LINGUISTICAL CHOICE IN TASMANIAN ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE: A STUDY OF THE PREVALENCE AND IMPACT OF MILITARY TERMINOLOGY IN THE UPPER FLORENTINE VALLEY FORESTRY DISPUTE, 2008-2012

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Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

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Signed

(Dr.) Pete Hay,
Jade Price’s thesis supervisor,
per Jade Price,
11 June 2015)
Abstract

The project examines the ubiquity and impact of military discourse in the context of disputation over the fate of natural areas. Though typically tense, anger-inducing and confrontational, do such face-offs merit the label ‘war’? It is argued here that they do not; that there are defining features of ‘war’ that do not apply to its metaphoric deployment in environmental conflict.

The nature of metaphor and its discursive purpose and standing are first examined, followed by a consideration of the readiness with which warfare metaphors tend to be applied to a range of non-military situations. Environmental discourse is particularly saturated with metaphors borrowed from warfare.

The project takes, as a case study, the dramatic on-site confrontation between (mostly) young forest activists and logging contractors and police in the upper Florentine Valley in the Tasmanian south-west. Protestors set up a permanent camp – ‘Camp Florentine’ – on the proposed line of access to the gazetted forest coupes, remaining determinedly in occupation for several years until logging operations were, for the time being, halted. Using semi-structured interviews a number of principal actors in the dispute were interviewed. Most, but not all, agreed that the use of military terminology in relation to the dispute was inappropriate. On the question of the impact of the widespread use of warfare-derived metaphors on the psychology and consequent comportment of participants in contestation over environmental goods – in this case, wild forest ecosystems – there was even less consensus.
Supervisor’s Statement, in lieu of Acknowledgements

Jade Price died in May 2013, shortly after her 30\textsuperscript{th} birthday, of a particularly fast-moving cancer. She was diagnosed with a terminal condition just a few short weeks before her death, and only a single week before she died we had a student/supervisor consultation, Jade believing even then that she still had six months of life ahead of her. But it was not to be.

Six months was just about how long it would have taken a healthy Jade to complete the project. But she was obsessed with doing so, even after the diagnosis. When this proved impossible her family approached the university to see whether she could receive her Ph.D. posthumously, for there are precedents for this. It was agreed that I, as supervisor, should try to access Jade’s computer, to identify not only the gaps in the thesis but, from any electronic notes or other evidence, to report, as far as possible, the arguments and evidence that Jade intended to assemble in filling these gaps, while not myself making those arguments. This bears repeating. I was not to complete the thesis myself, for that would not have been Jade’s work. The only exception to this is the Abstract, which I have written, for a thesis absolutely must have an Abstract. I have, though, avoided being expansive, and have sought to provide the mere scaffolding of an Abstract. Had she lived, I would not have wanted Jade to be as terse as this. This exception apart, my brief was to state what it appeared Jade intended to write, whilst making it clear that I was merely reporting what was apparently the case, and that my interpolations were to be clearly identified as mine and not Jade’s.

I have done that, and all my observations are, like this page, rendered in red highlight, with my initials following. The first three chapters are in final form. The least developed chapter is Chapter 4, and there was also a clear need for additional work in Chapters 6 and 7. There is no concluding chapter, and only a rudimentary start to an Introduction. I must be held accountable for these shortcomings, for I strongly advise my students to leave the Introduction and Conclusion until all else has been written. It also seems likely that Jade would have salted her thesis with some appropriate photographs, but, as there is no indication in her notes of what, if anything, she was contemplating in this regard, I have not tried to second-guess her.
I now hold only an honorary position at the university, and unfortunately a great many banked-up commitments, including the need to get other higher degree students submitted ahead of inflexible deadlines, meant that two years elapsed before I was able to complete this task. Additionally, Jade’s computer passwords were not known, and it required expertise that I do not possess to gain access to her thesis files. But we eventually succeeded.

Jade was a grand student, both feisty and endearing. It was a privilege to have been her supervisor.

(Dr.) Pete Hay

(11 June 2015)
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Introduction

‘Welcome to “Camp Floz”’: How I Became Involved in the Upper Florentine Forests Blockade

I first visited ‘Camp Florentine’, the camp set up by forest activists to blockade work access to the upper Florentine Valley, in 2008. I had never seen anything like this before and, fascinated, and determined that somehow this would be the focus of my Ph.D. research, I returned several times, despite being made to feel unwelcome. On my early visits to the Florentine the protesters were hostile, suspicious and, I thought, panicked. Tensions were high and they didn’t trust newcomers. One told me was all about as far as they were concerned: ‘For God’s sake, just go and get yourself arrested’.

But I knew that was not what I was there for. I wasn’t willing to do anything that would get me arrested, like ‘locking on’ to logging equipment. I wanted to be there for the forests but not to do anything arrestable.

The protesters themselves were daunting. You had to be a tough person to be part of their direct action: willing to camp out for months and endure cold, have a head for heights (for tree-sitting) and a strong bowel. They were physically fit, strong-minded individuals. They lived in the bush, and had specific jobs to do in the camp and on the protests. If, like me, you were a newcomer, you had to fit in, find your place in the working camp, confront your own shortcomings.

When I first went to the camp I was not yet clear about what my research would be. I think they knew I was not there for the long haul. I didn’t have much food and not many spare clothes, and I looked as if I was only going to be there for a couple of days – which was indeed my intention. I was what they called a ‘tourist’; I was there to observe, and so from their viewpoint, a nuisance. It was a time of active and dramatic protest: tree sits, mono poles, road blockades. The protest actions were focussed on slowing down logging in the forests; for instance, by ‘locking on’ (explained below). It was confrontational and potentially dangerous, and it took a great deal of
courage and determination. Faced with these people I felt physically and mentally inferior; not made of the required tough stuff.

I went for a walk in the old-growth forest, full of the beauty of the bird-life and the trees, to find myself suddenly just outside the boundary of the logging exclusion zone (explained below). Suddenly confronted by the scar of a logging road and the roar of chainsaws, I understood the destruction of the forests compared with the beauty of nature. It cut me to the quick. But back in the camp I was excluded from strategy meetings and daily camp chores. ‘What’s said in the camp stays in the camp’, I was told. And I felt like an outsider.

But in 2011, I was invited to an open day in the Florentine. Someone from Still Wild Still Threatened contacted me and said: ‘we’re really interested in your research’. I presented some of my theoretical work and realised that a very different ethos from the 2008 visits now prevailed. The people were inclusive and welcoming – as interested in outreach as direct action. And Tasmania’s longest-running blockade, Camp Florentine, had since become a conservation movement icon. Anyone was now welcome at a strategy meeting; a young friend I took along was invited to stay the night in one of the tree-sits, to help cook a meal, to go on a guided bushwalk. People at the camp wanted to maintain it against the odds, and they needed financial support to do that, so the ‘closed shop’ was no more, and inclusivity was the order of the day.

Anatomy of a Forest Blockade: How the Camp Came To Be and How It Worked

Protest Action: Strategy, Tactics, and Key Terms Explained

Research Questions, Hypotheses, and a Synopsis of the Chapters

Jade had not written an Introduction when her illness forced her to abandon work on the thesis. It would have been one of the last things written – on my advice: I tell my students that, as long
as they are clear about what it is they wish to argue and how they intend to do it, it is best to leave the Introduction to last, so that they eventually write an Introduction to what has actually been written, not to what they expect to write. We had, however, discussed the requirements of an Introduction, and this is reflected in the sub-headings. And when I finally managed to access her computer I was pleasantly surprised to see that she had actually made a start. Jade had earlier written a short personal essay on her research for the university newsletter, and the material above is a reworking of some of that essay. PH]
Chapter 1: Theories of Metaphor

The linguistic status and function of metaphor has preoccupied philosophers and linguists for several decades. Theory tends to diverge along two paths, what we might call the ‘literality path’ (theories that focus upon the link between metaphor and its literal referent) and the ‘cognition path’ (theories of metaphor as revelation of conceptual construction rather than a merely poetic/linguistical device).

Associated Terms

To understand theories and philosophies of metaphor, it is useful to contextualise the term with related concepts such as analogy, synecdoche, metonymy and polysemy.

Analogy is an inference that if two or more things agree with one another in some respects they will probably agree in others; specifically:

1. a: resemblance in some particulars between things otherwise unlike:
   b: comparison based on such resemblance
2. correspondence between the members of pairs or sets of linguistic forms that serves as a basis for the creation of another form.

Synechdoche is: ‘a figure of speech by which a part is put for the whole, the whole for a part, the species for the genus, the genus for the species, or the name of the material for the thing made’. In comparison, metonymy is ‘a figure of speech consisting of the use of the name of one thing for that of another of which it is an attribute or with which it is associated (as ‘crown’ in ‘lands belonging to the crown’)’ (Merriam Webster Online, 2008). Polysemy refers to a term having multiple meanings.

In comparing metaphor to its associated terms, Denham explains:
synechdoches and metonyms ... operate by a fairly straightforward move of substitution: in the former, a species term is substituted for a genus, or a genus term for a species (‘twenty summers’ for ‘twenty years’, ‘that creature’ for ‘that man’); in the latter, a natural adjunct is substituted for the whole (‘the White House’ for the American President, or ‘boiling kettle’ for the water boiling in it). Apt metaphors, however, are not merely substitutive instruments of oblique reference, although they often do perform the function of obliquely referring. Metaphors serve an attributive function as well (where ‘attributive’ is used to cover any linguistic device by which properties, qualities, aspects, etc. are suggested, stated or implied of a sentential or discourse subject) (2000: 233).

This attributive function will be considered further. It is important to retain some focus on metaphor’s associated terms whilst exploring types of metaphor, philosophies of metaphor and the implications of metaphor for knowledge, truth, philosophy and the evolution of language. I first consider epiphor and diaphor, as the idea of two different types of metaphor appears to underpin much other literature on metaphor.

**Epiphor and Diaphor**

Wheelwright first distinguished between these two types of metaphor - epiphor and diaphor - in his book *Metaphor and Reality* (1962), and his work on epiphor and diaphor is reconsidered by Earl Mac Cormac in his 1985 book *A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor*. Epiphors are held to be metaphors whose primary function is to express, whilst diaphors are held to be metaphors whose primary function is to suggest (Mac Cormac, 1985: 38). Further, whilst a diaphor emphasizes the dissimilarity between referents, an epiphor is a metaphor that relies on features of similarity between the two referents at hand. To elaborate:

epiphors express insights of which we were previously unaware or only dimly aware until we confronted the metaphor. Their success depends on our ability to recognize features of similarity between the referents ... so successful do some epiphors become that they lose their semantic anomaly and fade into ordinary language. Through usage, the similarities between the referents of an epiphor are so well accepted that one or both of the words has an additional meaning added to its lexical entry in the dictionary (Mac Cormac, 1985: 39).
Mac Cormac offers ‘billboards are warts on the landscape’ as an example of an epiphor. He explains the similarities between a wart as an ugly protuberance on the skin, and a billboard as an ugly protuberance on the landscape. He also suggests that this epiphor may become common English usage if a definition of ‘wart’ becomes simply that of ‘an ugly protuberance’ as well as a protuberance specifically related to the skin. In contrast, ‘diaphors suggest new possible meanings by emphasizing the dissimilarities between the referents rather than expressing the similarities. No pure diaphors exist, for if there was no analogy between the parts of the metaphor, we could not understand it as intelligible’ (Mac Cormac 1985: 39). Gertrude Stein’s ‘toasted Susie is my icecream’ is the example of a diaphor offered by Mac Cormac. It is the juxtaposition of ‘toasted’ and ‘icecream’ that is most diaphoric within this statement.

The benefit to be gained from an exploration of epiphor and diaphor consists in epiphoric metaphors’ potential for lexicalisation:

an epiphor can remain an epiphor, expressive of analogies of the features of the two, normally unrelated referents. This often takes place in literature: poetic epiphors remain metaphors since they are only used when reading poetry. Other epiphors, however, become eliminated when the meaning of the attributes changes their meaning. Dictionaries add lexical meanings to words as lexicographers observe the widespread changes in usage in ordinary language (Mac Cormac, 1985: 42).

Lakoff and Johnson, in Philosophy in the Flesh: the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (1999), identify two long-standing views about the ‘literality’ of metaphor and its uses:

Those uses can be either (1) indirectly literal, in that their meaning must be reducible to literal concepts, or else (2) meaninglessly fanciful, in that they do not express literal ideas at all and thus have no meaning, but are only flights of the imagination. Theories of the first sort reduce all metaphor to “proper” but indirect, literal language, while theories of the second sort treat it either as irrelevant to meaning and irrational thought, one that, for better or worse, destabilizes meaning (1999:122).

This distinction will be examined further below, but presently it is worth considering its import for the distinction between epiphor and diaphor. It may be that those who follow the ‘indirectly
literal’ school of thought are referring to epiphors and the ‘meaninglessly fanciful’ notion is more applicable to diaphors. Mac Cormac has explained that epiphors often have a limited lifespan and can develop literal meaning through their lexical entry in dictionaries. Thus, one might say that epiphors are ‘indirectly literal’; in the sense that they involve the new usage of commonly-understood referents, but that their literality is latent and yet to come. Diaphors, however, have far more dissimilarity between their referents. One might say that diaphors are fanciful in respect to their lack of literality. I would argue against the meaninglessness of any metaphor, but certainly a diaphor would appear more fanciful than an epiphor.

‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Metaphors

Other writers, while not commenting specifically on epiphor and diaphor within their research on metaphor, offer insight for extended consideration of these terms. Harré et. al speak of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ metaphors in their 1999 book Greenspeak: a Study of Environmental Discourse. In the context of an examination of environmental discourse, Harré et.al. suggest that whilst a ‘good’ metaphor is one that encourages understanding of the issue at hand, a ‘bad’ metaphor is one that encourages misunderstanding or further complicates an already complex issue. Though Harré et.al. specifically speak of metaphors within environmental discourse, this idea of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ metaphors can be applied to a general exploration of metaphor, for instance, in the hypothetical case of deciding whether epiphors are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than diaphors. In the context of encouraging understanding, epiphors might be considered ‘good’ or ‘better’, than diaphors. Certainly, it appears easier to understand ‘billboards are warts upon the landscape’ than ‘toasted Susie is my icecream’. However, it may be that a diaphoric metaphor is more thought-provoking, or more creative of meaning. A metaphor that provides more dissimilarity between its referents may be better able to provoke consideration of the referents at hand and new insight into understanding and the utilisation of these terms, outside of their mainstream, most commonly utilised or ‘first order’ definitions. Harré et al. say of metaphors: ‘they are tools meant to help us explore the unknown and as tools they are either useful, harmful or useless but neither right nor wrong’ (1999: 109). Certainly, the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of a metaphor depends on its use and context.
Traditional Theories

Black (1962), Mac Cormac (1985) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) are just some of the more prominent authors who examine theories of metaphor (another, Ortony [1993], touches on presentation, pretense, categorization echoic mention and reminder theories). Though Black (1962) provides one of the earliest overviews of theories of metaphor, he does, however, draw heavily on the work of Richards (1936). Black distinguishes between substitution theory, comparison theory and interaction theory. He explains substitution theory thus: ‘any view which holds that a metaphorical expression is used in place of some equivalent literal expression, I shall call a substitution view of metaphor (I should like this label to cover also any analysis which views the entire sentence that is the locus of metaphor as replacing some set of literal sentences)’ (1962: 31). Comparison theory, is explained thus: ‘if a writer holds that a metaphor consists in the presentation of the underlying analogy or similarity, he will be taking what I shall call a comparison view of metaphor... this is a view of metaphor as a condensed or elliptical simile’ (1962: 35). Black uses the metaphor ‘Richard is a lion’ to demonstrate the differences between the substitution theory and the comparison theory. He explains:

In the first view, the sentence means approximately the same as ‘Richard is brave’; on the second, approximately the same as ‘Richard is like a lion’ (in being brave), the added words in brackets being understood but not explicitly stated. In the second translation, as in the first, the metaphorical statement is taken to be standing in place of some literal equivalent. But the comparison view provides a more elaborate paraphrase, inasmuch as the original statement is interpreted as being about lions as well as about Richard (1962: 36).

Kliebard (1982) paraphrases Black’s objections to the substitution theory and the comparison theory thus: ‘objection to both these theories is based in part on the idea that implicit in them are “objectively given” similarities between the two elements in a metaphor. It is better to say… that the metaphor creates a similarity than alluding to similarities that exist antecedently’ (13).

Ortony also criticises comparison theory. He states: ‘it is often claimed that metaphors are merely implicit... an essential component of certain kinds of language use, it is not the same thing
as such a use’ (1993: 344). In merely comparing the principal subject and the subsidiary subject through use of the comparison theory, one misses much new meaning to be gained about the principal subject. The comparison theory is lacking because some of the similarities between metaphor subjects are implicit, and emphasis should be on the creation of new meaning rather than on the existing similarities between referents. Further, ‘the problems posed by the existence of metaphors are also posed by the existence of similes, so that the reduction of metaphors to similes will contribute nothing to their solution’ (Ortony, 1993: 345).

The third of Black’s theories of metaphor, interaction theory (or ‘view’) is, he argues, ‘free from the main defects of substitution and comparison views’ (1962: 38). He explains it in the following way: ‘in the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is resultant of their interaction’ (1962: 38). Black explains that interaction theory is committed to the following seven claims:

1. A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects – a ‘principal’ subject and a ‘subsidiary’ one.
2. These subjects are often best regarded as ‘systems of things’ rather than ‘things’.
3. The metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system of ‘associated implications’ characteristic of the subsidiary subject.
4. These implications usually consist of ‘commonplaces’ about the subsidiary subject, but may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant implications established ad hoc by the writer.
5. The metaphor selects, emphasised, suppresses, and organises features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject.
6. This involves shifts in the meaning of words belonging to the same family or system as the metaphorical expression; and some of these shifts, though not all, may be metaphorical transfers. (The subordinate metaphors are, however, to be read less ‘emphatically’.)
7. There is, in general, no simple ‘ground’ for the necessary shifts of meaning – no blanket reason why some metaphors work and others fail (1962: 44).

In Ortony’s 1993 book, Metaphor and Thought, Black revisits interaction theory. He revises his original formulations on interaction theory with minor improvements (1993: 27). For example, he prefers to speak of a primary subject and a secondary subject rather than principal and subsidiary ones. For the ‘system of associated commonplaces’, relevant to the secondary subject, he instead uses the label ‘implicative complex’ (1993: 28). Other theories include those named
‘traditional theory’ and ‘commonsense theory’ by Lakoff and Johnson, ‘tension theory’ and ‘deviance theory’, by Mac Cormac, and ‘controversion theory’ which both Lakoff and Johnson and Mac Cormac examine. Though no one theory or combination of theories creates a complete understanding of metaphor, each adds to the debate and encourages further exploration of the function of metaphor in modern English language. Lakoff and Johnson explain: ‘if you hold traditional views about metaphor, then you inherit views about what reality is, how language is connected to the world, whether we can have objective knowledge, and even what morality is’ (1999: 118). They explain ‘traditional theory’ as follows:

1. Metaphor is a matter of words, not thought. Metaphor occurs when a word is applied not to what it normally designates, but to something else.
2. Metaphorical language is not part of ordinary conventional language. Instead, it is novel and typically arises in poetry, rhetorical attempts at persuasion, and scientific discovery.
3. Metaphorical language is deviant. In metaphor, words are not used in their proper senses.
4. Conventional metaphorical expressions in ordinary everyday language are “dead metaphors”, that is, expressions that once were metaphorical but have become frozen into literal expressions.
5. Metaphors express similarities. That is, there are pre-existing similarities between what words normally designate and what they designate when they are used metaphorically (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 119).

This ‘traditional’ view of metaphor has long prevailed: ‘the traditional theory of metaphor has persisted for twenty-five hundred years in the philosophical and literary traditions, and the weight of all that tradition cannot be easily overcome by empirical evidence for the existence of conceptual metaphor’ (1999: 119). Lakoff and Johnson provide a more detailed, extensive critique of traditional theory in Chapter 8 (Metaphor and Truth) of their book.

They compare ‘traditional theory’ to ‘commonsense theory’ (sometimes called ‘commonsense folk theory’):

if the commonsense theory were true, metaphor would not serve the central function of language, which is supposedly to communicate and express literal truths about the world. Because of this, metaphor has been traditionally relegated to a theory of tropes, which is intended to handle uses of language in which truth is not thought to be at issue: poetry, rhetorical flourish, fictional discourse, and so on. The banishment of metaphor from the realm of truth
explains why metaphor has traditionally been left to rhetoric and literary analysis rather than being taken seriously by science, mathematics, and philosophy, which are seen as truth-seeking enterprises (1999: 120).iii.

Commonsense (folk) theory is compared to traditional theory: ‘there is only one way the world is. Our language consists of words expressing ideas that literally fit the world... much of Western philosophy has turned the commonsense folk theory into an expert, objectivist theory’ (1999: 120).

**Forms of Traditional Metaphor Theory**

‘Controversion theory’ was first presented by Monroe Beardsley in his book *Aesthetics* (1958). This theory asserts that every metaphor taken literally constitutes a false statement: ‘a commitment to the controversion theory puts the creator of a metaphor in the position of intentionally formulating a false statement in order to convey a new idea’ (Mac Cormac, 1985: 207). It is a traditional theory in that ‘a metaphor is a significant attribution that is either indirectly self-contradictory or obviously false in its context, and in which the modifier connotes characteristics that can be attributed, truly or falsely, to the subject’ (Beardsley, 1976: 142). Here we have a theory that is primarily concerned with literality and a desire to cement the meaning of referents. The central assumption of controversion theory (as articulated by both Lakoff and Johnson and Mac Cormac) can be likened to traditional theory’s assertion that metaphorical language is deviant in regard to what these theories purport to be the inherent falsity of combining previously unrelated referents. Mac Cormac’s articulations of controversion theory and deviance theory are an elaboration and separation of the ‘traditional theories’ that Lakoff and Johnson critique.

Mac Cormac examines controversion theory in the context of related discussions of tension theory and deviance theory. He introduces these thus: ‘theorists of metaphor have located the difference between metaphor and analogy in (1) the emotional tension generated by the juxtaposition on anomalous referents (the tension theory), (2) (the controversion theory), and (3) the ungrammaticality of the juxtaposition of the two referents (the deviance theory)’ (1985: 25).
All are needed because: ‘each of these contains a partial truth, but none of them satisfactorily offers an adequate demarcation’ (1985: 26). Mac Cormac’s deviance theory is most similar to Lakoff and Johnson’s traditional theory and also deals with the notion of deviant use (misuse) of language. He offers this chronology: ‘transformational generative grammarians early held that metaphors violated grammatical rules and therefore were deviant linguistic structures’ (1985: 30), however, ‘recognizing that metaphors can involve words as referents that change their semantic markers led grammarians to admit that metaphors are semigrammatical devices’ (1985: 31). This recognition led to further assertions: ‘metaphors cannot be presented as fully grammatical because they violate semantic rules. Yet, neither can they be viewed as absolutely deviant in grammar because so many of them die and become part of ordinary language through the change in meaning of their referents’ (1985: 31). This ‘dying’ of metaphor will be considered further. Further, ‘grammars that view metaphor as deviant may themselves all fail to present a theory of metaphor that can differentiate successfully between metaphor and nonmetaphor’ (1985: 32).

Mac Cormac concludes his chronology thus: ‘the deviance theory defines metaphor as an intentional misuse of language and assumes that a semantical theory should not encompass metaphor. But metaphor pervades language so extensively that any semantic theory that excludes metaphor fails as a linguistic theory by being far too narrow’ (1985: 33). Deviance theory is, then, of limited utility in explaining the place of metaphor in English language. Does controversion theory, in Mac Cormac’s view, take us any further?

‘The controversion theory’, Mac Cormac writes, ‘differentiates between metaphor and ordinary language by observing that a literal reading of a metaphor produces statements that are false. To avoid this falsehood, the metaphor must be read speculatively, as if it were true or false’ (1985:28). Further, ‘to eliminate the intentional perpetration of falsehood by otherwise honest people, metaphors must be either paraphrased or converted into statements of similarity – analogy’ (1985: 28). Here we realise the ‘controversy’: ‘this controversion to a simile (as if) with further restriction of the features to those that are similar prevents falsehood but robs the metaphor of its suggestive meaning. Paraphrase to ordinary language and reduction to explicit analogy makes true metaphors a subset of analogies. Metaphors that have not been paraphrased or reduced to analogy remain falsehoods’ (Mac Cormac 1985: 29). Herein lies the inherent problem of controversion theory, as it: ‘poses a dilemma for the philosopher seeking an
explanatory account of metaphor: either metaphors assert falsehoods or the only legitimate metaphors are the least interesting ones, the ones that collapse into ordinary language or into explicit analogy’ (1985: 29).

The ‘collapsing’ of metaphor into ordinary language will be examined further in relation to the ‘dying’ of metaphors. Now, however, having noted the shortcomings in controversion theory, we turn to tension theory. Mac Cormac suggests:

metaphors can be partially true and partially false, that the truth or falsity of a metaphor is not an either/or matter but rather a matter of degrees. In the respect that the attributes of the two referents are similar, the metaphor can be said to be true, whereas with respect to the difference of certain attributes it can be said to be false. The more suggestive the metaphor, the greater the degree of falsity; the more expressive of analogy, the greater degree of truth. As a corollary, the more suggestive, the more tensive a metaphor (1985: 30).

Tension theory specifically focuses on the emotional implications of metaphor, concerning which Mac Cormac asks: ‘why would a poet or even a scientist choose to misuse language intentionally, producing false statements in order to produce an emotively meaningful statement? Human beings, unless they wish to lie or deceive, usually do not intentionally set out to produce false but meaningful statements’ (1985: 27). Rather:

the poet wants to express an insight or suggest a possible new and creative meaning and resorts to an unusual juxtaposition of words that he or she hopes will convey a glimmer of truth, not express an obvious falsehood. We may feel some meaning in a metaphor, but that meaning cannot rest solely on emotion; it must have some cognitive support. Few words depend solely on their emotive import for their meaning; most depend on recognition of their cognitive content (1985:27).

Mac Cormac explains that the tension in a metaphor is produced by falsehood, ungrammaticality, unfamiliarity, or some combination of the three. Further:

the metaphor may become less ungrammatical, and its falsehood diminishes through modification of the metaphor. Familiarity reduces tension and thereby may eliminate falsehood and ungrammaticality. This indeed brings about a most peculiar state of affairs – a hypothetical theory
or speculative poetic insight can become true not through the confirmation of experience but through continued expression of a metaphor. Through continued misuse, tension lowers, truth increases, and the utterance becomes grammatical. Truth and grammatical deviance become functions of emotional tension. When tension disappears, truth and proper grammar appear.

Tension is not a characteristic of all metaphor, and a linguistic usage does not necessarily cease to be a metaphor when tension disappears. As Mac Cormac explains: ‘many metaphors are characterized by tension, but other metaphors remain metaphors even though they have lost their psychological shock. These often entice people into believing that they are literal rather than metaphorical, presenting a clear and present danger to the poet and scientist’ (Mac Cormac 1985: 28). It is time to turn to the issue of ‘live’, ‘dead’ and ‘moribund’ metaphors in relation to the literalisation of metaphor.

In her 2003 paper ‘Live, moribund, and dead metaphors’, Christina Alm Arvius suggests that as well as ‘live’ metaphors and ‘dead’ metaphors, ‘moribund’ (dying) metaphors also exist. She explains that a dead metaphor ‘denotes vocabulary items that have lost their metaphorical character’, whilst moribund metaphors are ‘uses that potentially retain their metaphorical quality, even if it is ordinarily not so obvious’. A live metaphor is defined as: ‘a use whose understanding is necessarily dependent on a source meaning, which is usually literal and concrete’ (2003: 7). Mac Cormac’s observation that metaphors may ‘collapse’ into ordinary language refers to the lexicalisation of metaphor of which Alm Arvius writes. She explains:

> lexicalisation does not just mean that a particular use has become a conventional part of a language system. It also means that a secondary sense has acquired sense relations within the language, and that it will be connected with certain idiomatic constructions. As a result, a lexicalised metaphor tends not to be strictly dependent on its source sense. Instead it is now itself stored in the vocabulary of a language, and directly associated with both particular lexical and grammatical characteristics (2003: 8).

The step Alm Arvius takes, however, that many philosophers of metaphor do not, is to attempt to distinguish between a dead and a dying metaphor. In doing so, she explains that the ‘death’ of a metaphor is not merely a matter of lexicalisation alone:
even if lexicalisation is a necessary condition for metaphor death, it is not a sufficient one. Instead it is obvious that as long as a use retains a polysemous relation with its source, it can be ‘revived’; that is, its metaphorical character is at least obvious on closer scrutiny, or when this secondary use is compared to a more basic application of a lexical word or multi-word idiomatic expression. In short, such lexical uses are at the most moribund (2003: 9).

Further, ‘a dead metaphor ... is no longer connected with a more basic source meaning. Instead it has become “literalised”, and its metaphorical origin is only revealed if we look at its history, or etymology’ (2003: 10). Also, ‘the difference between dead metaphors and merely moribund ones is thus that the latter retain a polysemous connection with some source contents, while this historical semantic link has been erased in dead metaphors’ (2003: 12). If we are to accept Alm Arvius’s particular theory on metaphor and lexicalisation, we must accept that there are in fact very few truly ‘dead’ metaphors and that many that other theorists consider to be dead are probably actually moribund, in the sense that they can be revived as their source meanings are revisited. One example of a dead metaphor provided by Alm Arvius is ‘pedigree’. She suggests: ‘borrowing a word which has metaphorical meaning in the contributing language typically results in literalisation in the recipient language’ (2003: 11). ‘Pedigree... appears to have originated from a metaphorical use of the French *ped de gris*, meaning literally “foot of a grouse”... or Middle English *pedegru* from Old French *pie de grue*, meaning “crane’s foot”’ (2003: 11). Alm Arvius extrapolates:

> Lexicalisation is often mentioned as the reason for metaphor death, but things seem in fact to be far more complicated ... highly proficient speakers of a language may sometimes differ as regards their interpretation of metaphors. Although a use may, say, be a moribund metaphor to one individual, someone else may tend to experience it as a live or transparent metaphor. In addition, the metaphorical character or a lexicalised use may be more obvious in certain contexts than in others (2003: 12).

