aid to any country through GBS. However, it has provided aid through partnered government agencies for earmarked projects. This form of direct government-to-government financing has continued the debate on whether this money is used for the intended purpose. For more on this see Grant W. Wilson, “An argument for reframing debates about corruption,” Asia-Pacific Viewpoint 54, no. 1 (2013), pp. 61-76 and Gary Walton, “Is all corruption dysfunctional? Perceptions about corruption and its consequences in Papua New Guinea,” Public Administration and Development 33, no.3 (2013), pp. 175-190. Concerns over corruption has also fuelled the signing of a joint statement on the “Zero Tolerance of Fraud” in aid to PNG and the Abbot governments push to include ‘mutual obligation’ as part of Australia’s country aid programs. For more on “mutual obligation” see Julie Bishops extended interview with John Middleton, Australia’s News Network, “Julia Bishop extended interview,” Newsline, 16 February 2014. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-13/julie-bishop-extended-interview/5258258 (accessed 19 February 2014). It is beyond the scop of this thesis to examine the effects of corruption in the delivery of Australia’s aid. I will say that in the case of PNG, claims of corruption have been levelled at what PNG government officials do with their own budget, which hinders PNGs own development and contributes to overall poor social indicators. There has been no proven case of Australian aid being used by PNG officials for purposes other than approved projects. For more on this see head of the Lowy Institutes Melanesia Program, Jenny Hayward-Jones interview on ABC, “A Focus on corruption in PNG,” Radio Australia, 12 September 2013. Available at: http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/a-focus-on-corruption-in-papua-new-guinea/1194730 (accessed 19 February 2014).
This leads one to ask the question: why, then, has Australia continued to supply aid to PNG when it appears to have no material or moral benefit?

The answer is that Australia does so for strategic reasons, which can be traced back to the importance of the state to Australia’s sea-line of defence. PNG sits on the northeast entry point to what has been described as Australia’s “inner arc.” The inner arc encompassed the Indonesian archipelago, Timor Leste and PNG to Australia’s north and northeast, and Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands and New Caledonia to the east. To defence policy planners, this represented the direction from which any threat to mainland Australia would be mounted. PNG was of particular concern because of its inherent instability, which made it susceptible to major power influence. And given the shortest distance between the two nations is just 150 km, spillover effects from the fragmentation or collapse of PNG were calculated to have severe disadvantages for Australia’s strategic interests. A healthy aid program was part of Australia’s foreign policy expectations aimed at preventing this from occurring. In fact, given that at the time of independence, Australia’s aid represented half of PNG’s budget, the general consensus amongst policymakers has been that without development assistance to PNG, the nation would have struggled to maintain internal security and social stability. The moral and material expectations were therefore linked in that Australian decision-makers viewed foreign aid as a means to assist a neighbouring state to achieve its development goals, and as a way to reduce the potential security issues associated with a failed PNG.

In 2013, Australia’s aid to PNG represented 70% of all donor aid, making it PNG’s principle source of funding for development.

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297 “Question: Papua New Guinea,” Senate, 29 October 1975. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=aid%20papua%20new%20guinea%20budget%20Decade%3A%221970s%22;rec=6;resCount=Default (accessed 21 February 2014).
298 Downer, “Foreign minister discusses PNG; Solomon Islands; aid and North Korea,” 2GB Sydney, Transcript of radio interview with Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 17 October 2006. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customRank;page=1;query=aid%20PNG%20Decade%3A%222000s%22%20SearchCategory_Phrase%3A%22media%22;rec=1;resCount=Default (accessed 23 September 2015).
reciprocal effect, and despite its poor performance towards reaching the MDGs and its decline in rank in HDI from 152 to 156 between 2011 and 2013, Australia’s aid has delivered some positive results.\textsuperscript{300} Evidence of this can be found in the area of health. While not usually placing a specific focus on this area, Australia’s health program to PNG has produced some moral outcomes. Spending on health to PNG increased during the ten years between 2000 and 2010, and is now around 20\% of Australia’s aid to PNG.\textsuperscript{301} The large health program in PNG is tied to its closeness to mainland Australia, making the potential spread of diseases a public health concern. This was realized in 2010, when a cholera outbreak on Daru Island, a part of PNG located in the Torres Strait, forced Australia to close the border with PNG as a precaution to stop the disease entering Queensland.\textsuperscript{302} A further disease scare occurred in 2011 when PNG had several reported cases of multi-drug resistant Tuberculosis (TB).\textsuperscript{303} This was the motivation behind the $32.9 million commitment to support the detection and treatment of TB in PNGs Western Province.\textsuperscript{304}

A significant amount of Australia’s aid to PNG has also been spent on technical assistance. This is mainly due to how Australia delivers its aid through “managing contractors” who...
provide expertise and advice directly to government departments, or who oversee specific projects in infrastructure development and health delivery.\textsuperscript{305} In 2006, the amount spent on technical assistance reached 70\% of total aid to PNG. Such a high proportion corresponded with a general shift in the government’s aid policy to a “whole of government” approach that focused on reducing corruption and promoting good governance. This also mirrored the Howard government’s broadening of regional security issues to include the effects of failed and weak states. And Australia’s foreign aid focus on corruption and good governance was expected to achieve these security interests.

Previously, Australia’s approach followed the dominant neoliberal thinking of the time, which was to limit the role of the state and administer small, program specific projects with the help of NGOs or private enterprise. However, this changed following a shift in international best practice that saw a direct link between the health of a state’s institutions and a breakdown of law and order.\textsuperscript{306} As a result, a new partnership was signed in 2004 termed the Enhanced Cooperation Partnership (ECP), which expanded Australia’s aid to PNG to include a significant role for other Australian departments, such as legal, policing, finance and immigration.\textsuperscript{307}

The level of technical assistance then quickly declined to 45\% in 2010, and was down to 37\% by 2013. A concern for good governance in PNG has been the oft-cited explanation for Australia’s focus on technical assistance, but this is not the only motivation. A less well-canvased one is the economic benefits reaped by Australia in trade in services. In 1999, this was the third largest source of exports to PNG, and in 2013 this was worth $570 million, the majority of which was in professionals, teachers and business advisers.\textsuperscript{308} The scale of the economic returns for Australia are increased when one considers that technical assistance cost less than other types of aid, such as commodity or capital aid. Yet opinion on whether


\textsuperscript{307}The ECP was then renamed the Strengthening Government Program (SGP) in 2008 and fell under the new PNG-Australia Partnership for Development. The ECP included 18 non-policing law and order officials, 36 treasury and finance, 10 immigration and border protection, 2 transport personnel, 3 custom workers and 1 civil aviator. The agreement also included 230 police officials, but these individuals were later withdrawn from the country after PNG ruled certain exceptions covering their conduct violated PNGs sovereignty and were unconstitutional. Alexander Downer, “New era of enhanced cooperation,” Media Release, 11 November 2003. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=10;query=PNG%20security;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 21 February 2014). In 2010, technical assistance had reached 360.

aid in technical assistance has been money well spent is divided. In terms of the flow on trade
benefits for Australia outlined above, this has been quite lucrative, but the outcomes for PNG
are not so clear. Some like Anita Doraisami and Ronald May have argued that this has been a
type of “boomerang aid” where the benefits have largely flowed to Australia in wages and
eligibility criteria for the tendering of contracts in its bilateral aid program allowing firms and
businesses in the receiving state to participate.\footnote{Downer, in making this announcement, singled out PNG as an important recipient. Alexander Downer, “AusAID contracts a new opportunity for PNG companies,” Media Release, 15 December 2004. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p?adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Alexander%20Downer%20PNG%20SearchCategory_Phrase%3A%22media%22%20Dataset_Phrase%3A%22press\%22%20Decade%3A%222000%22%20Year%3A%222004%22%20Month%3A%2212%22;rec=5;resCount =Default (accessed 27 February 2014).}

Despite these criticisms, Australia’s technical assistance has been the only source of training
and expertise, which occurred frequently in health where PNG had few trained professionals
and technical assistance represents 47% of Australia’s health commitment. In other areas,
Australia’s assistance helped PNG attract further aid from external sources, as was the case
when PNG’s application for funding for the Global Fund in 2009 was rejected over concerns
it did not have the facilities and procedures in place to properly treat HIV and AIDS
demonstrated a preference for advisers over physical aid. For example, in the law and justice
sector, the participating departments were offered a choice between technical assistance and
direct financing, and the result was 60% of funds going towards the employment of

The moral outcomes stemming from Australia’s aid to PNG have also led to benefits for
Australia. The state of PNG itself, while drastically underdeveloped, is rich in natural gas, oil,
gold and cooper, which accounted for around 70% of the states exports. At the time of the first Development Cooperation Treaty, PNG was Australia’s 11th largest investment destination worth $2.3 billion. Yet the overall two-way trade was low, worth $2.1 billion, or about 1% of Australia’s trade, meaning there were significant opportunities for growth. Indeed, growth in trade, and particularly in energy, was the key motivation behind Australia’s loan of $548.55 million to the development of the joint LNG project in PNG. This was established in 2010 as an initiative to capitalize on PNGs “resource boom.” Between 2003 and 2012 PNGs national revenue tripled from K3.6 billion to K10.2 billion respectively. At the time, Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island Affairs Richard Marles stated:

Australian companies are well positioned to benefit from Papua New Guinea’s economic growth. The potential exists for two-way trade to increase significantly, particularly if estimates are realized of a 15 to 20% annual increase in GDP as a result of the PNG LNG Project.

Even though the project is not due to start operations until 2015, Australian businesses have already benefited. The LNG project’s major sponsor was Exxon Mobil Corp, but Australian companies Oil Search and Santos gained significant shares in the development. From the $19 billion project, $3 billion went to contracts for Australian businesses for work during the construction phase. The economic gains for Australia were not just restricted to the mining and resource sector. By 2013 over 4,000 businesses were investing in PNG and Australia was PNG’s principle destination for exports at 35.9% and top source of imports at 34.4%. Total Australian investment in PNG had also increased to $18.618 billion, which was equal to its investment in China. This was in comparison to PNG investment in Australia, which had run

314 Ibid.
to debt at -$465 million. What this demonstrates is that overall Australia’s close development relationship with PNG has resulted in significant financial payoffs.

**Australian aid to Pacific and PNG**

**Sources: OECD QWIDS and AusAID Budgets**

**Australia’s foreign aid and development to Southeast Asia: The Indonesian focus**

It has been shown that Australia’s aid to the Pacific has largely been targeted towards states where Australia has a long-standing strategic interest, in the case of PNG, or where a change in Australia’s regional environment has required a recalculation of Australia’s aid priorities, as was seen in increased aid to Solomon Islands. It has also been shown that Australia’s foreign aid is guided by specific moral and material expectations of receiving beneficial returns. This was found in the type of aid Australia’s prefers (agriculture, economic development and good governance) and where Australian policymakers anticipated that Australia’s aid would best achieve its moral expectation of reducing poverty.

This demonstrates the importance of rational choice in understanding where Australia delivers its foreign aid and a similar pattern emerges when assessing Australia’s aid to “Asia.” Aid to this region has been largely directed to Southeast Asia and to one nation: Indonesia. By 1975, it was the largest recipient of educational scholarships and technical

assistance under the Colombo Plan and represented half of Australia’s aid to the entire East Asian region. Since then, it has been the region’s largest recipient of aid, receiving on average 13% of total Australian ODA.\textsuperscript{320} In 2008, it replaced PNG as the largest recipient of Australian aid with a jump from $230 million in 2005 to $457 million in 2010. And by 2012, it was over $500 million – representing around 40% of Australian aid to East Asia.

The reasons for this high level of aid activity are fairly clear. Like PNG, Indonesia is strategically close to Australia, the shortest distance between the two states is 200 km with overall sea distances ranging from 500km to 900km. Apart from being proximate, Indonesia is also populous, with a population 10 times the size of Australia at 247 million as of 2013. The size and geographic proximity has meant that Indonesia is often described as Australia’s most important strategic and diplomatic partnership. As a founding member of ASEAN, a stable and productive relationship with Indonesia was thought to act as a bridge into closer ties with other nations, making it Australia’s largest regional asset. And yet, while there has been a desire for positive relations in regional cooperation and bilateral trade, this has been offset by security concerns from what Australian strategic studies experts, such as Paul Dibb and Robert Ayson, have termed the “arc of instability.”\textsuperscript{321} The notion of an arc of instability derives from the nature of Indonesia’s geography. Indonesia is an archipelago consisting of 17,500 separate islands, which stretch over 5,100km above Australia’s northern borders. Its political and social organization has also been traditionally unstable, with a decentralised governmental system, frequent breakdowns in law and order and risks of separatist

\textsuperscript{320} In 2000, Australian aid to Timor Leste exceeded Indonesia by $37 million. Like Solomon Islands, this corresponded with Australia’s leadership of the International Intervention Force for East Timor (INTERFET). Before INTERFET, Australia gave no aid to Timor Leste, apart from the $500,00 provided between 1975-1976 over the “Balibo Affair.” After 2000, aid to Timor Leste declined from its high of $160.77 million to $85.42 million in 2001. It increased slightly to $104 million in 2012 and is expected to be $114.6 million by the end of 2014. What this demonstrates is that while aid to Timor Leste increased during the INTERFET operation and continued during the period of state-building after independence, this has been as significant when compared to the level provided to Solomon’s under RAMSI. As such, it does not warrant further examination here. Instead, the expectations and outcomes of Australia’s involvement in INTERFET will be covered in the next chapter on humanitarian operations. Statistics used here are compiled from multiple sources. See OECD, “Query wizard for international development statistics.” Available at: https://stats.oecd.org; “Australian aid over time,” Development Policy Centre (2012) Available at: https://sites.google.com/site/australianaidovertime/home and DFAT, Australian Aid, “Timor Leste,” (December 2013). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/timor-leste/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 25 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{321} Paul Dibb originally coined the expression “arc of instability,” during the late 1990s when strategic opinion centred on the security effects flowing from a rapidly rising Asia. Since then, this sense of strategic insecurity in Australia’s direct sphere of influence has guided strategic and political policy towards one of its nearest neighbours. For more see, Paul Dibb, David D. Hale and Peter Prince, “Asia’s insecurity,” Survival 41, no. 3 (1999), pp. 5-20; and Robert Ayson, “The Arc of instability and Australia’s strategic policy,” Australian Journal of International Relations 61, no. 2 (2007), pp. 215-231.
movements. All of these factors together meant Indonesia represented the largest potential threat to Australia’s mainland and maritime security.

In this regard, Australia’s aid to Indonesia shares a similar purpose to PNG in that it has been guided by the strategic need to ensure the island chain remains relatively secure. A certain amount of regional obligation also motivated Australia’s high level of commitment. Given the nature of Southeast Asian politics and the steadfast ASEAN commitment to the principle of non-intervention, it was accepted that Australia could not assume that others in the region had the ability to respond to a failed and fragmented Indonesia – a concern that was realised during the Timor Leste crisis, where Australia was the only state with the capacity and willingness to lead a multi-nation stabilization force.322

The strategic importance of Indonesia is evident in the consistency of Australia’s aid to the state, which continued despite various instances of conflict in the relationship. One of the earliest examples was the decision to continue aid during the Konfrontasi when Australian and Indonesian forces clashed in Malaya.323 Aid to Indonesia was heavily debated and it was decided that Australia needed to continue its aid as a means of securing open airline communications.324 By 1995, Australia’s development assistance to Indonesia had increased to over $100 million, which reflected its growing relationship with the nation, and a significant indication of the Hawke-Keating Labor governments accelerated push into Southeast Asia.

Following the end of the Cold War, Australia was again concerned about the US’ commitment to Southeast Asia. In 1992, the US shut down its six bases in the Philippines and indicated that it would take a stronger stance on Indonesian human rights abuses and labour practices.325 This fuelled, in part, Australia’s policy of “comprehensive engagement” that focused on building regional security and a key aspect of this was closer ties with Indonesia,

324 There was a particular concern that if Australia did not continue to supply aid to Indonesia, it would loose out on the knowledge, contacts and prestige acquired in administering certain projects, such as the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN), to other nations. NAA, A663/3/10, “Provision of AFTN project under Colombo plan aid,” Head Intelligence Coordination Branch, 30 September 1964.
325 Following the deaths of protestors in Dili by the Indonesian military in November 1991, in 1992 the US suspended Indonesia’s participation in military training exercises as part of the International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP). This was re-instated later in 1995 under President Clinton with certain conditions. For more see, Robert G Sutter, The United States in Asia (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 100-110.
which had already produced payoffs in Indonesia’s support for Australia’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative and the potential for increased trade; Indonesia’s real GDP growth had reached an annual average of 7%.  

A combination of security and economic expectations of reciprocity led to a flurry of diplomatic activity between the two nations. In 1994, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans began secret talks with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alitas on a bilateral security agreement between the two nations. In the same year, Minister for Trade, Bob McMullen led a delegation of 250 business leaders to Jakarta, which, at the time, was the largest single overseas Australian delegation. This coincided with the second meeting of the Australian-Indonesian Ministerial Forum (AIMF). The AIMF was the first bilateral dialogue that brought ministers together from foreign affairs, trade, business, development and defence. Shortly after this meeting, Evans announced plans for $150 million worth of concessional loans to Indonesia for infrastructure development. The stimulation of business and trade interest in Indonesia showed signs of producing dividends for Australia. In the five years between 1989-1994, exports to Indonesia had tripled to $1.8 billion, and of this, $766 million was in manufactured exports. Australia was Indonesia’s 10th largest source of investment with over 180 Australian companies operating in the nation.

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328 The majority went towards the building of its rail and transport sector and included tendering for Australian businesses in the $21.7 million Traffic Control Project in Bandung, the Bekasi to Bandung Railway Resignalling Project worth $74.5 million and the $3.9 million Brantas River Industrial Waste Treatment Plants Project. This coincided with the $135 million already provided under its development assistance. In reference to the importance of its ODA to Indonesia, Evans stated that: “The program not only provides benefits to Indonesia, it continues to provide opportunities for Australian business to showcase technology and expertise in areas crucial to continued economic growth in Indonesia.” Gareth Evans, “Successful outcome to Indonesian aid talks,” Press Releases, 8 September 1994. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Indonesian%20aid;resCount=Default (accessed 3rd February 2014).

329 Gareth Evans, “Foreign affairs, defence and trade committee report: Government responses,” Senate, 2 June 1994. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Committee%20Report%20Government%20Responses%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221994%22%20Month%3A%2206%22%20Day%3A%2202%22;rec=1;resCount=Default (accessed 3rd February 2014).
The shift to focus Australia’s diplomatic resources on regional engagement was the foreign policy approach publicly pursued by the Hawke-Keating government that argued successive Coalition governments had not done enough to advance Australia’s status in the region. This, however, was largely rhetorical. The Colombo Plan was a Coalition initiative, which continued under successive Labor and Coalition governments. Recognition of Indonesia’s importance to Australia thus had strong bipartisan support, which was particularly evident during the Timor Leste crisis when Australia’s aid to Indonesia was intensely debated. This time, Prime Minister Howard threatened to cease monetary aid to Indonesia as punishment for their conduct in Timor Leste but this was never carried out. In fact, after a dip in aid in 1998 to $97.09 million, which occurred before the crisis, aid to Indonesia was back to equal 1995 levels, and by 2004 had increased to $158 million.

Alongside the strategic and economic interests, the giving of aid to Indonesia was also a way for Australia to contribute the most to the moral expectation of reducing the conditions of poverty. Prime Minister John Howard emphasised this point when he stated that the purpose of Australia’s aid to Indonesia was both moral and strategic. In his own words:

It addresses the humanitarian needs; it also serves to bring our countries and peoples closer together. It is a strategic commitment to raise the living standards of the people of Indonesia.

Approximately 120 million Indonesians live on less than $US2 a day, and more than 32 million live below the poverty line. And despite an increase in overall growth indicators, the state still ranks 121 out of 187 on the HDI. The geographic closeness of Indonesia to Australia meant that its aid could achieve more in assisting the poor, and Indonesia’s importance to Australia foreign and security policy meant the expectations of reciprocity


were potentially increased. In fact, these expectations were quite significant given the size of Australia’s aid commitment. In 2005, following the 2004 tsunami, Howard announced a $1 billion aid and relief package, the Australian-Indonesian Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD), which was provided alongside Australia’s development assistance to Indonesia, bringing the total amount of ODA to $2 billion over the four years between 2005 and 2009. This made Australia the single largest grant aid donor to Indonesia.

Sources: Development Policy Centre and AusAID Budgets

Australia’s aid to Indonesia was not, in the first instance, determined by a humanitarian obligation to help a neighbour in response to a natural disaster. It reflected Canberra’s broader foreign aid policy that had expanded to consider non-traditional security threats and their link with domestic instability and social decline. Here, the threat of terrorism and

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335 The AIPRD was originally set to operate between 2005 and 2009 with annual contributions of $500m going towards programs of both reconstruction and social development. However, given the size of the aid package, this was extended in 2008 to run until 2013. In total, $2.5 billion was spent on the AIPRD making Indonesia the recipient of the single largest aid program ever implemented by Australia. By 2013, its yearly commitment had reached $541.6 million, which is expected to increase to $583.6 million by the end of 2014. DFAT, Australian Aid, “ Indonesia country brief,” (December 2013). Available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html (accessed 26th January 2014).

336 John Howard, “Foreign policy in the age of terrorism,” Address by the Prime Minister John Howard to the Sydney Institute Intercontinental Hotel, Sydney, Speech, 1 July 2003. Available at:
Islamic extremism was significant. The Bali terrorist attacks had occurred 2 years before the tsunami, and in the same year that Howard announced the AIPRD Australia began talks on a new security treaty with Indonesia that included cooperation on counter-terrorism, people smuggling and police training. This was no coincidence: as Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Dr Hassan Wirajuda indicated, Australia’s assistance went a long way to quell domestic criticism of Indonesia’s relationship with Australia after Timor Leste, which made it easier to start negotiations on a new treaty.\(^{337}\) The overall effect of this was three-fold and was linked to the moral and material expectations described above.

Australia’s assistance facilitated the creation of a new security pact, which also spearheaded Indonesia’s support for Australia’s participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS). Three months after the aid package was announced, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in a meeting with Prime Minister Howard stated that he “stressed the importance of Australia’s close engagement with the region, and I reiterated Indonesia’s support for Australia to join the East Asia Summit this year.”\(^{338}\) This paid off when Australia was accepted into the EAS in Malaysia in December 2005.

Further gains were also achieved in improving Australia and Indonesia’s trade and investment relationship. Following Yudhoyono’s visit, Australia and Indonesia signed a new economic framework that opened investment for Australian business in mining, agriculture and agribusiness, the automotive sector and finance.\(^{339}\) Two–way trade with Indonesia increased from $8.5 billion in 2004 to over $10 billion in 2013, making Indonesia Australia’s 8\(^{th}\) largest export destination and 10\(^{th}\) largest source of imports.\(^{340}\) Investment increased from

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\(^{339}\) Mark Vaile, “Australia and Indonesia announce trade and investment framework,” *Media Release*, 18 April 2005. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=Indonesia%20development%20business%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 28 February 2014).

\(^{340}\) Some of the investment opportunities included Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBAs) Indonesian banking subsidiary, PT Bank Commonwealth (PTBC), acquiring Surabaya-based regional bank; Newcrest Mining Limited, opening mines in Gosowong on Halmahera Island and Australia’s largest oil and gas producer Santos expanding production across East Java.
$350 million to over $7.35 billion by 2013, $6.75 billion of which was Australia’s investment in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{341}

Based on this evidence, Australia’s decision to increase its ODA to Indonesia was motivated by the expectation of reciprocal benefits for Australia’s national and regional security. The delivery of aid also produced certain moral and material outcomes. An important aspect of the AIPRD was the $500 million in concessional loans that went towards infrastructure development. The other $500 million was spread through a grant assistance program, which included health, education, rehabilitation and capacity building.\textsuperscript{342} The concessional loans were long-term, with no interest up to 40 years, and were open for Australian, Indonesian and New Zealand contracts. Several major Australian companies were awarded building contracts, such as Boral, BlueScope Steel, OneSteel, Leighton Holdings, Thiess and Linfox. A large share of the loans, around $300 million, was channelled through the Eastern Indonesian National Road Improvement Program (EINRIP) and went towards road transport, water and sanitation.\textsuperscript{343}

The EINRIP yielded significant results and was heralded as one of the more effective aid programs delivered under the AIPRD, to the extent that by 2013 infrastructure development under the program represented nearly 30% of Australia’s total ODA to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{344} The EINRIP was designed to provide 20 major road projects across nine provinces, with a total of 395km of national roads being constructed and 1300 meters of fabricated steel bridges. To date, 8 of the 12 projects have been completed with the remaining 4 under implementation.\textsuperscript{345}


\textsuperscript{343} The loans were supported by $28 million grants package for operational and administrative support. Peter Costello, “Third joint ministerial statement,” Press Release, 7 December 2005. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=EI NRIP;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 5 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{344} An estimated 85% of AusAID expenditure on infrastructure aid was delivered through the EINRIP, and its administrative counterpart the Indonesian Infrastructure Initiative (IndII). The remaining 15%, around $13 million, went to small projects delivered in partnership with the WB and the ADB. “Performance audit AusAID’s management of infrastructure aid to Indonesia: Australian agency for international development,” Auditor-General Audit reports for 2012-13 No. 39, 28 May 2013. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query =EINRIP;resCount=Default (accessed 5 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{345} The program has now been extended to close in December 2014 to allow for completion of the existing projects. DFAT, Australian Aid, “Eastern Indonesian national roads improvement project program fast facts,”

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These projects led to flow on development effects in granting greater access to health and education facilities, particularly for women and children.\textsuperscript{346} As mentioned above, Australian business benefited from procurement contracts through AusAID. For example, consultancy firm URS Australia PTY LTD was the recipient of one of largest contracts ever undertaken, being awarded an estimated $20 million over 3 years.\textsuperscript{347} The majority of Australia’s activity was directed towards those provinces closest to Australia – Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Nusa Tenaggara, Papua and West Papua. Therefore the policy was in line with its overall strategic interests in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{348}

Another key area of Australian development assistance was in education and training, which was expected to lead to both moral and material outcomes. Indeed, education represented the largest sector of funding to Indonesia, approximately $500 million or 25% of its ODA to Indonesia. The Australian-Indonesian Basic Education Partnership (AIBEP) was part of Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy as it argued that the teaching of radical Islam was a factor in acts of terrorism and improving education was the one way that Australia expected to counter potential terror attacks. This was a problem in Indonesia where Islamic schools (both madrasah and pasentren) comprised of one-third of the education sector.\textsuperscript{349}

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\textsuperscript{346} Further benefits were also had in the increased transport times, and greater access to local communities has also attracted private investment in primary commodities, such as corn and sandalwood. The operation of EINRIP was also effective in comparison to other multi-donor aid initiatives. The World Bank sister road project was three years behind schedule as of 2011, even though it started at the same time as the EINRIP. Australia also had more success in holding the Indonesian Ministry of Public Affairs to account as it attached safety and productivity conditions on its loans. For more see Charles Tapp, “Study of Australia’s approach to aid in Indonesia: Final report,” A Report to the Panel Conducting the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, (2011). Available at: www.aidreview.gov.au/publications/study-indonesia.doc (accessed 5 February 2014).


\textsuperscript{348} Several resource contracts were awarded to Australian companies. These included Australia’s Rio Tinto, which was awarded the contract to develop Indonesia’s US$2 billion Sulawesi Nickel Project. A six-year US$610 million contract for the provision of mining services at the Wahana coal mine in South Kalimantan was awarded to PT Wahana Baratama Mining and a US$70 million coal mining contract was given PT Multi Harapan in East Kalimantan to increase the Botang coal export terminal from 8.5 million tones per annum to 18.5 million. Aero Energy Australia was awarded 4 multi-million dollar Coal Bed Methane (CBM) projects in South Sumatra and Kalimantan, which assisted in the development of Indonesia’s gas sector. Warren Truss, “Australia and Indonesia strengthen trade and investment partnership,” Media Release, 26 June 2007. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Indonesia%20development%20business%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;rec=9;resCount=Default (accessed 28 February 2014).

\textsuperscript{349} In Indonesia, the madrasah’s are those that teach the national secular curriculum and are typically described as moderate or mainstream. The pasentren are those schools, which are largely unregulated and remain outside the national exam system. Two of the Bali bombers, Mukhlas and Amrozi, were educated at a pasentren in Solo established by convicted terrorist and radical cleric Abu Bakir Bashir. Tim Lindsay, “Hardline Islam a
Foreign Minister, Bob Carr, stated as recently as 2013: “It is in our interests and in Indonesia’s interests to seeing that the country has a good education system.” Here, Australia’s interests guided where this program was targeted. The majority of Australia’s education activity was directed towards Eastern Indonesia and corresponded with the targeted development approach of other programs, such as the EINRIP described above. These provinces also happen to rank the lowest on the HDI and, in this regard, Australia’s national interest converged with moral expectations to produce both moral and material outcomes.

Over 330,000 new school places were created through building or extending 2,074 junior secondary schools, which included 504 Islamic schools constructed to meet national curriculum standards. The administrative aspect of this program also produced quite tangible benefits for Indonesia. A study in 2009 on the impact of teacher training and school management assistance found that AIBEP schools thrived against non-AIBEP counterparts. In general they provided better access to post-primary education in remote areas, greater distribution of textbooks and employed higher quality teachers. Of the 30 AIBEP schools sampled, 87% had a long-term budget and strategic plan in place, twice that of the non-AIBEP schools. On top of the assistance through the AIBEP, Australia awarded 350 scholarships a year to Indonesian students to study in Australia, which is set to increase to 500 by the end of 2014. Stimulating education exchange was part of Australia’s trade relationship as educated-related travel represented nearly half of its trade in service exports at $579 million.

The examination of Australia’s aid to Indonesia demonstrates that strategic expectations were the defining factor motivating its high level of commitment, which was part of Australia’s overall policy of regional engagement. Alongside these strategic expectations was the moral...
anticipation that Australia’s aid would contribute towards reducing the conditions of poverty. These expectations converged to led to economic benefits that were tied to specific development projects like EINRIP. Together with Australia’s aid to PNG, this demonstrates that geography played a significant role in the calculation of where Australia’s aid went. This is not necessarily surprising and follows what was expected in terms of understanding Australia’s foreign aid and development policy. What is less clear, though, is where Australia gave aid that was not linked to geographic considerations, and whether this was also guided by expectations of reciprocity and produced both moral and material outcomes. This is the task of the next section of the chapter, where I examine Australia’s foreign aid to Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. While traditionally less of a focus for Australia’s aid, this will add to the moral realist claim that aid can change depending on a shift in how Australia calculates its material interests.

**Strategy beyond geography: Expectations of reciprocity guiding Australia’s foreign aid to Africa and the Middle East**

During the Colombo Plan, Australia’s only aid to Africa was through the scholarship support scheme. In 1974-75, when a separate Australian aid department was established, aid to African nations totalled only $6 million. By the mid-1980s this had increased to $80 million, but by 2002 this had decreased to just $50 million. However, in the five years between 2008 and 2013 Australia quadrupled the amount of aid to Africa, from $100 million to $385.6 million respectively. It had reached a peak of $436.348 million in 2012. In relative terms, this was still a small amount, representing around 9% of the total aid budget. But given that Australia went from being a largely insignificant aid donor, to an active aid player in the short space of five years, this is significant. Australia’s contribution followed the global shift in aid and development to Africa as a result of the latter’s near tripling of GDP, which demonstrated potential for significant market opportunities in trade and investment. Africa also has 30% of the estimated global mineral reserves, and Australia’s African aid program was adjusted to reflect this reality with new initiatives, such as the Australian Mining for Development Program (M4D) in Africa, being delivered alongside the established focus on

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agricultural and health. In this regard, despite a temporary shift in where Australia provided its aid, it was still guided by a calculation of the same moral and material expectations that traditionally underpinned the aid program. As the Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said at the time:

There’s a lot that Australia can do both from an economic point of view, a capacity-building point of view, and development assistance point of view, in areas where we’ve got great comparative advantage or expertise.

The Australian mining presence was quite extensive and can be seen as a major contributor to Australia’s increased aid to the region. Over 200 Australian resource companies were involved in 650 projects in 42 African nations. The total combined value of Australia’s mining investments in Africa was estimated at $62 billion. As of 2013, one in 20 companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) was invested in Africa, and the continent hosts the largest amount of Australian overseas mining companies, approximately 40%. In 2013 Australia hosted an Africa Down Under Conference on Minerals and Oils, where it was announced that AusAID would spend $140m on the M4D in Africa. Yet, despite the increase in aid and expected returns in investment, Australia’s total two-way trade to African states had declined by 24.3% in 2009, indicating that the reciprocal benefits were not so clear. Perhaps more telling was the correlation between Australia’s interest in Africa

357 Australia has been active in these two areas since the 1980s when there was a broad increase in its aid activities. For example, since 1984, it has been a major contributor to the Hamlin Fistula Hospital in Addis Ababa, which focused on both treatment and training for local medical professionals. It treats, on average, over 2,500 women per year. DFAT, Australian Aid, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Mining for development in Africa,” (2013). Available at: http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/sub-saharan-africa/Pages/mining.aspx (accessed 13 January 2014)


and its campaign to win a rotating non-permanent UNSC seat where African states make up 54 of the 193 votes in the General Assembly. This claim is further supported by the projected $155.2 million decrease of aid to Africa in the 2014 budget.\(^{362}\)

![Australian Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa](chart.png)

*Sources: Development Policy Centre and AusAID Budgets*

This, of course, does not necessarily detract from the moral outcomes of Australia’s aid in terms of social and economic development, nor does it fully account for where in Africa this aid was directed. In terms of the recipient benefits, Australian aid has assisted in vaccinating an estimated 2.5 million African children against measles, 2.6 million against polio and 25,000 against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. It has also assisted in the establishment of 25 rural maternal health clinics and its scholarship program has increased, from a low total of 300 during the Colombo Plan years, to over 4,000 Australian Awards and Scholarships being awarded to African students. Contributions towards food security and agriculture have been particularly notable, and this has guided where Australia has directed a large majority of its aid. \(^{363}\)


Zimbabwe has been the major recipient of Australian aid to Africa, representing 25% of the African aid program. Between 2008 and 2012, Australia gave $194.662 million to Zimbabwe, making Australia its fifth largest aid donor. For Australia, Zimbabwe was expected to represent a fertile aid destination, and it was cost effective in terms of Australia’s ability to deliver aid. As a former member of the Commonwealth; Zimbabwe had some of the administrative infrastructure already in place to implement aid and development projects. Greater material benefits were also expected in that Zimbabwe had land and climate similar to Australia and therefore was suited to Australian agricultural expertise. Here, Australia saw potential for economic returns as it enjoyed a trade imbalance in its favour, with Australian exports to Zimbabwe worth $6,743 million, while Zimbabwean imports were worth $242,000. Roughly half of the export total was wheat, at $3,481 million, indicating that agricultural assistance to Zimbabwe coincided with interests in expanding Australian primary export markets.

This section showed that even when Australia chooses to provide aid to nations outside its direct strategic sphere of influence, it is still guided by expectations of reciprocity, and rational calculations of where its national interests can be achieved. This was found in the original decision for Australia to increase its aid to Africa under the expectation that it would lead to reciprocal payoffs in its bid to be a non-permanent member of the UNSC. An increase in aid also corresponded with the opening of Africa to international mining and investment, and programs like M4D presented an opportunity for Australia to share its expertise while also reap some economic benefits in return. But mining opportunities were shown to be a less significant expectation of reciprocity than the UNSC membership, as Australia’s aid to Africa decreased after its diplomacy was successful. As well as highlighting the importance of expectations of reciprocity, this also demonstrated the importance of rational choice in that Australia’s decision to increase aid to Africa was determined by a rational calculation of whether it would achieve its diplomatic and economic objectives at the time.

Reconstructing Australia’s ODA in the Middle East: Moral and strategic considerations of Australia’s foreign aid

Australia’s foreign aid to the Middle East has a longer history than in Africa, but similar patterns of decision-making can be found that further support the observations made above. During the Colombo Plan, Australia paid some attention to Pakistan and Afghanistan in assistance in agriculture and food aid, but the region was not a significant factor in Australia’s aid priorities. However, this changed during Australia’s commitment to the war in Afghanistan, as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Australia’s aid increased from zero during the height of Soviet offences in 1985, to $198.394 million in 2012.366 There was a slight increase following Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and Evans, as Foreign Minister, announced a $20 million relief and aid package over three years, most of which went towards food aid where Australian wheat was sold and distributed by the World Food Program (WFP) at subsidised prices.367 This then decreased again during the Taliban occupation to just $671,000 in 2001. In percentage terms, over the 10-year period between 2001 and 2012, Australian aid to Afghanistan went from 0.4% of the total to 3.9%.368 As of 2013 it represented Australia’s fourth largest aid partner, after Indonesia, PNG and Solomon Islands.369

366 These statistics can be found in the graph compiled below.
367 Approximately $2 million went to UN agencies for assistance in Afghan returnees, $10 million went to food aid and the remaining went to other relief efforts such as clean water, sanitation and hygiene. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, “Questions without notice: Afghanistan aid,” Senate, 5 May 1989, p. 1921. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Questions%20Without%20Notice%3A%20Afghanistan%20Aid%20Decade%3A%221980s%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed February 2014). In 1993, another $4 million was announced which included the distribution of 7000 tones of Australian wheat. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans, “Australian wheat in $4m aid package for Afghanistsan,” Media Release, 20 December 1993. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=“Australian%20Wheat%20in%20$4m%20aid%20package%20for%20Afghanistan.”;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 2 February 2014).
368 This represents the total ODA to Afghanistan, which includes the assistance provided by the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the Australian Federal Police (ADF) and the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIC). AusAID delivered the majority, between 70 and 75%.
A significant chunk of this aid was targeted to the Uruzgan province, around 20%, where Australia had the largest troop presence. The remaining 80% was directed towards national programming that included infrastructure development, agriculture and education. These projects had benefits for both Australia and Afghanistan. The most significant area of interest for Australia was in infrastructure development. For three years between 2010 and 2013, it led the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). It is no coincidence that Australia’s aid contribution increased to its largest point in 2010 when it took over from the Dutch in leading the PRT. It is also instructive that Australia’s aid to Afghanistan has declined since the end of the PRT, from a high of $198.3 million in 2012, to an expected expenditure of $152.3 million by the end of 2014. But during this time, Australia’s aid produced quite significant outcomes for both Australia and Afghanistan.

The focus on Uruzgan was not guided solely by strategic concerns. It was also where Australia expected to achieve the most in terms of its aid objectives. Downer emphasised the convergence of these moral and material expectations when he stated that Australia’s aid would:

Reinforce the progress of the militarily-led reconstruction effort in Uruzgan Province – one of the neediest parts of Afghanistan. It will
improve the delivery of essential services such as health and education, strengthen agricultural production and help build security and stability in Afghanistan and adjoining areas of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{370}

The province was one of the poorest in Afghanistan with literacy rates for women estimated at 1\% compared with the rest of the state at 18\%.\textsuperscript{371} Australia’s commitment specifically targeted education for girls and women and assisted in the increase construction and rehabilitation of over 200 schools.\textsuperscript{372} Some of the PRT funded projects also led to job opportunities for local Afghans. The construction and upgrade of over 200 km of roads and bridges generated employment opportunities for over a 1000 people.\textsuperscript{373} And supported a further 350 small-scale community infrastructure projects relating to agricultural development and health.

Perhaps an overlooked aspect of Australia’s commitment to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan is the potential for private investment as the security situation increased. In 2010, then Australian Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, addressed the “Afghanistan International Investment Conference,” in Dubai and announced there was “significant potential for Afghanistan as a destination for private and public investment.”\textsuperscript{374} For Australia, there was substantial interest in the largely untapped mineral wealth and under-development mining sector, with reserves estimated to be worth $US3 trillion.\textsuperscript{375}

Part of Australia’s aid already went towards increasing the capacity of the mining industry under the expectation that it would lead to certain economic payoffs. It provided funding for Afghan mining officials to study geology at Australian universities as part of the Australian

Awards program, and its M4D partnership with Afghanistan assisted in the exchange of officials to train at the Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum. This led to reciprocal payoffs when the Afghanistan government indicated that Australia was a natural source of mining investment and expertise. The Afghani Mines Minister, Wahidullah Shahrani, stated “Australia is a model for us,” and had been “very generous to help us with technical capacity and give us scholarships for postgraduate programs.”

![Australian aid to Iraq](image)

**Sources: OECD QWIDS and AusAID Budgets**

Australia’s aid to Afghanistan indicated a consideration for expectations of reciprocity, as well as the potential for moral and material outcomes. This was the case, despite the Middle East being an area of neglect in terms of where Australia has traditionally delivered aid. Here, Australia’s development assistance to Iraq is also worth further evaluation. Before the Gulf War, Australia’s aid relationship with Iraq was even less than it originally was with Afghanistan. Australia’s first aid commitment was in 1978 and was a mere $11,000. This increased slightly after 1991 when Australia provided emergency relief aid to assist Kurdish

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refugees in Northern Iraq and food aid to assist in general shortages. There were two national interest expectations motivating Australia’s decision to provide humanitarian aid to Iraq. The first was strategic: there was a sense of obligation amongst policymakers that Australia’s military participation as part of the multinational coalition *Operation Desert Storm* needed to be supported by development assistance. The second factor related to Australia’s economic interests. Its major military contribution was in supporting trade sanctions against the nation in the Persian Gulf, where it provided ships and additional support for *Operation Damaska*. By the end of 1990 trade sanctions were starting to have a significant financial effect on Australia. At the time, the cost was estimated at up to $1 billion, the majority of which was lost in wheat sales. Hence food aid was given in surplus wheat, approximately 5,000 tonnes between 1991 and 1996, as a means of keeping Australia in the wheat market without compromising its support for international sanctions. And its military commitment was guided by the desire to see a timely resolution to the conflict in order to restart its trade relationship with Iraq.

Yet having said this, the amount of aid was still relatively small, with only $2.74 million being given between 1991 and 1997. This indicates that, in general, Australia’s aid was guided by its level of military commitment, which was also fairly limited. This claim is further supported by the cessation of direct aid in 1997 when Australia could resume the sale of wheat to Iraq through the UNs’ “oil for food” program. Following 1997, Australia’s aid resumed again in 2003 when it became one of the early supporters of the WoT and joined the

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377 “Questions without notice: Middle East Kurdish refugees,” HoR, 10 July 1991. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Iraq%20aid%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221991%22;rec=8;resCount=Default (accessed 4th February 2014).
380 Australia was a net exporter of energy and so was less concerned about damages to oil imports. However, there was some concern that if the crisis continued it would start to have a more severe impact on global oil prices and negatively effect the economies of its major trading partners (the US and Japan). This would have added strain to an already depressed global environment (given the 1990s recession) leading to negative effects for Australia’s economy.
381 “Questions without notice: Food sid,” Senate, 5 December 1997. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=food%20aid%20Iraq%20Decade%3A%221990s%22;rec=1;resCount=Default (accessed 6 February 2014).
382 UN Security Council Resolution 986 established the UN “oil for food” program in December 1996. It allowed Iraq to export $US1 billion worth of oil every 90 days with the sales intended to be used to purchase food and other necessities for the Iraqi population. This program ended in May 2003 when sanctions were lifted from the Saddam Hussein regime by Resolution 1483.
coalition of willing in the War in Iraq. This time, the strategic and economic expectations were much more significant and were reflected in the amount of aid given, which by 2008 had reached a high of $358.8 million. The majority was given in food aid with Australia providing over 100,000 tonnes of wheat. This was 20 times the amount given during the Gulf War. Aid was also focused on the reconstruction effort with over $200 million going towards the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The remaining was incorporated into debt relief and in assistance to refugees, Internally Displaced People (IDP) and technical training. Such a sizeable increase in aid to Iraq was fuelled by an increase in Australia’s material commitments and the expected returns flowing from this.

In terms of Australia’s material commitment to the war, this was much larger than in 1991. This time, Australia deployed ground troops with 2,200 members of the ADF participating in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This corresponded with an initial sum of $100 million of aid to Iraq, which had received no aid between 1997 and 2003. In announcing the increased aid package Foreign Minister Alexander Downer emphasized that it would supplement Australia’s reduced capacity to commit to a long-term peacekeeping effort in Iraq. Over the next 12 years Australian defence personnel were present in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom until their full withdrawal in November 2013. And during this, Australia’s aid commitment was generally inline with its military operation. In 2008, when aid to Iraq was at its highest, Australia’s newly elected Labor government announced that it would withdraw its combat troops but increase its aid to Iraq as a means of keeping Australia active in Iraq’s

385 This also included three warships and 14 F/A-18 Hornet aircrafts. The majority of these troops had left Iraq by the 15th July 2003. 70 were left to protect the Australian embassy, 80 to assist in the operation of the control tower at Bagdad airport, 16 to help the search for WMDs and 90 were deployed to positions in the US-Iraq administration. In 2005, Australia sent an additional 450 troops for 12 months to protect the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group in al Muthanna Province. This deployment moved to Camp Terendak at the US-operated Tallil airbase and adopted a training role for assistance of Iraqi security forces. All Australian combat troops were withdrawn by June 2008. Misha Schubert, “Troops pull out of Iraq,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 June 2008. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/national/troops-pull-out-of-iraq-20080601-2kJh.html (accessed 10 February 2014).
387 Ibid.
transition to independent governance.\textsuperscript{388} From 2008, however, aid to Iraq significantly declined to just $26.9 million by the time a full drawdown of all military personnel was completed in 2013. This is set to further decrease to $11.3 million by the end of 2014.

The connection between Australia’s aid and its military resources indicate that strategic factors were important in Australia’s decision to see Iraq as a priority destination for its aid. In this regard, Australia’s strategic expectations in giving aid to Iraq were consistent with its approach towards Afghanistan. Not only were the strategic expectations similar, the moral expectations also fit with Australia’s general view of aid in that Australia’s assistance will, “enable the people of Iraq with humanitarian assistance, including food, water and sanitation and health care.”\textsuperscript{389}

It is important to note that it is not the intention of this chapter to engage in an in-depth evaluation on the merits of Australia’s decision to support the US in the War in Iraq, instead, the point is that in the case of Iraq (and for that matter, in Afghanistan), Australia’s decision to direct aid to Iraq was guided by the strategic focus of its military engagement. Indeed, Australian strategic studies experts have made similar conclusions, one even as recently as 2014, with Hugh White stating that: “For successive Australian Governments, aid to Iraq was primarily an adjunct to our military effort – a (relatively) low cost, low risk way to supplement our modest troop numbers and show our credentials as a good ally to America.”\textsuperscript{390}

Strategic interests in Iraq corresponded to significant commercial outcomes for Australia. By 2003 Australia had developed a substantial trading relationship with the Middle East, worth around $8 billion a year.\textsuperscript{391} Its trade with Iraq had also increased to the extent that Australian


\textsuperscript{389} Downer, “Australia supports humanitarian assistance for Iraq,” Press Releases, 19 February 2003. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Iraq%20humanitarian%20assistance%20Decade%3A%222000s%22;rec=8;resCount=Default (accessed 23 September 2015).


