Social Movement Leadership and the Tasmanian Environmental Movement: a case study

by

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Abstract

The environmental movement, like many ‘new social movements,’ is comprised of participants who tend to eschew claims of leadership in preference of egalitarian, collective decision-making strategies, best described as ‘direct democracy’. However, this does not mean that environmental movements do not have leaders. Environmental leaders inspire and mobilise, they act strategically and influence the outcomes of movement activities, even though many do not have a public profile. Partly due to the rhetorical stance of movements, social movement leadership remains a largely under-researched topic. This is particularly the case for environmental movement leaders.

This research deficit is important because over the last 40 years environmental concerns have transformed from ‘radical’ or ‘fringe’ issues to become ‘mainstream’, with Greens politicians prominent in Australian state and federal politics, and Greens parties propagating across the western world. As a result, environmental issues are no longer new or exciting, but have become routinized, with their political potency reduced. These changes affect the structure of organisations within environmental movements, as well as the activities, frames and discourses considered as legitimate means of expressing environmental concern. Consequently, the demands imposed upon leaders may have changed from the broadly charismatic to the bureaucratic, in line with Max Weber’s theory of routinisation.

While the semantic expression of environmental concern by environmental leaders is important, so too is the dissemination of environmental messages. Contemporary social movements have a complex relationship with media, and the environmental movement is no exception. Social movements rely on news media to communicate their goals to the general public, but the ‘newsworthiness’ of the movement often rests upon negative framing of their activities. In addition, news media tend to conflate notions of leadership with those of celebrity, which can undermine both leaders and the broader movements they represent. As such, the interaction between the environmental movement and news media are critical for understanding the formation of environmental concern.

This research examines environmental movement leadership in Tasmania, a physically and symbolically important site for environmentalism both nationally and around the world.
Empirically, it relies upon semi-structured qualitative interviews with leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement and textual analysis of these interviews to identify key themes and trends. A tripart analysis of Australian and Tasmanian news media, and snowballing, was used to identify the leaders interviewed in this research.

Several key findings emerged in relation to environmental movement leaders. Leaders in the Tasmanian movements do not appear to share many of the traits and characteristics of other kinds of leaders, such as business leaders, or leaders involved in representative politics. Nor does a principal theory of leadership for the social and political sciences, ‘elite theory’, have the sufficient explanatory power for understanding leaders of the Tasmanian environmental movement. While environmental leaders have some of the characteristics of political elites, they are not able to exercise power, and have very limited authority over movement participants. A possible exception to this rule is the charismatic former politician Dr Bob Brown.

If environmental leaders are not elites, what do they contribute to the movement? The roles and responsibilities of leaders are varied and in a state of flux. Some leaders take on multiple roles, yet previous accounts of the Tasmanian environmental movement suggested a far greater division of labour was apparent in previous decades. The basis of leader status gained through experience and dedication to environmental causes is discussed, as is the role of women in leadership.

Leaders’ effective use of market-based activism is examined through two case studies. Of particular interest is the influence of market-based activism on the relationship between leaders and the wider movement, and its implications for wider ‘financialisation’ in the movement.

Finally, the relationship between leaders and media is considered through a discussion of leaders’ interaction with news media, and social media. News media are particularly important for the success of Tasmanian environmental leaders, while social media are far less central than contemporary social movement literature suggests. This research highlights how leader-centred accounts can provide particular insight into current operation and future direction of environmental social movements.
Declarations

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

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The research associated with this thesis abides by the international and Australian codes on human and animal experimentation, the guidelines by the Australian Government's Office of the Gene Technology Regulator and the rulings of the Safety, Ethics and Institutional Biosafety Committees of the University.

This research project has been approved by the UTAS Human Research Ethics Committee under reference number H0013096, as part of a wider research project entitled Leadership and the Construction of Environmental Concerns in Australia. This project received funding from the Australian Research Council under Project ID DP130102154.

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Finally, to Eadie, my daughter, who was born during the writing of this manuscript, and who has made so much of my life radically and transformatively better: I love you, and I dedicate this work to you.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Australian Conservation Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AYCC</td>
<td>Australian Youth Climate Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBF</td>
<td>Bob Brown Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPU</td>
<td>Communications Electrical &amp; Plumbing Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDO</td>
<td>Environment Defenders Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Ecological Modernisation</td>
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<td>EMO</td>
<td>Environmental Movement Organisation</td>
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<td>ET</td>
<td>Environment Tasmania</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEC</td>
<td>Hydro Electric Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIS</td>
<td>Humane Society International</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<td>NVA</td>
<td>Non-Violent Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCT</td>
<td>Pew Conservation Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>Sydney Morning Herald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWST</td>
<td>Still Wild, Still Threatened</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCT</td>
<td>Tasmanian Conservation Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFA</td>
<td>Tasmanian Forestry Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFIAT</td>
<td>Tasmanian Forests Intergovernmental Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Tarkine National Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWS</td>
<td>The Wilderness Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTG</td>
<td>United Tasmania Group</td>
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Introduction

Social movements have become in many ways a defining aspect of Western societies since the late 1950s. Anti-war, civil rights, feminist and environmental movements, amongst others, emerged as forces that in many cases radically changed the wider social world. Just as these ‘new’ movements had precedents in and were influenced by prior movements, contemporary movements have been influenced by, or in some cases are directly linked to the movements which emerged during this time. ‘Occupy Wall Street,’ ‘Black Lives Matter,’ and the movement for marriage equality in Australia all draw upon the lessons learned and tactics developed by earlier iterations of movements.

Unsurprisingly, social movements have attracted significant scholarly attention by those in the social sciences, with a variety of theories and approaches ranging from positions which have viewed movements as irrational, through to positions which impose a kind of economic rationalism on movement actors (Saunders, 2013). However, one aspect of social movements which has been largely overlooked is the contributions of leaders (Morris & Staggenborg 2004: 171; Reger, 2007: 1303; Taylor, 2007: 311; West, 2008: 133; and Tranter, 2009: 708). We know from history that movements have historically had leaders; think for example of Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, Harvey Milk, Gloria Steinem or Bob Brown, who played very public roles in their respective movements. We also know that there are others who have worked behind the scenes but who have made profound contributions to the success of their movements (Herda-Rapp, 1998; Robnett, 1997). As Gramsci (1971: 196) noted: “Pure spontaneity never exists, for there are always leaders and imitators, even if many remain nameless figures who leave few traces in historical records.”

This thesis will examine the roles and contributions of these figures, some of whom are well known, and some who may well be the ‘nameless figures’ that Gramsci spoke of, to expand an understanding of leadership within the context of social movements and elucidate the power structures within movements and the demands this places on leaders to achieve the goals of their movements. It will use the Tasmanian environmental movement as a case study to achieve these ends; as a movement with well defined leadership which has engaged in action around
environmental issues for nearly 60 years and been influential around the globe, it offers a unique perspective into movement leadership which can provide insight into the sociological workings of movements.

**Tasmanian Environmentalism**

The environmental movement has been a significant force both socially and politically since it emerged out of the ‘New Left’ social movements of the 1960s and ‘70s. The rise of environmentalism was seen as critical to processes of “macrosocial and political change” to the extent that it is potentially capable of recreating civil society (Rootes, 2004: 608). In his overview of the environmental movement, Rootes (2004) echoes Nisbet’s (1982: 101) claim that environmentalism was arguably the “single most important social movement of the [20th Century]”.

The ambitious goals of the movement are unsurprising given its origins in the ‘New Left,’ but while many of the other issues that came out of the same era have been placated or otherwise marginalised in Western societies, environmental concern has become a ‘mainstream’ social and political issue, becoming increasingly bureaucratised and institutionalised in the process (Tranter, 2010). This process, which Pakulski and Crook (1998) refer to as ‘routinisation,’ reflects a process by which environmental concern has evolved socially and politically from being ‘new and exciting’ to instead being ‘expected and familiar.’ Of particular interest here is the basis of leadership in the environmental movement, and how these leadership roles have evolved as environmentalism has become ‘routinised,’ with a particular focus on the environmental movement in Tasmania.

Tasmania has played a key role in the global environmental movement, both materially and symbolically (Pybus & Flannagan, 1990) as a locus for the kinds of political, social and economic issues that define the movement’s agenda and history. Tasmania has demonstrated many of the outcomes expected by theorists as the environmental movement has ‘routinised’ and entered the ‘mainstream’ socially and politically. This is particularly apparent with regards to the emergence of a ‘post-materialist’ population whose values “transcend materialist preoccupation... [and] reflect growing concerns with ‘quality of life,’ self-actualisation and civil liberties [including] increasingly prominent concerns about the natural environment” (Pakulski and Crook, 1998: 5). These emerging concerns are also seen as responsible for the subsequent factionalisation of the political ‘left’ (Lipset in Heath, 1991; Krien, 2012). As a result of these developments, as well as the continued conflict around environmental issues on the island (Ajani, 2007; Krien, 2012), Tasmania is an ideal
site for an examination of the basis of current and historical leadership in the environmental movement and the subsequent development of environmental concern.