We need to examine further this matter of speaker and sentence meaning to better understand interpretation of metaphor.
Searle suggests that: ‘the main problem of metaphor is to explain how speaker meaning and sentence meaning are different and how they are, nevertheless, related. Such an explanation is impossible if we suppose that sentence or word meaning has changed in metaphorical utterance’ (1993: 91). The notion of speaker meaning is comparable to that of first and second-order meaning. In explaining first and second-order meaning, Kittay provides the example: ‘the rock is becoming brittle with age’ (1987:42). The first-order meaning of rock could be a literal meaning: ‘naturally-occurring solid material matter’. A second-order meaning might be: ‘old, stalwart Emeritus Professor’, which is metaphorical rather than literal. Kittay explains, ‘the semantic rules which metaphors break are the ones governing first-order discourse. These are rules governing discourse in which we are to assume that the applied timeless meanings are coincident with the utterance type’s occasion meaning’ (1987: 50). Knowing whether or not such rules have been broken may be a matter of knowing both the subject being referenced and knowing (or at least sympathising with) the speaker, and in this sense, knowing the ‘truth’ of the matter at hand and the relevance of the metaphor. Kittay offers another metaphorical example: ‘Smith is a plumber’, and suggests, ‘it is metaphorical if we know that Smith is not a plumber but a surgeon’ (1987: 100). Again, the relevance and interpretation of the metaphor depends on the listener/reader’s knowledge of Smith and also their personal truth and knowledge regarding analogies between surgery and plumbing. If metaphors and analogies comparing plumbing and surgery become common, the ‘plumber’ referent may take on a second-order lexical definition related to surgery. Further, ‘metaphorical meaning has to do with the capabilities of language to generate meaning. When a term is used metaphorically, a “new” sense is created. Yet we want clearly to distinguish metaphorical sense from merely another sense such as we might locate in a dictionary’ (Kittay, 1987: 121).

It may be that a metaphor is simply a future literal definition undergoing transition. The English language is fluid; meanings and definitions of terms change and evolve, words take on additional meanings, whilst others become obsolete. It may be that a metaphor signals the beginning of a new definition, and once that usage becomes commonplace and listed as second-order within a dictionary, it ceases to be metaphorical. To use a life metaphor, it may be that in the ‘birthing’ of a new lexical definition, the metaphor is now ‘dead’. Certainly, ‘metaphor is a means available within natural language to extend that expressive capacity in often radical ways. We use
metaphor when the resources of literal language are inadequate to articulate significant distinctions or unities’ (Kittay, 1987: 125).

It is imperative to consider the implications of metaphor not only for truth but for knowledge.

Mac Cormac offers three explanatory levels relevant to metaphor:

1. A surface level in which metaphors appear in linguistic form
2. A deeper level of linguistic explanation

In presenting these explanatory levels, he explains: ‘the mental formation of metaphors constructs a linguistic bridge from the embodied mind to culture. New metaphors change the culture in which we live, thereby affecting the ways in which humans interact with their environment’ (1985: 177). Certainly, ‘the human mind combines concepts that are not normally associated to form new concepts’ (Mac Cormac, 1985: 127). Further:

    when we speak of metaphor as a knowledge process, we include in that knowledge process the cognitive activity of the mind, the activities of the brain on which the mind depends for its operations, and the interaction of the mind with its environment. I describe the latter as a form of interaction between biological and cultural evolution brought about by the formation of new metaphors’ (1985: 127).

It is in this sense that language and behaviour really cannot be separated, or, perhaps, we see that pure objectivity in language and discourse is impossible as all language choice is based on this cognitive process and the environmental interactions that underpin such cognition. Thus, ‘new metaphors change the culture in which we live, thereby affecting the ways in which humans interact with their environment. These changes in the culture are a form of cultural evolution, and the interaction of the human body (including the brain) in turn affects biological evolution’ (Mac Cormac, 1985: 128). If we are to consider biological evolution in a more specific context, say, the ecological evolution of a particular island community, one could make similarly philosophical observation on the interactions of metaphor (language) and cultural evolution in relation to the environmental politics and management of that island environment: specifically, the ways the
environmental situation is conceptualised and how this conceptualisation relates to the way the environment is managed and, thus, how it evolves. Mac Cormac considers the movement from mind to culture a movement from level 3 to level 1, in terms of the three explanatory levels of metaphor listed above.

In considering explanatory level 3 – ‘the deepest level of cognitive activity’ – Mac Cormac deals with memory, creativity, imagery and features of similarity and dissimilarity (1985: 128). In referring to the role of memory in metaphor creation, Mac Cormac explains: ‘undergirding such a creative formation must be a semantical organization of concepts in the long-term memory that does not prohibit such a juxtaposition’ (1985: 128). Put simply, a person’s memory must marry two concepts to a point where their use as a metaphor is not ludicrous to the creator of that metaphor. Mac Cormac agrees with the weight of psychological opinion that long term memory is composed of words and concepts and not merely words alone. Though comprised of concepts and names, some concepts are not named, for example, emotions that have not been defined to the point of naming. Thus, ‘a poet attempting to express an event passionately experienced searches through his lexicon of words stored in his memory as the proper expression of the vividly remembered emotional experience (a nonverbal concept in the long-term memory)’ (1985: 129). It is at this point that tension arises between psychologists, philosophers and linguists on the subject of metaphor. Psychologists suggest a division into two types of long-term memory. These are episodic memory and semantic memory. Episodic memory refers to the personal remembrances of each individual whilst semantic memory refers to more general information, such as the semantic meaning of words that are learnt and remembered by all. Whilst psychological study embraces the possibility of these two long-term memory types, linguistic studies of metaphor suggest that the stated division between the two is not so. Further:

the inventor of a metaphor retrieves from the long-term memory combinations of words that are not normally associated, and the motivation for doing so may arise from particular experiences etched in the episodic memory. If retrieval from the semantic long-term memory operated in the same fashion for everyone, then the possibility of creating novelty would seem unlikely ... in allowing the episodic memory to fuse with the semantic memory in long-term memory storage, the origin of memory creation may lie in personal experience and not just arise from the semantic aspects of language learning fixed in memory (Mac Cormac 1985: 130).
Mac Cormac’s insight may help to explain the indigeneity of language and language use. It may be that a collective culture and history is directly related to the shared metaphors and language of a community or place.

The creativity of metaphor resides in the new conceptual possibilities to be found in the combining of referents never before combined. This creativity can be extensive and immeasurable when new metaphors enter the media, politics or other powerful discursive realms. Basically:

the creation of a new metaphor occurs when an individual juxtaposes conceptual referents never before combined, producing both a semantic anomaly and a new conceptual insight. This new metaphoric expression surprises us both with its strange grammatical form and its suggestion of a new possible way of looking at an event or at the world. The mark of a creative poet, scientist, or theologian arises from the individual’s ability to step outside of the normal way of conceiving of things and to reconceive them in a new conceptual system expressed in highly suggestive metaphoric language (Mac Cormac 1985: 136).

Arthur Koestler sought to describe the cognitive process underlying creation in his book *The Act of Creation* (1964). He separated what he calls bisociation from association: ‘in creative acts of humour, discovery, and art, bisociation results from an excess of human energy... new ideas are thrown up spontaneously like mutations; the vast majority of them are useless, the equivalent of biological freaks without survival-value’ (1964: 226). Here Koestler compares the creation of successful metaphors to that of genetic determination. Whether or not one chooses to accept this analogy, it is worth considering what, here, is considered to be a successful metaphor. Koestler appears to suggest that a successful metaphor is one that survives, perhaps one that remains within language to such an extent that it becomes a ‘dead’ metaphor (as already discussed in the comparison of epiphors and diaphors); one that comes to be accorded dictionary definition. Against this Mac Cormac argues: ‘unlike biological evolution... the evolution of ideas is an ever-repeated process that does not end in ecological niches’ (1985: 137). It may be, however, that some discursive realms harbour resident metaphors that bypass the evolutionary process of language: that, rather than continuing because they are successful, in fact remain, and are
perpetuated especially (and ironically) to preclude evolution of thought and its resultant biological consequences. Hill and Johnson offer this insight within their discussion of ‘worldview’: ‘when aspects of a particular metaphor are valued, personally and culturally, they take on the moral significance of truth and can serve to influence goals and direct actions... metaphors also serve to organize our worldview. A worldview equips a person with an understanding of the world, especially the relationships of the different aspects of the world to each other’ (2003: 20). Further:

worldviews and their embedded metaphors can become dysfunctional – as are many currently in favour – such as development and progress. A pertinent example of a dysfunctional metaphor is growth, an honorific word in modern society. We are told we should be growing in economic output, in population, and in wealth, prestige, stature, and complexity. This has been taken to its extreme in globalization (Johnson and Hill, 2003: 20).

Considering the implications of imagery for metaphor, Mac Cormac observes: ‘sometimes the comprehension of a metaphor depends on a visual image rather than on a linguistic understanding of the referents’ (1985: 141). Certainly, when a word possesses several listed definitions, it may be that two people have a very different comprehension of what that referent represents. To have an understanding, that is, a personal definition of that referent, a person has accompanying mental imagery. When we speak of something being mental, in this case, mental imagery, we are referring to the total emotional and intellectual response of an individual to an external reality. In the case of metaphor, this is a person’s mental reaction to hearing or reading a metaphor and the immediate mental imagery that it evokes for the individual. It is often the case that metaphorical language is used for the express purpose of engineering particular images which people commonly associate with language uses. Writers on this matter include Pylyshyn (1973), Paivio (1971), and Kosslyn (1980). Briefly, Pylyshyn sees all mental imagery reduced to propositions - whilst not all referents can be conceptualised in terms of images, all images can be expressed as propositions. Paivio sees metaphor comprehension as involving separate processes whereby imagery is comprehended on the one hand, and semantic similarities and dissimilarities are comprehended within another cognitive process. The reactions of these two processes are combined through a meditational process to form a single interpretation of the metaphor. This can be elucidated through consideration of the difference between what is mental and what is
conceptual. While both involve the mind and, thus, the intellect, the mental imagery evoked by a metaphor is the immediate images the two referents symbolise (for a particular individual). The conceptual imagery is the ensuing concept and image of the concept that the combined referents produce, mentally, for the individual. While the mental images of referents may be quite similar from person to person, the conceptual imagery produced by metaphor comprehension is likely to be more diverse, particularly in the case of diaphor comprehension. Like Pylyshyn, Kosslyn also deals with propositions and the notion of a propositional hierarchy.

Recognising features of similarity and dissimilarity between two referents is a product of the human perceptual system and the long-term memory. The more salient stimulus (the prototype) is selected as referent and the less salient stimulus (the variant) as subject. The example presented by Mac Cormac is that ‘we say “the portrait resembles the person” rather than “the person resembles the portrait”’ (1985: 145). Further, ‘the salience of similarity features changes according to the context’ (1985: 145). Salience is a worthy consideration in the analysis of particular metaphors and for exploration of features of similarity and dissimilarity, particularly regarding epiphor and diaphor.

Language is an evolutionary process in the sense that it shapes human interaction generally and, therefore, human interaction with the non-human world. It is an instrument for human survival. Metaphor plays a large part in this process. Mac Cormac explains: ‘our very language ability depends on the capacity of the brain to recognize and generate language and the symbols used in this transmission are shaped by culture’ (1985: 149). Further, ‘metaphors bring about changes in the ways in which we perceive the world, and these conceptual changes often bring about changes in the ways in which we act in the world’ (1985: 149). Mac Cormac describes the somewhat cyclical nature of long-term memory and societal language use whereby, ‘new metaphors change the stock of language used by society, which in turn becomes stored in long-term memory, thereby changing human conceptual activity. Changes in culture can change the environment, thereby affecting the biological adaptability of the human organism. Thus, through conceptual metaphoric changes in language biological evolution may be influenced’ (1985: 150). It would be useful if researchers were to follow particular metaphors and attempt to describe how their use has impacted upon biological evolution. As Mac Cormac notes, in his study of the metaphor of
the mind as a mirror for nature, ‘biological changes occur over such relatively long periods that
the possible influence of this metaphor on biological evolution is presumed; it cannot be shown
directly’ (1985: 151). It may however be possible to research specific biological and/or
environmental processes and associated metaphors that cover a shorter time frame, and thereby
produce more conclusive results. White offers further insight into the possibilities of metaphor
for the evolution of language:

if, whatever else it does, a metaphor sets up a comparison, which the reader is
invited to explore, then the most obvious fact about that comparison is that the
number of relevant respects in which two things can be compared is not fixed,
but is open-ended, and that the reader can continue to see ever fresh points of
comparison. Even in the context, there need be no definite limit to the
properties of one object that are relevant to its comparison with another (White,

Metaphors are invitations to explore comparisons; those comparisons are only limited by the
imagination. Furthermore, a metaphor does not offer a comparison between two things, but,
rather, a comparison between two situations. A situation would appear more fluid and
changeable than a set ‘thing’. In this sense, situations ought to be as changeable as the language
used to describe them.

Finally, it is worth considering the implications of metaphor for meaning. Word meaning
presents something of a dilemma in that: ‘if the meanings of words and sentences were not stable,
communication would be impossible ... on the other hand, if the meanings of words could not
change, the formulation of new hypothetical meanings through metaphors would also be
impossible’ (Mac Cormac 1985: 181). Mac Cormac notes the oft-suggested function of time as
an explanation for both the changeability and stability of word meaning: ‘at any one time the
possible meanings of words remains fixed (synchrony), whereas over time the meanings of words
change (diachrony), especially through the use of metaphors’ (1985: 181). But he disputes this
explanation: ‘in metaphor we must be able to understand at the same time both the ordinary stable
meanings of the literal sense of the referents and the new possibilities of meanings proposed by
the hypothetical aspects of the metaphor’ (1985: 181). Whilst meaning is difficult to describe and
no one definition will suffice, ‘an adequate theory of meaning includes semantical aspects,
emotive aspects, speech act aspects, contextual aspects, and cultural aspects’ (Mac Cormac, 1985:
Theorists such as Cohen believe a theory of meaning should be based on the timelessness of semantic rules and the temporal features of events in the world (1966: 22). It would appear that both measurable time and timelessness have a role to play in the creation of lexical meaning. Mac Cormac suggests: ‘one cannot understand a metaphor unless one knows both the usual semantic associations of the referents and the suggested new associations composed of both similar and dissimilar features’” (1985: 185). Whilst this is somewhat true, the situation may not be so simple. Speaker and hearer may be in disagreement over what is ‘usual’ and what is ‘new’. Speech act, context and culture are the realms (along with features of similarity and dissimilarity) that Mac Cormac considers imperative for the creation of meaning through metaphor.

Metaphor as a speech act also conveys the emotive feelings of the speaker and may provoke additional and sometimes different emotive feelings in the hearer. Context offers a pragmatic interpretation of which possible meaning of a metaphor to accept. Context suggests which novel juxtapositions of similarities and dissimilarities among semantic features to accept for this particular metaphor. Culture offers not only a larger context with which to embed the metaphor, thereby affecting its meaning, but also a place where metaphors can have meaning in the sense of significance, rather than being just instruments of communication (1985: 185).

Research concerning a particular metaphor or discursive situation needs to involve a detailed analysis of all four realms.

In an attempt to explain metaphor and meaning, Moran states:

often we will want to say that a statement which is wildly false when taken literally is quite true when taken figuratively. And from here it is natural to reason in the following way. Truth-values cannot vary unless truth-conditions vary, and if the truth conditions of an utterance are what determine its meaning, then the literal and the metaphorical interpretations of an utterance amount to differences in meaning (1997: 251).

Such observations offer a return to Mac Cormac’s work on metaphor and creativity in relation to episodic and semantic memory. As each individual’s life experiences are different, so too are the connotations and meanings attached to the words which form our shared languages.
Black’s interaction theory and Mac Cormac’s tension theory are two theories that ‘work’ in that they offer much to a general understanding of metaphors. They are theories that can be applied to modern discursive situations in an attempt to understand complex metaphors present in areas such as the media, whilst theories such as Lakoff and Johnson’s traditional theory are misleading, even for the examination of poetic metaphors. A final theory worthy of examination is that of conceptual metaphor.

*Conceptual Metaphor*

Having discussed the various traditional theories that relate to metaphor as a linguistic and literary device, it is now necessary to consider the wider conceptual implications of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson introduce the theory of conceptual metaphor in their 1980 book, *Metaphors We Live By*, written prior to the aforementioned *Philosophy in the Flesh: the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*. This work on conceptual metaphor should be considered the furthest step along the ‘cognition path’. Its importance can be explained thus:

> our conceptual system is not something that we are normally aware of. In most of the little things we do every day, we simply think and act more or less automatically along certain lines. Just what these lines are is by no means obvious. One way to find out is by looking at language. Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like (1980: 3).

This theory is at odds with traditional theories discussed previously. In essence, conceptual metaphor theory submits that metaphors are not merely linguistic devices - they are, in fact, conceptual. The authors explain: ‘our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature’ (1980: 3). Further, ‘our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor’ (1980: 3). Most importantly, ‘since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like’ (1980: 3). Here we
begin to see the importance of Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory for informing us of the role metaphor plays in human behaviour. The authors explain conceptual metaphor in terms of a source domain and a target domain. Basically, the source domain is the conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions and the target domain is the conceptual domain that we try to understand. Conceptual metaphors typically employ a more abstract concept as target and a more concrete or physical concept as their source.

Lakoff and Johnson present the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR as an example of the systematicity of conceptual metaphor. They explain: ‘because the metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is systematic’ (1980: 7).

The ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is reflected in everyday language by a variety of expressions, including the following:

Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I’ve never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments (1980: 4).

In explaining the extensive systematicity of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson invite the reader to imagine a culture where argument is not conceptualised as war, but rather, conceptualised as a dance. The inadequacy of the war conceptualisation is explained by them in this way: ‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’ and in this instance:

it is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different types of things – verbal discourse and armed conflict – and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured (1980: 5).
It is here that Lakoff and Johnson suggest the greatest challenge in metaphor research. This involves taking metaphors that are most ingrained within a culture; those that are systematic in the conceptual subconscious, realising them, mapping them, and imagining alternatives that may better serve society.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory is that of highlighting and hiding. The systematicity that allows a concept to be comprehended in terms of another necessarily hides other aspects of the concept. Returning to the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, when conceptualising argument in terms of battle, we miss all the cooperative aspects of a verbal argument, the fact that people arguing are sharing time and opinions, usually rationally, and the fact that such a discourse can be productive. Highlighting and hiding is of great relevance when considering metaphor within culture and the way a culture is shaped by particular metaphors. Are the most appropriate concepts being highlighted? Are the least important concepts being hidden? And if conceptual metaphors are embedded within culture to the extent that we are generally unaware of them, is it possible to reshape a culture by revising embedded dysfunctional metaphors?

Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphor also offers insight into discussion of live, dead and moribund metaphors. Such issues are viewed entirely differently when metaphor is regarded as a matter of mental conception rather than one of mere literality and lexicalisation. Lakoff and Johnson offer an opinion through a discussion of the ‘partial nature of metaphorical structuring’. They use the example of the metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON. In explaining the partial nature of metaphorical structuring, they explain that the only part of this metaphor in general use is that of ‘the foot of the mountain’. We do not, for example, usually refer to the head or shoulders of a mountain. The expression is an instance of an isolated metaphorical concept. Lakoff and Johnson explain:

examples like foot of the mountain are idiosyncratic, unsystematic and isolated. They do not interact with other metaphors, play no particularly interesting role in our conceptual system, and hence are not metaphors that we live by. The only signs of life they have is that they can be extended in subcultures and that their unused portions serve as the basis for (relatively uninteresting) novel metaphors (1980: 55).
So, whilst philosophers such as Alm Arvius believe dead metaphors are those that are used so extensively that they have lost their ‘shock value’ once entering into general English usage and even gaining dictionary entry, Lakoff and Johnson submit that these metaphors are the ones that are most alive: ‘expressions like wasting time, attacking positions, going our separate ways, etc., are reflections of systematic metaphorical concepts that structure our actions and thoughts. They are alive in the most fundamental sense: they are metaphors we live by. The fact that they are conventionally fixed within the lexicon of English makes them no less alive’ (1980: 55). It is worth returning to the fourth tenet of the Traditional Theory presented by Lakoff and Johnson in *Philosophy in the Flesh: the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*:

4. Conventional metaphorical expressions in ordinary everyday language are ‘dead metaphors’, that is, expressions that once were metaphorical but have become frozen into literal expressions.

Here the philosopher is offered the option of choosing between literality and cognition paths. If the philosopher (or researcher) is more interested in the metaphor’s function within, say, linguistics and written language it may be more useful to examine particular metaphors’ literality, possibly in terms of ‘liveness’ and ‘morbidity’. If the researcher is more interested in a metaphor’s implications for meaning, truth and culture it is probably less useful to concern himself with issues of literality, lexicalisation and dictionary definition but to look more to the cognition path and the extent to which metaphors may or may not be systematic within a given cultural situation.

Whilst a substantial body of work exists on metaphor theory, the subject appears so complex that the scope for further research is infinite. Certainly, literature to date suggests that there are no definitive answers on matters such as meaning, truth and knowledge, when metaphor is examined generically. Work on metaphor and culture, particularly Mac Cormac’s research on the implications of metaphor for society, and thus, biology, suggests that lexical and biological timeframes are simply too long for conclusive research to be undertaken. Rather, it is worth considering particular metaphors and/or discursive realms and their implications for society and environment within temporal and spatial limits. The tenets of speech act, culture, context, and
features of similarity and dissimilarity are worthwhile starting points, as is a consideration of the metaphor’s epiphoric and diaphoric elements. The traditional theorists have provided a sound and necessary basis for understanding the literalist elements of the English language that metaphors undermine. Theorists dealing with cognition have gone a step further in exploring issues of truth, meaning and culture corresponding to metaphor in a generic sense. What is now required is detailed analysis of particular metaphors in relation to their consequences for human culture and the biological community.

In their 1996 book *The Language of Environment: a New Rhetoric*, Myerson and Rydin present the proposition of ‘metaphorical argumentation’ in the realm of environmental discourse. The authors explain metaphorical argumentation by quoting Lakoff and Johnson’s work on conceptual metaphor. They explain: ‘metaphors affect each other and they interact: if time is a river then it is not a circle. Often the interaction is argumentative: if one metaphor applies, another falls aside’ (1996: 150). Myerson and Rydin offer the example of global warming as a conceptual environmental metaphor. They insist: ‘the metaphor creates and embodies the issue’ (1996: 150). They begin with the central metaphor of a greenhouse. They suggest that greenhouses embody warmth but also fragility. Further, ‘it is a metaphor in which nature and artifice meet – a greenhouse is a human contrivance to help nature’ (1996: 150). Myerson and Rydin attempt to map the global warming metaphor as ‘the greenhouse effect does refer to a creative process, without which the Earth would never have been warm enough for life’ (1996: 150). The greenhouse effect is the reverse: ‘a dense and smothering atmosphere’ (1996: 150). Just as Harré *et al.* have defined metaphors as ‘tools meant to help us explore the unknown’ (1999: 109), Myerson and Rydin explain that metaphorical argumentation is ‘used to try and define the indefinable, grasp the contradictory’ (1996: 152). Further, ‘there is metaphorical impaction with the play of metaphors, some overt, others implied. The metaphors structure the arguments, they reinforce points, and they make connections’ (1996: 151). The issue of global warming and its central greenhouse metaphor brings into play issues of perspectives, horizons, distances, prospects and time. It is also about care; both the greenhouse metaphor and warming suggest care, and this in turn invites questions about duty of care and disruption of care. After presenting other metaphors on population and the Earth, generally, the authors submit in conclusion:
metaphorical argumentation links environmental argument to fundamental themes of space and time, of how the world is imagined and represented. It is responsible for the scope and even grandeur of the environmental agendas. And it is also responsible for the density, the play of meanings, the presence of suggestion as well as precision in environmental arguments ... Environmental irony is about addressing the future, always a major dimension in environmental argument. Indeed, environmental argument is one of the main ways in which our culture seeks to address its possible futures. Meanwhile, associative argumentation makes links across different discussions and debates, bringing broader resonances into environmental topics (1996: 178).

Myerson and Rydin’s work can be considered in conjunction with that of Schon (1993). Schon introduces the notion of ‘generative metaphor’. He explains a tradition associated with metaphor that:

treats metaphor as central to the task of accounting for our perspectives on the world: how we think about things, make sense of reality, and set problems we later try to solve. In this second sense, ‘metaphor’ refers both to a certain kind of product – a perspective or frame, a way of looking at things – and to a certain kind of process – a process by which new perspectives of the world come into existence (1993:137).

Further, ‘our debates over social policy turn often not on problems but on dilemmas. The participants in the debate bring different and conflicting frames generated by different and conflicting metaphors’ (1993: 139).

Additional consideration of metaphor in discourse, particularly environmental discourse, should involve an investigation of features of similarity and dissimilarity between referents, context, culture and speech act. We have seen that metaphors are invitations to explore comparisons; a study of metaphor is also an invitation to explore the imagination. Exploration of conceptual and seemingly ‘dead’ metaphors may be the most difficult but possibly the most interesting when considering new possibilities for speaking, writing and conceptualising.
Chapter 2: Military Metaphor

We now turn to a specific use of metaphor within a variety of discursive realms. There is a ubiquity of military metaphor in the English language and particularly in environmental discourse. Metaphors for war are scrutinized here because such metaphors are crucial to shaping discourse. A variety of papers which look specifically at military metaphor, particularly within the environmental realm, are reviewed. Military metaphor within the media is also examined, as it is military metaphor in the realm of environmental protest, as constructed and deployed within the commercial media that have been most studied.

Metaphors for War

It should not be surprising that much public policy is involved with military manoeuvre and expenditure and that much political language, in turn, has been militarised. Military terminology includes signifiers such as ‘enemy’, ‘weapon’, ‘war’, ‘soldier’, ‘battle’ and ‘battlefield’. Such terms have original, first-order meanings and second-order meanings which are non-military and more recent. The terms become metaphorical when they are used to represent things that are not actually militant. Thorne explains: ‘over hundreds of years, the English language has undergone a steady process of militarisation. Words and phrases of military origin have entered mainstream usage and become naturalised. As a result, we are rarely conscious of the fact that we are using military terminology in routine interaction. (2006: 1). Moran suggests that this use of militarisation might be traced back to religion:

when serious effort and determined struggle are required, it is common to call for a war. One might trace the tendency to ancient philosophers and religious myths that described great cosmic wars. Humans have often imagined their lives to be foot soldiers in the battle for good and evil. Every experience is then viewed as a skirmish between the Lord’s anointed and the forces of Satan (2011: 103).
Moran insists, however, that ‘the casual use of “war” as an organizing image for almost any concerted action in the modern world is both unnecessary and dangerous’ (2011: 103).

Lakoff (1991) describes both ‘Karl von Clausewitz’s Metaphor’ and the ‘just war’ metaphor system. Each offers a grounding in war metaphor theory for discussion of military metaphor in environmental discourse. The Prussian General’s Metaphor, ‘War is Politics Pursued by Other Means’, as developed in his influential 1832 text, Vom Kriege [‘On War’], involves a cost-benefit analysis of war, [at a policy level]. As Lakoff explains, for von Clausewitz ‘each nation state has political objectives, and war may best serve those objectives. The political “gains” are to be weighed against the acceptable “costs”. When the costs of war exceed the political gains, the war should cease’ (1991: 2). The Metaphor makes war a matter of foreign policy rather than a matter of morality, health or environment: ‘these are the realities that it hides; the political realities it fails to articulate’ (1991: 2). It has achieved new prominence since the Vietnam War, particularly in the USA.

Lakoff also details the metaphor system of the ‘just war’, which he terms ‘the Fairy Tale of the Just War’ (1991: 4). This metaphor sets up the ‘fairy tale’ characters of villain, victim and hero, and in this case the metaphor system is about morality. The villain commits a crime against the victim because an imbalance of power creates a moral imbalance. The villain is always evil and monstrous whilst the victim is always worthy of rescue and likable. The hero is virtuous and capable. Due to the villain’s inherent evil, reasoning is out of the question; a battle must take place, which a hero must win on behalf of the victim. Moral balance is restored when the hero makes the necessary sacrifices to do battle with the treacherous, evil villain and emerges victorious. The hero always acts honourably. Lakoff explains: ‘the most natural way to justify a war on moral grounds is to fit this fairy tale structure to a given situation. This is done by metaphorical definition, that is, by answering the questions: Who is the victim? Who is the villain? Who is the hero? What is the crime? What counts as victory?’ (1991: 4). While such a discursive structure may be put in place to justify actual war on moral grounds, the same is often
done with the metaphorical ‘wars’ (which occur within environmental news reporting, for example).

Having explained both Clausewitz’s Metaphor and the Fairy Tale of the Just War as metaphor systems used to justify war (and particularly the Gulf War, the context which within which his paper was written), Lakoff offers notable insight into the limitations of any war metaphor, and, in fact, the limitations of military metaphor generally: ‘Clausewitz’s Metaphor only allows war to be justified on pragmatic, not moral grounds. To justify war on both moral and pragmatic grounds, the Fairy Tale of the Just War and Clausewitz’s Metaphor must mesh: the “worthwhile sacrifices” of the fairy tale must equal the Clausewitzian “costs” and the victory in the fairy tale must equal the Clausewitzian “gains”’ (1991: 7). Most importantly: ‘it sees war in terms of only one dimension of war, that of political expediency, which is in turn conceptualized as business’ (1991: 7). It is the inherently adversarial character of military metaphor that is perhaps its most problematic attribute, certainly within environmental discussion. The limitations of such adversarialism will be discussed below.

A third metaphor for war, one used in political justification of actual war, is that of ‘holy war’, detailed by Mongoven (2006). Mongoven notes the prominence of such rhetoric within the Bush Administration’s reaction to the September 11 terrorist attacks of 2001, and ‘holy war’ rhetoric has become even more prevalent in international politics since then. The metaphor of ‘holy war’ is synonymous with that of ‘total war’. The total war frame requires demonization of an enemy and ‘overmobilization’, or a “‘no-holds-barred’ approach to combat” (2006: 407). Mongoven explains that President George W Bush’s strike on Iraq was an example of total war, where his metaphor of ‘war against terrorism’ underwent ‘metaphorical idolatry’ (see below). She explains: ‘holy war framings may ask less of doctors, or of soldiers, than should be asked, precisely because they are symbolically assigned to the side of good’ (2006: 407). In this sense, the holy/total war metaphor may be seen as a continuance of the ‘just war’ metaphor, in that the ‘warrior’ – the soldier, doctor and so forth - is assigned the role of ‘hero’, except that such wars have no limits, and the story really has no end, or, at least, none in sight. While the total war
frame encourages excess in the pursuit of a demon enemy, ‘the logic of the just war tradition explains that if you do not limit the means by which you fight, you come to look like the tyrant you purport to oppose’ (2006: 407).

Mongoven considers, in tandem, the costs of two metaphors of war, one of war against disease, the other of war against terrorism. It is within this consideration of metaphorical wars that an explanation of the holy, total war metaphor is provided. She uses the term metaphorical idolatry to refer to ‘the conceptual error of mistaking a mediating metaphor for complete literal reality’ (2006: 403), having coined the term because the caution against this prevalent fallacy ‘was first issued by monotheistic theologians concerned about mistaking “God” for one’s language for “God”’ (2006: 403).