\textsuperscript{391} The Middle East was becoming an important destination for motor vehicle exports. In 2002, motor vehicles were Australia’s main export worth $1.83 billion. In 2003 General Motors Holden sent exports worth $750m while Toyota Motor Corporation Australia LTD exported vehicles worth $1.5 billion making the Middle East their main export market. David Richardson, “Economics of war with Iraq,” Current Issues Brief Index 2002-03, Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Group, 24 March 2003. Available at:
wheat exports on their own were estimated at $829 million, which represented 20% of the total Australian wheat exports, making Australia Iraq’s second largest source of wheat. Based on this evidence, a shock to Australia’s wheat exports in Iraq was of particular economic concern and was made even more so in the face of competition from the US wheat lobby. Indeed, Downer stated Australia’s commitment of 100,000 tonnes was to rival the US, which had committed 500,000 tonnes of wheat, but had suffered delays in distributing it. More specifically, he indicated that it would be good for Australia’s prestige if the “first ship to enter Iraq in the wake of hostilities was carrying Australian wheat – particularly if it was escorted by HMAS ANZAC.” The expectation of economic reciprocity in Australia’s humanitarian assistance is made clearer when compared with the ebb and flow of its trade. Before 2003, Australia had a growing trade with Iraq after the relaxation of trade sanctions. This declined to around $200 million following Australia’s loss of wheat contracts. But by 2013, trade with Iraq was completely one-sided with Australian exports starting to recover, and worth an estimated $593 million, of which $580 million was in wheat.

Reaping the benefits of reconstruction was also a motivating factor for Australia, and one where expectations of material benefits were sought. By January 2004, Australian companies had been awarded contracts in agriculture, environmental rehabilitation, electrical distribution, finance and economic policy. This included a lucrative $1 billion contract for Australia’s Worley Group to help rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure. A year and a half later, when Australia’s reconstruction committed through AusAID was nearly $170 million, over


392 Mark Vale, “Trade minister discusses war, food aid; US trade negotiations; Quarantine: WTO; and national party leadership,” Meet the Press, 13 April 2003. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=5;query=Iraq%20aid;rec=11;resCount=Default (accessed 22 January 2014).


394 Ibid.


396 Some of these firms included the ANZ Bank which assisted in managing the Trade Bank of Iraq, SAGRI International which assisted in rebuilding Iraq’s agricultural industry, the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) which won the remaining contracts left under the “oil for food” program, and Multimedia, which provided satellite-based internet and communication bandwidth services. Mark Vale, “Australia’s track record of achievement in Iraq,” Media Release, 19 January 2004. Available at: http://www.trademinister.gov.au/realeases/2004/mvt005_05.html (accessed 6 February 2014).
20 Australian companies had won an estimated US$1.9 billion worth of deals.\textsuperscript{397} The material benefits for Australia in contributing to the reconstruction effort and the development achievements were therefore not mutually exclusive.

Australia’s aid to Afghanistan and Iraq was primarily guided by strategic expectations that it would support its military commitment, and thus the increase of aid after previously having a limited aid program operating in these nations, was the result of a shift in how Australia calculated its national interests. Alongside these material expectations was the moral intent by policymakers that redirecting aid to these nations would assist their development needs. These observations are line with the changes in Australia’s aid towards Africa, which were determined by a change in how Australia calculated its national interests at the time. Together, these cases emphasise the value of rational choice in understanding that Australia’s aid policy is likely to change in response to changes in the calculation of its national interest. This does not mean that the moral and material expectations of reciprocity seen to motivate Australia’s aid change, nor does it mean that the moral and material outcomes are less likely to appear. Indeed strategic expectations of reciprocity were still found to be present, and so were the moral outcomes in improving education and employment, particularly in Uruzgan. Material outcomes were also consistent and found in the awarding of reconstruction contracts and in opening the potential for Australian investment in mining.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter applied the moral realist framework to understand Australia’s foreign aid policy. It found that the main theoretical perspectives have approached the moral dimensions in foreign aid and development with the view that states should be judged on normative standards of whether aid reflects good intentions, and not on whether it achieves any positive outcomes, for both the donor and the recipient. Hence I proposed moral realism, with its focus on moral and material outcomes, as a tool that can better understand Australia’s foreign aid and development policy, and it was found that moral realism shows promise in this regard.

Specifically, it was found that Australia’s aid was guided by strategic expectations of reciprocity that the giving of aid would lead to certain moral and material benefits. This was clear in Australia’s push for the Colombo Plan, which was guided by an expectation that it would ensure US commitment in the Asia-Pacific, assist in combating the spread of communism, as well as act as a springboard for further diplomatic and economic relationships in Southeast Asia. These material expectations converged with the moral expectations that Australia’s aid would contribute towards the economic and social development of recipient states. Expectations of reciprocity were also found in what type of aid Australia preferred. Australia preferred to focus on education, agriculture and infrastructure development as these were expected to produce both moral and material outcomes. Moral outcomes were also produced in stimulating employment, providing educational opportunities to study in Australia, as well as skills training in agriculture. Material gains were found in expanding Australia’s export markets and in providing opportunities in investment.

These sectors remained features of Australia’s foreign aid program. However, it was also found that Australia’s aid priorities changed depending on what type of aid would achieve the most benefit to its strategic, commercial and diplomatic interests. This was evident in the high level of assistance in health to PNG and the focus on reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. Agriculture became less of a focus as technical assistance expanded to include aspects of “good governance” as part of the government’s changing response to issues of regional security. This added weight to the moral realist view that aid is determined by both an expectation of reciprocity and rational choice as to where a state’s national interests lie. Thus, rational choice can explain changes to Australia’s aid policy, which was found when Australia decided to increase aid to nations outside of its direct strategic sphere of influence. This occurred during its heightened aid program to Iraq and Afghanistan where Australia’s aid was used to support its military objectives. Australia’s military presence in the War in Iraq (1990-1 and 2003), and in Afghanistan was fairly modest and so ODA was viewed as a means to bolster its commitment in the eyes of its allies, while also being a tool for the achievement of greater material gains in infrastructure development. Similar patterns were found in Australia’s aid to sub-Saharan Africa where its aid became a tool in the government’s diplomatic strategy to gain a non-permanent Security Council seat.
Overall, the majority of Australia’s aid flowed to states that were geographically close to Australia, such as PNG and Indonesia, which represented the greatest potential threat to Australia’s security. These nations were also where Australia calculated that it could achieve the most in terms of its moral outcomes. This was particularly evident in Australia’s aid to Indonesia following the 2004 Tsunami where positive aid results were found in increasing educational opportunities and rebuilding infrastructure. Australia’s aid to Indonesia was also found to demonstrate that Australia stood to gain from including morality as part of its foreign aid and development policy, as this decision produced material benefits in Indonesia’s support for Australia’s participation in the EAS and led to further trade and investment payoffs from the awarding of Australian business contracts as part of the reconstruction.

In sum, this chapter outlined how a moral realist framework is used to interpret the moral and material dimensions involved in a state’s foreign aid policy. Yet, having said this, one case study is not enough to make a convincing argument for the utility of the moral realist approach, nor is it sufficient to properly assess whether Australia actually stood to achieve material benefits from including morality as part of its foreign policy choices. Therefore, I now turn to the next chapter where I apply moral realism to understand Australia’s foreign policy choices towards humanitarian operations.
Chapter Three

Australia and humanitarian operations: Morality and interests guiding the use of force for humanitarian purposes

This chapter explores Australia’s role in implementing the humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste. It is organised into two sections. The first section introduces the main debates on peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. In doing so it draws out normative perspectives on these issues and highlights their limits in understanding the motives of states (and outcomes for them) in choosing to act against abuses of human rights. This clarifies the moral realist contribution that subsequently follows. The second section applies the moral realist framework to Australia’s foreign policy choices in Cambodia and Timor Leste. It finds that in both cases Australia was motivated by an expectation of reciprocity in achieving broader strategic goals tied to regional security and defence capability. An expectation of material returns is strengthened by evidence of rational choice in that Australia decided to intervene based on when it could gain the most from its commitment.

Evidence of expectation of reciprocity and rational choice indicates the likelihood of moral and material outcomes, both of which occurred in Cambodia and Timor Leste. In Cambodia, I find moral outcomes from Australia’s proposal for a United Nations (UN) transitional authority that led to the withdrawal of Vietnam and the holding of democratic elections. The material benefits for Australia were in the closer economic relationship with Vietnam, which had been a long-term foreign policy priority. Likewise, Australia’s diplomacy and leadership in the peace-enforcement mission in Timor Leste brought security and stability to the province, minimising the bloodshed and ensuring Timorese self-determination. Australia benefitted in reputational payoffs from leading the mission. It did so materially in signing a more favourable oil and gas deal over the Timor Gap, and in resolving a long-running obstacle to developing closer relations with Indonesia. In sum, this chapter finds further evidence in support of the explanatory potential of moral realism, and this reinforces the claims made in the previous chapter on Australia’s aid and development policy.
Defining peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention

Peacekeeping is defined loosely here as the “support of peacemaking between states by creating the political space necessary for the belligerent states to negotiate a political settlement.” Thus, peacekeeping operations (henceforth PKOs) are usually deployed after a ceasefire has been negotiated and are not intended to enforce political solutions. They are only mandated to use force for the purpose of self-defence. Cambodia was an example of a traditional PKO as the peacekeepers were deployed to “supervise” the ceasefire, as well as the withdrawal of foreign military assistance. However, it also went further in that the UN had transitional administration of Cambodia, temporarily adopting sovereignty over the territory. In this regard, Cambodia was also a multidimensional operation that included military, police and civilian personnel that took control of the state’s administrative structures, such as foreign affairs, defence, finance and communications. The UN also ran the elections and ensured the peaceful transition to a new government. For clarity, this thesis refers to the UN operation in Cambodia as peacekeeping since the mandate on force remained within traditional parameters.

Defining humanitarian intervention is a little more contentious. Some, such as J. L. Holzgrefe, restrict the practice of intervention to the coercive use of force without the consent of the recipient state, while others broaden the definition to include acts with the intent to punish, as well as those where any outside interference has taken place for the purpose of humanitarian assistance. This thesis defines humanitarian intervention as “coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purpose of addressing massive human rights violations or widespread human suffering.”

Using this definition means Timor Leste can be classified as humanitarian intervention or “peace enforcement”, as the multinational coalition was an armed military force authorised to

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use “all necessary means” to enforce peace and address widespread abuses of human rights. This thesis refers to both cases collectively as humanitarian operations/missions.

The “moral” views of humanitarian operations: Solidarity of human rights

There is an exhaustive amount of literature on the moral dimension of humanitarian missions. And as has been mentioned earlier, proponents of the English School (ES) have tended to claim ownership over how to understand morality within these debates. On the one side are the solidarists, like Timothy Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, who follow cosmopolitanism in viewing the increase of state interdependence as evidence of the emergence of an international society motivated by norms of common humanity. From this perspective, the state system is morally bound together through the establishment of a global consciousness where states are obligated to act in response to human suffering. Mutual consent is then formed that justifies the use of force based on a set of agreed upon rules or codes of conduct.

After WWII ideas of pluralism, mutual recognition of sovereignty and individual rights were recognised in the UN Charter, which defined sovereignty and human rights as separate moral and legal elements of the international order. But for solidarists, this began to change towards the end of the Cold War as the effects of globalization increased transnational relations and connected individuals across state borders, signalling the potential emergence of a “world society.” The end of bipolarity accelerated this process by ushering in a more cooperative international environment that opened space for an increased role for Global Civil Society (GCS), which was free to promote its human rights agenda. The GCS was joined by evidence of states’ willingness to use force against another sovereign for the achievement of humanitarian objectives, and these operations were legitimizied under Chapter VII of the UN.

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Charter. As a result, international societal norms evolved to no longer view state sovereignty as consistently superior to individual rights.

On the other side of the ES are the pluralists whose views on humanitarian operations tend to vary. Some, like Robert Jackson and Robert Vincent, are critical of the practice as it violates the central rule of international society: respect for sovereignty and non-intervention.404 Others, such as Jennifer Welsh, have argued that consensus on what is meant by the norm of sovereignty has changed to the extent that in exceptional circumstances (like genocide, ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities), it is both *just* and *legal* for states to intervene into another state’s sovereign territory.405 This was particularly so after shifts in international perceptions on the norm of sovereignty, which made it conditional on the obligation of the state to protect its own citizens, and tied this to a “just cause” of international society to react if the state fails to uphold its sovereign responsibility.406 Here, the solidarists and the “humanitarian pluralists” are similar in melding the moral and legal principles of international order to explain the rise of PKOs and humanitarian intervention following the end of the Cold War.

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404 Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). As has been mentioned in chapter 1, Bull’s views on universal human rights and the use of force are difficult to pin down. In the one breath he argued that the best way to ensure international order was in respecting the coexistence of equal sovereigns and thus held a position of moral scepticism on the ability of norms and rules to transform state behaviour. However, in the same breath, he also argued that this was the best way to protect individual freedoms, prompting some such as John Vincent to claim that the purpose of Bull’s society was normative and hence solidarist. For more see Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Vincent was also quite critical of military intervention and argued that legitimizing the practice through international legal frameworks would lead to more wars and the advancement of an imperialist cosmopolitanism. Yet in his later writings, Vincent argued that states had to abide by certain standards in order to receive the respect and mutual recognition of sovereignty by others within international society. For more see Vincent and Peter Wilson, “Beyond non-intervention”, in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman, eds, *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p. 125.


406 It is not the intention of this thesis to go deeper into debates on the “right” of sovereignty versus sovereignty as “responsibility.” This has been done ad nauseam elsewhere. See for instance, Roberta Cohen and Francis M Deng, “Exodus within borders: The uprooted who never left home,” *Foreign Affairs* 77, no.4 (1998), pp. 12-16; Tim Allen and David Stayn, “A right to interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the new humanitarianism,” *Journal of International Development* 12, no. 6 (2000), pp. 825-842 and Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). Since this thesis takes a realist approach, it defines sovereignty, as “Supreme power over a certain territory.” Hans Morgenthau, “The problem of sovereignty reconsidered,” *Columbia Law Review* 48, no. 3 (1948), pp. 341-365. The point made here is that normative perspectives have tended to view sovereignty as a critical component when analysing state responses to human rights. For realists, sovereignty just “is” and its consideration in foreign policy is based on whether it is relevant at the time. In the case of Timor Leste described below, it was part of Australia’s calculation on when was the right time to intervene, with Prime Minister John Howard stating that it would be an act of war and a violation of Indonesia’s sovereignty if the humanitarian operation went ahead without their consent.
Like the ES, constructivists also source their views on PKOs and intervention from the norms and rules inherent in international society. Where they claim to be different is in the argument that norms governing the use of force, sovereignty and human rights are not necessarily the result of rational progress, but are constituted from the normative context in which they are created. In other words, norms of sovereignty and human rights are part of the same moral discourse. Christian Reus-Smit and Martha Finnemore have been the leading supporters of this perspective, stating that the norm of humanitarian intervention reflects the changing perceptions and beliefs of international society on the legitimacy of the use of force for humanitarian ends.\textsuperscript{407} Previously, perceptions on the use of force were constructed on the dominant belief that violence is destructive, and therefore needed to be avoided for the preservation of society. The state had a monopoly on the use of violence and its sovereignty afforded it the legitimacy of wielding force to protect the rights and freedoms of its citizens.

This changed during the later half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century when ideas of self-determination proliferated, and produced a number of new postcolonial states. These societies were not necessarily motivated by territory or economic gain, and instead were motivated by universal notions of human rights internationalised in the UN Charter. Therefore, for constructivists, sovereignty was constructed on ideas of human rights at both the domestic and international level. The use of force underwent a process of “norm cascading” with each case, from Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia, to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo, humanitarian intervention gained legitimacy according to international social standards, reinforcing the constitutive structure of sovereignty and justifying the use of violence against others. Sovereignty defined by human rights then combined with the advent of non-traditional security threats after the Cold War, such as the spread of refugees, Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), drug and arms trafficking, as well as transnational terrorism. This demonstrated that it was no longer accurate to tie the legitimate use of force to the supremacy of state sovereignty, especially as the security of the state no longer

guaranteed the security of the individual.\textsuperscript{408} This added to the legal authority of humanitarian operations by expanding the threshold of threats to international peace and security to include threats to human security.

In each perspective a common thread emerges; that is, the focus on linking the moral dimension of humanitarian operations to perceptions of legitimacy according to accepted rules and standards of international society. There are several problems with this approach. This first and most important is that it overlooks the importance of material interest in motivating states to use their national resources for the benefit of others, which is key to understanding why states include humanitarian missions as part of their foreign policy choices. Instead, normative perspectives prefer to focus on the justification of each act, prioritizing moral obligation over whether any real outcomes were achieved, for both the intervener and recipient. As will be outlined below, a moral realist perspective offers a more powerful account as it prioritizes the expectations, calculations and outcomes of foreign policy, and can therefore shed light on the reasons why states participate in humanitarian missions, and when this is likely to occur.

**The reality of intervention: Reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes**

Realist contributions on humanitarian operations have largely been critical and have approached the moral dimension with the view of moral scepticism. This is true of both the structural realists – like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt – who are only concerned with an international order determined by the balance of power; as well as for those classical realists suspicious of the heavy moralising involved in pursuing interventions based on ideological concerns for spreading democracy, regime change and the promotion of human

\textsuperscript{408} Notions of “human security” were popularised during the mid-1990s and became part of the constructivist lexicon in arguing that material factors of security are constituted by ideas and norms, which can include ideas of human rights. As the human rights regime took off following the end of the Cold War, international societal perceptions changed to see security as the protection of the individual over the protection of territorial borders. For more see, Gary King and Christopher L. J. Murray, “Rethinking human security,” *Political Science Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (2004), pp. 585-600; Dan Henk, “Human security: Relevance and implications,” *Parameters* 35 no.2, pp. 92-100 and Pauline Ewan, “Deepening the human security debate,” *Politics* 27 no. 3, (2007), pp.182-189.
rights. Yet even Hans Morgenthau did not entirely dismiss the practice. Instead he cautioned against the use of abstract principles to rationalise the act of intervention:

rules [governing intervention] must be deduced not from abstract principles which are incapable of controlling the actions of governments, but from the interests of the nations concerned and from their practice of foreign policy reflecting those interests.

Expectations of reciprocity

A moral realist understanding of humanitarian intervention thus focuses on the material motivations of the state committing the act and how the action itself will affect the stability of the international system, as well as the resources of the intervener(s). In particular, the moral realist is first concerned with separating the act of humanitarian intervention from attempts at establishing the moral justification for it. This is important as it allows moral realism to identify the moral and material factors present in the expectations of reciprocity seen to motivate a state’s decision to use force for humanitarian purposes.

As detailed above, normative approaches to intervention have overwhelmingly been concerned with establishing the authority of each case, and in doing so have tended to confuse what was the primary motivation, replacing material interests like security and trade, with notions of legal legitimacy. The same error can be found in relation to moral considerations. In their numerous attempts at tying legitimacy to both moral and legal norms, these scholars have also failed to properly consider whether there was in fact any moral benefit in performing the act. The intervening state may indeed decide to follow recognised standards of international law and achieve some legitimacy in the eyes of others, but evidence of a state adhering to normative standards is not enough to claim that a state is being guided by moral considerations. Evidence of whether the intervention actually led to moral outcomes is needed before making judgements on state behaviour. This is where an expectation of reciprocity by the intervening state that intervention will garner beneficial returns better accounts for whether it will lead to moral outcomes for the recipient state.

410 Hans Morgenthau, “To intervene or not to intervene?” Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967), p. 430.
**Rational choice**

It is important to not only consider the expectation of reciprocity as the guiding motivation. It is also the case that when states do decide to intervene this is based on rational calculations of whether it is likely to achieve national interest objectives. In other words, rational choice can explain the timing of intervention and why states decide to intervene in some cases and not in others. Here, for instance, it is instructive to consider the intervention in Kosovo. At the time, the decision was arguably dictated by changes to the geopolitical environment in Europe, which for the US and the UK brought attention to potential threats to regional instability, and challenged US primacy in the post-Cold War international order. In the case of Australia’s intervention into Timor Leste described below, rational choice can also account for why, after thirty years of ignoring international calls for action, a policy change was made by the Howard government and Australia became the lead nation in implementing the peace-enforcement operation.

**Moral and material outcomes**

Both expectations of reciprocity and rational choice can account for the motives and context in which these operations are likely to take place. Moral and material outcomes can explain the effects of humanitarian operations. I realise that attempts at determining the moral outcomes of both peacekeeping and intervention are fraught with difficulty, given the potential for “moral hazard.”

But for moral realism evidence that the operation had a positive effect on the recipient nation is important in connecting the intervening states expectations of reciprocity with policy results. Evidence of moral outcomes is not without precedent, and can range from the short-term effect of rescuing individuals from oppression, as was evident in the PKO in Iraq in 1991, or be more long-term and lead to independence and large-scale campaigns of state-building, as was evident in both Kosovo and Timor Leste. The level of moral benefit, however, will always be relative to the success of the operation determined by the intervening state itself. And here, evidence of material outcomes is important. This may be found in acquiring strategic gains from reducing the spread of

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411 The concept of a moral hazard associated with intervention was popularised by Michael Walzer who also referred to the “dirty hands” of the interveners in supporting a side that was just as brutal and corrupt as the current regime. See Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 3rd ed, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 20-15.

cross-border security issues, or in increasing the prospect of trade and market opportunities by resolving long-standing conflicts. In some instances, the material benefits can go further in that the intervening state can stand to gain economic benefits from the awarding of reconstruction contracts and business links.

**Australia and humanitarian operations: Putting Australia’s national interest into perspective**

Now that I have outlined how a moral realist would approach instances of peacekeeping and intervention, it is necessary to apply this to a reading of Australia’s foreign policy involvement in the two cases of intervention identified in this thesis: Cambodia and Timor Leste. But before I start my analysis, it is useful to present a picture of how Australia has traditionally responded to instances of human suffering. When making judgements on this policy arena, many are inclined to highlight Australia’s status as a middle power that has the capacity to “punch above its weight” when it comes to its level of influence in international affairs. The concept of a middle power has largely been associated with a set of normatively based prescriptions centred on the use of multilateralism as the preferred mode of diplomacy, and the desire to cement Australia’s place in the world through a combination of both interests and values – or what former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and others described as Good International Citizenship (GIC). ⁴¹³

As evidence to support claims of Australia as a GIC, scholars have typically pointed towards its history as an active member of peacekeeping. Since 1947, Australia has provided some 65,000 personnel to over 50 UN and multilateral international peace and security operations. ⁴¹⁴ On the surface, this may seem like a significant contribution for a state with the size and capacity of Australia, but the bulk of this support was made after the end of the Cold War, where changes to the international environment made the commitment of national resources a more attractive foreign policy choice. Before then, Australia’s contribution had been relatively minor. It sent a small contingent to the UN Good Offices Commission (UNGOC) in the Dutch East Indies and to the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) between 1947 and 1951. This was alongside Australia’s contribution to the monitoring mission in India-Pakistan in 1950, and the ground, air and naval forces sent to Korea during...

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⁴¹³ Interview with former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Melbourne 2010.
the same year. These missions were broadly linked to Australia’s desire to match the diplomacy displayed by Dr. H.V. Evatt during the creation of the UN with a certain amount of material support. Yet, once ANZUS was signed in 1951 Australia’s military resources were directed towards its support of its American great and powerful friend. Mutual concern with the US over the spread of communism guided its role in both the Korean War and in Vietnam. Likewise, a mixture of colonial ties and strategic interests guided Australia’s decision to station forces alongside the UK in the Malaya peninsula between 1950-1960, and in Borneo between 1963-1966.

During this time, then, very few of Australia’s resources were dispatched to PKOs. In fact, until the late 1980s, Australia had participated in less than 20 UN sponsored peacekeeping missions and had deployed only 13 military personnel. A small contingent of military observers was sent to the Suez during the 1956 crisis. Australian medical staff were also sent to the UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea, and a small number of police were part of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFIC). Here, the context of Australia’s security and defence planning was significant. The Nixon Doctrine had signalled the end of Australia’s forward defence strategy and left Australian planners in doubt about how to ensure its security in the absence of a direct territorial threat. This resulted in ambiguity over where Australia’s military resources should be directed, which continued the low level of UN commitment. Australia sent a helicopter to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) II and a small number of military observers to the Iraq-Iran Military Observer Group. Other notable (but limited) commitments were also made to Zimbabwe in 1979 and to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to enforce the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1982.

For a detailed discussion on Australia’s role in talks at San Francisco and its greater participation in the UN during its early years see Norman Harper and David Sissions, *Australia and the United Nations* (Manhattan Publishing Company: New York, 1959), pp. 47-78. A considerable amount of foreign policy analysis has been devoted to Evatt’s activism in presenting Australia as a leader amongst smaller powers. Indeed, he is widely acknowledged to be the source of claims that Australia has a particular “brand” of foreign policy identified by its activism through international institutions and its championing of issues of equal representation. See David Lee and Christopher Waters, *Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy* (Canberra: Allen& Unwin, 1997).


1985, Australia’s contribution to UN PKOs was at one of its lowest points, with deployments to the UN mission in India-Pakistan downscaled due to perceptions that Australia had overstretched its defence resources.\(^\text{420}\)

Australia’s approach towards humanitarian operations changed towards the end of the 1980s when it became clear that it needed to re-focus defence strategies to the protection of mainland Australia. This culminated in the 1986 Dibb Report, that stated Australia’s force structure should be determined by the independent ability to protect its own vital interests, which included the ability to exercise control over land territory, territorial seas and airspace vital to Australia’s security.\(^\text{421}\) An emphasis on Australia’s independent defence capability was part of the Hawke government’s overall perception that Australia’s security was too interdependent with the US, and needed to focus on building a defence capability that could respond to Australia’s unique strategic situation.\(^\text{422}\)

A key aspect of this was the need to anticipate and respond to threats from its external environment, which meant a significant interest was to “seek cooperation with Southeast Asia and South Pacific friends in building their defence capabilities.”\(^\text{423}\) Since the number of direct threats to Australia was limited, participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian based missions was a means of demonstrating the value of Australia’s military capacity, as well as contributing to the goal of cooperation with regional partners through the mutual resolution of threats to international peace and security. In 1989, Australia made its largest contribution to date to the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.\(^\text{424}\) While not traditionally in Australia’s direct sphere of influence, the mission was a chance for Australia

\(^{420}\) Ibid, p. 4


\(^{424}\) Australia sent 300 personnel to assist in the engineering component. Australia’s contribution was targeted to assist in the building of roads, bridges, airstrips and camps. Bob Hawke, “Namibia,” HoR, Ministerial Statement, 6 March 1989. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=United%20Nations%20Transitional%20Assistance%20Group%20in%20Namibia%20Decade%221980s%22 Year%221989%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 10 April 2014).
to gain international recognition to what Prime Minister Bob Hawke described as “one of the United Nations’ most substantial achievements for many years.”

The other major humanitarian mission supported by Australia was the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This mission demonstrated more clearly the strategic implications of Australia’s participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Australia committed significant diplomatic and military resources to the operation. Foreign Minister Evans was personally influential in pushing each party to accept the terms of the Cambodian peace settlement that created the conditions for a multinational UN operation. Its diplomatic role was also not limited to the ministership of Evans, and extended back to the time of Foreign Minister Bill Hayden. In terms of its military contribution, Australia sent 600 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel and provided the commander of the operation, Lt. Gen. John Sanderson. By the time UNTAC withdrew in 1993, over 1,200 Australians had served in Cambodia. This was not the largest contingent, but Australia’s involvement represented a shift in the level and type of support being provided. Australia was more ready to commit combat trained troops to overseas operations, and this theme was reiterated in the 1991 and 1993 Strategic Reviews on Australia’s defence preparedness.

The end of bipolarity introduced to Australian policymakers the strategic implications of peacekeeping and intervention, particularly given Australia’s geographic position in a largely underdeveloped, socially dislocated regional environment. The 1991 Force Structure Review recognised that Australia’s defence preparedness required a shift in its force structure “towards selectively higher levels of readiness so as to have the capacity to deal with the lower level military situations that might arise with little warning. This also provides a capacity to assist allies and regional friends.” The 1993 Strategic Review tied Australia’s changing national strategic policy to its interests in maintaining regional security. Specifically, it stated that along with its “defence-in-depth” strategy:

> The ADF must be able to undertake a number of other important roles. Examples include natural disaster relief, assistance to the civil

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425 Ibid.
community, aid to the civil power, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, provision of assistance and responding to crises in the nearer region, and other activities in support of regional security.\textsuperscript{427} Along with Cambodia, Australia sent a large military contingent to Somalia in 1993 and again to Rwanda in 1994.\textsuperscript{428} Five years later, it was the lead nation of the UN-mandated International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). Like Cambodia, Australia’s commitment to INTERFET represented a turning point in how it understood its role in ensuring international peace and security. This time, the operation went further than the traditional peacekeeping role of the past and was more accurately described as “peace-enforcement” in that it fell under the Chapter VII use of “all necessary means.”\textsuperscript{429} Australia sent 5,700 ADF personnel to the operation, which represented the largest military contribution to the multinational force. Australia also contributed a substantial amount to the state-building effort through AusAID, estimated at $235 million over the first five-year period.\textsuperscript{430} Over a decade after Timorese independence in 2002, Australia remained the largest bilateral aid donor, providing over $100 million a year.\textsuperscript{431}

Much has been made of Australia’s involvement in both Cambodia and Timor Leste in that each case seemingly represented a normative shift in how policymakers traditionally perceived Australia’s approach to issue’s of human rights, self-determination and security.\textsuperscript{432} Yet the cursory evidence described above suggests that Australia’s foreign policy choices in this area have been consistent in being guided by rational calculations of its national interest.

\textsuperscript{427} Australia’s strategy of “defence-in-depth” was part of its Defence of Australia (DoA), which sought to develop Australia’s military capabilities to a level of preparedness that could perform both defensive and offensive operations in the sea-air gap to Australia’s north and to its territorial defence. For more see DoD, “Strategic review 1993,” pp. 44-46. Available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/stratreview/1993/1993_Part2.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014).


power were arguably important in providing the right conditions for Australia to act. Rather than Australia’s approach reflecting foreign policy guided by GIC or normative middle power diplomacy, this indicates that its choices were determined by an expectation that it would achieve its strategic objectives under the Defence of Australia (DoA) doctrine that included greater defence cooperation with Southeast Asia as a major priority. From a moral realist perspective, this raises some interesting questions as to what specifically motivated Australia’s decision to intervene in each instance and whether this actually led to both moral and material outcomes. The rest of the chapter seeks to answer these questions.

**Australia and Cambodia: Morality meets interests in Australia’s foreign policy**

To understand Australia’s involvement in the Cambodian peace operation it is important to look back at Australia’s diplomatic relationship with the state. Australia’s broad involvement in Indochinese politics has been characterized as “dependent ally,” a term which is mostly argued in reference to Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. Its early involvement with Cambodia was also certainly guided by Australia’s support for US foreign policy. However, as will be discussed below, this does not adequately explain evidence that from the 1980s Australia’s interests in Cambodia (and Vietnam) did not align with the US, and Australia’s diplomacy even led to then Secretary of State, George Schultz, calling Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden’s Cambodian proposal “Stoopid” at an ASEAN-Plus meeting in Bangkok in 1983. But during the Vietnam War, Australia’s role in Cambodia was to act as a diplomatic intermediary for US communications through Indochina. The Australian embassy in Cambodia was ideal for this purpose given it was already staffed with US liaison officers who had previously developed friendly relations with both South Vietnamese and Cambodian elites. This meant that during the early stages of the Vietnam War it was able to act as an interlocutor for the establishment of US-Cambodian intelligence sharing, and related operational activity along the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border.

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433 Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War as part of its commitment to the ANZUS alliance will be discussed in more detail in the chapter that follows on Australia’s security partnership with the US. Briefly, it has been commonplace to argue that Australia’s response towards Vietnam was a classic case of alliance entrapment where Australia was forced into the war because of its obligations under the ANZUS treaty. For more on Australia’s role as a dependent ally during the Vietnam War see Joseph Camilleri, *Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980) and Coral Bell, *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988).

434 Hayden responded to this remark with “Well, Mr Secretary, not as stoopid as your efforts in Vietnam.” For more on this entertaining episode of diplomacy see Blanche D’Alpuget *Hawke: A Prime Minister* (Melbourne: University Press, 2011), p. 181.


436 NAA, A3016/10/12 “Cambodian/US relations” Brief memo to the Prime Minister, May 1967.
Following the end of the Vietnam War, Australia’s diplomacy and involvement in Cambodia started to depart from the various multilateral peace negotiations that started after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. These negotiations began in 1981 and went for 8 years before they were abandoned in 1989 without the parties reaching a resolution. Australia had no direct involvement in these negotiations, yet had strategic and economic interests in seeing a resolution to the conflict. The most important of these was the reset of previous attempts at building strong relations with Vietnam, and Australia immediately set out to achieve this, despite condemnation from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), China and the US. In 1983, Labor came to power with a Vietnam policy platform that began with the restoration of direct aid, which Australia had previously been forced to cut, in line with ASEAN and US policies of isolating Hanoi. While under previous governments Australia had continued bilateral aid to Laos as an indirect signal of its interests in Vietnam, the Hawke government determined that the nation should be given alternatives to dependency on the Soviet Union, and since Australia had already established a diplomatic post in Vietnam, it was ideally suited for this role.

Australia also viewed the conflict in Cambodia as a significant threat to regional peace and security. It showed signs of becoming a protracted civil and regional conflict that had the potential to exacerbate great power competition in Australia’s strategic sphere of influence. Taking steps to resolve the crisis was expected to achieve the economic benefits of improving relations with Vietnam described above, as well as represent Australia’s contribution towards

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437 There were several unsuccessful regional and international attempts at resolving the crisis before a resolution was achieved at the Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) in 1991. In 1981, the UN convened an International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) to discuss the issue of Vietnamese occupation and the Cambodian civil conflict, but Vietnam did not attend as they assumed the Western backed Coalition Government of the Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was being given a platform to declare themselves the legitimate government of Cambodia. This Conference was followed by an initiative put forward by Russian President Mikael Gorbachev in July 1986. The Gorbachev initiative called for the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations as he saw the divide between the Chinese backed Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and the Vietnamese installed Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), as the main obstacle to reaching any resolution to the conflict. A regional proposal was put forward in July 1988 and early 1989 when Indonesia proposed the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs). The JIMs were the first time that the four Cambodian factions, Vietnam, Laos and the six members of ASEAN came together at a neutral setting to discuss the Cambodian problem. These meetings were specifically convened to resolve the issue of who would hold government in Cambodia. For a detailed account of these initiatives see David Chandler, “Cambodia Since 1979,” A History of Cambodia, 3rd ed. (Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 227-246.


regional peace and security. These expectations were informed by both moral and material expectations. For Hawke, Australia’s activism was motivated by a distinct “moral obligation to make an effort to alleviate the human suffering arising from that situation” and a belief that as one of the only nations with a good relationship with Vietnam, China, ASEAN and Thailand, there was a reasonable expectation that Australia could assist in reaching a resolution to the crisis.440

Thus, on a four-day visit to Vietnam in July 1983, Hayden announced a series of policy initiatives that demonstrated Canberra’s commitment to a warming of bilateral relations. These included ministerial exchanges, academic and information seminars, trade promotion assistance and English language training for Vietnamese living in Australia.441 In a show of support for Australia’s efforts, Vietnamese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach visited Australia in 1984 and Hayden travelled to Vietnam again in 1985. This policy engagement was immediately condemned by China and the US, who were against any signs of rapprochement with Vietnam during its aggression towards Cambodia.442 In Beijing, leaders declared that Australia was being used by Hanoi as a “cats paw” and the US looked on Australia’s actions with some concern, having been unsuccessful at blocking Vietnam’s request for multilateral aid through UN agencies.443 Disapproval of Australian diplomacy was compounded by its decision to withdraw as co-sponsor for ASEAN’s UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, which called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia, and self-determination for the Cambodian people.444 Hayden argued that Australia could not


441 Matthew Richardson, “Hayden’s Vietnam aid ‘coup,’” The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 July 1983, p. 3

442 The federal Liberal opposition was also against Australia’s public diplomacy towards Vietnam, as they feared it would alienate Australia from ASEAN and the US. They were also against any action that could be viewed as Australia’s accepting or condoning Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. Partisan policy differences can be an important factor in determining what variables, like the perception of elites on foreign policy decisions, can intervene at the domestic level and explain how parties sell policy. However, as this thesis is primarily concerned with evaluating foreign policy outcomes, a discussion of party differences in policy would not add much in the way of understanding how national policy decisions lead to specific outcomes. For more on the domestic debates on Australia’s rapprochement with Vietnam, see “Australia and Indo-China,” HoR, 7 December 1983. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Diplomatic%20relations%20Vietnam%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%20Year%3A%221983%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 20 April 2014).

443 Ian Davis, “China calls Hayden a “‘cat’s paw’ for Hanoi,” The Age, 14 March 1985, p.1

444 Australia still voted in support of the bill, but was unwilling to have their name attached to the bill itself.
support a bill that sought to further marginalize Vietnam, and did nothing to halt the influence of the Pol Pot regime.  

The issue of bilateral aid to Vietnam continued until 1984 and generated several debates in the Australian House of Representatives. Australia continued to follow the US and ASEAN in refusing to restore direct bilateral aid to Vietnam until 1991, as did the rest of international society. However, Australia did provide some assistance. To appease international concerns Australia changed how its aid policy was described, outlining a distinction between humanitarian and developmental assistance. The aid provided to Vietnam was described as “humanitarian,” and therefore not tied to any conditions of support for the Vietnamese government. This was accepted as a less overt form of bilateral aid delivery, even though it led to the development of a joint Australian NGO office in Phnom Penh, and other joint projects in agriculture, education and health, as well as the awarding of a contract to the government owned Overseas Telecommunications Cooperation (OTC) to build a radio satellite station in Ho Chi Minh City. Australia’s actions in pursuing this approach demonstrated signs of reciprocity when Vietnam singled out Australia as the only non-fraternal state with which it would be interested in developing stronger diplomatic relations with. Canberra’s commitment to providing humanitarian aid continued through the Cambodian negotiations, to the extent that by 1990 it was providing nearly $20 million annually in assistance.

Alongside pursuing bilateral ties with Vietnam, Hayden, under the direction of Hawke, started to initiate dialogue amongst the key players involved in the conflict (ASEAN, China, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Vietnam and the US), on reaching a peaceful solution.

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446 These debates occurred in the Senate in response to the Labor Government canvassing with regional and international partners whether it should resume foreign aid to Vietnam. The opposition was of the view that bilateral aid should not resume until Vietnam withdrew its forces from Cambodia and Laos. For the senate debate see “Australian aid to Vietnam,” Senate, 26 May 1983. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=foreign%20aid%20Vietnam%201983%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%20Year%3A%221983%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 15 May 2014).
Australia’s role at this point was to only act as a dialogue facilitator to encourage all parties to come to a resolution. The reasons for Australia’s diplomacy were clearly guided by an expectation of reciprocity of material returns. Hayden explained that Australia had a specific interest in the Cambodian problem as “the greatest unresolved source of tension in the Southeast Asian region,” which affected its ties with Vietnam and contributed to security concerns in refugee flows. In the series of individual talks conducted in 1985 between Hayden, who was sometimes accompanied by Michael Costello, and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, there was some discussion on the features of a peace settlement. These features included a ceasefire; the removal of Pol Pot; an international observer role for the UN; and the phased withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. During these discussions, Hayden made some progress on getting Hun Sen to make concessions towards Prince Sihanouk in exchange for his support in removing the Pol Pot regime. Hayden viewed justice for the victims of the Khmer Rouge as one of the main impediments towards reaching any resolution on Cambodia and attempted to resolve the issue by suggesting the establishment of an international tribunal to try the regime for its crimes. This was proposed at another ASEAN-Plus meeting in Manilla in 1986, but was immediately dismissed by Schultz and failed to achieve consensus amongst ASEAN members. By the end of 1986, Hayden’s efforts had proved unsuccessful at gathering support for any further dialogue on a Cambodian peace settlement, and as a result Australia’s diplomacy on the issue was discontinued. However, these government-to-government links did act as a precursor to the “shuttle diplomacy” that followed and helped to achieve wider approval of the Australian peace proposal put forward between 1989 and 1991.

The above evidence demonstrates that Australia had specific moral and material expectations of reciprocity driving its activism towards resolving the Cambodian problem. The first, and most obvious, was the strategic interests in resolving an ongoing regional conflict that had dominated Southeast Asian politics for decades. The second, and less discussed, was the warming of relations with Vietnam. These motivations were pursued despite risks to Australia’s international reputation and damage to its relationships with ASEAN states, particularly Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. This indicates that Australia determined the

benefits from pursuing a resolution to outweigh the potential costs in doing so. Yet, in stating this, when it was clear that Hayden’s diplomacy was not achieving the expected returns, Australia cooled its efforts. In this regard, Australia was exercising rational choice in that the pursuit of a resolution was not worth the national capital required to continue to push for a resolution. This changed two years later when external conditions shifted and a resolution to the Cambodian problem became a central feature of Australia’s foreign and security policy. The next section will focus on the expectations of reciprocity combined with rational choice that characterized Australia’s response to this issue.

*Australia’s Cambodian peace proposal: Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice*

The second Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) held in July 1989 remained deadlocked over the contentious issue of power sharing between the four Cambodian parties: the Vietnamese-installed People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the three factions that formed the Coalition Government Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). From 1989 Australia’s contribution towards international efforts to resolve the crisis was to gather support for its own peace proposal that would push past this stalemate.

The expectations of reciprocity guiding Australia’s decision to become involved in the crisis were again twofold. The first and most important was the significant material interests that were consistent with Australia’s previous diplomacy. The crisis was having a prolonged impact on Australia’s regional security, which was now also having an affect on Australia’s ability to develop relationships with key regional nations, during a time where the Labor government identified Asia-Pacific engagement as a priority. As stated by Evan’s in reference to the problem of Cambodia:

“It is the single greatest source of instability in the region. It feeds tensions and hostility between regional countries who could and should be friends. It

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454 The CGDK consisted of the three coalition factions competing against the Vietnamese installed PRK. They included the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC); the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) or the Khmer Rouge; and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF).

455 “Australian and United Nations representatives are playing a key role in peace negotiations in Cambodia.” Transcript of Dateline interview with Gareth Evans, Saturday 19 October 1991. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Australian%20and%20United%20Nations%20representatives%20are%20playing%20a%20key%20role%20in%20peace%20negotiations%20in%20Cambodia;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 15 May 2014).
Aside from the clear strategic expectations sought by pushing for a resolution to the crisis, Australia also expected that its involvement would contribute towards achieving relative peace in Cambodia. Evan’s highlighted this moral expectation when he stated that, “Australia has a humanitarian obligation to help resolve the tragedy that has engulfed Cambodia.” In this regard, the expectations and diplomatic approach where in line with a moral realist reading of the evidence. Evans proposed a peace initiative that included conditions made by Hayden during his previous diplomatic efforts, such as a negotiated ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign forces, except this time he made an important inclusion: a new role for the UN as a transitional administration that would have sovereignty authority over Cambodia’s internal organization during its transition to democracy. This proposal was important because it allowed for the heated issue of who would govern Cambodia to be left off the negotiating table, making it easier to achieve consensus for a peace plan. Australia’s strategy to achieve consensus on its plan was to engage in an intense process of “shuttle-diplomacy.” Now Secretary of DFAT, Michael Costello, conducted 29 meetings between 1989 and 1990 where he met with representatives from 13 different states (some of which included the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia Japan and China), over 21 days. In anticipation of a UN presence, Australia also sent a technical mission to Cambodia, Thailand and the Thai/Cambodian border to gain knowledge on the conflict, and on the administrative and social structures of the Cambodian state. The end result of these efforts was international acceptance of the Australian peace proposal. The exact details of the plan was expanded into a working paper series “Cambodia: An Australian Proposal,” which was presented to all four Cambodian parties, ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos, at the Jakarta Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC) in February 1990.