The Tasmanian environmental experience has been defined by a series of conflicts between the movement on one side and industry and government on the other; initially these began as a series of conflicts with the state-owned Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC), which dammed Lake Pedder in 1972 after substantial community resistance (Lester, 2006b) providing many of the early lessons for the movement that where taken into future campaigns (Tranter, 2009). The Lake Pedder campaigns were also responsible for the emergence of the United Tasmania Group (Lines, 2006) which is widely considered to be the first of the ‘Green’ political parties globally, although there were environmentally aligned political campaigns prior to this in NSW which are often overlooked (Lines, 2006).

The loss of Lake Pedder ‘radicalised’ many in the Tasmanian community and resulted in a more generalist approach to campaigning. As McGregor (2004: 493) notes, “after failing to prevent the damming of Lake Pedder in Tasmania using traditional covert lobbying tactics, activists began targeting the general public in order to overtly influence political decision makers.” Activists applied these lessons to a new front in the conflict over dams, the proposed damming of the Franklin River, which they successfully prevented after making the dam a central issue at the 1983 Federal election (Tranter, 2009; McGregor, 2004).

The Franklin River victory effectively ended the HEC’s plans for expanding the Tasmanian hydro network, but new fronts in the environmental conflict opened up around forestry, particularly with the state-owned Forestry Tasmania but also with corporate interests, the most notable of which was Gunns Limited, a locally run forestry enterprise. The proposal of a pulp mill at Wesley Vale in 1989 and a range of campaigns around forest protection, which included Farmhouse Creek and the Lemonthyme (1985-1988), Jackeys Marsh (1986-1987), the Great Western Tiers (1991), the East Picton (1992-1993), the Tarkine (1995) and Mother Cummings Peak (1997), as well as an ongoing campaign around The Styx Valley (1999-) (Tranter, 2009), characterised movement activity through to the present day. An ongoing campaign around another pulp mill at Bell Bay was also a central issue (Tranter, 2009), and the development was delayed through legal challenge until Gunns went into receivership in 2012, effectively ending the campaign.
The most recent significant development for Tasmanian movements has been a series of campaigns which led to expansion of the Tasmanian World Wilderness Heritage Area in 2013. Subsequently the Australian government, led by Prime Minister Tony Abbott, attempted to reverse the expansion to allow for logging within the region, and this was followed by the Tasmanian government’s application to log within the expansion zone, which it withdrew in 2016. These changes were the result of the 2011 Tasmanian Forests Intergovernmental Agreement (TFIA), which was proposed as a means by which the conflicts over forestry in Tasmania might be ended, and involved substantial negotiation between industry and key movement organisations. However while TFIA and the subsequent expansion of the World Heritage Area were on face value successful, it resulted in a good deal of contention within both the Greens and the wider environmental movement. In Tasmania this agreement is often referred to as the Tasmanian Forestry Agreement (TFA), which was the name of the act which passed the Tasmanian parliament in 2012 as part of the TFIA.

The interviews and other research conducted for this thesis have been shaped particularly by the events around the World Wilderness Heritage Area expansion; leaders were still dealing with the internal fallout from the negotiations and TFIA/TFA, and were facing the threat of seeing their hard work undone by the Abbott government. This formed the principle context for an investigation into leadership in the Tasmanian environmental movement.

Leadership as a critical silence in Social Movement Literature

Leadership has been a key focus of research in many of the social sciences, particularly psychology and political science. Leaders are seen as critical in understanding success and failure in business and politics, as well as other aspects of social life, sometimes to the point where leadership is seen as more influential and important to the outcome of endeavours than many other, equally important aspects (Rothman, 2016). Theories around political elites, for example, are mainstream and accepted within political sciences (Tranter, 1999; Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012).

In research around social movements, however, leadership is marginalised if not totally ignored (Morris & Staggenborg 2004: 171; Reger, 2007: 1303; Taylor, 2007: 311; West, 2008: 133; and
Leaders in movements are viewed with suspicion or hostility, either as spectres of authoritarian leadership in the classic Weberian sense, or as individuals more concerned with status and being ‘celebrities’ to draw media attention. Leaders are broadly seen as a distraction from mass mobilisation, from protest and organising and the large public demonstrations of support for a campaign issue, and the personal motivations for solidarity in a group which may not offer clear material benefits.

What these studies miss in their focus on the ‘mass’ of movements, in dealing with the movement as an abstraction, are the contributions of individuals towards making large mobilisations possible, and the power dynamics that exist throughout the movement. There are a range of actions which key individuals undertake both behind the scenes (Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998) as well as in public roles (Gamson, 1975) to create conditions for movement efficacy which would not be possible otherwise; leaders provide the cognitive and material resources needed for coordination.

There is also evidence to suggest that movements where participants proclaim ‘leaderlessness’ are quite hostile and destructive, because they hide a cadre of submerged leaders who are difficult to directly confront (Freeman, 1999a; 1999b). Theory which reproduces this silencing of power helps to reproduce those conditions and ultimately helps to propagate movement conditions which are tyrannical and anti-democratic – a far cry from the original purpose of the ‘new’ social movements which have championed democratic participation since they emerged in the late 1950’s.

The Tasmanian environmental movement is a useful case study for this research. Historical accounts of the movement in Tasmania reveal numerous individuals who through choice or circumstance have contributed to the way in which many, including movement participants, approached nature, and made material contributions to the movement via various campaigns and organisations. In some cases these influential figures define the Tasmanian environmental movement in the public imagination, particularly Bob Brown and Christine Milne, two early movement leaders who established themselves in successful campaigns for the environment and then played critical roles in establishing the Greens as a political force in Australia and internationally. Authors such as Thompson (1984) make it clear that rather than just appearing influential because of media attention these leaders made meaningful and substantial contributions to the direction of the movement in their own right. It seems difficult, for example, to
imagine that the Tasmanian environmental movement would be substantially similar to its present form without the formative influence of Bob Brown.

Given that Gamson’s (1975) quasi-longitudinal research, and the history of the Tasmanian environmental movement, highlight the centrality of leadership, it appears critical that meaningful social theory around the emergence, growth and success of social movements accounts for the contributions of leaders without marginalising the importance of the broader movement population. If leaders and leadership have contributed to the success of the Tasmanian environmental movement, then it follows that leaders and leadership contributes something to the movement beyond direct democratic decision making.

The Tasmanian environmental movement inhabits a critical space in the ‘imaginary’ of the global environmental movement, having established itself as a model for organisation and tactics for other movements throughout Australia and the western world. In this context, understanding the contributions of Tasmanian environmental leaders to the movement and movement grievances is helpful to the development of theory. This theory can then better explain the dynamics of social movements and assist in appraising the role of the environmental movement in relation to society and the claims of novelty in social movements (as per Melucci, 1989).

This thesis aims to address this deficit to outline in detail some of the key activities that leaders undertake to make movements successful and viable, exploring their roles, recruitment, the source of their power and authority as leaders, and the way in which leaders interact with key institutions such as the media. These assessments provides further insight into how leadership in social movements is distinct from other forms of leadership, and avenues for further research in the future.

Aim of Thesis

I will investigate the influence and roles of environmental leaders in Tasmania, and how these leaders both currently and historically engage with environmental issues locally, nationally and globally. Leaders provide an important locus of power within social movements and have an
important influence upon the tactics, discourse and philosophies deployed by movements and movement organisations.

The research questions which orient this research are:

1. Who are the key leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement, what is the basis for their leadership, and how is leadership understood and generated within the movement?
2. What contributions do leaders make to the construction of environmental concern within the Tasmanian environmental movement?
3. How do leaders understand their roles and the contexts in which they operate, and how do these understandings expand or constrain the potential activities of movements?

Research Plan

In order to examine the contributions and importance of leaders to the Tasmanian environmental movement, key participants in the Tasmanian movement were identified using a three-part sampling strategy that drew upon both public prominence and influence within the wider network of environmental movement activists and leaders. These individuals were interviewed about their roles, their backgrounds, how they approached institutions such as the media, and a variety of other related issues. A substantial review of media articles around the 2014 Tasmanian state election was also undertaken to understand the context in which leaders operated and engaged with the media.

This thesis explores the key issues and themes which emerged from this process through a leader-centric perspective. It does this by conceptualising social movement leadership in relation to other mainstream leadership approaches including elite theory, analysing the relationship that these leaders have to power and authority and where their status as leaders emerges from, and finally by exploring some of the novel themes which emerge from leader-focused research to demonstrate how including leaders in analysis can benefit the development of theory.

Thesis Overview

In chapter one of this thesis, entitled “Social and environmental movements,” I will argue that the social theory around social movements is inadequate to explain the emergence and contributions
of influential individuals or ‘leaders’, let alone explaining why leaders exist within the movement. The major theoretical perspectives on social movements examine the ‘mass’ of the movement and broad collective action – the interactions between a movement and mainstream society – rather than the intra-movement politicking between various ideological positions, bases of concern and interest groups. These intra-movement interactions are usually left in a causal ‘black-box’ to resolve themselves, where the movement is functionally treated as a more-or-less homogenous group. Additionally some of the activists and scholars who recognise the lack of knowledge around movement leadership suggest that leadership is inauthentic: that movement leadership represents a distortion of the democratic potential of movements and increases the power and influence of a few at the expense of civil society (Barker, et al, 2004: 2; Gemmil & Oakley, 1992). However this assertion implies that movements which have strong leadership are structurally weak (and thus able to be co-opted by leaders) or that leaders prioritise their own success over the success of the movement.