Mongoven also considers Sontag’s 1988 work on military metaphor in medical discourse on cancer. She iterates what Sontag calls ‘Ultimate Otherness’; that is, ‘ultimate threat, ultimate challenge to natural and social order’ (2006: 406). ‘Ultimate Otherness’ is employed in total war rhetoric’s demonization of the enemy: ‘as many historians of war have noted, the conduct of total war psychologically demands a demonization of the enemy... now not only are cancers discussed as invaders, but social movements or groups that are perceived as undesirable are described as cancers’ (2006: 406). Mongoven offers much insight into the problems of total war framing in politics and the news media and, in fact, in any sphere of everyday life, including the conceptual wars that cannot be won, and the mistruths and hidden realities in military framing. Reporting Sontag’s critique of the ‘war on cancer’ Mongoven writes:

It is a war that cannot be won... the perceived enemy is not something that can be defeated. There will always be some cancer in the world, even if treatment and prevention admirably improve. But the interminable rhetoric of war allows for ever greater funding allowances and contributes to a highly centralized bureaucracy for dispersing cancer-fighting resources, even as ‘battle fatigue’ draws attention away from real - but less than total - victories (2006: 409).
In war there is an end and in sporting matches there are winners and losers at the end of the competition. One of the problems with using military terminology to frame discourse on campaigns around medical, political or environmental issues is the fatigue that comes with such language. If an issue is framed as a war, or even as a contest, when that issue persists over a long period of time it becomes fatiguing not only for those involved but also for the general public that media campaigns and general communication aim to reach.

**Military Metaphor in Non-Military Discourse**

Authors writing on metaphorical wars such as Sontag (1988), Hooten (2002) and Mongoven (2006) look at historical ‘wars’ on poverty, drugs and illness, as well as the ongoing ‘war on terrorism’ that was commenced under the Administration of George Bush Sr. Authors undertaking more general investigations of military metaphor in discourse such as Beckett (2003), and Romaine (1997) include the discursive realms of social work, management and environmentalism.

In 2002, Jon Hooten published a paper entitled: ‘Fighting Words: The War over Language’, in which he explores President Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’ in the 1960s, President Reagan’s ‘War on Drugs’ in the 1970s and 1980s, and President George W Bush’s ‘War on Terrorism’ (2001 onwards) in the context of Mongoven’s ‘metaphorical idolatry’. Like Mongoven, Hooten analyses the American ‘wars’ on poverty, drugs and terrorism, and makes trenchant commentary on the casual use of war terminology in political discourse and everyday speech. He was at high school during the Gulf War and remembers personally formative years when war terminology referred to actual warfare: ‘in our dearth of wartime experience, we have learned to deploy the images of war casually. The words of war were once the moral and emotional defense of the nation, corresponding with the real memories and motivations of an embattled citizenry. As war became less messy and more distant, the language of war invaded the common lexicon of America’ (2002: 2). Hooten takes the constructionist position (not to be confused with constructivism) iv that violent language leads to violent behaviour. He asks: ‘while we
have haphazardly sprinkled our language with war’s metaphors, is it possible that we have collectively forgotten how to think clearly about the literal phenomenon? Can the collective linguistic turn from the literal to the metaphorical be without consequence’ (2002: 2)? Certainly, it appears that in American political discourse, and, probably, Western discourse more generally, many have forgotten, or indeed, never known, how to distinguish the literal from the metaphorical. As much a warning for future dialogue as a reflection on past discourse, Hooten implores:

Invoking the language of war does more damage than it prevents. To war against anything will eventually allow the metaphors to become realities... When we invoke the language of war, figurative battles against finances become literal battles against financiers. Symbolic warfare against weapons supplies becomes bloody warfare against weapons suppliers (2002: 7).

Pushing constructionism still further, Hooten suggests:

when war is accepted in any form, it can be accepted in all forms. Oscar Wilde in 1891: ‘as long as war is regarded as wicked, it will always have its fascination. When it is looked upon as vulgar, it will cease to be popular’. Only when we choose not to invoke the words of war to address social ills will we begin to solve the problems that lead to violence; (2002: 7).

Of all the authors discussed here, it is Hooten who most extensively explores the interconnectedness of war themes in spheres of political discourse and actual, military warfare.

Hill and Johnston (2003) are others who apply the constructionist view of military metaphor in discourse, this time to the realm of adult education. Their paper examines adult education on environmental issues. They are most concerned with the language of educators. They state:

we unwittingly reveal our beliefs about the world and our place in it by the metaphors and figures of speech that we use... metaphors reveal how our thinking is ordered; they are the essence of thought, reason, and
emotion. Mental images, including myths and metaphors, are more influential in how we see and act in the world than pure logic alone (2003: 20).

Importantly, ‘when aspects of a particular metaphor are valued, personally and culturally, they take on the moral significance of truth and can serve to influence goals and direct actions... metaphors also serve to organize our worldview. A worldview equips a person with an understanding of the world, especially the relationships of different aspects of the world to each other’ (2003: 20). Military metaphors contribute to and are reflective of the adversarial culture within which they are metaphorically predominant. As Hill and Johnston explain:

the language and metaphors we choose make us teachers of sustainable development – or unsustainable development; educators of ecological understanding and peace with and in the natural world – or educators of violence against nature. If our language is devoid of nature, or unwittingly antinature, we need to question what worldview we might inadvertently be teaching (2003: 21).

They give an example of one educator’s use of military metaphor in adult education:

As she discussed the influence of the language choices we made, she found herself using expressions like, ‘If you want to be on the front line’ or ‘In order to be in the vanguard’, and suddenly everyone noticed she was using metaphors with military connotations. The dictionary offers secondary, non-military meanings for both terms, but the mental images they invoke are certainly not organic. While personally mortified, she was happy to observe the workshop participants realise how insidious this type of metaphor can be (2003: 17).

Hill and Johnston conclude by iterating the case that language affects behaviour on a global scale:

When we unthinkingly choose metaphors of war, dominance and oppression, so commonplace in Western society, the incongruence of the disturbing associations can overshadow and detract from the positive content we hope to communicate. Working to change our ways of speech to reflect our values is a conscious act requiring sustained effort. We can learn to be aware of how frequently we use
dysfunctional metaphors in our teaching, and whether we communicate the 
messages we would choose. No matter the origins and familiarity of commonly 
used metaphors, we can learn to avoid those that perpetuate a destructive and 
exploitative antinature attitude. Our talk is in part our action (2003: 22).

A sustained effort was required by Christine Milne, in her attempts to remove military 
language from parliamentary debate during her years as leader of the Greens in the 
Tasmanian House of Assembly from 1993 to 1998. In an interview in Christine Fraser’s 
2008 book, Politically Correct: Talking to Twelve Tasmanian Women, Milne explains:

we had to stop saying things like we were going to ‘target’ the Minister – that’s a 
fairly common phrase, but we had to think about how we could say the same thing 
without using the word ‘target’. It takes a fair bit of discipline to actually stop 
before you say something, to think about how it can be worded differently. We 
didn’t go in and move motions about it. In fact, we didn’t say anything about it – 
we just stopped doing it. And after about a year, people stopped doing it to us. It 
demonstrated to me completely that if one group of people take the lead and they’re 
quite disciplined about it, eventually others would come around.

Hill and Johnston’s insistence that violent and military language is antinature and anti-
environment is here supported by the leader of a political party in an active and, 
apparently, successful attempt to remove it from parliamentary dialogue.

Romaine (1997) is one author who looks specifically at military metaphor within 
environmental discourse (what terms ‘Greenspeak’. She draws heavily upon Lakoff’s 
(1991) ‘Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf’, and 
also what she considers to be ‘the central metaphor systems used in reasoning about the 
state of the environment’. She argues that ‘Greenspeak rests on a few basic conceptual 
metaphors, which project inferences from a limited set of source domains onto the target 
domain of the environment. War, in particular, acts as the prime source domain’ (1996: 
175). Like Mongoven (2006) and Hooten (2002), Romaine refers to metaphorical wars 
‘fought’ by the American government: ‘Greenspeak conceptualized as “warspeak” shares 
much in common with the discourse used in other metaphorical wars, such as the Cold 
War, the War on Poverty, the War on Crime, the War on Drugs and so forth, as well as 
with that used in actual war”’ (1997: 176). She considers several military-derived
‘greenspeak’ metaphors as well as the now somewhat moribund ‘container’ metaphor of earth as a greenhouse: ‘its basis lies in the image schema of “containment” that underlies our bodily experience as bounded physical beings set off from the rest of the world outside us’ (1997: 176). Further, ‘acting in concert with entailments from the source domain war, “earth as greenhouse” serves as the locus of the “battlefield” of the metaphorical “war on the environment”’ (1997: 176). Writing of the International Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, she illustrates how war metaphors in Greenspeak were used to describe the politics thereat, employing discourse analysis of various news stories about the Rio Summit and including many additional environmental news stories of the time, such as that of logging and the fate of the Spotted Owl in the Pacific Northwest. The work of Lakoff and Johnson is again brought to bear as she extricates conceptual metaphors such as argument is war and war is not violent crime”; systemic metaphorical themes that are as common to environmental reporting now as they were in the 1990s.

Like Hooten (2002), Romaine engages with constructionism in considering the danger of metaphorical, discursive war becoming actual warfare. She reports: ‘from another part of the Third World, a report hinted that environmental action may lead to an all-out war. The story, which appeared just before the Rio Summit, was about nationalist opposition to intervention by foreigners who were telling the Brazilian government what it should do to preserve the Amazon rainforest’ (1996: 180). Here it appears that a news report warning of an environmental ‘campaign’ encouraged speculation about actual warfare through its use of military terminology. Suggesting that one way in which the English language is made adequate to the task of talking about environmental issues is through the use of a small set of basic conceptual metaphors, she quotes Hardin (1974): ‘no generation has viewed the problem of the survival of the human species as seriously as we have. Inevitably, we have entered this world through the door of metaphor’ (568). Again, the issue is whether military metaphors are adequate to the task of appropriately representing environmental problems.

1. It seeks to simplify the problem and thus prolong the inevitable confrontation with its complexity
2. It promotes an apolitical approach to the problem (it cannot be debated in the public realm)

Like Mongoven, Hartmann-Mahmud highlights the problem of the total (holy) war metaphor: ‘by declaring war on a concept that is impossible to separate from the society in question, that has no distinct beginning or end, and that is immune to narrowly defined, uni-dimensional “attacks”, the entire effort becomes misguided. Concepts and social phenomena are not readily addressed in a theatre of war’ (2002: 429). We have a system of feedback involving war, politics and communication whereby politicians use military language and military strategy to discuss non-military problems. They deploy war as a metaphor for problems such as drug abuse and cancer which are certainly problems, but are not in fact war. Language and, thus, reality, becomes confused when we have politicians and media commentators using Clausewitz’s Metaphor to explain strategies of actual war to the public they represent, then using military framing such as that of the ‘Fairytale of the Just War’ to explain pseudo, metaphorical war to the same audience. A further problem, particularly in the United States, may be that of politicians with military training whose use of military terminology is habitual and saturated, compared to that of non-military politicians and the meanings they associate with language.

An underlying theme in Hartmann-Mahmud’s paper is that freedom of speech is hampered by the prevalence of military metaphor. She explains: ‘how could one not support a “war on poverty”? A “war on drugs”? A “war on overpopulation”? Recently, those who have questioned the “war on terrorism” in the United States have been accused of being unpatriotic citizens who undermine America’s cultural and political strength and leadership in the world... dialogue and debate become silenced by the imminence and urgency of war’ (2002: 427).
Hartmann-Mahmud compares the two dimensional mapping of a physical space to the figurative map created by the declaration of war on a concept. She considers the limitations of military metaphor through this analogy and suggests: ‘clearly, the metaphor of war applied to concepts such as poverty, drug abuse, over-population and terrorism simplifies and thus misleads. It also narrowly demarcates acceptable speech; thus, again, the “mapping” of political space transforms society’ (2002: 430).

The critical traffic is not all one-way, however. In analysing military terminology in the discourse of social work, Beckett (2003) argues against the constructionist view that sees the use of military metaphor as conducive to actual violence. He describes the constructionist view thus: ‘instead of language being seen as a representation of an outside reality, “reality” becomes something that is created (“socially constructed”) by language: a kind of story or narrative’ (2003: 626). In the context of his own social work profession, he challenges this viewpoint, suggesting: ‘we need to tackle not just the language but the structural causes for the needs, demands and expectations that make social workers feel besieged’ (2003: 638). Beckett’s work is at odds with that of, say, Hooten: that people who use military language and particularly war metaphor framing are actually constructing wars. Beckett does not think that we can change practices simply by changing the words we use. He challenges commentators on social work discourse and practice who believe that, by reducing the prevalence of military language in social work, much counter-productive and aggressive practice can be changed:

> with due respect to these authors, the approach they suggest seems to me to be an example of a mistake that we in social work far too often make: believing that we can change things simply by changing the words we use. In my experience such an approach results either in the new words falling rapidly into disuse or in their being used in a way that is incongruent with – even opposite to – their ostensible meaning (2003: 637).

Beckett affirms the presence of military concepts within social work practice through his own observations over 18 years as a social worker and teacher of social work, but he
disagrees with the social constructionist position that suggests that war language creates a war reality: ‘the “commonsense” assumptions about the relationship between language… and reality seem to have been reversed. Instead of language being seen as a representation of an outside reality, “reality” becomes something that is created (“socially constructed”) by language: a kind of story or narrative’ (2003: 626).

Beckett also references Lakoff and Johnson’s work on metaphor as the way we conceptualise one mental domain in terms of another. He explains that educators attempt to teach a ‘sacred language’ of empowerment to social workers, and this, he says, includes such conceptual metaphors as social workers are bridges and social work is opening doors. He believes, though, that workers are more inclined to think in terms of social workers are soldiers, clients are enemies, and requests for help are explosive shells. What is in question here, and in discursive realms other than social work, is the adversarial quality of military language and its causative relationship to adversarial behaviour. It is also necessary to consider reasons why military metaphors prevail, even as conceptual metaphors, to the detriment of metaphors taught as the ‘sacred language’. Beckett describes ‘sacred language’, as it was originally defined by Anderson (1991), thus: ‘languages such as classical Arabic, Latin, or Church Slavonic which are not used in everyday speech but are vehicles for the transmission of traditional beliefs and values’ (2003: 629). In the realm of social work, Beckett suggests: ‘we might use this term to refer to terminology such as “Anti-oppressive practice”, “Empowerment”, “User participation” and “Non-judgemental”. These are names for concepts that are instilled in social work training. Any social worker would recognise and have some understanding of them’ (2003: 629).

Finally, it is necessary to consider the role of the print media in relation to military metaphor. In mapping how mainstream media transform society, it is imperative to consider the militaristic or ‘fighting’ frames of the media.
Fighting Frames – Environment in the News

It is often the nature of conservation campaigns and environmental reporting that narratives are constructed around Lakoff’s (1991) ‘Fairy Tale of the Just War’ metaphor system. We have seen that ‘the most natural way to justify a war on moral grounds is to fit this fairy tale structure to a given situation’ (1991: 4), in which that situation is more often a metaphorical ‘war’, and, thus, a news story, than it is an actual war. Such framing is common and the discourse of these environmental ‘wars’ is heavy with military metaphors. Richards and King (2000) investigate what they label the ‘fighting frame’ in North American News reporting. They present a case study of a dispute between a group of Carmelite monks from the Nova Nada Monastery in Canada and the logging company, J.D. Irving. The authors provide an explanation not only of the media’s representation of conflict but also of the role media and journalists play in shaping the actual conflict upon which they report: ‘in stories about conflict that generate media interest, from war to protests to shootings, from the political arena to labour and management, the media’s role is central to our understanding. They provide us with the information that helps us know what is truly happening. To that extent, the media, too, are participants in the conflict’ (2000: 481).

Richards and King also explain narrative and its deployment in journalistic writing:

‘employing the narrative form is an attractive way of processing information. Storytelling’s universal appeal derives from a psychological impulse to narrate, and our desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure that exists only in imagination... the narrative approach helps make sense of the world by organizing experiences and lending the sense of order to events’ (2000: 483). The authors explain the conflict or ‘fighting frame’ within narrative thus:

there are different frames within which journalists apply the storytelling approach... the conflict frame is an example: a readily available device with which the facts [can] be easily arranged into a narrative... Framing a story as a conflict, with two clearly polarized parties, brings an element of drama to the story because of the ‘gravity of the opposition of
the two outcomes... Even complex stories are simplistically reduced to a script of binary opposition (2000: 483).

They approvingly cite media critic, Jonathon Alter: ‘hyper-adversarialism... is now really corroding journalism” (quoted in 2000: 480).

Richards and King explain how journalism can exacerbate conflict. As journalists have the important task of representing stories for the public, they play an important role in determining how much conflict continues. As communication problems are often the cause of conflict, the media, as communicators, have the capacity to determine how much conflict ensues when an environmental dispute story is presented to the public. They can choose whether conflict is exacerbated or played down. Richards and King explain that ‘the coverage itself may cause participants to hold their positions more firmly, to be less willing to compromise’ (2000: 480). Media attention, then, can exacerbate conflict and encourage participation in the conflict. It is important that journalists and stakeholders in conservation campaigns recognise this. The media become players and can be played. Richards and King describe how, in the Nova Nada/ Irvings dispute, the conflict model adopted by the media accentuated the dispute between the two stakeholder groups as ‘journalists far and wide were attracted to this story’ (2000: 481). Their account highlights the role of journalists as active participants in the dispute rather than mere reporters. Journalists typically construct a story of binary opposition where one stakeholder is cast into the ‘A’ (subject) role, whilst a second stakeholder is cast into the ‘B’ (object ) role, and in this case, ‘reporters used the conflict frame to assemble the narrative, in which the monks, regularly cast in A role, or subject of the story, were “pitted against” the Irving company, who played the B role, or object’ (2000: 483).

From a constructionist perspective, Hannigan (1995) also looks at environmental news reporting. He suggests that:

the media situate the environment as the locus for rancorous conflict. While this environment as conflict package sometimes deals with the wider clash of cosmologies between environmentalists and their opponents, it is more likely to depict these disputes in the same manner
as journalists routinely display industrial relations disputes. That is to say, protestors are implicitly blamed for the disruption of moral commerce, the rationale for their actions is compressed into short soundbites and the background to the conflict is downplayed. The leaders of environmental protest actions are often presented as ‘hippies and violent ‘ecoteurs’ armed and ready for monkeywrenching. An environmental conflict story may shoot to the top of the news agenda if a well-known celebrity arrives on the scene (1995: 90).

Possibly the greatest problem for a public wishing to understand the conflict and the environmental issues underpinning it, is the downplaying of the background to the conflict. Hannigan stresses this, explaining that, ‘one consequence is the spill-over of this media discourse into real life ideological battles between environmentalists and their opponents’ (1995: 72). So, as with the dispute between the Nova Nada monks and J.D. Irving Ltd. detailed by Richards and King (1999), it is possible to see how journalism encourages and reinforces environmental conflict in its reporting. Where a dispute may originally be minor, it can grow to the point of becoming intractable through the media’s use of metaphor and issue framing and the consequent public reaction to that framing.

Stocking and Leonard suggest that:

the environmental story is one of the most complicated and pressing stories of our time. It involves abstract and probabilistic science, labyrinthine laws, grandstanding politicians, speculative economics and the complex interplay of individuals and societies. Most agree it concerns the very future of life as we know it on the planet. Perhaps more than most stories it needs careful, longer-than-bite-sized reporting and analysis now” (1990: 42).

Hannigan considers in detail what he has termed ‘depth of coverage’:

whether this depth of coverage is realistically possible is an open question which depends on several factors: First, editors and producers, the newswiners who effectively set everyday line-ups and assignments, must see environmentalism as more than a transient phenomenon which loses its lustre once it ceases to register strongly in public opinion polls and government agendas. This is less likely to be the case in regions of the country where environmental conflict is endemic because of a natural resource-based economy. Ironically, the one section of the media where environmental coverage has become institutionalised is in
the financial pages, where ‘green business’ is seen as having increasing economic relevance (Hannigan 1995: 92).

Here, a relationship between conflict issues and issues that register in opinion polls and government agendas is apparent. One aspect of ‘depth of coverage’ should be education on environmental issues which have been sources of conflict or have the potential to be sources of conflict in the future. Hannigan again:

Second, environmental issues must be perceived as occupying a distinctive story niche rather than simply overlapping a multitude of existing subject areas – politics, business, agriculture, science and technology, etc. Without a distinctive image, environmental coverage is destined to always remain event-driven and conflict-oriented. At the same time, environmental problems are by their very nature intricately tied into economic and political structures and policies, making it difficult and sometimes even inadvisable to consider them separately; for example, this is the case with many Third World ‘sustainable development’ stories. It is thus difficult to balance the need for a distinct environmental specialty beat with the need for a depth of coverage which may reside in other areas of journalistic expertise (Hannigan, 1995: 92).

It is the current media fashion to juxtapose traditional politics and green politics, and traditional agriculture with a green, ‘sustainable’ agriculture. Rather than these binary oppositions, Hannigan argues, environmental issues should be presented independently, as newsworthy for their own sake, rather than as a means of creating controversy, which is their current media purpose. He concludes:

finally, some way must be found to combine ‘muck-raking’ or ‘exposure journalism’ with the longer term goals of environmental education and policy reform. Investigative reports in the press or on television programmes such as 60 Minutes, Frontline or Fifth Estate may temporarily shock audiences but they do not necessarily result either in a deeper understanding of an issue or in effective regulatory action” (1995: 93).

In a much-cited 1992 article for the Independent, journalist Gregg Easterbrook writes of environmentalist reporters’ tendency for ‘pushing the panic button’ in their reporting of
environmental issues. Easterbrook charges those responsible for environmental reporting with sensationalism and with ‘self-censoring’ the information that reaches the public. He was particularly critical of Al Gore’s framing of the climate politics of the time. Though not aware of the relevant discourse, Easterbrook is actually writing of the commercial media’s tendency to use a fighting frame when reporting on environmental issues. He states: ‘it’s worrisome that Mr Gore, the bright light of political environmentalism, seems increasingly to believe that the only correct stance is to push the panic button on every issue’ (1992: 2). Easterbrook uses, as an example, a reported ozone hole above North America:

It’s just that, ummm, there never was any ozone hole over North America. What Nasa monitors found were precursor chemicals that are sometimes, but not always, associated with ozone depletion. No actual breach had been detected, and none developed. The precursor compounds can derive from CFCs; they can also stem from volcanism, and last year there was an eruption of unusual power at Mount Pinatubo in the Phillipines. These annoying details were dismissed in the name of a good panic (1992: 2).

In criticising the dominant ‘panic button’ or fighting frame tendency in environmental reporting, Easterbrook observes that: ‘one factor in environmental overstatement is the belief that only end-of-the-world locution can hold public attention. This assumption is wrong. Voters care about issues that pose no threat to life, and they would continue to support environmentalism even if the rhetoric were more veracious, because the plain-spoken case for the environment is strong enough’ (1992: 3). This would suggest that at some point the plain-spoken, less panicky, war-mongering stance came to be deemed not strong enough, and the ‘panic button’ had to be hit in order to get the attention of the public:

Lately, Mr Gore and the distinguished biologist Paul Ehrlich have ventured into dangerous territory by suggesting that journalists quietly self-censor environmental evidence that is not alarming, because such reports, in Mr Gore’s words, ‘undermine the effort to build a solid base of public support for the difficult actions we must soon take’. Sceptical debate is supposed to be one of the strengths of liberalism; it’s eerie to hear liberal environmentalists asserting that views they disagree with
ought not to be heard. More important, the desire to be exempt from confronting the arguments against one’s own position traditionally is seen when a movement fears it is about to be discredited. Why not defuse environmental rhetoric before an implosion (1992: 3)?

Easterbrook, then, charges environmental spokespersons with a fear of thinking; an eco-paternalism manifesting as a belief that the general public should not be given all the facts. Like Hannigan (1995), Easterbrook believes environmental news can be newsworthy in its own right, without panic or a war framing built into the narrative, though he and Halligan come to this position from an entirely different basic perspectives.

In 2005 Karlberg and Buell undertook a discourse analysis of twenty years’ worth of material from three North American newspapers, Time and Newsweek from the USA, and Maclean’s, from Canada. They documented war metaphors and related adversarial news schema from 1981 to 2000. Like Mongoven (2006), Beckett (2003), Hooten (2002), Romaine (1997) – in fact, almost all authors who comment upon military metaphor – Karlberg and Buell write within a North American context, commenting on the metaphorical wars on poverty and drugs that have become such familiar tropes within public discourse there. The authors look to document both causes and potential consequences of adversarial news frames in environmental reporting, connecting discourse analysis to constructionism, thus:

discourse analysis is an emerging methodology that studies the relatively tangible traces of discourse, such as spoken, written, or visual texts, in order to provide insights into the relatively intangible phenomena that they shape and reflect, such as human culture and consciousness. Underlying the methodology is a social constructivist epistemology that traces back through philosophers and theorists such as Gergen (1999), Foucault (1980), Berger and Luckmann (1966), Geertz (1973), and Wittgenstein (1974), all of whom contributed to a recognition that language and discourse not only reflect social reality, they also construct it. Discourse analysis is thus a method for ascertaining the constructive effects of discourse through the structured and systematic study of texts (Phillips and Hardy, quoted in Karlberg and Buell 2005: 24).
Karlberg and Buell list authors whose work demonstrates that human beings have as much capacity for cooperation and mutualism as they have for adversarial behaviour. They link this evidence to a critique of the Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’ paradigm that, they believe, so dominates North American news media. This is important because ‘the media function as an important socializing institution through which we learn what it means to be human. Furthermore, perceptions about what it means to be human influence our social norms and social behaviour’ (2005: 24). In keeping with Karlberg and Buell’s critique of the ‘war of all against all’ paradigm, is Moran’s analysis of what he deems to be the linguistic overkill of Hobbes’s war metaphor:

In his treatise, On Human Nature, Thomas Hobbes writes: ‘War is nothing else but that time wherein the will and intention of contending by force is either by word or action sufficiently declared; and the time which is not war is peace’. Curiously, Hobbes applies the word ‘war’ to time, not to the conflict itself. Whenever there is contending by force sufficiently declared, there is war. On that basis ‘peace’ is a momentary lull in the fighting. By declaring war to be ‘nothing else but... every contending by force’, Hobbes established the linguistic framework for the metaphor of war to run wild (2011: 103).

Karlberg and Buell draw a link between metaphor and cultural codes: metaphors are among the most basic constituents of cultural codes’ (2005: 24). Further:

on the most basic level, codes structure the relationship between signifiers and meanings in any given language. On a more abstract level, codes also structure the associative relationships between different concepts, as in the case of metaphorical thought, as well as the relationships between concepts and social practices. Cultural codes thus establish structures of human consciousness as well as structures of social organization. Some codes are constructed through conscious effort and others are internalized or produced in a largely unconscious manner. Regardless of how they are transmitted and how they emerge, cultural codes establish rules of correspondence, or conventions, through which thought, talk, and action become mutually intelligible within a shared culture. Metaphors help to shape and reflect such cultural codes (2005: 24).
The relationship between metaphors and news frames is then illustrated: ‘metaphors often become the defining schema or frame through which a news story is constructed... for instance, if the public is already familiar with the metaphorical construction of argument as war then journalists can employ this schema in their coverage of any new public policy debate that arises and the stories will be easily understood’ (2005: 25). This suggests, simply, that war metaphors are common to environmental reporting because they function well. Karlberg and Buell offer the following insight – which would be of use to Easterbrook – on frames:

frames, of course, serve an unavoidable function of news. They allow journalists and citizens to organize and make sense out of an almost infinite universe of potentially available information. They become problematic, however, when the same routine frames are uniformly employed throughout the media – which tends to be the case... In theory, different journalists and different media outlets could provide diverse interpretive frames that offer contrasting insights into complex issues and events. Such frames would be valuable resources for democratic deliberation. In practice, however, different journalists and media outlets tend to repeatedly recycle highly formulaic news frames ‘that reconstitute the world in similar ways’ (2005: 25).

Analysing the ‘highly formulaic news frames’ that are used to present environmental reports is critical. In an age of increasing interdependency and environmental destruction, Karlberg and Buell insist, the public needs factual, informative reporting with an emphasis on mutualism rather than fear, adversarialism and war. As Moran suggests: ‘one step towards making war inadmissible to human thought is to stop using it as a handy metaphor. Using war language to describe ordinary human problems is not helpful either for the likelihood of war or for the solution of any problem’ (2011: 102). The role of the media in constructing public discourse and, hence, reality, is crucial to the shaping of sustainability and other environmentalist imperatives.
Chapter 3: Methods

A qualitative method was chosen for the study. Collier, Brady and Seawright explain that: ‘qualitative research routinely utilizes thick analysis, in the sense that analysts place great reliance on a detailed knowledge of cases… by contrast, quantitative researchers routinely rely on thin analysis, in that their knowledge of each case is typically far less complete’ (2010:180). Thin analysis usually permits researchers to focus on a much larger data set, with the consequence that, ‘they may benefit from a broader comparative perspective, as well as from the possibility of using statistical tests’; nevertheless, ‘whereas the precision and specificity of statistical tests are a distinctive strength of quantitative research, the leverage gained from thick analysis is a characteristic strength of qualitative research’ (2010: 181). Interviews were chosen as the data collection method rather than such alternatives as questionnaires, focus groups or participant observation. The reasons for this are explained below.

Focus Groups

This technique involves a group of six to ten people sitting around a table (or at least in a circular position) discussing a topic introduced by a researcher. The researcher moderates the discussion and invites comment. The session lasts between one and two hours. Cameron explains: ‘interaction between members of a group is a key characteristic of this research method, and it is that which helps differentiate focus groups from the interview method, where interaction is between interviewer and interviewee’ (2000: 117), and Macnaghten and Myers observe that: ‘the rapid spread of focus groups corresponds to a new interest, in many social science fields, in shared and tacit beliefs, and in the way these beliefs emerge in interaction with others in a local setting’ (2004: 65). Further, ‘they are often used in an exploratory way, when researchers are not entirely sure what categories, links and perspectives are relevant’ (2004: 65). Whilst focus groups provide the extended narratives that may emerge from one-on-one interviews, the benefits of group-based data can be summarised thus: ‘prompts to talk, correcting or responding to others,
and a plausible audience for that talk that is not just the researcher. So focus groups work best for topics people could talk about to each other in their everyday lives – but don’t’ (MacNaughton and Myers, 2004: 65).

**Questionnaires**

McQuirk and O’Neill explain that: ‘in human geography, questionnaires pose standardised, formally structured questions to a group of individuals, often presumed to be a sample of the broader population’ (2000: 147). Questionnaire-sourced data has the advantage of potential ease of comparison across subject responses. In human geography, questionnaires are often used for the purpose of obtaining both quantitative and qualitative data and in this case are referred to as ‘mixed-method’ questionnaires. One widely-held strength of questionnaires is that they are cost-effective, enabling, ‘extensive research over a large or geographically dispersed population’ (McQuirk and O’Neill, 2000: 148).

De Vaus (1995) identifies four distinct question types: attribute, attitude, behaviour and belief. Attribute questions concern such characteristics as income bracket and age; attitude questions relate to what people think is desirable or undesirable about certain topics; behaviour questions relate to what people do (recreation habits, for example); and belief questions relate to what people believe to be true and false (religious beliefs, for example). It is important that the target respondent population has both the knowledge and the understanding to answer the questions that are posed.