457 ibid.
The Australian proposal outlined the establishment of a Supreme National Council (SNC) that would have authority over Cambodian sovereignty. The UN would supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces, have direct control of the civil and political administration during the transition to Cambodian governance, and ensure free and fair elections.462 By the end of 1991, Indonesia, France, the UN Security Council and the four Cambodian parties had agreed to a SNC to oversee Cambodian sovereignty during the transition towards democracy.463 The SNC was chaired by Prince Sihanouk, and included representatives from the PRK and the three parties from the CGDK. International acceptance of the SNC created the conditions for a UN resolution on a PKO to be implemented in Cambodia. This occurred in 1991 when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 717, which formed the 268 member’s United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).464 This peacekeeping mission led to the creation of UNTAC, which supervised the Cambodian elections and was in charge of implementing the “Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict signed in Paris.”465

It is important to note that the timing of the end of the Cold War was critical in getting all of the Cambodian parties to support the Paris Agreements and in Australia’s decision to commit to finding a resolution. Previously, influence from external parties had made this impossible, as each political faction was supported by the interests of a separate competing great power. Following the end of the Vietnam War, and the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, Beijing was both wary of Moscow’s intentions in filling the hegemonic vacuum, and threatened by Vietnam’s emergence as a regional power.466 China originally courted the support of Hanoi and put pressure on the nation to abandon its policy of neutrality during the Sino-Soviet rivalry. But Chinese conditions on economic assistance and US-ASEAN arms and goods embargos pushed Vietnam closer to Moscow. In the background, Sino-Soviet competition continued and intensified as the US developed closer relations with China. Vietnam was also fearful of policies of encirclement as China openly declared support for the


Meanwhile, Cambodia itself was undergoing a massive civil and humanitarian crisis. Between 1975 and 1979, the political party of the Khmer rouge, the Democratic Kampuchea (DK), governed Cambodia under the leadership of Pol Pot. The DK promoted a particularly extreme form of xenophobic Khmer nationalism that led to the implementation of “Year Zero”: a purification strategy that was largely responsible for the estimated death of 1.5 million people and the forceful displacement of 270,000 Cambodians, many of whom sought asylum at the Cambodian/Thai border. At the same time, a regional conflict with Vietnam was also waging, threatening the security and stability of Indochina. The DK was fearful of communist Vietnam and its potential for regional hegemony, and had been engaging in border clashes since 1975. International attempts at resolving the border disputes failed largely as a result of Chinese Security Council veto. The Chinese publically supported the DK and had been supplying arms to the regime as part of its strategy to marginalise Vietnam (and the influence of the Soviet Union) from mainland Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union had also been supplying arms, economic aid and fuel to Vietnam since 1978 and was in support of the continued rule of the Vietnamese installed PRK. On the other side, the CGDK,

469 This number included deaths from starvation, inadequate healthcare and overwork from labour camps. The majority were victims of the DK’s “Year Zero,” which involved resetting the calendar by “purging” of all those who were found to be associated with, or in support of, the previous government. These individuals included army officials, those from civil and social services, and anyone found to be communicating with the Vietnamese. For more on the policies of the DK, see Francois Ponchuad, Cambodia Year Zero (New York: Holts Rinehart and Winston, 1978).
470 The Khmer Rouge and the communist forces in Vietnam had been loosely aligned during the Vietnam War. However, following unification, the DK became increasingly concerned about the rising dominance of a Soviet backed Vietnam. As well as the border clashes, which lasted up until invasion, the DK purged Vietnamese trained military personnel and attacked the disputed Phu Quoc Island. For more on Cambodian-Vietnamese relations during the lead up to Vietnam’s invasion see Joseph R. Pouwatchy, “Cambodian-Vietnamese relations,” Asian Survey 26, no. 4 (1986), pp. 440-451.
471 The Vietnamese made a proposal to the UN in February 1978 that would allow for the international supervised withdrawal of forces from border areas, but the proposal was refused by the Khmer Rouge and lacked the key support of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). For an extended investigation into the history of border clashes between Vietnam and Cambodia see Ramses Amer, “Cambodia and Vietnam: A troubled relationship,” in N Ganesen and Rames Amer eds. International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, 2010), pp. 92-117.
as the non-communist resistance, was supported by ASEAN and the US, both of which provided non-lethal assistance to the coalition.\footnote{472}

Thus, the conflict in Cambodia was essentially operating at three levels: the political and humanitarian crisis at the domestic level, the Indochinese disputes at the regional level, and the international competition between the great powers at the international level. Australia’s proposal for the UN to act as custodian for Cambodia’s sovereignty was critical in that it sidestepped the important issue of who would govern the country. It also provided China a way to save face in stopping its support for the Khmer Rouge, which had been a major impediment to previous peace agreements.\footnote{473} While this proposal was important, it was made possible by the events leading to the end of the Cold War.

The Soviet Union, as part of its economic reforms, began reducing its economic and military assistance to Vietnam, which had been undergoing its own period of economic transformation. Vietnam had been receiving $US1.8 billion in economic aid annually and an estimated $US1.4 billion in military assistance. On top of its direct aid, the Soviet Union was also the recipient of 90% of Vietnam’s raw materials and 70% of its grain imports.\footnote{474} The Soviet Union’s declaration of reducing aid in 1986 resulted in a 20% loss to Vietnam’s economic aid and a 30% reduction in its military budget.\footnote{475} This inevitably hastened Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, which occurred in 1989. Likewise, the political and economic reforms occurring in the Soviet Union at the time meant that it was more willing to support a peace agreement. Indeed, the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had already put forward a proposal for peace in 1986, but this had failed because of Sino-Vietnamese rivalry. Chinese-Vietnamese relations were also showing signs of rapprochement, with border clashes

\footnote{472} As mentioned previously, the CGDK consisted of three different parties: FUNCINPEC, the DK (Khmer Rouge) and the KPNLF. The FUNCINPEC was made up of supporters loyal to the leadership of exiled Prince Sihanouk while the KPNLF consisted of supporters that were split between their loyalty to General Dien Del who formed the party after the Vietnamese invasion, and former Buddhist Prime Mister Son Sann. Before the formation of CGDK in 1982, the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC aligned to form the non-communist resistance against the Khmer Rouge. These three parties were then loosely aligned in their resistance to the PRK. However, the Chinese supported DK were in opposition to the Western backed KPNLF and FUNCINPEC, which added another layer of competition to the crisis. For a more detailed political history of Cambodia see Justin Corfield, \textit{The History of Cambodia} (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009).

\footnote{473} Interview with former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Melbourne 2010.


\footnote{475} Carlyle A. Thayer, \textit{The Vietnam People’s Army under Doi Moi} (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), pp. 21-24.
having ended by 1988. A combination of these external factors meant the timing was right for a renewed push for a peace plan, and between 1989 and 1991, Australia’s diplomacy on Cambodia was at its peak. This demonstrates that rational choice was present in that Australia expected to receive significant material benefits in return for its efforts in resolving the crisis.

A rational calculation of expected returns was particularly important given the level of resource commitment. The diplomatic initiative described above was met with material costs. The overall cost of the mission was $US1.7 billion and Australia’s contribution was $28.7 million, which represented 1.51% of the total expenditure for the operation. Australia also made a significant military contribution. When the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was established in October 1991 to create a neutral environment for the disarmament effort, Australia provided the signallers unit with 65 personnel. Its commitment then increased with the established of UNTAC in 1992. Australian Lt General John Sanderson was in charge of the UNTAC force and Australia provided the first contingent of 500 personnel through the Force Communications Unit. Australia also provided Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel to the second contingent, as well as 14 personnel to serve on the UNTAC headquarters staff, and 10 police offers dispatched for the UNTAC’s civilian component. In response to a request for further assistance in May 1992, Australia provided a movement control unit of 30 personnel to assist with the deployment of UTAC’s forces. It also provided an additional 115 troops and six Blackhawk helicopters.

Immediate returns from Australia’s diplomacy were found in international prestige. Canberra’s petitioning for Australia to be the leader of the peacekeeping operation was

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determined by the expectation that it would solidify the initial reputational benefits. But it
was not just expected returns in reputation that motivated Australia’s level of military
commitment: there were also significant strategic benefits in that Australia was provided with
an opportunity to achieve its long-term policy of “comprehensive engagement” in Southeast
Asia. This was the overarching policy motivation guiding Australia’s decision to participate
in the PKO, which led to material payoffs in inter-operability training with Southeast Asian
forces.

The end of the Cold War meant Australia had to adapt to the end of its forward defence
strategy and consider issues of regional security not determined by the bipolar system, as
intra-state conflict had the potential to threaten the balance of regional stability. Following
the release of DoA and in response to a changing security environment, Evans made a major
speech in 1989 redefining Australia’s regional security and defence strategy. It emphasized
the relationship between national defence and Australia’s need to exert a more confident role
in the Asia-Pacific, where the capability of Australia’s armed forces had a relevance for both
the defence of Australia and for the defence of the region, otherwise it was at risk of being
left with “a secondary role in the region.” Of particular interest was greater defence
participation in Southeast Asia, which was identified as a means for Australia to have a role
in shaping issues of international strategic importance “in ways which are not open to us
elsewhere.”

Yet, despite Evan’s identifying Southeast Asia as a priority for Australian security and
defence policy, the extent to which Australia could legitimately use force in the pursuit of
interests outside the defence of its national territory was severely limited. The differences in
culture, population size and relative diplomatic influence between Australia and states of
Southeast Asia (particularly Indonesia) made defence cooperation difficult to pursue. In
Evans’ own words:

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481 This point has also been made by Derek McDougall who argued that the combination of Australia’s
diplomacy under Evans and Sanderson’s leadership of UNTAC increased Australia’s international standing. See
Derek McDougall, “Australia’s peacekeeping role in the post-cold war era,” Contemporary Southeast Asia
482 Gareth Evans, “Australia’s regional security,” Ministerial Statement by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans,
483 Ibid.
In considering this issue [the use of force] we are effectively looking only at the South Pacific, where our military power is disproportionately large: our ability to undertake such initiatives in the countries of Southeast Asia will be very limited.485

The ability to excise military resources to help resolve the Cambodian conflict represented an opportunity for Australia to achieve this more elusive strategic goal without jeopardising its diplomatic standing in the region. And assuming leadership in the military operation also meant Australia could gain operational experience and inter-operability with Southeast Asian militaries without having to negotiate individual defence cooperation agreements. In fact, the effort placed in building a consensus on Australia’s role in implementing the PKO strengthened its standing among Southeast Asian states, and led to further reciprocal benefits when Indonesia’s public support for the Australian proposals led to an invitation to participate in the IMC.486 This was a step forward for Australia’s policy of regional engagement, as it had previously been shut out of direct talks on issues affecting Southeast Asian security and stability.

The wider acceptance of Australia’s actions in Cambodia also carried weight when it came to presenting its proposals for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum where Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas agreed to cooperate with Australia at the preliminary meetings on APEC and assisted in convincing the other ASEAN states to accept its initiative with the first forum meeting being held in Canberra in November, 1989.487 Indonesia’s support was especially important given the heavy opposition from Malaysia, which attempted to squash Australia’s APEC initiative by putting forward a proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus. Indeed, Evans noted the centrality of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia as recently as November 2012: “steady diplomatic progress was made in the

485 Gareth Evans, Australia’s Regional Security (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989), pp. 21-22.
refinement and development of the Australian-initiated plan [...] largely because of the close personal relationship I had developed with Al Alatas.**488**

*Moral and material outcomes: Self-determination and Australia’s strategic and economic interests*

The expectation of reciprocity motivating Australia’s decision to propose and support a Cambodian peace settlement does not detract from the moral outcomes achieved. Despite resistance from the Khmer Rouge in cooperating with the disarmament and demobilization process, UN sponsored elections were held between the 23rd and 27th of May 1993. 89.6% of the eligible population turned out to vote and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) party won 45.5% of the vote.489 Following the results, the elected Constituent Assembly enacted the constitution three months later. This body was then transformed into the Legislative Assembly as per the requirements of the Paris Agreements. UNTAC’s mandate formally ended on 24th September, the same day the constitution was promulgated.490 Cambodia was declared a constitutional monarchy and a new power-sharing government was formed between Prince Norodom Ranariddh (son of Sihanouk) and Hun Sen under the reign of King Sihanouk. In effect, the peace settlement and UNTAC achieved their primary objective of returning sovereign control to the Cambodian people who were able to determine their own government.491

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489 45.5% of the vote reflected 58 out of 120 Assembly seats while the other main winner the Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) won 38.2% and 51 seats. The FUNCINPEC dominated the vote but had little administrative resources and a small military. The CCP, on the other hand, controlled more of the administrative structures and a larger share of the armed forces. A new constitution had to be ratified by two-thirds majority in the Assembly, which meant some form of power sharing had to be made between the two parties. An astute analysis of the election and its aftermath can be found in Amitav Acharya, “Cambodia, the United Nations and the problems of peace,” The Pacific Review 7, no. 3 (1994), pp. 297-308.

490 The ADF completed their withdrawal as part of UNTAC on 15 November 1993.

491 While it was the case that UNTAC achieved its goals of overseeing a relatively free and fair election, and the power-sharing agreement between Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen was recognized by both parties as well as the Legislative Assembly, in 1997 Prime Minister Hun Sen instigated a coup d'état and sacked Prince Ranariddh as co-Prime Minister. Since then, Hun Sen has reigned over Cambodia as its sole Prime Minister for over 20 years. The events that occurred after the withdrawal of UNTAC and the continued reign of Hun Sen has led to criticisms of the process of democratization and the strength of Cambodia’s democracy. For more on these points see Joakim Öjenda and Mona Lilja eds. Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2009) and Simon Springer, Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism and the Contest for Public Space (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). These arguments are important, but they do not detract from the fact that UNTAC did achieve its mandate and Australia’s efforts demonstrate that an expectation of reciprocity, combined with rational choice, can lead to a moral outcome. In any case, moral realism does not claim to make predictions about how future events will play out, it only claims to describe the factors involved when they do.
Apart from the moral outcomes of democratic elections, Cambodia also benefited from relative social stability. The Paris Agreements ensured that all external patrons withdrew their material support of the competing political groups, significantly reducing the prospect of an endless civil war. The withdrawal of foreign support was particularly important in dealing with the Khmer Rouge, who, without Chinese backing, was diminished in capacity and size. Normalization of Cambodia’s internal politics also meant that it was no longer considered a pariah state and was allowed to re-join regional architecture such as the Mekong Committee, which Cambodia had been unable to participate in since 1976. Stability also allowed for the safe return of over 370,000 Cambodian refugees and the international reconstruction effort contributed significantly to infrastructure development and the delivery of essential services. The International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICRC) rose over $US1 billion, of which Australia contributed an initial estimated $52 million. This increased to $92 million (and included civilian aid and military assistance under the Defence Cooperation program), over four years between 1994 and 1998. Australia’s assistance went towards education, de-mining, health, agriculture and rehabilitation of infrastructure.

The initial support for Cambodian reconstruction led to some material benefits in closer defence cooperation and investment in communication technologies primarily by Telstra,
which did not profit from its $16 million investment made in 1995, until 1997. The investment and business returns in Cambodia were minimal in comparison to the material benefits found in the development of closer ties with Vietnam. As has been explained above, it is impossible to properly assess Australia’s motives and expected policy outcomes in resolving the Cambodian problem without considering its actions towards Vietnam. This was the determining factor in its initial policy of early diplomatic recognition of the state in 1973 and why it broke with regional and international practice in its policy of re-engagement, well before Vietnam was accepted back into international society in 1989. Evans clearly highlighted these intentions in pushing for a Cambodian peace settlement:

We have seen it as important to assist as best we can in the commercial and economic recovery of the country, and we are taking steps accordingly to upgrade our presence in Vietnam at a trade representation level to ensure that that occurs. There is a consistency about our position in this respect. We are trying in a number of ways to ensure that enough of an environment is created where there is still pressure to proceed towards a settlement of the unresolved questions in Cambodia.

As well as its early diplomatic recognition of Vietnam, Australia signed a trade and investment agreement in 1974, which further demonstrates the importance of Vietnam to Australia’s regional foreign policy. This agreement was replaced in 1991 with the Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-operation and the Investment Protection Agreement. By late 1992 two-way trade between Vietnam and Australia had reached $252 million, which represented a 227% increase from 1990. Investment between the two countries also increased with the establishment of the Australia-Vietnam Ministerial-level Joint Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee, which focused on investment projects in rail and road construction, telecommunications and services, agro-forestry and fisheries, mineral exploration and processing, as well as education and training. As a result, Australia

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500 Statistics found in table “Australian trade with Vietnam.”
501 Peter Cook, “Opening statement at the Australia- Vietnam ministerial-level joint trade and economic cooperation committee,” Speech, Canberra, 6 October 1993. Available at:
became one of the top five investing countries in Vietnam, with two-way trade rising from $8 million in 1980 to $402 million in 1994. Australia also gained access to Vietnam’s evolving market in timber, rubber and fishing resources where previously it had struggled against heavy competition from North and Southeast Asian nations.  

Specific economic benefits resulting from the warming of relations with Vietnam were found in infrastructure development and mining. BHP Engineering was involved in the development and rehabilitation of Vietnam’s steel industry and BHP Petroleum also had a role in oil exploration. In fact, Evans himself stated that Australia’s efforts in forming a diplomatic relationship with Vietnam were central to BHP being awarded the multi-billion contracts to develop the Dai Hung offshore oilfield. Previous work by OTC Australia placed it in a good position to liaise with OTC International’s search for earth satellite stations in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. These projects were part of the Australia-Vietnam Joint Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee. For more see, Bob McMullan, “ Australian-Vietnam relations,” Speech, JTECC Dinner, Hanoi, 6 September 1995. Available at: http://www.trademinister.gov.au/speeches/1995/jetecdlnr.html (accessed 20 May 2014).
opportunities with Australian exports in ships, banking and financial services, specialized machinery, telecommunication and iron and steal reaching $80.9 million by 1994.  

In comparison, Cambodia’s economic development has been relatively stagnant and Australia’s trade relationship with Phnom Pen was – and still is – minimal. It is largely underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure and civil service, with not much interest in the way of primary commodities (its main exports are foodstuffs and timber). The structural difficulties and lack of effective political administration meant it had little to offer as a source of labour, investment or manufactured goods. By 2013, the total amount of Australian imports from Cambodia was only $58 million, and Australia ranked 18th in two-way trade with Cambodia while two-way trade with Vietnam had reached $7.6 billion, representing 1.2% of Australia’s total bilateral trade, with Vietnam a key importer of Australian wheat, cooper and aluminium.

The normalization of Vietnamese and Cambodian relations with Southeast Asia following a resolution to the Cambodian conflict also expanded the market potential of ASEAN, as both states were members by 1999. Greater regional engagement between Indochina and ASEAN was a major foreign policy aim for Australia, and was part of Evans’ framework for achieving regional security. By 1986, 4 of Australia’s top 10 market export destinations were in Asia, and by 1996 this number had increased to 7. ASEAN states were particularly attractive because Australia’s skill in agriculture, agri-business, medical training, biotechnology, and mining were suited to Southeast Asian investment. The addition of Vietnam especially increased the market potential of ASEAN, which between 1975 and 1995 grew at an annual rate of 7%, and by 1995 had a regional GDP of US$650 billion. By 1997 Australia’s exports to ASEAN had grown at a rate of 18.5%, and as a group it represented

507Vietnam was fully admitted into ASEAN in July 1995 and Cambodia in April 1999.
Australia’s second largest export destination. It is clear that the stabilization of Indochina led to significant economic gains for Australia and was one of the factors driving Australia’s resolution of the Cambodian problem. And Australia’s previous establishment of a reciprocal relationship with Vietnam increased the chances that its long-standing trade interests there would be achieved, while also helping to convince Vietnam to sign-on to the Australian peace proposal.

This section has shown that moral and material expectations of reciprocity were the key motivators for Australia’s foreign policy towards finding a resolution to the Cambodian conflict. At the time, Australia’s defence strategy and military preparedness had been reframed to include both “defence-in-depth” and a capacity to contribute towards regional defence operations. Participation in a multinational peacekeeping mission allowed Australia to achieve this, as well as gain military experience in small offshore operations. Its diplomatic leadership also led to material benefits in interoperability with Southeast Asian states and in boosting the success of its APEC proposal.

Even though Australia had been quietly campaigning for a resolution to the Cambodia conflict for nearly a decade, it did not devote significant diplomatic and military resources until it became clear it was likely to achieve the expected results, which occurred after the end of the Cold War. This demonstrates the importance of rational choice in calculations of Australia’s decision making. Together, the expectations of reciprocity and rational choice indicate a convergence of moral and material factors in Australia’s foreign policy, which also led to moral and material outcomes. Moral outcomes were present in Australia’s proposal for a UN transitional authority that smoothed the way for the international PKO and created space for the holding of democratic elections. These moral outcomes coincided with material benefits for Australia in achieving its long-term goal of economic cooperation with Vietnam, as well as leading to expanded economic and financial opportunities within ASEAN.

But one case is not enough to fully understand Australia’s policy towards humanitarian operations. It would be useful to look at where Australia has engaged in the use of force for the purpose of ensuring international peace and stability. This would give a broader picture of Australia’s foreign policy in this area, particularly as its involvement and expected returns

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were significantly greater in Timor Leste. Such a case will add weight to the moral realist argument that a state’s commitment to moral claims is based on rational calculation of material interests and not on a commitment to prescriptive norms. To illustrate this point, the remainder of this chapter applies the moral realist framework to understand Australia’s foreign policy towards Timor Leste.

**Timor Leste: Geopolitical and geostrategic calculations informing Australia’s foreign policy choices**

Australia’s actions towards Timor Leste show similarities to how it responded to Cambodia. In the first instance, the immediate concern was not the safety and protection of the Timorese. Like its relationship with Cambodia, Australia tended to shy away from being actively involved in resolving the tension between Indonesia and Timor Leste. The Labor government under Gough Whitlam was indifferent to the annexation of Timor Leste by Indonesia. In fact, government documents released later indicated that Australia had knowledge of the planned invasion in October 1975, some three days before Indonesian forces began their assault. Support for Indonesia’s control over Timor Leste continued under the Fraser government. On November 22 1979 the UNGA voted in favour of Timor Leste’s right to self-determination and independence. Australia was one of the 31 states (and the only western nation) that voted against the Resolution, instead accepting de jure recognition of Timor Leste as part of Indonesia.

This decision did not necessarily demonstrate Canberra’s support for the use of force, and was tied to the view that it would place Australia in a better position to remain on good terms with Indonesia, as well as to negotiate terms for the entry of aid and relief efforts into the province. In this regard, Australia did not entirely abandon Timor Leste, providing $3.185 million of the $7 million contributed towards the joint aid projects implemented by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Indonesian Red Cross (IRC).

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512 Australia was the only nation to accept both *de facto* and *de jure* recognition of East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia. The resolution was passed with 63 in favour, 31 against and 45 abstentions. “The question of East Timor: General assembly,” HoR, 22 November 1979. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Eas t%20Timor%20Decade%3A%221970s%22;rec=3;resCount=Default (accessed 30 April 2014).

This commitment had two motives. Alongside the humanitarian concerns, it did much to alleviate domestic criticisms made in Parliament and by private aid organizations that the government was ignoring the plight of the Timorese. As Andrew Peacock stated “while Australia’s contribution has been large in relation to others, it is justified by the proximity of Indonesia to Australia and the intense interest the Australian community has in developments in East Timor.”

Unlike the diplomatic activity pursued by the Hawke government during the early stages of the Cambodian conflict, the response to Timor Leste was fairly muted. At the time, there were significant concerns for the stability of Indonesia. The government saw the “New Order” under President Suharto as a stabilising influence that could govern more effectively than the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETLIN) rebel group. The Labor government came under heavy criticism for its support of Indonesia with many seeing it as tacit approval of the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Suharto regime. In response to these criticisms, Hayden argued that:

People who follow a one-dimensional perception of moral values in foreign relations pursue a misleading caricature of reality… they are free to denounce and criticize publicly without having to worry about the consequences of their actions on the foreign, political and external commercial relations of their country.

Australia’s acceptance of Indonesia’s annexation of Timor Leste was also well known, and it was thought that a public reversal of this policy position would result in retaliatory action by Indonesia. Concerns over any punitive response were significant given Australia relied on friendly relations with Indonesia for cooperation on refugees, shipping and air rights, and continued negotiations on the Timor Sea. It was also thought that any push for

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516 International acceptance of Indonesia’s control over Timor Leste had also increased. A vote of the General Assembly in 1982 was supported by nearly all nations in the Pacific region, including the US and India. The result was 50-46-50.
517 Bill Hayden, in a submission to Cabinet on the benefits versus consequences of Australia taking a more hardened stance on East Timor, also included the potential for the conflict to spread to PNG where Australia and Indonesia shared a border; further stalling of negotiations on Australian property rights in East Timor; possible suspension of travel of RAN warships through Indonesian waters; and Indonesia could use its influence on Islamic Council Conference nation to take measures hostile to the interests of Australia. NAA, A13977/12,
independence by Australia would have little to no benefit for Timor Leste, with Indonesia threatening to suspend its cooperation on the Timorese Family Reunion Program and refusing to grant entry of journalists and parliamentary delegations. In this regard, the significance of Indonesia to any potential plans for Australian involvement in resolving the Timor issue was blatantly clear: “the issue [of East Timor] was inseparable from Australia’s relations with Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Australian relations with the rest of South East Asia.” 518

During the rest of the 1980s, Australia maintained its policy of indifference on Timor Leste as the issue fell off the international agenda. The new Foreign Minister, Evans, focused the majority of Australia’s diplomatic attention on reaching a peaceful settlement in Cambodia and in growing ties with Indonesia. Australia continued to give aid and lobby for access of the ICRC, as well as push for talks on the issue of human rights during ministerial exchanges. 519 These policies were consistent with those of previous governments and were intended to keep Indonesia on side for negotiations on bilateral trade, the Timor Gap and security. As I mentioned in the previous chapter on foreign aid and development, the Hawke/Evans period was characterized by an expansion of Australian foreign policy into Asia and a distinct focus on regional security. Indonesia, as the largest and nearest nation, was the main recipient of this policy agenda with an explosion of diplomatic activity occurring between the two countries. Of particular note, and one that perhaps received the greatest amount of critical attention, was the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty signed with Indonesia in December 1989. 520 The Timor Gap Treaty re-ignited internal debates on the legitimacy of Australia’s

“Relations with Indonesia: East Timor,” Cabinet Submission no. 12 Australia’s policy on Indonesia – East Timor, 23 March 1983, p. 4-6.

518 Ibid, p. 3.

519 By 1985 Australia had provided $9m to East Timor for food and humanitarian relief. “Questions without notice: East Timor,” Senate, 12 September 1985, p. 509. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Evans%20East%20Timor%20Decade%22%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 8 May 2014).

520 The “Timor Gap Treaty” or Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia was entered into force on February 9, 1991. Australia had been made aware of the oil and gas reserves under the Timor Sea during the 1960s when the Portuguese administration of Timor allowed US Oceanic Exploration to explore areas of the Timor Sea that went beyond the median line between Australia and Timor. In 1972 Australia negotiated a seabed boundary with Indonesia that was largely in Australia’s favour as it secured agreement that went nearly two-thirds towards the island of Timor. At the time, Australia argued that this boundary represented the end of its continental shelf. The negotiations were conducted between Indonesia and Australia and Australia’s insistence that negotiations be based on its continental shelf left a “gap” opposite Portuguese Timor that became known as the “Timor Gap.” The 1972 sea boundary allowed for a greater area of exploration and in 1974 Australian oil and gas company Woodside Petroleum discovered the Greater Sunrise gas field in 1974. This seabed boundary continued until 1989 when Australia and Indonesia negotiated the Timor Gap Treaty. This treaty divided the area into three different “zones of cooperation” that distributed the revenue between the two nations on a 50-50 split. A copy of the treaty can be found at DFAT, Australia Treaty Series, “Treaty
1979 policy of recognizing Indonesia’s claim over Timor Leste. Evans, in response to criticism that Australia had again shirked its human rights responsibilities for material gain argued that:

There is no binding legal obligation not to recognize the acquisition of territory that was acquired by force. Such recognition does not, of course, imply approval of the circumstances of the acquisition. In international law the legality of the original acquisition of territory by a state has to be distinguished in subsequent dealings between the state acquiring that new territory and other states – in this instance, Australia.\(^{521}\)

Australia effectively viewed the status of Timor Leste as being separate to its policies of cooperation with Indonesia, and this approach continued until 1999. And the consistency of Australia’s attitude towards the issue of self-determination since Indonesia’s annexation of Timor has been guided by a rational calculation of whether a push for independence would lead to any beneficial outcomes. There were several conditional factors informing this decision. First, Australia did not have the military capacity to unilaterally implement any peacekeeping force and, without the consent of the Indonesian government, it would have been perceived as an act of war. In the event that Australia did intervene, there was no guarantee that it would receive the support of the US, which was one of the deciding factors in implementing the 1999 INTERFET mission. As former Prime Minister Malcom Fraser later stated: “The US never would have chosen Australia over Indonesia – the largest Islamic country. What we did would have been immaterial.”\(^{522}\) At the time, Timor Leste was considered a resource-poor nation of little concern to international society apart from its strategic importance to neighbouring Australia and Indonesia. On the other hand, Indonesia was far more important to Western defence planning; not only is it the largest Islamic nation in the world, the sea lanes that transit the Indonesian archipelago are central to US naval

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\(^{521}\) “Questions without notice: Timor Gap Treaty,” Senate, 1 November 1989, p. 2709. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderby=customrank;page=0;query=Evans%20East%20Timor%20Decade%22A%221980s%22;rec=14;resCount=Default (accessed 8 May 2014).

presence in the Pacific and the Gulf, which also sit in the middle of important trade routes for its main ally in Northeast Asia, Japan.  

Alongside the capability gap and lack of allied support, Australia also understood that its relationship with Indonesia was still too frail to survive any diplomatic backlash. This concern was tied to Australia’s need for Indonesia’s cooperation in maintaining a stable regional order, particularly in the “Inner Arc” surrounding its northern approaches. As the 1997 White Paper noted two years before the intervention, Australia’s relationship with Indonesia will always be strategically important as the archipelago is located “astride Australia’s northern approaches through which 60% of Australia’s exports pass.” Australia’s offshore oil and natural gas installations on the Northwest Shelf, where energy and mineral exports to Japan and China pass through the straights in the Indonesian archipelago, meant a mutually responsive Indonesia acted as a strategic shield to Australia’s immediate north, whereas a hostile and isolationist Indonesia could use the advantage of geographical proximity to the Straits of Malacca for area denial.

And yet, by 1998, the Howard government had indicated that it was prepared to alter Australia’s policy on Indonesian sovereignty of Timor Leste and take on a greater role in ensuring peace and security in the region. This leads to interesting questions as to what influenced this policy change and whether it was guided by an expectation of reciprocity, which resulted in specific moral and material outcomes. Much of the literature on this has preferred to emphasize the normative shift in Australia’s overall policy of sovereignty and self-determination, but the above evidence shows that material considerations and contextual factors were arguably more central to explaining a change in Australia’s policy towards Timorese independence. A further examination of the motivations and outcomes that precipitated this event is needed to demonstrate the validity of the moral realist claim. The next section of the chapter sets out to achieve this objective.


The initial factor leading to a change in policy was the fall of the Suharto regime. Suharto had been in power since 1966 and had maintained a strict policy of law and order by splitting control of the nation between his Golongan Karya (Golkar) party and the military. Economically, the nation had done well under the Suharto era. The political stability meant Indonesia was presented as a safe-heaven for foreign investment and the economy had consistently grown at an annual rate of 7.5%. Exports had also reached over $US50 billion by 1996 and unemployment was steady at 4.4% amongst a growing middle class. Indonesia was perceived by international society as a model developing nation for growth and prosperity. Its size and status as a potential economic powerhouse translated into increased influence on the world stage, and Indonesia wielded considerable weight within ASEAN and was viewed as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Yet despite this, rumblings of dissatisfaction began to emerge in the lead up to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), which accelerated the environment of political discontent. Suharto’s New Order that transformed Indonesia from a dysfunctional and fractious nation under threat from communist insurgency and failed state status had come at a cost to certain individual freedoms. Campaigns of protest began in 1996 in response to the government organized ousting of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno and popular leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Civil unrest continued during the May 1997 parliamentary elections as members of Indonesian society voiced concern over the lack of opposition parties and free public debate. Political ambiguity on who would be the next leader of Indonesia began to grow.

527 Suharto expanded the role of the military in Indonesian society by placing military officials into government and civil service positions. 75 of the 500 seats in parliament were reserved for members of the Indonesian military. For more on the Suharto regime, see Michael RJ Vatikiotis, _Indonesian Politics Under Suharto Vol. 69_ (London: Routledge, 1993).


529 This claim has been made by Michael Dove and Daniel Kammen. For more see, Michael Dove and Daniel Kammen, “Vernacular models of development: an analysis of Indonesia under the “New Order”,” _World Development_ 29, no. 4 (2001), pp. 619-639.


532 Only two opposition parties were allowed: the Indonesian Democratic Party and the Muslim based United Development Party (PPP). The two parties were originally a collection of independent groups, but were forced to merge by electoral rules emplace between 1973 and 1998. The four main Muslim parties became the PPP and
leader of Indonesia added to anxieties on the future stability of the nation. There were increasing debates on the ability of Suharto to remain President for another five-year term in 1998, at the end of which he would be 82 years old.\footnote{533}

Against the background of political dissent, by the end of 1997 Indonesia was beginning to feel the effects of the AFC.\footnote{534} The state had already accumulated an alarming amount of debt, approximately US$110 billion, a substantial amount of which was perceived as bad debts.\footnote{535} The thirty-year period of industrialization had led to substantial job growth, but had also led to a doubling of real wages to about 25 cents an hour. Population growth and wage increases resulted in an influx of rural workers to urban centres where employment and housing were not guaranteed. Many of these were young Indonesia’s who represented around 20% of the workforce and 70% of the unemployed.\footnote{536}

The financial structure of Indonesia did not help the crisis. The fixed exchange rate of the rupiah to the US dollar and a current account deficit of 4% created downward pressure on the nation’s economy and encouraged speculative attacks where large amounts of Indonesia’s reserve currency was sold to protect the rupiah. High domestic interest rates also meant that the five major secular parties became the PDI. Following the ousting of Megawati, the military took control of the PDI and organized the re-election of former party head Suryadi. Government disapproval of Megawati actually began a few years earlier with her appointment as chairperson in 1993. The government refused to recognise Megawati’s appointment and orchestrated a failed attempt to replace her with Budi Harjono. The instalment of Suryadi led to a split in the PDI amongst Megawati and Suryadi supporters. The storming of PDI headquarters by Suryadi supporters prompted the June 1996 riots and government crackdown. In the 1997 legislative elections, Megawati’s faction threw their votes behind the PPP while the government backed Suryadi only managed 3% of the vote. In terms of press and individual freedom, the PDI and PPP were forbidden from speaking out against the government, and government approval was required before the release of any campaign slogan or advertisement. The government vetted all candidates and nearly half of all members of the 500-seat parliament were appointed by the regime. Only the President’s Golkar party were allowed to campaign for supporters at the district and local level, and all government employees were mandated to support the governments Golkar party. An in-depth account of politics under the Suharto regime can be found in Michael RJ. Vatikiotis, \textit{Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order} 3rd ed. Vol. 5 (New York: Routledge, 1998).\footnote{535}

\footnote{533} The government’s near monopoly over the political system meant any potential leader needed to be “tapped” by Suharto as part of a plan of succession. Two-years from the 1998 presidential elections, it was not yet clear that Suharto would step-down and nominate his deputy and future Vice-President B.J. Habibie who was not popular with the Indonesia military. In the end Suharto stood (and won) another five-year term. Ibid. pp.206-210.

\footnote{534} Indonesia was not the only Asian country demonstrating signs of an economic downturn. Between 1993 and 1996, the total debt to GDP of ASEAN had increased from 100% to around 167%. During the worst stages of the crisis, this reached over 180%. For more on the effects of the AFC see Morris Goldstein, \textit{The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications}. Vol. 55 (Washington DC: Peterson Institute, 1998).

\footnote{535} Bad debts were state-owned bank loans given to Suharto’s family and inner circle, which were unlikely to be re-cooped. These were estimated at around US$3billion.

Indonesian investors borrowed and held money offshore contributing to a hollow market. The social and economic conditions combined created a “perfect storm” and meant that when the AFC fully hit Indonesia in 1998, it became one of the worst affected states. It suffered a dramatic drop in the exchange rate and stock prices plummeted. No longer able to control speculative attacks, Indonesia was forced to float its currency, the rupiah fell from Rp2,342 to Rp12,014 against the US dollar between 1996 and 1998 respectively. The currency depreciation led to a major episode of capital flight as foreign investors were forced to face high debt repayments in Indonesia’s domestic currency terms.

During this time, Indonesia was undergoing negotiations for its first instalment of International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts, worth a total of US$43 billion. The initial US$3 billion did little to ameliorate the worsening economic crisis, and the rupiah reached its lowest point of Rp12,000 in January 1998, forcing President Suharto to sign a new loan deal with the IMF that included a commitment to end government monopolies on investment and eliminate state subsidies. As a result, the price of food staples increased by 80%, prompting street riots and student protests over fears of food shortages. Social discontent intensified following the halting of an IMF loan instalment and the re-election of Suharto on March 11, 1998. In a late attempt to quell the crisis, Suharto agreed to close more insolvent banks in exchange for a relaxation of the IMF’s condition to dismantle food and energy subsidies. But the damage had already been done. The price of food had increased by 30% and the end to energy subsidies had increased the price of kerosene by 25%, petrol by 71% and diesel fuel by 60%.

The week of May 12th to 19th was the worst week of protests against the Suharto regime and eventually led to his resignation on May 21st. On May 12th six students were shot dead at Trisakti University in Jakarta, which triggered a week of violent protests resulting in the

540 Ibid.
541 Some Suharto family linked banks refused to close, which increased international and domestic pressure for a change to the regime. Op cit. “Indonesia: from showcase to basket case,” p. 727.
death of nearly 500 people. Suharto resigned and Bacharuddin Jusuf (B.J.) Habibie was installed as President, ending Suharto’s 32-year rule. The change of leadership was essential to Australia’s decision to push for Indonesia’s acceptance of a resolution to Timor Leste. As former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated: “There is simply no doubt that, were President Suharto still in power, the resolution of the East Timor problem would not today be a real possibility.”

Habibie came into office with a view to resolving the issue of Timor Leste and was prepared to re-examine Indonesia’s stance on the province. In June 1998, he announced that Indonesia was ready to accept a “special status” of autonomy for Timor Leste. Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, wrote a letter to Habibie in December 1998 urging a long-term path of self-determination that would eventually lead to independence. It is important to note that Australia (and some cabinet members in Indonesia, particularly Foreign Minister Ali Alatas), were not in favour of referendum with a straight vote between autonomy and independence. Australia preferred to pursue a path of self-determination that occurred over


546 There has been some debate over the importance of this letter, particularly from Habibie and Ali Alitas who both indicated that it was Howard’s aggressiveness in pushing for independence that led to the referendum being held in 6 months and not 10 years. In an interview for the ABC’s “The Howard Year’s” Habibie indicated that it was Howard who suggested that he solve East Timor through direct independence “In this letter he suggests that I have to solve [East Timor] as how the French have solved their colonies in the Pacific New Caledonia - he suggests it.” ABC, “Howard pushed me on E Timor referendum,” ABC News, 16 November 2008. Available at: [http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-11-16/howard-pushed-me-on-e-timorese-referendum-habibie/207044](http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-11-16/howard-pushed-me-on-e-timorese-referendum-habibie/207044) (accessed 14 May 2014). Ali Alatas made similar comments in 2007 during his testimony to the Truth and Friendship Commission established to identify the facts and events surrounding the 1999 outbreak of violence following the referendum. Specifically he pointed out that Howard’s suggestion of an “interim autonomy” angered Habibie as it involved significant financial and diplomatic support from Indonesia without them achieving much in return in terms of international prestige. Therefore, Habibie had no choice but to run with independence. Interestingly, in an interview conducted after his testimony he argued that it was “not the letter,” and instead it was the strong Australian involvement in the peacekeeping effort that occurred after the vote. “It was rather the spirit of overzealousness of Australia suddenly to send troops and send the largest contingent of troops. Sometimes it’s a gung-ho attitude etcetera. It was not the letter, it was not the letter.” ABC, “Howard instrumental in East Timor referendum run-up: ex-minister,” ABC PM with Geoff Thompson. Transcript of interview with former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alitas, 19 November 2007. Available at: [http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2007/s1851651.htm](http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2007/s1851651.htm) (accessed 14 May 2014).
a ten-year period and allowed for a process of reconciliation between FRETLIN, the pro-integrationists and the Indonesians. This policy proposal mirrored the successful Matignon Accords that had enabled the former French Polynesian colony of New Caledonia to peacefully negotiate a framework for independent statehood.

Australia’s position on interim autonomy was guided by a concern for the stability of a territory that was on its doorstep and a reasonable calculation that Indonesia, at this stage, was unwilling to accept a forcible move to self-determination. Timor Leste was also largely ill-equipped to deal with immediate statehood. Therefore a delayed process of independence had the advantage of allowing time for the necessary institutional and social structures to be built to increase the prospects of Timor Leste as a viable state. This would also have the related benefit of keeping Indonesia on side for future negotiations on reconciliation and a possible international humanitarian presence.

With these concerns in mind, Habibie’s request to the UN Security General on the 27th January 1999 for the UN to hold a referendum on a vote between greater autonomy and independence came as somewhat of a surprise to Australia and has contributed to debates on whether self-determination was ever part of the foreign policy goals pursued by both Howard and Downer. Habibie’s decision to hold a referendum was motivated by several domestic and international factors. The economic situation in Indonesia had worsened towards the end of 1998. Real GDP growth had shrunk another 16.5% and oil prices remained high at US$10-$12 per barrel. A declining economy meant it was becoming harder for Indonesia to maintain its monetary subsidies to Timor Leste, and greater international and domestic attention to plight of the Timorese also meant it was no longer in Indonesia’s interest to continue to

548 The Matignon Accords were signed on 26 June 1988 and were a set of agreements that outlined a framework for an interim settlement that would conclude in 1998 with a referendum on the future constitution of New Caledonia. The accords were signed between French President Michel Rocard and the two main political organisations in New Caledonia: the Melanesian nationalist and the loyalist to the French. The 1988 referendum asked both French and New Caledonian residents to vote to allow for self-determination in 1998, to which 80% of voters agreed. Stephen Hennigam, “The uneasy peace: New Caledonia’s Matignon Accord’s at midterm,” Pacific Affairs 66, no. 4 (Winter 1993-1994), pp. 519-537. On May 5th 1998, the Noumea Accord was signed by French President Lionel Jospin, which scheduled the transfer of sovereignty to New Caledonia by 2018.
justify its control over the territory. Indonesia had already suffered penalties for its actions in Timor following the Dili massacre in 1992 and was in a comparatively weaker position in 1998-99 to shrug off a threat of military, economic or political sanctions. The rushed ballot was a way for Habibie to boost Indonesia’s international standing in the eyes of the West by being seen to resolve the crisis, while at the same time presenting himself as a leader on deciding domestic issues in the lead up to the Presidential election. This decision came as an initial surprise as Howard had preferred an alternative policy outcome for Timor, as outlined in his letter to Habibie. However, Australia did come to support the referendum.

Here, Australia’s response was the result of a “window of opportunity” in determining whether it could successfully navigate a resolution to what had become a “regional sore” in the nations direct strategic environment. As Downer stated:

The main issue informing this policy change was security and tranquillity in the region. Human rights were a factor and it is always good to make a contribution to human rights issues when you can, but this was not the driving force.

The Timorese also followed Australia in supporting the ballot. For them, it was becoming evident that the violence would continue without a definitive resolution that had either the

550 Indonesia had spent a considerable amount on the development of Timor and arguably did more to progress the territory than Portugal. The international solidarity movement was given a boost in 1996 with the awarding of the joint Nobel Peace Prize to Romas Horta and Carlos Bello. Romas Horta and Carlos Bello jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize “for their work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor.” The Nobel Peace Prize, “The Nobel peace prize 1996.” Available at: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laurates/1996/ (accessed 13 May 2014).

551 On November 21, 1991 Indonesian military opened fire on a group of mourners commemorating the death of two pro-independence fighters at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. The original estimates of those killed were between 50 and 100. This was increased to between 250 and 270. Philip Shenon, “Indonesia seeks to atone for a massacre in Timor,” The New York Times, 17 September 1992. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/17/world/indonesia-seeks-to-atone-for-a-massacre-in-timor.html (accessed 13 May 2014). During the 1990s, the US took a number of actions against the Indonesian’s in response to the ongoing violence in East Timor. The most significant was the suspension of the International Military Education Training (IMET) program in 1992, which was cited in the previous chapter as evidence of Australia’s concern for a marginalisation of Indonesia by Western states and the effects this would have on its policy of “comprehensive engagement.” The US also suspended the sale of light arms and crowd control items and Congress blocked the sale of a F-16 aircraft that was up for sale in both 1996 and 1998.

552 Despite his intentions, Habibie received significant opposition criticism for this decision, particularly by his main presidential opponent Megawati Sukarnoputri who accused him of breaching the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) decree that East Timor remain integrated into Indonesia. “Criticism mount over Habibie’s East Timor decision,” The Jakarta Post, 7 September 1999. Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/1999/09/07/criticisms-mount-over-habibie039s-east-timor-decision.html (accessed 13 May 2014).

553 Interview with former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Sydney 2011.
Timorese accepting integration with Indonesia, or both parties agreeing to hold a vote on the territories future status. Here again, statements made by Downer are instructive:

I spoke to Ramos Horta about it when the violence was growing and growing. I told him that if you don’t take this ballot now it may not come again for another 10 or 20 years. And he said, “We need the ballot now.”

In the lead-up to the ballot, Australia’s main involvement was in continuing to lobby Indonesia, alongside Portugal, on allowing an international peacekeeping presence on the ground during the process, and for the disarmament of all parties. It had some success in achieving this with the signing of the May 5th Agreement. This outlined the conditions of the vote, which included the presence of UN civil police advisers as part of the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and recognition by Indonesia that it would unequivocally accept the results of the vote. Australia later faced some criticism on why it did not push harder for a greater UN presence before the ballot, given what many predicted would be a massive outbreak of violence following the referendum. The reasons for this are similar to those of previous governments. It was quite clear that Habibie was unwilling to make any real concessions on this point, and without Indonesian’s consent Australia’s participation in any peace-enforcement operation would be “tantamount to a military attack.” As well as this, there was also the view that if a vote were made conditional on any peacekeeping force, then it would not have taken place prolonging...
what had already been a twenty-four year conflict. In this regard, there was an expectation of reciprocity guiding Australia’s diplomacy and a rational calculation of what action would result in the best outcome for Australia and for Timor Leste.

After a two-week delay due to security concerns, 98.6% of registered Timorese went to the ballot box on the 30th August, 1999. The vote was considered a success in that the majority of Timorese were able to exercise their right to self-determination. And the result was overwhelming, with 78.5% in favour of independence. Australia made a substantial contribution to the original UN mission. It committed US$10 million to the UN Trust Fund for East Timor (UNTFET), pledging a further US$10 million in logistical support to help the establishment of the UN team. This meant that overall Australia was the largest donor to UNAMET, contributing US$20 million from a total of US$46 million. Australian staff and resources also made a significant contribution to the missions programme with Australia providing 38 AFP officers as civil police advisers, including the Commissioner, Alan Mills. In areas of human development, such as health, education and employment, Australia provided an initial contribution of US$3 million.

Yet, as mentioned above, what occurred afterwards cast doubt on any initial moral claim Australia had in its involvement in the process. Despite the UN urging all parties to accept the result, the election incited Indonesian-backed militia forces to launch a “scorched earth campaign,” destroying over 80% of Dili’s infrastructure, which led to the estimated deaths of

558 “Questions without notice: East Timor: Peacekeeping,” HoR, 2 September 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221999%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2202%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 13 May 2014).


561 Australia also provided a further US$5 million to assist the initiatives of the ICRC, which focused on bringing medical supplies and refuge to Internally Displaced People (IDP). John Howard, “Urgent Humanitarian Assistance for Timorese,” Press Releases, Prime Minister John Howard, 10 September 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;sortBy=customrank;page=0;query=Urgent%20Humanitarian%20Assistance%20for%20Timorese;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 31 May 2014).
nearly 1,400 people and forcibly displaced nearly 300,000 Timorese.\textsuperscript{563} The crisis also spread to West Timor, with evidence that the Indonesian backed pro-integrationist forces were complicit in orchestrating attacks against the Timorese refugees seeking asylum there.