Neither of these positions appear to hold when examining the Tasmanian environmental movement as a whole; overwhelmingly the factions aligned with leaders have been successful while direct democracy groups have remained marginal or disappeared over time. Leaders appear to have made extensive personal and professional sacrifices for the sake of their goals, and it is difficult to argue that they have co-opted the movement to serve their own ends. In addition, the Tasmanian movement has actively worked to oust leaders who don’t represent the interests of their organisations or the movement as a whole, which poses a strong counter-argument to the active-leader, passive-follower model that anti-leader discourses propagate.

Additionally there is historical evidence to suggest that leadership is critical to movement success; while many theorists treat the environmental movement and other movements of the ‘New Left’ as wholly novel (Saunders, 2013), their grievances and tactics largely derive from proceeding movements from as far back as the 1800s (see Zinn, 2003; on the precedents for Australian environmentalism see Pybus & Flanagan, 1990). In a review of ‘contest organisations’ addressing a variety of grievances throughout the United States from 1800-1945, Gamson (1975) found a consistent and significant relationship between organisations which adopted bureaucratic structures and centralised leadership, and successful outcomes (including, but not limited to, policy
changes and electoral victories). These precedents suggest that barring the radical transformation of the dominant social order, leadership remains a critical factor to movement success.

Gamson’s work will be discussed and critiqued in more detail in Chapter two, entitled “Leading the movement,” along with a broader discussion of what leadership is and how it is understood in the context of social movement theory. Gamson’s findings present dual problems for scholars and activists who overlook leadership (deliberately or otherwise). If leaders are critical to successfully addressing movement grievances as history suggests, then why doesn’t leadership have a central position in understanding movements as a whole – and, by implication, if a lack of defined leadership is more important to a theoretical movement than success (i.e. the argument for maintaining a model which ignores leadership or is explicitly anti-leadership), then what are movements for?

In chapter two I argue that scholarly work around social movement theory has largely failed to articulate a meaningful or realistic argument around these questions. Movements are more often seen as the seeds of new and radical forms of social configuration, as opposed to a more theoretically conservative positions which views movements as emerging forces for civil society. As Melucci (1989: 213) argues, movements are not radical but serve to “oil the machinery” of societal order and ensure the persistence of current configurations. In using theory to speculate on the revolutionary potential of social movements, scholars have neglected the influence of leadership in contributing to the fundamental purpose of a movement: addressing grievances.

Most popular mass movements do not come into being with the express goal of overthrowing the social order; they come into being in order to address particular grievances on the part of a population. Some may argue that addressing said grievances requires the overthrowing of the social order in that particular time and place, and the realities of organising what is usually a volunteer force who may be facing strong social opposition to their position necessitates an internal politics that appeals to the sensibilities of those dissatisfied with representative democracy. Yet it does not follow that the inherent purpose of movements is to propagate either revolution or novel political forms.
In chapter three, entitled “Media representation and roles,” provides a brief survey of the literature around a particular site of leader activity: the media. Engaging with the media helps establish leadership credentials but is also crucial for gaining the sympathy and support of the wider public (Gitlin, 1980) and an important site for the generation of environmental concern, which makes it a contested space both intra-movement and extra-movement. I will demonstrate the value of media to social movements and particularly social movement leaders, but also argue that leader-media interactions can, per Gitlin (1980), distort leadership and hamper meaningful leader identification. This chapter is critical because it provides insight into an area where leaders are able to make meaningful and important contributions to achieving movement goals. It also highlights the limitations of this study into environmental movement leadership and helps define the boundaries of what ‘leaders’ are for the purposes of this study.

Chapter four, “Methodology,” outlines my methodological approach and research design of this thesis, including the sampling and interviewing process, and the philosophical influences in developing this research process. In doing so I argue for the suitability of these approaches and critically engage with the literature around the approaches used. The analytical approach and the results of the sampling used to guide qualitative interviewing are also discussed.

Chapters five, six, seven and eight, explore and discuss the themes that emerged from this analysis and discuss briefly how these results relate to broader literature, providing some context for their theoretical significance.

Chapter five, “Are movement leaders elites?” examines the identified leaders to determine whether they meet the traditionally held criteria for elites in terms of their power and authority. While I find that most leaders outside of politics would struggle to qualify as elites, one individual does shares many elite characteristics: Dr. Bob Brown. I briefly review his biography and the corpus of literature around Bob Brown’s contributions to the movement to assess whether he qualifies as elite.

In chapter six, “The changing role of leaders,” I will examine the contributions leaders make in terms of their roles, to determine whether leader’s roles structurally contribute to their status as leaders. Movement leaders do not operate on power or authority in the same manner as
traditional leaders but do so through demonstrations of commitment and by using a variety of soft skills which they have developed through their experience in the movement. This leadership is relatively tenuous and open to challenges when compared to non-movement leadership.

Chapter seven, “Financialised leadership and movements,” is a close case study of one emerging tactic around financialisation, engaging in the market to achieve movement outcomes. It draws much less on the traditionally held forms of movement activity, and is much less dependent on ‘mass’ mobilisation than other approaches. I also examine some of the financial pressures that movements face around their activities and how this shapes inter-movement dynamics.

Chapter eight, “Media and movements,” examines the interaction between leaders and the media, historically one of the most critical institutional forces for social movements. In this I show how the changing dynamics of media, including the emergence of social media, have impacted leadership. Some leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement are seen by the media as semi-official figureheads for the wider movement, and these leaders can limit the scope of movements. Additionally I will explore how leaders outside of the mainstream act to innovate new tactics and create opportunities for success.

Finally the conclusion of this thesis will discuss the strengths and limitations of the study, how it contributed to the study of social movements and some suggestions for further research.
Chapter 1: Social and environmental movements

Introduction

Social movements have been a central topic of analysis and debate for sociologists since the emergence of the discipline; for example, social movements formed a central concern of Max Weber’s sociological analysis, and Marx ultimately sought to create a social movement to overthrow capitalism. Both Marx and Weber were particularly interested in the role of social movements in producing radical social changes as a result of conflicts over labour-capital and class relations (Edelman, 1970; Rootes, 2004). Social movement scholars have long tied themselves to the ‘sociological project’ by claiming to stand upon the shoulders of the early ‘giants.’ However Connell (2008) demonstrates that in reality the work of scholars is complex and diverse, and cannot be reconciled into anything like a consistent philosophical or scientific project. The purpose of referencing the contributions of these long-dead men is not a claim as an heir to their ‘project’ but to note the existence of social movement phenomena at the time of their writing – a social phenomena which is both preserved and transformed in late-or-liquid modernity and the focus of continuing intellectual effort to understand it.

However the ‘sociological project’ seeks more than just to understand: it also seeks to control (Routledge & Simons, 1995). Consequently Connell’s (2008) central insight might be the spatial/temporal mapping of power relations in the construction of the social sciences. In mapping these relations she makes tangible the conflict of interests between those of us who seek to understand, even with the best of intentions, and those who represent what Routledge & Simons (1995) call “the spirits of resistance” for whom being known is tantamount to being controlled. Or to look at it another way: consider the similarities in the purpose of signifier to signified between Rootes (2004: 610), who channels Weber when he suggests that all sociological language is theoretical abstraction designed to assist understanding and explanation – the relationship between concept and reality thus never being one of precise identity – and Marcuse (2004: 811), who expands Said’s (1978) Orientalism when he develops the concept of ‘hegemonic metaphor,’ which “describes a subject that does not exist in reality... or rather, [seeks] to shape something that does exist in reality into a form that makes it manageable and manipulable by dominant powers.” The relationship between signified and signifier in both definitions is the same; the latter simply
recognises the power dynamics: the act of sociological understanding renders its subjects, for better or worse, vulnerable to power.

McGregor (2004) makes this conflict clear in his study of environmental imaginaries amongst activists: in highlighting the increasing dominance of hegemonic rational frames around environmental ‘management’ over emotional or spiritual reasons for protection, he shows how activities like whaling or strip mining could be rationally justified and that these hegemonic frames limit the ‘legitimate’ psycho-social spaces for resistance. The dominance of hegemonic paradigms and the ability for hegemonic frames to incorporate competing ideas means that paradigms for resistance must eventually be abandoned – see, for example, Esteva’s (1992) critique of the ‘Development’ metaphor and subsequent rejection of the Development paradigm - but this abandonment also gives rise to new forms of, and opportunities for, resistance. Part of why social movements have maintained such a presence in sociological literature and inspired such intellectual debate is that they are moving targets; constantly responding, reflexively and purposefully, to the power(s), discourses and ideologies they seek to contest.