**Participant Observation**

Kearns describe this methodological tool thus: ‘to generalise, participant observation for a geographer involves strategically placing oneself in situations in which systematic understandings of place are most likely to arise’ (2000: 196). Every participant observation
situation is unique, so, it is difficult to systematise this approach, but Gold (1958) suggests four possible research roles:

- 1. *Complete observer*, which entirely removes a field worker from social interaction with informants. ‘Here a field worker attempts to observe people in ways which make it unnecessary for them to take him into account, for they do not know that he is observing them, or that, in some sense, they are serving as his informants’’(Gold, 1958: 221).

- 2. *Observer-as-participant*, which involves ‘one-visit’ interviews. Misunderstanding between observer and informant is more likely because the interaction is so brief.

- 3. *Participant-as-observer*, in which both field worker and informant are aware that that theirs is a field relationship. Though frequently used in community studies, it should be recognised that the mere presence of a researcher can be enough to alter a situation. Respondents may tailor their behaviour to suit what they think a researcher wants to observe. Likewise, they may act contrary to their normal behaviour.

- 4. *Complete participation*, in which the true identity and purpose of the fieldworker is not known to those who (s)he observes. Interaction is as natural as possible.

One classic use of participant observation is William Whyte’s pioneering *Street Corner Society* (1957), a study of a slum district in Boston which Whyte designated ‘Cornerville’. Of Gold’s four typologies listed above, Whyte’s work best fits ‘complete participation’, in that he was thoroughly immersed in the communities that he was researching and his research and purpose was not known to them.

**Selecting the Method**

Its manifest advantages notwithstanding, it was decided to forego the questionnaire option. This method tends to channel responses into predetermined and constrained categories without a capacity for the respondent to be a co-contributor to the research framing. Questionnaires are less inquisitive than open-ended questions, and tend to seek evidence to support pre-formulated assumptions.
The focus group technique was thought to have much to recommend it, except that this procedure offers no confidentiality to participants. Confidentiality was important to allow respondents to be candid and fearless in discussing what is a highly controversial subject in Tasmania. The sensitive (even incendiary) nature of the topic is such that focus groups would have needed to be rigorously managed, necessitating separate groups of activists, journalists, police and Forestry Tasmania personnel. There has been much controversy surrounding the issue of logging in the upper Florentine Valley and, to gain the cooperation of potential research subjects, it was important that the research did not foment further controversy but, rather, helped to facilitate discussion on language choices in discourse surrounding the issue and non-violent direct action in the Tasmanian forestry dispute. Thus, as a key imperative of the data collection was to have respondents speak candidly, without fear or favour and without the input or pressure of peer opinions or group think, focus groups were ruled out as a means of data collection.

Participant observation was also ruled out as a potential methodological tool. Again, given how divisive the subject matter is, it would have been physically and logistically impossible to be a participant across the different groups, gaining trust whilst ascertaining the necessary information about participants’ attitudes to the war metaphor within discourse on the protests. Because the very nature of the protests was for participants to adopt a strong position, it would be difficult to participate as a researching observer without being seen to be partisan and, thus, to have surrendered objectivity in the eyes of some potential subjects.

At one point in the research it was intended to conduct a complete discourse analysis of media articles from the time of the protests in order to demonstrate the prominence of the war metaphor. Instead, a media archive of the time was constructed. It is sufficiently comprehensive to ‘prove’ the prevalence of military language within coverage of the protests and has been a useful prompt in interviews.
Interviewing

An interview can be described as ‘a face-to-face verbal interchange in which one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or belief from another person’ (Maccoby and Maccoby, 1954: 499). Interviews were chosen as the research method because I sought interaction with the respondents and wanted to prompt them to speak specifically about war themes, but I also wanted them to be fully aware of their participation and conscious and present in the interaction between myself as investigator and them as respondents. Interviews are of three types: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. The interview type selected for this particular study was the semi-structured variety. Dunn explains: ‘this form of interviewing has some degree of predetermined order but still ensures flexibility in the way issues are addressed by the informant’ (2000: 52). These characteristics suited my purposes because I wanted to explore military metaphors and their meanings along with the respondents, and I wanted to be able to respond spontaneously to any ideas and thoughts that their responses triggered.

An interview schedule was composed. In a semi-structured interview the list created is of general, open-ended questions, with the interviewer feeling free to depart from the script as necessary. One of the advantages of an interview schedule of this type is flexibility. An interviewer should allow the conversation to flow naturally but redirect it to cover all questions listed as necessary within the time allowed. Unlike an interview schedule, an interview guide, or aide mémoire, is a mere list of issues to be covered during the interview, with the interviewer required to formulate coherent questions ‘on the spot’. This allows even greater flexibility and responsiveness than an interview schedule, but is much riskier. Dunn explains: ‘any loss of confidence or concentration may lead to inarticulate or ambiguous wording of questions’ (2000: 54). (An additional advantage of a prepared interview schedule of, say, eight carefully-worded questions, over an aide memoire is that the former allows for easy comparison between informant answers.)

Though it is often thought appropriate to provide informants with a copy of the interview schedule prior to the interview this was not deemed appropriate here, as the interviewer was seeking spontaneous rather than pre-prepared answers. In some cases, potential respondents
demanded access to the interview schedule prior to deciding whether or not to be involved in the study, and this request was acceded to. Some potential respondents declined to be interviewed after sighting the interview schedule.

Interview questions were divided into primary and secondary questions. Primary questions were used to initiate discussion at the beginning of the interview. A double-barrelled question was used at the commencement of the interview to encourage informants’ reflection on the upper Florentine Valley protests. This was: ‘Can you tell me about your experience of Camp Florentine and the upper Florentine Valley protests? How did you come to be involved?’

‘Funnelling’ was the process used for ordering interview questions. Dunn explains that funnelling ‘involves an initial focus on general issues, followed by gradual movement towards personal matters and issues specific to the informant. This strategy allows for conversational development towards more sensitive issues’ (2000: 58). Funnelling, then, allows informants to ease into the interview gradually, by discussing easier topics first and leaving more sensitive, difficult issues for later when a rapport has developed between interviewer and informant.

Interviews were recorded with an MP3 recorder and then fully transcribed after the interview. Prior to recording, informants were asked to choose a pseudonym for the purposes of the interview. Informants were given the choice of receiving a copy of their interview transcript for vetting.

**Subject Selection**

Face-to-face, one-on-one interviews were set up with 17 respondents, these being activists, police officers, journalists and Forestry Tasmania representatives. Nine of these respondents were activists, 4 were police officers, 2 were Forestry Tasmania representatives and 2 were journalists. Initial contact was made by telephone, by email, and via the social networking internet site, Facebook. Contacts were chosen because they had appeared in newspaper coverage of the 2009 upper Florentine Valley protests. For example, a police spokesperson might be identified as an informant of interest because he had been extensively interviewed in a newspaper article of the
time. From these initial contacts, snowball sampling (also known as chain sampling) was used to identify further participants (Bradshaw and Stratford: 2000).

Interviews took place at a variety of locations. It was important to meet activists at places convenient for them. Two interviews took place at the university. One took place at the interviewer’s own home in Sandy Bay (a suburb of Hobart, Tasmania). Interviews with police officers took place at local police stations and, in one instance, at the Launceston police station. Representatives from Forestry Tasmania were interviewed at Forestry Tasmania’s headquarters in Hobart. In all instances there was an emphasis on finding a place that was both quiet and private.

**Reluctant Respondents**

In a project in which participants entertain strong passions and animosities, there is always a high likelihood that people will be reluctant to participate. Adler and Adler explain that respondents: ‘may be hard to find and even harder to secure for permission to study. Other people may agree to be interviewed, but then resist opening up or discussing certain kinds of topics. They may not be forthcoming during part or all of the interview’ (2002: 515). These tendencies were prominent within this study. There was a reluctance to be interviewed in all groups. Adler and Adler explain that reluctance is usually an issue of access or resistance. During this research, reluctance was mainly of the resistance type. All participants, particularly activists, were reluctant to discuss protests which potentially involved illegal activity. Trust between myself, the interviewer and respondents was essential and was often gained during the course of the interview. Respondents were often dubious of, or somewhat confused by, the nature of the study, most becoming more comfortable when interview questions were presented to them (as noted, the questions were only made available on request, and not all potential participants were rendered more comfortable as a result).

In seeking interviews, I experienced rejections from all groups except the police. All police officers who were approached for an interview agreed to the request. Refusals were particularly
disappointing in the case of journalists; many television journalists were approached but declined for a variety of reasons. This may have had something to do with the transient nature of journalism; many had moved to other jobs since covering the upper Florentine Valley protests of 2008/09 and did not necessarily remember much about their coverage of events. A majority of activists contacted agreed to interviews. Many Forestry Tasmania workers declined interviews. The most reluctant group was forest workers/contractors. This reluctance resulted in none of these people being available for interview and the research being altered accordingly.

Considerable efforts were made to approach and secure the cooperation of contractors – letters were written, phone calls were made, an advertisement was placed in the newsletter of the Tasmanian Forest Contractors Association, posters were distributed, and verbal information was provided in public houses and cafes in the Derwent Valley region; however interviews with contractors were not obtained.

**Ethics**

The project received ethics approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania). Interview respondents had the option to contact the Acting Executive Officer of the Committee with any complaints or queries about the research, but none did. As part of the ethics procedure, participants were provided with an Information Sheet detailing the Aims and Objectives of the study, the study procedure, its voluntary and confidential nature, contacts for the ethics committee and the contact information for Dr Hay (the research supervisor) and Ms Price in order to gain further information.

**Data Analysis**

Data was stored in both electronic form and hard copy. It was stored as recorded interviews on the MP3 recorder used in interviewing and typed transcripts were also made. Transcripts were also kept in a second electronic form using the NVivo software package under the project title ‘Florentine Research’. A USB drive with this data, as well as the MP3 recorder and the typed,
printed transcripts, will be stored in a locked cabinet in a locked room within the School of Geography and Environmental Studies for a period of three years before being destroyed, as per the guidelines of the Human Research Ethics procedure.

Coding

Codes are of two types: descriptive and analytic. This project utilised both descriptive and analytic codes. Descriptive codes are category labels that ‘reflect themes or patterns that are obvious on the surface or are stated directly by research subjects’ (Cope, 2005: 224). In this study, in vivo codes were deployed. In vivo codes are a subset of descriptive codes that use the actual phrasing of the subject. Cope offers the following example: ‘if interviews were done with elderly women who mentioned crime in their neighbourhoods, “crime” would be an in vivo descriptive code’ (2005: 224). Analytic codes are secondary to descriptive codes. Cope explains that ‘often, descriptive codes bring about analytic codes by revealing some important theme or pattern in the data or by allowing a connection to be made’ (2005: 225), and offers an example similar to the one noted above: ‘it might become apparent that the elderly women mentioned above were specifically afraid of young men and boys they perceive as threatening while walking down the street, and therefore the analytic code “fear of youth in public space” might be developed and applied’ (2005: 225).

Coding has the following purposes: data reduction, data organisation, the creation of search aids, and analysis. As Cope observes: ‘some form of reduction or abstracting is desirable to facilitate familiarity, understanding and analysis’ (2005: 225). Coding reduces the volume of data such as interview transcripts by putting it into smaller ‘packages’, which can then be grouped. Organisation ‘allows analysis to proceed by arranging data along the lines of similarity or relations’ (Cope, 2005: 225). ‘The organizing part’, Miles and Huberman explain, ‘will entail some system for categorizing the various chunks (words, phrases, paragraphs) so the researcher can quickly find, pull out, and cluster the segments relating to a particular research question, hypothesis, construct or theme’ (1994: 57). Coding is reflexive: as themes emerge, previously coded material needs to be re-examined.
NVivo software was used because it was the most recent software available for the analysis of qualitative data. It was developed to replace packages such as N6 (NUD*IST 6). When the project began NVivo 8 was used, but in 2011 I converted to NVivo 9, which I found easier to use and understand. Dearne describes the value of this software package thus: ‘the researcher or analyst can test theories, identify trends and cross-examine information in a multitude of ways using its search engine and query functions. They can make observations in the software and build a body of evidence to support their case or project’ (2008: 1). I attended a two day course in 2010 to learn to use NVivo 8, and then attended a similar two day course in 2011 to learn the new application, NVivo 9. Both courses were taught by Dr Linda Sweet.

**Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS)**

Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) is a generic title for a range of software that is specifically designed to handle unstructured, qualitative data. NVivo can be categorised as a ‘code based, theory building’, CAQDAS. This means that it is ‘designed with a capacity for retrieval, coding, annotating, memo making and cross-questioning’ (Peace and van Hoven, 2005: 239). One of the main benefits of using CAQDAS as opposed to coding manually is described by Peace and van Hoven. They view coding as a recursive process:

computer software can make data coding and categorising more flexible. Not only can you experiment freely with various categories, you can also code data more fluidly in different ways. You do not have to make up one coding system for your research and then allocate data to one set of either/or categories. Programs such as *QSRN6/NVivo* allow you to put the same segments of data under a number of different headings or categories and retrieve them through a range of indexing and searching tools that are activated by the codes the segments of data have been given. You can do multiple coding and then instigate complex inquiries of those coding patterns. This versatility can also enhance ‘interactivity’ between the researcher and the data (2005: 241).

Interviewer questions were removed from the NVivo transcripts so that queries such as word frequency searches would only pertain to respondents’ words.
A number of themes were derived from the interviews. These included war (definitions, whether there is such a thing as a war against nature), non-violent direct action, the Tasmanian media and its role in conflict creation and perpetuation, and themes of anarchy and democracy in relation to Tasmanian environmental activism. Having sorted these themes via NVivo 9, it is now necessary to explore them further, beginning with the theme of war – its metaphorical context in the upper Florentine forestry dispute, and whether or not a ‘war against nature’ is being waged in Tasmania.
Chapter 4: Tasmania’s Forest Conflict in Historical Context

This chapter explains the historical and current situations pertaining to both upper Florentine Valley forestry and Tasmanian forestry generally. It details the history of forestry policy and the current situation with regard to the Government Business Enterprise, Forestry Tasmania and the Tasmanian Forests Agreement (TFA), currently before the State Legislative Council. [As the situation was at the time Jade drafted this chapter. Since that time a newly-elected Liberal Government has rescinded the TFA. This would have been updated prior to submission. PH]

Colonial Forestry

Timber-getting was a significant activity in colonial Tasmania from the very beginning, and an assessment of the island’s potential as a timber resource for ship-building was part of the remit given to Lieutenant John Bowen (in charge of the first settlement party) by Governor King in Sydney (Carron 1985, Tardiff 2003: 43). It did not take long for convict sawing stations remote from the main settlements to be established to supply the timber needs for the colony. An important convict sawing station was set up at Birch’s Bay on the D’Entrecasteaux Channel, and others ventured further into the southern forests; the southernmost being set up at Southport in 1841. Once the extraordinary properties of Huon pine (*Dacrydium franklinii*) were realized, the forest industry gathered additional steam.

As David Young has observed: ‘when Europeans invaded Tasmania in 1803, approximately 60% of its land area of nearly 15 million acres was covered with forest... consequently, during the first six decades of White settlement, there was no suggestion that the forests should be in any way managed, and the various forest industries were allowed to develop in a haphazard and virtually unregulated fashion’ (1991: 1). Furthermore:

the first forest workers in Tasmania were convicts who produced the timber needs of the young Colony, and their efforts helped offset the cost of penal administration. Timber was obtained by primitive means. Mechanisation, initially even the use of animal power, was eschewed. This was partly
because labour was so cheap, requiring only to be fed and supervised, and partly because the form of work was intended as a punishment (1991: 1).

In 1858, the *Waste Lands Act* was passed. As Young observes, ‘this legislation, intended to regulate and promote the sale of Crown land for agricultural purposes, included a clause providing the granting of a licence “for the felling, removing and selling [of] timber on any agricultural or pastoral land not leased”’ (1991: 3). This allowed the Governor to designate ‘town lands’, ‘agricultural lands’, and ‘pastoral lands’, but there was no mention of timber growing or forest conservation. As Carron observes: ‘the only control was through the issue of licences by the Surveyor-General acting as Commissioner for Crown Lands, to fell, remove and sell timber on unleased lands, subject to certain regulations’ (1985: 60). ‘The waste lands continued to be treated as a commons’, writes Young, ‘freely open to the exploitation of all who purchased licences’ (1991: 3).

The inadequacy of the *Waste Lands Act 1858* to regulate timber harvesting engendered the first tentative steps towards forest stewardship. In 1870 the Commissioner for Crown Lands, Robert Crawford, ‘proposed a scheme which rested upon the premise that the southern forests would never sustain an agricultural population of any magnitude and should be served by special legislation distinct from the Waste Lands Act’ (Young 1991: 8). In the short term Crawford’s views fell victim to political apathy, but seeds had been planted, and would bear fruit in the next two decades.

[Next there is a paragraph heading: “1879 Select Committee into the preservation of Huon pine and blackwood”, and then a paragraph headed “Crown Land Timber Reserves 1881”, but there is nothing under either heading. PH]

In 1885 a *State Forests Act* was passed which enabled the appointment of a forest conservator, ‘a fit and proper person’, who would, ‘have the management and control of all waste lands of the Crown which may be reserved to Her Majesty for the preservation and growth of timber or for public recreation’ (1985: 61). Carron argues that, ‘unfortunately, the duties, power and responsibilities of the conservator were not defined in the Act, nor was it supported by appropriate regulations’ (1985: 61). G.S Perrin was the first person to be appointed Conservator.
He commenced duty in March 1886. [Jade intended to greatly expand this discussion, using Young’s authoritative work on this office in general and Perrin in particular. Perrin was perpetually frustrated in his attempts to make the position an effective one. PH]

The position was eventually superseded. According to the Tasmanian Archives Office:

the functions of the Conservator of Forests, previously an official in the Lands and Surveys Department, became the responsibility of a new Department when the Forestry Act 1920 was proclaimed on 1 January 1921. The Conservator of Forests was the permanent head of the new Department until 1947. A Royal Commission was appointed in 1945 to enquire into the administration of the Forestry Department and as a result the Forestry Act was amended in 1946. The amendments abolished the position of Conservator of Forests and created a 3 member Forestry Commission to manage the Department (later increased to 4 members) (2013: 1).

[From Jade’s notes it is apparent that she had only made a start on this sub-section, and that she intended to detail the gradual development, in the second half of the nineteenth century, of political awareness of the need to develop a system of order and regulation in the extraction and use of timber from the Tasmanian forest estate. It is clear that she intended to draw heavily upon the work of Young (1991), but that she also intended to trawl the publications and conference proceedings of the Australian Forest History Society for additional material. As part of this evolutionary analysis she would have discussed – in addition to pragmatic and local change-drivers – the impact of relevant ideas that were disseminating globally at the time, particularly George Marsh’s influential Man and Nature (1864), known to have had an impact upon thought within Tasmania – as I had already discussed this with her, I know that this was destined for inclusion. There are also paragraph headings (with nothing beneath them) indicating that material on the impact the demand for timber on the Victorian goldfields had on Tasmanian timber-getting in the 1850s, and on 1850s land laws and tall forest clearing (most notably on the North-West Coast) were to be included. Finally, she would have concluded the sub-section by introducing, as a link to the next sub-section, the management tool known as the ‘concession system’. It is probable that additional work in this sub-section – including a more detailed fleshing-out of the early colonial period (sketched in above), would have added another 4-6 pages to this part of the thesis. PH]
The Concession System

The Society of American Foresters defines a forest concession as:

... 1. a temporary (or terminable) and defined facility involving the use of a forest and its produce, sanctioned by the owner of a forest to individuals or communities – synonym forest privilege. 2. A contract, license, or permit to a firm or a person to extract and market timber (timber concession) or other produce commercially from a defined area of the forest within a given period - note a timber concession may specify the number, type and size of tree that may be harvested (2008: 1).

Its introduction to Tasmania is explained by Ken Felton (a senior manager in Forestry Tasmania), thus:

... to further encourage economic development, legislation of 1898 gave resource security through guaranteed access to timber in return for capital investment in processing plants. The concession system was thereby inaugurated... payments for the quantities of logs taken from Crown forests – royalties – were introduced in the same year, supplementing licence fees. The first concessions were for timber milling in the Southern Forests. They were followed by five more, set up by Acts of Parliament from 1926 to 1968, primarily designed to encourage papermaking (2012: 1).

[The candidate intended to detail the history of concessions in the first half of the twentieth century, but had not gone beyond recoding the following quotations. PH]

From the Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia: ‘while the terms of the various concession statutes vary, their essential feature is that the holder has exclusive access to a wood resource for long periods of time, in general 80 years’ (1983: 2); ‘the concession system in Tasmania has been a direct response to the fundamental requirement of the pulp and paper industry for a secure and predictable supply of wood of particular quality’ (1983: 4). The Federation also describes the concession system’s contribution to roading: ‘the concession system has promoted the construction and maintenance, at no public cost, of thousands of...
kilometres of all-weather, heavy duty roads for forest development and harvest access. Such roads which serve public and private purposes could never have been built without the Concession system. Pulpwood royalties take into account this saving to the public purse’ (1983: 7).

From TPLUC:

Forestry Tasmania formerly administered a number of Acts, dating from 1926 to 1978, under which the Tasmanian Government originally granted exclusive rights to private companies for pulpwood from large areas of Crown land. The grants, called concessions, were made to encourage the pulp and paper industry to establish in Tasmania and included exclusive rights to cut and remove any pulpwood in the concession area and incentives, such as fixed royalties and water provided without charge, for industrial developments such as the paper mill at Burnie. The Concession Acts were significant factors contributing to the establishment of pulp, paper and other industrial developments at Burnie, Wesley Vale, Boyer and Triabunna (TPLUC 1996: 129).

The concession system was finally superseded in the 1990s. Though the principle Acts under which the forests and forest industry in Tasmania are managed remains the Forestry Act 1920, this has been substantially amended by the Forestry Amendment (Forestry Corporation) Act 1994, the Forest Practices Act 1985 (amended in 1994), the Public Land (Administration and Forests) Act 1991 and the Private Forests Act 1994. [further developments in the 2 years since this paragraph was written would have required amendment to this and the incorporation of additional information before submission. PH]

‘Opening Up’ the South-West for Timber and Mineral Exploitation: Australian Newsprint Mills, Maydena,

[This section is undeveloped. In it the candidate intended to move the focus from Tasmania generally to the ‘neck of the woods’ of interest to her larger project – the Florentine Valley on the South-West access roads beyond the present town of Maydena. It appears that she intended to make extensive use of Peter MacFie’s comprehensive but unpublished history of Australian
Newsprint Mills, though she had not gotten around to entering it into her bibliography. The candidate’s computer includes a notation, arising from discussions with the supervisor, that this section needs additional material. PH]

The area adjacent to the Florentine Valley began to be seriously opened up for large-scale industrial development in the early 1900s, when a company called the Great Western Railway Group planned to construct an electric railway from Glenora (the present railhead) to ‘the rich mining areas of the west’ (Gowlland and Gowlland, 1973: 124). Gowlland, Gowlland and Gowlland note that ‘by 1908 a considerable amount of work had been done on route surveys. Many possible routes were investigated, the most appealing and probably being entered on topographical maps of the time’ (1973: 5). The supply track which was cut became known as the Great Western Pack Track and was designed with sufficient width to allow to fully laden pack horses to pass one another (Gowlland, Gowlland and Gowlland, 1973: 5). Though this track never became the intended railway, the section from Junee to the Florentine was used as an access road across the Florentine River to the osmiridium field at Adamsfield. Government geologist W.H. Twelvetrees and his party had reported osmiridium in the Adams River district in 1909, and the town of Adamsfield was officially proclaimed on the 30th of October 1925. It existed for a couple of decades but went into serious decline in the 1940s, and by the mid-1950s the town was deserted (Gowlland, Gowlland and Gowlland 1973).

Attention, meanwhile, had turned to the substantial timber resource in the hills and mountains beyond Mount Field. These reserves of timber became the concessions of Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM). Peter MacFie explains the origins of ANM thus:

the Australian Newsprint Mills evolved from the need for an Australian paper industry. In 1920 the Melbourne-based Mussen Group funded research at Kermandie to make newspaper from Tasmanian hardwoods. A breakaway newspaper syndicate led by Keith Murdoch (Herald & Weekly Times) and Warwick Fairfax (Age) formed the Derwent Valley Paper and Pulp Company (1932) and negotiated extensive forest concessions in the Florentine Valley with the government. The two groups came together as Australian Newsprint Mills and began building the Boyer Mill [at New Norfolk] in 1939 (2012: 1).
MacFie describes how, in the early years of the Boyer Mill, ‘bushmen used crosscut saw and axe to fell timber and tractors dragged logs to sidings, where steam haulers winched logs onto rail trucks. Spur lines joined the main railway to Boyer’ (2012: 1). In 1941, ‘the company had priority access to the newly arrived American Caterpillar crawler tractors equipped with power take-off winches’ (MacFie 2007: 299). Technological capacity was revolutionised when, ‘by 1960, the chainsaw had replaced the crosscut saw, increasing the timber extraction rate. Boyer Mill expanded, with new machines increasing production’ (2012: 1). This success was shortlived, however: mechanisation and contracting work gradually reduced the workforce, and the area adjacent to Maydena was made part of the South West World Heritage Area, limiting possible expansion.

The town of Maydena was built in 1947 as a base for logging in the Florentine Valley (MacFie, 2012: 1), this being central to the ANM concession. Significant logging occurred in the Florentine, then, during the tenure of the ANM concession. With out-dated machinery and global competition, the Boyer Mill nearly closed prior to Fletcher Challenge taking over in 1988. The Maydena Depot closed in 1990 in the wake of the New Zealand paper giant’s acquisition of ANM and the workforce was reduced from 3000 to 600. Prior to this, ANM-funded amenities for forestry communities, such as halls, football grounds and swimming pools, had been built at Maydena and New Norfolk. Within the concession itself, ‘extensive silviculture research’, MacFie writes, had ‘led to Maydena becoming known as “the cradle of Australian forest silviculture”’ (2012: 1), an apt description, as, ‘until the Boyer mill opened in 1941, Australia was totally reliant on imported newsprint’ (2007: 294). In 2002, Fletcher Challenge was itself taken over by Norwegian paper company Norske Skog.). The mill, which now produces paper for newspaper advertising inserts, has significantly improved its environmental performance.

**Developments Elsewhere: APPM at Burnie and the Sawmilling Sector in the Twentieth Century**

[Nothing appears under this sub-heading, and it is not a matter that the candidate had discussed with me. PH]
Beginning of an Export Woodchip Industry, 1972


Three Tasmanian companies were initially involved in exporting woodchips – Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holding Pty Ltd. (operating from the port of Triabunna), Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Pty Ltd. (operating from Burnie) and Northern Woodchips Pty Ltd. (with operating facilities for processing and loading at Longreach, on the Tamar River, Northern Tasmania). As McCuaig explains: ‘these three companies emerged between 1968 and 1970 from a crowded field of interested groups, complete with assured supplies of timber, State Government approval and/or support, written contracts with Japanese buyers, finance and finally (but of ultimate importance), Commonwealth Government export licences’ (1981: 1). Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Pty Ltd.’s contract was with Mitsui and Co. (Aust) Pty Ltd. for the export of 600 000 tonnes of chips per year over a 16-18 year period. Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Pty Ltd. contracted with with Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd. and Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha Ltd. for the export of 7.7 million tonnes of chips over an 11 year period, a level of export that was subsequently raised from an initial 700 000 tonnes per year to over 900 000 tonnes per year. Northern Woodchips Pty Ltd. Undertook to export 700 000 tonnes of chips per year for 15 years to Yamoto Sangyo Co. Ltd.

McCuaig explains that ‘the initial total combined investment in plant and facilities for the woodchip industries was estimated to be of the order of $12.8 million, while approximately 900-1000 people would be directly employed in the forests and mills of northern and eastern Tasmania’ (1981:1), while ‘wood to support these new enterprises came from a variety of sources. Logging residue and wood classified as unsuitable for sawmilling purposes, from Crown Land and private property, combined with a quantity of saw-mill residue, were all available for conversion to woodchips” (1981:1).
[As can be seen, Jade’s work on the early years of the woodchip industry draws almost exclusively on McCuaig’s Masters thesis. I’m unsure whether Jade had other recourse to other sources with which she could ‘leaven the lump’. In any case, at this point of the thesis she reverts to quotations and note, not yet converted into the author’s own script. They follow. PH]

The Tasmanian woodchip industry was conceived and brought to fruition through a process involving a powerful group of sawmilling interests working with the State Government and the Tasmanian Forestry Commission, though Japanese business interests and the Australian Federal Government were also involved’ (McCuaig 1981: 2).

Tasmanian Pulp and Forest Holdings Pty Ltd. – “the company came into existence in response to prevailing conditions in the timber industry and its exclusively Tasmanian executive proceeded to approach Government and became involved in the policy-making process in a particularly personal Tasmanian way” (1981: 3).

[Much has changed in the woodchipping sector since Jade became unable to work. The port of Triabunna, previously owned by Gunns, has been sold off to an environmentally-oriented benefactor, and is no longer processing chips. Currently there is no capacity to ship chip from any southern port. Nor is there much activity in the northern ports, with the global market for chip is oversupplied, and Tasmanian supply is not competitive. These are momentous developments that would have to have been addressed prior to submission – indeed, she would have needed to include a description of developments subsequent to 1981, when McCuaig’s study was published. PH]
Public Infrastructure for Forest Management in the Twentieth Century: Charting the Changes

[This sub-section has been idiosyncratically developed, with most of the key material still to be written. In its final form the sub-section would have been large and unwieldy and I would probably have required Jade to split it. PH]

The present regime of forestry management in Tasmania stands in linear descent from the creation of the 1920 Forestry Act. As Carron explains:

the Act provided for the creation of a Forestry Department with certain functions, powers and responsibilities; for the financing of the Department; for the classification of forest land, the dedication of state forests and proclamation of timber reserves; for disposing of forest produce; for the fixing of royalties; and for granting leases for grazing. The financing of the Department was provided by the crediting of one half of each year’s gross forest revenue, at the following 1 July, to a special fund which the Conservator could draw on with the Minister’s approval. Any money not spent in the year credited could be carried to a later year (1985: 66).

Material would have been added to fill the gap between the passing of the 1920 Act and developments of the 1940s. PH]

In 1945 widespread corruption was revealed in the Forestry Department, and Judge Richard Kirby of the District Court of New South Wales was appointed Royal Commissioner to ‘inquire into and report upon alleged irregularities connected with the administration of the Forestry Department’ (Tasmanian Government, 1945: 2566A). Kirby was instructed to inquire and report on sever matters:

1. Whether in or about the year 1937 or the year 1938 the Government of the State of Tasmania, or any Minister of the Crown for the said State –

   (a) Improperly sold or caused to be sold at a gross undervalue, to Arthur Garibaldi Newman … and to Harold William Harvey Hale, Julia Marion Harvey Hale, Arthur John Newman, Charles Albert Newman, Ellen Anna Newman, Helen Winifred Newman, Nancy Adele Newman, George Norman Pockett and James Stewart, or to any other person or persons
(being friends or associates of the said Arthur Garibaldi Newman) an aggregate of 6000 acres or thereabout of land situate near Lake Leake in the County of Glamorgan in Tasmania as third-class land under the provisions of the Crown Lands Act 1935;

(b) Improperly (having regard to the forest value of the said land) caused the Conservator of Forests for the State of Tasmania or any officer of his Department on his behalf to consent to or to fail to object to the said sales;

(c) Improperly influenced any officer of the Public Service of Tasmania in relation to the said sales or any matters incidental or preliminary thereto; or

(d) Otherwise acted improperly in relation to the said sales.