Australia actually reacted quite quickly to the post-election violence given the initial constraints of having to wait for the MPR, the Indonesian People’s Assembly, to meet in early November and endorse the outcome of the ballot before any action regarding a security presence was made. In fact Australia was instrumental in getting an international force on the ground \textit{before} this occurred, even though Habibie had repeatedly refused to give Indonesia’s consent until the MPR met. This does much to counter potential criticism that some moral considerations for the safety and security of Timor Leste were not present. Of course, this was not the only factor, nor was it the most overwhelming.

An expectation of reciprocity and a rational calculation that Australia’s military and diplomatic efforts would achieve beneficial outcomes account for Australia’s decision to intervene in Timor Leste. One of the early calculations was Australia’s willingness to take the lead on any military operation and its readiness to deploy the necessary forces. The UN indicated that it would be “almost impossible” to have a full international force ready inside of two months. Meanwhile, Australia had been “planning for months” for the possibility that it might need to make a significant contribution, placing 2 brigades (2000 troops) on 24-hour defence readiness in early September.\textsuperscript{564} Diplomatically, Downer had been lobbying for a UN consensus on an alternative security presence made up of a “coalition of the willing” that would reinforce the civil police and Military Liaison Officers (MLO) already on the ground as part of UNAMET. Downer announced this proposal on the 4\textsuperscript{th} of September (the day the outcome of the ballot was made public) and argued that it could be done “with Indonesian

\textsuperscript{563} The number of deaths is difficult to accurately present. The deaths following the plebiscite were relatively modest. However, Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999 were estimated to have led to the death of between 120,000 and 200,000 Timorese. Out of a population of 700,000 this puts the death toll comparable in scale to the number of deaths recorded in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime. For more see Susan Harris Rimmer and Juli Effi Tomaras, “Aftermath Timor Leste: Reconciling competing notions of justice, Analysis and Policy Law and Bills Digest Section, 21 May 2007. Available at: http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/TimorLeste (accessed 15 May 2014) and Paul Daley, “Evidence of organised killing campaigns grows,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 November 1999, p.10.

\textsuperscript{564} John Howard, “Prime Minister discusses East Timor,” Transcript of radio interview with John Miller, 4BC, 7 September 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=East%20Timor%20Indonesia%20IMF%20Howard%20Decade%3A%221990s%3B%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 15 May 2014).
agreement and with the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution in a much shorter period of time. And that is one of the proposals which we are working on at the moment.\textsuperscript{565}

Australia relied heavily on the support of the US in wielding the stick needed to achieve Jakarta’s approval for an international peacekeeping force. Greater involvement from the US allowed Australia to maintain some leverage with Indonesia without having to risk taking action that could damage its bilateral relationship. Downer neatly indicated Australia’s hesitancy to act on its own in this regard:

You know, if we were to scrap the military to military links, that is one of the stays of the relationship, then, obviously the relationship would turn down very rapidly and I think there’d be a lot more closed doors in Jakarta, even at the political level than would otherwise be the case.\textsuperscript{566}

As it became more obvious that the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) was responsible for much of the violence, Australia was eventually forced to downgrade its defence cooperation with Indonesia on the 10\textsuperscript{th} September, cancelling three scheduled joint training missions and putting under review $7.8 million worth of defence assistance. Yet Australia was not fully willing to sever its security ties and continued its healthy aid commitment, even increasing it by $24.14 million between 1998 and 1999.\textsuperscript{567} It was also reluctant to support more coercive economic action with Howard stating just 6 days before the APEC meeting with Clinton that “cutting off an IMF loan is not necessarily going to bring in the requisite short period of time

\textsuperscript{565} Alexander Downer, “Announcement of the referendum result in East Timor,” Press Releases, doorstop interview Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, 4 September 2014. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=East%20Timor%20results%20of%20Independence;rec=11;resCount=Default (accessed 31 May 2014).

\textsuperscript{566} “Discussion about the situation in East Timor after the ballot and Australia’s relationship with China,” Transcript of interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, Meet the Press, Channel Ten, 5 September 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221999%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2205%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 15 May 2014).

\textsuperscript{567} In the end it was the Indonesia’s that famously “tore up” the 1995 agreement made between Suharto and Keating in response to what they viewed as Australia’s aggressive action in their leadership and support for the peacekeeping operation. Alexander Downer, “Development cooperation program,” Ministerial Statements, HoR, 9 December 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/1999-12-09/0093/hansard_frg.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 15 May 2014).
the sort of outcome we want.”568 Delaying much needed economic assistance would further destabilize an already fragile social and political environment that had significant security implications for Australia. To work around this, Australia made the calculated decision to hedge with the US.

The US had indicated earlier that with 14,000 troops in Kosovo, it was unable to play a large material role but was willing to put diplomatic pressure on the Indonesians to accept the mission.569 At the annual APEC meeting in Auckland, Howard met on the sidelines with Clinton and various members of ASEAN to discuss the issue of Timor Leste. The outcome of this was important. In a series of bilateral talks Howard reached agreement with Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore on their participation in a peacekeeping coalition.570 And after talks with Clinton, the US announced that it would again suspend the joint military training program and threatened a freeze of IMF and World Bank assistance packages now worth nearly US$70 billion. The US also cut off the sale of small-arms weapons and threatened further economic sanctions if the Indonesian government and military failed to cooperate with the force, and agreed to provide logistical support to the operation.571

On the same day that Australia achieved support for its coalition and the US announced its series of sanctions, President Habibie, along with Ali Alitas and General Wiranto, made a televised address announcing Indonesia’s readiness to accept an international peacekeeping force.572 Resolution 1264 (1999) established the non-UN INTERFET, which was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to restore peace and stability in Timor, support

568 “Prime Minister discusses East Timor,” Transcript of the Prime Minister John Howard radio interview with John Miller, 4BC, 7 September 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=East%20Timor%20Indonesia%20IMF%20Howard%20Decade%3A%221990s%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 15 May 2014).
570 John Howard, “East Timor, UN peacekeeping force and Indonesia,” Press Release, Transcript of press conference with John Howard at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, Auckland New Zealand, 13 September 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221999%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2212%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 16 May 2014).
UNAMET and assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Australia fulfilled its promise of leading the multinational force and contributed over 5,500 of the 12,600 troops. The commander of the force was Australian Major-General, Peter Cosgrove who was in charge of a multinational coalition that included significant contributions from states in Australia’s region, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea.

The Australian deployment to INTERFET represented its largest military commitment in over thirty years, and encompassed three infantry battalion groups, defence headquarters, as well as support units. This was joined by maritime and air operations. Its involvement in Timor Leste did not stop with the withdrawal of INTERFET. In March 2000, INTERET was replaced with the United Nations Transitional Authority of East Timor (UNTAET), which oversaw the civil administration of Timor Leste until its independence and included the deployment of a UN PKO. Australia contributed the largest number of personnel to the UN PKO, an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 personnel, as well as a landing aircraft and Blackhawk helicopters.

Australia’s diplomacy and military resources: Moral and material outcomes of foreign policy

On the 20th May 2002, the territory of East Timor was declared the new nation of Timor Leste signaling the final result of self-determination for the Timorese. Much has been made about the merits of Australia’s actions in the lead up to INTERFET, but there is a general consensus that it did contribute to Timor Leste becoming a relatively stable and independent state. In fact, some, like James Cotton and Alan Dupont, have argued that without Australia’s diplomacy and leadership in building an international coalition, this outcome was unlikely. As has been mentioned earlier, Australia’s commitment was guided by an overarching expectation that its support for a vote of independence, and subsequent humanitarian operation, would contribute to regional security. There were also specific moral and material

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574 The deployment of military personnel was followed by federal police, MLOs and consular officials.
575 This was designated Operation Warden as part of the wider UN efforts designated Operation Stabilise.
576 Australia also contributed personnel to the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which was established to keep the peace after independence between 2002-2005. In 2006, the sacking of rebel military personnel led to outbreaks of civil unrest and violence in Dili prompting the UNs Integration Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) to be deployed. ADFs personnel were sent as part of Operation ASTUTE and continued until December 2012 when the UN formally withdrew its PKO from Timor.
outcomes that allowed Australia to gain benefits in prestige, economic investment and closer ties with Indonesia.

The proposal for a coalition instead of a UN blue-helmet operation was a way to have a security force on the ground to stop the bloodshed, but it was also a means for Australia to gain leadership credentials in the region while also having other states shoulder some of the operational burden. This led to reputational benefits and also satisfied domestic concerns that Australia had not done enough to resolve the crisis. As Eric Schwartz, Presidential Assistant on multilateral and humanitarian affairs, commented:

There is enormous appreciation in Washington for the leadership that the Government of Australia has shown in this undertaking. Australian diplomats did a masterful job in pulling together an international coalition. The Australian military has acted with professionalism, has been highly effective, and General Cosgrove has proven to be an absolutely excellent leader.

As well as its commitment to securing the conditions for Timor’s independence, Australia contributed significantly to the reconstruction process. At the time, Australia’s contribution of $74 million (to the UN estimated $300 million needed for the first three years of reconstruction) represented the largest it had ever made to a single humanitarian crisis. Such a large donation was partly motivated by a concern that Timor make the transition to a secure and thriving state, and partly inline with expectations that Australia would continue its leadership role during the nation-building process. As Howard noted before the operation:

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578 John Howard and John Moore, “East Timor,” Joint press conference with John Howard and John Moore, the Minister of Defence, Parliament House. Press Releases, 8 September 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=2;query=East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%221999s%22%20Year%3A%221999%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2208%22;rec=10;resCount=Default (accessed 16 May 2014).


I have said all along that if independence for East Timor means that Australia must accept a greater burden than would otherwise be the case and that will be a burden in aid, a burden in other respects because it will be a fragile, fledgling country. There’ll be fewer than a million people, it will have a very low standard of living, it will have virtually no infrastructure.  

This expectation was also met with the desire to achieve material outcomes in business contracts and investment. And here again, Australia acted quickly to achieve this goal. In preparation, it established an AusAID office in Dili less than one month after INTERFET was deployed and convened a reconstruction forum in Canberra on 19th of October where over 450 business and government representatives were provided an overview of the requirements and opportunities for re-building. This gave Australian businesses a head start on lobbying for operations in road repair, building refurbishment, transport infrastructure and water supply. Howard also took the unusual step of writing to various business heads and CEOs in December 1999, inviting them to contribute to Timor’s development. This meant that by the time that Timor Leste was “open for business” in June 2002, Australia had established an Australian-East Timor Business Council and had reaped significant financial benefit with some 347 Australian businesses operating in Timor Leste. Some of the more lucrative contracts went to ANZ for banking and finance; Multiplex for the construction of public offices; Ortech Industries for housing construction and the RMS Engineering and Construction PTY Ltd for the construction of commercial buildings.
These outcomes were not just localized to Australia. The influx of investment and development meant Timor Leste achieved impressive annual growth of 15% between 1999 and 2001. The most significant economic effect of independence was the royalties achieved from the singing of a new oil and gas agreement. For Australia, it meant that it could successfully re-negotiate a better agreement on the Timor Gap – a concern that had been tied to Australia’s actions over Timor Leste since the 1960s. The terms of the Timor Sea Treaty were concluded on the 19th of May, signed on the day of Timor Leste’s independence and entered into force in April 2003. The treaty split the revenue 90%-10% in Timor’s favor and on the surface this may seem like a deal that goes against the actions of previous governments in their pursuit of a relative advantage. However, the area known as the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), formerly the “Timor Gap” where the 90%-10% was enforced, did not include the large and profitable Greater Sunrise field, of which Australia claimed 79.9% lay within its seabed boundary signed with Indonesia in 1972.

During the preliminary negotiations Timor Leste repeatedly disputed the legitimacy of this boundary, arguing that it contravened the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, which placed the field within Timor’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In response, Australia withdrew from recognizing this Convention before negotiations officially started and refused to reach a deal that did not recognize this boundary. The initial result was the signing of the Sunrise International Unitisation Agreement that accompanied the Timor Sea Treaty and overwhelmingly advantaged Australia in leaving only 20.1% of the field within the JPDA where Timor would receive 18.1% of the revenue. This treaty was amended in 2006 in

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Available at:


recognition that the original agreement was markedly unreasonable for a new and developing state that could use the revenue to become less aid-dependent. The Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) was entered into force in February 2007 (the same day as the SIU) and divided the upstream revenue from the field on a 50%-50% basis.\textsuperscript{591} It is difficult to fully quantify the benefits of this agreement to Timor Leste given that large amounts of the projected revenue from the oil and gas fields are yet to be exploited. However, an estimated 90% of Timor Leste’s economy is generated from oil and gas, which has been deposited into a sovereign wealth fund that increased from $370 million in 2005 to $11.78 billion in 2012.\textsuperscript{592} Australia’s expected economic benefit is obviously much larger. The Greater Sunrise field is estimated to contain 8.4 trillion cubic feet of gas and 295 million barrels of hydrocarbon, worth over $40 billion. Australia’s Woodside Energy Ltd holds the right to develop the field with a project cost of $6.6 billion. Timor Leste gained 90% share of the Bayu-Undan field, but Australia built the only natural gas pipeline connecting the field to a processing plant in Darwin harbour, and has benefited from the construction and processing.\textsuperscript{593} The pipeline was complete in 2005 and is estimated to produce $2 billion in direct revenue on top of the $1.6 billion already achieved in combined construction of the LNG plant. It also led to the creation of over 1,500 jobs and increased trade opportunities with Japan as Australia’s share (approximately 3 million tonnes of LNG a year) was contracted to the Tokyo Electric Power Company and Tokyo Gas.\textsuperscript{594} These outcomes were reciprocal. Australian investors in the project, Phillips Petroleum, Inpex Sahul, Santos and Petroz made substantial contributions to Timor Leste. Nearly US$13m was spent on project training and infrastructure development, including airport, education and health facilities.


\textsuperscript{592}The majority of this has come from the Bayu-Undan field, which reached peak in 2013-14 earlier than previous estimates, sparking fears that Timor’s sovereign wealth fund will be unable to fund future infrastructure projects. For more see David Winning, “East Timor’s economic engine maybe low on gas,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2014. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303636404579396361782040576 (accessed 19 May 2014).


Over $US44 million was spent on running costs and for the supply of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) at a concessional rate which was predicted to be worth $20 million. Discounted LPG was expected to assist Timor in replacing expensive and imported diesel fuel for domestic power generators.595

In a similar way to the case of Cambodia, perhaps one of the less well-known benefits to Australia’s actions in Timor Leste was the strengthening of its relationship with Indonesia. Indeed, some, like Hugh White, have argued that INTERFET was a strategic failure in the short-term effect it had on Australia’s relationship with Indonesia.596 Yet, what I have shown demonstrates that at every step the government was acutely aware of how this would affect its most important bilateral relationship outside of the US. It was the main reason why successive Prime Minister’s were wary of any proactive policy over the Timor issue and why John Howard was steadfast in his commitment to gaining Habibie’s consent before any PKOs were sent. Not only does this uncover the centrality of rational choice, it also indicates that Australia would not have made a move without an expectation that a resolution to the “thorn in the side” of its relationship with Indonesia would lead to some benefits in return.

596 It was the case that Indonesia initially reacted badly to Australia’s diplomacy and leadership of the multinational coalition, which was demonstrated in Indonesia’s scrapping of the 1996 security agreement. This was a calculated risk for the Australian government and, as mentioned, it was the main consideration affecting previous action over the Timor issue during the Suharto era. But by September 1999, both the internal situation in Indonesia, and the regional environment, had changed to the extent that the risk in intervening was outweighed by the benefits expected in return. For more see Hugh White, “The road to independence: reflections on Australia’s strategic decisions concerning East Timor December 1998-September 1999,” Security Challenges 4, no. 1 (2008), pp. 69-87.
Trade between the two countries actually increased after 1999 and has more or less been on a steady growth path worth over $14.1 billion in 2013. Of course, some of this can be attributed to Indonesia’s political and economic transformation, as well as its recovery from the AFC, but a resolution to the Timor issue also increased market confidence in Indonesia, which had been labelled a pariah over its human rights abuses. Business-to-business links and FDI between the two nations increased, particularly in the area of mining, textiles and agriculture. During the height of the crisis in 1999, Australia had gained approval for 54 new investment projects. A year later, 34 new projects were approved worth US$32 million. Alongside the economic benefits, greater outcomes were also had in the signing of a new security agreement in 2006 that was wider in its scope of cooperation and consultation. The “Lombok Treaty” included the areas of defence and defence technology, law enforcement, transnational crime, people smuggling, counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, maritime and aviation security, as well as nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes.

Source: DFAT

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597 Statistical information can be found in the table “Australian trade with Indonesia.”
**Conclusion**

This chapter has applied a moral realist framework to understand Australia’s foreign policy choices in Cambodia and Timor Leste. It found that Australia’s record as an active middle power in this policy area is better explained by reference to expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes than supporters of Australia acting as a GIC would acknowledge. This is particularly the case given that in both Cambodia and Timor Leste Australia waited until the conditions were right for it to reap the maximum national interest benefits in return, which indicates that moral and material considerations converged in Australia’s decision to use force for humanitarian purposes.

In Cambodia, the end of the Cold War provided Australia with an opportunity to present its Cambodian peace plan with the expectation that an agreement on UN transitional administration of Cambodia would break the deadlock on international negotiations. This also produced some moral outcomes in the withdrawal of foreign forces, partial demobilization and the holding of relatively free and fair elections. Australia’s support of UNTAC was consistent with its regional strategic interests. It provided an opportunity for Australia to military contribute towards regional stability in a changed environment where non-traditional security threats were more prevalent. Resolution to the Indochina conflict also led to economic gains as a result of the normalization of relations with Vietnam, which had been a long-term foreign policy goal for Australia.

Similar evidence was found in Australia’s use of force in Timor Leste. Australia’s commitment was more significant and so were the material benefits. Like in Cambodia, Australia waited until the conditions were ripe for it to receive the maximum outcomes. This occurred after the fall of the Suharto regime, which provided the opportunity for Howard to propose a path of self-determination for the Timorese. Rather than representing a normative shift, this policy change was motivated by a rational calculation that it would achieve some beneficial outcomes, for both Australia and for the Timorese. It provided a further opportunity for Australia to adopt a leadership role in resolving issues of regional security, which led to specific reputational payoffs. Economic benefits were also gained in Australia’s commitment to the reconstruction process and more importantly in the signing of the new Timor Sea Treaty.
This thesis has now applied the moral realist framework to two of the three empirical cases and found that the perspective shows potential in understanding the position of morality in Australia’s policy choices in the arenas of foreign aid and humanitarian operations. However, this is only two thirds of the full story. The presence of moral and material calculations as part of Australia’s foreign policy choices in these policy arenas was not wholly unexpected. Hence, the next chapter will complete my case investigation by applying moral realism to a policy arena where only strategic factors are likely to be present. Hence I now turn to the case of the Australian-US security partnership.
Chapter Four

Australia and the US security partnership: Morality and interests in Australia’s strategic alliances

As demonstrated in Chapter 1, much of the realist literature has treated the potential for moral considerations in state foreign policy choices with a high level of scepticism, while normative perspectives have over-emphasized the role played by shared norms, values and ideas. Thus, this chapter seeks to offer an alternative by examining the Australian-US security partnership from a moral realist perspective. It is organized into two parts. It begins with an evaluation of the main theoretical debates on strategic alliances. Within this discussion I identify the limitations of normative understandings of security, and specifically their pre-occupation with the inherent cooperative benefits of multilateral strategic alliances. I then provide an overview of a moral realist approach to alliances, which is broadly informed by the moral and material consequences of states choosing to form security partnerships underpinned by common interests.

The next section forms the bulk of the chapter and is where I apply the moral realist framework to the Australia-US security partnership. It finds that in originally forming the tie Australia was motivated by an expectation of reciprocity in having security assurances from a great power, as well as access to US defence planning, intelligence and technology. The decision to align with the US was also guided by moral calculations in that Australia understood the US to be the best security partner that could assist in maintaining regional peace and security, which had benefits to other states outside of the relationship. Evidence of continued expectations of reciprocity over the life of the partnership is strengthened by evidence of rational choice as Australia sought to maintain close cooperation with the US, despite instances where doing so appeared to compromise Australia’s national interests.

The presence of expectations of reciprocity and rational choice demonstrates the likelihood of moral and material outcomes, which I argue have been evident in the flow-on benefits to states in Australia’s regional environment – especially in the areas of counter-terrorism and joint law enforcement. This has led to material benefits for Australia in bringing stability to its area of direct strategic importance and contributed to its regional interests in developing
closer security and defence ties with states in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific Islands.

In sum, this chapter finds further evidence in support of moral realism as a useful framework for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices, and in doing so completes the application of moral realism to the empirical cases.

**Defining alliances: The Australian-US security partnership**

While alliances obviously vary in their specific details they are generally considered a type of security cooperation defined by mutual agreements to defend against a common external threat.\(^{600}\) This can appear in two forms: formal and informal. In a formal alliance commitments are enshrined in written agreements (like Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Charter, for instance). In comparison, an informal alliance is one made up of ad-hoc agreements founded on “either tacit understandings or some tangible form of commitment, such as verbal assurances or joint military exercises.”\(^{601}\) The US-Australian security partnership, under the Australian New Zealand United States (ANZUS) treaty has both formal and informal aspects.\(^{602}\) The treaty itself does not include an explicit mutual guarantee that each party will come to the aid of the other. Instead Article 3 specifies that “Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.”\(^{603}\) The promise to consult in the event of a security threat is then followed by recognition that this would also constitute a mutual security threat under Article 4, which states that:

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\(^{602}\) ANZUS is often used in the literature to refer to both the treaty and the various dialogues, institutions and exchanges between the US and Australia as part of the security partnership. This thesis takes a broader approach and focuses on the US-Australia security partnership that extends outside of the ANZUS treaty. This allows the thesis to keep within the parameters of examining the bilateral relationship between the US and Australia given that ANZUS was originally a tri-lateral security agreement that included New Zealand up until the mid-1980s. In 1984 the new New Zealand Labor government came to power with the promise of banning the docking of ships carrying nuclear weapons at New Zealand ports. The US then sent the conventionally powered destroyer USS *Buchanan* to dock in New Zealand in 1985. Prime Minister Lange sought assurances that it did not carry nuclear weapons and in response the US argued that it was long-standing policy to refuse to confirm or deny whether vessels are carrying nuclear weapons. Negotiations to resolve the dispute broke down and New Zealand enforced the ban barring the ship from docking. The US implemented several measures in retaliation. The first was to cancel all joint military training exercises. This was followed by a restriction of intelligence exchange and flow of information. And in 1986, it suspended its pledge to aid New Zealand in the event of a security threat. New Zealand was technically still part of ANZUS as it refused to formally withdraw, but without the defence assurances of the US and access to intelligence gathering in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, it was no longer considered part of the security alliance. For more see Ted Galen Carpenter, *A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances after the Cold War* (Washington DC: CATO institute, 1992), pp. 96-97.

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.\(^{604}\)

The agreement – albeit codified in a treaty – is therefore more of a tacit understanding that relies on the close consultation and dialogue between the parties. This is an important feature of the partnership also described later in this chapter. But how have alliances been interpreted in the literature? What specific benefits might be argued to flow from an alliance? And what – if anything – is moral about alliances? Below I focus on normative explanations for alliances in order to differentiate them from the moral realist perspective that follows subsequently.

**Common, collective, comprehensive and cooperative: The normative view of alliances**

The literature on the nature of morality in strategic alliances is fairly limited compared to aid and humanitarian intervention. As has been mentioned previously, normative perspectives have tended to focus on the potential for moral outcomes in collective or multilateral alliance groupings. The assumption here is that agreements made between larger groups are more moral because they require a greater level of sacrifice of the national interest to achieve compromise. A greater compromise to reach a common interest increases the likelihood of benefits to the society of states as a whole. The overall purpose of an alliance is then security defined by cooperation, rather than security defined by self-interest.

Notions of cooperative security in particular were popularized following the end of the Cold War, when George Bush Snr heralded a “New World Order” of cooperative and peaceful international relations.\(^{605}\) Cooperative security was part of a new wave of efforts to reconceptualize security alongside other variants such as common, comprehensive and

\(^{604}\) Ibid.

\(^{605}\) George Bush made his “Towards a New World Order” speech in front of a joint session of Congress in 1991. He argued that increased diplomacy and cooperation between the developed and developing world, Muslim and non-Muslim, and Arab and non-Arab over condemnation of Iraq in Kuwait, as well as greater compromise between himself and Gorbachev, demonstrated that “a new world order -- could emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.” George Bush, “Address before a joint session of the congress on the Persian Gulf crisis and the federal budget deficit,” Speech, George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, Public Papers 1990. Available at: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9 (accessed 16 April 2014).
collective security. Australia’s own Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, was part of this trend. He argued that states had become more interdependent, and thus issues of security required multilateral or regionally-coordinated responses to resolve them. Previously, normative conceptions of security had been scarce, with only a few contributions from cosmopolitan perspectives that emphasized the growing effects of globalization, and the need to consider a definition of security that transcended state borders. Likewise, the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics made similar observations as part of its quest to build an empirical approach to understanding inter-state cooperation. For the majority of the early English School (ES), ideas of security and strategic planning were viewed through the prism of international rules and laws.

Alliances were a product of international society that reinforced cooperation between states, and further cemented the normative principles of international order. But since the superpower rivalry of the Cold War made cooperation scarce, these scholars were fairly limited in finding evidence to support their assumptions. NATO was quite obviously a mechanism of US hegemony in Europe designed to maintain the strategic balance in the West’s favour, which meant they were left with informal security “groupings” and organizations like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the multilateral Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Both of these organizations were considered moribund: the former because of a lack of consensus on the purpose of the

607 Gareth Evans placed particular importance on the role of the UN in implementing preventative diplomacy through peacekeeping and the just use of force. However, he also argued for cooperative diplomacy amongst states that utilized multilateralism and multilateral frameworks. For more see Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993); and Evans “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict,” Foreign Policy 96 (1994), pp.3-20.
609 The literature on security and strategic studies within the English School is difficult to summarize. As I have mentioned in the literature review chapter, evidence of the school’s claim to empiricism is contested with the majority of scholars advancing a normative bent that goes beyond the bounds of a state based international society. Yet, Bull himself maintained a more realist take on security and international order. He argued that international order was determined by the balance of power, and the rules, norms and laws of international society were created and maintained in response to that balance. Specifically, Bull argued that during the Cold War international societal order rested on the ability of the super-powers to “accommodate their interests.” This accommodation extended further than bipolarity and also encompassed the rise of other great powers with nuclear weapons capability. Thus, for Bull, international order reflected the strategic balance of power, which precluded states’ ability to exercise mutual restraint in their interactions with each other. Complimentary interests amongst the great powers could then be found in the rules that limited the actions of others states, but this only occurred in situations where the relative power balance was maintained. In this regard, he was very much inline with classical realist assumptions on the balance of power and international law. For more on Bull’s often overlooked views on security and strategic studies see Robert Ayson’s very informative and timely book Bull and the Accommodation of Power (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
institution (the Soviet Union seeing it as a way to maintain influence in Eastern Europe, and the West seeing it as an extension of its desire to promote economic integration), while the later failed to achieve much material and diplomatic support, and was disbanded in 1977.\footnote{\textsuperscript{610}}

Yet after the Cold War, normative scholars were given space to consider new ideas about security, and of particular importance here was the deepening and broadening of the concept to include non-traditional threats that cut across state borders. The rise of transnational security threats demanded new ways of responding to them that recognized the growing interdependent nature of international relations, and the limits of unilateral defence measures. Hence, cooperative security became popular as it denoted “consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{611}} In this regard, cooperative security incorporated elements of common security, where responses to threats are constructed “in common” with others instead of against them, and comprehensive security where security is multidimensional and includes issues such as human development, trade and damage to the environment.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{610} The CSCE was the result of the Helsinki Accords, which were aimed at improving contact between the West and the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe. It achieved very little. The position of the Soviet Socialist Republics remained unchanged and it was the economic downfall of the Soviet Union over 20 years later that created the conditions for independence and movements towards the West. The CSCE morphed into the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has maintained the same track record in promoting international cooperation. Again, this can be attributed to the divergent interests of the participating parties, particularly the US and Russia. The US has seen it as a forum for the promotion of domestic institutional reform, while Russia has viewed it as a mechanism to keep control over its traditional sphere of influence. Disagreements over the purpose of the institution, as well as the consensus based decision making model it employs, has led many to note its irrelevance in international politics. See Ondrej Ditrych, “Security community: A future for a troubled concept?,” \textit{International Relations} 28, no. 3 (2014), pp. 350-366 and Elana Kropatcheva, “Russia and the role of the OSCE in European security: a ‘Forum’ for dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of interests?,” \textit{European Security} 21, no. 3 (2012), pp. 370-394. SEATO was arguably set to fail before it was even properly established. As I will describe in more detail below, the US, Australia, Britain and France all had differing views of what a Southeast Asian security pact should look like. The US was torn between the view of John Foster Dulles, who saw a security pact as a means of deterring communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, and the Pentagon that was hesitant to commit to any treaty that would embroil Americans into a land-war in Asia. The UK and France were in the midst of recovering from WWII and were against any treaty that committed their defence forces to another war, and Australia was concerned that it was too provocative against the Chinese and would embroil them in conflict without the guarantee of protection. The Treaty was eventually signed in 1954 and came into force in 1955. Over the next twenty years, the participating members struggled to agree on what was meant by communist insurgency and subversion, with the Communist Party being legal in Australia while communists were routinely shot in Thailand. The treaty ended in 1977 after the main contributing members in terms of economic assistance and technical cooperation, the US, France and Britain, ceased to provide their support. For more on the creation of the treaty see Roger Dingman, “John Foster Dulles and the creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization,” \textit{The International History Review} 11, no. 3 (1989), pp. 457-477. Information on the various problem inherent within SEATO can be found in Ronald C. Nairn, “SEATO: A critique,” \textit{Pacific Affairs} 41, no. 1 (1968), pp. 5-18.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{611} Evans, “Cooperative security and intrastate conflict,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 96 (1994), p. 4.}
These new security typologies were the start of an explosion of interest by normative perspectives in security studies. The “securitization” agenda was introduced in the early 1990s, popularized by the Copenhagen School and supported by Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap De Wilde.\textsuperscript{612} The Copenhagen School borrowed from aspects of comprehensive security to argue for a widening of security beyond military threats. But these scholars also went further, and challenged the way security was determined. Instead of referring to material interests, the Copenhagen School argued that it was more appropriate to conceptualize security as a speech act. In other words, security issues were given meaning through the dialogue of elites and states responded to them as a security threat when they were selected – and then communicated – as threats through a process of securitization. As well as widening the scope of security issues, Buzan argued that security was highly interdependent and localized to specific regions or “mini-systems.”\textsuperscript{613} From this perspective, states form alliances in response to common security threats that are tied to their geographic location, and these threats are determined by a dialogical consensus that they will affect all parties involved.

In addition to the Copenhagen School one can also refer to the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies (CSS). Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones have been its key supporters, and they advanced an emancipatory concept of “world security” that shifted the referent object of security from the state to the individual, seeing the state as the means to ensure security, and not an end.\textsuperscript{614} For them, security was the freedom of the individual to determine their own life and therefore the Welsh School was concerned with deepening security to encompass more than just physical protection. This contribution was closely related to critical cosmopolitanism that determined security to be an instrumental value, which individuals and groups pursued for the betterment of society.\textsuperscript{615} The state was thus an obstacle to the kind of transformation that would allow individuals to achieve their own security.

\textsuperscript{615} See Andrew Linklater, Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).
While contributions from CSS are interesting, they fail to consider how security would be achieved in the absence of the state as its main guarantor. Inevitably, the rejection of problem-solving methods meant these scholars have provided no foreign policy alternatives outside of the normal practices of international politics, and overlooked the importance of state interaction (such as alliances, conflict resolution and international diplomacy) in contributing to international peace and stability. The Copenhagen School, with its focus on the dialogical process in operationalizing security, is equally problematic. There is simply not enough space to cover the myriad conceptual and methodological critiques that can be leveled at securitization scholars.\(^{616}\) The most relevant one to this chapter is the removal of security from its material source, which is important for understanding why, and for what purpose, states form alliances. The material structure of security tied to the national interest provides consistency in measuring the success of an alliance, which a rhetorical structure is unable to achieve, as there is no guarantee that the recipient state will always view the same threat in the same way, making a dialogical consensus difficult. This uncertainty also brings to light the challenges of identifying when a security threat comes to be recognized as one. For a realist, this is obviously guided by strategic factors – threats to physical territory, to Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and to broader geopolitical interests. The securitization agenda, on the other hand, has no such reference point, meaning threats to national security can be whatever political elites decide at a particular time, making it almost impossible for the state to prioritize which security threat requires the attention of the state’s resources.

CSS and securitization scholarship has also been joined by a wave of constructivist scholars eager to highlight the deficiencies of realism and its positivist assumptions of anarchy, the

\(^{616}\) The securitization agenda is open to much criticism. The immediate conceptual problem is the expansion of security into sectors (political, societal, military, economic and environmental), which makes it difficult to determine what threat is classified as falling under which sector, and what national resources are needed to solve it. The classification of these sectors is also vague, particularly the “societal” security sector, which refers to the ability of the society to adapt to changing security threats. This could mean a number of things, like social organization, civil and political administration, demographics, strength of judicial system and social mobility. Some of these also crossover with other sectors, like political security, adding another layer of complexity in identifying what threat is being securitized at what time. This is both a conceptual and methodological problem of the Copenhagen School that links into how securitization scholars conceive of security. For them, securitization is an intersubjective process as security is determined by a “speech act” that must be accepted by the others before resources are mobilized to resolve it. But if security is contingent on consensus, what happens when this fails to be achieved? The threat of terrorism in Indonesia, for instance, is a threat to Australia’s security even if the wider Australian public does not know or accept this to be true. There are also problems with confining security threats to specific regions. The rise of China, for example, originates in Northeast Asia, but has security implications for a number of states, including Australia, that are outside this region. For more of these criticisms see Bill McSweeney who is the Copenhagen School’s most vocal critic. Bill McSweeney, “Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school,” *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (1996), pp. 81-93.
balance of power and state security. Constructivist approaches to security and strategic studies have been focused on demonstrating the existence and importance of ideational factors on behavioural outcomes. Ted Hopf has argued that ideas and identity could be used to discern the intentions of actors in forming alliances. Specifically, he stated that realism (and particularly defensive realists) could only explain alliance partners that balanced against a mutual threat based on geographic proximity and offensive military capability, and could not account for the perceived intentions of states because this relied on a posteriori knowledge. For Hopf, identity is a useful lens to understand the difference in how states perceived the same threat: for example, why the US viewed the Third World as an arena for competition against the Soviet Union while Western Europe perceived it as former colonies and economic resources.  

Other constructivists, like Martha Finnemore and Thomas Risse-Kappen, also took issue with the utility of realism, and especially the inability of the perspective to assess change in the purpose of alliances. Its faith in the determining power of systemic forces meant realism always dictated that alliances were formed in response to the balance of power, forcing states to either balance or bandwagon. The persistence of some alliances (especially NATO) after a shift in the balance of power was thus an anomaly for realists, as it would suggest a transformation in systemic forces that made cooperation, rather than competition, more likely. Hence constructivists have turned towards the fluid nature of identity to understand how NATO had moved from a collective defence organization to one that implemented large scale humanitarian operations, effectively joining the UN as an institution mandated to use force for international peace and security.  

For these scholars, the end of the Cold War was the result of ideational factors and the triumph of liberal-democratic values meant communism, and consequently Soviet aggression, were no longer a threat. But NATO continued, indicating that states could be motivated to form alliances for reasons other than blind material interests – in this case, value-rational motivations of maintaining and promoting norms of democracy, human rights and cooperation.  

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619 Frank Schimmelfennig has also argued that constructivism can account for NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. Realism holds that states will rationally prefer fewer participants rather than more as this increases the likelihood that each member will share the burden of maintaining the alliance. But not only did NATO not
Yet there are several assumptions made in error here by constructivists. The first is that they assume alliances are in a constant state of flux, and are contingent on the mutual constitution of ideas and interest, all the way down and all the way up. In a similar way to critical scholars, this means they overlook the need for material interests in identifying the factors present when an alliance is formed. And these factors are important in judging the success of an alliance in contributing to any moral outcomes of international peace and stability. This limitation is also apparent in the constructivist claim that it can better account for change in the structure and function of alliances. The main target for constructivism has been the parsimony of structural realism, but as I demonstrate in more detail below, a moral realist explanation of interest defined as power that allows for greater flexibility in the type of interests, as well as the threats perceived, can accommodate these changes without socializing structural forces or relying on the causal power of ideational factors.

If we look briefly at NATO, for instance, the fall of the Soviet Union led to changes in the relative distribution of power in the West’s favour, and therefore removed the threat of Soviet expansion. But it did not transform the member states’ motivations in maintaining the alliance. For the US there was a need to consolidate hegemony over Europe, and expanding the alliance decreased the likelihood that Russia would make future claims on Eastern Europe. Likewise, for the former Socialist Republics, signing up to NATO provided security assurances against Russian interference, which also reinforced their move from authoritarianism towards sovereign independence. In this regard, while the underlying material power altered, the alliance was still motivated by individual calculations of the national interest.

This strongly resembles an expectation of reciprocity in alliances, and hence suggests a moral realist examination might be useful. Not only can this potentially explain NATO expansion, but it might also shed light on the perceived change in the purpose of the alliance. Read from a moral realist perspective, NATO’s actions in Kosovo indicated that rather than representing an act of cooperative security and a new direction for NATO as a humanitarian organization, members were motivated by specific expectations of receiving material benefits in return, disband following the end of the Cold War; it actually increased with more states willing to adopt the organizations principles of “democracy, individual freedoms and rule of law” into their own domestic practices. For more see “NATO expansion: A constructivist explanation,” Security Studies 8, no. 2-3 (1998), pp. 198-234.
such as maintaining regional stability. This also suggests that alliances change when the material interests do, emphasizing the presence of rational choice. Yet when it comes to the moral dimension, this is much harder to determine. As described above, normative perspectives focused on the morality found in multilateral alliances that reflected notions of cooperative security, while securitization and critical scholars generally overlooked how security was achieved, and instead focused on the concept itself, locating morality in the process of consensus (in the case of the securitization school), and as an instrumental value (in the case of the Welsh school).

Constructivists have not engaged directly with questions of morality in their writings on security and alliances, however they have broadly adopted the cooperative security agenda in that they have viewed multilateral groupings as repositories for promoting certain ideas of freedom and human rights. What is common, then, amongst normative perspectives is the conflation of multilateral cooperation with morality, which disregards the reciprocal benefits that hold security partnerships together. From a moral realist perspective, the decision for a state to align with country X over country Y is guided by an expectation of reciprocity that there are moral and material benefits to mutual security that are quite apart from the normative good of entering into alliances. The moral expectations might be found in strengthening the sovereignty of “new” states, as with the expansion of NATO post-Cold War, or maintaining regional peace and security, which arguably informed Australia’s calculated decision to align with the US post-WWII. In this regard, assisting “others” as part of expectations of reciprocity is tied to a calculation of whether it will achieve the security interests of the alliance partners. The presence of reciprocity and rational choice are important as they suggest a functional dimension to alliances, whereby moral and material outcomes might be possible. Below I provide a taste of how a moral realist perspective would conduct an analysis of alliances before applying this to a study of the Australian-US security partnership.

**Moral realism and strategic alliances: Expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material outcomes**

*Expectations of reciprocity*

As argued above, the main problem with normative perspectives lies in how they understand security. Since moral realism takes a classical realist view, it defines security as the protection and defence of the national interest, which naturally falls within the strategic
domain of interstate relations. The best way to defend against threats to the national interest is for states to ally with others in order to maximize their power, and whom a state chooses to align with will depend in the first instance on the balance of power. In the case of the Australian-US security partnership the balance of power arguably determined Australia’s decision to align with the US and characterized the asymmetrical nature of the alliance, but the motivation was guided by an expectation of reciprocity that aligning with the US would lead to fewer risks, and substantially more security benefits, relative to other alliance partners such as the UK. Evidence of an expectation of reciprocity demonstrates that alliances of cooperative security are unlikely, as it would require the state to consider the interests of others at an equal level to the national interest. If this were true, then states would devote fewer resources to maintaining an alliance and it would be useless as a tool for the defence of national security. A moral realist would therefore expect that states would naturally preference bilateral security partnerships that operate under a framework of common interests.

This does not mean that deep cooperation in alliances without clear threats is impossible; rather, it means that it must be guided by the state’s own understanding of the security interests involved and hence part of the process of alliances rather than the end goal of them. In this regard, it is possible to find a set of common interests within the workings of an alliance if both parties demonstrate enough self-interest in maintaining it. Indeed, according to Morgenthau: “An alliance adds precision, especially in the form of limitation, to an existing community of interests and to the general policies and concrete measures serving them.” The presence of complimentary interests is also not always limited to what would exclusively achieve the self-interest of the alliance partners. It may be the case that concerns for regional peace and security form part of the expectations in aligning with country X, which can benefit other states outside of the alliance partners. The focus, then, is not on whether two or more states share a common history, identity or cultural background, although this can sometimes help to strengthen the material commitment to the alliance, instead it is on whether there are complimentary interests that all parties are motivated to pursue.

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**Rational choice**

Rational choice follows expectations of reciprocity in that it can account for the process of rational calculation that occurs when states choose to form an alliance. In Australia’s case, the US was the alliance partner least likely to make excessive demands of Australia, and that would contribute the most to its national security. This calculation continues as both states consider the benefits of maintaining the security partnership. The process of rational choice is thus not static, allowing for changes to the nature of alliance partnerships according to timing and context. In fact, the test of a successful alliance is often measured on its flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing international realities. The US-Australian security partnership has maintained the same basic purpose since its inception; this is despite changes to the nature of perceived threats, going from primarily a defence against the spread of communist governments in Southeast Asia, to a defence against a more profuse range of threats that include the spread of fundamental Islamism, spillover issues from failed states and cybersecurity. But what has remained consistent is the motivation to deal with them: the protection of the national interest. Hence the inclusion of rational choice means that moral realism can also explain instances where states demonstrate miscalculations in determining the national interest benefits from pursuing a particular alliance policy. As I demonstrate later in this chapter, this was particularly noteworthy in Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War.

**Moral and material outcomes**

An expectation of reciprocity explains the motivation of states forming a security partnership and the process of rational choice allows moral realism to account for the changes in the types of security interests pursued, as well as the structure of the partnership itself. What is left is evidence that strategic alliance policy can lead to moral and material outcomes. The pursuit of the national interest that forms the expectation of reciprocity is likely to produce material outcomes in increased security, international and regional stability, inter-operability and access to intelligence, as well as defence technology. In some instances the diplomatic collaborations can also help to achieve goals in other policy areas, such as the US agreeing to join the East Asia Summit (EAS), in part because of Australia’s urging.

Moral outcomes, on the other hand, are not so easily identified. This is especially so given that moral realism still abides by assumptions about the balance of power and relative gains. Yet the existence of relative gains does not necessarily preclude the possibly that others outside of the alliance partners might also achieve some benefit. In looking at the Australian-
US security partnership, for example, the expectation of regional peace and security in the Asia-Pacific also led to moral outcomes where states outside the US and Australia benefited from their security cooperation. Southeast Asian states, in particular, have benefited from the close cooperation on military training and joint efforts in counter-terrorism. This has also led to material benefits for Australia in defence cooperation with nations in its direct sphere of influence, as well as achieving Australia’s strategic interests in contributing towards its northern approaches. Thus, it is expected that when moral and material interests converge as part of an expectation of reciprocity in Australia’s strategic alliance policy, this will lead to moral and material outcomes.

Now that I have provided an introduction on how a moral realist would approach the study of strategic alliances, it is time to examine whether this framework is of further use in understanding the US-Australian security partnership. The remainder of the chapter will be concerned with achieving this objective.

**Australia-US security ties: the bedrock of Australian security policy**

The most appropriate way to begin an analysis of the US-Australian security partnership is to identify the interests of the partners in forming the alliance. Much of the conventional scholarship begins with the signing of the ANZUS treaty itself, but Australia’s motives in aligning with the US actually appeared well before 1951, with the arrival of the Great White Fleet to Australian ports. At the time, Australia was still part of the British Empire, and was considered a land of British subjects. Australia’s foreign policy was dictated by the Foreign Office of the UK and the Empire’s Royal Navy, which had a small Imperial Squadron stationed in Sydney, guaranteed its security. Having said this, Australia was generally unhappy with the lack of strategic interest shown by the UK in maintaining its naval presence. Australia was providing £200,000 a year for its upkeep, and had no assurances (either written or tacit) that London was willing to aid in its defence. In fact, under the Naval Agreement Act of 1903, the ships could be withdrawn at anytime for the protection of Commonwealth interests, which left Australian ports potentially exposed.

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622 Ibid. p. 69-72.
623 Insecurities around the commitment and capacity of the British to assist in protecting Australia’s interest were not helped by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance first signed in 1902 and renewed in 1905 and 1911, which allowed Britain to reduce its naval presence in the Pacific. The treaty outlined British recognition of Japanese claims over Korea, and Japanese recognition of British claims over India without committing either side to
The decision to invite the US fleet, the first modern and full flotilla to dock at Australian ports, was calculated in showing its recognition of the US as a rising naval power. The Australian Prime Minister at the time, Alfred Deakin, also hoped that it would lift national support for an independent Australian navy:

We live in hope that from our own shores some day a fleet will go out not unworthy to be compared in quality, if not in numbers, with the magnificent fleet now in Australian waters.\(^{624}\)

While this was important in introducing Australia to the US as a potential ally, it still remained firmly in step with its colonial master. The US declared that it would continue its policy of isolation after a brief departure during WWI, and Australia was not yet ready to exercise an independent foreign policy that involved replacing Britain with the US. It took over thirty years before Australia developed a formal diplomatic relationship with the US, establishing an Ambassadorship to Washington in 1940.\(^{625}\) The security partnership developed shortly after, and was largely shaped by the events of WWII.