In this chapter I will examine the historical and contemporary explorations of social movements, assessing the theories which scholars have applied to movements (both to understand and control). In doing so I will outline some of the historical approaches and assess their contradictions and ideological assumptions, arguing in line with Saunders (2013) that the theoretical lenses that have dominated social movement research are largely inappropriate if used exclusively and that a synthetic framework incorporating elements of a range of different movement theories is necessary to appreciate the dynamics of movement activity, especially when it applies to leadership behaviours.

Following this is a discussion of environmental concern and discourse that seeks to elucidate the variety of motivating factors and discursive meaning that relates specifically to environmental movement participation and leadership. This discussion is important because it bridges the gap between the theoretically generic work on ‘social movements’ and the more specific but sparse literature on environmental movements.
Finally, this chapter will briefly explore the literature specifically relating to environmental movements and environmentalism and some of the insights that this more directed research contributes to this thesis.

Social movement theory

What is a social movement? It might ostensibly be described through Zald & Ash’s (1966) widely cited definition of social movements, synthesised from Weber (in Gerth & Mills, 1946) and Michels (1949), which suggests that a social movement is “a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals or social institutions or structures” (Zald & Ash, 1966: 329). They additionally suggest two key features which distinguish social movements from regular bureaucratic organisations: the goal-based nature of social movement organisations makes them, at least conceptually, temporary institutions; and they place a focus on purposive and solidarity-based incentive structures rather than material or remunerative (Zald & Ash, 1966: 329).

Alternatively, Calhoun’s (2001) exploration of emotion in social movements that provides perhaps the most insight into how one might go about understanding how social movements are understood in the public imagination. He writes that social movements are not especially emotional; individuals are emotionally invested in the kinds of stable social relations they participate in every day – there’s a huge emotional investment in the status quo (Calhoun, 2001: 54). Emotions are not just a function of disruption to social life, but social movements do make emotions prominent; they reveal the emotional layer of social life. Critical here for Calhoun is Victor Turner’s conception of the liminal, a period in which social hierarchies are upturned, tradition is rendered uncertain, and future outcomes are unknowable. What Calhoun and Turner make clear is that social movements – not just in terms of emotions, but generally – cannot be thought of as distinct from the societies in which they operate.

Society is constantly in a state of flux: individuals, groups, classes and whole societies draw upon discourse and habitus from their histories in order to, as Bourdieu asserts (1990: 54), create more history. Society might be understood as a collection of movements who influence each other to decide the ‘direction’ of the social collective. In this case discourse and habitus act to maintain the overall ‘direction’ of society in ways which make it difficult for groups with radically different views
to affect change. As such any particular society, I argue, has a broad hegemonic social movement which represents the way in which dominant discourses and habitus of the individuals within act to reinforce the status quo.

Individuals are not just emotionally invested in the status quo, as Calhoun argues, but their bodies and daily practices are anchored in habits, skills, styles, tastes and ‘common-sense’ (Calhoun, 1990: 66-7), and their language a system of thought “composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and worlds of which they speak” (Lessa, 2006: 284). These discourses are simultaneously reproduced and re-constructed through their everyday use. Social movements create or respond to liminal moments, which create opportunities for action. What makes them ‘movements’ contra the broad hegemonic social movement is the degree and quality of their deviance from social norms both discursively and habitually, and the threat that this deviance represents, perceptually or in reality, to the status quo. These two factors contribute to the visibility of the movement and help explain why the ‘new’ social movements all have their roots in counter-culture and the emergence of a ‘new-left’ (Rootes, 2004: 614) at a time when the polity was becoming increasingly conservative (Hutton & Connors, 1990: 99-101). However, using the visibility of certain movements as the basis for theorising has created a broad range of conceptual issues for social movement theorists.

**New social movement theory**

The most common paradigm in scholarship on social movement theory has been the dichotomy between ‘new’ and ‘old’ social movements, which views the early (or ‘old’) social movements (e.g. labour, abolitionist or suffrage movements) – ostensibly the kind studied by Marx and Weber – as distinct from the social movements of late-capitalism (for example, see Gundelach, 1988; Laraña, Johnston & Gusfield, 1994). However the justification for this paradigmatic 'split' is viewed by some theorists as problematic (Diani, 1992; 2002; Melucci, 1994). Saunders (2013: 123-4) suggests that a structural bias in sociology lead scholars to focus on labour movements as the benchmark for social movements, but that the failure of the labour movement to produce the revolution “that many theorists had hoped for... [brought about] what has thus far proven a wild goose chase of searching the broader social movement milieu for a revolutionary agent with which to replace it.”
Thus was born ‘new’ social movement theory, not ‘new’ in the sense that the movements or motivating issues they examined were new, but that the scholarly interest and theoretical frameworks applied to them were novel (Saunders, 2013: 125). Diani (1992; 2002) has covered the pluralist and contradictory nature of these perspectives in some detail, but it is illustrative to briefly explore some of these 'claims to novelty.' Gundelach (1988) sees novelty in the aims and objectives of new social movements; particularly the rejection of ‘materialist' values around labour-capital or class relations in favour of more 'post-materialist' (Inglehart, 1977; 1990) issues and a 'green' struggle for an alternative future. Another perspective, advocated by Touraine (1981: 71-77), sees social movements as a response to large-scale structural and cultural changes centred around a 'core conflict' for the systems of meaning that set dominant rules in a given society. Touraine claims social movements are defined by their activity around the 'core conflict' (1981: 81) and suggests the novelty lies in a change of 'core conflict' from that of 'old' social movements.

Diani (2002) rejects these suggestions in favour of Melucci’s (1989) analytical perspective. He suggests that 'new' social movements may have claims to novelty on the grounds that they break down traditional social configurations or 'cleavages.' Synthesising Rokkan’s (1970) theory on 'political cleavages' and Simmel's (1955) work on the intersection of social circles in modern society, Diani (2002) suggests that social movements "mobilise networks of people and groups which cut across traditional cleavages..." challenging those cleavages "...both as sources of meaning and specific relational structures." What Diani sees as novel, then, is the kinds of networks that make up social movements and the kinds of linkages which occur in those networks. Both Diani (2002) and Harvey (1989, 1996) point to the radical changes of late-modernity as a source for understanding 'new' social movements, and Melucci (1989) draws upon similar understandings to present one of the few genuinely 'novel' analytical definitions of new social movements. Just as Bauman (2000) emphasises the centrality of individual freedom under late-or-liquid modernity, Melucci (1989: 177-178) writes that the source of change in social movements is that "the freedom to have which characterised... industrial society has been replaced by the freedom to be". Social movements in late-modernity, he suggests, are a response to the shift of power away from the state towards interdependent transnational relationships (Melucci, 1989: 213) with movements functioning to 'oil the machinery' of societal order rather than – and contrary to common rhetoric – revolutionary and transcendental ends. But for Melucci novelty or 'newness' is then "whether the meaning and the
place they [social movements] occupy in the system of social relations can be considered the same” (Melucci, 1994: 105).

These differing conceptions of 'new' social movements demonstrate the broad application of the term across scholarship. Johnston, Laraña & Gusfield (1994) attempt to clarify the term by suggesting some general, though not inherent, characteristics of new social movements. For Johnston et al (1994) new movements are characterised by breakdown of political cleavages (participants come from a variety of political backgrounds) and a lack of overarching ideologies. New movements mobilise grievances which involve cultural and symbolic issues linked to identity rather than materialist values, which results in the 'defining' of individuals identities through movement actions. Finally, new movements regularly employ 'radical mobilisation tactics', and there is a sense that new social movements are a reaction to the 'credibility crisis' of participatory society in the West. As a result of these factors, new social movement organisations are often 'segmented, diffuse and decentralised' (Johnston, Laraña & Gusfield, 1994: 6-8).

This contestation of meaning around what constitutes a ‘new’ social movement is important for a few reasons. It highlights the difficulty that theorists have in clearly articulating what is ‘new’ about the movements which emerged during the 1960s and ‘70s, and the fact that this idea of a ‘new’ paradigm has persisted in scholarship despite these conceptual problems speaks to the need for the idea beyond mere theoretical specificity. In order to assess the contributions of leadership from a theoretical standpoint it is necessary to be conceptually clear about what a movement is as a social phenomena, and whether ‘new’ movements are distinctive phenomena in their own right. The inability for movement scholars to agree on what a ‘new’ movement is suggests it is not a helpful theoretical concept in this regard despite is dominance in the literature.