2. Whether the said Arthur Garibaldi Newman made a gift of £500 to the Minister for Forests (the Honourable William Percy Taylor) under the guise of the payment of a wager in respect of a horse named Quixotic, which competed in and won the horse race known as the Grand National Steeplechase in the year 1945, and, if so, whether there was any impropriety in such transaction.

3. The alleged irregularities in the said Forestry Department enumerated by Stanley Charles Burbury, Esquire, in a report made by him on behalf of the Acting Solicitor General on the 24th day of August, 1945, pursuant to a joint resolution of the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly of the State of Tasmania agreed to on the 7th day of July, 1944, or referred to in any reports of the Auditor-General to the Parliament of the State of Tasmania relating to that Department.

4. Whether sawmillers or those directly or indirectly connected with the timber industry have offered or given bribes to officers of the said Department.

5. Any matters relating to the administration of the said Department connected with or arising out of the matters referred to in paragraph 3 thereof, and any such matters to which the Honourable Joseph Darling referred to in the said Legislative Council on the 15th day of November, 1945.

6. Whether Ernest Newton West, Esquire, a member of the said House of Assembly, the secretary of the Tasmanian Branch of the Australian Labor Party, directly or indirectly accepted gifts of money from Alstergren Proprietary Limited on behalf of the said party with a view to securing favoured treatment of the said company in the granting of forest leases permits or licences or otherwise in relation to forestry matters.

7. Whether it has been a common practice for any Minister for Forests for the State of Tasmania to seek or accept bribes.
The Royal Commission and the response to its findings have been analysed by Hay (1976; 1977; see also Petrow 2006). In essence the allegations were that sawmill proprietors had allegedly bribed Forestry Department officers and a former Minister for Forests, Tom D’Alton. The Commissioner found that D’Alton had accepted bribes on two of the four instances under investigation, but came to the somewhat bizarre conclusion that ‘there was nevertheless “no evidence from which it could be inferred that it had been a common practice on the part of Mr. D’Alton to accept bribes’” (Hay, 1976: 192. Hay was quoting from the Second Report of the Royal Commission, as presented to Parliament).

In the wake of the Commission’s findings the Government moved to abolish the Forestry Department and the Office of Conservator of Forests and set up instead a 3-person Forestry Commission, consisting of a Chief Commissioner and two Assistant Commissioners. In 1978 the Forestry Act was amended and a third Assistant Commissioner ‘with special responsibility for private forestry’ was added (Tasmanian Archives Online, 2012: 1).

Further changes occurred in the 1980s, as it a shift in forestry operations from Crown to private land became increasingly apparent. In 1987 a Forest Practices System and Code was put in place… [here Jade has a note to herself to add in information about what the Code does. PH]. Simultaneously, a Private Forests Council was inaugurated [more detail was to have been provided here. PH].

In keeping with the fashion for converting government instrumentalities into corporate and commercial bodies, 1994 saw dramatic change in the evolution of forestry administration. Not only was the Private Forests Council converted into Private Forests Tasmania, but the Forestry Amendment (Forestry Corporation) Act transformed the Department into a Corporation, ‘at which point the Commission was abolished and its functions transferred to the Board of the Corporation’ (Tasmanian Archives Online, 2012).

With these changes Forestry Tasmania moved from being a regulatory agency to a Government Business Enterprise, its primary organizational purpose, legally established, now being to operate commercially. The newly-created body, Forestry Tasmania, has a three-person Board of
Directors and a Chief Executive Officer. The composition and functions of the new corporation were well articulated by TPLUC: ‘the directors are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Minister, and the Chief Executive Officer is appointed by the directors. Forestry Tasmania is obliged to comply with written directions from the Minister for Forests, provided those directions do not require the corporation to behave in a manner inconsistent with its statutory obligations” (TPLUC, 1996: 127). Furthermore, ‘Forestry Tasmania is vested with exclusive management and control of: ‘All State Forest, and, if the Director-General of Lands consents, forests and all forest products on other Crown land; Forest operations; and Development, control and delivery of the corporation’s commercial policy’ (1996: 128), The following objectives and functions of Forestry Tasmania were set out in the much-amended Forestry Act 1994:

- Optimise the economic returns from its wood production activities;
- Optimise the benefits to the public and the State of the non-wood values of forests;
- Manage Multiple Use Forest Land (State Forest entered into the Register of Multiple Use Forest Land) for wood production, and, in a manner consistent with sustainable forest management and forest production policy, for other purposes including:
  - Conservation of fauna and flora, landforms and cultural heritage;
  - Care of the environment, including scenery; and
  - Recreation;
  - Promote and encourage exploration and development of mineral resources in Multiple Use Forest Land;
  - Maintain Forest Reserves and Deferred Forest Land in State Forest; and
  - Provide information to and recreational facilities for the public, including the use of forestry roads (1996: 128).

One of the most controversial aspects of the amending legislation and the operational environment in which Forestry Tasmania goes about its business is the degree to which it has walled itself off from public scrutiny. The Forestry Amendment (Forestry Corporation) Act 1994 amended the Freedom of Information Act 1991 so that information relating to the performance and exercise of the powers and functions of Forestry Tasmania is exempt from freedom of information requirements (TPLUC, 1996: 128). With the passing of time significant doubt has been raised over the economic performance of Forestry Tasmania, and its viability in
the absence of ongoing government subsidies, and in this context the organisation’s secrecy provisions have only added fuel to the fires of controversy.

[The sub-section was to have concluded with a discussion of the fraught recent past of Forestry Tasmania, and its current attempt to secure FSC. As noted, with all these additions this subsection would have been ungainly, and would most likely have been split, probably at the key year of 1994. PH]

**The Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area**

[Nothing had been written under this sub-heading. It was, nevertheless, to be a short and succinct description of the history of the TWWHA – its advent, subsequent boundary adjustments, and a brief explanation of what its adjacent presence meant for future timber extraction activities in and around the Florentine Valley. One-two pages at most. PH]

**Conflict over the Future of the Forests, 1980s-Present**

In 1948 the Government revoked 2000 acres in the Mount Field National Park and added them to ANM’s Florentine concession, an even that caused a brief public outcry. Peter MacFie has described this as ‘Tasmania’s first modern conservation controversy’, though it would be some time thereafter before the forests again became the focus of the young but rapidly growing post-war conservation movement.

[This sub-section would have been quite extensive. Nothing appears after this introductory paragraph until the material on Wesley Vale, below. As well as her account of the Wesley Vale Pulp Mill controversy, she was to have explained the shift in focus of environmental activism from dam-building to forestry in the 1980s, and to have outlined the 1980s/1990s conflicts over clearfall logging in the Southern Forests, at the Lemonthyme, at Mother Cummings Peak and Jackey’s Marsh, the more recent conflicts at South Sister and the Blue Tier in the North-East, and
the conflict over the so-called 'Road to Nowhere' through the Tarkine in the far North-West. The key activist groups involved in these issues, their genealogies and strategies were also to have been discussed, along with a description of the underlying clash of bedrock value that makes resolution of these conflicts so intractable. Jade and I had already discussed all this, but it is unfortunate that she was never able to write it up, as it is this component of the background that this chapter sets out to provide that most directly bears upon her empirical study of conflict over logging in the Florentine Valley. PH]

In 1988 a $1000 million development of a pulp and paper mill alongside their existing operation at Wesley Vale, a rich, dairying region on the North-West Coast, was proposed by North Broken Hill Limited (NBH), with Noranda Forest Inc subsequently added as a 50% partner following application to the Foreign Investment Review Board. The site consisted of ‘about 80 hectares and another 50 hectares of nearby farming land would be needed to accommodate the new mill and ancillary works. The new mill was anticipated to produce a net export earning of $280 million and employ on a permanent basis some 300 to 400 persons’ (Chapman 1992: 20). Its potential impact on nearby farm land and on the shallow ambient waters of Bass Strait mobilized opposition.

The campaign against the mill was led by a group known as CROPS – Concerned Residents Opposing Pulp Siting, the spokesperson for which was a hitherto unknown teacher, Christine Milne. This campaign launched Milne on a political career that eventually saw her in the Senate and Leader of the Australian Greens. Milne was from a Wesley Vale farming family, and many members of CROPS were local farmers who stood to be directly affected – issues included: waste of productive agricultural land, air, water and noise pollution and traffic hazards. The state’s peak agricultural body, the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association supported CROPS, articulating a position of not necessarily opposing the mill; but certainly objecting to its proposed siting. There were also doubts about the long-term availability of the timber resource required to feed the mill, with estimates that ‘there would not be enough pulpwood in the North of the State to supply further expansion’ (Chapman, 1992: 20).
The Commonwealth and Tasmanian Governments, on the other hand, were keen for the mill to proceed. As Young explains: ‘the Commonwealth Government [had] created a strategy to increase efficiency in the pulp and paper industry and to make the industry internationally competitive, thus supporting the idea of the project at the Wesley Vale site’ (1996: 55). With this encouragement, the development proponents forged ahead, confidently anticipating eventual approval:

by the end of 1987 NBH had allocated $2 million for the purpose of detailed technical studies and continued to search for international investors. At this stage the proposal was subject to Tasmanian environment and planning legislation and was classed as a scheduled premises under the Environment Protection Act 1973. The primary objection was the siting of the mill at the Wesley Vale site (1996: 55).

The involvement of Noranda and the Foreign Investment Review Board brought the proposal under the scope of Commonwealth legislation, a complication that would lead to its undoing. At this stage, however, the focus was on the State. As Young explains: ‘in November 1988 NBH suggested to the State government that normal planning appeal procedures be relinquished. This resulted in the Northern Pulp Mill Agreement Act 1988, effectively abolishing the public right to appeal planning decisions’ (1996: 58). This Act established guidelines for an environmental impact assessment (EIS) of the proposal and for the Director of Environmental Control to provide an assessment report on the adequacy of the proponents’ EIS. ‘There was strong concern over the adequacy of the EIS by many government departments and private groups and individuals. There were 81 submissions, only three of which showed support for the project’ (Young 1996: 58). Further:

the public submissions raised eighteen major areas in which inadequacies were found. These included criticisms on: effluent disposal to the Bass Strait with the need for more baseline data on bioaccumulation of toxins in food chains; the lack of information on the effects of organochlorine emissions on the environment; the effect of the resource use and the impact of large areas of clearfell in the tourist industry; and the lack of references and use of false statements within the EIS (1996: 59).
Jade’s treatment of the Wesley Vale mill fiasco is probably over-detailed – nevertheless, it is unfinished. I had already advised her that more information was needed about the campaign strategies adopted by CROPS, and an account of how the proposal finally came unstuck had also still to be written. PH

Strategies for Depoliticising the Forests I: The Regional Forest Agreement 1997

Ten Regional Forest Agreements (RFAs) are in place in four Australian states. In New South Wales there are RFAs in Eden, the North East (Upper and Lower) and the Southern NSW region. In Victoria, East Gippsland, the Central Highlands, the North East, Gippsland and West regions all have RFAs. In Western Australia, the South-West forest region has an RFA, and in Tasmania, the entire state is covered by the Tasmanian RFA. As the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry explains, ‘the RFAs cover regions where commercial timber production is a major native forest use’ (2007: 12).

The Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) of 1997 was a component within the National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) of 1992. The Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission (TPLUC) of the time explained: ‘the development of RFAs is a key element of the National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS)... and is a primary mechanism for implementing the NFPS” (1996: 2). Like other agreements which have followed it, the NFPS and this RFA were ‘the Governments’ response to many years of divisive community debate about forest policy and decision making’ (TPLUC, 1996: 2). The NFPS sought to operationalise such principles as ecologically sustainable development (ESD) and to establish a comprehensive, adequate and representative forest reserve system. TPLUC listed the goals of the NFPS as follows:

- establish a comprehensive, adequate and representative (CAR) forest reserve system which will protect biodiversity, old growth forest and wilderness values;
- provide for complementary management outside reserves in public native forests;
- develop an efficient, value adding, internationally competitive and ecologically sustainable wood products industry;
- provide for a range of other forest values including water supply, tourism and recreation in an ecologically sustainable management framework;
- coordinate decision making between the Commonwealth and States and Territories;
- expand hardwood and softwood plantations; and
- provide assistance to communities faced with structural adjustments as a result of the implementation of these measures” (1996: 2).

Once Tasmania had signed the NFPS, the Commonwealth signed a Statement of Intent on Forest Management (SOI). The SOI drew on such previous agreements and inquiries as the 1986 MOU, the 1988 Heads of Agreement on forest management in Tasmania and the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE). It included agreements to:

- sign a Scoping Agreement for the development of an RFA in Tasmania;
- undertake a study of old growth and wilderness values in forests;
- suspend harvesting in specified forest areas of the Picton, Huon and Weld areas of the Southern Forests until the old growth and wilderness assessment and all agreed actions arising from the study were implemented;
- undertake feasibility studies for domestic value added processing opportunities and develop strategic options for increasing value adding in Tasmania as part of the economic and social assessment for an RFA;
- undertake feasibility studies for domestic value added processing opportunities for existing forest resource export operations, and develop strategic options for increasing value adding; and
- subject to achievement of significant progress towards an RFA, the pulpwood volumes identified in the 1986 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the 1988 Heads of Agreement as surplus to existing export licences being available for new value added projects in Tasmania (TPLUC, 1996: 3).

The Scoping Agreement was signed on January 16th 1996.

Strategies for Depoliticising the Forests II: The Community Forests Agreement 2005

The RFA failed spectacularly to quell conflict in the forests, in large part because the environment movement were of the view that the ‘Agreement’ had been significantly altered after they had signed off on it. In the 2004 federal election, Labor leader Mark Latham vowed to end logging in Tasmania’s old-growth forests with an $800 million job-saving package for
timber workers. On the 4th of October, in Hobart, Latham outlined his policy. The plan was to ‘put a moratorium on new logging in old-growth forests outside existing plans for 10 months, while an expert panel reviewed scientific and conservation arguments for locking up 240,000 hectares of disputed ‘high conservation value’ forests” (Koutsoukis, 2004: 1). Latham’s package was rejected by Tasmania’s Labor Premier, Paul Lennon, as well as powerful Labor-affiliated unions, and in the atmosphere of party disunity thereby generated Latham lost the federal election.

On the 13th of May 2005 the (Liberal) Prime Minister, John Howard, and the (Labor) Premier of Tasmania, Paul Lennon, jointly announced the Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement (TCFA). Where Latham’s plan had been formulated without consulting the Tasmanian Government, industry or unions, Howard’s plan had the approval of all three. It has been described by the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry as: ‘a joint commitment of the Australian and Tasmanian Governments to enhance the protection of Tasmania’s forest environment and assist the Tasmanian forest industry to adjust to changes in forest resources. Under the agreement over $250 million was committed to revitalize the timber industry and preserve old-growth forests’ (2012: 1). The key features of the agreement were:

- Additional protection of well over 170,000 hectares of forest on public and private land.
- Protection of old growth forest in Tasmania increased to more than 1 million hectares.
- Formal reservation of significant additional areas of the Tarkine, the Styx valley and other key conservation areas across the Stat.
- A new Forest Conservation Fund to protect 45,600 hectares of old-growth forest and other under-reserved forest types on private land, including a special Mole Creek component targeting 2,400 hectares.
- Reduction of clear felling of old-growth forest on public land.
- A phase out of clearing and conversion of rare, vulnerable and endangered non-forest vegetation communities.
- Measures to monitor impacts of chemical use on water quality, to save the Tasmanian devil and to further reduce the use of 1080 poison.
- Investment of over $200 million in total in the Tasmanian forest industry to maintain supply levels to the industry and to assist the industry to adjust to a future increase the proportion of logs from regrowth forests and plantations.
- $115 million to fund additional plantation establishment and productivity improvements in existing plantations and native forests to ensure sawlog and veneer log supply targets are able to be met into the future.
- Support for the Tasmanian hardwood industry, including $42 million for the development and revitalisation of mills and other businesses in the industry and $4 million for country sawmills.
- $11.4 million to support the special species and beekeeping industries.
- $4 million to build skills and training for the Tasmanian forest industry.
- $10 million in assistance for the Tasmanian softwood industry to maintain a viable and environmentally sustainable industry (2012: 1).

The CFA was not intended to supplant the Regional Forests Agreement. As the then Department of Premier and Cabinet explained: 'the new commitments have been negotiated under the Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) through a Supplementary Agreement… the RFA Supplementary Agreement will build a firm foundation for the Tasmanian forest industry going forward and underpin resource security for the proposed new pulp mill at Bell Bay’ (2007: 13).


The TCFA protected a total of 170 000 hectares of old growth, though only 58 000 hectares of that was in formal reserves. As Andrew Darby reported at the time, ‘the rest was in ‘informal reserves, much of it in streamsides, steep slopes and skylines that could never be cut under forest management rules’ (2005: 2). Darby saw it as sleight-of-hand:

the total of protected forest in Tasmania has also grown, such that Howard is able to say a million hectares of old growth is now reserved. But these “old-growth” reserves include scrubby, dry coastal forests and melaleuca swamps, as well as myrtle rainforest. Many of these trees remain outside national park – or world heritage-level protection, and the battle over the iconic trees of Tasmania – the tall old-growth eucalypts – continues (2005: 3).

**Strategies for Depoliticising the Forests III: The Tasmanian Forest Agreement 2013**

Originally called the Tasmanian Forests Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) as it involves both Commonwealth and State governments, this agreement was the outcome of years of fraught
negotiation between personnel from industry and environment movement peak bodies. Given the years of deep mistrust that had to be overcome on both sides, that it was achieved, and subsequently received the sanction of both tiers of government, must be counted a major accomplishment. The Signatories to the Agreement were the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), the Australian Forest Contractors Association (AFCA), the Australian Forest Products Association (AFPA), the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU), Environment Tasmania (ET), the Forest Industries Association of Tasmania (FIAT), the Tasmanian Forest Contractors Association (TFCA), Timber Communities Australia (TCA), the Tasmanian Sawmillers Association (TSA), The Wilderness Society (TWS), and the Wilderness Society (Tasmania). Some groups on both sides maintained animosity for being excluded from the deliberations of the TFA process. The Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association (TFGA) was one, and several environment groups, notably the Huon Valley Environment Centre, Still Wild, Still Threatened, Markets for Change, and the Meander Valley-based The Environment Centre were others, while the Tasmanian Conservation Trust evinced skepticism rather than outright hostility. Macintosh and Denniss argued, that ‘the promised new reserves under the TFA will not quell the calls from conservationists for more protection. The green groups involved in the deal – the Wilderness Society, Australian Conservation Foundation and Environment Tasmania – are but three voices in a diverse and complex movement. The idea that they speak for the broader movement is fanciful’ (2012: 1). This view is contestable, but it was widely held.

The TFA’s Bill is currently before the State Legislative Council. It was passed by the Tasmanian House of Assembly on the 13th of December 2012 after a 13-hour debate and the need for an extra parliamentary sitting day. On the 15th of January 2013 it was announced that the House of Assembly had presented 158 pages of amendments to the Bill. The only current alternative to the TFA is the Tasmanian Liberal Party’s 13 Point Plan, to be found at http://www.willhodgman.com.au/policy-statements/13-point-forestry-plan.

Fred Gale (2012) outlined the ‘trade-offs’ of the TFA:
…Environmental interests give up their long-standing campaign against native forest logging and their opposition to the utilization of forest residues for a range of commercial purposes.

Economic interests get a lower, but guaranteed minimum wood supply of high quality sawlogs. They also get yet-to-be-determined volumes of peeler billets and specialty timbers that are secured in ‘Permanent Timber Production Zones’ and ‘Specialty Craft and Timber Zones’.

Economic interests give up their long-standing campaign to prevent most of Tasmania’s remaining public high conservation value forests from being ‘locked up’ in national parks. They must drop their opposition to Forest Stewardship Council certification.

Social interests get compensation for affected firms and workers to transition to a smaller, but more secure timber industry. It will be aided by enhanced regional development funds to promote, among other options, value-added forest products.

Social interests must give up the same things economic interests must give up.

[In the two years that followed Jade’s drafting of this sub-section much transpired. Though it was a close-run thing, the Agreement passed the Legislative Council, was endorsed in Canberra, and became law. Subsequently, however, a change of government at state level saw it undone, the new Liberal Government under Premier Will Hodgman moving swiftly to dismantle the legislative framework of the Agreement. Again, the reaction of the Legislative Council was uncertain, but the legislation to rescind the Agreement narrowly passed. Jade was across developments pertaining to the TFA on a day-by-day basis, and would have factored these into this account as they occurred, including the provision of a detailed description of the regime that currently applies. PH]

The Situation Today

[As is to be expected, there is nothing under this sub-heading. It was to be a succinct and to-the-point summary – probably only 4 or 5 paragraphs. PH]
Chapter 5: War

What Is War?: Selections from a Vast Literature

This chapter seeks to explicate the nature of war. It first seeks to define war in a generic sense, and then it seeks to distinguish between ‘old’ (traditional) and ‘new’ (modern, postmodern) war. In distinguishing between ‘old’ and ‘new’ war, two examples of ‘old’ wars are explored, these being the Second World War and the Korean War. War as it has since become – ‘new’ war – is then explained, predominantly through the writing of Mary Kaldor.

The chapter seeks, in conjunction with the following results chapters, to answer these questions:

- What conflict is war and what conflict is not war?
- What constitutes ‘modern’ war?
- What is metaphorical and what is not, when using war terminology to describe a conflict?
- Given changing concepts of war, could the Florentine forests dispute actually be some kind of present-day ‘war’?

The literature on war is vast, and a single chapter cannot hope to deal with it comprehensively. A mere sample of the voluminous literature about war is considered here.

War has been defined in a multitude of ways, and Moseley warns that ‘the student of war needs to be careful in examining definitions of war, for like any social phenomena, definitions are varied, and often the proposed definition masks a particular political or philosophical stance paraded by the author. This is true of dictionary definitions as well as of articles on military or political history’ (2010: 1). He instances the following definitions:

Cicero defines war broadly as ‘a contention by force’; Hugo Grotius adds that ‘war is the state of contending parties, considered as such’; Thomas Hobbes notes that war is also an attitude: ‘By war is meant a state of affairs, which may exist even while its operations are not continued’; Dennis
Diderot comments that war is: ‘a convulsive and violent disease of the body politic’; for Karl von Clausewitz, ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’, and so on. Each definition has its strengths and weaknesses, but often is the culmination of the writer’s broader philosophical positions (2010: 1).

Several definitions and perspectives are presented below. Moseley himself outlines what he refers to as the ‘political-rationalist theory’ of war. This includes definitions that refer only to conflict between states, dismissing the notion that wars might occur between bodies that are not politically constituted as states. In addition, ‘there are other schools of thought on war… if war is defined as something that occurs only between states, then wars between nomadic groups should not be mentioned, nor would hostilities on the part of a displaced non-state group against a state be considered a war’ (2010: 2). A similar perspective is provided by military historian John Keegan. Writing about the political rationalist theory of war in his book, *A History of Warfare* he notes that the rationalist theory does not deal satisfactorily with pre-state or non-state peoples and their conflict, which in all other respects, would appear to be warfare.

Orend contends that to understand definitions of war it is necessary to understand related terms such as ‘state’, ‘statehood’ and ‘nation’. ‘Nation’ is defined as ‘a group which thinks of itself as “a people”, usually because they share many things in common such as ethnicity, language, culture, historical experience, a set of ideals and values, habitat, cuisine, fashion and so on’ (2005: 1). He compares this with the definition of a state, which: ‘refers much more narrowly to the machinery of government which organizes life in a given territory’ (2005: 1). The importance of this distinction is embodied in the list that Orend provides of what he deems the essential characteristics of war:

- War should be understood as an *actual, intentional and widespread* armed conflict between political communities
- War is a phenomenon which occurs *only* between political communities, defined as those entities which either are states or intend to become states.
- Certain political pressure groups, like terrorist organizations, might also be considered ‘political communities’, in that they are associations of people with a political purpose and, indeed, many of them aspire to statehood or to influence the development of statehood in certain lands.
- *All warfare is precisely, and ultimately, about governance.*
The mere threat of war, and the presence of mutual disdain between political communities does not suffice as indication of war. The conflict of arms must be actual, and not merely latent, for it to count as war. Further, the actual armed conflict must be both intentional and widespread: isolated clashes between rogue officers, or border patrols, do not count as actions of war.

- There’s no real war, so to speak, until the fighters intend to go to war and until they do so with a heavy quantum of force.
- War is about governance, using violence instead of peaceful measures to resolve policy (which organises life in the land) (2005: 2).

On the basis of these factors, Orend formulates this definition of war: ‘war is the intentional use of mass force to resolve disputes over governance. War is, indeed, governance by bludgeon. Ultimately, war is profoundly anthropological: it is about which group of people gets to say what goes on in a given territory’ (2005: 2). Martin Van Creveld extends this observation: ‘in any war, the readiness to suffer and die, as well as to kill, represents the single most important factor. Take it away, and even the most numerous, best organized, best trained, best equipped army in the world will turn out to be a brittle instrument’ (1991: 160).

Writing in the 1960s, Rowen drew a close link between war and the conventionality of policy: ‘policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse’ (1963: 298). But once recourse is had to war conventionality breaks down. Of the lawlessness of war he writes: ‘we know, of course, that war is only caused through the political intercourse of governments and nations; but in general it is supposed that such intercourse is broken off by war, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its own’ (1963: 296), whilst ‘real war is no such consistent effort tending to the last extreme, as it should be according to abstract theory, but a half-hearted thing, a contradiction in itself; that, as such, it cannot follow its own laws but must be looked upon as part of another whole - and this whole is policy’ (1963: 297).

Still earlier, in the context of the global depression of the 1930s, Gregg related war to capitalism: ‘war is merely the final outcome of many different processes of life. It is swifter, more intense, franker, more dramatic and openly violent, and therefore more clearly terrible than our so-called “peace,” but the fundamental assumptions, valuations and attitudes toward people and life are much the same in both our style of peace and war’ (1936: 104). Further, ‘war is the crisis of our
kind of peace, and our kind of peace is a peace that tends to maintain and promote capitalism’ (1936: 104). Gregg stands within a Marxist tradition of writing on war that traces back at least as far as Lenin, who wrote in 1914: ‘the war is not an accident, not a sin as is the idea of the Christian ministers (who preach patriotism, humanitarianism and peace no less eloquently than the opportunists); it is an inevitable stage of capitalism, it is a form of capitalist life as natural as peace’ (1914: 88).

Another perspective from the 1930s is given by Dixon. He aligns war with economic competition, arguing that war is natural and that ‘nature’ is the enemy, ‘nature’, in his use of the term, being the ‘fecundity of life on earth. He writes:

Abolish war, say our humanitarians, and you have abolished the worst feature among the rivalries of mankind. Reflect a moment, however, and you discover that you drive these rivalries into another channel, in which the sufferings inflicted are, indeed, masked, but little diminished. Economic competition remains... a less noble form of war, yet as ruthless and merciless. Capture a people’s markets and you strike at its life... War is more dramatic and spectacular, but slow grinding starvation wields no less deadly a sword. Between four and five millions perished from famine and attendant causes in Russia in 1933, and the world was quite unruffled, though no year of the great war had such a crop of victims. It is the fecundity of nature against which our moralists should direct their indignation. Nature is the enemy. I have read that the bodies of over 30,000 infants are picked up every year in the streets of Shanghai. Until the reformers have found some means of restraining that fecundity, of reducing Nature’s vast populations, these living creatures can hardly be expected to lay aside their weapons (1937: 98).

Thus, Dixon believes birth rates are responsible for the world’s wars and that people are justified in taking up arms in the face of poverty.

William James, in the context of his concern for the alleviation of social injustice, also urged ‘war’ against nature, arguing for: ‘a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against Nature’ (1977: 669). He believed that the characteristics associated with militarism were not of themselves, intrinsically ‘bad’ but rather sterling human qualities that could be turned to good account if we could only eliminate
warfare between humans, and channel that discipline into a ‘war’ against nature with the goal of diverting natural resources into the alleviation of social injustice.

The ‘war against nature’ perspective is a minor theme within the literature on war, but has been given emphasis here because it directly relates to the consideration of the context in which war terminology is applied – that of the Florentine Valley forest protests – that is the focus of this study. It should be noted, though, that Dixon and James, in writing of wars against nature, do not consider ‘nature’ in the way the interview respondents within this study have. There is, for example, no literature to be found on, say, a ‘war against the trees’. Interview respondents within this study have tended to consider the ‘war’ within the Florentine forests as one whereby human activists are moved to defend otherwise defenceless trees in a ‘war’ against other humans – logging company personnel and contractors. Though much has been written on logging disputes globally, war terminology has not been considered within the relevant academic literature.

We now move to an exploration of ‘old’ wars in order to better understand the difference between conflict that can be called ‘war’ and conflict that should not be defined as ‘war’, as well as providing a basis for an understanding of how warfare has changed through time.

[This sub-section is not quite complete. Jade intended to add 2-3 additional definitions/perspectives from more recent writings than those reported here. PH]

‘Old’ Wars

‘Every society has its own characteristic form of war’, writes Kaldor. ‘What we tend to perceive as war, what policy-makers and military leaders define as war, is, in fact, a specific phenomenon which took shape in Europe somewhere between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, although it has passed through several different phases since then’ (2001: 13). Further, ‘the notion of war as a state activity was only firmly established towards the end of the eighteenth century... between the fall of the Roman Empire and the late Middle Ages, war was fought by a variety of
actors – the Church, feudal barons, barbarian tribes, city-states – each with its own characteristic military formations’ (2001: 15). Thus Kaldor explicitly rejects the notion that war is intrinsically a function of relations between states, and Figure 1 charts the different phases that war has gone through from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the twentieth century. But the coming of the nation-state and its claim to a legal monopoly over legitimate violence, drew the practice of war into the exclusive ambit of state activity:

the establishment of standing armies under the control of the state was an integral part of the monopolization of legitimate violence which was intrinsic to the modern state. State interest became the legitimate justification for war, supplanting concepts of justice, *jus ad bellum*, drawn from theology. The Clausewitzian insistence that war is a rational instrument for the pursuit of state interest – ‘the continuation of politics by other means’ – constituted a secularization of legitimacy that paralleled developments in other spheres of activity. Once state interest had become the dominant legitimation of war, then claims of just cause, by non-state actors could no longer be pursued by violent means (2001: 17).