The war left Britain diplomatically and militarily devastated. Indeed, the rumblings of British decline that were evident as early as 1908 were made abundantly clear by the end of 1941. The British had failed to fend off Japanese assaults on British Singapore and on December 10, 1941 Japanese air forces sunk the British ships the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, cutting off their defences against a further Japanese offensive into Southeast Asia. Two months later, the Japanese conquered Singapore and took control of the British naval base, marking the end mutual defence in the event of a Russian offensive. Both parties were concerned about further Russian aggression, particularly the Japanese after the Japanese-Russian war of 1904. And the treaty was meant to represent a loose form of cooperation between the two potential rivals over a common threat. Yet the treaty did not last long and was terminated in 1923 following the Imperial Conference where Britain lost the support of Commonwealth governments who were concerned that it placed them at risk of being dragged into a conflict between the US and Japan. For more see Joseph Ferguson, *Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907–2007* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 12-13.

\(^{625}\)Senator Sampson referenced this passage during a debate on whether Australia should devote more resources towards establishing its own military, and particularly its own navy. The original speech by Alfred Deakin was made in 1908 in a welcome to the American Great White Fleet. “APPROPRIATION BILL 1931-32 First Reading,” Senate, 4 August 1931. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=%%22We%20live%20in%20HOPES%20that%20from%20our%20own%20shores%20some%20day%20a%20fleet%20will%20go%20out%20not%20unworthy%20to%20be%20compared%20in%20quality,%20if%20not%20in%20numbers,%20with%20the%20magnificent%20fleet%20now%20in%20Australian%20waters%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 5 August 2014).

\(^{625}\)Richard Casey was Australia’s first Ambassador to the US.
of the “Singapore Strategy.” This had substantial consequences on the defence and security of Australia, as the Singapore Strategy was its only means of deterring Japanese imperialism – one that had already suffered significant setbacks with their conquering of Northern French Indochina a year earlier.

Three days before the Japanese assault on Singapore, Imperial Japanese air forces conducted a surprise attack on US naval bases in Pearl Harbour, forcing the US to abandon its policy of isolation. At the same time, Japan started its invasion of the US-controlled Philippines, and the islands of Wake and Guam. A declaration of war on Japan followed a day later, which pulled the US into the Pacific War. The US awakening altered the dynamics of the Pacific Theatre and consequently Australian foreign and security policy. This time there was a more pressing need for close defence cooperation with the US, and Australia was clearer about its desire for this to occur. Australian Prime Minister John Curtin made his now-famous “look to America” speech shortly after Pearl Harbour on December 27, 1941, where he re-framed Australia’s strategic outlook on the Pacific War. For him, it was a mutual fight involving the US and Australia as developed and democratic nations, against a common enemy threatening regional security and stability:

The Australian Government, therefore, regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies’ fighting plan. Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.

In stating this, Curtin was acknowledging that the balance of power had shifted and Australia could no longer place expectations of reciprocity on the UK, which had calculated its own cost-benefit analysis on the defence of the Pacific versus Europe in its “Europe First” war

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Australia’s own defences were stretched between its support of the Commonwealth efforts in the war in Europe, and the protection of Australian interests closer to home. After the fall of Singapore, Curtin asked Churchill for Australian forces sailing to defend British interests in the Dutch East Indies to be returned to help defend against Japanese advances into Australian New Guinea and Borneo. Churchill initially rebuffed this request and instead ordered the re-routing of the forces to support the defence of Burma, all without Curtin’s knowledge. This added weight to perceptions that Britain had abandoned its commitment to Australia and placed secondary importance on the Pacific Theatre of war. For Australia these perceptions increased and had significant reciprocal effects on its national interests after the first Japanese air raid on Darwin Harbour on February 19, 1942. Australia was left unprotected and feared full invasion: and in this context, Australia “looked to America” as the nation that shared the same interests in the face of a mutual threat. In other words, it aligned with the US over the UK because of an expectation of reciprocity that this was the best way to protect its national security.

Roosevelt was not entirely pleased with Curtin’s speech, claiming that it showed “panic and disloyalty” amongst Allied partners, but regardless, the US did come to Australia’s aid. US General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific region and arrived in Australia on March 17, 1942.

Churchill had been active in getting US assurances that if it joined WWII, it would direct the majority of its military resources to defeating Nazi Germany. The Pacific would be regarded as a secondary Theatre of war where the US would only implement a defence posture and seek to take back the Philippines when Germany was defeated. The two leaders met several times during December 1941 and early January in what became known as the Arcadia Conference where Churchill and Roosevelt agreed on a “European First” strategy and developed a European Theatre of Operations (ETOs) for coordination of military resources. Keith Sainsbury, “‘Second front in 1942’—a strategic controversy revisited,” British Journal of International Studies 4, no. 01 (1978), pp. 47-58.


This explanation appears to share some similarity to Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” thesis, which argues that states form alliances to balance against a common threat. Walt followed Waltz in arguing that states are primarily concerned with survival, which is determined by the structural conditions of anarchy. However, he argued that perceptions of threat matter in whether states will balance or bandwagon, and in doing so Walt expanded the capacity of states as rational actors. Moral realism, as an approach that derives its assumptions from human nature, argues that the balance of power is induced from the state of nature, which naturally allows for more variation in how states conceive of their interests and what choices they make to achieve them. Moral realism also argues that the choices states make in aligning with one state over another is determined by an expectation that it will lead to reciprocal benefits in return.

cut the lines of communication and supply between Hawaii and Australia. Over the next 18 months nearly 250,000 US troops were variously stationed in Australia. These forces, the US Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), were based in Brisbane for coordination of Allied operations in New Guinea and the Central Pacific. In March 1943, Japanese forces were defeated in New Guinea, removing Australia from direct threat of invasion. Two years later, after the success of the Allied “island hopping,” and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese surrendered on September 2, 1945.

Hence from the outset the US-Australian security partnership demonstrated signs of being guided by an expectation of reciprocity in that the US saw Australia as a convenient location to coordinate its Pacific War operations, while Australia saw the US as its best defence against territorial invasion and further attacks on its interests in the Southwest Pacific. The geostrategic implications of Australia’s location were the most important indicators of the expectation of reciprocity underpinning their cooperation, and have arguably contributed towards the longevity of the partnership. Evidence of rational choice was also present when Australian decision makers waited until the timing was right before they openly supported the US. Yet this is only a limited evaluation of how a moral realist would approach the development of Australia’s security partnership with the US. What is left is to discover whether both moral and material calculations have converged, which also points towards the existence of moral and material outcomes. The rest of the chapter set outs to achieve this aim.

The ANZUS alliance: Common interests, communism and national security
As mentioned in Chapter 2 on Australia’s foreign aid and development policy, Canberra’s strategy post-WWII was two-fold: first, sign a security deal with the US that increased its national security in an area of regional instability; and second, develop some form of regional economic arrangement that would improve living standards and contribute to Southeast Asian security. It was therefore no coincidence that ANZUS and the Colombo Plan were enacted in the same year. And like the Colombo Plan, ANZUS was a major accomplishment for Foreign Minister Percy Spender, who saw the establishment of a “Pacific Pact” that included a declaration of mutual aid from the US an essential part of Australia’s security. Originally, draft proposals for this security agreement were conducted in consultation with the UK over

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concerns that it would further retreat from its commitment to Singapore and Malaya if it were seen to be left out of negotiations. However, it was quickly made clear that the UK showed little interest in participating in any regional security architecture:

We have never had the slightest indication from London that it was prepared to consider favourably any *mutual* obligations or that London would favour the establishment of definite machinery in the Pacific that would keep Australia, America and New Zealand in close and regular contact.\(^{635}\)

The US had similar reservations about the involvement of the UK, preferring to establish bilateral contacts with Pacific nations as part of its desire for regional hegemony. At the time, the US was working on a peace treaty with Japan, “the Treaty of San Francisco” that would lay the framework for the hub-and-spokes alliance system. In exchange for Australia’s (and New Zealand’s) cooperation on Japanese reconciliation, the US agreed to a mutual defence pact that provided Australia with a security assurance it came to view as the “bedrock” of its foreign security policy. Indeed, Australia was quite insistent about its expectations of reciprocity in this area:

The Australian Government wishes to make it quite clear that it could not give any consideration to a Japanese peace treaty that the US Government has in mind unless at least effective arrangements regarding the future of Australia and its territories can be agreed upon. In other words unless a defence agreement along the lines of the one agreed upon in consultation with Mr Dulles can be concluded.\(^{636}\)

Australia achieved this objective on September 1, 1951 when the ANZUS treaty was signed and entered into force on the 29th of April 1952, the same time as the Security Agreement


\(^{636}\) Australia and the US had conducted a series of meetings in February 1951 on the feasibility of a security agreement. They had reached a tentative agreement on the basic principles, but had not as yet agreed on potential members. NAA, A6768 EATS 77 Part 2, “Pacific pact (ANZUS treaty),” Japanese Peace Treaty, Memorandum to Mr Dulles, The Australian Embassy, Washington, 5 March 1951.
was signed between Japan and the US. Despite the quid pro quo underpinning the ANZUS negotiations, both states had an interest in forming a security partnership. Australia was concerned about the potential for Japanese re-armament and that it could ally with communist China, threatening regional security and stability, while the US was interested in extending its policy of containment to the Asia-Pacific. These initial policy differences did not detract from Australia’s acceptance that aligning with the US was the best way to ensure national security in the face of the rising threats posed by communism and Soviet aggression. In fact, Australia was quick to signal its recognition of US strategy over Japan, and signed a trade and commerce treaty with Tokyo in 1957.

The spread of communism and the extension of Soviet sphere of influence were the common security concerns that shaped the workings of the alliance for the next 40 years. For Australia, these concerns were directly tied to its defence, as it was a relatively rich Western state situated amongst politically and socially unstable neighbours susceptible to great power influence and communist insurgency. Australia was particularly concerned about instability in Indonesia and PNG as these states formed Australia’s northern approaches. Indonesia represented the most significant security threat in terms of SLOCs and security spillover, while PNG to the northwest formed its defensive line against physical invasion.

Australia was also geographically distant from the centre of international politics, and there was a fear that the US and the UK would leave Australia out of its post-war defence planning, which had already occurred with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, a mutual defence agreement that included Canada and the other Western European states, but not Australia. Australia thus sought an independent security assurance as a means to protect

itself from potential threats “and enable it to effectively plan the use of its resources and military power in the interests of peace in the geographical area of the world in which it lives.”

The mutual defence arrangement was viewed as a deterrent against attacks to the Australian mainland and to wider threats in the region. And the strength of this deterrence was increased with the potential extension of the US nuclear umbrella as a result of the partnership.

Outside of halting the spread of communism, the US was concerned about the freedom of trade routes, the Malacca and Sunda straits being the primary throughway for oil and other resources. An alliance network with Australia, New Zealand and Japan created a strategic triangle that acted as a deterrent against any potential threat to deny US air and naval access. As Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara later remarked in reference to the defence of the straits through Singapore and Indonesia:

> The strategic importance of the Malacca Strait area derives from its controlling position with respect to passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and its proximity to the western approaches to Southeast Asia through Thailand. Freedom to transit the Malacca and Sunda Straits, both of which can be controlled effectively from the Malaysian/Singapore area, is axiomatic in principle and necessary in practice. Continuation of the present high volume of military and commercial transits would require circumnavigation of the Indonesian Archipelago if control of the Straits areas were denied the United States or its allies. Such a detour of over 2,000 miles would be comparable to placing an additional ocean, the size of the Atlantic, in the path of seaborne traffic.

These expectations of reciprocity were determined by the bilateral consultations, agreements and ministerial meetings, between Australia and the US. Both nations were reluctant to

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extend the security commitment beyond the trilateral agreement. They were particularly hesitant to have proposals for the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) supersede ANZUS military machinery. At the time, there were multiple debates on whether the UK should be admitted to the Military Committee as a way to extend military cooperation in the region, but this was rejected out of concerns that it would raise objections by the French, who would demand inclusion because of their territorial occupancy in the Pacific. The US was particularly blunt about its objections to replacing ANZUS with a multilateral alliance structure, highlighting the lack of “teeth” amongst the Anglo-New Zealand-Australia-Malaya (ANZAM) partners in contributing to regional peace and security. Australia’s interest in restricting the number of participants was also tied to its limited military capacity in responding to regional conflict. The inclusion of Asian nations such as the Philippines and Indonesia would have increased the costs of the security assurance and reduced the expected returns, in that “any extension of security agreement will increase Australia’s obligation without equivalent compensation.”

Regional peace and security: The potential for moral considerations as a part of the Australia-US security partnership

The preference for restricted membership does not negate the presence of moral expectations of reciprocity within the security partnership. Certainly, bilateral and trilateral security commitments are principally guided by straightforward strategic calculations of maximum return for minimum cost, which naturally increases the expectations of reciprocity in favour of the member states. Normative perspectives have taken this to mean that moral considerations are more important in multilateral security arrangements because they reduce the likelihood of relative gains and increase the chances that states will compromise over policy that is in the common good. As a result, they have largely overlooked the possibility of a moral dimension within bilateral security cooperation. This is where moral realism can arguably account for both strategic and moral factors in examining the Australian-US security partnership.

643 NAA, A4311 943, “ANZUS,” Australian mission to the UN Outward telegram, 14 September 1953.
644 This being said, the US did use Australia’s participation in such regional infrastructure as a source for information on British foreign and security intentions. NAA, A5954 1465/1 “Review of ANZAM planning by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. File no. 4 from Mr. Casey’s discussions in Washington at ANZUS Council meeting,” Draft letter to UK High Commissioner, Canberra, September 1955.
To begin with, the moral dimension is tied to a concern for assisting the US as part of the expectations of reciprocity, as well as a concern for upholding regional peace and security. For Australia, this fit alongside its material interests in reducing the potential threats to its geostrategic sphere of influence. The treaty itself stated that a principle desire of the parties was to “strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area.”646 Yet even before the signing of ANZUS, Australia’s decision to ally with the US showed evidence of moral expectations. This was most notable during WWII when Australia and the US cooperated to halt the spread of Japanese imperialism. As demonstrated above, this was guided by specific strategic expectations, but it was also guided by a moral concern in resisting Japanese attempts “to not so much control Southeast Asia as a plan to dominate the whole of the illimitable Pacific.”647 This led to certain moral outcomes in removing a threat to the territorial integrity of several Southeast Asian and Pacific nations. And such concerns for regional stability appeared again in the signing of the mutual security agreement.

The threat of communism was not so much fuelled by a concern for insurgency on mainland Australia, as it was determined by a fear of communism penetrating the social and political institutions of Southeast Asia and subsequently upsetting regional order. It is no coincidence, then, that the Colombo Plan and ANZUS were created around the same time. The plan was a policy of economic development tied to moral and strategic considerations in providing a practical contribution, or “hand up,” in assisting individual nations. And in this regard, it was reminiscent of the Marshall Plan in that it was concerned with helping states so they were less susceptible to communism.648 The security alliance was initially less obvious in its moral considerations, primarily viewed as the material insurance Australia needed to devise its forward defence strategy of fighting communism in the near abroad. But this strategy also included moral expectations of assisting neighbouring states in fighting communism. Indeed, Australia anticipated that ANZUS would lead to this outcome:

“Military commitments in a programme of peace through strength will give satisfaction to all free peoples and encouragement to our many friends in South-East Asia.”

This security assurance meant Australia was less restricted in its response to regional crises and could pursue cooperative defence relations with Southeast Asia. Such an expectation of reciprocity in exchange for Australia’s alliance loyalty was emphasised by Minister of External Affairs Richard Casey when he commented that: “important countries of South-East Asia could be overrun and destroyed if we waited until war broke out before we in Australia began to raise, train, equip and despatch forces to that part of the world.”

An expectation of reciprocity in regional peace and security has emerged in other major events in the development of the Australian-US security partnership and as I will demonstrate below, this expectation has led to certain moral and material payoffs. But before I elaborate further, it is important to clarify that I am not implying that these moral calculations will always be present, nor am I stating that they will naturally override the pursuit of the national interest in balancing the costs versus the benefits of acting within the partnership. Instead, the US-Australian security partnership can be viewed as an instrument that has, at various times, sought to promote and maintain regional peace and security to the benefit of other states, and this moral dimension rested on the presence of common material interests.

These interests reflected the framework of the alliance, but what about the functioning of the relationship itself? This is an important question, as the partnership is much greater than the initial security agreement. It includes Australia’s actions in maintaining the alliance and the benefits gained from its loyalty to it. Thus, an examination of Australia’s policy choices within the partnership is needed to demonstrate the existence of rational choice in Australia’s decision to continue to align with the US, despite claims that this has, at various times, damaged its ability to exercise an independent foreign policy. The next section will discuss this aspect of the alliance and, once completed, evidence of both expectations of reciprocity and rational choice will be found that indicate the potential for moral and material outcomes.

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The development of the US-Australian security partnership: Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice informing Australia’s foreign policy choices

Outside of the mutual defence arrangement, the annual consultative meetings have arguably been the most important feature of the alliance for achieving Australia’s interests, given the vague parameters of the defence commitment. The treaty only states that parties should “act to meet the common danger” and was not an explicit guarantee equal to Article 5 of NATO. The area classified as being under the umbrella of the agreement was also left unclear, only referring to the “island territories under [the parties’] jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.” Diplomatic relations were thus a priority for Australia, and this was guided by moral and strategic expectations of reciprocity.

When the treaty was under negotiation, it was agreed that a mechanism for automatic consultation would be useful in tackling regional and international crises. Australia and the US had already cooperated on how to respond to the unfolding conflict on the Korean Peninsula, with Menzies agreeing to make Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Mustangs in Japan available to US authorities as part of the UN’s 21-nation peacekeeping force. Later, Australia also sent an infantry battalion from the Australian contingent of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan (BCOF).

Australia’s participation in the Korean War was guided by both moral and material expectations. The first and most important was a show of material support for US foreign policy. In fact, Australia’s eagerness to commit troops in Korea (it was the first nation after

651 Ibid.
652 Clarifications on what parts of the Pacific would be covered by the agreement was sought during the Konfrontasi. At the time, Australia was concerned about attacks on its forces in Malaya and Singapore and sought greater assurances that the US would respond with military support even after UK’s withdrawal. This was achieved in 1967 when the US agreed that the terms of the ANZUS Treaty would apply to Australian armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft in Malaya/Singapore. “Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defence McNamara” on Australian Request for Consultations Regarding Future Security Arrangements in Malaysia/Singapore, held at the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, Malaysia 381, 8 November 1967. Top Secret. Available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v27/d33 (accessed 4 July 2014).
the US to deploy personnel from all three services) was motivated in large part by an expectation that it would demonstrate Australia’s willingness to support the interests of the US, and therefore further negotiations of the ANZUS treaty. Apart from this material expectation, Australia’s response to the Korean crisis was also consistent with the mutual moral and material expectation of halting Sino/Soviet aggression and the spread of communism. Following Korea, Canberra was especially keen to have cooperation on military matters continue, and pressed the US to have both representatives from the State Department and Department of Defence (DoD) be part of the alliance machinery. It was also important that this body be relatively fluid in terms of its agenda in order to allow for greater flexibility on what issues would be discussed. This suited Australia because the strategic and political environment was such that security priorities had the potential to change suddenly, and for the US it provided the State Department with more room to negotiate a consensus with a reluctant Pentagon.

The first meeting of ANZUS laid the foundation of the modern Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN). The parties agreed to create an ANZUS “Council” that was centred on cooperation on military matters (including interoperability, technology exchange, and training), as well as intelligence. Closer links in these two areas were the main priority for both states and led to considerable reciprocal benefits. Australia was eventually able to gain access to US standards and specifications for bases and airfields, which increased its interoperative capability with US air, naval and defence forces. This was also in line with US Pacific strategy in the Far East, which was to “retain its system of peripheral bases in the Pacific Island chain stretching from Japan to the Philippines.” Access to US military intelligence and the operation of these defence facilities was a major expectation of reciprocity in Australia’s commitment to the partnership and this led to significant material payoffs.

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657 Ibid.
659 NAA, A4311 7/30/68 “Proposed offer to Australian facilities to United States – a study for ANZUS council Meeting,” Report by Defence Committee, November 1956.
Intelligence sharing and joint defence facilities

Indeed, one of the main purposes of the consultative meetings was to gain insight into US military thinking on the Asia-Pacific, and develop cooperation on intelligence. Australia viewed US knowledge on potential Pacific threats essential to its own defence:

It would be difficult for the Australian government to proceed with the preparing and planning for any “Hot” war without access to the relevant American knowledge and planning in the Pacific, will therefore try to bring the Americans to agree that adequate machinery will be provided.\textsuperscript{660}

To this end, a particular concern for Australian defence planners was the security of Malaya as it was the only land route leading from Asia to the island area north of Australia, while the Allied powers were concerned about freedom of the air route from Australia to the Indian Ocean and Middle East. These common interests led to the establishment of a closer intelligence partnership that has been guided by both moral and material expectations that have remained important to the present day. Intelligence was considered a prominent feature of national security following the central role it had played in the Allied victory during WWII. The US and the UK signed the USA-UK Security Agreement, which was formalized as part of the Atlantic Charter. This involved the sharing of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and was extended to the three other English-speaking nations of Canada, New Zealand and Australia.\textsuperscript{661} This became known as the “Five Eyes” Agreement under which each nation was in charge of signals collection in a specific geographical area. For the US and Australia, this meant the US turned their attention to Northern China, Latin America and Eastern Russia while Australia surveyed Southeast Asia, Indochina, Mainland China and the South Pacific.\textsuperscript{662}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{660} NAA, A5954 1465/1 “Review of ANZAM planning by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. File no. 4 from Mr. Casey’s discussions in Washington at ANZUS Council meeting,” Draft letter to UK High Commissioner, Canberra, September 1955.
\item \textsuperscript{662} Canada supplemented the United States and helped surveillance Russia, New Zealand helped Australia survey the Indian Ocean and the UK surveyed North Africa and continental Europe. Ibid, pp.1-2.
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The first expectation was obviously material. The US placed importance on coordination with stations in Australia because the disruption from atmospheric phenomena meant there was no other alternative to the monitoring space satellites watching China, Southern Russia and the Indian Ocean. This agreement led to the creation of two joint intelligence and defence facilities: the satellite research station Pine Gap in the Northern Territory and the Joint Defence Facility Nurrungar (JDFN) located on the Island Lagoon in South Australia. The station in Nurrungar specialized in space-based surveillance and particularly early detection of missiles and nuclear detonations using US geostationary satellites. It was the first such facility outside of the US that could detect “launch on warning” in response to ICBM launches. The site was in operation between 1968 and 1999, and was used during Vietnam and the first Gulf War to detect Iraqi Scud missile attacks.

Pine Gap worked in coordination with the RAF facility at Menwith Hill in both signals collection and missile launch detection as part of the Defence Support Program (DSP) and Space Based Infra Red Satellite (SBIRS) systems. The development of Pine Gap was followed by ECHELON, which formed the operational agreement on collection and analysis of data within the Five Eyes. ECHELON was the global tracking software system that allowed Pine Gap to gather information from telephones, mobiles, faxes, and eventually emails and text messages. During the Cold War it was mainly used to monitor the diplomatic and military activity of the Soviet Union, and after 9/11 was directed towards intelligence gathering in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as wider operations in counter-terrorism as part of the global WoT.

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665 The Nurrungar site was decommissioned in 1999 and its activities were transferred to Pine Gap.

666 For more on the operations at Nurrungar, particularly during the Cold War, see Desmond Ball, *A Base for Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987).


Alongside the missile detection and surveillance operations, a naval communication centre was established. The US Naval Communication Station located at North West Cape in Western Australia was originally a US-operated facility that enabled the US Navy to communicate with submerged submarines and surface vessels in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific Ocean. Australia’s location meant it was ideal for a naval communication facility that could stay in contact with the US naval presence acting as a deterrent to Soviet control over an important trading route for both the US and Australia.

During this time, joint operations were also extended to science and space exploration and Australia continued to reap benefits in access to US technology and expertise. A Joint Geological and Geophysical Research Station at Alice Springs was established to monitor the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, on the surface and underground. Australia gained access to both the products of these installations and the wider assessments to disarmament to which they contribute. This facility was originally established in 1955 and is still in operation as part of the contributing stations to the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In this regard, the station was an important apparatus in fulfilling Australia’s international treaty obligations. Australia also exhibited expectations of reciprocity in the area of space research. It gained access to space vehicle tracing and the construction of communication facilitators managed by the Australia Department of Supply on behalf of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This agreement was initially contracted to last 10 years and was extended in 1970 for a further decade. The Australian facilitators were the largest concentration of NASA facilitators outside of the US and represented over $US70 million in technology and funding.

These facilities were developed in response to the mutual threat of the Soviet Union and were guided by a moral and material expectation that Australia (and the region) would benefit

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669 This site was renamed the Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt in memory of the former Australian Prime Minister who disappeared in December 1987 off the Victorian coast.
671 It is jointly operated by Geoscience Australia and the US Air Force.
673 Contemporary operations also include the monitoring of seismic activity for the detection of earthquakes.
from having access to advanced military and defence technology, as well as intelligence and communications. Australia viewed the US as the only power that could balance against the Soviet Union and maintain peace and stability in both Indo-China and the Pacific. In Fraser’s own words:

“A confident exercise of American policy is the cause of peace and stability. America is the only power that can balance the might of the Soviet Union. If America does not undertake that task it will not be done. If it is not done the whole basis of peace and stability is unsupported.”

Yet despite the governments positive rhetoric on closer cooperation between the US and Australia, at the time, there was considerable debate as to whether it was in Australia’s interest to allow an expanded US presence on its soil. Some analysts, like Desmond Ball, argued that it placed Australia higher on the list of potential targets of attack (including nuclear) by the Soviet Union. Ball was particularly critical of the level of US control over these facilities, which represented an infringement on Australia’s ability to exercise its own sovereignty. Others, like Paul Dibb, have stressed the importance of these bases to Australia’s strategic and defence policy. Indeed, the intelligence gathering function of Pine Gap was essential to Australia’s ability to monitor potential threats in Indonesia and greater Southeast Asia. The operations covered in Pine Gap were unique in their ability to intercept

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676 Desmond Ball has been regarded as the perennial critique of the joint and US defence facilities in Australia. For more see Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1980); Jeffrey T. Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, (Sydney, London and Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1985); and Ball, A Base for Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar (Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987).

677 Yet, in pointing out the various costs of supporting these bases, particularly North West Cap and Nurrangur before its closure, Ball, in his testimony to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties: Reference Pine Gap, did admit that the intelligence gathering function of Pine Gap was too valuable to Australia’s strategic interest, as well as to broader goals of arms control and disarmament, for him to suggest its closure. Desmond Ball, “Joint Standing Committee on Treaties: Reference Pine Gap,” Joint Committees, 9 August 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Joint%20standing%20committee%20Pine%20Gap%20SearchCategory_Phrase%3A%22committees%22%20Dataset_Phrase%3A%22committees%22%20Decade%3A%221990s%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 2 December 2014).

microwave emissions coming from the interior of a state, which could not be collected by other means, such as ground stations, ships or aircrafts.

Along with the geological research station in Alice Springs, the telemetry of these satellites meant they have been essential to the monitoring of various arms control agreements. During the Cold War this capability was particularly useful for the US as it provided an efficient means to monitor Soviet compliance with the various Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Agreements. This was not limited to the Soviet Union and extended to monitoring arms and nuclear activity from India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, the greater Middle East and the western Pacific.

For Australia, the facility was essential to its missile defence, as it monitored and detected missile launches from states with the capacity to reach mainland territory. The most important of these states was China as its DF-5A, developed in 1971 and with an estimated range of 12,000km, had the capacity to reach Australia. Since then, China’s capabilities have continued to grow, and as of August 2014, its successful testing of the Dong Feng 31A and Dong Feng 5A meant it had the ability to reach the US with missiles carrying multiple nuclear warheads. Australia’s participation in missile defence was therefore anticipated to increase US deterrence and was part of the moral and material expectations motivating its decision to continue cooperation through the joint intelligence installations. As the Defence Minister Stephen Smith stated:

The intelligence collection capabilities of both countries provide Australia with information on priority intelligence such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and military and weapons developments. The Pine Gap facility also supports monitoring of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, and

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679 Coral Bell made this point during debates on the utility of the ANZUS alliance. See Coral Bell, “Managing to Survive,” The National Interest no. 2 (1985), pp. 36-45.
681 The distance between China and Australia is only 7,500km.
underpins global strategic stability by providing ballistic missile early warning information to the United States.\textsuperscript{683}

In an evolving strategic environment where US primacy over the Asia-Pacific is increasingly challenged, the operations at Pine Gap contribute to Australia’s security and defence policy, which has shifted focus towards the threat posed by great power competition in its own backyard. This is particularly so as the number of states with medium to long range ballistic missile capacity has increased. India successfully tested the Agni-II ballistic missile in 1999 (a year after its nuclear tests) and by December 2014 had developed and launched the long-range ICBMs Agni-V and Agni-IV, which have the suitable range to reach several cities in Mainland China.\textsuperscript{684} In Northeast Asia, North Korea has been attempting to launch the Taepodong missiles which, if ever successful, will have the capacity to strike the US and northern Australia. Based on these developments the Asia-Pacific region represents greater proliferation of these capabilities, than any other area in the world. As Dibb stated in 1999, well before the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific:

When you look at parts of the world, particularly in our own region where we need to be well informed, I would argue that in recent years we face a strategic environment that is much more uncertain than in the past...we clearly need to be as well informed as we can, whether it is from this facility [Pine Gap] or some other facilities, about the generality of military developments.\textsuperscript{685}

The benefits of this facility (and Nurrangur when in operation) have clearly outweighed the perceived costs involved in accommodating an increased US presence. Indeed, similar calculations and long-term benefits can be found when looking at the decision to allow the

\textsuperscript{685}\textsuperscript{ Paul Dibb, “Joint Standing Committee on Treaties: Reference Pine Gap,” Joint Committees, 9 August 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Fcommjnt %2Fj0000053.sgm%2F00005;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Pine%20Gap%20Paul%20Dibb%20Decade% 3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221999%22%20Month%3A%2208%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 15 December 2014).}
establishment of North West Cape. When the agreement was signed in 1963,686 and after the facility was operational in 1967, there was substantially more opposition, as Australia had no control over the operation and no access to the communication collected. This began to change during the 1980s when the facility moved to reflect a joint operation. The Whitlam Labor government in 1974 renegotiated the original treaty to remove the “US” from the name of the station in order to reflect the increased Australian presence.687 Yet real cooperation did not eventuate until later when Australia could use the facility for communication between its own ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific.688

In 1999, Australia gained full control over the facility, but continued to benefit from US funding and expertise, which was rapidly increased following the signing of the new Harold E. Holt Treaty at the 2008 AUSMIN. The treaty committed Australia and the US to jointly operate the facility for the next twenty-five years and came into effect in 2010.689 The new treaty added Space Situational Awareness to the facility that enabled Australia to gain access to US space radar and surveillance technology to monitor satellite and anti-satellite military activity in space. This was done following the successful anti-satellite missile test conducted by China in 2007 to shoot down one of its defunct weather satellites, which led to concern about the strategic intentions of China’s space program.690 Thus, despite the original concerns over US control of North West Cape, and the other joint defence facilities, Australia benefited greatly from US cooperation. And the persistence and extension of these

intelligence agreements over time and through different governments demonstrate Australia’s consistent support for these benefits, which reinforces the claim that expectations of reciprocity have guided Australia’s policy choices in aligning with the US.

**Australia and the US in Vietnam: Inflated expectations and miscalculations of foreign policy**

The majority of these facilities were established during the 1960s when Australia was fighting alongside the US in the Vietnam War. It is difficult to examine the US-Australian security partnership during the Cold War without discussing this conflict. Until Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan, Vietnam was the longest war Australia had participated in. During the ten years of combat operations between 1962 and 1972, over 60,000 ADF personnel were involved. This included 30 military advisers, a full battalion in 1965 and a task force in 1966.\(^691\) It has been common amongst Australian scholars to argue that Australia’s decision to commit troops to Vietnam was the result of its “dependency” on the security partnership with US, and its overall support for the US domino theory of communist insurgency in Southeast Asia.\(^692\) But alliance dependence does not properly capture the rational calculations (or miscalculations) involved in Australia’s decision to participate in the Vietnam War.

Australia’s views about the spread of communism had been consistent with those of the US since its involvement in the Korean War, but this does not mean that Australia did not have specific strategic interests in supporting US intentions in Vietnam.\(^693\) Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia was of particular security concern for Australia as it was thought by Menzies that if communism gained a foothold in one country, like Vietnam, it would lead to a “domino effect,” and the adoption of communist governments across the region (in this case, the major concern was communist governments in Laos, Cambodia, Malaya and

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691 Following 1972 a limited number of ADF personnel remained and a small group of the RAAF were deployed in 1975 to assist refugees and evacuations.

692 The literature on Australia’s participation in Vietnam is extensive. Some of the more instructive on Australia’s foreign policy choices during this time can be found in Norman Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian-American Relations Between 1900 and 1975* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1987); and Joseph Camilleri, *Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980). These contributions have followed the typical “entrapment versus abandonment” argument to state that Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War was an example of alliance entrapment and provides considerable evidence that Australia is a dependent ally beholden to the interests of the US as the dominant power in the relationship.

693 Paul Dibb has also made this claim, see in particular, *US-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View* (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 2005).
These states were underdeveloped and relatively unstable, making them ideal targets.

The strength of communism in Indochina also led to significant fears that it would eventually take hold in states more important to Australia’s security and defence, namely Indonesia. During the Indonesian Konfrontasi, which began just a year before Australia sent troops into Vietnam, Australia was in conflict with Indonesia in the Malaya peninsula and Borneo. A year earlier in 1963, the UN had given control of Dutch West New Guinea to Indonesia, which bordered the Australian Territories of Papua and New Guinea. A communist controlled Indonesia thus represented a threat to Australia’s national defence, as well as its security interests in maintaining regional stability in Southeast Asia.

Rather than representing Australia’s blind following of US foreign policy, Australia had certain expectations of reciprocity from its participation in the Vietnam War. This point has been made by others, like Llyod Cox and Brendan O’Connor, who as recently as 2012 argued that Australia saw the conflict in Vietnam as an opportunity to draw the US into military engagement in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Cabinet papers released after the 30-year rule demonstrate that Menzies saw US intervention into Vietnam to be motivated partly by a desire to stop Southeast Asia from falling under the grips of communism and “partly because they were conscious that the security of Australia would be at stake if South Vietnam fell.”

From his perspective, Australia “arguably had a livelier interest than the [US] in the success of their Vietnam efforts” and should look for ways to encourage and support the military mission of the US. In Menzies own words: “We would be prepared to put in a battalion and were looking for a way in and not a way out.”

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695 By the early 1960s, the Sukarno regime’s closeness to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was of concern to Australia and represented a significant threat to its strategic and economic policy in Southeast Asia. For more see Thomas Bruce Millar, “Problems of Australian foreign policy January-June 1965,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 11, no. 3 (December 1965), pp. 267-276.
699 NAA, A4940 C3811 “Foreign affairs and defence committee,” 7 April 1965.
Australia’s participation in the war was motivated by a dual expectation that it would strengthen the US’ commitment towards Australia and Southeast Asia, as well as counter the spread of communism in Asia-Pacific. As will be shown in the analysis that follows this chapter, these expectations were based on a number of miscalculations in how Australia perceived US strategy in Southeast Asia, as well as the spread of communism as a monolithic ideology supported by the governments in both the Soviet Union and China. The point made here is that it was not necessarily expectations of alliance loyalty that motivated Australia decision to enter into Vietnam, and these abovementioned factors contributed to a miscalculation in the benefits achieved from pursuing this policy option.

The Nixon Doctrine, Australia’s policy of defence self-reliance and the end of the Cold War

The Vietnam War represented a period where Australia lent material support to its partnership with the US and where the bulk of its cooperation in defence, intelligence, interoperability, science and technology exchange was developed. It was also a time where Australia’s own defence strategy was momentarily revised in light of the Nixon Doctrine. In 1969, US President Richard Nixon announced that the US expected its alliance partners to bear the primary responsibility for their own defence. 701 Australia perceived this declaration to mean that the US was pulling out of Asia, and therefore it could no longer count on regional security underpinned by US military might. 702 Anxieties over the strength of the alliance were also momentarily increased with the election of the Whitlam government that ran on a policy platform of removing Australian troops from Vietnam (which began in 1972), and had made public its criticisms of US policy in Vietnam and its secret military installations in Australia, which caused the US to state that the new Australian government represented “a completely new period in Australian-American relations”703 However, irrespective of these initial reservations, the Whitlam government remained firmly committed to ANZUS, with Whitlam himself taking measures to reduce the activism of his Labor colleagues against the US, by, in one instance, not allowing them access to information on

the Pine Gap signals intelligence base.\textsuperscript{704} The Whitlam government even sought direct assurances in 1974 that the US would maintain its air and navy presence in the Asia-Pacific, which Australia received when Washington stated that it needed to “lend substance to the commitments made to US allies in the region” and “American allies needed to count on not only the nuclear umbrella but also conventional support.”\textsuperscript{705}

Nevertheless, Australia’s anxiety over a perceived change in US defence policy continued. It increased after the fall of Saigon and the withdrawal of US combat troops from Southeast Asia in 1975. In response, the new Fraser government commissioned a Defence White Paper that focused more on building Australia’s capacity for self-defence, which signalled the end of Australia’s forward defence strategy.\textsuperscript{706} Maintaining a policy of defence self-reliance meant a significant increase in defence spending, and a restructure of the ADF into a force that could be deployed independently of allied coalitions. This proved difficult as budgetary constraints restricted defence spending to 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\textsuperscript{707} So instead of this policy representing a shift away from the importance placed on the alliance in defence planning, it actually reflected further continuity. Australia relied on its reciprocal partnership with the US to modernize its own defence force and obtain the technological advantage over Southeast Asian military capabilities needed to implement defence self-reliance.\textsuperscript{708} And this fuelled Australia’s rational calculation to remain part of the ANZUS Treaty following the withdrawal of New Zealand in 1985.\textsuperscript{709}

Debate about the threat posed to Australia in being associated with the US, and in being seen to support nuclear proliferation, resurfaced again in 1985.\textsuperscript{710} But such concerns were...

\textsuperscript{704} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{709} See footnote 572 for more information as to why New Zealand was no longer part of the annual meetings.

\textsuperscript{710} Opposition was centred on perceptions that the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was no longer sound following closer cooperation between Gorbachev and Reagan on halting their nuclear build-up. The Hawke governments support for the alliance was also taken as being in direct contradiction to their signing of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which attempted to limit the testing of nuclear capabilities. Despite these criticisms, the liberal opposition came to support the security the relationship provided. For more on this debate see “Alliance with the United States,” Senate, 6 November 1985. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=1;query=Australia%20United%20States%2
dismissed in the face of wider security interests in maintaining the alliance. Australia relied on a US naval presence to protect against Soviet competition in the Pacific. This was particularly so given the stationing of a Soviet naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, the largest naval base outside the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{711} Australia’s commitment to the alliance thus had security implications for its trade routes, and in contributing to its policy of defence self-reliance, which required an estimated budget of nearly 3\% of GDP, or $6.353 billion.\textsuperscript{712} Training of personnel was estimated to cost a third of the budget, approximately $2.832 billion, leaving the remaining two thirds for defence equipment, operational costs and industries. Australia required continued US assistance in training, technology transfer and intelligence to implement this policy. As Defence Minister Kim Beazley stated:

The alliance does assist the development of defence self-reliance. What the alliance relationship in fact does, on a day-to-day basis, is substantially to advance our technical capabilities and our understanding of events in our area of strategic concern. Partly as a result of the latter contribution it also enables us to limit the cost of our insurance. Without it, our defence budget would become the victim of a shopping list of requirements to deal with worst-case scenarios. The technical improvements assist in ensuring the ability to secure and sustain a technological solution for the problems posed by our strategic geography.\textsuperscript{713}

The trilateral structure was effectively replaced with a bilateral one without any costs to the US or Australia. The strong military and diplomatic ties between the two states in the creation of AUSMIN meant the ejection of New Zealand had no effect on the deterrent function of the alliance.\textsuperscript{714} In fact, for Australia, its commitment led to significant returns in

\textsuperscript{713} Ibid, p. 1093.
\textsuperscript{714} Bob Hawke, “Hawke Government – notice of motion,” HoR, 19 March 1985. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Australia%20United%20States%20alliance%20Decade%3A%221980s%22%20Year%3A%221985%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 1 August 2014).
closer government-to-government cooperation. This was made clear following the events of 9/11 where arguably the partnership went through its greatest expansion.

But before I turn to Australia’s foreign policy decisions in the aftermath of 9/11, it is prudent to first briefly discuss Australia’s role in the First Gulf War, as it was partly guided by Australia’s security partnership with the US. The chapter on aid and development highlighted that Australia’s material commitment to the Gulf War was part of the multinational coalition *Operation Desert Storm*, which consisted of three RAN warships, two frigates and one supply ship. These were primarily involved in enforcing international trade sanctions against the Saddam regime in response to its invasion of Kuwait. Australia’s decision to respond to the crisis was a combination of moral expectations in supporting the principles of non-intervention and liberation of Kuwait, and material factors in supporting the allied coalition led by the US. Prime Minister Bob Hawke emphasised a convergence of these moral and material factors in motiving Australia’s decision to support the coalition when he stated that: “Humanitarian concerns do not stand alone. They stand alongside, and reinforce, important Australian interests which are deeply engaged in the Gulf.”

While the alliance itself was not specifically invoked, as was the case in 2003, Australia’s participation can still be read as being determined by expectations of reciprocity in strengthening the security commitment of the alliance by showing support for US foreign policy. Australia’s decision also reflected a straightforward rational calculation. Its commitment was fairly limited. The Hawke government was quick to respond to the US’ request for states to join the international coalition and its early enthusiasm meant that Australia was spared having to contribute ground troops or air support. The level of support was not surprising given that it was outside Australia’s traditional strategic sphere of influence, but was still considered important in the context of the security partnership and to the stability of the Middle East, which was a source of Australian imports, particularly oil.

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716 Bob Hawke, “Middle East,” HoR, Ministerial Statement, 4 December 1990. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=1;query=Hawke%20Kuwait%20Decade%3A%221990b%22%20Year%3A%221990%22;rec=12;resCount=Default (accessed 4 August 2014).
The operation was also relatively successful in that the allies had pushed Iraqi forces out of Kuwait by February 1991, six months after Saddam declared victory over Kuwait.\textsuperscript{718} In this regard, the decision to joint the coalition produced a moral outcome in that Australia’s participation assisted the liberation of Kuwait, while also providing an opportunity for Australia to fulfil expectations of contributing to the new post-Cold War international order. Similar expectations and calculations were made following 9/11. However, this time, they were arguably more substantial and the outcomes more directly affected the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific.

\textbf{Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror: The free trade agreement, counter-terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing}

The events of 9/11 and Australia’s response were thought to represent a significant turning point in the alliance, as it was the first time the mutual defence clause was enacted. Whilst I would not argue that the pay-offs Australia received as a result of participating in the Iraq War, as well as other conflicts stemming from the War on Terror (WoT) necessarily justify the reasons for the war itself, it is nonetheless the case that alliance loyalty, underpinned by moral and strategic calculations, subsequently led to significant material gains. In this instance, the moral and material calculations were not directly tied to Australia’s participation in Afghanistan and Iraq, and instead can be viewed in the broader context of its commitment to the global WoT, which was focused on combating the threat of terrorism in the Asia-Pacific. Here, the expectations of reciprocity underpinning its commitment to the alliance did lead to moral and material outcomes.

One of the expectations of reciprocity flowing from Australia’s participation was the signing of a US-Australia FTA, which had been under negotiation for several years. The then-Foreign Minister Alexander Downer admitted to this, noting, “the Australian-US FTA was a direct result of Australia’s participation in Iraq and the War on Terror.”\textsuperscript{719} Australia had been eager to gain access to US markets in areas where it had become globally competitive, such as the


\textsuperscript{719} Interview with former Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, Sydney 2011. While it is widely accepted that Australia anticipated this material pay-off from its participation in the War in Iraq, there has been some, like Michael Wesley who state that it was not until well after Australia pledged its support for the War that Australia expected that it would assist in a resolution to the trade negotiations. For more see Wesley, “The strategic effects of preferential trade agreements,” \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs} 62, no. 2 (2008), pp. 214-228.
building of high-speed catamarans, and in the more lucrative areas of agriculture, such as beef and sugar. After the agreement came into effect on January 1, 2005 Australia’s trade with the US increased from $13.848 billion to $15.533 billion, with a high point of $17.966 billion reached in 2008.\textsuperscript{720}

While both Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Prime Minister John Howard considered this deal a political gain at the time, it was also highly criticised due to its preference for US goods, services and investment, which threatened to divert Australian suppliers away from more efficient and competitive international markets.\textsuperscript{721} The diversion of trade from other markets was a particular concern for Australia given the economic rise of East Asia. Evidence to support this concern came to fruition 10 years later with an estimated $53.1 billion of trade being diverted from the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{722} Despite these negative consequences that came to light some time after the agreement was set in force, at the time of signing it was certainly considered a material advantage flowing from Australia’s support for the war in Iraq.

*Desert to tropics: Intelligence, inter-operability and counter-terrorism*

The other, and more important, material benefit was closer cooperation in intelligence sharing. This was immediately found during joint ADF and United States Forces - Iraq and Afghanistan operations where Australia was given unprecedented access to US intelligence gathering and intelligence systems. Previously, strict US National Disclosure Policies (NDP) meant Australia was only privy to select pieces of US intelligence.\textsuperscript{723} This changed with Australia’s participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia’s participation in Afghanistan was through *Operation Slipper* as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It was the largest non-NATO contributor to the operation with up to 1550 troops stationed there between 2001 and 2010. The original contingent included 300 Special Australian Service (SAS) troops, 4 F/A-18 Hornets, tanker transport aircraft and two Orion


\textsuperscript{721} More extensive information on impacts of the trade agreement can be found in Elizabeth Thurbon “10 years after the Australia-US free trade agreement: where to for Australia’s trade policy?,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 5 (2015), pp. 463-467.


Australia’s commitment in Iraq was also considerable. Australia deployed ground troops with 2,200 members of the ADF participating in the 2003 invasion, as well as three Hercules transport aircraft, two Orion maritime surveillance planes and 14 F/A-18 Hornets.

At the time there was extensive debate as to whether Australia’s loyalty had once again forced it into a conflict that it had little interest in fighting, and lacked the necessary capabilities to fully commit. Yet these concerns were also disputed by security experts such as William Tow, who argued that Australia’s contribution was in line with its policy of using niche capabilities as part of coalition military operations, which the US found particularly valuable, and which for Australia produced significant material outcomes. Others, like O’Connor and Cox, have also stated that claims of Australia being a dependent ally that followed the US into unnecessary wars were mistaken. In a similar way to their views on Australia’s decision to participate in the Vietnam War, they have argued that Australia made a calculated and independent choice to strengthen ties with the US by joining the coalition, and that the long-term benefits of doing so outweighed the potential short-term consequences.