Buechler (2000) is particularly critical of the lack of theoretical specificity with regards to the use of “new social movement” which he warns is a diverse set of approaches that cannot be consistently or coherently consolidated. While his views echo Diani’s (1992) work around this problem – suggesting possibilities for synthesis of the broad theoretical perspectives – there remains elements of divergence and, subsequently, analytical confusion (Diani, 1992: 7-13).
Additionally the claims made by some 'new social movement' scholars about the death of ideology as a "unifying or totalising element for collective action" (Johnston, Laraña & Gusfield, 1994: 6-7) deserve critical appraisal on the grounds that it imposes a historicised understanding of 'old' social movements, and in doing so undermine the agency of the individual actors who took part in these movements. While it is possible to conceive of and perceive social movements in ideological terms, “abstract ideological proclamations” are not experienced as abstraction by “real people” (Žižek, 2011: 3-8). While it is possible to 'clearly' see social movements of the industrial era as ideological, this doesn't necessitate that participants saw their actions in ideological terms, nor that movements in late-modernity aren't similarly ideological. Žižek (2011) suggests that ideological presuppositions are necessary for the reproduction of social relations, even if they appear to be strictly utilitarian or hedonistic in their motivations (ibid), a view of ideology as pervasive and inescapable that conflicts starkly with the view of Johnston et al (1994), who continue to conceptualise ideology in traditional Marxist terms. Rather than causing the death of ideology, Žižek's work suggests that late-modernity has subsumed social movements into capitalist ideology, rendering their ideological motivations invisible.

Pichardo (1997) furthers this critique by arguing that much of what has been positioned as a qualitatively 'new' paradigm is the result of academic focus on the political left and a marginalisation of social movements from the political right. As such the premises of 'new' social movement theorists around tactics, structure and participation follow from particular ideological ends (Pichardo, 1997: 414-419) rather than paradigmatic change. Any novelty in movements, he claims, is not inherent to the movement, but the result of new forms of domination within post-industrial society, suggesting the new social movement thesis is 'untenable' (Pichardo, 1997: 426).

Saunders (2013: 124) adds that because of the structural bias within the field, “nineteenth century manifestations of the women’s movement and religious movements were largely ignored or, considerably later, passed to historians.” Surveying the historical literature around these movements, especially the suffragette and abolitionist movement, makes clear just how inadequate ‘new’ social movement theory is as an analytical device, with the Reformation (Roberts, 2004: 574-578; Perry, 2005: 193), abolitionist and suffragette (Zinn, 2003: 120-121; Brogan, 2001: 412; Robnett, 1997) and even labour movements (Brogan, 2005: 416; Zinn, 2003: 224; Perry: 348) all failing to fit cleanly into either ‘old’ or ‘new’ social movement categorisations in terms of their
rationality, interests, scope, ethic, actions, organisation or democratic form (Saunders, 2013: 127). In particular the strategic and network linkages between the suffragette and abolitionist movements (Zinn, 2003: 121; Brogan, 2005: 412) and the similar linkages between the later feminist and civil-rights movements (Robnett, 1997; Steinem, 1969) render any analytical comparison fairly meaningless.

It is reasonable to suggest from this that it is not possible to consistently separate out ‘old’ and ‘new’ movements in terms of their ideological stances as per Johnston, Laraña & Gusfield (1994), or even their relationships across social cleavages as per Diani (1992). In particular, Diani’s claims can be seen as simultaneously too broad to contain any meaningful specificity about the pluralistic and rapidly sub-dividing nature of political cleavages in late-modernity, and too narrow to account for the extensive social conflicts around which movement action takes place. By Diani’s (2002) own admission the role of identity – personal identity, not just collective identity – needs closer examination, and I would suggest such investigation would need to account for the collapse of identity and ontological instability of capitalist late-modernity (Young, 2007).

Even the ‘materialist’/’postmaterialist’ divide, a theory supported by the work of Habermas (1981, 1987) Gundelach (1988) and others – which supposes that what distinguishes the ‘old’ and ‘new’ movements is a move away from issues of social and economic security and towards personal expression and human rights, and argues for a generational basis to this change – is difficult to clearly distinguish here. Inglehart’s (1971, 1977, 1981, 1990, 1997) theory of 'post-materialism' serves as a theoretical and empirical base for many of these claims. Citing Mazlow’s psychological theory of the hierarchy of needs, Inglehart (1971; 1977) suggested post-WWII economic growth and the expansion of the middle class had created the ideal conditions for significant generational value change, away from 'materialist' concerns such as social or economic security and towards 'post-materialist' existential desires: "the need for belonging and to aesthetic and intellectual needs" (Inglehart, 1971: 991). This shift in values coincided with another developing social phenomena, that Inglehart (1990: 44) refers to as 'cognitive mobilisation': "the development of political skills... needed to cope with the politics of a large scale society" that saw the potential for a 'new politics' where elites, rather than directing the population, could be actively challenged (Inglehart, 1977: 295).
Almond (1990) cites Inglehart’s ‘post-materialist’ thesis as "one of the few examples of successful prediction in political science," and Pakulski & Crook (1998: 5-6) suggest it provides a useful theoretical perspective in understanding the rise of the environmental movement, although they caution that the 'hierarchy of needs' inherent in his account "sits uncomfortably with the levels of fear and anxiety associated with many contemporary environmental issues" (ibid: 6). They suggest that in order to understand the emergence of the environmental movement, Inglehart must be balanced with Ulrich Beck's (1992) account of 'risk society' (ibid: 7).

There has been substantial debate around the post-materialist thesis (see Abramson, 2011), with particularly strong criticism from Clarke and his colleagues (Clarke, 2000; Clarke & Dutt, 1991; Clarke, Dutt & Rapkin, 1997a, 1997b; Clark et al, 1999). However Clarke’s more substantive criticisms have been rebuffed by Inglehart & Abramson (1999) and Abramson (2011) who suggest that Clarke lacks the data to prove his suspicions about the sensitivity of the battery of tests, and that data he provides as an argument against post-materialism actually supports their thesis. Additionally Saunders (2013: 130) is critical of the application of the post-materialist thesis to social movement theory. As she notes, there isn’t a strict correlation between post-materialists and movement participation: the development of environmental concern doesn’t necessitate that someone would participate in the environmental movement. She also raises questions about the causal relationship between post-materialism and movement participation: “who is to say that new movements were not responsible for bringing about new values rather than vice versa?” (Saunders, 2013: 130). This is a fundamental problem with quantitative approaches, which are subject to a causal ‘black box’ (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2007) but at the same time Saunders critiques are rather mild. Inglehart’s (1971; 1977) work does indicate a strong link between post-materialism and the ‘new’ movements across Western societies – a very high level research approach. Saunders (2013) critiques largely charge Inglehart’s work with not being appropriate to assess local and interpersonal choice making, which is not within the scope of Inglehart’s research to begin with.

As mentioned previously, some scholarship argues that the post-materialist thesis needs to be tempered with Beck’s (1992) account of the ‘risk society’ in order to accurately represent the emergence of social movements, particularly the environmental movement, but again this additional explication remains unsatisfactory. Beck (1992) suggests that modernity has expanded the social awareness of risk and that ignorance is no longer the primary source of the risks faced by
society, instead replaced by knowledge. By way of example, Beck asserts that while previously deforestation was a local issue, today the death of forests occurs globally (1992: 21). This has led to very different social and political consequences: as a species, humans must now comprehend their capacity to cause their own suffering, destitution, and destruction by forces too abstract, massive or obtuse to perceive in their totality. The kinds of risk resulting from the industrial era were 'latent,' Beck claims, but they are now becoming visible: "acid rain, toxic accidents and nuclear near-catastrophes are symbols of the historical end of the period of 'latency' of the previously invisible risks of industrialisation" (Pakulski & Crook, 1998: 7). Beck (in Pakulski & Crook, 1998: 7) suggests that environmental movements are a response to this, a "newly emerging 'sub-politics' in which reassurances from public authorities and experts about levels of risk are no longer trusted."

Similar points are echoed by Saul (1992: 311) and Furedi (1997), the former particularly skewering the blindness and inaction of bureaucracy and expertise; the latter the 'diminished humanity' imposed upon individuals in societies experiencing this phenomena. Shared by all three, and echoing Harvey (1989) and Melucci (1989), is the assessment of governmental agency as powerless to deal with the consequences of modernity – along with the subsequent rise of social movements as a means to deal with the critical issues that lie outside of the states purview.

Saunders (2013: 132-4) answers this through her analysis of Melucci’s (1995) conceptualisation of newness, which argues that one of the elements of new movements is their ‘planetary’ dimension. Certainly “student, environmental and peace movements were... working on global issues” and taken on the broad planetary awareness that Beck is speaking of, but Saunders sees precedent for this in the anti-slavery and women’s movements decades earlier, and argues that “the archetypal old movement, the labour movement, also has a planetary dimension, having spawned campaigns against sweatshops and for human rights” (Saunders, 2013: 134). Saunders (2013: 138-42) ultimately concludes that while new social movement theory has offered many useful insights and brought cultural aspects of movements to the foreground, it overemphasises culturally challenging participatory aspects over formal organisation and rational decision making. It imposes a homogenous view of movements and the networks that construct them, and fails to account for the fact that the ‘new’ movements are no longer new (and indeed perhaps never were) because they’ve been, at least in part, institutionalised. These critiques agree broadly with the problems this literature review has identified.
Resource mobilisation theory

Resource mobilisation theory, the other relevant social movement theory, suggests that the emergence of social movements is not because of the severity and impact of social grievances, but rather the injection of, and subsequently competition for, resources by social and political elites towards particular goals. McCarthy & Zald (1977) are generally credited with the emergence of resource mobilisation as an explanatory device for social movement behaviours (Saunders, 2013: 76) but it also generally follows Olsen’s (1965) work on collective action which views social movement participants in economic or instrumental terms; that is, as strictly rational actors along the lines of the theoretically constructed *homo economicus*.