The state’s claim to a monopoly over the legal exercise of violence also required that war be clearly distinguished from crime, as van Creveld explains:

To distinguish war from mere crime, it was defined as something waged by sovereign states and by them alone. Soldiers were defined as personnel licensed to engage in armed violence on behalf of the state... To obtain their license, soldiers had to be carefully registered, marked and controlled to the exclusion of privateering. They were supposed to fight only when in uniform, carrying their arms ‘openly’ and obeying a commander who could be held responsible for their actions. They were not supposed to resort to ‘dastardly’ methods such as violating truces, taking up arms again after they had been taken prisoner, and the like. The civilian population was supposed to be left alone, ‘military necessity’ permitting (1991: 41).

According to Kaldor, ‘by the end of the eighteenth century, it was possible to define the specific socially organized activity which we perceive as war. It could be situated in the context of a whole series of new distinctions which were characteristic of the evolving state. These included:

- the distinction between the public and private, between the sphere of state activity and non-state activity;
- the distinction between internal and external, between what took place within the clearly defined territory of the state and what took place outside;
- the distinction between the economic and the political which was associated with the rise of capitalism, the separation of private economic
Table 1. The Evolution of Old Wars  (source: Kaldor, 2001: 14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>17th and 18th centuries</th>
<th>19th century</th>
<th>Early 20th century</th>
<th>Late 20th century</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Polity</strong></td>
<td>absolutist state</td>
<td>nation-state</td>
<td>coalitions of states; multinational states; empires</td>
<td>blocs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals of war</strong></td>
<td>Reasons of state; dynastic conflict; consolidation of borders</td>
<td>national conflict</td>
<td>national and ideological conflict</td>
<td>ideological conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of army</strong></td>
<td>mercenary/professional</td>
<td>professional/conscription</td>
<td>mass armies</td>
<td>scientific-military elite/professional armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military technique</strong></td>
<td>use of firearms, defensive manoeuvres, sieges</td>
<td>railways and telegraph, rapid mobilization</td>
<td>massive firepower; tanks and aircraft</td>
<td>nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War economy</strong></td>
<td>regularization of taxation and borrowing</td>
<td>expansion of administration and bureaucracy</td>
<td>mobilization economy</td>
<td>military-industrial complex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- activity from public state activities, and the removal of physical coercion from economic activities;
- the distinction between the civil and the military, between domestic non-violent legal intercourse and external violent struggle, between civil society and barbarism;
- the distinction between the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant or the criminal (2001: 20).

And there was an even more fundamental distinction, one that bears significantly on the present project. ‘Above all’, writes Kaldor, ‘there emerged the distinction between war and peace itself’. This distinction confined ‘war’ within clear conceptual boundaries: ‘in place of more or less continuous violent activity, war became a discrete event, an aberration in what appeared to be a progressive evolution towards a civil society, not in today’s sense of active citizenry and organized NGOs, but in the sense of day-to-day security, domestic peace, respect for law and justice. It became possible to conceive of “perpetual peace”’ (2001: 20).

**World War II**

The 1939-45 War resulted in 50 to 70+ million fatalities, making it the deadliest conflict in human history. It included all the great world powers ranked up in opposing military alliances: the Allies and the Axis. World War II involved the mass death of civilians through events such as the saturation bombing of cities (such as the London Blitz and the firebombing of Dresden), the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (the only war that has involved, to date, the use of nuclear weapons), and the genocide of the Holocaust. It also involved a state of total war, whereby the participating states placed their entire economic, scientific and industrial capabilities at the service of the war effort.

In brief, World War II began with the invasion of Poland by Germany and subsequent declarations of war on Germany by France and most countries of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Countries making up the ‘Allies’ included the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Britain and the countries of the British Empire, China, France, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Brazil. Countries making up the ‘Axis’ included Germany, Japan, Italy, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The victory of the Allies over the Axis, which concluding with the defeat of Japan in 1945, ended the war.
Excepting nuclear weapons, used only at the very end of the war, the major weapon systems of World War I were still dominant in World War II, though great advances had taken place in some of these systems. Though automatic weapons became available during the war, they were short range and low accuracy. According to Weinberg: ‘their very rapid expenditure of ammunition... could create supply problems, and most armies relied on rifles for much of their infantry until the end of the war’ (2005: 536). Cavalry ‘was used on a far lesser scale than in any prior European or Asiatic conflict’ (Weinberg, 2005: 537). Horses were mainly used for transport and haulage of weapons and medical supplies and mules were used widely as pack animals, especially in mountainous terrain.

The Second World War saw tremendous advances in air warfare. In the beginning most air forces still had bi-planes but these were replaced with single-engine, single-wing fighters which came to characterize all air forces. ‘If fighters became faster, carried heavier armour, came to have self-sealing tanks, and flew further, bombers changed in a different way’, Weinberg writes. ‘The two-engined standard bomber of all air forces continued to be used in varying modifications by all air forces. The major new development was the four-engined bomber, produced in ever large numbers primarily by the United States and Great Britain’ (2005: 540).

This section is incomplete. Jade intended to add some material about war as it was fought on and under the sea, and conclude with a summary of the salient features of World War II as war. PH]

The Korean War

The 25th June 1950 is generally taken as the day the Korean War commenced, and hostilities ceased towards the end of July 1953. It was a classic Cold War confrontation that got out of hand, a war between the West-backed Republic of Korea and the notionally Communist dictatorship, the People’s Republic of Korea. Boose explains:

It was primarily the result of the political division of Korea by an agreement of the victorious Allies at the conclusion of the Pacific War at the end of World War II. The Korean Peninsula was ruled by the Empire of Japan from 1910 until the end of World War II. Following the surrender of the Empire of Japan in September 1945, American
administrators divided the peninsula along the 38th parallel, with the U.S. military forces occupying the southern half and the Soviet military forces occupying the northern half (1995-6, 112).

The Korean War can be thought of as a ‘proxy war’, in that both North Korea and South Korea were sponsored by external powers. The division between North and South sharpened in 1948 with the failure to hold free elections aimed at eventual unification. The North established a Soviet-style government whilst the South adopted a western governmental model. The 38th parallel became a permanent political border between the two Korean states. Following cross-border raids and skirmishes, the situation escalated into all-out warfare when North Korea invaded South Korea on 25th June 1950. This was the first significant armed conflict of the Cold War. The United States and other countries sponsored a successful resolution in the United Nations Security Council authorizing military intervention in Korea. Along with the United States of America, 20 other countries, including Australia, sent a total of 341,000 international soldiers to help South Korea repel the invasion. An armistice agreement was signed on 27th July 1953 which ended the active stage of the war. This Agreement restored the borders near the 38th Parallel and created the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a 2.5 mile-wide fortified buffer zone between the two Korean nations.

[Jade had thus far only provided a factual introduction to the Korean War as an example of ‘old’ war. She intended to go on from here to a discussion of the ways in which the Korean War was fought, the technologies used, and what there was about this war that justifies its categorisation as ‘old’ war. PH]

‘New’ Wars

Kaldor explains the essential features of what she calls ‘new’ war in this way:

the political goals of the new wars are about the claim to power on the basis of seemingly traditional identities – nation, tribe, religion. Yet the upsurge in the politics of particularistic identities cannot be understood in traditional terms. It has to be explained in the context of a growing cultural dissonance between those who participate in transnational networks which communicate through e-mail, faxes, telephone and air travel and those who are excluded from global processes and are tied to
localities even though their lives may be profoundly shaped by those same processes (2001: 70).

The ‘old’ war economies, such as those of the total wars of the twentieth century, saw centralized administration to increase war efficiency and maximise revenue to pay for the war. As many people as possible were mobilised, either as soldiers or workers, to participate in the war effort, which was largely self-sufficient in character. The new type of war economy is quite different; wars are now globalized. In Kaldor’s view:

they involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Participation is low relative to the population both because of the lack of pay and because of the lack of legitimacy on the part of warring parties. There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support. Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions is common (2001: 90).

Importantly, Kaldor differentiates ‘new’ war from the state based-rationality of classical Clausewitzean theory. Instead, modern war has much of the unpredictability of anarchy:

Those who conceive of modern war in traditional Clausewitzean terms, based on definable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying vested interests, both political and economic, in the continuation of war. They tend to assume that political solutions can be found without any need to address the underlying economic logic. At the same time, however, those who recognize the irrelevance of traditional perceptions of war and observe the complexity of the political, social and economic relationships expressed in these wars tend to conclude that this type of violence can be equated with anarchy (2001: 91).

Different authors conceptualise war in its contemporary manifestations in a number of different ways. Angstrom, emphasizing the fluid state of contemporary war theory, provides a list: “new and old wars”, “the third kind of war”, “uncivil wars”, “intrastate wars”, “resource conflict”, variants of “ethnic war”, “internal war”, “ideological civil wars”, “shadow wars”, “people’s wars”, “foreign internal defence”, “military operations other than war”, “terrorism”, “indirect wars”, “communal war”, “low-intensity conflicts”, “small wars”, “insurgencies”, “complex emergencies” (2005: 6). The old Clausewitzean orthodoxy will no longer do, then:
the debate on how to conceptualise modern war indicates that far from being readily accepted, Clausewitz’s ideas on the nature of war have become increasingly challenged. Implicit in many of the contribution to the non-state warfare segment of the debate on the nature of modern warfare is the tacit assumption that non-state war is different from war between states. The nucleus of this argument is that the nature of war depends to a high degree upon the nature of the actors and their war-conducting institutions, Hence, wars conducted by irregular militias will be fought differently and therefore have a different nature than wars conducted by states and their armies (2005: 6-7).

Further, there are ‘those who adhere to Clausewitz in regarding war as a rational phenomenon, and those who suggest that war has become irrational’ (Angstrom, 2005: 7). Most importantly, ‘according to this line of thought, imposing rationality misleads our analyses of these wars. Instead, identity, emotions and psychology are better suited to understanding modern war’ (Angstrom, 2005: 7). Donald Snow argues similarly:

in a sense, what has emerged is a kind of ‘new-old’ form of war that is both pre-Clausewitzian and possibly post-Clausewitzian. What is most notable about it is the essential divorce of war from politics. In this style, war is not so clearly the continuation of politics by other means ... the new warfare is pre-Clausewitzian, apolitical, and self-justifying. At the same time, the apparent chaos, savagery, and pointlessness of much of the new internal war would shock most pre-Clausewitzians of the period when armed conflict was imbued with notions of warrior ethic and chivalry (1997: 129).

It is, of course, also possible to question the supposed ‘rationality’ of ‘old war’ decision-making. Van Creveld is one who stresses the irrationality of modern war, even in its conventional forms: ‘in any kind of regime the people who comprise the decision-making body are made of flesh and blood. Nothing would be more preposterous than to think that, just because some people wield power, they act like calculating machines that are unswayed by passions. In fact, they are no more rational than the rest of us – and indeed, since power presumably means that they are less subject to constraint, they may be less” (1991: 157).

Susan Griffin, in her 1992 book, *A Chorus of Stones: the Private Life of War*, writes in similar vein of the psychology underpinning major military decisions. So, too, does Martin Shaw, though he does so to argue that what seems to be the ultimate in irrationality actually requires a degree of discipline and organization that undermines the claim that there is a pervasive absence of rationality in modern warfare. He writes:
To organize a force that can carry out slaughter requires extensive preparation. It takes organization and ideas for warriors to overcome pervasive taboos against killing. It takes discipline to make soldiers aggressive against people they don’t know, to inflict force in a way that achieves intended results and to overcome powerful instincts of self-preservation and fear. If all human killing requires social relations and beliefs to make it possible, the kind of mass killing involved in war requires peculiarly developed, conscious social organization and justification (2003: 21).

Kaldor’s position is vulnerable, then, to the criticism that it ‘emphasises the continuities of war rather than the changes’ (Angstrom, 2005: 12). Nevertheless, it is Angstrom’s view that, on balance, Kaldor has the best of the debate. One way in which the controversy can be circumvented entirely is to simply refer to ‘modern’ war. Angstrom tends to do this, and even Kaldor sometimes does so, listing what she sees as the defining characteristics of modern war. These are presented below.

Characteristics of Modern Wars

Privatization of military forces

Privatization is now a feature across a multiplicity of fighting unit types, both public and private, state and non-state. These include regular armed forces or remnants thereof, paramilitary groups, self-defence units, foreign mercenaries, and regular foreign troops generally under international auspices. Kaldor sees this tendency as reflective of the ‘failure of the state’, one consequence of which is ‘a growing privatization of violence’ (2001: 92).

New patterns of violence

Classical revolutionary warfare (such as that of Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh or Mao Tse-tung) typically has as its central objective the control of territory through gaining support of the local population rather than through capturing territory through the conventional defeat of enemy forces in a major battlefield confrontation. This is now in process of supercession, with ideological factors of diminishing importance. Kaldor explains: ‘the new warfare borrows from the both revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency... an important difference between revolutionaries and the new warriors, however, is the method of political
control... the new warriors establish political control through allegiance to a label rather than an idea’ (2001: 98). [Kaldor – and Jade herself – were writing prior to the ISIS phenomenon. I would have asked Jade how that development qualifies or supports this particular factor. PH]

Financing of war

Changes here constitute, says Kaldor, an extreme version of globalisation. Territorially-based production may collapse as a result of liberalisation and the withdrawal of state support, through physical destruction (in pillage, for example), because markets are lost due to the sudden discontinuation of states, or for a number of other reasons. A main source of funding therefore is ‘asset transfer’ – the redistribution of existing assets to the advantage of the fighting units themselves. ‘Asset transfer’ generally includes looting, robbery, extortion, pillage and hostage taking. A second form is market-based. As Kaldor explains it, ‘a typical characteristic of the new wars are the numerous checkpoints which control the supply of food and necessities. Sieges and blockades, the division of territory between different paramilitary groups, allow the fighting units to control market prices’ (2001: 102). In addition, ‘war taxes’ or ‘protection money’ are sought from the production of primary commodities and various forms of illegal trading. ‘External assistance’ may take the form of remittances from abroad to individuals, direct assistance from the diaspora living abroad, assistance from foreign governments, humanitarian assistance (see Figure 1)
[I have left ‘Figure 1’ exactly as it appears in the draft chapter, though Jade would have been required to reproduce it in a more acceptable form that this.  PH]

The uncontainability of violence

According to Snow: ‘in the classic insurgencies the parties to the conflict shared the same centre of gravity: the legitimacy of the target population.  This had a moderating effect on the warfare, which in the new internal wars is not present’ (quoted in Angstrom 2005: 8).  ‘New’ warfare is characterized, then, by an absence of shared moral constraint about who is a combatant and who it not.  ‘The new type of warfare’, Kaldor writes, ‘is a predatory social condition.  While it may be possible to contain particular groups or individuals, it is very difficult to contain the social condition either in space or in time’ (2001: 107).  Further:

neighbouring countries are the most immediately affected.  The cost of war in terms of lost trade, especially where sanctions or communications blockades are introduced or where borders are closed, either deliberately
or because of fighting; the burden of refugees, since generally it is the neighbouring states who accept the largest numbers; the spread of illegal circuits of trade; and the spill-over of identity politics – all these factors reproduce the conditions that nurture the new forms of violence (2001: 107).

As well as economic costs, neighbouring countries take in the majority of refugees. Tensions typically occur between the refugees and their host populations. Trade routes necessarily cross borders and thereby spread new war economies. The politics of identity bleeds across domains. Kaldor explains: ‘all identity-based groups, whether defined in terms of language, religion or some other form of differentiation, spill over borders ... majorities in one country are minorities in another: Tutsis in Rwanda, Burundi in Zaire ...’ (2001: 109).

[I can’t recall whether Jade also intended to discuss additional factors here. There is nothing in her computer notes to indicate that she did. I do recall that we had discussed the need for an additional paragraph or two to round off and conclude this discussion. PH]
Chapter 6: Metaphor Theories in Relation to the Florentine ‘War’

This chapter applies metaphor theories to Florentine ‘war’ discourse. Of the previously-examined theories of metaphor the two most applicable to the case of military metaphor in the Florentine ‘war’ are, it is argued, the interaction theory and tension theories. They provide the most useful framework for an understanding of how the war metaphor creates meaning and offers insight into its usage in Tasmanian environmental discourse. Beardsley’s controversy theory is explored in relation to the print media. Black’s theories of metaphor: substitution, comparison and interaction theory are all revisited in relation to the Florentine ‘war’, the former two being found wanting, while interaction theory is found to be the most applicable theory of metaphor in the case of the dispute at hand.

Features of Similarity and Dissimilarity, Context, Culture, and Speech Acts

If we are to consider the speech (or sentence) act at play, we need to ask: who has used the metaphor, where, and for what audience? The metaphor: ‘the upper Florentine Valley dispute is war’ is a microcosm of the larger dispute that is the large-scale Tasmanian forest ‘war’. When speaking and writing of the Tasmanian forests dispute, the use of military metaphors is ubiquitous – speech acts referring to the upper Florentine Valley dispute as war are not isolated examples of the metaphor; they are, rather, a continuation, that is, an extension, of a military metaphor common to Tasmanian ecopolitical discourse. This has implications for the understanding of the metaphor and for its very status as metaphor rather than a literal description of a true war in the upper Florentine Valley. If military language was apparent only in discourse surrounding the upper Florentine Valley dispute, one may have cause to further question the nature of protest activity in the valley, perhaps suggesting that it is more violent than that of other contested areas within the state. But the fact that the military terminology is applied to all spheres of the Tasmanian forest dispute shows that the discourse is in fact metaphorical because it is obvious that while there is much protest activity over the issue of logging in Tasmanian forests, Tasmania, as a state, is certainly not engaged in any type of war, not even a civil war.
Considering features of similarity and dissimilarity, Mac Cormac has noted that ‘the salience of similarity features changes according to the context’ (1985: 145). We can also recall that the more salient stimulus (the prototype) is selected as referent and the less salient stimulus (the variant) as subject.

Context - [This paragraph note exists in the chapter draft, but I have been unable to discover what she had in mind here, though there are matters flagged in the sub-heading that have not been considered. PH]

Revisiting Black’s Substitution and Comparison Theories of Metaphor

As stated in Chapter 1, Black explains that the substitution view of metaphor holds that a metaphorical expression is used in place of some equivalent literal expression. We might assume, then, that a metaphor is being deployed when the upper Florentine Valley dispute is described as war. If we are to replace this with ‘some equivalent literal expression’, we might say: ‘the upper Florentine Valley dispute is protest’. Or, as this analysis can apply to a set of literal sentences, we might say: ‘the upper Florentine Valley dispute is a protest situation involving a blockade and direct action tactics on the part of protestors’.

The metaphor basically says that protest is like war, in this instance. This is a simple comparative exercise, comparing aspects of war with aspects of the upper Florentine Valley dispute. One interviewee directly compared the upper Florentine Valley dispute with a battle: ‘this was a battle between two sides over a piece of ground. I need a better word than “battle”; it was a conflict. But there are analogies between that and a military situation where two sides fight over a patch of ground. There is a front line; there is often and, in this case, fairly limited, violence. And on this day, there actually was a police front line and a protestor front line and they sort of met and the protestors got hauled off’ (Henry).

Black explained that ‘if a writer holds that a metaphor consists in the presentation of the underlying analogy or similarity, he will be taking what I shall call a comparison view of metaphor... this is a view of metaphor as a condensed or elliptical simile’ (1962:35). One instance of an activist presenting the similarity of protest and war is in the following: ‘the
next minute there were heaps of police officers and there were people swinging around in trees kicking arrows that the police were shooting into the trees and it was chaos’ (Millie). The activist goes on to explain: ‘the police shoot the arrows up to climb; to get a line up. And there were people kicking the arrows trying to stop them climbing’ (Millie). The first quotation certainly gives the impression of a war zone and if the activist was to have been speaking of army officers rather than police officers, it might not have been metaphorical. The second quotation explains that the shooting of arrows was not militant but part of the police operation to remove ‘sitters’ from treesits. What is apparent here is that the activist is presenting the analogy; the person interviewed has deliberately chosen to describe the situation in militant terms, before going on to explain the non-militant nature of the activity of which she speaks.

Another activist presents the metaphor thus: ‘it was like a military operation on their part that they planned out: this is how we are going to crumble you, we’re going to go in there every single day and one day that you’re not there we are going to destroy everything. So we’d talk about it, we’d have conversations and you’d have twenty-four hour watch so everyone was very tired for a long time and we’d get used to Forestry being there knowing that they were going to break up our day and people can’t go on walks; that kind of thing’ (Cookie). This respondent describes relations between the activists and Forestry Tasmania employees during one of the busts, describing the situation via a simile (‘it was like a military operation’) and going on to explain that simile.

Black states that substitution theory is ‘any view that holds that a metaphorical expression is used in place of some equivalent literal expression’ (1962: 31). An activist extends the metaphor thus: ‘it would be quite easy to describe it as warlike behaviour with casualties which, from the forest activists’ perspectives, would be the people being assaulted, the cars being burnt and smashed up, and from the forest worker and forest contractors’ perspectives would be having their jobs and their livelihoods taken away. I perceive those to be the casualties of what could be described as a forest war’ (Max). Here the activist explains what literal expressions he believes are meant by the metaphor ‘casualty’, as part of the extended war metaphor. One respondent from the print media explained: ‘I think particularly in headlines and sometimes in sports reporting, too, it is easy – these are easy, familiar terms we can reach for. We can portray a complex dispute as a simple battle between two sides; you can also say it gets portrayed as a sporting match. We do
our best to give people the subtleties and nuances but you’re doing that in 350 words’ (Henry). Often, then, it is simply more convenient to substitute literal description with a metaphor.

Revisiting Black’s Interaction Theory

Comparison theory goes a step further than the substitution theory. As comparison theory views the metaphor as something of an elliptical simile, we might say that ‘the upper Florentine Valley dispute is like war’; this is how we come to compare the upper Florentine Valley dispute to war and also to compare war and protest. Black’s interaction theory offers a means not just for comparison, but for looking at how the parts of the metaphor interact to give words new meaning.

In examining this metaphor in relation to the interaction theory, we must revisit Black’s associated seven claims.

A metaphor has two distinct subjects – a ‘principal’ subject and a ‘subsidiary’ subject.

In this case, the principal subject is the upper Florentine Valley dispute, and the subsidiary subject is war.

These subjects are often regarded as ‘systems of things’ rather than ‘things’.

This means that we must incorporate within our understanding everything descriptive of the upper Florentine Valley dispute and war. For example, within interview analysis a theme developed which I called ‘ingredients of war’. This theme encompassed respondents’ opinions on what constitutes war. One activist stated: ‘it’s a very war-like situation or battle; there are several battles that have taken place’ (Helen). Another activist described activity during the dispute which is like the ecological destruction that takes place in a war-zone: ‘there is loss of life, habitat is destroyed, the trees come down, the place gets napalmed, and the habitat, the animals; there is death’ (Max). Another activist explained how the dispute was different to war: ‘to me war is people being killed (slaughtered) and raped and that’s not happening’ (Millie). Another stated: ‘if it was war they would know
about it, you know, people would be dying and people would be getting cut and shot and whatever the hell, we’d be fighting each other’ (Possum). From these statements we have evidence of the ‘systems of things’ related to each subject. The upper Florentine Valley dispute brings into play such concepts as loss of life, loss of habitat and napalming. The ‘war’ subject includes things such as murder, rape, cutting, shooting, fighting and battles.

*The metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a set of ‘associated implications’ characteristic of the subsidiary subject.*

In this case, associated implications of the subject ‘war’ are applied to the upper Florentine Valley dispute.

*These implications usually consist of ‘commonplaces’ about the subsidiary subject, but may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant implications established ad hoc by the writer.*

The ‘commonplaces’ are all those things one can think of that are associated with war – the ‘ingredients of war’ theme was a setting down of respondents’ ‘commonplaces’ on war.

*The metaphor selects, emphasises, suppresses, and organises features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject.*

We have seen in a previous quote that there is loss of life, habitat, animal death, ‘napalming’ of vegetation, and large trees coming down, and that these are just some of the ways in which the upper Florentine Valley dispute is (like) war. The metaphor emphasises and selects the negative aspects of the Florentine dispute and encourages further conflict, whilst acting to suppress potentially positive aspects such as community solidarity or the ingenuity of the camp defences.

*This involves shifts in the meanings of words belonging to the same family or system as the metaphorical expression; and some of these shifts, though not all, may be metaphorical transfers (the subordinate metaphors are, however, to be read less ‘emphatically’).*

One word that was discussed in relation to its meaning was ‘casualty’. I asked respondents about the meaning of this word within the dispute, and who the ‘casualties’ might be. One
respondent stated: ‘the rest of us – the middle ground. The science, the society at large that has this big hole in it because there are things we just can’t talk about seriously’ (Simon). ‘Napalm’ is another word the meaning of which has changed as a result of the dispute. Napalm was an incendiary device originally used for creating fire during warfare. Within the upper Florentine Valley dispute, ‘napalm’ is used to describe similar incendiary devices used to burn the slash left after clear felling a coupe. This burning has yet to happen in the upper Florentine valley but the salient point is that a metaphorical transfer has already taken place; a word that used to apply only to warfare now also applies to this forest dispute.

There is, in general, no simple ‘ground’ for the necessary shifts of meaning – no blanket reason why some metaphors work and others fail.

This is a metaphor that works. It may be that there are some terms, such as ‘napalm’, that are associated with warfare and can easily be applied to forestry. Therefore, it may be that using war metaphors to describe forestry disputes is all too easy. We have seen that a lot of the ‘commonplaces’ applicable to war are also applicable to the upper Florentine dispute, at least this is so of those ‘commonplaces’ referring to the ecological destruction wrought by warfare.

Simply put, interaction theory is useful for understanding the metaphor at hand because it encourages one to consider how ‘everything about the upper Florentine dispute’ is like ‘everything about war’. In encouraging one to look at the interactions between these systems of things, it also draws attention to those things/systems of things that are dissimilar. For example, we have seen that war involves rape and murder, and the upper Florentine dispute certainly has not involved these things. So Interaction theory allows us to examine both the epiphoric and the diaphoric elements of the metaphor and, thus, leads to a greater understanding of the metaphor’s use within the media and society and the possible damage it may do as a misrepresentation of the dispute at hand.
Revisiting Mac Cormac’s Tension Theory

Mac Cormac states:

Metaphors can be partially true and partially false, that the truth or falsity of a metaphor is not an either/or matter but rather a matter of degrees. In the respect that the attributes of the two referents are similar, the metaphor can be said to be true, whereas with respect to the difference of certain attributes it can be said to be false. The more suggestive the metaphor, the greater degree of falsity; the more expressive of analogy, the greater degree of truth. As a corollary, the more suggestive, the more tensive a metaphor (1985: 30).

Mac Cormac goes on to explain that the creator of a metaphor is not trying to produce a falsity, but is trying to convey a truth. Meaning cannot rest solely on emotion but must have some cognitive support: ‘few words depend solely on their emotive import for their meaning; most depend on recognition of their cognitive content’ (1985: 27). We undertook a cognitive process in determining the meaning of the metaphor through an exploration of Black’s Interaction Theory. It is now necessary to consider the emotional implications of the metaphor. One respondent suggests ‘the big debate I think underpinning all this is the emotions-based approach to sustainable practices and forestry and the sustainable or scientific approach to forests management and forestry’ (Forester). It may be that the media and general society are taking an emotions-based approach to the upper Florentine dispute in describing it as war. The same respondent explains ‘so when you go through this peace process and people wonder why it won’t work I can tell you why: it’s been decades of this inflammatory language between the two and the inflammatory language has caused such unreasonable emotion that you can’t get beyond it’ (Forester).

According to Mac Cormac:

The metaphor may become less ungrammatical, and its falsehood diminishes through modification of the metaphor. Familiarity reduces tension and thereby may eliminate falsehood and ungrammaticality. This indeed brings about a most peculiar state of affairs – a hypothetical theory or speculative poetic insight can become true not through the confirmation of experience but through continued expression of a metaphor. Through continued misuse, tension lowers, truth increases, and the utterance becomes grammatical. Truth and grammatical deviance become functions of emotional tension. When tension disappears, truth and proper grammar appear (1985: 27).
If we are to accept Tension Theory to explain the use and function of the metaphor we might agree with the former respondent who believes that the language of the upper Florentine dispute and wider Tasmanian forest ‘war’ has caused ‘unreasonable emotion’. Since this theory posits that the metaphor’s creator is not trying to produce a falsity but is trying to convey a truth, it is worth considering the ‘truth’ within the metaphor. Many respondents suggest that while there is no physical war going on in the upper Florentine Valley, there is an ideological war being waged. One stated that, ‘it could be seen as a war of ideologies, but physically? No.’ (Missy). The same respondent continued: ‘it all comes down to individuals; you can’t make blanket judgements, some of us have really good relationships as far as you can have a relationship with someone when you’re on different sides of an ideological debate or “war”’ (Missy). Further, ‘people may say that it’s an ideological war but that’s a pretty serious word (war). It really depends on how you define war’ (Missy). This raises the question: ‘can a war be anything other than physical?’ Brian Orend would certainly say ‘no’, but it is worth examining the nature of ‘hot’ ideological conflict. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘ideology’ as ‘a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy’. For example, one might say that the ideology of the activist group, Still Wild Still Threatened, particularly in relation to the upper Florentine Valley is the inherent worth of wild natural systems and, hence, the ideal of having the contested forests protected as both National Park and World Heritage Area. The ideology of those in conflict with this, that of Forestry Tasmania for example, is that the value within forests stems from their commodity value to humans, and, therefore, that the upper Florentine Valley should be roaded and logged for economic purposes.

Revisiting Beardsley’s Controversion Theory

Mac Cormac states that ‘a commitment to the controversion theory puts the creator of a metaphor in the position of intentionally creating a false statement in order to convey a new idea’ (1985: 207). He suggests that the inherent problem with controversion theory is that it ‘poses a dilemma for the philosopher seeking an explanatory account of metaphor; whither metaphors assert falsehoods or the only legitimate metaphors are the least interesting ones, the ones that collapse into ordinary language or explicit analogy’ (1985: 29). One respondent offers the following on Camp Florentine: ‘in a globally wealthy, well-off state like
Tasmania I would be very reluctant to describe it as a war-zone. On a people level you can look across the world and see situations that make a blockade at the Floz seem like nothing’ (Missy). She explains further: ‘people might say it is an ideological war but that’s a pretty serious word. It really depends on how you define war’ (Missy). We have seen how war is defined by Orend:

- War should be understood as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities
- War is a phenomenon which occurs only between political communities, defined as those entities which either are states or intend to become states.
- Certain political pressure groups, like terrorist organizations, might also be considered ‘political communities’, in that they are associations of people with a political purpose and, indeed, many of them aspire to statehood or to influence the development of statehood in certain lands
- All warfare is precisely, and ultimately, about governance.
- The mere threat of war, and the presence of mutual disdain between political communities does not suffice as indication of war. The conflict of arms must be actual, and not merely latent, for it to count as war. Further, the actual armed conflict must be both intentional and widespread: isolated clashes between rogue officers, or border patrols, do not count as actions of war.
- There’s no real war, so to speak, until the fighters intend to go to war and until they do so with a heavy quantum of force
- War is about governance, using violence instead of peaceful measures to resolve policy (which organises life in the land) (2005: 2).