Some of the short-term risks were calculated to be damage to Australia’s reputation in Asia-Pacific and domestic consequences in entering a war that appeared to the public to have little relevance to Australia and its interests. For more see O’Connor and Cox, “Australia, the US, and the Vietnam War: ‘hound dog,’ not ‘Lapdog,’” Australian Journal of Political Science, 47, no. 2 (2012), p. 181.
military procedures. In some instances, the ADF was excluded from participating in briefings where it had been involved in gathering the intelligence used for further operations. Given Australia’s early support for the Coalition of the Willing (CoW) and the success of the Australian SAS in taking control of key territory from Iraqi air forces, this was an issue affecting continued cooperation.729 As a result, the US altered its laws preventing foreign nations from seeing or hearing classified intelligence, and granted Australia and Britain access to US planning for combat missions and counter-terrorism activities. Australia was effectively upgraded to the status of “Intelligence Partner,” which meant from 2004 onwards it would have access to all US information on international terrorism and future joint military operations stored on the intelligence data system SIPRNET.730

The opening of US intelligence and military information meant there were fewer restrictions on closer US and Australia defence cooperation. After the 2004 AUSMIN meeting, Howard and US President George W. Bush agreed that Australia and the US needed to strengthen interoperability through the Joint Combined Training Centre (JCTC). The JCTC was codenamed Operation Talisman Sabre and included exercises in amphibious assault, air raids, and live fire.731 Talisman Sabre is conducted every two years and represented an important part of Australia’s strategic and defence planning as it allowed for continued access to US military doctrine even as its commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq reduced. In 2013, it became the second largest maritime training exercise in the world, with over 30,000 US and Australian troops operating out of Shoalwater Bay Queensland.732

The intelligence relationship had direct material benefits for Australia’s own counter-terrorist strategies, which were revised in the face of changing security threats. Australia moved to an intelligence gathering approach that utilized the technology and procedures of the US. Specifically, Australia adopted the American model of having civilians in charge of counter-

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730 DoD, “ Australia’s defence relations with the US,” Joint Standing Committee On Foreign Affairs, Defence And Trade, 26 March 2004. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Inquiry%20onto%20Australia%20United%20States%20Defence%20Relations%20Intelligence%20Decade%3A%222000s%22%20Year%3A%222004%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 2 August 2014).
terrorism efforts and focused on intelligence-led strategies of prevention rather than ex-post facto arrests and captures. This move corresponded with a new intelligence deal covering geospatial intelligence obtained from imagery, surveillance satellites and reconnaissance aircraft known as GEOINT. It had been a long-term priority for Australia to acquire space-based imagery for intelligence gathering in South and Southeast Asia. Indeed, the 1994 Defence White Paper stated that:

As a significant new measure, the government places a high priority on assured access to high-quality, space-based imagery to meet Defence’s needs for mapping, charting, and navigation and targeting data.

Australia was concerned about threats to its interests from Al Qaeda offshoot Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) whose acts of terrorism in Bali in 2002 led to Australian causalities. Australia also suffered an attack on its embassy in Jakarta in 2004. Following the Bali bombing, Australia joined the US, Canada and the UK in discussions on international counter-terrorism efforts that had ramifications for Australia’s efforts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Australia was an enthusiastic supporter of the global fight to stop the spread of terrorism, but it obviously placed a different level of importance on the Southeast Asian region. Whereas the US viewed the region as the “second front”, Australia viewed Southeast Asia as the major theatre of the WoT. Apart from the direct attacks on Australians in Indonesia, there was

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737 Daryl Williams, “Counter terrorism and counter terrorism measures,” Speech, Attorney General Daryl Williams, Australian Embassy, Washington, 1 May 2002. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=United%20States%20Counter-terrorism%20Decade%3A%222000s%22%20Year%3A%222002%22;rec=7;resCount=Default (accessed 18 July 2014).
recorded evidence of Islamic fundamentalists in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, as well as signs of a JI cell operating in Australia.738

Australia had been tracking the rise of JI and other potential terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia for some time before the events of 9/11, but by 2003 Canberra’s perception of terrorism as a threat to a strategic area already described as an “arc of instability” had increased significantly. Australia was especially concerned about the rise of terrorism in Indonesia.739 And its previous terrorist cooperation with the US produced both moral and material outcomes in helping to combat this mutual threat. In this instance, the expectations of reciprocity motivating Australia’s contribution to the WoT led to moral outcomes in that it assisted Indonesia’s ability to combat the threat of terrorism, and was linked to broader concerns of maintaining security and stability across Southeast Asia. An expectation that Australia’s participation in the WoT would contribute towards regional security was highlighted by Foreign Minister Downer when he stated that:

There must be great unity in the international effort to counter-terrorism and terrorists, wherever they may be—Afghanistan, Iraq, Europe, as we saw in Madrid, or in South-East Asia. The only way to deal with these


terrorists internationally is from a position of unity, and we all have to be prepared to make a contribution.  

Australia’s most significant contribution was in Indonesia and broader Southeast Asia. It signed 9 bilateral Memoranda’s of Understanding (MOUs) on counterterrorism with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Fiji, Cambodia, East Timor, India and Papua New Guinea. The US and Australia also helped train and establish the elite Indonesian terrorist force, the Densus 88, which at its peak trained over 400 personnel. Australia also provided US$35 million to develop the Densus training centre as part of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), while the US contributed an initial US$12 million that reached US$16 million by 2006. The Indonesian forces had a high success rate and were responsible for nearly 500 arrests and 250 convictions, which markedly reduced the influence of JI as an effective terrorist organization.

The Pacific defence: Intelligence cooperation meets transnational crime

Australia’s moral and material expectations from US cooperation on terrorism extended to achieving Australia’s strategic objectives in the South Pacific, and this also led to moral and material outcomes. At the same time as revising its intelligence gathering, Australia implemented a new policing network in the South Pacific that drew on US intelligence cooperation. As I mentioned in Chapter 2 on aid and development, by the early 2000s Australia’s approach to regional security had shifted to focus on the threats of weak and failing states that had the potential to become breeding grounds for terrorism and other forms of transnational crime. Instead of viewing these security concerns as strictly belonging to military affairs, the Howard government understood them to be linked to a break down of law and order, and hence an issue of policing. By 1997 Australia had already developed a

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743 There was some criticism that Densus 88 was using torture and was responsible for violence against peaceful West Papuan protesters. Despite this, the force was still successful in countering the threat of terrorism in Indonesia and was quite popular among Indonesians. Greg Barton, “Ten years on: Indonesia’s anti-terrorism advances,” ABC The Drum, 12 October 2012. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-12/barton-bali-bombings-ten-years-on/4308906 (accessed 4 August 2014).
regional framework for cooperation on transnational crime called the Law Enforcement Cooperation Program (LECP), which had established police training operations across the Pacific, and in Indonesia. However, they were short on collecting information on where and when instances of crime were likely to take place.

In 2002, this gap was filled by the establishment of the Transnational Crime Units (TCU) in Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, PNG, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. These units were tasked to deal with dispersed crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, arms trafficking, counterfeiting, identity theft, money laundering and terrorism. The TCUs worked in combination with the Australian Secret Intelligence Organization (ASIO) to identify, investigate and analyse criminal activity. This led to the creation of the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC), which provided twenty-four hour contact between Australia, overseas police forces and the intelligence service. The involvement of the US came in 2004 with the development of cooperation between the AFP and the DoD Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West) in Hawaii. These organizations had success in dismantling the largest methamphetamine drug operation in the southern hemisphere based in Fiji. The Pacific Transnational Crime Network led to the creation of the Pacific Financial Intelligence Unit Project (PFIU) in 2005 and the Australian Financial Intelligence Unit (AFIU), which increased Australia’s capacity to track criminal financial activity between the mainland and the Pacific Islands. An expectation that US-Australian cooperation would achieve Australia’s unique security interests in the South-Pacific was re-iterated in 2004 when Downer stressed at an AUSMIN meeting that the alliance is important, “not just for Australia’s security but for the broader security of the western Pacific region.”

Material outcomes were also to be found in adding criminal intelligence gathering to the security partnership. Australia benefited from the advanced training of JIATF West, as well

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as additional $450,000 in US funding for TCUs. The US took advantage of the criminal intelligence-monitoring network established by Australia to achieve its goals of halting the financing of terrorism and money laundering. Following 9/11, the US announced that it viewed the global reach of terrorist organizations as a significant threat to international and regional stability and “would encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists” by working with its “allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism…and deny access to the international financial system.”

The number of weak states in the Pacific also made it a potential hot spot for terrorist-related criminal activity, even though there was yet to be a recorded case of terrorism in the Pacific. This did not mean that Australia was not in a position to benefit from the involvement of the US. In fact, Australia was arguably able to gain by following the US narrative on global terrorism. The reasons for this are relatively clear. The Pacific Islands, which includes PNG, are the closest territories to mainland Australia. Breakdowns in law and order represent a significant threat to its sea line of defence. This was the primary expectation motivating Australia’s intervention into Solomon Islands in 2003, and formed the basis of Australia’s aid and development program to the South Pacific during the Howard government. Criminal intelligence gathering, as well as training and funding by the US, was useful for Australia in achieving its own unique strategic interests in the region.

Apart from the material outcomes described above, there were also moral outcomes stemming from Australia’s expectations of reciprocity to capitalize on the resources of the US. The Pacific Islands are largely under-developed and suffer from decentralized and corrupt governments that have traditionally struggled to maintain law and order. Cooperation between the US and Australia on counter-terrorism and criminal intelligence was anticipated to assist the Pacific Islands in developing and strengthening their own policing capabilities. In 2003, Australia had an estimated 8,500 AFP across the Pacific.

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751 The majority of the Pacific Islands rank between 130-150 out of 177 on the International Transparency Index (TII).
Islands. Its commitment to this area has remained. Since 2010, Australia and the US have conducted operations to capture organized crime syndicates using the South Pacific as a transit point between the US and Australia. This included donating patrol boats, training of local police in law enforcement intelligence, surveillance and operations security, as well as construction of TCU facilities.

_Bilateral bridge to the collective: Expanded participation in NATO_

Along with state-to-state increases in intelligence cooperation, Australia’s growing partnership with the US following 9/11 also enabled it to gain greater access to NATO’s collective intelligence apparatus. Here again, this was tied to efforts of maintaining regional security, and participation in NATO had been a long-term foreign policy goal for Australia that dated back to the first US-Australia security meeting. At the time, Australia had a limited relationship with NATO, but considered European politics significant to its approach to world affairs:

> Means should be found to enable Australia to receive information regarding NATO developments, particularly those that have a direct bearing upon Australian interests. Consideration might also be given to the best way to enable Australia, when NATO is dealing with matters affects interests of Australia, to express its views to NATO.

In 2004, Downer pushed for more Australian involvement in NATO and emphasized the mutual interests both Australia and the US have in severing the links between failed states, terrorism and transnational crime. He argued that NATO’s new Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean dialogue did not go far enough in recognizing the global nature of terrorist threats and Australia was well placed to extend its reach by acting as a bridge between the

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North Atlantic and South Pacific. In the same way that Australia was fearful of being left out of decisions of international security during the early days of the partnership, it was concerned again about being excluded from security planning that would directly benefit its own strategic sphere of influence. Australia expected that in finalizing the Information Security Agreement (ISA); it would stand to gain closer cooperation on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, crisis management and peacekeeping. Such measures were realized the following year when Australia and NATO agreed to exchange classified information under the ISA and to cooperate on the newly established Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) - all during a visit by then NATO Secretary General Mr de Hoop Scheffe.

Intelligence and trade relations were accompanied by the signing of the Treaty on Defence Trade Cooperation, which made it easier for Australia to gain access to sensitive defence technology and compete for defence-related global supply chain contracts. This deal had a security and economic benefit in that it led to improvements in interoperability between Australia and the US, and reduced the bureaucracy involved in defence exports by providing license-free access to US defence equipment. At the time the treaty was signed in September 2007, Australia was the only other nation outside of the UK to achieve such a deal.

Prominent Australian foreign policy scholars have regard the Howard years as the “golden age” of alliance cooperation. These scholars highlighted the close personal relationship between Prime Minister Howard and President George Bush as a major contributor to the growth of the alliance and a catalyst for Australia’s support of US foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet what I have demonstrated above is that an expectation of


reciprocity was the primary motivation. This involved both moral and material calculations in combating the spread of terrorism and bringing stability and security to the Asia-Pacific, which had been a long-term foreign policy goal for both the US and Australia. National interest calculations were also important in that Australia’s support of the alliance was determined by a rational choice of how it could benefit in return. The returns were considerable, and included unprecedented access to US intelligence and the successful signing of the US-Australian FTA. As well as the material benefits, closer cooperation between the US and Australia in intelligence led to moral outcomes in assisting the developing states of Southeast Asia and the Pacific to achieve their own security. This was found in assisting Indonesia in stopping the threat of JI and in combating transnational crime in the Pacific Islands by improving policing. This also produced material benefits for Australia in achieving its security interest in Southeast Asia and its strategic interest in the Pacific.

The rise of China and the US pivot to Asia-Pacific: Expectations of defence cooperation and regional security

So far I have demonstrated that there is a case to be made for a moral realist reading of the US-Australian security partnership by examining significant turning points in the development of the relationship. But in order to present a well-rounded picture of how a moral realist would approach Australia’s policy choices in strategic alliances, an examination of the contemporary US-Australian partnership is needed. This is particularly important for understanding Australia’s support for a US troop presence in Australia and Asia-Pacific, despite anxieties that this would complicate its growing economic and diplomatic relationship with China.

In 2007, China surpassed the US as Australia’s largest trading partner, which meant that for the first time in Australia’s history, its main security partner was not its main trading partner. This reality has the potential to complicate Australia’s strategic position, as China emerges to challenge US hegemony in the Pacific. Indeed, much has been made of the potential for both alliance entrapment and abandonment as a result of what Hugh White (and

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others) have characterized as Australia’s “China choice.” 761 For Australia, the choice has always been between its loyalty to the US as its most important security partner and its economic dependence on China in the event that the US and China come into conflict.762 It is not the intention of this thesis to make any definitive argument on which side Australia should choose, it is only to demonstrate that within the US-Australian security partnership, common interests in responding to the rise of China, as part of an expectation of reciprocity, have led to specific moral and material outcomes.

The rise of China reflected a shift in the international balance of power and altered the focus of the US-Australian security partnership, from one that prioritized cooperation on counter-terrorism and intelligence, to one that prioritizes greater defence cooperation. This has largely been the result of the US “pivot” or “rebalance” of its strategic posture towards the Asia-Pacific.763 During the early 1990s, the US significantly reduced its military presence in the region, going from a high of 135,000 personnel, to an average of 100,000.764 In the aftermath of 9/11 US military resources were focused on securing its interests in the Middle East and the defence of the Asia-Pacific was narrowly located to its key partners in the WoT, of which the South Asian nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India were the main recipients. As previously mentioned, Australia benefited greatly from intelligence, inter-operability and trade in the Post/911 period, yet the defence relationship remained the same. This changed following the 2011 announcement that US troops would be stationed at Australian facilities

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762 Alexander Downer as foreign minister was the first public official to vocalize Taiwan as an issue where Australia would be forced into making this choice. Downer stated that Australia was not obligated to assist the US, under ANZUS and would remain “neutral” if China tried to regain full sovereignty over Taiwan. Tom Allard and Hamish McDonald, “ANZUS loyalties fall under China’s shadow,” *The Age*, 18 August 2004. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/08/17/1092508475915.html (accessed 20 July 2014).

763 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first made reference to a US pivot towards Asia in an article for *Foreign Policy*. Even though Secretary Clinton only referred to the word “pivot” 4 times, from this point on it has been used to explain the US’ refocus of diplomatic and military attention towards the Asia-Pacific. For more, see Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific century,” *Foreign Policy* 189, no. 1 (2011), pp. 56-63.

764 The US also closed its largest military base in Manila.
in the Northern Territory. The decision was labelled the biggest development in US-

This policy change was the result of Australia and the US’ common interests in responding to potential threats from a rising China, which could challenge US primacy and threaten the stability of Australia’s strategic interests in Asia-Pacific, namely the security of its trade routes, as well as its freedom to exercise a policy of comprehensive and constructive regional engagement. Thus, Australia agreed to the rotation of US troops in Darwin because of an expectation of reciprocity that this would increase its defence position, which would also contribute to regional peace and security. It started with the 2009 announcement by the Obama Administration of the “strategic pivot,” which identified several shifts in US foreign policy priorities. For Australia, the most important was the recognition that the centre of international politics had moved to its own strategic backyard.

We see this very much as responding and reflecting the fact that the world is moving into our part of the world, the world is moving to the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. We need to respond to that. The world needs to essentially come to grips with the rise of China, the rise of India, the move of strategic and political and economic influence to our part of the world.\footnote{Foreign Minister Stephen Smith commenting on the new US-Australia deal for US marines in Darwin. See Matt Seigal, “As part of pact, U.S. marines arrive in Australia, in China’s strategic backyard,” *The New York Times*, 4 April 2014. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/asia/us-marines-arrive-darwin-australia.html?_r=0 (accessed 24 June 2014).}

Acceptance of the changing power dynamics brought with it the desire by the US to re-stamp its hegemony over the area in the event of potential competition from China. In 2012, former US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta announced a departure from the US’ 50/50 split between the Atlantic and the Pacific; and instead planned to have 60% of its navy deployed
to the Pacific by 2020. Washington’s strategy was thus centred on strengthening its alliance structures by increasing its military presence in the region. Australia benefited greatly from this in a number of ways. In fact, not only did Australia benefit, it actively encouraged US rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific with an expectation that it will contribute to greater regional security. This was best illustrated in then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stating that US participation in the EAS was influenced by the diplomacy of Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd. In terms of defence planning Australia’s decision to accept US troop presence had an economic benefit in that Australia was again grappling with a limited defence budget, despite the initial increase of $146.1 billion of defence spending announced by the Rudd government in 2009 – a projected rise that was considered more “aspirational” than a firm commitment. By 2013 the Labor government, led by Prime Minister Julia Gillard, announced a new defence funding model that reduced defence spending to 1.5% of GDP, the lowest since before WWII. The increased military presence was thus a way for Australia to help secure its defence without having to over-stretch its budget spending.

Over 2,500 US troops were to be in Darwin on a rotating basis. By 2012, Australia had a full company of 200-250 marines in the Northern Territory with a predicted 2,500 by 2017. This would incorporate a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that included command, logistics and ground combat, as well as aviation combat with up to 25 aircraft. In exchange, the US received greater access to Australian bombing ranges and remote training.

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facilities, particularly the Bradshaw Field Training Area at the Top End. The US Marine Corps (USMC) was looking to develop better (and closer) training with regional militaries, and the placement of troops in Darwin was useful because of its proximity to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. The new pact also included increased use of Australian Air Force bases for the American Air Command and the potential for increased ship and submarine visits through the Indian Ocean docking at a naval base in Perth. Indeed, closer defence relations that covered the Indian Ocean had been a long-term foreign policy goal for Australia that dated back to the 1960s.

As well as the material benefits, moral anticipated in strengthening US military commitments in the region. This is in line with previous calculations of Australia’s alliance loyalty in that its continued support for US supremacy in the Asia-Pacific would lead to moral and material outcomes of regional peace and stability. Encouraging US engagement in the region also had the potential to produce greater trilateral and multilateral defence relationships that would enable a better response to any regional contingency, such as coordinated responses to natural disasters and humanitarian assistance. Such a policy goal reflected the continuation of common interests between the US and Australia in maintaining regional peace and security by increasing the sovereign ability of Asia-Pacific states to defend against potential threats. As made clear in the previous section, a particular focus for Australia had been the development of closer defence ties with Indonesia. In fact, Minister for Defence Stephen Smith highlighted this expectation of reciprocity as part of Australia’s commitment to the alliance when he stated that:

The United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific has been a force for stability and investment and prosperity since the end of World War II, so

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772 Ibid.
774 During the 1960s Australia had sought to add threats to joint interests in the Indian Ocean to the mutual defence pact, but was rebuffed by a US administration hesitant to beholden itself to any commitment that would drag it into a regional war. There is still no formal understanding on the threats to the Indian Ocean, however this reflected a growing trend to widen the scope of regional defence planning to include activity in the Indian Ocean and was inline with Australia’s strategic thinking outlined in the 2011 “Australia in the Asian Century White Paper,” which extended the area of traditional strategic importance to the western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. For more see, “Australia in the Asian Century,” (September 2011), p. 74-75. Available at: http://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/645592/australia-in-the-asian-century-white-paper.pdf (accessed 20 August 2014).
what we’re doing is enhancing our practical cooperation. And already, that’s had good regional impacts, because with the rotation of a small number of Marines through Darwin, we’ve already agreed with the President of Indonesia that we’ll have a regional exercise, Australia, the United States and Indonesia on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. So there are very good regional implications.

In 2013, Australia and the US also emphasized the importance of working with Indonesia as a regional leader and identified defence and intelligence cooperation as a priority. Australia’s material interests in pursuing this policy goal was tied to the increased capacity of Indonesia to realize its strategic potential within ASEAN, which would allow for greater strategic depth in Canberra’s defence planning. Security of the Indonesian archipelago was also vital for freedom of SLOCs and for continued prosperity in trade and investment. Australia’s ability to contribute to these policy goals was greatly increased by its support of US re-engagement with Indonesia and broader Southeast Asia. The US had already funded Indonesia’s Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMMS), which covered activity over the important Malacca Strait, as well as the Sulawesi Sea and Molucca Sea.

This demonstrates that common interests – as part of an expectation of reciprocity – have remained central to the longevity and durability of the US-Australian security partnership, and this has continued to show evidence of leading to both moral and material outcomes. In this instance, Australia and the US were united in viewing the rise of China as a potential strategic threat to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Australia’s concerns have been tied to the possibility of conflict between the US and China. The former Australia’s main security ally and the latter its largest trading partner. In comparison, the US has been nervous about any action from China that could challenge its hegemony over a region of strategic and

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economic importance. But regardless of these variations in how the US and Australia have calculated their interests, both states have shown a mutual desire to maintain the regional status quo, which has included moral considerations in maintaining peace and security. This has led to moral outcomes in strengthening the defence capacity of regional allies through trilateral defence cooperation, which has also led to further material pay-offs for Australia, as greater US engagement in regional defence and security was identified by policymakers as a key strategic goal.

Conclusion
This chapter has applied a moral realist framework to the Australian-US security partnership. It did so by first outlining some of the problems with normative approaches to understanding alliances, namely that these contributions have over-stated the shared norms and values that can sometimes drive alliances, particularly multilateral alliance groupings. At the opposite end of the spectrum, it also found that realist examinations have largely dismissed the potential for moral considerations in alliance partnerships. This represents a gap in the literature, and an area where a moral realist view might be useful in understanding Australia’s strategic alliances.

Indeed, it was found that moral realism could explain the US-Australian security partnership. Expectations of reciprocity were found in the common security interests that solidified the relationship during WWII and were found to motivate Australia’s support for US foreign and security policy. The moral calculations as part of this reciprocity were difficult to determine, but were found in both Australia’s and the US’ mutual desire to see the partnership as a mechanism that could deter conflict and promote stability in Asia-Pacific. These expectations were found to continue during the partnership, and informed Australia’s decision to allow joint defence and intelligence facilities, and its willingness to commit material support towards various US-driven international coalitions. These decisions were made despite fears that it could lead to alliance entrapment and limit Australia’s ability to exercise an independent foreign policy. This demonstrated rational choice in that Australian decision-makers calculated that the benefits of maintaining the alliance far outweighed the costs involved. This was certainly true in terms of access to US intelligence, military technology and training.
Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice together indicate the likelihood of moral and material outcomes. The moral outcomes can be found in the security flow-on effects to nations in the Pacific, which have benefited from cooperation between Australia and the US in areas of counter-terrorism, policing and disaster relief. This also produced material benefits in bringing stability to Australia’s area of direct strategic importance and contributed to its regional interests in developing closer security and defence ties with the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Thus, this chapter demonstrated evidence of a convergence between moral and material considerations in Australia strategic alliance policy that, in some instances, led to moral and material outcomes.

This completes the application of moral realism to the three arenas of Australian foreign policy, which means it is now time to bring the case study chapters together to more comprehensively analyse whether moral realism stands up against potential criticisms, and assess whether it represents a valuable tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices. I undertake this task in the next chapter.
Chapter Five

Morality and material interests: The case for moral realism in understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices

So far this thesis has mapped out the framework of moral realism and how it might be applied to three arenas of Australian foreign policy. A preliminary examination of the data indicated that a moral realist perspective that incorporates the presence of both moral and material calculations has the potential to sharpen our understanding of the motives, choices and outcomes of a state’s foreign policy. However, this is not enough to make a definitive conclusion. Before this can be done, the evidence must be further analysed and alternative explanations concerning the place of morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices evaluated.

To do this, the chapter is organized into three sections, which serve in combination as the crux of this thesis. The first briefly refreshes the reader’s memory by highlighting how the dominance of normative and critical contributions to the classical realist revival has engendered a flawed understanding of how classical realists understood morality. The second section then presents English School (ES) and constructivist assessments of Australian foreign policy as potential alternatives to moral realism. I find that these perspectives are limited in their ability to account for the motives, choices and outcomes of the position of morality in Australia’s foreign policy. Specifically, I find that the ES and constructivist normative understanding of morality downplays the strategic interests that determine why (and when) Australia chooses to include morality as part of its choices. Finally, the third section conducts an analysis of moral realism’s explanatory utility in the Australian case by drawing together the three themes of expectations of reciprocity between states; rational choice in calculations of foreign policy decisions; and moral and material outcomes of foreign policy. In doing so, I answer my primary research question (“is moral realism an appropriate analytical tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices?”) in the affirmative.
Understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices: Reintroducing the academic landscape of morality in classical realism

This thesis began with an examination of the most prominent approaches to the revival of classical realism in International Relations (IR) theory. There has been recent scholarly interest on how best to theorize morality in international politics and the return to classical realism has been directed towards gathering insights on how classical realists, and specifically Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan, understood the position of morality in IR. But rather than this revival adding clarity to how classical realists primarily adopted a consequentialist view of morality, it has instead led to a misrepresentation of classical realism’s core methodological and theoretical principles. The examination of the classical realist revival in Chapter 1 found that the majority of these contributions came from cosmopolitan, constructivist and critical theoretical perspectives that have fundamentally different views to classical realism on how to theorize morality in international politics.

A cosmopolitan perspective, like the one put forward by Richard Beardsworth, understands morality to be a categorical imperative, and therefore applied to international politics by assessing states’ adherence to a universal set of rules and laws. This is at variance to the views of Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan, who all saw morality as deriving from the consequences of rational thought, and contingent on time and place. Constructivists have also conceived of morality differently to classical realists, by arguing that it is intersubjective, and part of how actors and structures are socially constructed. For constructivists like Reus-Smit, morality is a social product guiding states about the “right” way to act. Similarly, critical theoretical perspectives view morality in terms of positivist and post-positivist critiques, which means – as Campbell Craig and Chris Brown have attempted to claim – that the classical realists’ own values and perceptions informed their views on morality as either “good” or “bad.” Yet while these perspectives have approached the study of morality from different theoretical positions, they nonetheless each regard morality as a normative resource,

rather than one linked to power and interests (which is the key conceptual proposition of classical realism in respect to morality).

As noted in Chapter 1, this similarity can also be found when examining the contributions from perspectives that one would expect to share more in common with classical realists. ES scholars, whether solidarist or pluralist, generally argue in favour of the potential for a rules-based international society independently influencing state behaviour.\textsuperscript{782} Even neo-classical realism, classical realism’s most contemporary incarnation, still understands morality to be normative, and has thus viewed it with a certain level of scepticism; seeing it as only important insofar as it can be a tool for elites to manipulate, sell or coerce policy.\textsuperscript{783}

Yet these normative understandings of morality are in contrast to how the classical realists theorized morality as part of a state’s calculation of the national interest, and evaluated according to the consequences of states choosing to include morality as part of their rational decision-making processes. This is why I have positioned moral realism as a perspective that seeks to properly incorporate the classical realist view of morality, and thus represent an original contribution towards the classical realist revival. Moral realism adopts the notion of an “ethic of consequence” which has a long history in classical realism as a form of prudence whereby states must weigh decisions, including ones dealing with morality, according to whether they achieve any benefit to the national interest.

The moral realist approach I have articulated here also tries to extend the work of Morgenthau et al, by proposing that for an act to be evaluated as “moral” it must also demonstrate a benefit to both the initiating state as well as the target recipient. Hence I connect motives with outcomes, by understanding morality to be tied to the classical realists’ consideration of the “other” in human nature. Indeed, classical realists accepted that states do not exist alone in international politics and must interact with others in order to survive. Therefore, states have the capacity to reason that, in certain contexts and under certain


conditions, they can actually stand to benefit from choosing to include expectations of reciprocity as part of rational decision-making. By combining these assumptions, a moral realist stance anticipates that morality is more likely to be visible in states’ decisions when it converges with national interests. Together this can actually lead to gains for the state in question.

As well as developing its moral realist framework, this thesis has also examined how the academic literature has treated morality with respect to Australia’s foreign policy. I found that it was commonplace for scholars to examine Australian policy choices within the context of its middle-power status. This has been true of those in support of Australia as a “Good International Citizen (GIC),” as well as those who have primarily focused on hard power calculations – such as defence spending, military capabilities, and alliance partnerships.\(^{784}\) This in turn has tended to produce quite specific foreign policy conclusions that I argued have fallen short in accounting for both moral and material factors in Australia’s policy choices. Not only does this represent a gap in the literature, it also uncovers a divide in Australian IR between the ES and realism.\(^{785}\) Australia’s academic landscape is unique in that it has remained outside traditional debates on morality in international politics, which tend to approach this through the prism of an epistemological struggle between liberalism and classical realism. Against this backdrop, Australia represents an excellent case for the application of moral realism because there has not yet been a systematic examination of the potential for morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices.

The limited assessments about morality in Australian foreign policy that do exist have primarily come from normative scholars from the ES and constructivist approaches. A brief explanation of how these perspectives have seen morality in Australia’s foreign policy calculations in the areas of aid and development, humanitarian operations and strategic alliances, is instructive in this context. First, it allows for alternative explanations to be considered. If they are found wanting, this will strengthen my case for positioning moral realism as a more appropriate tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices.

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My initial survey of the literature on morality in international politics deliberately included cosmopolitanism and critical theoretical scholarship, but since contributions from these perspectives have been minimal when referring to Australia, a discussion of them would not produce much in the way of clarifying the moral realist position I have advanced. Nor would it present a viable alternative to understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices: indeed, doing so is a matter for a different thesis. In any case, as I have argued previously, these perspectives are similar in that they see morality as a prescriptive force capable of shaping policy decisions independently of material interests. And in discussing ES and constructivist views below, I am also mindful of potential criticisms that I have taken moral realism too far, to the extent that it is no longer possible to identify it as falling within the classical realist camp. Thus, in examining the potential alternatives to moral realism, I am also reinforcing the claim that it is still grounded in empiricism and material interests.

The English School and Australian foreign policy: The norm of international society

I begin with contributions made by the ES with respect to understanding morality in Australian foreign policy. There are several ways that this can be achieved from an ES perspective, but its methodological and epistemological pluralism represents one of the major forms of criticisms of this School. To avoid potential confusion on this, I focus on the middle-ground empiricism most commonly associated with Hedley Bull. The main assumption of this perspective has been that in abiding by the laws, norms and rules of international society, Australia has stood to benefit by playing a role in upholding the maintenance of international order. The logic here is that a stable rules-based society is of

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786 Roy Jones identified the methodological and conceptual problems of Wight’s adoption of the three traditions as part of his forceful critique of the ES. Jones also pointed out the difficulties of using international society as the main conceptual tool for understanding the normative behaviour of states. Specifically he pointed out the problem of identifying membership of international society when it was clear that not all states follow all the rules and norms of international society at all times. And so when states violate or fail to abide by these norms, does this mean they are no longer considered members of the society? For more of his astute analysis, see Roy Jones, “The English School of international relations,” Review of International Studies 7, no. 1 (1981), pp. 1-13.

787 In Australia there has been some debate on what direction the ES should pursue, whether that is the Grotian inspired view that maintains pluralism of the sovereign states, or the cosmopolitan view commonly associated with Martin Wight. This divide has not been as entrenched as the wider solidarist versus pluralist one found to occupy the majority of contemporary ES scholars. Instead, Australian scholars have been concerned with identifying a constructivist thread in how an international society is created and maintained. For more on this see the edited volume: Alex Bellamy ed., International Society and its Critics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). A constructivist view on Australia’s moral foreign policy will be discussed later. In this chapter, I will restrict my discussion to the ES perspective identified by practitioner and scholar Gareth Evans who has featured heavily in this thesis and has described Australia’s foreign policy as a mixture of “idealist-pragmatism.” See Evans and Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, pp. 41-44.

Ibid.
material benefit for all states involved, as the alternative is an unrestrained anarchical environment where cooperation is severely limited. Gareth Evans incorporated this view into his ideas on GIC and “cooperative security,” which also argued that an increasingly interconnected world produced threats to state sovereignty that transcended national boundaries, and required a collective or multilateral response to resolve.\textsuperscript{789} Evans also argued that notions of reciprocity guided Australia’s policy of GIC, as greater interdependency motivated states to address common security threats.\textsuperscript{790}

Thus, an international societal approach does not necessarily dismiss the role of interests in motivating states to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. And in this regard, the middle-ground perspective shows some promise on the issue of morality in Australian foreign policy. If we look at Australia’s foreign aid and development policy, the Colombo Plan was a multilateral economic development program that brought together a number of nations from the North Atlantic, West and Southeast Asia, to discuss a strategy for development that was predicted to benefit both recipient and donor states. There was also a sense that Australia’s diplomacy in promoting this plan was motivated by a desire to do the “right thing” by improving the living standards of impoverished countries, while also seeking to garner some reputational payoffs in doing so. At the time of the signing of the Colombo Plan, the global aid regime was still in its infancy – and yet the Plan was consistent with liberal ideas on the promotion of human rights laid out in the recently signed and adopted (at the time) United Nations (UN) Charter, of which Australia was a founding signatory.\textsuperscript{791}

Aid policy is often associated with the promotion of universal human rights, and from an ES perspective Australia’s relatively prosperous position meant it had an obligation to assist others in need within international society. This also benefited Australia by contributing to a more secure and ordered regional environment, since the Colombo Plan was a mechanism


\textsuperscript{791} I have purposely not spent much time engaging with Australia’s relationship with the UN or Non State Actors (NSA). There are several reasons for this, but the most important is that from a moral realist perspective, it is difficult to assess the role of the UN in producing moral and material outcomes. This is because these actor’s have no independent explanatory power and are only relevant as tools used by the state to further their own interests. Therefore, they are of little value when considering the motives and outcomes of policy, and as will be discussed in more detail, this is where moral realism can better account for both the motives and the consequences of Australia’s moral behaviour.
that sought to deter the destabilizing threat of communist insurgencies. When Australia’s aid policy developed to focus on its immediate region, with the majority of its aid flowing to Indonesia and PNG, one could argue that this also reflected its desire to contribute to the order of international society.

Not only does a rules-based international society underpins the explanatory power of the ES, but it can also potentially be applied to understand Australia’s role in humanitarian operations, as well as its security partnership with the US. In the case of Cambodia and Timor Leste, it could be claimed that Australia’s response reflected a moral obligation to uphold the principles of the normative order by reinforcing the right of sovereign independence. ES perspectives have also stated that Australia’s intervention in these two cases was justified according to international law, which allows for the use of force when international peace and security is being threatened.\(^{792}\) In this regard, Australia was motivated by both necessity and morality, as keeping order was beneficial to its national interest and to international society as a whole. And while a coherent ES view of the Australian-US security partnership is more difficult to discern (since scholars within the School writing on Australian foreign policy, like Timothy Dunne and Andrew Linklater, have tended to overlook this policy arena),\(^{793}\) one can nonetheless sketch its outline. In this case, an ES perspective would likely argue that the US-Australian security partnership was an example of security cooperation primarily in pursuit of maintaining international order. The assumption here is that both states recognize – and accept – their moral duty in achieving this aim.

From the above description, a combination of humanitarianism and self-interest informed Australia’s decision-making. This seems on the surface to strengthen the ES characterization of “idealist pragmatism” when referring to the inclusion of morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices. But, in stating this, ES perspectives typically fall short in identifying whether

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\(^{793}\) Dunne and Andrew Linklater generally restrict their scholarship on Australia to explaining its role as a good international citizen and how its policy reflects adherence to the rules and norms of international society. See Andrew Linklater, “What is a good international citizen?” in Paul Keale ed *Ethics and Foreign Policy* (St Leonards: Allen, 1992), pp. 60-92; Wheeler and Dunne, “Good international citizenship: A third way for British foreign policy,” *International Affairs* 74, no. 4 (1998), pp. 847-870; Dunne and Jess Gifkins, “Libya and the state of intervention,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 65, no. 5 (2011), pp. 515-529. The lack of ES scholarship on the Australian-US security partnership is reflective of the general lack of interest by ES scholars on strategic alliances. As I have mentioned elsewhere, ES scholars have prioritized multilateral relationships between states as these are viewed as inherently more cooperative and thus more likely to uphold the shared norms of international society.
it was self-interest or moral obligation that really motivated Australia’s actions in upholding the norms of international society. The inability to make this judgement stems from the tendency of the ES to treat the pursuit of international order as an end in itself, and therefore as a separate interest, rather than one that is pursued as part of a state’s broader strategic, economic and diplomatic goals. As a result, the ES conflates morality with states’ material interests. This is because whether or not a state is acting morally is evaluated on the basis of whether it follows the norms of international society, and not on whether it led to any moral and material results. This conceptual and methodological difference is also what separates a moral realist view of reciprocity from an ES one. Moral realism understands morality to be part of a state’s material expectations of reciprocity; while the ES sees this as a separate testable variable that is linked to greater interdependency and a state’s pursuit of absolute gains. In this regard, the ES also disregards the important causal role played by state interests, which determines why, and in what context, states do choose to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices.

Given these problems with ES explanations about morality in Australian foreign policy, it is worth turning to evaluate how constructivist scholarship has treated the issue. There are, in fact, a number of similarities between the ES and constructivism. Perhaps the most prominent is an analytical focus on norms as factors that directly shape policy. The key difference, though, is in constructivism’s insistence on the mutual constitution of norms and interests in the construction of Australia’s identity, which then affects its foreign policy choices. Therefore, constructivists argue that evidence of morality in Australia’s decision-making can be attributed to the process of social intersubjectivity. And in making a case for these socialization processes constructivism also has the potential to account for the role of morality in Australian foreign policy choices.

*Constructivism: Mutual constitution in Australia’s foreign policy?*

Australian IR and foreign policy scholarship witnessed an explosion of interest in constructivism during the mid-1990s and early 2000s. Scholars such as Reus-Smit, Anthony Burke and Alex Bellamy have been major contributors towards a constructivist turn that placed norms and identity politics at the centre of many academic understandings of
Australia’s foreign policy. For them, Australia emerged from the end of the Cold War uncertain of where it “fit” in the post-bipolar international environment. It was no longer acceptable for Australian decision makers to construct policy on the assumption of a constant state of anarchy. Likewise, it was also no longer accurate for Australia to conduct its foreign relations exclusively through the prism of fixed material interests. Instead, they argued that much of Australia’s foreign policy could be explained by its constructed identity as a developed, western nation in a culturally and politically diverse region of developing states.

This identity could notionally explain a number of policy choices. Burke, in particular, has argued that Australia’s identity has contributed to its view of security. According to his view, Australia is an anxious country that has constructed its security through an historical fear of invasion, which has prompted a heightened sense of insecurity, not to mention past antagonistic relations with surrounding Asia-Pacific nations. To overcome this, Australia has needed to adopt a more inclusive and cosmopolitan national identity to accommodate differences in culture and religion. This would then lead to a change in how Australia traditionally identified with regional partners, and result in more cooperative and productive relationships. Constructivists therefore argue that Australia’s policy of regional engagement, as part of the Hawke-Keating governments’ foreign policies, was reflective of a change in how Australia perceived of its identity.

Norms and identity are the key causative forces in constructivism that can potentially explain the inclusion of morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices across the three different policy arenas. According to constructivists, Australia’s foreign aid and development policy can be understood by referring to its history as a participant in the global aid regime, which has contributed towards its constitutive identity as a member of international society that abides by the society’s agreed norms on aid-giving. In this regard, constructivist understandings of Australian foreign aid are similar to those of the ES, and can be summarized as a developed state’s moral obligation in maintaining a liberal order.


795 Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety*, pp. 15-83
Constructivism has a little more explanatory weight when dealing with the use of force for humanitarian ends. In this context, Australia’s response to Cambodia and Timor Leste reflected the effects of norm cascades with respect to changing perceptions on the use of force and sovereignty. Indeed, Australia could be seen as a norm entrepreneur in this area. In 1980 it was one of a handful of nations that refused to recognize the ousted Khmer Rouge as the legitimate and sovereign representative of the Cambodian people. In doing so, Australia signalled that it saw sovereignty linked to the legitimacy of a specific governing authority: and for this to be restored to Cambodia, international society needed to ensure the holding of free and fair elections.

Constructivism can also potentially offer a legitimate alternative to moral realism in examining Australia’s choices within the US-Australian security partnership. For instance, Australia’s decision to align with the US could be read as a shared commitment to upholding international peace and security following the end of World War II. Identity was important in shaping Australia’s perception as the only western democratic nation in the Pacific, which had an interest in aligning with the US. These two states had a shared historical experience as former British colonies, and both had similar values dealing with individual freedoms and the rule of law. These factors might be said to have informed Australia’s decision to view the US as a friend and approach their partnership through the prism of cooperation rather than competition.

Factors relating to identity might also explain the continued viability of the security partnership with Washington in a way that speaks to the success of the alliance and creates links to the potential for moral and material outcomes flowing from it. For a number of constructivists, a common worldview between Australia and the US has produced a mutual understanding that peace and cooperation are worthwhile foreign policy goals. And this has been evident through the length of the partnership. During the Cold War, Australia and the US cooperated in areas of intelligence, technology exchange and military training for the purpose of maintaining regional stability in the face of communist threats to their shared identities. When the Cold War ended, Australia and the US were in agreement on recognizing the change in the strategic environment – to one that focused on cooperation to resolve non-conventional security threats.
From this discussion, it might appear that constructivism can explain Australia’s foreign policy choices quite well. One might even suggest that it adds more than a traditional ES understanding given that constructivism can assess how states respond to changing international realities with reference to a corresponding change in their identities. This said, what constructivism cannot do, and where it generally falls down as a tool for foreign policy analysis, is to account for Australia’s motives in choosing to act morally. This is a persistent and thorny problem, since constructivism offers few insights on why states act without turning towards the reflexivity of mutual constitution. And doing so makes it hard to discern whether, for example, it was an interest that motivated Australia to respond in Cambodia and Timor Leste, or its acceptance of international norms.

Similarly, when dealing with the US-Australian security partnership, even if we accept that it was shared identity that compelled Australia to form an alliance with the US, this still does nothing to resolve whether this was due to material calculations or qualitative ones relating to common values, similar regimes and shared cultural history. This inability to distinguish norms from interests also means that constructivism has trouble identifying the factors present when a state does decide to act morally, and the consequences that can occur as a result.

Critically, the shortcomings of both the ES and constructivism can be traced to how they understand morality, which has meant that they each overlook the importance of material interests as central drivers in any Australian decision to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. In comparison, a morality seen as directly connected to calculations of the national interest, and assessed on its consequences, can deliver a more accurate account. More than this, and as demonstrated in previous chapters, it can also potentially offer the ability to examine whether choices lead to moral and material outcomes through motives: an area where the ES and constructivism are both weak.

Hence, the rest of this chapter is devoted to demonstrating that moral realism provides for a superior explanatory framework in the case of Australia. This is important not only to counter claims that moral realism is falling into the same normative trap of previous contributions towards the classical realist revival, but to also counter criticism that it offers little outside of a conventional realist reading of Australian foreign policy. This is where an emphasis on evidence of moral consequentialism in classical realism identified in Chapter 1 is important.
and why a further look at whether Australia’s expectation of reciprocity in acting morally did in fact lead to moral and material outcomes is useful. I proceed using the same three themes assessed in previous chapters: expectations of reciprocity, rational choice, and moral and material outcomes.

**Strategic considerations of the “other:” Expectations of reciprocity between states**

The expectation of reciprocity central to moral realism is informed by the classical realist conception of the “other” in international politics. This theme captures the strategic and moral considerations necessary for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices by tying the motivation to act morally with rational calculations that it will lead to material benefits in return. Expectations of reciprocity can thus account for situations where a state is most likely to act morally, and moral realism would expect this to occur towards others that are strategically important, as the expected returns are likely to be greater. This means that moral realism can explain the central role of geography in Australia’s decision-making without needing to rely on empirically slippery concepts like norms and identity.

As has already been demonstrated in this thesis, geostrategic factors relating to Australia’s security and diplomacy have been important in understanding the position of morality in its aid and development policy, in its participation in humanitarian operations, and in its strategic alliances. The connection between expectations of reciprocity and geography are relatively clear. Strategically, Australia’s position as an island continent in the Asia-Pacific has meant its security concerns have been derived from threats to its land borders from the northeast and northwest. This historic sense of insecurity has been compounded by the general instability of Australia’s regional environment. The Indonesian archipelago that sits directly above Australia has been a source of tension since it gained independence in 1945. Likewise, conflicts in Indochina, Southeast Asia and the South-Pacific have in the past been a continuing cause for concern in Australia’s security and defence policy. Given this traditional level of insecurity in Australia’s strategic environment, it is likely that evidence of Australia acting morally might be found as being directed towards those states in Australia’s immediate sphere of influence, where there is an increased capacity to achieve beneficial returns. In this regard, moral motivations are to be expected alongside strategic ones, and have been present as part of Australia’s expectations of reciprocity.
Expectations of reciprocity in Australia’s foreign aid and development policy

Expectations of reciprocity are clearly visible in Australia’s foreign aid and development policy. Of course, this is the policy arena one would be most likely to find evidence of moral expectations. This in itself is also not necessarily a new claim. Hans Morgenthau made similar observations about the nature of aid when he stated:

Much of what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of… bribes… [It] preforms the function of price paid by the donor to the recipient for political services rendered or to be rendered by the latter to the former.796

As noted in Chapter 1, Lieven’s and Hulsman’s “developmental realism” is partly a call for scholars to recognise the reciprocal benefits of aid.797 But where moral realism differs is that evidence of expectations of reciprocity in this case indicates the likelihood of moral and material outcomes. Together with rational choice, these led to national interest benefits to Australia as a donor state. Before I elaborate on these claims further, it is prudent to first demonstrate where these expectations of reciprocity were found and how both geostrategic and moral calculations converged in Australia’s foreign policy decision-making.