Resource mobilisation theory is helpful because it recognises the broad variety of resources that are required for the survival of formal social movement organisations and the kinds of strategic decisions the leaders are required to make in order to gain, and make use of, such resources. This might include approaches to fundraising, but also the application of these funds towards the campaign in ways which achieve a movements goals. Snow & Soule (2010: 87-88) suggest that these resources are not just material or monetary, but also human, social-organisational, moral and cultural (although the two latter categories are problematic, as will be discussed shortly), and suggest that scholars examining social movements and their resource mobilisation need to examine the derivation of resources and the opportunities for influence and co-option that come from externally derived resources. Practically speaking, resource mobilisation suggests that individuals might participate in the environmental movement in exchange for jobs, access to resources, social status, or even something as abstract as existential meaning.

For McCarthy & Zald (1977), these resources generally came from elites and were responsible for the emergence of social movements; they argued along the lines of Turner & Killian (1957 in Saunders, 2013: 76) that there was always sufficient grievances to support a movement if the movement was well organised and had access to the power and resources of an established elite group. For Saunders (2013) and Dalton (1994) this instrumental focus makes it useful for interpreting the activity of formalised, routinised organisations which have adopted a ‘neo-corporatist’ structure – Saunders cites Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace as examples, but in the Tasmanian context these might be Environment Tasmania or The Wilderness Society.
Saunders (2013: 80-1) argues that resource mobilisation was “initially applied to movements of the 1960s and 1970s” and focussed on the “more legitimate aspects” of social movement activity opposed to the emerging dissident sub-cultures of the time; this means that resource mobilisation theory makes social movements appear more cohesive and orderly than they really are, and marginalises the ‘unbounded’ or ‘fragile’ organisations found in social movements.

Routledge & Simons (1995) also criticise resource mobilisation theory on the grounds that it reduces movements from the collective action of various groups and individuals with different opinions and opposing interests into a simplistic analysis of the goals, organisation and leadership of the movement as a homogenous group. Such analysis, they argue, views protest as instrumental and oriented towards particular political or economic goals. Success of the movement is the gauge by which the significance of protest is measured rather than the transformation and development of the individuals involved in the movement (Routledge & Simons, 1995: 476). They suggest that identity-oriented theory might help understand the creation of identities and solidarities of collective actors, viewing movements not as mere success or failure but as the language with which “social actors express their discontent” (ibid: 476) and recommend considering the motivations and reasons leading to the emergence of resistance and a broader account of resources to include ‘cultural’, ‘political’ or ‘identity’ based resources. However Saunders (2013: 80) notes that other scholars, particularly those from economics disciplines, have previously tried to incorporate ideas like ‘collective identity’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘ideology’ as resources within mobilisation theory, and that such work revealed conceptual limitations. Perhaps then it is better to simply accept the limitations of resource mobilisation theory as helpful in understanding formal social movement organisations and some of the strategic decision making elements required of social movement leaders, rather than trying to reform it into a serviceable broad-scale theory of movement behaviour.

A synthetic analytical framework

Saunders (2013) offers a useful alternative framework for understanding social movements, which from my analysis represents the best attempt to synthesise the disparate and contradictory steams of social movement theory into a concept with both theoretical rigor and utility with regard to
sociological research. Given that none of the major social movement theories are capable of adequately conceptualising both intra-and-extra-movement interactions necessary to examine leadership, it is worth briefly covering her work to establish a synthetic approach.

Saunders (2013) argues that it is more helpful to conceptually approach social movements as “networks of interaction between individuals and organisations engaging in collective action aimed at achieving or resisting social change” (Saunders, 2013: 6). This draws broadly on Diani’s (1992) previous work around the conceptualisation of social movements.

Saunders (2013) broader conceptualisation of social movements has much in common with Nilsen & Cox (2013: 71-73), who argue that social movements are not just a form of resistance; they not only coalesce from below as resistance to hegemony but also from above as a form of domination. This critical analysis is also shared by Snow & Soule (2010: 27-29), although they oddly accuse critical theory of being too focused on race and class as sources of grievances despite critical theorists like Harvey (1989) having long suggested that social movements arise from "disruptions of home, community, territory and nations by the restless flow of capital" (1989: 238). These movements spread beyond narrowly defined class interests or struggles, instead viewing social movements as having the "aim of liberating space and time from their current materialisations and construction of an alternative kind of society in which value, time and money are understood in new and quite different ways" (Harvey, 1989: 238).

Saunders (2013: 180-1) identifies ‘resource mobilisation’, ‘political opportunity/process’, and ‘new social movement theory’ as the key theoretical steams in the literature. She suggests that in the case of environmental networks it is necessary to combine ‘resource mobilisation’ and ‘new social movement theory’ to correct the limitations of each framework. While these theories have often been viewed in opposition to each other, Saunders argues they share a number of key variables, particularly if ‘rational’ decision making is expanded to include emotions and norms. Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta (2001) argue that the dominant Weberian understandings of social movements have delegitimised emotions as a basis for action; Weber’s typology saw any non-rational behaviours as deviant (Goodwin et al, 2001: 2). Goodwin et al (2001) draw upon Robnett (1997) to argue that this has led gender to be neglected in social movement theory as gender roles are laden with emotional expectation – women do both more and different kinds of ‘emotional labour’ in
most societies, and Robnett demonstrates that in the civil-rights movement male leaders made emotional appeals to mobilise their audiences, but women in grassroots leadership roles were responsible for developing the kinds of emotional intimacy required to persuade people to act in dangerous circumstances. Meanwhile Ahmed (2014) argues that hate and fear were important mobilising factors for racist movements in the United States against both blacks and Muslims, and in Australia against refugees, demonstrating the consistency of theory when applied to movements from the bottom-up and/or political left as much as top-down and/or from the political right.

Saunders (2013: 183) insight that “while it is not always economically rational to become an environmental activist, it might be emotionally rational to do so” is a welcome response to these critiques. She suggests that resources both economic and emotional need to be built up and mobilised; similarly there is a need for organisations, regardless of their formal status, to spend time on maintenance, whether that be of a collective identity and solidarity or a staff base and office space. This is largely in line with Routledge & Simons’ (1995) earlier critique of resource mobilisation. Saunders (2013) also recommends that ‘political opportunity’ be incorporated, but removed from its statist/structural focus towards a more dynamic view; she notes that an objectively open polity will never be open to anti-state actors, for example.

Broadly, Saunders’ framework seeks to address both strategic and normative social action, as well as accounting for individuals, organisations, targets and the polity as actors (Saunders, 2013: 180). There are some parallels here between Saunders work and Jasper’s (2004) strategic approach to social movements. Jasper highlights the importance of individual agency in movements over and above the structuralist perspectives inherent in theoretical and analytical approaches around resource management and political opportunity. He highlights the particular strategic concerns of movements along the lines of informal-formal organisational approaches; maintaining the coherency of actions as the organisation expands; dealing with shifting goals; coercion-persuasion dilemmas; privileging form or content; and the need to balance sustaining an organisational base with gaining public support (Jasper, 2004: 9-10). This approach is helpful because it recognises the key role of leaders in movements, something that is absent from other approaches. However, it could be argued that Jasper’s approach neglects normative behaviour and over-emphasises the individual, which Saunders’ framework corrects.
What does this discussion contribute to an understanding and appreciation of social movements, then? Social movements tend to be thought about in terms of their visible ideological conflict with the status quo, and social movement scholars have often privileged movements associated with ‘left-wing’ or progressive issues through their research and analysis. However social movements are the distinct product of history and cannot be viewed as somehow distinct from the socio-cultural contexts from which they emerge, and more importantly can emerge as easily from ‘above’ as from ‘below’. Just as the reformation spawned the counter-reformation, movement threats to hegemony and the status quo produce counter-movements. In an environmental context this has been most prominently been demonstrated through the rise of astro-turfing and disinformation campaigns (Lee, 2010), for example the extensive networks campaigning against wind-based renewables in Australia which rather than emerging from the grassroot has been fostered by mining and political interests through groups designed to give the appearance of broad public support (Chapman, 2011). Emerging forces such as the anti-feminist movement and the resurgence of neo-nazi movements have similarly been largely neglected in social movement literature.

Importantly, movements remain ideologically, principally and tactically diverse; any attempt to define precisely what any particular movement is ‘about’ will inevitably be reductive. And while the role of social movements may be changing within society along Meluccian lines, this change is best described as liminal: undefined, fluid, and unpredictable.