Through an understanding of these precepts we can conclude that the dispute situation in the Florentine Valley is not actually a war. For example, the Florentine dispute does not involve real, intentional and widespread armed conflict; it merely involves the presence of armed police officers at times of illegal activity. The dispute is not between political communities per se, but is between a (state) government business enterprise, Forestry Tasmania, an alliance of eco-political activists and members of the general community. The dispute is about governance but it is also about much more than Tasmania’s governance. It is about an ecosystem and the inherent rights of the non-human realm to its survival and integrity. It is about ecological problems such as climate change and deforestation which are not confined to the state of Tasmania and its governance, but are global environmental problems with global-reach implications. But there is no war or threat of war in the upper Florentine Valley. For one thing, the activists involved are engaged in non-violent direct action (this will be discussed in the next chapter); there is therefore no threat of a conflict of arms because one
The parties to the dispute do not intend to go to war. As one police officer stated: ‘the police response is twofold – we recognise the right for democratic speech and the right for democratic voicings of opinion so it is really very important for me to allow people to freely go about their protest in relation to logging and the road work constructions, and the other part is ensuring at the same time that lawful business operations are allowed to continue unhindered’ (Barry). He continues: ‘people like to protest because they believe strongly in things happening in society and that’s fine; it doesn’t bother me. The only time that I become involved is when I’m working in my capacity as a police officer and if people are protesting unlawfully then unfortunately I have to become involved’ (Barry). In the view of this officer, the nature of the Florentine Valley conflict was protest activity, requiring the normal police response rather than a kind of military intervention that might be describable as war. Finally, neither the police nor the protestors were ‘using violence instead of peaceful measures to resolve policy issues’. Considering controversy theory’s assumption that the creator of the metaphor is deliberately devising a false statement, I suggest that it is the media that appears responsible for the falsehood that the upper Florentine dispute situation is a war.

[The chapter is not quite finished. A new front is opened by the final sentence, and this would need to have been followed through. In addition, the chapter needs rounding off and a linkage to the next chapter. Most of the later chapters in the thesis still need this, and that’s down to me, because it was my advice to Jade to write the chapters as discrete entities, and to work on the linking paragraphs as the last thing. PH]
Chapter 7: Discussion of Results (Themes)

In this chapter I review 34 themes identified in the analysis of the interviews, and grouped into six sub-themes. Themes and sub-themes were generated using NVivo descriptive and analytical codes, as described in Chapter 3 (Methods). Salient quotations relevant to each theme are provided and discussed with the aim of better understanding the metaphor: ‘the Upper Florentine forests dispute is war’. The six sub-themes are as follows:

1. Language and Words
2. Media
3. Non-violence
4. Political Science
5. War
6. Tasmanian Forests Conflict

Theme 1: Language and Words

The theme ‘Language and Words’ encompassed the following two sub-themes: ‘emotional language’ and ‘language affecting behaviour’.

Emotional Language

The two Forestry Tasmania (FT) representatives who were interviewed both commented on what they describe as the ‘emotional language’ of the contest over the Tasmanian forests, and of the upper Florentine Valley dispute specifically. One pre-empted the outcome of the current peace process, arguing: ‘when you go through this peace process and people wonder why it won’t work I can tell you why – it’s been decades of this inflammatory language between the two and the inflammatory language has caused such unreasonable emotion that you can’t get beyond it’ (Forester). He continues: ‘that’s another thing about the use of language; they give all these trees emotional names which makes it harder to cut them down irrespective of whether they’re worth anything’
(Forester). Another Forestry Tasmania representative, commenting upon military metaphor in the discourse of the dispute, added: ‘I think the language is the media’s construct. I haven’t really heard the anti-forestry people talking about a war and I haven’t heard the anti anti-forestry people talking about a war. You have the media talking about a war and I think it encourages a gloves-off approach’ (Stewart). ‘Forester’ may simply be thinking in terms of dollar values when he questioned whether the named trees are actually worth anything. Here we have a clash of values where the less tangible, intrinsic values of the forest, valued by more ecocentric and, perhaps, more emotional people, are signified through the naming of giant trees. With regard to the war (and otherwise inflammatory) language of which both representatives speak, it may be that, as ‘Forester’ suggests, the language has been part of the discourse for decades, in which case, it may be that ‘Stewart’ no longer notices it within the language choices made by his colleagues and rivals within the ‘anti anti-forestry people’, but now notices such language only where it is more obvious – in print media headlines. We have looked at the question of whether or not language affects behaviour, and, therefore, whether a militant language and mindset exacerbates conflict. It may be that changing our language, and quite dramatically, is a necessary step in achieving peace in the forests.

Language Affecting Behaviour

One of the activists interviewed commented on the impact military language has on behaviour: ‘I remember a Mercury headline that was to the effect of “war, battlelines have been drawn” or something, and I just remember feeling angry at the media and feeling scared that because the media had announced that we were in a war without the knowledge or agreement of the contractors or activists who probably wouldn’t describe it that way most of the time, scared because the contractors or whoever might read that and assume that now that it’s been stated it will actually start a war from their labelling it that way’ (Possum). Nevertheless, ‘everything we do is basically words; it’s all just words backed up by action’ (Possum). This is an example of military metaphors within the discourse creating anger and fear and, one might say, confusion. I think what this quotation indicates is that it is not to the people out in the forests, the activists engaged in direct action blockading, nor is it to the contractors, that the aggressive discourse can be sourced. It is, rather, journalists, as well as media spokespersons from both sides of the conflict, who have most frequent recourse to the language of war. While these metaphors have the power to
rouse audiences at rallies and gain the attention of newspaper readers, the reality of direct action in the forest is sufficiently devastating for activists, police officers and contractors without the need to melodramatise it as ‘war’.

Theme 2: Media

The theme ‘Media’ encompassed the sub-themes ‘laziness in the media’, ‘media needs conflict’; and ‘newsworthy’

Laziness in the Media

One of the print journalists interviewed suggested that many of the military metaphors that appear in the Tasmanian print media’s presentation of the upper Florentine forests dispute are a result of laziness on the part of journalists. He explains: ‘I think a lot of the linguistics in the environment debate and in the news comes down to laziness on the part of journalists – it’s a lot easier to say that a ceasefire has broken out because journalists have been writing that way for thirty years’ (Henry). He explains further: ‘I think, particularly in headlines and sometimes in sports reporting too... [that] these are easy, familiar terms that we can reach for. We can portray a complex dispute as a simple battle between two sides, you can also say it gets portrayed as a sporting match. We do our best to give people the subtleties and nuances but you’re doing that in 350 words and some people saw what you saw and some people saw something completely different because they were standing 300 metres up the road. When you start simplifying complex things unfortunately sometimes you reduce shades of grey into black and white, and that’s when we fall back into these sorts of things’ (Henry). But is this laziness, or is this calculated and deliberate use of provocative language in order to inflame the debate? In chapter 2, it was shown that the inclusion of military metaphors in environmental new reporting is at least as old as the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Can this long tradition of use simply come down to journalists’ laziness?
One activist suggested that the media’s portrayal of the conflict heightens it: ‘I think the way that it is portrayed in the media has at times escalated conflict. There’s been times when the camp has been firebombed, and just afterward there was a protest that ended in violence as a couple of contractors started attacking a car and breaking windows with an axe and dragged a couple of protestors out of the car and physically assaulted them. While the nature of the activities was obviously one of high confrontation, I think the media was responsible for sensationalising what was going on, which fed into a wider community outrage on both sides of the debate; people being upset about these protestors being physically and violently attacked, and then also the contractors and the workers in the dispute, too... There was a sense that they were getting more and more fire and frustration which was sort of exacerbated by the media’s coverage of it’ (Max).

A print journalist said: ‘we tend to only go to protests where there’s likelihood that there’s going to be conflict; arrests, and when they’re highly contested areas. We just don’t have the time or the resources to get to every one so we’re very selective’ (Henry).

It seems that the media seek conflict, exacerbating it through recourse to inflammatory military metaphors. In this sense, then, the media is not on the ‘side’ of peace in the forests, because they are most interested in covering stories that involve conflict in ‘highly contested areas’. The fact that journalists ‘tend to only go to protests where there’s a likelihood that there’s going to be a conflict’ gives a skewed presentation of protests, making it appear that they are usually or even always violent, despite the fact that nonviolence is actually the norm. In this way, the print media in Tasmania is at odds with the environment movement in the latter’s striving to be seen as it actually is – nonviolent.

Newsworthy

An activist expressed frustration with the media’s attitude to what merited reporting: ‘one minute they love the Greens and the next minute they get Green fatigue and they don’t. And it depends on what’s happening in the state; if it’s boring and there’s nothing else happening then they will cover our stuff. And they’re provocative, the media are provocative – it’s all about where they can find the biggest catastrophe, how many people were arrested, did people get hurt, that is what they ask first! If it sounds bad enough then they may come out and cover the action, and it seemed to me that some
activists would pander to this and seek to manipulate the media – but who was really manipulating who?’ (Millie). A print journalist, providing a perspective from within the media, affirms the essence of ‘Millie’s observation: ‘we create a hierarchy of most newsworthy to least newsworthy. The Chief of Staff would say, “okay, there’s 200 protestors up there, we know the police are going up there; we know there’s a likelihood something newsworthy is going to happen”’. This is not a matter of choice: ‘it would be nice if we had the resources to go in times when there wasn’t conflict and we do try to do that; newspapers and the media in general don’t have as many resources as we’d like’ (Henry). He further explains the process of setting media priorities: ‘it’s a matter of prioritising stories based on how interesting they are; it’s really not more complicated than that, and how many reporters you’ve got... we also pay some heed to whether other media are going, distance is a factor, resources are a factor. I mean, I had to get up and do a story on Maria Island and that’s two people for a day. And you’ve just got to wait until a photographer can do it. You’ve [also] got to make sure you’ve got a car. We have sufficient resources to do the job but we’re not unlimited. If someone goes down the Tasman Peninsula, for example, they’ll ask other reporters if there’s any job they want done along the way. So we try to manage our resources as efficiently as possible. Regarding the Florentine, I think we probably went more times in this period than anyone else went up there. We covered it for slightly longer than the other media. [We were] very good at making snap decisions – this story is better than that story than that. It’s just a question of priority. To send someone on this story (the Florentine) – that’s a full day out for two staff, so that’s a high threshold’ (Henry)

It may be that, while conflict with its accompanying military metaphors has short term benefits in gaining media attention for the conservation movement, it has longer-term detrimental effects for environmental campaigning. [Jade had a series of asterisks here, which I take to mean that she intended to write provide analysis here. PH]

**Theme 3: Non-violence**

The theme ‘non-violence’ encompassed the sub-themes ‘non-violent direct action’ and ‘numbers of people’.
Non-Violent Direct Action

One of the problems with the media’s attraction to conflict, and the military discourse prominent within the Tasmanian conservation movement, is that it compromises the movement’s tradition of Non-Violent Direct Action (NVDA). NVDA typically includes the rejection of what is often termed ‘verbal violence’, and while this can include shouting and swearing it should, and often explicitly does, also include the rejection of military metaphor, or, military terminology being used in non-militant activity (such as NVDA). The Tasmanian print media often portray attempts at NVDA within the conservation movement as, in fact, violent. One way they do this is to seek out those rare occasions of violence within the normality of non-violent behaviour to present to the general public. One activist explains: ‘I can think of maybe two or three [actions] that have had any violence in them, some a bit borderline, some with verbal violence. It is drummed up a lot but the actual reality is that most actions go by very peacefully’ (Missy). Another activist articulates how different attitudes and definitions of NVDA apply in different places around the world: ‘there are all sorts of workshops I’ve been to around the world and many people have different views about how far you go within the confines of NVDA, and it depends on where you have become aware of activism I suppose. In Canada, for example, they spike trees. I know that in Still Wild Still Threatened there are different boundaries than have applied in other blockades. But we do talk about them. Every now and then someone will come in and say, “why don’t you just smash shit up? Pour sand in petrol tanks or spike tyres?”, but there are reasons why that doesn’t happen. For example, you won’t get the support from the community if they feel scared and it would have backlash for the community living in the area affected by what happens’ (Cookie). Tasmania can actually be seen as one of the strictest of the world’s activist theatres when it comes to strict adherence to NVDA.

Numbers of People

One activist explained why he thinks violence has not happened at large forest actions, such as the Florentine ‘community walk-ins’ (an activist camp variation of an open day, which usually involved large numbers of people crossing into the exclusion zone, thereby inviting arrest): ‘violence doesn’t happen because you can’t attack a big group of people with a small group of people; it just doesn’t happen. So violence only really happens when
people are singled out or there’s a small group of people’ (Possum). Another activist explains how the numbers of people staffing the camp changes with the seasons: ‘there’s that winter and summer divide and during winter you get to know three or four people really well. You share everything because there’s no one else, but then during summer you get this massive influx and new energy and some people who are good and others who are crazy that you don’t really get along with, though you know you’re in it for the same reason’ (Cookie). This same activist noted the transience of blockaders: ‘you’ve got to acknowledge that you’re transient; you don’t have a house in the nearest logging community and so you have to be very aware of what you’re doing and how it will play out in the grand scheme of the campaign and control your anger’ (Cookie).

Theme 4: Political Science

The ‘Political Science’ theme encompassed the sub-themes ‘anarchy’ and ‘democracy’.

Anarchy

The classic definition of anarchism is provided by the Russian Prince, Peter Kropotkin. For Kropotkin, anarchism is:

the name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government – harmony in such society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of the civilized being (Shatz, 1971: xi).

Anarchy is a term that the media likes to use to describe forest activism. It is also a term that seems to confuse people, it also having the negative and pejorative meaning of lawlessness. Three different activists commented on anarchy in relation to the organisation and management of Still Wild Still Threatened. One stated: ‘I couldn’t stand by activists who purposely antagonised workers; that really killed me. And I couldn’t support the movement, because that was not being stamped out at the time. There was a real anarchy and no rules and I really struggled with that so I pulled away from the movement because of that’ (Millie). Another suggested: ‘anarchy is a word that a lot of people like to throw around. I think it has different meanings for different people as
well. I could easily say that there are people in Still Wild Still Threatened who have anarchist tendencies or ideas. I like to think that that’s not a bad thing; it’s quite open-minded” (Cookie). The most insightful thoughts on whether or not Camp Florentine was an anarchist facility came from a third activist involved with the camp. He said, ‘I wouldn’t call it an anarchist-run camp because the trust is accorded to the people who are seen to have a high amount of experience and/or knowledge [of] campaign policy. The effort is always to ensure that, even whilst acknowledging that certain people may be in a better position to act or advise in certain situations, that the policy making and the decision behind whatever policy it is we choose to adopt is made by everyone with a consensus-based system. We allow for internal lobbying amongst ourselves to reach that consensus. Obviously when people’s egos are involved there is sometimes a push to govern or lead but in my opinion it has never been so... if compromise could be reached and it wasn’t impractical it was usually put into place immediately. It was only impracticality that ever brought up contention ... Was it democratically run? No, because it was not majority rules. Do I think it was anarchist? It wasn’t at all. There were times and situations when we had make a decision and we had to, in those situations, reach a paler form of consensus; where people had to take advice as part of their vote for the organisation’s direction, for the camp’s direction’ (Karl). Though Karl argued that negotiated consensus decision-making is not anarchy, in fact what he described fits closely with the Kropotkinist description quoted above.

Democracy

Democracy literally means ‘rule by the people’. But, beyond its etymological meaning, it is a much contested and complex political idea. John Dewey explains:

democracy is much broader than a special political form, a method of conducting government, of making laws and carrying on governmental administration by means of popular suffrage and elected officers... universal suffrage, recurring elections, responsibility of those who are in political power to the voters, and the other factors of democratic government are means that have been found expedient for realizing democracy as the truly human way of living ... democratic political forms are simply the best means that human wit has devised up to a special time in human history. But they rest back upon the idea that no man or limited set of men is wise enough or good enough to rule others without their consent; the positive meaning of
Interviewees spoke not so much of the camp as a democratically-run organisation but of the activists’ (and the general Tasmanian population’s) democratic right to protest. The fact that Tasmania is a democratically-governed state of Australia that is clearly not at war was also emphasised. Peaceful protest was held to be a function of a healthy democracy and not an attribute of war. One activist stated: ‘I don’t think we need to go and play at war for people to understand that there’s really bad things happening to the natural world and to society that need to be addressed. I think we should count our lucky stars that we’re not at war and get on with using the frameworks that we live within and the tools we have to get those outcomes’ (Jack). This activist continues: ‘In Tasmania we have most things that we want and it’s not a war and it does us a disservice to frame it as such. We’re not out there fighting contractors in coupes. We’re out there because we have to be out there to stop trees going over, so I don’t like that as a metaphorical way of seeing things. I see it as the cut and thrust of the democratic society that we live in to try to achieve outcomes that are fundamental for the environment that we live in’ (Jack).

Further: ‘I think the way to change things is by using the structures that we have rather than framing things as some sort of battle to the death’ (Jack). Another activist refers to the Tasmanian situation as a ‘half-democracy’: ‘If it was a war people would know about it... people would be dying and people would be getting cut and shot and whatever the hell; we’d be fighting each other. But we’re in this sort of half democracy where there’s a conflict there for sure but there’s a weird understanding that we don’t whack each other with sledgehammers... we don’t physically apprehend or assault and generally we don’t get assaulted’ (Possum).

A police officer explained how the policing of protest works in a democratic society: ‘the police response is twofold – we recognise the right for democratic speech and the right for democratic voicing of opinions, so it was really very important for me to allow people to freely go about their protest in relation to logging and the road construction, and the other part was ensuring at the same time that lawful business operations were allowed to continue unhindered’ (Barry). ‘Barry’ emphasises that ‘it was never a war, it was never a battle. It was a protest. These were people exercising their democratic right. There were strategies put in place to stop business activities, but we were never
not able to overcome those strategies to allow business to continue’ (Barry). Another police officer iterates the public’s right to lawful protest: ‘people like to protest because they believe strongly in things happening in society, and that’s fine. It doesn’t bother me. The only time I become involved is when I’m working in my capacity as a police officer, and if people are protesting unlawfully then I have to become involved’ (Harry). A third police officer described the police’s role as, ultimately, to uphold the official line: ‘it was straightforward: no one’s there to give anyone a hard time. They’ve proven their point – they don’t want the trees chopped down, but the government’s decided differently’ (Nigel).

Theme 5: War

The theme ‘War’ encompassed many sub-themes. These were: ‘a mental war’, ‘akin to war’, ‘defining war’, ‘ingredients of war’, ‘ideological war’ and ‘war on environment (not on people)’.

A Mental War

A few activists considered the Upper Florentine Valley dispute as a mental war; a war that was going on inside people’s heads. That is, the dispute was being conceptualised as war. One activist, a former member of Still Wild Still Threatened, observed that to some activists: ‘it must feel like a war zone because they don’t fit in and they’re choosing to go against everything. So they’re in conflict all the time and they have made a culture out of it. I’m sure it seems like a war zone in their heads, but I never believed it was a war zone. I was always trying to counteract that language and that behaviour, because I grew up with these people and this industry’ (Millie).

Another activist explains the daily routine for the activists living at camp, and links this to the idea of ‘mental war’: ‘basically every night that you’re there, there’s the potential that the police and Forestry Tasmania are going to come in with machinery and destroy everything, basically destroy your home, and I found that quite hard at the end of it. A lot of people burn out because they don’t have the energy. Like, community people come in and put a lot of energy in but the mentality has to be there, staunch, and the
next day just rebuild it. They burn it down, we build it up again, because it’s not about
what we put on that road, it’s about the forest still being there and people believing that
we can change things’ (Cookie).

[Here, too, the previous paragraph is followed by a series of highlighted asterisks, indicating
that Jade intended to expand this discussion, presumably to add in some analysis of the
passages quoted. I would certainly have urged her to do this, anyway.]

Akin to War

The theme ‘akin to war’ encompassed respondents’ thoughts on times when the dispute was
actually like war. One activist, formerly of Still Wild Still Threatened, described an incident
where ‘there was heaps of police officers, and there were people swinging around in
trees, kicking arrows that the police were shooting into the trees, and it was chaos. The
police shoot the arrows up to climb; to get a line up, and there were people up there
kicking the arrows trying to stop them climbing... it was kind of like what I assume a
war zone is like without guns firing I guess. That was the only time I felt that there was
a real warlike conflict thing happening, because it wasn’t actually coming from me or
the people around me at that time. It was so military – like a military operation’
(Millie). Perhaps the reason that this activist felt that the situation was ‘military’ has
something to do with the etymology of the word ‘war’. The word ‘war’ comes from an old
North French word, ‘were’, which means, ‘to bring into confusion’.  [Jade would have been
asked to make this apparently tenuous connection more direct; more transparent. PH]

Another activist said: ‘I hate to say this, but it was almost military. Like a military
operation on their part that they had planned out: this is how we are going to crumble
you, we’re going to go in there every single day and then one day that you’re not there
we’re going to destroy everything. So we’d talk about it, we’d have conversations and
you’d have twenty four hour watch. Everyone was very tired for a long time, and you’d
just get used to Forestry [Tasmania] being there, knowing that they were going to break
up your day and people can’t go for walks, that sort of thing’ (Cookie). Yet another
activist, originally from the Derwent Forest Alliance, stated: ‘I was in air force cadets when
I was little, and it does feel like a battle at times, because you’re battling to get your
point across and you’re battling for the rights of the forest and the things that live in it,
so it feels like a battle, though it shouldn’t’ (Jade). A Forestry Tasmania representative
believed that ‘it’s just rhetoric, but I think there are elements that are getting involved because they like the idea of it being a war. It hasn’t yet become as debased as a real war, but it gets there at times’ (Stewart). Further: ‘when they do stunts out there on the front line out in the logging coupes, then possibly you could see that as akin to war, but I have no direct experience of that’ (Stewart). One of the print journalists interviewed suggested that ‘this was a battle between two sides over a patch of ground; I need a better word than “battle”; it was a conflict. But there are analogies between that and a military situation where two sides fight over a patch of ground. There is a front line; there is often, in this case, fairly limited violence. And on this day there actually was a police front line and a protestor front line and they sort of met and the protestors got hauled off. I think some of the language that’s used is not specifically military, like “battle”. You can battle alcoholism’ (Henry).

[Again, at this point Jade has a series of asterisks, and I presume more material, or analysis of the presented material was to be added in. PH]

Defining War

One activist provided a particularly poignant observation. She said: ‘in a globally wealthy, well-off state like Tasmania, I would be very reluctant to describe it as a war zone. On a people level you can look across the world and see situations that make the blockade at the Floz look like nothing’ (Missy). This statement brings the Upper Florentine forests dispute into an appropriately global context. ‘Missy’ also states: ‘people may say it’s an ideological war but that’s a pretty serious word. It really depends on how you define “war”’ (Missy). We have already defined war in a previous chapter, but this quotation brings us to the following theme.

Ideological War

One activist states: ‘it could be seen as a war of ideologies, but physically, no’ (Missy). She elaborates: ‘it all comes down to individuals; you can’t make blanket judgements. Some of us share really good relationships, as far as you can have a good relationship with someone when you’re on different sides of an ideological debate, or “war”, so there’s grudging respect on both sides’ (Missy).
Ingredients of War

The theme ‘ingredients of war’ was one whereby interviewees explained what they considered to be the factors contributing to war. As none of the people interviewed had ever been in a situation of real war, each had to mull over what they considered war activity might actually be like, in comparison to the blockade activity they had experienced in the upper Florentine Valley. One activist explained: ‘it’s a very war-like situation, or battle; there’re several battles that have taken place. So I think it could be legitimately referred to as a war, but I think we need to be really careful about how we use that term and the connotations that it has. Also, because it continues to fuel that debate, as I was saying earlier, this [the larger Tasmania forests conflict] has been going on for thirty years. The more it goes on the harder it is to get out of that situation’ (Helen). Another activist suggests: ‘you should talk to some rednecks, some of the guys that actually go out and firebomb the camp. They actually use war tactics like firebombing, violence, all these sorts of things, they’ve had shotguns out there; people have fired shots in the air to scare people. There’s been people setting things on fire, people ramming the camp with cars… More so on the side of people who don’t want the protestors out there, but I guess logistically some of the actions of protestors are aligned to that of military people’ (Jade). Another activist observes, quite simply: ‘there is loss of life, habitat is destroyed, the trees come down, the place gets firebombed, napalmed, and the habitat, the animals; there is death’ (Max). For another: ‘I did at some points feel like some kind of battle was going on, because we were trying to sneak through the bush at night’ (Helen). One activist goes beyond these more conventional usages of metaphor: ‘people are arming themselves with lock-on devices and they’re climbing trees and arming themselves with tree sits – these are the weapons used’ (Max). This activist has extended the metaphor to the point where ‘weapons’ is redefined to include standard blockading tactics and activities. Yet another activist explains what she considers war to be, and says why she does not think the dispute should be referred to as war: ‘to me war is people being killed and slaughtered and raped, and that’s not happening’ (Millie).
For one activist: ‘I think with Forestry [Tasmania], and the Tasmanian and Federal Government, and Gunns [Limited] and the various companies, what they do, and what the contractors end up physically doing, when they’re bulldozing old-growth forests and ferns and stuff like that, I don’t think there’s many other words that would accurately describe it apart from war or violence’ (Possum). This activist makes no distinction between war and violence, though this is a distinction that needs to be made. [a series of asterisks indicates that Jade intended to make this distinction here. PH] Another activist suggests that: ‘it could be symbolic of people trying to defend a wild place from destruction, which is going on all over the world; people war constantly trying to defend their lands, or places they’ve made a connection with, that are being destroyed. But we constantly try and be peaceful and do peaceful direct action, while war has connotations of violence and it is used in the media and in society constantly to refer to other things. Because this is a debate with two sides – one trying to defend something and the other trying to attack or destroy it – then the metaphor does seem quite fitting, and a lot of people would see that what they’re doing is violence against the forest, and against nature and against the earth. And because of the nature of it [the upper Florentine Valley forests dispute] – because it’s been going on for four years and it’s been held and pushed back and held and pushed back – it’s a very war-like situation or battle; there’re several battles that have taken place. So I think it could be legitimately referred to as a war, but I think we need to be really careful about how we use that term and what connotations it has’ (Helen). Another activist explains: ‘technically the forest, which is alive, is getting killed. The forest has no defence except for the advocates who try to stand up for it. So definitely, if it was a battle between the forest and the loggers then definitely it’s a war, because the forest is dying; it’s getting crushed. But it’s kind of abstract; there’s no comparison to war where people are getting killed; no one in Tasmania is getting killed over this’ (Cookie).

The most frequent connotation of war that emerged from the interviews was violence. [Again, a series of asterisks indicates that Jade intended to develop this observation. PH]
Theme 6: Tasmanian Forests Conflict


Camp – Like Two Different Places

Activists explained how the camp has gone through several incarnations in the wake of being ‘busted’ (raided) by Tasmania Police from time to time and then rebuilt by the Still Wild Still Threatened community. Put simply, there have been times when the police have been present and the camp has been disrupted and times when it has been more serene. A Tasmanian print journalist explains: ‘I didn’t get to spend any time there when it was just a peaceful camp and there were no police. I’m pretty sure the only time I went there were protestors there, there were police and there were media’ (Henry). Different activists describe the camp’s different incarnations and different periods of cleanliness and ‘trashiness’. A blockader from the Derwent Forest Alliance explains: ‘we had a really tidy, neat, civilised camp, because there were only two of us and Prue took a lot of pride in keeping it clean. It was a lot different to how it is today – however it’s looking a lot better than it used to. I have to say it’s gone through various stages of trashiness, I suppose” (Jade). An activist attempted to explain changes in the camp in relation to its staffing: “it goes in flows too, though, so there’s that winter and summer divide, and during winter you get to know three or four people really well. You share everything because there’s no-one else, but then during summer there’s this massive influx and new energy’ (Cookie).

The notion of the camp as two different places juxtaposes the camp when it is being torn apart by the police and the camp when it is peaceful and maintained by activists. Others saw the evolution of the camp’s various incarnations as more complex than that. One observed: ‘it would have to have started when that original road-spur was first blockaded. The first time those people set up the car [the half-burial of an old car body on the proposed line of logging road was known in camp lingo as a “dragon”] and a fire and some sort of
shelter arrangement – in my thinking, that’s when the camp started. So it’s gone from a front line action to a community outpost’ (Karl). Further: ‘the camp has gone from being constantly manned and people being on 24 hour watch cycles to now there being occasions when camp is empty for one or two days’ (Karl).

Another conception of the camp as two different places takes its point of reference from the decision to remove some blockading structures in order to improve the aesthetics of the camp and make it more appealing to the general public on the occasion of events such as the 2009 Walk Against Warming, held in the upper Florentine Valley. One activist explains: ‘the evolution of the actual blockade structures – it went from being totally functional to being aesthetic. So much so that the removal of the dragons wasn’t a practical or a tactical decision – in fact, taking them away removed one more point on the road and made it easier to get around now that the defence wasn’t there. And that was an aesthetic decision based on our perception of public perceptions of the camp at that time’ (Karl). This activist’s reference to public perceptions shows that Still Wild Still Threatened was aware of its public image and the camp’s public image and made these issues factors in camp strategy. But the dragons were only removed because the logging threat, and hence, the threat of another police bust, had all but gone: ‘there would have been no question of removing those structures if there was a question of the busting of the camp any day, which there was before, and while we had that, we had structures that were visually less pleasing, rather than other more complicated, intricate structures set up in the trees; that were better aesthetically’ (Karl). Though this activist indicates that the public image of Camp Florentine was a priority for Still Wild Still Threatened, he also makes it clear that the actual survival of the camp was of greater priority.

Casualties

Only one respondent spoke of the Upper Florentine Valley forest ‘war’ in terms of ‘casualties’: This respondent was an employee of Forestry Tasmania, a scientist, known for his public commentaries on the dispute. When asked who the ‘casualties’ in the ‘war’ were, he said, ‘the rest of us – the middle ground. The science. The society at large that has this big hole in it because there are things that we just can’t talk about sensibly’ (Stewart). We spoke of protests in Hobart in which entry to the Forestry Tasmania building was blocked, and the affect they had on the organisation’s workers. ‘Stewart’ mentioned one
particular protest: ‘yes a lot of people [Forestry Tasmania workers] were stuck outside. But it doesn’t often happen like that. Usually we’re in here and there’s a protest outside and we’re told not to use the front entrance and it doesn’t affect things much. It has more affect on the reception staff. They have been traumatised by it… there was no physical assault… [but things] were getting nasty for the people at the front desk. It’s not very pleasant. It’s gotten worse recently; the protests are more demonstrative and less respectful of the law. There was someone wielding a knife, albeit when he was roped up in the structure of the dome, to use it while someone was there to arrest him, to mess with their attempts to get him down. That’s not nice to think people walk in here with knives’ (Stewart).