My examination of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy showed definite indications that it has been guided by expectations of reciprocity. The Colombo Plan enacted after the end of WWII was explicitly expected to advance Australia’s broader economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific.798 The decision to focus specifically on South Asia was originally informed by colonial ties to the British Commonwealth where infrastructure and administrative processes were more compatible with Australian practice. The expected returns were thus greater than if Australia’s resources had been directed towards states that were ill-equipped to receive its assistance. This changed, however, when Australia began to

798 Richard Casey made this clear in a ministerial speech upon creation of the Plan. See Richard Casey, “International affairs,” Ministerial Statement, HoR, 21 June 1951. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=Colombo%20Plan%20United%20States%20Decade%3A%221950s%22%20Year%3A%221951%22;rec=5;resCount=Default (accessed 10 January 2014).
develop its own bilateral aid program. Here, Australia decided to direct its aid towards states that were important to achieving its security and defence objectives: namely, PNG and Indonesia.

PNG’s location directly affects Australia’s sea line of defence to the Pacific, and combined with Australia’s colonial history to it, made PNG an obvious destination for Australia to extract beneficial returns from its aid policy. But PNG is also interesting in that after nearly 40 years of being one of Australia’s primary recipients of aid, there has been little to indicate that Australia’s efforts have led to much improvement in its overall development. In fact, in some areas, like health, there is evidence of a marked decline in development standards as tuberculosis (TB) and HIV infection rates have increased. Yet despite this, Australia’s aid to PNG has increased at a steady rate since 1975, and by 2014 was over half a billion dollars, making it the largest recipient of Australian aid. This prompts the question: why has Australia continued to provide aid to PNG if it was not achieving any real moral or material benefits? The answer can be found in the weight Australia has placed on the moral dimension involved in its aid delivery. In the case of PNG (and its aid policy more generally), the moral expectations linked to considerations of the other were not the primary motivating force. Instead, it was the material expectations linked to PNG’s geographic position, which was high enough to outweigh the costs of Australia continuing its aid.

Similarly, Indonesia’s location as an archipelago sitting directly to the north of Australia, coupled to its domestic instability, has made it an attractive aid recipient. Australia’s aid approach to Indonesia has been informed by a combination of mistrust and insecurity, and a concomitant desire to develop friendly and cooperative relations. These dual (perhaps even countervailing) concerns have contributed towards the view that Indonesia falls within the “arc of instability”, with multiple problematic security implications for Australia. These have included potential spillover from state weakness, drug and weapons trafficking, TOC, money laundering, people smuggling and transnational terrorism. These security concerns

mean that Indonesia has been a key aid priority for Australia. Indeed, it has been the recipient of Australia’s single largest aid program: the Australian Indonesian Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD), given in response to the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. As a result, the size of Australia’s aid program to Indonesia, coupled to its strategic importance make it a good example to illustrate both the moral and material motivations present in expectations of reciprocity over foreign aid and development policy.

So far I have emphasized strategic expectations, but this does not imply that a moral dimension has been completely absent. Indeed, moral considerations as part of the expectation of reciprocity have been significant, and related to Australia’s commitment to reduce poverty and increase standards of living – motivations often associated with the delivery of aid. As mentioned previously, Australia has already shown evidence of such behaviour. Previous studies by Rukmani Gounder and Kunal Sen have identified the presence of Recipient Need (RN) and Donor Interest (DI) in the construction of Australia’s aid policy. But there have not yet been any investigations into what these interests were, and to what extent the needs of the recipient have played a part in Australian calculations. In the case of Indonesia, quite apart from strategic and economic interests, the giving of aid was also a way for Australia to achieve humanitarian objectives revolving around poverty reduction and assisting in creating an upward trajectory on other development indicators. In 2013, more than 32 million Indonesians were found to live below the poverty line and the nation ranked 121 out of 187 on the Human Development Index (HDI). Giving generously to Indonesia has had the twin expectation of achieving Australia’s national interests, and also allowing it to achieve its intended development outcomes for Indonesia.

Expectations of reciprocity have also guided what type of aid Australia has delivered. The bulk of Australia’s aid efforts have been directed toward areas of development where both Australia and the recipient state could benefit. During the Colombo Plan Australia’s aid was tied to education, technical cooperation, agriculture and the construction of infrastructure, as

these were areas where Australia identified a material advantage for supporting. This was particularly the case in relation to education and technical cooperation. Alongside the strategic expectations, the Colombo Plan was a mechanism by which Australia could develop diplomatic relations in a region where it was perceived as a colonial outlier. This was exercised through the most successful part of the Colombo Plan: the student scholarship and exchange program. It allowed students from participating Colombo Plan countries to study on government-funded scholarships, which were supplied at limited expense to Australia, with expected returns in greater people-to-people links that also went some way towards ameliorating the negative reputation of the White Australia Policy.

In this way, Australia’s preference for education was not limited to material motivations: indeed, it was also consistent with the overall view that the best way to target poverty was to implement programs of social and economic development. These expectations determined other key development areas, like agriculture assistance and food security where Australia has had an advantage through its role as a primary producer with similar climate conditions to its aid recipients. And this has also led to material payoffs in opening commercial and business opportunities. Of course, there was some deviation from these expectations, such as the focus on good governance during the Howard years. But here again, this was guided by an expectation of reciprocal benefits, as the policy change was complementary to the government’s approach towards nation building and counter-terrorism.

This view of development has had implications for how Australia delivers its aid, which has been heavily typified by grants. Grant aid allows a recipient nation the freedom to chart its own development course, while at the same time increasing the prestige returns for Australia in being seen as a generous donor. As well as identifying a preference for grant aid, my

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809 Australia’s preference for grant aid was identified in the Colombo Plan and continued as part of its bilateral foreign aid and development policy. See NAA, A1838 708/13/4. “Colombo Plan for cooperative economic
analysis of expectations of reciprocity indicates that Australia has preferred to conduct its aid policy bilaterally. This is because bilateral links allow for greater flexibility in developing closer diplomatic relationships, which reinforces Australia’s ability to reap maximum prestige gains.\textsuperscript{810}

In sum, an analysis of expectations of reciprocity demonstrates that strategic factors have the primary determinants of its aid policy. These have guided Australia’s aid towards states in the Asia-Pacific for the overriding reason that it has increased the expected material returns. But moral considerations have also been present, chiefly in the expectation that the giving of aid increases the economic and social development of the recipient state. When viewed in combination, this shows how moral and material factors converged to shape what type of foreign aid Australia has preferred, and where it was likely to be delivered.

Expectations of reciprocity in Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations: Cambodia and Timor Leste

Expectations of reciprocity can also be seen guiding Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations. And here again, strategic factors tied to the security of the Asia-Pacific have also meant that its response to humanitarian crises has been localized to this specific geographical area, with the exception of the need to participate in assistance missions as a result of post-conflict requirements stemming from US choices (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan). Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations has been part of its broader strategic agenda (rather than separate to it), and has thus been dictated primarily by strategic factors. This was certainly clear when examining Australian responses to the conflicts in Cambodia and Timor Leste, where national interest expectations motivated Australia to use force for humanitarian purposes.

The best evidence to support this can be found in the recognition that Australia has had to re-focus its strategic priorities on the defence of its territory and maritime approaches. In a potentially unstable regional environment, this has meant that Australia has needed to be focused on increasing the ability of its defence force to respond to mainland threats, but that

\textsuperscript{810} The benefits of bilateralism in foreign aid and development were highlighted in the mid-60s where despite the increase of states turning towards the use of multilateral aid institutions, Australia still focused on bilateral aid delivery. NAA, A1838 2021/2/2, “Aid estimates 1966-67,” Colombo Plan - Economic development aid - Estimates and program schedules, 13 March 1967.
it has also found it necessary to seek to develop defence relationships with other nations in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As the 1987 Dibb Report noted, Australia’s ability to achieve this was limited given the low number of direct threats to its national security.\footnote{DoD, \textit{The Defence of Australia} 1987 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987).} Thus, participation in peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations has been one of the most appropriate ways for Australia to contribute to the security of its regional environment, as well as to advance its interests in defence and trade cooperation. These policy goals were reiterated in the 1991 and 1993 Strategic Reviews and were clearly associated with material expectations of reciprocity that informed Australia’s response towards Cambodia between 1988-1994.\footnote{These reviews can be found at DoD, “Force structure review 1991.” Available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/ForceStructureReview1991_opt.pdf (accessed 28 April 2014) and DoD, “Strategic review 1993.” Available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/SE/publications/stratreview/1993/1993_Part2.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014).}

The conflict in Cambodia was one that involved multiple domestic, regional and international players, which contributed to the instability of wider Indochina. But there were also moral expectations that reinforce a moral realist claim that expectations of reciprocity can lead to both moral and material outcomes. These were linked to the diplomatic and operational efforts of Australia in pushing for a resolution to the conflict. Australia expected that – in presenting a peace proposal – it would lead to an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia and allow the UN to conduct relatively free and fair elections, which occurred in May 1993.\footnote{Empirical results of the election, as well as analysis can be found in Amitav Acharya, “Cambodia, the United Nations and the problems of peace,” \textit{The Pacific Review} 7, no. 3 (1994), pp. 297-308.} In this regard, moral expectations existed alongside the strategic ones, and both were part of Australia’s decision to expend diplomatic and military resources on resolving the Cambodian crisis.

The expectation of reciprocity guiding Australia’s response toward Timor Leste was much greater, linked to the increased threat a long-term conflict between the Timorese militia and the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) posed to Australia’s interests. The conflict in Cambodia had taken place on the outer ring of Australia’s direct sphere of influence, but was still important enough to its strategy of regional security that it had a strong interest in responding. Cambodia also represented an instance where the costs were relatively low if Australia’s efforts were unsuccessful. In Timor Leste the potential costs were much higher,
and as Chapter 3 demonstrated, these corresponded to the increased expectations of reciprocity motivating Australia’s decision to respond.

Timor is strategically close to Australia and is part of the arc of instability. This meant that security spillover from a prolonged conflict represented significant threats to Australia’s northern approaches. These were articulated in the 1997 White Paper that identified failing and weak states as major security issues shaping Australia’s regional security and defence policies. Alongside the strategic expectations was also the effect a continuation of the Timor issue would have on Australia’s diplomatic relationship with Indonesia, which for some time has been the most important of Australia’s bilateral relationships outside of the US-Australian tie. Chapter 3 also demonstrated that moral considerations were present in Australia’s diplomacy in pushing for a resolution to the Timor issue, and once Indonesian consent was obtained, allowed for UN-hosted elections and the restoration of law and order. These moral and material considerations were expected to yield significant results, and as will be shown in more detail below, could be found both in the immediate prestige benefits gained from leading the operation, as well as in the re-negotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty heavily in Australia’s favour.

Evidence from both Cambodia and Timor Leste also indicates that Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations has been motivated by an expectation of reciprocity, and not by factors of international society and identity, as commonly claimed in alternative readings by normative scholars. These expectations were informed by both material and moral factors and were consistent with the evidence from my analysis of Australia’s foreign and development policy. Strategic expectations linked to Australia’s geographical position motivated its decision to intervene, indicating that Australia’s willingness to use force for humanitarian purposes increased when the conflicts were in its direct sphere of influence.

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815 Alexander Downer alluded to these moral and material factors in an interview in 2011. Interview with Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Sydney 2011.
**Expectations of reciprocity in the US-Australian security partnership**

It was expected that strategic factors would be present in the US-Australian security partnership. Indeed, the strategic importance of security cooperation has been a central research area for realist scholarship.\(^\text{817}\) What has been less commonly discussed is the presence of moral factors in security cooperation, which is where moral realism holds some promise concerning whether moral and material factors have been present in Australia’s strategic politics. Chapter 4 showed that this was in fact the case, although the moral dimension was less significant than in the other two policy arenas. This is not a wholly surprising result given that national interest goals are much higher when dealing with strategic alliances. This also means that the costs involved are much greater, and thus states are less likely to consider moral factors as part of their rational calculations. And in the US-Australian partnership the asymmetrical structure of the alliance has also reduced the scope for Australia to act morally.

In spite of this, the expectations of reciprocity found to motivate Australia in the previous policy arenas were also discernible in its security partnership with the US. Australia’s expectations in aligning with the US has been informed by a calculation that it would assist in achieving regional stability and act as a security buffer in the event of threats to Australia and its strategic interests.\(^\text{818}\) These strategic expectations have underpinned Australia’s willingness to militarily participate in US-led coalitions. In return, Australia has received material benefits, particularly in gaining access to information on US military strategy, intelligence, and hardware. Australia’s commitment to the partnership has also been a way for it to have a role in shaping regional and international affairs above its middle power status, as can be seen via Australia obtaining a seat at the table in NATO discussions as a dialogue partner, and in participation in various trilateral military exercises with China and Indonesia.\(^\text{819}\)

These strategic expectations have been specific to Australia achieving its regional and national security objectives, but included in this has also been the moral expectation that aligning with the US would lead to benefits for other states in the Asia-Pacific. This is

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819 Greater engagement with NATO was identified as a priority for Australia in 1952. See NAA, A5461 I/4/2/A “ANZUS council – first meeting,” Savingram DEA, Australian Embassy Washington, 16 July 1952.
apparent in the efforts Australia has placed on keeping the US engaged in the Pacific as the best guarantor of regional security. This was first identified in former Prime Minister John Curtin’s “Look to America” speech, which signalled Australia’s shift from aligning with the UK, to aligning with the US.\textsuperscript{820} A concern for regional security was also identified in the ANZUS Treaty, in which both the US and Australia emphasised that the agreement included a commitment to “strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area.”\textsuperscript{821} As will be explained below, this decision led to specific moral outcomes in mutual efforts to strengthen the sovereign integrity and independence of regional states, particularly during the Cold War. In this regard, the morality involved in considering the interests of the other was not as important in constructing Australia’s expectations of the partnership, however they were still present in how Australia determined the purpose of the alliance – that is, to ensure Pacific security.

\textbf{Choosing morality: Rational choice in the calculation of foreign policy decisions}

I have demonstrated that Australia’s foreign policy has been guided by expectations of reciprocity given that its consideration of the other has been tied to whether it had a reasonable expectation of receiving material benefits in return. But while expectations of reciprocity explain the motives of Australia in choosing to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices, they cannot alone account for why states will chose to act morally in one instance, and then decide not to in another. This is where rational choice is important as it distinguishes moral realism from other approaches that see morality in normative terms – as a factor that describes how states ought to develop their foreign policy.

Timing and context are central to how moral realism sees rational choice. Since it is grounded in the principles of classical realism and is a tool for understanding the position of morality in state foreign policy choices, it must be able to account for the factors involved when states do decided to include morality in the process of rational decision-making. In this

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regard, rational choice is closely linked to expectations of reciprocity, as when states include these expectations, they are also making a rational calculation to do so.

*Rational choice and Australia’s foreign aid and development policy*

Rational calculations of the national interest can account for how expectations of reciprocity are determined by a simple cost-benefit analysis of where these expectations lie, which also means that rational choice can explain shifts in Australia’s foreign aid and development policy as the factors influencing this calculation change. It has generally been the case that Australia has localized its aid delivery to specific states in Southeast Asia and the Pacific as outlined under the expectations of reciprocity, which is supported by the process of rational choice in calculating Australia’s foreign policy decisions. Strategically, providing aid to Southeast Asia and the Pacific has allowed for a greater return when calculating what was best for Australia’s national interest.

Yet, there are some instances where Australia has appeared to deviate from this process, by increasing its aid to the Middle East and Africa, for instance. On the surface, this may appear as though Australia has altered how it calculated the delivery of its aid by placing the national interest behind a concern for addressing absolute poverty, as HDI for target states in Africa and the Middle East have been significantly lower than those in the Asia-Pacific.\(^\text{822}\) However, the closer examination of the factors involved in making these decisions in Chapter 2 uncovered that Australia has still been determining its foreign aid policy via rational calculations of the national interest. Therefore this policy change can more accurately be analysed by looking at timing and context.

This was apparent in respect to my examination of Australia’s sharp increase of aid to Africa between 2008 and 2013. During these five years Australia quadrupled the amount of aid to Africa, from $100 million to $436.348 million, which came to represent around 9% of the overall aid budget.\(^\text{823}\) But this policy change occurred within the context of the discovery of

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significant mining opportunities for Australia across the Eastern side of the African continent. An expectation that Australia would receive economic returns from its aid to Africa is also consistent with evidence that Australia preferred to deliver its aid through mining-related development programs, such as the Australian M4D initiative, which focused on technical assistance and training in mining for local populations. The implementation of these development programs corresponded with a significant increase in the presence of Australian resource companies eager to capitalize on Africa’s mineral wealth. Over 200 Australian companies were estimated to be operating across 42 African states by the end of 2013, which amounted to $62 billion worth of investment.

Alongside the economic expectations, it was also the case that Australia’s aid agenda in Africa was influenced by the timing of its desire to gain a seat at the UN Security Council as a rotating non-permanent member. This informed Australia’s expectation that boosting aid to Africa would lead to certain national interests benefits and this observation is reinforced by the decline in aid following the end of Australia’s five-year term on the UNSC. Thus, the same expectations of reciprocity found to traditionally motivate Australia’s foreign aid and development policy were also consistent with Australia’s foreign aid policy towards Africa. Instead of being strategically informed, these motivations were economic and political.

Similar evidence of the role of rational choice can be found in Australia’s increase of aid to Iraq and Afghanistan. This decision was determined by a re-calculation of the strategic priorities in its aid policy in the wake of Australia’s participation in the War on Terror (WoT). Prior to this, Australia’s aid to the Middle East had been less than it had given to Africa. In fact, apart from a small donation to Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, and a minor one to Iraq after the first Gulf War, Australia’s aid to both states had been non-

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Unsurprisingly, this suddenly changed following its decision to commit military forces to the conflicts with both nations.

In Afghanistan, Australia’s aid footprint became quite significant, to the point where by 2012 it was the fourth highest recipient of Australian aid. This sharp increase was due to the context of the global WoT and Australia’s military participation as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Australia’s commitment towards this international coalition was relatively modest, and a large aid presence was timed to increase the perception of Australia’s influence in resolving the overall conflict. Such an observation is further supported by the fact that the bulk of Australia’s aid has been directed towards Uruzgan province, where Australia had its largest military presence.

The same rational calculations were behind Australia’s aid commitment to Iraq, which saw a dramatic increase in aid funding, going from no aid between 1997 and 2003, to a lump sum of $100 million at the start of the Iraq War. This then increased again to $358 million in 2008. As with Afghanistan, Australia’s aid was timed to coincide with its military commitment, except in this case aid was used to supplement Australia’s limited capacity to engage in long-term peacekeeping efforts. This indicates that Australia’s shift in aid to Afghanistan and Iraq was rationally contingent – an observation that is further supported by the decline in aid following the ADF’s withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014 respectively.

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827 Before 2001, a small $20m relief and aid package was delivered to Afghanistan in 1989 and an additional $4m was provided in 1993. See Gareth Evans, “Questions without notice: Afghanistan aid,” Senate, 5 May 1989, p. 1921. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Questions%20Without%20Notice%3A%20Afghanistan%20Aid%20Decade%3A%221980s%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed February 2014) and Evans, “Australian wheat in $4m aid package for Afghanistan,” Media Release, 20 December 1993. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=“Australian%20Wheat%20in%20$4m%20aid%20package%20for%20Afghanistan.”;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 2 February 2014).


829 Before 2003, Australia gave a token $11,000 to Iraq in 1978 and $2.74m in 1991. “Questions without notice: Middle East Kurdish refugees,” HoR, 10 July 1991. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=2;query=Iraq%20aid%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221991%22;rec=8;resCount=Default (accessed 4th February 2014).

Rational choice and Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations: Cambodia and Timor Leste

Evidence for rational choice is relatively straightforward in Australia’s decision to participate in the humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste, and this does much to counter conventional readings of Australian foreign policy that have over-estimated the moral commitment involved in its activism during instances of conflict resolution. This was particularly evident during the Cold War, where Australia’s participation in peacekeeping was relatively low-level, despite its early diplomatic leadership at the San Francisco Conference. It is important to note that in making this claim, I am not passing any moral judgment on the valuable assistance Australia provided to these some 20 peacekeeping missions. Instead I am only highlighting that its material commitment corresponded with its willingness to participate, as well as its capacity to do so at that time.

In both Cambodia and Timor Leste, a change in the external environment was central to why Australia decided to intervene. These changes opened space for Australia to recalculate the costs versus the benefits of responding, and this increased the likelihood that the expectations of reciprocity would be achieved. The appearance of timing and context is therefore significant in understanding Australia’s participation in Cambodia and Timor Leste, and here Australia’s response can be seen as abiding by the principle of rational choice. As well as challenging the extent of Australia’s commitment to humanitarianism, evidence of rational choice also reinforces the moral realist claim that action was taken primarily for instrumental reasons.

If we revisit Australia’s diplomacy towards Cambodia, before 1989 successive governments had shown little interest, apart from Hayden’s limited attempts during the early 1980s, in resolving the long-standing Indochinese conflict. This changed following the end of the Cold War, which provided the context for Australia to re-evaluate the benefits to be gained

832 Until the late 1980s, Australia had participated in less than 20 UN sponsored peacekeeping missions and had deployed only 13 military personnel. *Australia’s Role in United Nations Reform*, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, June 2001), p. 215.
from pushing for a resolution. Prior to its collapse the Soviet Union had reduced its economic
support for Vietnam, and this hastened the withdrawal of Hanoi from Cambodia. Likewise,
the political and economic reforms occurring in the Soviet Union meant it was more likely to
accept an international peace proposal, and by 1988 Chinese-Vietnamese relations were also
showing limited signs of rapprochement.

Hence by 1989 the timing was right for Australia to begin gathering support for its peace
proposal. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (DFAT) Michael Costello were heavily involved in the negotiating process
between the major parties involved in the conflict, and Australia’s DFAT was responsible for
the development of the Red Book, which laid out the details of the Cambodian peace plan.
Significant national resources were also devoted to the peacekeeping mission, and at the time
it was the largest PKO Australia had participated in. Ultimately, the amount of diplomatic
and military involvement would not have occurred without a conclusion that specific gains
relating to regional and economic security were possible as a result of Australia’s involvement.

A similar picture was evident in Australia’s involvement in Timor Leste. Debates on
Australia’s support for self-determination in Timor Leste had occupied popular and academic
discourse since the mid-1970s. Yet Australia did not take decisive action until the end of
1998. For nearly twenty-five years, successive Australian governments had accepted
Indonesia’s sovereignty over the province of Timor Leste, but in late 1998 Howard
announced that Australia would support a path of autonomy eventually leading to full
independence. Then, in February 1999, Australia led an international peacekeeping force
after violence broke out following the result on Timorese independence. The change in policy
and Australia’s lead role in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) came as a

surprise, and was seen by many as proof that Australia had come to accept changing norms on sovereignty and self-determination. However, these views do not stand up against the empirical record. The end of the Cold War provided Australia the context in which it was beneficial to campaign for peace in Cambodia, but in Timor Leste there were numerous factors that contributed to the decision, and had they not occurred, it was unlikely that Australia would have acted. The first was the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), which were devastating to the Indonesian economy. The AFC contributed towards the second factor prompting Australia’s involvement – the downfall of the Suharto regime. By the end of 1998, Indonesia’s economy had shrunk by 16.5% and food prices had increased by 80%. This incited a series of public riots that contributed to growing discontent with Suharto, whose regime was already under threat from endemic corruption and mismanagement. The downfall of Suharto in May 1998 created internal weakness, and it is not surprising that B.J Habibie was more receptive towards a ballot on independence.

After the ballot, Habibie was originally hesitant to agree to the entry of an international PKO to enforce the peace and ensure a safe democratic election. And Howard made clear that Indonesia’s consent was central to Australia’s leadership of any intervening force, and would not have taken place without it. This strengthens an argument in favour of rational choice. In the event, of course, Habibie did finally agree after the US provided the motivation by threatening to freeze a much-needed International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout worth US$70 billion, as well as severing military cooperation between the US and Indonesia.

The context was thus conducive for Australian intervention. The timing was also right, in that it had the operational readiness to carry out the peace-enforcement mission, and had acquired a regional consensus from key Southeast Asian states, as well as logistical support from the

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US, which was another crucial factor in Australia’s decision to push for a PKO. All of these factors meant that even though there was some cost in terms of Australia’s relationship with Indonesia were to be expected, this was calculated as an acceptable risk given the material outcomes in contributing to regional security and a renegotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty that were anticipated in return.

**Rational choice in the US-Australia security partnership**

Rational choice in the US-Australian security partnership helps to account for the flexibility and longevity of the relationship without having to fall back on the mutual constitution of norms and identity to explain it. It is also an important factor in demonstrating how moral realism can account for the nature of alliance relationships from the perspective of the weaker partner. As a result, moral realism might actually add to the literature on alliances in a way that goes beyond balance of power theory, as well as those perspectives put forward by Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller, which open the “black box” and incorporate the state’s perception of threats when analysing their strategic choices.842

In looking at the US-Australia security partnership, timing and context linked to rational choice was apparent from the outset of the relationship. As part of a calculated decision to “look to America,” as the state with the capacity and willingness to contribute towards Australia’s national security, Australia was not only motivated by self-interested factors dealing with Australia’s need to maintain a territorial defence against the Japanese. More to the point, aligning with the US was also the best way to ensure regional peace and security in the war’s aftermath. These twin goals have remained part of Australia’s desire to maintain (and, most recently, extend) its partnership with the US, despite times where the costs in doing so appeared to outweigh the benefits. So while a rational choice assumption can account for the longevity of the US-Australian security partnership, it also extends neoclassical realist scholarship. It does so because rational choice links with expectations of reciprocity to show that moral and material outcomes can result from Australia’s strategic alliance policies.

There have been clear calculated benefits to Australia in having ongoing communication with a great power that was central in shaping international politics during the 20th Century, and

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the infrastructure of the alliance was established to achieve this goal. The ANZUS treaty itself was purposively vague in its definition of what would trigger mutual defence as a policy option, which placed an emphasis on the ability of both parties to consult on common security interests.\textsuperscript{843} It also placed Australia in a position to bargain for various payoffs for its support of the US. A particular example of this was the elevation of Australia to “Intelligence Partner,” which allow it to gain access to US intelligence on military and counter-terrorism operations stored on SIPRNET.\textsuperscript{844}

The emphasis on diplomatic contact has been reinforced through the annual Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), which have allowed for greater flexibility in discussing mutual threats and concerns, and formed part of Australia’s original rationale to limit the number of its alliance partners.\textsuperscript{845} The ability to discuss common security threats meant that both nations were better able to consult and respond to changes in the international environment when they occurred. This was an important aspect of the alliance that also increased Australia’s ability to bargain for greater access to US technology, and military planning resources. Not only did this provide Australia with superior capabilities that it was unlikely to achieve independently, but it also provided an economic benefit in limiting the domestic cost of defence without jeopardizing Australia’s security.\textsuperscript{846}

The overall benefits outlined above indicate that Australia’s rational calculation worked in its favour. This does not mean, however, that in some instances, Australia miscalculated the cost versus benefit ratio in its commitment to the alliance and the moral and material outcomes did not occur as expected. Moral realism can account for this in a similar way to classical realism by referring to the dangers of constructing policy on ideological grounds. This was most obvious in the decision to enter the Vietnam War. As I have pointed out elsewhere, alliance loyalty was not the single motivating factor. Indeed, subsequent Cabinet documents


\textsuperscript{844} DoD, “Australia’s defence relations with the US,” Joint Standing Committee On Foreign Affairs, Defence And Trade, 26 March 2004. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=Inquiry%20onto%20Australia%20United%20States%20Defence%20Relations%20Intelligence%20Decade%3A%222000s%22%20Year%3A%222004%22;rec=0;resCount=Default (accessed 2 August 2014).

\textsuperscript{845} NAA, A1838 277/2 Part 5 “Pacific security arrangements,” Cablegram, Department of External Affairs, 13 November 1951.

\textsuperscript{846} This benefit was made clear by Kim Beazley in 1987 during debates on global disarmaments and the viability of the alliance after the withdrawal of New Zealand. See Kim Beazly, “Defence statement,” HoR, no. 144, 19 September 1985, p. 1093.
from the Menzies government demonstrate that Australia sought the help of the US to pressure South Vietnam to invite Australia into the war.\footnote{See NAA, A4940 C3811 “Foreign affairs and defence committee,” 7 April 1965 and NAA, A4940/1 C4643 Part 2 “Australian military aid to South Vietnam,” 7 April 1965.} The point here is that it was also Australian priorities driving the bargaining in the partnership, which demonstrates that Australia’s involvement in Vietnam is not so easily explained by simple references to alliance dependence.

Australia did take the view that its participation in Vietnam would strengthen its commitment to the alliance and in turn would increase the importance of Australia as a reliable ally.\footnote{This observation has also been made by Llyod Cox and Brendan O’Connor. See “Australia, the US, and the Vietnam War: ‘hound dog,’ not ‘Lapdog,’” \textit{Australian Journal of Political Science}, 47, no. 2 (2012), p. 173.} However, this decision was informed by Australia’s perception of the threat of communism, and its forward defence strategy that involved stopping foreign threats before they reach the mainland.\footnote{Robert Menzies outlined this rationale in his ministerial statement on Vietnam in 1965. Robert Menzies, “Vietnam – ministerial statement,” HoR, no.17, 29 April 1965, pp. 1060-1061.} Australian decision-makers generally understood communism to be a monolithic ideology emanating from the Soviet Union, which, left unchecked, had the potential to spread across Indochina and eventually affect Australia’s national security. Joining the fight against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was a way for Australia to exercise its policy of forward defence while also doing some good by assisting in the defence of South Vietnam.

There were several policy miscalculations resulting from Australia’s decision to participate in the Vietnam War. Australia failed to fully recognize the territorial ambitions of the DRV and the greater geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asian politics, which indicated that the adoption of communist governments was not so inevitable.\footnote{Australian war historian Peter Edwards has made similar statements on the misreading of communism in Southeast Asia by Robert Menzies. For more see Peter Edwards, \textit{The Essential History: Australia and the Vietnam War} (Sydney: NewsSouth, 2014), pp. 116-125.} It also misjudged the capacity of the US military, in terms of Menzies’ unswerving faith that overwhelming force would win the war. In this regard, moral realism can indeed account for when rational calculations are not carried out with clear national interests in mind. Yet it can also go further in linking this to unexpected outcomes. In the case of Vietnam, self-determination for the Vietnamese was not forthcoming, and nor did Australia benefit much considering the costs involved in its nearly decade-long commitment to the war. This reinforces the moral realist claim that moral and material calculations based on ideological descriptors are rarely good predictors of foreign policy outcomes.
The material benefits of choosing to include morality as a part of foreign policy choice:

Moral and material outcomes of foreign policy

Moral realism also argues that expectations of reciprocity and rational choice can lead to both moral and material outcomes. In other words, states can actually *benefit materially* from choosing to include morality as part of rational decision-making. The inclusion of moral and material outcomes is therefore significant as this theme defends moral realism from criticisms that it is still treating morality normatively, and as a factor that can determine state behaviour across time and space. Specifically, evidence of moral and material outcomes connects the motives incorporated in the expectations of reciprocity with policy outcomes, making moral realism a tool for understanding foreign policy choices, rather than one that prescribes how states ought to act.

A look at whether these policy choices have led to both moral and material outcomes is also important as it shows how this thesis presents moral realism as an extension of classical realism. This is the crux of where I seek to make an original contribution to the current literature on how the classical realists understood morality in international politics. The classical realists under examination did not explicitly refer to moral and material outcomes, but this does not mean that they were indifferent to the consequences of states acting morally. Indeed, as I noted in Chapter 1, one can detect support for a consequentialist ethic amongst classical realist scholarship, which was viewed by Morgenthau et al as the best guide for identifying morality in state foreign policy choices.

For Morgenthau, this was tied to considerations of what are the likely consequences flowing from a rational calculation of the interests involved in acting morally.\(^{551}\) Niebuhr was less straightforward in his views on consequentialism, and it was often evident that he was torn between his desire to present a Christian ethic based on principles of faith and reason, and his concern for the practical constraints produced by an imperfect human nature that a deontological morality finds difficult to overcome.\(^{552}\) Nevertheless he was fairly clear in his concern for the ability to assess the likely consequences of including morality as part of

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552 For more on this see Mark Hass, “Reinhold Niebuhr’s “Christian pragmatism”: A principled alternative to consequentialism,” *The Review of Politics* 61, no. 4 (1999), pp. 605-635.
rational decision-making. Kennan held similar views to Morgenthau and tied his discussion of morality to the concept of prudence. He argued that political leaders must weigh the trade-offs of certain policy choices guided by a determination of the national interest. Leaders must do this because there is no universal moral standard that can be applied to the myriad circumstances states are presented with when making policy decisions. Therefore, the appearance of morality in state foreign policy must be assessed according to the consequences these policy choices are likely to produce.

The above neatly lays out the validity of including moral and material outcomes as it incorporates the classical realist concern for the effects of rational policy, while also representing a revision of classical realism in that it can account for evidence of where states have sought to gain material benefits by choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. Here it is necessary to clarify that this policy arena must be analysed with relevant consideration awarded to both parts. It is not enough to simply demonstrate where there have been national interest benefits: a moral realist approach must also show whether there were any moral outcomes flowing from the motives identified under the expectations of reciprocity. In doing so, moral and material outcomes represent the next logical step in the moral realist framework. Once this analysis is completed I will have provided enough evidence to successfully address the primary thesis research question: is moral realism an appropriate analytical tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices?

The moral and material outcomes of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy

It has already been shown that Australia’s foreign aid and development policy has been primarily guided by strategic considerations as part of an expectation of reciprocity. Alongside these strategic motivations there is also evidence of a concern for the effect Australia’s policy choices have had on the interests of other states. These expectations dictated that Australia direct the majority of its aid to states within its own region, as the expected returns were greater. When Australia deviated from this expectation, which was evident in its increased aid commitments to parts of Africa and the Middle East, this was also guided by material expectations linked to new investment opportunities and Australia’s military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. These changes were explained by referring to

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rational choice, which demonstrated that the giving of aid was contingent on calculations of the national interest and not on absolute moral obligations. These two factors illuminate the purpose of Australia’s aid, and which states are most likely to benefit from it. Yet it does not show whether Australia’s aid achieved any real moral and material outcomes.

I now assess this claim, starting with evidence of moral outcomes. It was expected that Australia’s aid would generate significant moral outcomes and these were found in assisting the development of the recipient state. As previously mentioned, it is important to note that a moral realist view of aid is not arguing that the giving of aid on its own can pull developing countries out of poverty. Nor does it argue that a focus on a particular type of development area, such as education, will solve the problem of school availability, lack of trained teachers or access to proper learning materials. It is merely stating that aid can produce some positive outcomes in building a school where previously there was none, or by providing curriculum support where previously this was based on fundamentalist religious doctrine. These outcomes are relative to the aid provided by Australia and reinforce the assumption of moral realism that the giving of aid is not an absolute moral foreign policy goal. Indeed, the material outcomes are arguably much greater, which follows the strategic motivations of aid that formed the expectations of reciprocity guiding Australia’s foreign aid and development policy.

Aid to Indonesia, for example, has produced quite substantial outcomes. This was especially so in the outcomes flowing from Australia’s education program, which was the largest sector of funding to Indonesia. The Australian Indonesian Building Education Partnership (AIBEP) was part of Australia’s counter-terrorism strategies and was implemented as a way to combat the spread of fundamentalist Islam. The AIBEP is a good example to demonstrate the moral and material outcomes that flowed from Australia’s expectations of its aid policy as it demonstrated clear strategic and moral considerations. The program was directed towards Eastern Indonesia as this included the Islands and provinces closest to Australia and where it

saw economic opportunities in resource partnerships. That said, these provinces also ranked the lowest on the HDI.\textsuperscript{856}

The AIBEP directly assisted in the creation of over 330,000 school places and in the building of over 2,074 schools.\textsuperscript{857} In keeping with Australia’s preference for student exchange, this program also included the awarding of scholarships, which had a material advantage in stimulating trade. Over half of Australia’s trade in service exports to Indonesia was in international student education. In fact, overall, the international student market was worth over $18 billion by the end of 2014, making education Australia’s third largest export sector.\textsuperscript{858}

This economic advantage was also consistent in other areas of Australia’s aid program. A less obvious but important example was in agriculture development and particularly the Australian Centre for International Agriculture Research (ACIAR), which engaged with Southeast Asian states to assist in improving production difficulties in livestock, aquaculture, fisheries and horticulture.\textsuperscript{859} This program followed the successful delivery framework of the Colombo Plan in that the bulk of the projects were delivered in the recipient states and utilized Australia’s expertise in agribusiness and agricultural science. Quite apart from the moral outcomes, this has also led to significant economic gains for Australia. Wheat is by far Australia’s largest agricultural export, and the majority of ACIAR’s work has been done in improving wheat production. A report on a sample of 48 of 600 bilateral projects administered by the ACIAR calculated the financial return to be estimated at around $2.5 billion, with the potential to be much greater if the remaining 452 projects are included.\textsuperscript{860}

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From this there have certainly been reputational pay-offs for Australia in being seen to act as a GIC, and diplomatic ties between Australia and its aid partners have been strengthened as a result. But while these were part of the benefits, they were not the most significant. As detailed above, the most significant benefit was commercial. This is not an unusual finding as aid is often viewed as part of a donors state’s larger trade objectives. From a moral realist perspective, what is different is that this material outcome does not detract from the moral ones. On the contrary, it was through choosing to act morally that Australia was able to make subsequent material gains from its foreign aid and development policy.

The moral and material outcomes of Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations: Cambodia and Timor Leste

The presence of both moral and material outcomes as a result of humanitarian operations is perhaps more difficult to assess than in foreign aid and development policy, as it is often the case that these policy decisions fall well short of meeting the desired expectations. This is true of the expected returns for the intervening state that can end up spending more resources on the operation than what was gained in returned, and for the recipient of the operation that can be left in a worse condition than before an intervention. If this were the case when examining Australia’s actions in Cambodia and Timor Leste, then it would be very difficult for a moral realist to make any positive evaluation about the benefits, either moral or material, of intervening. This means that investigating whether there was any moral and material outcomes is essential in order to defend moral realism from claims that it makes no greater observations than reducing the use of force to narrow self-interest calculations, or that it falls into the same trap of normative perspectives in prescribing how Australia should have acted according to universal moral standards.

As with the evidence from Australia’s foreign aid and development policy, a focus on expectations of reciprocity show that its decision to intervene was guided mainly by strategic factors. This also meant that the two major operations under review were located in Australia’s direct sphere of influence, demonstrating once again that its decision-making was influenced by a calculation of greater strategic returns. Australia’s decision also showed

evidence of rational choice in that it waited until the circumstances were ripe before it chose to act. Together, this indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely.

But before this conclusion can be made it is necessary to analyse these outcomes in more detail. To begin with, there is evidence of moral outcomes resulting from the operations in both Cambodia and Timor Leste. For consistency I commence with the operation in Cambodia. Australia’s Cambodian peace proposal was put forward as a way to break the long-standing roadblock in international negotiations over the conflict. Previous attempts at reaching a resolution had been unsuccessful, and Australia’s proposal laid the groundwork for an international peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, which Australia was subsequently a leading participant. Thus, the moral outcomes in this instance were two-fold. The first was a peace plan that was agreeable to all four main parties, particularly the Chinese who had been resistant to any plan that opened them to criticism of their support for the Khmer Rouge. The second was the peacekeeping mission itself.

The United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had two functions that led to moral outcomes. It was the first UN mission that adopted an administrative role, taking responsibility for governing the country until elections could be held. The second UN mission adopted a traditional peacekeeping role that included various goals relating to maintaining law and order, as well as adopting transitional authority of Cambodia. Some of the more important functions of UNTAC were the monitoring of the ceasefire; demobilization and disarmament of warring parties; the supervision of withdrawal of foreign forces; de-mining and military training in de-mining; and the rehabilitation and repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

These aspects of the operation met with varying levels of success, but before I elaborate further it is important to briefly state that it is not the intention of this thesis to engage in

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863 Foreign Minister Gareth Evans stated in an interview that the proposal for a Supreme National Council (SNC) created the conditions for China to accept an international agreement on Cambodia. Interview with former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Melbourne 2010.
debates on the extent to which the operation fulfilled its goal: it is only to demonstrate that Australia’s diplomacy in pushing for a resolution, and its leadership of UNTAC, did achieve some moral benefit. The operation managed to take custody of over 50,000 weapons and cantoned over 52,000 troops amongst the participating groups.866

The Khmer Rouge was not part of the cooperating parties as outlined in Phase II of the operation, and this led to significant concern over whether UNTAC could ensure peace and security during the holding of elections.867 But despite this, the operation continued and was successful in organizing and conducting the first free and relatively fair elections in 42 years. The holding of democratic elections was regarded as the single most successful aspect of the operation with 89.6% of eligible voters registered, and representatives of 20 political parties on the ballot.868 Ensuring an ordered process of self-determination was part of the expectations of reciprocity that guided Australia’s involvement, and this did in fact produce moral outcomes in the withdrawal of foreign forces and the holding of democratic elections.

Similarly, Australia also calculated that its participation would stabilize Indochina and resolve a long-term conflict that had led to a regional refugee problem that threatened to reach Australia’s borders. The UN operation in Cambodia was unusually effective in this area and by March 1992, 360,000 refugees along the Thai-Cambodian border had been repatriated.869 This meant that not only were there moral outcomes for Cambodia itself, there were also benefits flowing from achieving greater regional stability as a result of a resolution to the conflict. As I explained earlier, the conflict in Cambodia had an impact on three levels – the civil war, the Indochinese regional security problem and the Cold War competition between the great powers. Australia’s peace proposal was presented as a means to combat these problems. The agreement of the UNSC, as well as ASEAN, on the goals of the peace plan allowed for the removal of all foreign forces and military assistance (apart from

867 For more on the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge and UNTAC see Benny Widyono, Dancing in the Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the United Nations in Cambodia (Plymouth: Roman Littlefield Publishers, 2008)
869 Australian parliamentary delegation to Laos, Vietnam,” Senate, Report, 14 December 1993. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=Cambodia%20peace%20settlement%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20year%3A%221993%22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 27 May 2014).
869 Gareth Evans,”Assisting Cambodia,” Speech, Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and
UNTAC) from Cambodia. This was a critical component involved in the resolution to the conflict.

It is clear from the above discussion that there were significant moral outcomes found in Australia’s participation in the Cambodian peace process. I will now turn to the material outcomes for Australia. Here, Australia’s largest material gain from its involvement was the strengthening of ties with Vietnam. This had been a long-term policy goal for Australia and one that has been frequently overlooked in previous investigations on Australia’s role in Cambodia. This is somewhat surprising as the economic benefits were significant, and would not have eventuated without a resolution to the conflict. Australian-Vietnamese trade increased from $8 million in 1980 to $402 million in 1994 as a result of thawing of relations with Vietnam and the wider international community. This also led to flow-on benefits in increasing the size and potential of ASEAN as market for Australian investment and trade. The interference of Vietnam into Cambodia’s domestic affairs had been an obstacle to Vietnamese admission into ASEAN. Likewise, the isolation of the regime in Cambodia had affected its position in Southeast Asian and delayed its own entry into ASEAN. Australia’s participation in Cambodia was unique in that, apart from Namibia, it had previously made modest contributions to international PKOs. This changed with its active role in both the diplomatic and operational component of the Cambodian mission. Yet while this was unprecedented, it was still consistent with the traditional parameters of PKOs, particularly in the use of force for self-defence only.

Australia’s involvement in Timor Leste, in comparison, went further in that its peacekeepers were authorized to enforce peace. The moral outcomes were perhaps greater in Timor Leste and this corresponds with the increased level of expectations guiding Australia’s decision to intervene. Like Cambodia, the moral outcomes were found in the stabilization of the territory and in an ordered process of self-determination. Where this differs is in the agreement by Indonesia to allow for a referendum on independence, after it had vigorously defended its sovereign control over the territory for nearly twenty-five years. This act of self-

determination paved the way for the holding of democratic elections and the creation of Timor Leste as a sovereign state.

Here again, the moral outcomes stemming from Australia’s involvement were twofold. The first outcome was the diplomacy of John Howard and Alexander Downer in negotiating an agreement with Habibie for an independence vote. Before 1999, Indonesia had been resistant to any change in the status of Timor Leste and the Indonesian military, the TNI, had been actively participating in violence against the Timorese population and the pro-independence forces. The process also included a negotiated agreement for the Indonesians to accept an UN-mandated international force to enforce peace and security following the referendum and in the lead-up to the elections. This was another course of action Habibie was reluctant to accept, and came about largely because of Australian diplomacy in persuading the US to apply economic pressure to Jakarta.

The second moral outcome was the implementation of INTERFET and Timor Leste’s eventual transition to a sovereign and democratic state. Australia led the multinational international force that was widely successful in ensuring law and order in Timor Leste. At the time it was Australia’s largest defence deployment since Vietnam. It achieved its goals by confiscating weapons from the anti-independence militias, and by implementing information campaigns that reassured local populations about their security. As well as its military operations, INTERFET performed a number of humanitarian roles. It provided logistical support to civilian agencies and protected aid convoys. It also rebuilt roads and public utilities, which allowed greater access for humanitarian assistance in health, food relief and sanitation.


873 At an annual APEC meeting, John Howard met with President Clinton in a sideline meeting. They reached an agreement on threatening to freeze an IMF bailout to Indonesia and for the US to cut off the sale of small-arms weapons. In the same meeting, Clinton also agreed to provide logistical support to any multinational operation. See Eric Schwartz, “The intervention in East Timor,” Report for the National Intelligence Committee, December 2001. Available at: http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/schwartz.pdf (accessed 28 May 2014).

874 The ability of INTERFET to connect with local populations and its efficiency in fulfilling its mandate with a low number of causalities has been identified as factors that made the operation a success. See Taylor B. Seybolt Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 127-132.