Environmental movements

The modern environmental movement is, like many contemporary social movements, a diverse and pluralist network of interlinked individuals, groups and organisations (Jasper, 2004: 5-6; Snow & Soule, 2010; Doyle, 2001), which tend to coalesce or mobilise around particular causes (Doyle, 2001). Rootes (2004: 614) argues that around the Western world, the modern environmental movement found its roots in the counterculture and rise of the ‘New Left.’ However this was not without precedent. Post-settlement Australian colonists displayed qualities consistent with elements of the environmental movement, particularly their spiritual or emotional connection to the natural environment (McGregor, 2004) and the recognition of the aesthetic beauty of nature which proceeds the emergence of the modern environmental movement. Bonyhady (2000), Pollack & MacNabb (2000), and Hutton & Connors (1990) all establish historic roots for the contemporary
movement, but Bonyhady (2000) in particular highlights that interest in conservation activity by the state was primarily conducted on ‘materialist’ grounds of security and economic stewardship. However this action by the state was regularly reinterpreted by parts of the population who privileged aesthetic or romantic readings of nature and supported conservationist causes on that basis. Hutton & Connors (1990: 19) suggest that tactics in the modern movement were not distinctly different from their predecessors, at least in Australia, although Grossman’s (1994) history of the American environmental movement provides similar evidentiary support. Thus it is not straightforward to argue that the early environmental movement was strictly ‘materialist’ but it is also difficult to argue that it had the kind of global imagination or consciousness which modern environmentalism espouses.

The modern environmental movement is not merely an extension of humanist liberalism and the expansion of rights to non-male, non-European, non-heterosexual humanity as the suffragette, abolitionist, feminist, civil-rights and gay-rights movements have sought to achieve, but can arguably be seen as an expansion of liberal thought beyond humanity and towards non-human life and the broad biosphere, preserved not merely for human appreciation but because it has intrinsic value in and of itself (see McGregor, 2004). Bonyhady (2000) notes that “…many of the key ideas that underpin modern environmentalism already had key champions in England by the late eighteenth century” (Bonyhady, 2000: 26) which can be seen as a direct response to urbanisation, industrialisation and the rise of modernity.

Most scholars regularly cite the publication of Carson’s (1963) seminal *Silent Spring* as influential in the emergence of the environmental movement (for example Hutton & Connors, 1990; McMichael, 2008; McGregor, 2004). This movement saw ‘environmentalism’ and ‘conservation’ move from being specialist or elite concerns to more general and politicised issues (McMichael, 2008). Issues ranged from pollution and acid rain, the so-called ‘brown’ environmentalism, to conservation and anti-development campaigns characterised as ‘green’ environmentalism. At its broadest interpretation, as per Harvey (1996: 118) that environmentalism encompasses “whatever exists in the surroundings of some being that is relevant to the state of that particular being at that particular place and time”, the environmental movement could be argued to also include recent
NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) movements in urban and suburban communities\(^1\). Particularly in Australia and Western Europe, the environmental movement has been responsible for new kinds of politics critical or sceptical of the rationality of information provided by state and corporate sectors (see for example Saul, 1992), and the emergence of Green political parties which have in some cases dramatically changed the political landscape. Hutton & Connors (1990: 99-118) argue that the environmental movement added to its tactical repertoire during this time, developing strategies around shareholder activism and commissioning research to justify their claims in the face of tokenism and co-option by government.

**Australian environmental movements**

The damming of Lake Pedder in Tasmania’s southwest is often talked about as the radicalising, catalysing event which brought about the emergence of the ‘new’ environmental movement in Australia, but naturally the historical record is not so clear cut. In Australia the ‘old’ movement had grown complacent after some easy victories, particularly regarding the protection of Lake Pedder under the national park scheme (Hutton & Connors, 1990: 94-95). The government had previously made overtures that suggested the scheme wasn’t, in fact, permanent protection if there was sufficient economic opportunity, as in the case of the Newsprint Mills excision, but for environmentalists it seemed as though their interests were sufficiently represented. Lake Pedder was protected until 1967, when the campaign to save it emerged, and its flooding was finalised in 1972, but prior to this the movement had coalesced around a number of other campaigns around the Great Barrier Reef, the Little Desert, Myall Lakes, and the Colong Caves (Hutton & Connors, 1990: 99-118). It was during this period that the movement expanded its tactics beyond the traditional lobbying and ‘shaping’ the decision making process towards shareholder activism and commissioned research, all of which fed into the Pedder campaign. Pakulski (in Hutton & Connors, 1990: 126) sees this development of new tactics over ‘traditional’ methods extending over the 1970s and into the ’80s, with an increase of activity both in Australia and globally involving protest, an expansion of issues, the globalisation of concerns from local-specific to general and universal, and the emergence of leading personalities and exemplary figures at the extra-local and national

\(^1\)And by extension their more extreme expression, often referred to by urban planners as BANANAs (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything).
level. But there were also extensive linkages to ‘old’ movements throughout this time, particularly the labour and union movement through the Green Bans of the 1970s (Hutton & Connors, 1990).

The Pedder campaign also highlights the strong links between the environmental movement and democratic principles. The chief institution involved in that case was the Tasmanian state-owned Hydro Electric Commission (HEC), a powerful statutory authority with strong connections to both the political class and the local media (Lester, 2007) and which lacked any political accountability (Hutton & Connors, 1990: 119). Bibby (2013) suggests that the Tasmanian government viewed the HEC as central to its economic fortunes and this dependency led to the organisation becoming extremely powerful and influential that it was referred to as a ‘state within a state’ (Bibby, 2013: 72). The Pedder campaign highlighted the failure of conventional politics and lobbying to achieve satisfactory outcomes for those concerned about environmental issues in a Tasmanian context, and this insight subsequently influenced the later Franklin campaign. But more immediately it influenced the emergence of the United Tasmania Group, the world’s first green political party (Hutton & Connors, 1990: 121). It also served to radicalise many who saw the ineffectual response of the lobbying undertaken by the (at the time) relatively conservative Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), which eventually saw its leadership replaced by those with a more activist bent.

This reflects the problematic nature of attempts to place environmentalism, like other social movements, within the ‘old’/’new’ paradigm. Post-settlement Australian colonists have always had particular relationships with – and ideas of – the environment; just not necessarily those held by many Australians today. Understanding the ‘environment’ as a discourse, and ‘environmental concern’ as a subset of this discourse, helps to make sense of some of these changes.

Environmental Concern and Discourse

As previously noted, the ‘environment’ might be nominally understood as a highly situated concept constitutive of “whatever exists in the surroundings of some being that is relevant to the state of that particular being at a particular place and time” (Harvey, 1996: 118). This general meaning has been largely circumscribed by the emergence of the ‘environmental movement’ where

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2 The Green Bans were a series of union-led environmental protests to prevent the destruction of both bushland and heritage-listed buildings. They were conducted principally around Sydney, NSW, during the 1970s.
'environmentalism' and ‘conservation’ moved from being specialist concerns to general and politicised issues (McMichael, 2008; McGregor, 2004). ‘Environment’ has subsequently been framed as a particular set of relations between human beings and their ecosystem, or the quantitative and qualitative ‘resource base’ which human beings can draw upon (Harvey, 1996). Harvey uses this contrast between an ‘ontological/theoretical’ “environment” and what is more commonly recognised as “environment” (that is, the socio-political understanding of it) to highlight ‘environment-as-discourse.’

Foucault suggests that discourse is a manifestation of the societal relationships of power (Crotty, 1998: 204), which shapes perception of social norms, ideas and behaviours, while simultaneously being shaped by those who wield them. They are “systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Lessa, 2006) but also a system of socially accepted signs and meanings, a way in which individuals communicate with each other about a particular topic (Brown & Yule, 1983). Smith (2005) sees Foucault’s concept of discourse operating both ideologically and institutionally, and that participation in a particular discourse both changes and reproduces it, allowing for the shift in discursive meanings over time.

Harvey (1996: 78-80) builds on this, but also advises a moderated view of discourse as part of a wider series of social ‘moments.’ Discourse for Harvey is a “moment of resort to the vast panoply of coded ways available to us for talking about, writing about, and representing the world” (ibid: 78), it expresses human thought, our fantasies and desires. Discourses are both affected and affective: they are “institutionally based, materially constrained, experientially grounded manifestations of social and power relations,” but also “suffuse and saturate all other moments within the social process” (ibid: 80).

Philosopher and social critic John Ralston Saul (1992: 8) claims that “language – not money or force – provides legitimacy. So long as military, political, religious or financial systems do not control language, the public’s imagination can move about freely with its own ideas. Uncontrolled words are consistently more dangerous to established authority than armed forces.” Discourse is, for Saul and Crotty (1998) a means of control and power over the kinds of ideas that are legitimate in society; the way in which we think about and talk about the environment, and the way in which
those discourses are contested and problematised, is a reflection of competing values within society.

‘Environmental concern’ might then be understood as a particular subset of environmental discourse; it is the level of concern a population or subset of a population holds about the environment, but it also represents the salience of environmental issues in negotiating the social and political landscape of the everyday. It also embodies a discursive contest over what McGregor (2004) refers to as ‘environmental imaginaries’ – that is, concern for the environment is a consequence and reflection of the way in which we understand the environment.