[Jade made the following note to herself at this point in the text: ‘Say something about citizens as casualties, “collateral damage”, difficult to work out who the casualties or what the casualties actually are. Everyone and everything involved? No winners.]

Contractors – Unheard Voices

As stated earlier, no forest contractors, ‘foresters’ or ‘loggers’ were willing to be interviewed for the purposes of this study, despite numerous attempts to secure their participation. One print journalist was willing to comment on contractors as the ‘unheard voice’ within the dispute. He stated: ‘they’re the only people that you don’t get to talk to. And generally they’re not allowed to talk to the media… or they say something that’s out of place and then feel that they could damage their commercial interests or their reputation or cause further provocation or identify themselves and then get singled out. So generally the haulage contractors don’t speak to the media much’ (Henry). In the context of this study this was most unfortunate, as it was not possible to ascertain whether or not contractors spoke in war language or conceptualised the upper Florentine Valley dispute as a war.

Description of Police by Protestors

Several activists responded to a question about the deportment of the police at the Florentine blockade. Opinion was sought on this matter for the purpose of discerning whether or not police behaviour was deemed militant and, therefore, whether it might be accurate to describe the dispute in military terminology. One activist stated: ‘we’ve had one or two bad ones
and that’s to do with a few police down here who have a bad attitude. But in general they’re okay... every now and then they’ll be frustrated, but rarely in Tasmania are police violent’ (Daz). Furthermore: ‘the Search and Rescue personnel are so much on our side that they will purposefully take ages to tension their lines and climb up trees to get to people. The police aren’t great, but extremely aggro, violent people? There are only a few examples of that’ (Daz).

Another activist described the behaviour of the police in this way: ‘really, it’s about the government putting them in a position where they are being militant, not in a violent way, but when they were walking along with the trucks, escorting them, it looked like they felt pretty stupid at times. They were wasting so many hours and so many taxpayer dollars, and we’re just a small group of people. Some were definitely more aggressive than others, but some were trying to have a joke with us and that sort of thing’ (Helen). Yet another activist advanced an opinion that largely reinforced what earlier respondents had said: ‘I thought the police were actually quite good, generally. In a few situations we’ve had people from different arms of the police actively helpful. I have, in the Florentine, seen some really bad behaviour from the police, but as I said, it’s always a mixed bag and the police force probably attracts its fair share of arseholes and more than a representative cross section of the rest of society, so there is always that aspect that you have to deal with. They are just a cross-section of the community and it is true that they’re just doing their job ninety percent of the time. But occasionally you get rabid ideologues like you do in any situation, like you do in the conservation movement or government – anywhere’ (Jack).

Not all activists were as generous in their assessments of the police. One said: ‘I’d love to think they’re not just government henchmen, but they are’ (Jade), whilst another stated: ‘I’ve been chased up trees by police where they’ve tangled up the rigging of my climb line when I’ve climbed above them which has directly threatened my life – I’m up there in the dark, big winds and big rains, with my rope tangled, which is essentially my life line’ (Possum).

[At this point Jade included the following highlighted note to herself: ‘Findings – police violence – rare, no militant language in the way activists refer to police.’]
Descriptions of Contractors by Activists

I asked activists to describe the language and behaviour of contractors during roading and logging activity in the upper Florentine Valley, in order to judge whether the contractors’ language and/or behaviour might be deemed militant. One activist thought so: ‘they are always calling us extreme greenies or extremists. We were called cannibals one time, like, “oh, they just live out in the bush, they’re cannibals; they appear out of nowhere”’ (Anna). Nor was contractor militancy limited to the verbal realm” ‘there was aggression from the truck drivers particularly, because the trucks were targeted as they were coming out of the coupe, [and] because they were so heavily protected by the police it was different to when we just do bush actions, because then they just turn up and you have the first interaction with them, and it’s very different to the protest situation where they are shepherded in and shepherded out. It was different when I was arrested. I was escorted out, and they were really rude and laughing and yelling things at us. Definitely for the people up the trees at the time they were definitely yelling different things; [being] abusive’ (Anna). This was a common view. Thus, another activist suggested: ‘generally the majority of contractors are angry, largely ignorant people, and they detest that we’re there stopping what they think is their right to do. I think there’s a vocal minority of contractors that are violent, who have no interest in participating in a logical conversation, and just want to pose violent threats’ (Possum).

Nevertheless, on the matter of the contractors there was no consensus view among the activists interviewed. One activist attempted to see the dispute from the contractors’ perspective: ‘even out in the bush, you have to be aware that we’re rocking up and stopping them from going to work. I find that most of them handle it pretty well, given what you’re actually doing to them’ (Jack). ‘Jack’ continued: ‘you have these conversations with contractors which are often times spiteful and they like seeing people suffer. Often they don’t understand and that’s a confusing thing for them as well, but they like being out in the bush even though they see it as a resource to be knocked over, and they don’t understand when they see somebody there crying over a tree getting knocked down... with the contractors it’s just a different cultural dynamic, and that makes those confrontations a little bit difficult, because people have their ideas from their separate corners and often these don’t integrate, so there’s a cultural disconnect there’ (Jack). Another activist believes you cannot make generalisations when describing the
behaviour of contractors in the upper Florentine dispute: ‘it all comes down to individuals; you can’t make blanket judgements. Some of us have really good relationships, as far as you can have a good relationship with someone when you’re on different sides of an ideological debate or “war”, so there’s grudging respect on both sides. Obviously there are some relationships filled with animosity between forest contractors and forest activists, but as I say, you just can’t make blanket judgements because it is down to a person-to-person perspective’ (Missy).

[Again, Jade has inserted a highlighted note to herself here: ‘One-on-one perspective – different to war – where people are merely numbers and uniforms. In war generalisations are made.]

*Emotion*

A Forestry Tasmania representative and a print journalist provided comment on the contribution of emotional responses in relation to both the larger Tasmania forests conflict and the dispute in the upper Florentine Valley. The Forestry Tasmania representative stated: ‘the thing that has really struck me since I joined Forestry Tasmania only four years ago, the thing that really struck me, there are people in those groups who absolutely hate Forestry Tasmania. You see it in the way they talk to you and it is not a rational thing – it is very emotional’ (Forester). He elaborated on this theme: ‘the big debate I think underpinning all this is the emotions-based approach to sustainable practices and forestry and the sustainable or scientific approach to forests management and forestry’ (Forester). [At this point Jade has the following highlighted note to herself: ‘Say something about emotions-based versus science-based.’ I presume she intended here to access neuroscience research that discusses the emotions-processing function of the brain, and stresses its centrality and its priority within brain functions. I hope so, anyway – I would certainly have been steering her in this direction. PH]

Not all non-activist responses were of the ilk. A print journalist explained some of his emotion at the destruction of Camp Florentine itself: ‘I remember it was quite a sad time, because they’d set up this lovely protest camp and then the bulldozers rolled on it. I found it quite sad, personally; they’d gone to all this trouble and set up a blockade camp
and then the lot was just bulldozed and some trees were taken down and a road was put through. It seemed very sad to me, but my personal opinion is irrelevant’ (Henry).

[Missing from this discussion is any observation from the activists themselves, and I would certainly have required Jade to add some of this in. PH]

The Exclusion Zone

A journalist explains confusion over the gazetted Exclusion Zone within the upper Florentine Valley thus: ‘the arrest of the Mothers Day 22 – I think that caused a historical rift between the police and Forestry Tasmania because the police were left prosecuting cases. Forestry [Tasmania] had a map and acted on that and arrested people who turned out not to be in that Exclusion Zone, so Forestry created another map. And I know there was some consternation within the police service’.

[There is no note at this point, but there is a series of highlighted asterisks, indicating that Jade had not done with this. As well, too, for the entry lack’s coherence as it stands – and the history of the creation of the ‘Exclusion Zone’ not referred to since the Introduction, would also merit a brief jogging of the reader’s memory. PH]

The Finality of Environmental Protest in Tasmania

Both print journalists interviewed commented on what they saw as the last hurrah of environmental protest in Tasmania – that is, they believed that protests on such a scale over conservation have had their day and that it is unlikely that they will occur again, at least, in the forests. One suggested: ‘in hindsight now you could say it’s probably the last big clash between bulldozers and protestors and the government smashing a camp so they could have a coupe harvested, and since then we have had these forestry peace talks start in May 2010, so they’ve now been going on for more than a year, and we had the Greens taking joint power in March 2010, so you could say that this is the last conflict to be had’ (Fran). She elaborated: ‘I think history will probably look at this aggressive conflict where the bulldozers went in [and] people had to chain themselves to their cars in the ground and all that sort of stuff, but we didn’t know at the time that circumstances both political and financial meant change would come so quickly, to the
point that that we might not see a camp like that again’ (Fran). The other print
government interviewed suggested that: ‘I think it was a bit of a symbol of futility, that they
just went in and demolished this camp that they could have gone around. I think in a
lot of ways it was a final, big public protest. I could be proven wrong tomorrow.
Because it was held in a place easily accessible by the media, by protestors, by Forestry
[Tasmania], and the police could choose to approach it in a certain way, it was symbolic
and possibly one of the last of its type.’ (Henry).

[At this point Jade made the following highlighted note to herself: ‘The journalists assumed
that both the Labor-Green state government and the Intergovernmental Agreement on forests
would offer sufficient conservation arrangements to see that blockades such as Camp
Florentine never happened again, and, this is certainly a major aim of the Inter-Governmental
Agreement. It is possible, however, that this agreement, like others that have come before it,
will fail in the eyes of conservationists, in which case there may be more blockades in the
future. Certainly, Camp Florentine is unique in that it is situated in such close proximity to a
major sealed tourist road, and is therefore so much more accessible than a lot of forest
blockades.’ Of course, much of this has been overtaken by subsequent political
developments. PH]

The Background to Interviewee Involvement

All interviewees where asked how it was that they came to be involved with Camp
Florentine. In the case of the activists, this question brought up themes of multiculturalism,
itinerancy and a commitment to the larger Tasmanian forests conflict. Most heard about the
camp through other activists’ involvement. Police officers explained about being detailed for
duty in the forest, and journalists talked about being sent to report on both the conflict and the
camp during peaceful times. One activist stated: ‘I was on the mainland and I picked up a
hitchhiker who was involved here and I ended up coming down. That was about 3 years
ago. Basically, I didn’t know anyone in Tasmania, I’d never been to Tasmania, but I
went straight out to camp and spent time there. I haven’t really thought about it much.
I got there just at the same time that they were setting up for one of the early cabarets –
so it was a good time to come in and meet people, because it ebbs and flows’ (Cookie).
Another activist said: ‘I came down for another blockade before this, the pirate ship in
the Weld Valley, I thought that that was still going on so I wanted to see what was going
on there. But at that point nothing was going on, so someone said, “you should go check out the Florentine” and I went up there’ (Daz). For another: ‘I first heard about Tasmania’s forests in Newcastle at a fundraiser event. I saw a video of the forests that activists had put together. A Students for Sustainability conference came to Newcastle that year... I met lots of people that were Tassie forest crew, and I decided that I really wanted to go down for the summer, and just never left’ (Helen). Another explained that: ‘I was involved with forest campaigning down in the Huon Valley. We had a long-running campaign down there, the pirate ship down in the Weld, and a few friends up in the Derwent had increasingly become aware that there were issues up there’ (Jack).

Another described his involvement as a consequence of his activism within the Derwent Forest Alliance: ‘I got involved via the Derwent Forest Alliance. The DFA was a community group which was pulled together by a guy called Kane Plowman, a group comprised of local residents of the valley, and I was kind of an outsider coming from Hobart; the others were from Maydena and Lachlan’ (Jade). Yet another activist described her introduction into Still Wild Still Threatened: ‘I came to Tasmania over six years ago to work at a friend’s festival and I met some wonderful people who took me out to the Styx Valley. I had just never seen a landscape like that anywhere in the world; it threw me for an absolute six, so I went back to the mainland and was back a couple of weeks later, and that was the beginning of my involvement in the forest campaign’ (Missy). Another activist reinforced the trend of having originally come from interstate: ‘I was in New Zealand and was planning to go travelling in Australia. My friend Val had been here and done some walks and stuff, and she had been to Camp Floz and was still getting media releases from here, so she told me about the camp and I bought my climbing harness as a result of that... I came in about January 08 and checked it out’ (Possum).

The initial involvements of the four police officers interviewed were obviously very different to those of the activists. As one explained: ‘I’m the sergeant in charge of Search and Rescue and as part of that our role is the lock-ons and dealing with people at heights. So I was part of the police response there. I can’t remember the dates but I was there when they were logging and when they were putting the road in’ (Nigel). Another explained that: ‘just after I was transferred to the Bridgewater Division problems started to arise in relation to disruption in the logging coupes, originally within the Styx Valley,
by a group based in the Derwent Valley. They were protesting against logging in the valley. And then slowly but surely the members of Still Wild Still Threatened actually moved into the area of the upper Florentine Valley and set up the camp there’ (Barry). In the case of yet another it was ‘basically through my position at the Bridgewater Police Station as second in command. I became automatically involved, through occupying that position’ (Harry). A female police officer explained her introduction to the camp thus: ‘the commander of the operation chose me for my role up there to be in the command bus with him and the other Inspector. I was stationed at New Norfolk’ (Alice).

[Jade then inserted the following highlighted note to herself: ‘The descriptions of their introductions to involvement with Camp Florentine show how different the experience was for the activist and the police. For the police it was obviously a job but for the activists it was a voluntary calling and an opportunity that many travelled some distance to partake in.’]

Iconification

Activists, a Forestry Tasmania representative, and a print journalist all chose to comment on Camp Florentine and the upper Florentine Valley as an iconic place for the Tasmanian forests conflict and the Tasmanian conservation movement generally. One activist explained it in this way: ‘the upper Florentine is an amazing piece of forest and it’s like an example; it kind of symbolises Tasmania’s forests. If you ask someone from the mainland who’s heard about the forest conflict in Tasmania they’ll probably have heard about the Florentine or the Weld. It’s kind of become an iconic forest that sort of symbolises the dissent of the community to logging. And because no one knew about it, and the benefits of it – it’s surrounded on three sides by protected land and it’s a relatively large piece of land with a beautiful river running right through the middle of it. There’s a long road that doesn’t go anywhere but is a big tourist road, and the coupe where they are trying to go is on that tourist road. So it’s easy to get media in and it’s easy to get visitors in and out, because it’s on a main road compared to other blockades in the world. You go to New Zealand and you might have to walk for two days to get resources in to a blockade that’s in the middle of nowhere, literally. And here we’ve got it easy and it’s an iconic forest. People all over the world know the upper Florentine because of the blockade. But it’s not the only forest here – it represents a whole lot of forests and the dissent of people towards forestry’ (Cookie). Another activist takes this
idea further: ‘we iconified a piece of forest basically on our own, with no help – sorry, limited help from some well-resourced organisations – and on a few occasions managed to get 500-1000 people out into the bush, which… to me reaffirmed that people do care about those areas and people can at least fulfil that campaign objective; to iconify an area and get people to understand where it is and why it’s important. It’s good to understand that you don’t need a lot of money and you don’t need a lot of highly technical campaign expertise. Basically, with some committed people, some lovely bits of bush and some determined direct action, good community outreach and a good eye for media management, we turned an area that no one knew about into the most iconic forest in the state. For me that was the lesson. That’s obviously only the start of the process of getting that area looked after, but it did make people realise that the ratbags in the bush are out there for a reason and do good things’ (Jack).

A print journalist agrees that the Camp Florentine blockade effectively conferred icon status on the forests of the upper Florentine Valley: ‘there was a Sunday protest that mobilised a lot of middle class support, particularly from the Derwent Valley… Because it was held in a place easily accessible… it was symbolic and possibly the last of its type’ (Henry). A Forestry Tasmania interviewee makes the point even more directly: ‘the environmental movement in Tasmania, I think, is the slickest propaganda unit in the world. I think they are exceptionally good and smart and the way they operate is to create icons; iconic areas. It doesn’t matter if the natural values aren’t so flash so long as, in the media sense, it becomes an iconic area. And I think the Florentine is one of those iconic areas – and the Styx. If you look at the Styx and get and eagle’s eye view it’s just a patchwork of harvesting operations right through there, but it’s regarded as pristine, though it’s not’ (Forester).

[Jade then inserted the following note to herself, along with her ‘more work needed’ shorthand – a series of asterisks: ‘Certainly an iconic area is more emotive and, therefore, the public has a greater desire to protect it’.

Larger Tasmanian Forests Conflict

Many interview respondents wished to comment on the upper Florentine Valley dispute as part of the larger Tasmanian forests conflict. Comments included the view that military
metaphors may have existed in Tasmanian environmental discourse as long as the conservation movement itself has existed. One activist, a former member of Still Wild Still Threatened, suggested: ‘this stuff, if it gets saved, well the conflict’s just going to move somewhere else because it’s in the people. It will be indigenous issues or mining; its whales now, its dolphins and seals. It’s almost like – I question whether we actually create the conflict – if everything was rosy, what would half these people do?’ (Millie). This activist, unlike most of the others, is local to the vicinity, and this vantage point led to a sense of frustration with many of her fellow activists. She stated further: ‘it’s all about perspective, and that’s really hard to get if you’re not part of the community, and if you don’t understand the generations of education and propaganda that we as locals have been fed; they [local people supporting or involved in logging] don’t see themselves as doing anything wrong’ (Millie). The same activist noted the multicultural aspect of the conservation movement and its link to iconising forests: ‘there are so many people in this movement from other cultures and other countries, and it’s effective in that people take the message back to other countries that aren’t really connected to it’ (Millie).

Another activist links the Weld Valley campaign to the Upper Florentine Valley campaign: ‘the Weld Ark had just been busted and that was a big blow to a lot of people who had been protecting that piece of forest for a long period of time. This was a new era in Tasmanian blockading and Tasmanian environmental advocacy. It [Camp Florentine] provided another place where people could go and learn about living in the forest and blockading and skill share with other like-minded alternative people and compare it to what they’ve heard in the media, and compare [their experience] to what they’ve been told by the industry’ (Cookie).

The ubiquity of military metaphors within Tasmanian environmental discourse generally was linked by one activist to the long-term intractability of forest conflict in Tasmania: ‘with the debate taking place over thirty years in Tasmania, I think it’s already deeply entrenched in the wider community. I don’t think it’s being “spearheaded” as such by the media. But the media will use terms that are often used in a more casual atmosphere’ (Max). Another activist traces the longer-term origins of the military metaphors to the contractors: ‘some contractors used that sort of language widely before it was portrayed in the media, though’ (Millie). A Forestry Tasmania spokesperson offers the following on military metaphors in Tasmanian environmental discourse: ‘I think a lot of
the linguistics of the environment debate and in the news comes down to laziness on the part of journalists. It’s a lot easier to say that a ceasefire has broken out, because journalists have been writing that way for thirty years. It takes a lot of effort to think outside of that phraseology’ (Forester). A print journalist, however, describes the decades-long Tasmanian forests conflict thus: ‘well it’s not an original thing to say, but it’s clearly been a very long-running one, and it has lots of shades of black and white and also shades of grey in between’ (Fran).

[Jade here inserted this note to herself: ‘Talk about print journalists describing the dispute as complex (shades of black, white grey) but then reducing it down to military metaphors, which, we have decided, are bad metaphors – reference from milmet chapter about milmets being bad metaphors for environment. Put in Henry’s quote about reducing complexities/word limits etc. Journalists seem to use a lot of metaphors – here this print journalist is using “shades of black and white and grey” to describe the forest conflict, yet another metaphor.’]

Peace

A print journalist stated: ‘I know people say it’s really polarised, and it is polarised – to the extremes – but increasingly that’s less so and there’s a lot of people wanting to end it, but don’t quite know how to go about it – and I guess that’s what the current peace talks are all about’ (Fran).

[Jade has no note to herself here, though it’s clear that additional quotation and discussion would have been needed. PH]

Lawlessness in the Bush

The theme that seems to relate most closely to actual warfare is that of ‘lawlessness in the bush’. At Camp Florentine there were occasionally unlawful incidents involving damage to cars and other property, and threats and even assaults on individuals. One activist draws attention to the most dramatic of these incidents, ‘when forest contractors bashed a car with two protestors locked inside, and as the protestors were leaving the car physically assaulted them, and that was upheld by the courts of Tasmania’ (Max). A Forestry
Tasmania representative offers the following on one of the contractors involved in the incident: ‘his is a tragic story. He lost about 1.2 million dollars of equipment that was set on fire, his sister committed suicide just beforehand, his business was on the ropes; his life was just a mess... that war scenario where these people think they are going to war everyday with these protestors has driven this guy to a terrible place in his life’ (Forester). Another Forestry Tasmania representative affirms that there was lawlessness in the forests that was like war: ‘the closest it would come to war, I think, is out in the bush where it’s mostly forest contractors facing off with protestors’ (Stewart). It is possible that the close proximity of the Florentine Valley to Maydena – to settlement – may have helped prevent further illegal behaviour, because of the media’s ready access to the site. One print journalist observed, with regard to forest protests generally: ‘these protests are always way out, and we generally don’t go out to the bush’ (Henry); nevertheless, the close proximity of Camp Florentine to a sealed road and a nearby town may have mitigated illegal activity.

Middle Ground

Two activists chose to comment on what I have termed ‘middle ground’ – the notion that there are not just two sides to the Tasmania forests conflict, but that there may be several perspectives. One activist stated: ‘I didn’t believe there were two sides… and if you think it’s “us and them”, then it’s always going to be “us and them”’ (Millie). Another activist explained that ‘everything seems like a battle because it feels like you’re battling. Lots of people in the environment movement say “the forces of darkness” and Forestry Tasmania has been referred to as “the dark star”, which is funny but it’s true. From our perspective it’s true, but that’s not to say there isn’t a middle ground or that people can’t see a middle ground’ (Jade).

[Jade then inserted the following note to herself: ‘It’s interesting to note that this activist uses such severe, loaded colloquialisms to describe the forest industry while talking about a middle ground within the conflict.’ Incidentally, one of the things I’d have wanted Jade to change before submission was the use of ‘Jade’ as a pseudonym for one of her interviewees! PH]

National Attention
A print journalist made mention of national attention in relation to Camp Florentine: ‘it came after the violence of those protestors who’d been in the car not far from there and had been attacked, and obviously national attention had been brought back on the forestry debate because of that, and Camp Florentine was the focus’ (Fran).

[Jade gives no indication that she intended to take this further, though my strong advice would have been that what is here is not sufficient. PH]

*Ratbag Subculture*

The final sub-theme under the more general theme of ‘Larger Tasmanian Forests Conflict’ is ‘Ratbag Subculture’. A former member of Still Wild Still Threatened explains it thus: ‘on the activist side, for a minority of people it’s become a subculture. This is the thing I didn’t like [and] that I had a conflict with. It’s become a subculture not for any outcome but for the culture itself. They’ve got their own style of music, their own style of dress, their own social norms... So they’ve created it, and it’s a place where some people don’t fit in. People with mental issues, ratbags, misfits, whatever you want to call them – it’s become their home’ (Millie). This activist judges many of her fellow activists harshly, then, and she continues: ‘the forest punk anarchist subculture doesn’t exist without conflict in the forests. As I see it we are making a stand for what’s good and righteous and for integrity and harmony, or it becomes obsessive – an objecting, disrespectful group where it doesn’t matter what rules you go against, even if that means disrespecting people who are trying to protect the same things as them... I’m going on feedback that I got from people who would go out there and come back and were horrified and shocked. People who wanted to help but didn’t fit the subculture’s criteria, or weren’t radical enough and so felt rejected and shunned, and because they didn’t fit in with the ‘in’ crowd, or weren’t made welcome, they left. It’s quite depressing to stand and talk to people all day about the beauty out there and how it desperately needs people’s help and in five minutes be counteracted because they meet the wrong person at camp” (Millie). Nor is Millie’s position without corroboration. Another activist suggests that ‘a lot of people are scared off and intimidated by people at the Florentine who consider themselves hardcore blockaders. There’s this insinuation of “lock-on or fuck off”, and there are staunch people who condone that, though there are people who believe it should be a completely open community-run blockade.
There’s no point in just having ratbags in the bush who travel from blockade to blockade around Australia and the world. You need commitment from residents – community – and people all around the world. It needs to be open to allow people to learn and share as well’ (Cookie).

Nevertheless, one activist speaks of the ‘ratbag subculture’ with pride: ‘there’s a considerable “outlaw living the dream” element to it; you’re out there doing things that other people won’t do and it’s important to have a cultural context that that occurs within, a culture that basically shields people from the constant loss that you’re seeing there, and a culture that incorporates the things that people throw about – “ratbag”, “anarchist” and whatever. We take those things and we own them. That’s the cultural aspect and that’s not unusual, in fact it’s common to blockading culture, and I would say that it doesn’t really get under people’s skin too much... we’re average Joes, we’re kids and adults from the suburbs, and we’re just out there doing something that others might see as more extreme, but we try to really avoid stoking those flames of us being anarchists or radicals or whatever the cast may be’ (Jack). ‘Jack’ comments on this subculture in relation to the media: ‘we have a particular culture generated and a particular culture that sustains us and some people feel that we shouldn’t be afraid to present that to the media, but from a broader campaign point of view that’s a hard thing to come at, because the lives that a lot of people lead and the visual stuff about how people look – well it’s a hard sell to the general public’ (Jack).

[In addition to some organisational issues – most notably the too-prevalent repetition of the same quotations in different contexts – Jade would have been required to incorporate quite a lot of additional discussion in this chapter. When I took delivery of Jade’s computer and managed to access her Ph.D. files, this was the chapter that was least familiar to me. We had discussed the general requirements prior to it being written, but I had not read what she had written at the time her illness was diagnosed and her focus shifted away from the thesis, nor had we discussed the themes that she was developing within it. Apart from the in-text gaps, many of them identified by Jade herself, it is clear that work was still needed, particularly here at the back end of the chapter. It ends abruptly, without the necessary analysis of what all this interview data amounts to. Unlike the earlier chapters, I am not able to shed light on what she would have argued in completing this chapter. PH]
Chapter 8: Conclusion

[The Conclusion was to have been the last thing written. We had discussed a chapter with only two sub-sections. The first was to have focused upon the question: who is responsible for the generation and dissemination of military metaphors in environmental discourse? The second was to have focused on the question: does the pervasive recourse to military metaphor shape, in any material way, the nature and prosecution of forest conflict?

On the first question, Jade’s position was that it is the media, rather than the parties to the conflict, who are most responsible for the militarisation of conflict discourse. From the evidence adduced in the previous chapter it would appear that the activists themselves tend loosely to concur, not, on sum, inclining to view forest conflict as war – though there are enough exceptions to this to make the correlation a weak one. In any case, not holding a considered view that conflict over the future of the forests can legitimately be described as war does not mean that, in the heat and spontaneity of discourse, the metaphor upon which one fastens is not the convenient and familiar warfare analogy.

I had also urged Jade to find a way to deal with inconvenient contradictory evidence. I had referred her to Derek Turner’s 2005 paper, ‘Are We At War With Nature?’ Turner argues that there is a pronounced tendency for environmentalists to explicitly conceptualise their activist campaigning as ‘war’. He instances Dave Forman and Earth First!, as well as other radical ‘defence of wilderness’ movements in the 1980s, though the tendency remains active. There is evidence in Jade’s computer that she certainly did intend to consider this impediment to her case. The following quotes from Turner’s paper were transcribed therein:

‘Nowadays the people who argue that our relationship to the environment resembles open warfare are writers and activists who wish to recruit others to the cause of environmental defence. Occasionally resorting to the language of the just war tradition, they argue that non-human nature is the victim of unjust aggression by humans’ (p. 22).
Discussing monkey-wrenching: ‘human beings’ relationship to the environment is like an armed occupation. And in the few places where untainted wilderness remains, that relationship is like war’ (p. 26).

‘Our relationship to the environment… differs from war in some important and obvious ways… war is a social phenomenon. But our relationship to the environment is not a social relationship, for the obvious reason that the environment is not a person or a social group’ (p. 29).

If you’re at war with someone they are also at war with you. ‘But many of those who seem to think that humans are at war with the environment do not think that the environment is at war with us’ (p. 30).

‘Someone who is too ready to think of himself as being involved in a war… is someone who is warlike… being warlike is a vice. Even if war is rationally and legally justifiable, people’s support for it should be reluctant’ (p. 33).

Jade also seems to have intended to use Jensen and Draffan’s 2003 book, Strangely Like War, which makes primary use of the familiar metaphoric framing that forests are ‘under attack’, and need someone to ‘defend’ them. She recorded the following quote from this book: ‘they will not… leave the forests alone, until either the forests are gone, or until those of us who love the land force them out of the trees’ (p. 141).

On the second question, it was Jade’s position that the use of military terminology was seriously detrimental to the environment movement and its projects. There is nothing additional in her notes to signpost the terms in which she was going to sum up this position in her Conclusion, though it seems likely that she would have had recourse to some of the quotes recorded above, because in the case of this, the second question, Turner’s arguments work for her.
The other challenge that Jade would have faced in the writing of this Conclusion was the integration of all the thesis chapters – the bringing of them into some sort of synergy – as against the largely disconnected ‘stand-alone’ thesis components that they remain. PH]
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Notes

i These theories are not mentioned in detail because they are only touched upon in the literature and, in the case of echoic mention theory, are more concerned with simile.

ii Lakoff and Johnson provide a more detailed, extensive critique of traditional theory in Chapter 8 ‘Metaphor and Truth’ of their book.

iii ‘conceptual metaphor’ is considered below.

iv Although both social constructionism and social constructivism deal with ways in which social phenomena develop, they are distinct. Social constructionism refers to the development of phenomena relative to social contexts while social constructivism refers to an individual’s making meaning from knowledge within a social context. For this reason, social constructionism is typically described as a sociological construct whereas social constructivism is typically described as a psychological construct. Though social constructionism contains a diverse array of theories and beliefs, it can generally be divided into two camps: weak social constructionism and strong social constructionism. The two differ mainly in degree, where weak social constructionists tend to see some underlying objective factual elements to reality, and strong social constructionists see the world as ontologically unreal. Rather, they propose that the notions of ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ are themselves social constructs, so that the question of whether anything is ‘real’ is just a matter of social convention.

v Note that argument is war is more diaphoric than war is violent crime. The two concepts ‘argument’ and ‘war’ have less in common than the two concepts ‘war’ and ‘crime’.

vi Richards and Kings’ paper describes a dispute between the Carmelite monks of the Nova Nada monastery and J.D. Irving; a company that bought more than 180 000 hectares surrounding the monks’ monastery in southwest Nova Scotia. J.D. Irving commenced tree felling and road building on the acquired land which negatively affected the monks’ need for silence, as they operated their hermitage as a wilderness retreat with an emphasis on silence and meditation. A dispute ensued over buffer zones. Richards and King detail the various ways in which journalists reported the dispute as a tale of ‘conflict between innocence and greed … spiritual and material … silence and noise, rural and urban’ (2000: 481).

vii In his influential seventeenth-century treatise, Thomas Hobbes described the natural human condition as bellum omnium contra omnes, a war of all against all.