In October 1999 the Security Council declared that INTERFET had achieved its mission and it was safe for UNTAET to take over the civil, military and administrative operations of Timor Leste. A year later, over 91% of eligible voters went to the polls again and elected 88 members to the new Constitutive Assembly that was tasked with establishing a new Constitution. In April 2002 Presidential elections were held, with pro-independence leader Xanana Gusmão elected. Timor Leste thus had a functioning legislature and executive, and on the 20th May 2002 it was declared independent – just three years after the referendum. The relative peace and security of Timor allowed for over 205,000 refugees to be repatriated and the extensive reconstruction effort, of which Australia was the largest contributor, meant that it received much needed assistance in priority state-building areas of water supply and sanitation, agriculture and rural development, health and education, and administration and governance.

Meanwhile, Australia’s gains were significant. Australia benefited greatly in choosing to consider the plight of the Timorese in their decision-making. The most immediate benefit was in international prestige as Australia was seen as a leader in maintaining regional security. This was particularly so as INTERFET was not a UN operation per se, and was instead a multinational force headed by Australia under the auspices of the UN. As a result, Australia was able to demonstrate its defence capacity to a wider international audience and gain credit for leading a successful military operation.

Australia also benefited from operational experience, which had been a key strategic expectation. The end of the Cold War meant Australia found itself in an environment of strategic uncertainty where its defence force was required to combat a multitude of diverse threats. The 1991 and 1993 Strategic Reviews had already identified a need for a change in

878 John Howard and John Moore, “East Timor,” Joint press conference with John Howard and John Moore, the Minister of Defence, Parliament House. Press Releases, 8 September 1999. Available at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=2;query=East%20Timor%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221999%22%20Month%3A%2209%22%20Day%3A%2208%22;rec=10;resCount=Default (accessed 16 May 2014).
Australia’s overseas defence preparedness, from one that focused on providing allied or coalition support, to one that was selectively skilled and could respond quickly to instances of regional insecurity. This “defence in depth” strategy was consistent with Australia’s DoA doctrine that moved the bulk of defence planning to the defence of the island continent, with the preparedness to rapidly respond to threats in Australia’s immediate strategic environment.

In Cambodia, Australia’s military commitment was substantial, but still in a supporting role with its contribution mainly in logistics and signalling. In Timor, it led the international coalition – a first for Australia – and it was in response to a humanitarian crisis that required the capabilities of an expeditionary force. The leadership of INTERFET was an opportunity for Australia to exercise the “new” ADF. As General Peter Cosgrove later commented: “The modern historical experience of the ADF took its first big step forward in Timor Leste.”

The economic benefits were tied to its ability to negotiate a more profitable deal on oil and gas distributions in the Timor Gap. As I mentioned previously, Australia has been strongly criticized for its dealings with Timor Leste over the Timor Gap Treaty, but the reality is that in gaining independence Timor was able to represent itself during negotiations, and was the sole recipient of the funds flowing from production. From this, it was able to establish its own sovereign wealth fund that as of October 2014 had generated $16.6 billion. Australia’s gain was higher than Timor Leste and this reinforces the moral realist assumption that states are primarily in pursuit of their own interests, but this does not mean that the recipient state fails to reap any benefits in return.

A more profitable deal over the Timor Gap had been a long-term policy goal for Australia that began after the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty. This agreement left Australia and Indonesia with three different “zones of cooperation” that resulted in a 50-50 split of revenue. But when

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Timor Leste gained independence in 2002, a year later the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) was entered into force that split the zone 90-10 in Timor Leste’s favour. On the surface, this appeared positive for Timor, however the majority of untapped oil and gas reserves remain outside the JPDA and in Australia’s waters. The new agreement also meant that the majority of the Greater Sunrise oilfields – the largest discovered in the Timor Sea – remained outside the JPDA and in Australia’s territory. Australia was in a better negotiating position with Timor as a new, weak and small state no longer part of the large and expansive archipelago. The replacement of Indonesia with Timor as the negotiating partner meant that Australia was able to restrict the sea boundary to the internal and external line between Timor Leste and Indonesia, rather than the median line between Timor Leste and Australia, which would have placed Sunrise in Timor’s waters. As a result, 79.9% of the field is claimed by Australia and once in full production is estimated to be worth over $40 billion.

Source: Australian Department of Geoscience

The material advantages gained by Australia in choosing to intervene in Cambodia and Timor Leste imply that Australia’s policy on the use of force in conflict resolution was primarily guided by calculations of the national interest. This conclusion was reinforced by Australia’s decision to intervene only when it was determined that it could reap the maximum benefit. This does not mean that moral considerations were absent. Indeed, they were visible in Australia’s push for a peaceful Cambodian settlement and this was partly fuelling its diplomacy in reaching an agreement amongst the various participating parties. This manifested itself in specific moral outcomes, the first of which was agreement on a peace plan that paved the way for democratic elections. Similar calculations were present in Timor Leste where moral outcomes were present in the holding of free and fair elections and the establishment of Timor as an independent and sovereign state. In this way, evidence of moral and material outcomes indicates that Australia chooses to participate in humanitarian operations when there are specific national interests involved, and when it makes this calculation, it can actually stand to gain material benefits in return.

The moral and material outcomes of the Australia-US security partnership

The moral outcomes in Australia’s security partnership are predictably less evident than in the other two policy arenas. This said; there is evidence to support a moral realist explanation of the alliance. The expectations of reciprocity outlined earlier established that both Australia and the US were mindful of contributing to regional peace and security, and this was present as part of the initial motivation for forming the alliance, alongside the strategic considerations for Australia in allying with the US as the best alliance partner to ensure its national security. These strategic considerations were of great benefit to Australia and have been part of its rational calculation in choosing to support US foreign policy at different times.

Moreover, evidence of expectations of reciprocity and rational choice indicate that moral and material outcomes are a possibility. These moral outcomes were linked to Australia’s concerns for the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Not only was this decision fuelled by Australia’s desire to ensure its own security, it was also part of a desire to ensure the independent sovereignty of other states in the surrounding region, which was then linked to Australia’s broader strategic objectives pertaining to regional stability. This moral outcome was present when the partnership was still in its informal stage during WWII, when Australia and the US were united in removing the Japanese from Southeast Asia and the west.
This went some way towards strengthening the sovereignty and integrity of the affected states. As Minister for External Affairs, Herbert Evatt remarked at the time, Australia’s fight against Japanese imperialism was about resisting their attempts “to not so much control Southeast Asia as a plan to dominate the whole of the illimitable Pacific.”

During the Cold War, Australia and the US expanded their cooperation to include intelligence and naval bases in Australia, which, apart from adding to the overall functioning of the alliance, also contributed to its deterrent capability. The stationing of Pine Gap and Northwest Cape increased the US’ ability to detect Soviet missile and naval activity in the Pacific region. And the deterrent effect of the alliance underpinned its importance to Australia’s national security and reinforced the partnership’s ability to facilitate regional stability. In identifying this as a moral outcome I am not implying that removing the threat of Soviet imperialism were factors that overrode the strategic threat to Australia’s forward defence. Instead, I am merely claiming that as a result of Australia viewing these as both threats to its own security and to the stability of the Asia-Pacific, other states stood to benefit. This was particularly so as the US-Australian partnership complemented the Northeast Asian US hub-and-spokes alliance system. This moral outcome is difficult to evaluate comprehensively, but was part of Australia’s calculations in choosing to deepen its cooperation with the US, despite criticisms that it was at risk of alliance entrapment.

Cooperation accelerated following 9/11, and in this instance the moral outcomes were much more significant. During this stage of the partnership, the moral outcomes flowed from increased cooperation between the US and Australia on counter-terrorism, which was specifically aimed at increasing security in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Specifically, Australia and the US have been strongly involved in counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and the Pacific Islands. This has also included joint task

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885 This observation has also been made by Glen Barclay, see, for instance, Glen Barclay St. J., “Australia looks to America: The wartime relationship, 1939-1942,” The Pacific Historical Review 46, no. 2 (1977), p. 261.
887 The benefits of these bases to regional security, and to the security of both the US and Australia have been highlighted by Paul Dibb and Coral Bell. See For more see Paul Dibb, “Soviet strategy towards Australia, New Zealand and the South-West Pacific,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 39, no. 2 (1985), pp. 69; Dibb, “Issues in Australian defence,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 37, no. 3 (1983), pp. 160-166; and Coral Bell, “Managing to Survive,” The National Interest no. 2 (1985), pp. 36-45.
888 For arguments on alliance entrapment, see in particularly Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980).
forces in drug trafficking and law and order training. These initiatives were the result of Australia’s participation in the US-led WoT and were part of the broader strategic goal of removing these threats to Australia’s national interest. In this regard, they were also tied to specific material outcomes that Australia sought from choosing to assist other states in its own region.

This leads succinctly into the question of whether Australia actually stood to gain any material benefits from its security cooperation. This has clearly been the case. After 9/11 greater US engagement in the region was a key foreign policy goal, and Australia’s previous alliance loyalty meant it was well placed to reap increased material gains, especially in the form of the US-Australia FTA. In the Pacific, US-Australian cooperation in counter-terrorism solidified the importance of criminal intelligence gathering as part of the security partnership. The number of weak and failing states in the Pacific represented a significant security threat, and the added training and funding by the US for combating drug trafficking, money laundering and other TOC increased Australia’s ability to achieve its security interests. These benefits were also extended to Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, where US funding and training was influential in the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), which was effective in combating the spread of JI.

These security benefits continued during the strategic pivot when US foreign security policy underwent a shift to focus on the Indo-Pacific in response to a rising China. Australia had been pushing for increased US involvement in the region for some time, and its diplomacy paid off with such outcomes as US participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the decision to strengthen defence ties by stationing US troops in the Northern Territory on a rotating basis. Apart from signalling the US’ strategic commitment to Australia, this was also part of a desire to develop closer defence relationships with regional militaries.

Australia’s geographic position and interoperability with the US meant it was ideally suited for achieving this goal.

Closer US defence cooperation with Indonesia was of particular concern for Australia as the Indonesian archipelago was vital for freedom of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and for continued success in trade and investment. The US had signalled its intention to expand its relationship with Indonesia following the Obama Administration’s decision to lift the ban on US weapon sales to Indonesia in 2010, and extending an invitation for Indonesian forces to join US-Australian military exercises in 2012. These initiatives corresponded with others the US was pursuing in the region, such as closer ties with Thailand and The Philippines, which reinforced the US’ position as regional security guarantor.

Evidence of these moral and material outcomes in the US-Australian security partnership indicates that both moral and material calculations were indeed present in Australia’s commitment to the alliance. The moral outcomes were not as strong compared with those in aid and the humanitarian use of force, but were nonetheless consistent with the moral expectations of regional security identified earlier under the expectation of reciprocity. These expectations dictated that Australia’s support for US foreign policy was linked to whether it would be beneficial to the stability and security of its strategic sphere of influence. In some instances this led to targeted moral outcomes in increasing the ability of Southeast Asian and Pacific nations to combat terrorism and security threats from weak and failing states. These instances also led to material outcomes in strengthening US-Australian security and defence cooperation in areas of regional defence and intelligence. Therefore, Australia actually stood to gain when it decided to include moral considerations as part of its alliance partnership with the US.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has conducted a moral realist analysis of the evidence provided in the previous case study chapters. It has found that moral realism is a valuable tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices. Expectations of reciprocity determined by geo-strategic

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factors played a key part, and can consistently be found to have shaped Australia’s foreign policy choices across the three policy arenas under examination in this thesis. An analysis of expectations of reciprocity also reveals evidence that Australia has acted morally when it has expected to receive material benefits in return. For Australia, geostrategic factors tied to its location in the Asia-Pacific have guided where the bulk of its aid has gone, and why it decided to conduct humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste. Likewise, Australia alliance loyalty in the US-Australia security partnership has been guided by expectations of reciprocity in securing Australia’s strategic sphere of influence in Southeast Asia and southwest Pacific.

This chapter’s evaluation of rational choice has also demonstrated that the inclusion of morality in calculations of Australia’s foreign policy decisions have been driven by assessments of the costs as opposed to the benefits to its national interest. The primacy of the national interest in calculations of moral choices means that in some instances states will choose not to include moral considerations as part of their decision-making if the costs outweigh the expected benefits. Rational choice can therefore explain why Australia provided the bulk of its aid to Indonesia and PNG, in preference to states in Africa where the poverty rate is higher. Similarly, it can also account for the type of aid given: in other words, why Australia has prioritized aid in education, good governance and infrastructure over other areas like health or female empowerment.

When looking at humanitarian operations, rational choices were also evident in Canberra’s decision to push for a resolution to the conflict in Cambodia, which was made after the conditions were right for Australia to reap the maximum benefits in return. Similarly, rational choice was also important in understanding why, after decades of calls for Australia’s support of Timorese independence, INTERFET was finally implemented in 1999. And, turning to the Australia-US security partnership, timing and context linked to rational choice helps explain Australia’s decision to align with the US during WWII as well as its ongoing commitment to the partnership, despite instances where it appeared that the costs outweighed the benefits.

The final theme, moral and material outcomes, represents the crux of a moral realist approach. It connected expectations of reciprocity to policy outcomes and posits that when states do decide to include morality as part of their foreign policy calculations, they can sometimes gain national interest benefits in return. On the basis of the evidence presented
thus far, moral and material outcomes have indeed been evident in Australia’s aid and development policy, where Australia has gained economically from greater investment and business opportunities in a number of cases.

Material gains were also apparent in Australia’s participation in humanitarian operations. In Cambodia, Australia received material gains in the development of a strong trade relationship with Vietnam, which had been a long-term foreign policy goal. Later, the benefits of the humanitarian operation in Timor Leste were considerable. Australia assisted in ensuring Timorese self-determination and gained material outcomes in negotiating a more favourable Timor Gap deal and in removing a “regional sore” in its relationship with Indonesia. The moral outcomes of the US-Australian security relationship have notable in the joint initiatives carried out in Southeast Asia and the Pacific assisting in ensuring the security and stability of the region, such as intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism training. This has achieved material benefits for Australia in that it has had to shoulder less of the resource burden, and more broadly in helping to strengthen US engagement in the Asia-Pacific.

Thus I have demonstrated that in the case of Australia moral realism is a useful research tool capable of accounting for the position of morality in state decision-making. It is now time to conclude the thesis by bringing together its major findings, and considering its implications for understanding morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices. At the same time, it will be pertinent to discuss the potential limitations of moral realism as an explanatory approach, and revisit my employment of Australia as a most-likely case. In discussing these limitations, I will also outline avenues for future research.
Chapter Six
Conclusions

This thesis has sought to make an original contribution towards our understanding of the position of morality in classical realism. It achieved this by developing the notion of moral realism as a modified explanatory framework that could shed light on why states choose to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, and when this is most likely to occur. The moral realist framework was developed from identifying three factors found to be in common amongst the classical realist scholarship of Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan. These were: (i) expectations of reciprocity between states; (ii) rational choice in calculating foreign policy decisions; and (iii) moral and material outcomes of foreign policy.

The central empirical claim of the thesis was that when states choose to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, they could actually stand to gain material benefits in return. After the factors of moral realism were identified, the thesis then applied the framework to evaluate the position of morality in three important arenas of Australian foreign policy: aid and development, humanitarian operations, and strategic alliances. Its main finding is that Australia was most likely to include morality when this converged with national interest objectives. And when this occurred, Australia was seen to gain material benefits in return. In sum, I found sufficient evidence to successfully answer the primary and secondary research questions posed by this thesis, which were:

*Primary research question*

Is moral realism an appropriate analytical tool for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices?

*Secondary research questions*

1. Are moral and material considerations present in Australia’s foreign policy decision-making?
2. Does Australia stand to gain when morality is a part of foreign policy choice?

To answer these questions, the thesis was organized into 6 Chapters. Chapter 1 is where I established the relevance of the study by engaging in a critical discussion concerning the main theoretical contributions within the classical realist revival. The revival of classical realism in International Relations (IR) was prompted by a resurgence of scholarly interest in how to theorize the position of morality in international politics. Scholars like Michael Williams, Chris Brown, Richard Beardsworth and William Scheurman have been some of the revival’s key contributors, and they sought to gain insights into how to understand morality by returning to the work of classical realists. But instead of adding clarity to how classical realism primarily understood morality in connection with material interests, which was then evaluated in state policy according to its consequences, I found that these contributions misinterpreted classical realism by trying to recast it as a normative perspective of IR.

The majority of scholars within the revival, whether writing from a cosmopolitan, critical, constructivist or English School (ES) perspective, view morality as normatively prescriptive. In other words, they have argued that classical realism was primarily concerned with morality as a factor that could prescribe how international politics ought to operate. This understanding of morality was in stark contrast to the descriptive and consequentialist approach of classical realism.

I then argued that this mischaracterization of classical realism had occurred without much opposition from realist scholars. Indeed, there had been a distinct lack of classical realist contributions within the revival, which is why I proposed moral realism as my own offering that attempted a more accurate reading of how classical realists understood the position of

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morality in international politics. Classical realism actually has quite an established history of viewing morality as a factor that could assist the national interest, and was assessed in state policy according to the consequences of states choosing to consider morality as part of their foreign policy choices.\footnote{The history of morality in classical realism extends back to Thucydides and Niccolo Machiavelli who both stated that considerations of justice, morality, and being “good” were important factors in furthering the power of the state. For more see Thucydides, \textit{History of the Peloponnesian War} transl. by Rex Warner, with an introduction and notes by M.I. Finley (London: Penguin Group, 1972) and Niccolo Machiavelli, \textit{The Prince and Other Political Writings} Stephen J. Milner transl. and ed. (London: J.M. Dent, 1995), pp.37-137.} Thus, I argued that there was space for an understanding of morality in classical realism that properly incorporated its views on the role of the state, the determining influence of the national interest, and, crucially, the significance of foreign policy outcomes.

The moral realist framework in this thesis was developed through a thorough examination of the work of three key classical realists scholars – Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr. These scholars were chosen because they shared a consequentialist view of morality, which made for consistency in drawing out the three categories of the moral realist framework.\footnote{There were a number of archival and published works cited to support the argument that these classical realists were concerned with putting forward a consequential view of morality. However, evidence of their views on morality can be found in a select number of key texts. For Morgenthau, this was in “National interest and moral principles in foreign policy: The primacy of the national interest,” \textit{American Scholar} XVII (spring, 1949), pp. 207-212; Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace} 4th ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966) and “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil,” \textit{Writing File}, Box 97, File 6, p. 10. Niebuhr’s understanding of morality was harder to interpret as he was often torn between his personal views on a Christian ethic and his observations on how foreign policy and international politics operates according to the principles of anarchy and the struggle for power. Yet, he still demonstrated support for a consequential view of morality. See in particular Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics} (New York: Touchstone, 1995) and “The moral issue in international relations,” \textit{Speeches, Articles and Books}, Box. 16, File unknown. George Kennan was more at home with foreign policy making and foreign policy analysis, than he was with debates on IR theory. But like Morgenthau and Niebuhr he was in support of a consequential understanding of morality and this was made clear in George Kennan, “Morality and foreign policy,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 64, no. 2 (1985), pp. 205-218.} The first category identified was \textit{expectations of reciprocity} between states, which incorporated the classical realist view of considerations of the other. Classical realists argued that individuals do not exist alone in human nature and to survive they must realize that, in some instances, it can be beneficial to the self-interest to consider the interests of others. An expectation of reciprocity between states allowed moral realism to argue that when states are seen to act morally by considering the welfare of others, they are most likely doing so out of an expectation that it will lead to national interest benefits.

The second category identified was \textit{rational choice} in calculating foreign policy decisions. This followed an expectation of reciprocity in establishing that a state can choose to include...
morality after a cost-benefit calculation of whether it will achieve their national interests. This means that the appearance of morality in a state’s foreign policy is contingent on time and place, and not expected to be observed in state decision-making at all times. Therefore, the inclusion of rational choice allows moral realism to account for when states are most likely to include morality as part of their foreign policy decision-making and why, in some instances, they may choose not to include it.

The third and final category identified was the *moral and material outcomes* of foreign policy. This category connected the motives found in the expectations of reciprocity with foreign policy outcomes. The potential ability of moral realism to account for the motives and outcomes of morality in foreign policy represented an expansion of classical realism. It also formed the rationale for exploring the central empirical claim of moral realism: that states can actually stand to gain materially when they choose to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices. I argued that including a category on the moral and material outcomes of foreign policy was possible by drawing out the classical realist concern for an “ethic of consequence,” which describes how claims of states acting morally must be judged on the consequences of states choosing to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices.

Classical realists argued that morality must be judged in this way, but they did not go much further in examining whether the inclusion of morality could lead to beneficial outcomes for both the state and the recipient. Therefore, this criterion represents the ability of moral realism to expand on classical realism, and at the same time properly incorporate classical realist views on consequential morality. The emphasis on establishing the results of morality in foreign policy is also important as a way to define moral realism as an empirical approach that required application to the evidence of policy decisions. This separates moral realism from normative approaches to morality that dominate research agendas within the classical realist revival, and which fail to make the connection between motive and outcomes.

The application of moral realism to foreign policy evidence was conducted through the use of a discipline-specific single focused case study. Here, I identified Australia as an appropriate most-likely case, because there had not yet been an examination of morality in Australian foreign policy choices from such a perspective. I found that the bulk of the literature on the position of morality in Australian foreign policy could be categorized as employing either ES or realist assumptions. Unsurprisingly, previous investigations on morality from the ES have
been limited to finding evidence of Australia following an international societal approach. ES scholars and policy practitioners, like Andrew Linklater, Timothy Dunne and Gareth Evans, have argued that Australia’s middle-power status and history of activist diplomacy mean that its policymakers were naturally inclined to choose policy according to whether it followed the norms, rules and laws of international society. Yet these approaches were found to not go far enough in accounting for evidence that when Australia chose to act morally. Rather, I suggested that it was doing so out of the pursuit of the national interest, and with an expectation that doing so would lead to mutually beneficial foreign policy outcomes.

Realist scholarship on morality in Australian foreign policy is largely absent. Realists writing on Australian foreign policy, such as Paul Dibb, Coral Bell and William Tow have argued that Australia’s policy responses have been primarily dictated by the global balance of power and shaped by the constraints of being a middle-power. For them, material rather than moral factors explain Australia’s tendency to prioritize strategic alliances with “great and powerful friends” and to seek economic advantages by utilizing its rich supply of national resources.

I argued that the dominance of ES and realist approaches towards understanding Australian foreign policy was unique amongst debates concerning morality in international politics, which has mostly been shaped by the great debate between realism and idealism. This further demonstrates the appropriateness of using Australia as a most-likely test case for the application of moral realism. After making the case for applying moral realism to the evidence of Australian foreign policy, I identified three separate policy arenas that were representative of the potential for morality in Australia’s policy choices. These were Australia’s foreign policy in aid and development; its role in humanitarian operations conducted in Cambodia and Timor Leste; and its strategic alliance with the US. These policy

896 Before the constructivist turn in Australian IR in the mid-2000s, the majority of those engaging with debates on morality from a normative perspective followed the ES assumptions on the role of international society as a civilizing force that could moderate state behaviour. For more see Andrew Linklater, “What is a good international citizen?” in Paul Keale ed Ethics and Foreign Policy (St Leonards: Allen, 1992), pp. 60-92; Timothy Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, “East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism,” International Affairs 77, no. 4 (2001), pp. 805-827; and Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australian Foreign Relations (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991).

arenas reflected different expectations about the likelihood of morality in Australian foreign policy. This allowed moral realism to be tested on a defined sample of evidence that avoided focusing narrowly on one specific policy arena, or broadly on an unmanageable sweep of events.

Now that I have outlined the rationale for why this thesis represents an original contribution towards the literature on morality in classical realism, and how I sought to demonstrate this by applying the moral realist framework to a case study of Australia, I can present the key findings made by the thesis, the implications for understanding the position of morality in Australia’s foreign policy choices, and some avenues for future research.

**Key findings and implications**

This thesis found sufficient evidence to answer both the primary and secondary research questions. I will start by presenting the findings of the first secondary research question: are moral and material considerations present in Australia’s foreign policy decision-making? Here, I found evidence of both moral and material considerations in the expectations of reciprocity guiding where and on what issues Australia chose to include morality as part of its foreign policy choices. Australia demonstrated a preference for doing so towards states in the Asia-Pacific, which indicated that morality was more likely to appear in its foreign policy choices dealing with states that are geographically close.

This finding made sense given Australia’s location in the Asia-Pacific, which means it must prioritize relationships with states in Southeast Asia and southwest Pacific as a means of maintaining national security and defence. It was also the case that these states were economically and socially under-developed, and dealing with a multitude of security issues that directly affected Australia. Hence they were strategically important, and acting morally towards these states was likely motivated by an expectation that it would lead to national interest benefits.

Evidence of an expectation of reciprocity also indicated that when Australia is seen to include morality as part of its foreign policy calculations, it is making a rational choice to do so. Thus morality is likely contingent on timing and context linked to calculations of the national interest, which means that it is not expected to appear in Australia’s foreign policy decisions at all times. Together, an expectation of reciprocity and rational choice can account for why
and when Australia is most likely to include morality as part of its foreign policy calculations.

The presence of geostrategic interests as part of an expectation of reciprocity was found across the three policy arenas, which implied that in the case of Australia, it is more likely to include morality in its foreign policy calculations when this converges with its material interests. This was the case in Australia’s foreign aid and development policy where the bulk of its aid program was targeted towards the Asia-Pacific. Strategic considerations guiding Australia’s aid expectations started with the Colombo Plan and continued with Australia’s foreign aid being targeted towards achieving the security and stability of Indonesia and PNG.

Indonesia represents the greatest potential security threat to Australia as it sits across its major Sea-Lines of Communications (SLOCs) and is susceptible to instability from poverty, separatism, extremism and Trans-national Organized Crime (TOC). Australia’s foreign aid has represented a means to combat these issues, while simultaneously improving Indonesia’s social and economic development. The same expectations of reciprocity were found to guide Australia’s foreign aid towards improving the stability of PNG, where Australia’s aid program has been provided out of an expectation of reciprocity that would contribute towards Australia’s strategic objective of maintaining South Pacific security.

Even when Australia was seen to deviate from this expectation of reciprocity by increasing its aid to states outside the Asia-Pacific, as it did during the 2008 increase of aid to Africa, or the increase of aid to Iraq and Afghanistan, this was still determined by a rational calculation of whether it would achieve Australia’s national interest. In the case of Africa, an increase in Australia’s aid was guided by an expectation that it would assist in Canberra’s bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Australia’s aid to Iraq and Afghanistan was also guided by an expectation of reciprocity. This time, it was consistent with Australia’s strategic interests as part of its participation in the War on Terror (WoT).

Not only does this demonstrate the consistency of expectations of reciprocity, but it also demonstrates the importance of rational choice in explaining changes to Australia’s foreign aid and development policy. Australia’s temporary change in foreign aid and development was not motivated by a normative shift in how Australia perceives the function of its aid program; instead it reflected a change in how Australia calculated its national interests. In this
instance, moral and material considerations converged and Australia determined that it would benefit from directing aid to these states. This indicates that when Australia is seen to include morality as part of its foreign aid policy, it is likely the result of a rational calculation of whether it will achieve its material interest.

Expectations of reciprocity and rational choice were also present in Australia’s policy choices in implementing humanitarian operations. Before the end of the Cold War Australia’s participation in peacekeeping had been relatively modest. This changed with its involvement in Cambodia and Timor Leste. Australia’s decision to commit considerable resources to these humanitarian operations was guided by specific expectations of reciprocity, and thus contingent on rational calculations of whether it would reap any benefits in return. In both instances, Australia’s geostrategic interests in reducing the number of security threats emanating from Southeast Asia were found to inform the expectations of reciprocity motivating its decision to use force for humanitarian purposes.

In Cambodia this was tied to Australia’s desire to contribute towards resolving issues of regional security, which was part of the Hawke government’s policy of comprehensive engagement with the Asia-Pacific. This expectation of reciprocity was linked to a rational calculation that Australia would benefit from pursuing a resolution to the conflict in 1989. Previous efforts at resolving the crisis had been unsuccessful, and thus Australia abandoned its diplomacy. This changed after the end of the Cold War, which provided the conditions for Australia to re-start its diplomacy in reaching an agreement on its peace proposals. This reinforces the importance of timing and context in understanding when Australia is most likely to include morality as part of its foreign policy decisions. In sum, Australia’s diplomacy in Cambodia was linked to a rational calculation that it would achieve certain expectations of reciprocity and so moral and material considerations converged to motivate decision-makers to resolve the crisis.

A similar convergence of moral and material considerations was evident in Australia’s approach towards Timor Leste. Here the issue of Timorese independence had been part of Australia’s domestic discourse since the Indonesian invasion in 1975, yet, the decision by the Howard government to shift Australian policy from recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, towards semi-autonomy, and eventually, support for independence was a clear watershed. This policy change was tied to a rational calculation that the conditions were right for
Australia to intervene. By December 1998 Indonesia was more susceptible towards accepting a ballot on the future of Timor Leste and by September 1999 reluctantly accepted an UN-mandated peacekeeping force.

Australia clearly had specific expectations of reciprocity motivating its decision to support independence and lead the multinational coalition. The issue of Timor Leste had become an obstacle to closer relations with Indonesia and the conflict itself was also at risk of spilling over into West Papua, which represented a significant threat to the stability of Australia’s northern approaches. Together with the example of Cambodia, this illustrates that Australia is most likely to consider the use of force for humanitarian purposes when the circumstances are conducive to the achievement of its material interests. And where this occurs, it is most likely guided by strategic expectations of reciprocity.

The convergence between moral and material considerations in Australia’s approach towards strategic alliances was less evident than other policy arenas. However, expectations of reciprocity were nonetheless found in Australia’s decision to align with the US as the best alliance partner to ensure both national and regional security. In this regard, it also reflected a rational calculation by Australia that in exchange for its willingness to support US foreign policy, Australia would receive certain benefits in return. This can explain why Australia has been consistent in maintaining support for the alliance, despite instances where it appeared to harm Australia’s national interests. In most cases the US-Australia security partnership was underpinned by common interest in ensuring Pacific security. For the US, Australia represented an attractive destination for its intelligence and naval installations and complimented its hub-and-spokes alliance network in the Asia-Pacific. For Australia, aligning with the US as the greater power in the partnership contributed to its ability to achieve its own security, and elevated its position in international affairs above its middle-power status.

These common interests were guided by straightforward national interest calculations in the first instance, but they were also partly informed by moral considerations in that mutual efforts to ensure regional security did lead to benefits for states that were outside the alliance. It was found that both the US and Australia determined that a key function of the alliance was to act as a deterrent against foreign intervention, and Australia’s efforts in keeping the US engaged in the Pacific was motivated by an expectation of reciprocity that it would achieve
this mutual goal. Thus, moral considerations tied to consideration of the other were indeed present, and converged with Australia’s material interest in maintaining the alliance. It is important to note that it was not always the case that Australia was concerned with the benefits to other states as part of its commitment to the alliance; still, my findings indicate that morality can nonetheless be seen in Australia’s strategic alliances. This is most likely to occur towards states that are central to achieving Australia’s geostrategic interests, and is the result of a rational calculation of whether it will produce some benefit in return.

The convergence of moral and material considerations in the construction of Australia’s foreign policy choices indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely, and these were indeed found. I will start by presenting the findings associated with moral outcomes as these will address whether it is possible to assess morality in Australian foreign policy according to its consequences. I will then move on to examine whether this led to material outcomes. Together, this will answer the final secondary research question: does Australia stand to gain when morality is a part of foreign policy choice?

*Moral and material outcomes: Assessing morality in foreign policy according to its consequences*

The moral outcomes produced from Australia’s foreign aid and development policy were fairly clear. Its aid program in Indonesia, particularly in response to the Boxing Day Tsunami, led to tangible outcomes in reconstruction and education. In PNG, moral outcomes were also found in improving the delivery of health services and the operation of judicial services. I accept, of course, that these moral outcomes were relative, and it was never expected that Australia’s foreign aid would be responsible for absolute aid goals like universal primary education, or the total eradication of diseases like Tuberculosis (TB). Through the use of moral realism, I have merely sought to establish whether it was possible to judge morality in foreign policy according to its consequences and this was identified in the benefits to the recipients of Australia’s foreign aid and development policy.

Moral outcomes were also clearly visible in Australia’s policy towards Cambodia and Timor Leste, which indicated that Australia’s policy choices on the use of force for humanitarian purposes can lead to benefits for the recipient state. In Cambodia the expectations of reciprocity guiding Australia’s decision to intervene led to moral outcomes associated with the resolution of the long-term regional crisis. Australia’s proposal for peace broke the
deadlock at the Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) and led to the establishment of various United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), which had transitional authority in Cambodia; implemented a ceasefire and disarmament process; and conducted free and fair elections.

Similar moral outcomes were found from Australia’s involvement in Timor Leste. Australia’s decision to support Timorese self-determination, and implement a multinational PKO led to the resolution of a humanitarian crisis that had been a regional security issue for over twenty-five years. Australia adopted a leadership role in garnering support for INTERFET, which was mandated to enforce peace by restoring law and order. This instance of peace-enforcement led to the stabilization of Timor, the holding of democratic elections and the creation of Timor Leste as an independent and sovereign state.

There was less evidence of moral outcomes in Australia’s strategic alliance policy. This was an expected finding, and implied that in the area of strategic policy Australia is less likely to consider morality as part of its national interest calculations when the potential risks of doing so are too high. This is a logical conclusion when dealing with areas of “high” politics where the parameters for acting outside the narrow self-interest are constrained by the balance of power. However, this does not mean states automatically determine that including morality as part of their alliance calculations cannot lead to both moral and material outcomes. The converge of moral considerations identified earlier as common interests in maintaining regional peace and security formed part of Australia’s expectations of reciprocity in aligning with the US, alongside national interest calculations that it would increase Australia’s capacity to achieve its strategic objectives. Hence, evidence of expectations of reciprocity in the US-Australia security partnership indicated that moral and material outcomes were likely.

These moral outcomes can be seen in the ability of the partnership to complement the US hub-and-spokes alliance system, which extended US nuclear deterrence to Southeast Asia and the Pacific. This contributed to regional peace and security during the Cold War by acting as a deterrent to the spread of communism and Soviet imperialism. This outcome was difficult to find, but was reinforced by Australia’s rational calculation to continue its support for the partnership despite concerns that this would increase the risk of alliance entrapment. In fact, following 9/11 Australian-US security cooperation actually increased and led to tangible moral outcomes in assisting Southeast Asian and Pacific states in counter-terrorism
and law enforcement. The benefits to regional states from US-Australian security cooperation have continued in the contemporary relationship. The rise of China created anxiety over Sino intentions of regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific and greater US-Australian defence cooperation was motivated, in part, by a concern for maintaining the current status quo of US supported regional stability, which also led to further moral outcomes in trilateral defence cooperation with Indonesia.

The appearance of moral outcomes in Australian foreign policy indicates that it is possible to understand morality in international politics by examining the consequences of states choosing to include it as part of their rational calculations of policy choices. And this enhances moral realism’s utility as a useful analytical tool capable of understanding morality in state foreign policies. However, evidence of moral outcomes only answers part of the primary research question. I must also show whether Australia’s decision to include morality as part of its foreign policy did lead to material gains. In this respect I did find evidence that Australia gained material benefits from choosing to act morally, which indicates that when morality is included as part of Australia’s foreign policy choices it can produce benefits that may not have been achieved if it had acted out of pure self-interest.

In Australia’s foreign aid and development policy its decisions to prioritize certain aid sectors (like education, infrastructure development and agriculture) have led to economic gains. In Indonesia, the Australian Indonesian Building Education Partnership (AIBEP) assisted in stimulating trade in service exports to Indonesia, which by 2014 represented half of Australia’s service trade to the state. Similarly, in infrastructure development there have been economic advantages from Australian businesses being awarded reconstruction contracts and expanded market opportunities. These opportunities were targeted towards areas where Australia sought to gain significant benefits, such as mineral exploration and mining of oil and natural gas. The type of aid Australia prioritized has varied, but when this has occurred it is still reflective of a rational calculation of whether Australia would benefit, as in Australia’s decision to prioritize good governance between 1997 and 2004, and part of the Howard government’s approach towards counter-terrorism and combating weak and failing states.

Australia’s decision to participate in the humanitarian operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste was also found to produce important material advantages. In the case of Cambodia,
Australia’s push for a resolution to the conflict paved the way for closer economic relations with Vietnam, which had been a long-term foreign policy goal for Australia that dated back to the end of the Vietnam War. Resolution to the Cambodian conflict also contributed to greater integration of ASEAN and the potential for increased trade and business opportunities for Australia after Cambodia and Vietnam became members. Similar economic gains are noteworthy in Australia’s intervention into Timor Leste. Here the material gains were especially visible in Australia’s ability to negotiate a favourable agreement over the Timor Gap. Its leadership of the INTERFET mission also led to international prestige benefits and contributed to Australia’s strategic goal of participating in regional defence missions.

The material benefits produced from Australia’s security partnership with the US have also been linked to Australia’s expectation of reciprocity in keeping the US engaged in maintaining regional peace and security. There have certainly been instances where Australia miscalculated the cost versus benefits of its alliance loyalty, as in Australia’s decision to participate in the Vietnam War, for example. But overall, Australia’s interests have been achieved in its commitment to the alliance and this has led to material payoffs in the benefits associated with cooperation in intelligence and defence, increasing Australia’s ability to respond to potential threats. During the Cold War, intelligence sharing assisted Australia’s ability to combat the spread of communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, and this expanded significantly after Australia’s participation in the WoT. Australia gained access to US combat planning and intelligence on counter-terrorism, and this led to greater cooperation in criminal intelligence and policing in the Pacific, where weak and failing states have been considered threats to Australia’s national security. Greater cooperation in intelligence also benefited Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, and especially US support in combating the spread of Jamah Islammah (JI).

Gains in defence have been equally significant. Australia’s middle power status has meant that its ability to secure its regional interests and defend its territory from attack has been limited. The extended deterrence provided by the US has not only contributed to regional stability, but also allowed Australia to maintain a relatively modest defence budget despite a geographical environment where the number of potential threats are arguably high, and rising. Outside of the benefits of deterrence, Australia has capitalized on closer defence cooperation through joint military exercises, use of US defence technology and interoperability with US forces, which prompted further gains during the US’ pivot towards
the Indo-Pacific in 2011, where greater engagement with US forces became a key strategic priority for Australia.

The evidence of moral and material outcomes indicates that Australia did stand to benefit from including morality as part of its foreign policy choices. And together with evidence of a convergence of moral and material considerations in Australia’s foreign policy calculations, I can conclude that moral realism is useful for understanding Australia’s foreign policy choices. Yet this does not mean that moral realism is a universal explanatory panacea for all aspects of foreign policy. Hence I now examine the limitations of this study, as well as identifying some potential avenues for future research, before making some final concluding observations on moral realism and Australian foreign policy.

Limitations of the study
The moral realist claim to identify morality through expectations of reciprocity and moral outcomes is to some extent methodologically ambiguous. It will not always be the case that these expectations will eventuate, and unintended consequences can interfere with both moral and material outcomes. The framework advanced in this thesis has attempted to counter the potential for unintended consequences by arguing that morality guided by the pursuit of the national interest, rather than ideological rationalization, is less likely to lead to unintended consequences (or “bad” policy outcomes). For classical realists, tying morality to the pursuit of the national interest allows states to avoid the type of ideological driven morality they argued would lead to miscalculations of foreign policy. This may reduce the likelihood that states will pursue irrational foreign policy. However, it certainly does not fully account for how unintended consequences may influence the evidence of moral and material outcomes.

This limitation also speaks to one of the main conceptual problems associated with theorizing morality in international politics: how do we discern the motives of actors in choosing to act morally? Normative perspectives try to resolve this by claiming that human nature has an inherent capacity for reason: humans can either learn that it is better to behave morally by considering the interests of others, or they are compelled by a moral duty to act with the common interest as the end goal of their actions. Moral realism, on the other hand, is less clear on how it assesses the source of morality, especially when it argues that moral considerations must be seen in the context of the state’s pursuit of the national interest.
I have adopted a more limited view of rationality, which was consistent with how classical realists understood morality to be linked to individuals’ ability to recognize that they do not exist alone in nature, and must – in order to survive – be mindful of the welfare of others. The motivation compelling states to act, as part of this expectation, was the calculation that it would benefit their national interests in return. This allows moral realism to retain a classical realist’s stance on the causal role of interests defined as power. Yet linking considerations of the other with the state’s national interests does open it to criticisms of moral relativism – that all action considered to be in the national interest is also considered to be moral. This reduces all moral acts to calculations of the national interest, making it difficult to identify the precise factors involved when states do decide to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices.

Classical realism sought to answer the charge of moral relativism by including the ethic of consequence, whereby evidence of morality in foreign policy is evaluated according to whether it leads to beneficial policy outcomes. The classical realists examined in this thesis did not attempt to link expectations of reciprocity with policy consequences, and this is where I positioned moral realism as a perspective that could achieve this. I did so by arguing that for a moral act to be evaluated as “moral,” one must show whether a state’s calculated expectations did produce some benefit to the recipient state as the “other.” This went some way towards resolving the issues of moral relativism by tying claims of morality in foreign policy decisions to evidence of this actually occurring in policy outcomes. However, the problem still remains as to how to demonstrate the extent to which morality played a part in a state’s rational calculations.

Limitations of Australia as a single case study
The findings of this thesis are also naturally limited by the research design. The use of a single focused case study means that evidence of morality in foreign policy decision-making is limited to observations of Australia’s behaviour, rather than making generalizable assessments of moral realism backed up by evidence from many cases. Indeed, it could be argued that presenting Australia as a “most-likely” case means that the study was predetermined to yield positive results. This limitation can reinforce the view that moral decisions are inherent in the internal structures and processes of the state, and specifically unique to Western liberal democracies. Such a critique is not without merit, and does pose a challenge to moral realism’s ability to assess when, and for what purpose, states choose to
include morality as part of their rational decision-making. It is possible to argue, for instance, that Australia’s tendency to act morally as part of an expectation of reciprocity was facilitated by the domestic structures of it being a liberal democracy, which can place limits on a state’s ability to pursue narrow self-interests. Hence, Australia has been compelled to act morally because this was the more attractive policy option according to a liberal democratic conception of its national interests.

Likewise, it is potentially valid to argue that Australia’s status as a middle power has meant that its ability to seek outcomes through simple power politics remains limited, and that it has therefore been more inclined to seek outcomes that would lead to reciprocal benefits. The framework articulated here does not directly engage with internal constraints that may affect the ability of states to act in international politics, except to say that the balance of power found in an anarchical human nature will dictate that all states will be concerned with the pursuit of power in order to ensure their survival. And how a state determines their interests will naturally vary depending on the state’s resources and capabilities. This means that moral realism expects to see a state acting morally when it is in their national interests to do so, which is argued to occur regardless of the state’s capabilities, as all states are concerned with furthering the national interest.

Avenues for future research

*Strengthening the “moral” tradition of classical realism*

The tradition of moral thought in realism extends further than the select work cited in this thesis. Indeed, there is a wealth of both political and philosophical moral realist literature dating back to Thucydides that was outside the scope of this thesis. I endeavoured to illustrate the evaluative potential of moral realism as a tool that can understand the results of foreign policy choices, and therefore a more in-depth look at the intellectual history of classical realism would not have significantly improved the value of this contribution. Having said this, it would be beneficial in terms of future research to present a more detailed picture of classical realism’s long-held engagement with questions of morality, and in doing so, answer criticism that realism is wedded to parsimony and has little to offer outside the usual Hobbesian maxim that life is “nasty, brutish and short.”

A more detailed study into the origins of moral realism would also complement further work on the three categories (expectations of reciprocity, rational choice and moral and material
outcomes) used to demonstrate the potential of moral realism as an explanatory tool. And as explained above, I deliberately positioned moral realism as an empirical approach that bridges theory and policy analysis. Thus, a detailed theoretical examination of these three categories would not have contributed much to an assessment of how moral realism can properly understand the position, as well as the effects, of morality in a state’s foreign policy.

This said, in order to properly advance the merits of moral realism as a legitimate research agenda, it would be necessary to conduct a wider investigation into its applicability across cases, and across more scholarship. Specifically, it would be useful to extend my research beyond the three classical realist scholars identified in this thesis, and discover whether there is commonality across a broader sample of the classical realist literature. Other contributions towards the classical realist revival, like those put forward by Michael Williams and Richard Ned Lebow have incorporated the views of John Herz, Edward Carr, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli into their work on finding areas of convergence between classical realism and critical theory. A similar study conducted from a moral realist perspective would strengthen claims that it remains grounded in the theoretical principles of classical realism, and represents a more accurate interpretation of how classical realists understand the position of morality in international politics. An expanded research project on morality in classical realism would also allow for greater engagement with some of the limitations of the moral realist framework identified above, particularly the problems associated with conceptualizing the moral motives of states in acting morally.

*Application of moral realism to comparative case studies*

As well as deeper research into the philosophical origins of moral realism, the strength of moral realism as a tool capable of understanding foreign policy results would be greatly enhanced by its application to multiple case studies. As identified previously, a comparative case study analysis would have been too unwieldy for a thesis of this type. Yet future avenues for research that compared like and unlike cases would allow a moral realist to explore whether evidence of moral considerations is specific to a certain type of state that embodies

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898 Both Michael Williams and Richard Ned Lebow were earlier contributors towards the classical realist revival and their work canvassed the tradition of morality in classical realism that extended beyond the more contemporary and well-known realist scholars. For more see Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* and Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
certain “moral” characteristics. For example, it would be both interesting and prudent to discover whether this framework would yield the same results when applied to a state that is classified as authoritarian or semi-authoritarian.

Similarly, a wider case study sample would also answer potential criticism that moral realism describes some states as being more moral than others. This is particularly so when considering the implications of moral realism in explaining the potential for morality in the foreign policy choices of the great powers. The US, China and Russia might have less need to include morality as part of their decision-making, or have greater constraints on their ability to act morally. Middle-to-small powers arguably have more flexibility to include morality as part of their foreign policy choices, and to do so for a greater amount of material return. Thus, a study that considered the choices of the great powers would lend increased weight to moral realism’s explanatory ability, and particularly the emphasis on rational choice in calculating foreign policy decisions.

**Final observations**

In the final analysis, debates over the question of what is moral and not moral in Australia’s foreign policy choices are unlikely to be altered by this thesis alone. But in advancing moral realism in this thesis, I hope to have made a modest contribution to what has become an important area of research in both classical realism and international politics. I look forward to doing so more extensively in the future as I develop the concept of moral realism in more depth.
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