One popular means of conceptualising environmental discourse is as a spectrum from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism (McGregor, 2004). The anthropocentric end of this scale consists of ‘status quo’ capitalism or a softer ‘sustainable development;’ the ecocentric is represented by radical ‘deep ecology’ movements which see humans as part of a larger biosphere, and takes particular emotive or aesthetic positions on the environment. Others, like Harvey (1996) see the discourses around the environment as forming part of a larger, longstanding dichotomy between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ (Cosgrove, 1984), with the environmentalist stance reflecting an externalising and managerial stance, while the ecologist stance sees humans as embedded in nature. Harvey (1996) suggests these two discourses create particular and distinctive political and philosophical outcomes.

From this it is possible to make some claims about what ‘environmental concern’ might look like as a meaningful analytical concept. ‘Environmental concern’ can be thought of as a discourse, but it is also an inter-related discourse or ‘discourse fragment’ (Jager, 2001) of ‘environmental’ discourse, which means that like ‘environmental’ discourse it is subject to the ‘culture/nature’ dichotomy and produces similarly ‘particular and distinctive’ political and philosophical outcomes. However, unlike ‘environmental’ discourse, ‘environmental concern’ is not as direct a reflection of the relationship between individuals and nature; instead it might be thought of as related to a number of socio-political factors: the salience of ‘environmental’ issues for an individual; the economic and political relationship of society to its physical environment; the subsequent threat to the environment by society as perceived by the individual; and the distance on the anthropo/eco-logical (or culture/nature) spectrum between social and individual conceptions of nature.
This conceptualisation builds on Harvey’s (1996) framework of ‘moments’ within social processes, which is reproduced in Figure 1. Within this framework, Harvey sees discourse as a product of power, as well as beliefs, values and desires, and it is possible to map moments of ‘environmental concern’ within this system. This is necessary in part because Harvey suggests that discourse, while important, is insufficient to understand a particular social moment (1996: 80). In undertaking this exercise it is also important to recognise that this mapping process has limitations. Translating between moments is difficult and problematic in terms of the application of power, which makes understanding the social process imperfect. Each moment is contested, heterogeneous and ‘overdetermined,’ so a priori knowledge of the particular dimensions and applications of power or values or social relations is impossible. Moments can become more or less permanent or ‘crystallised’ over time, which needs to be addressed (Harvey, 1996: 80-2). Finally, that discourse is complex but very much a product of interpersonal relations. “A discursive moment is a form of power, it is a mode of formation of beliefs and desires, it is in itself an institution, a mode of social relating, a material practice, a fundamental moment of experience. Discourses can never be pure, isolated or insulated from other moments in social life... [nor] can they be insulated and separated from those doing the discoursing” (Harvey, 1996: 83).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse/Language</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Beliefs/values/desires</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions/Rituals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Material Practices</td>
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*Figure 1: ‘Moments’ in a Cognitive Map of the Social Processes. (Reproduced from Harvey (1996: 78), figure 4.1)*

With this in mind, it is possible to expand a view of ‘environmental concern’ beyond discourse and explicitly address the values, beliefs and power relations inherent in the analytical framework above. Values and beliefs are critical to the construction and reproduction of environmental concern as a discourse; they reflect the relationship between individuals and their ‘environment-as-nature.’ Here the rise of the environmental movement in politics is illustrative. Drawing on the previously mentioned ‘post-materialist’ thesis (Inglehart, 1971; 1977; 1981; 1990; 1997), Tranter &
Western (2009) suggest that these values contributed to, and were propagated/consolidated by, Green political parties, addressing issues beyond environmental protection and nuclear energy to include sexual equality, consumer advocacy, and human rights (Dalton in Tranter & Western, 2009: 149). When the Green parties achieved parliamentary representation, these issues and values become politically legitimate (Tranter & Western, 2009: 162). This was particularly true for younger demographics, in line with Inglehart’s thesis. Tranter (1996) has previously linked these value/generation changes, along with ‘new class,’ ‘education and intellectual status’ and ‘lifestyle’ as possible bases of the environmental movement. However, Tranter & Western (2009) also note that these values were not as represented in the youngest generation, which they initially suggest as a ‘period effect,’ possibly the result of worsening economic conditions.

The value changes identified by Tranter (1996) and Tranter & Western (2009) might be stronger amongst younger demographics, but they aren’t limited by age or generation. McGregor (2004) focuses on ‘environmental imaginaries’ as a way in which societies commonly imagine nature; a kind of ‘regional discursive formation’ in which a range of competing discourses result in “certain modes of thought, logics, themes, styles of expression and typical metaphors” (Peet & Watts, in McGregor, 2004: 594) become naturalised and “govern how events and issues are interpreted and communicated” (McGregor, 2004: 594). In McGregor’s (2004) study of self-described ‘environmentalists,’ he highlights the way in which discourse interacts with other social moments, and how beliefs and values, while still important to the formation of concern, are sublimated beneath dominant rational and economic frames. In particular McGregor sees spiritual or emotional understandings of nature and subsequently, as sources of environmental concern, being actively delegitimised by the environmental movement in favour of rational/logical and economic arguments, a move characterised as ‘intellectually taming’ spirits of resistance by “turning the poetry of transgression into the prose of rationality” (Routledge & Simons, 1995: 475).

Drobbin (2001) echoes these questions about how concern is constructed, not just within an environmental context, but generally within social movements. Drawing upon the work of Albert Hirschman, he suggests that modernity transformed ‘passions’ and emotional labour which motivated social practice into modern ‘interests;’ subsequently passion or spiritual impetus was replaced by rational and calculated impetus as the way in which individuals make sense of the world. For Dobbin, theorists of modernity “typically take actors at their word – they use the same
language as the actors themselves... But the language of rational calculation is... a lens through which actors see their own actions, retrospectively and prospectively. When you do what you do, you invent stories that are highly rationalised. (2001: 78)

For McGregor, this rationalist framing of environmental concern is deeply problematic: “while it gives the movement a unified front it also engages with sometimes better- resourced stakeholders on a common linguistic ground that can be constructed in ways that are very sympathetic to economic development over environmental values... the vibrant actions and individualism that epitomised, empowered and radicalised the early direct action-type activities of the Australian environmental movement may be ostracised and lost within the current imaginary” (McGregor, 2004: 604). This rationality can undermine the varied motivations individuals might have to participates in the movement. It is also worth briefly noting that Routledge & Simons (1995), Drobbin (2001) and McGregor (2004) all marginalise the role of news media in the (re)production of these discourses and the transformation passions and values into rationality, instead focusing on the perspective of an individual.

These insights by both Drobbin and McGregor can be viewed as largely consistent with and complementary to Tranter & Western’s (2009: 163-164) work, which concluded that value changes could also be the product of ‘routinisation’ and the ‘institutionalisation of environmentalism.’ Routinisation as advanced by Pakulski, Tranter & Crook (1998) draws upon the Weberian concept, arguing that as issues of concern move from being new and special to being expected and familiar:

"Environmental issues become everyday issues, publicised by media in widely recognised formats. They become integrated into the political system through specialised and bureaucratised pressure groups, as well as programs and electoral platforms of the major political parties. These processes are accompanied by a diversification and elaboration of environmental concerns into popular world views and ideological packages. (Pakulski, Tranter and Crook 1998, 236–7)

The ‘institutionalisation of environmentalism’ is similarly related to the creation of an environmental rationality as it reflects the status of the environmental movement in producing and disseminating environmental knowledge: according to Rootes (2003: 4) “the environmental
movement’s virtual monopoly on ‘ecological discourse’ is lost” – their influence appropriated, along with their issues, by other political actors.

Routinisation and institutionalisation within the environment movement are important phenomena in that they affect environmental discourse and legitimise particular values and beliefs, but both consequentially and independently impact on all aspects of environmentalism, the environmental movement and environmental movement leaders, as well as how they are perceived by the media and the public; subsequently these issues will be explored and discussed at length throughout this thesis. What is important about this routinisation process with regard to environmental concern is that it simultaneously reduces the salience of the issue for the media and the general public as it becomes routine, and that it represents the social processes by which ‘environmental discourse’ is colonised or co-opted by dominant, or hegemonic, discourses and values (Esteva, 1992).

Saul (1992: 338) argues that much of this co-option had already taken place in the early 1990s. He writes that the modern environmental movement is both valuable and empty – that the “victories being won for environmentalism are taking place almost exclusively in the political arena,” as distinct from genuine social or economic change, and that the acceptance and appropriation of environmental rhetoric by business and bureaucrats is not a victory but a loss: “Deprived of their exclusive vocabulary, environmentally oriented political parties such as the Greens [had] already begun to founder on the complexity of modern politics.” This suggests that routinisation/institutionalisation is not a neutral process – Saul sees it as the result of the systematic failure of a hyper-rational polity, which is increasingly corporatised, secretive and distrusting of the public.

Power is the other key aspect of environmental discourse and environmental concern: the discursive moment is, according to Foucault, indistinguishable from the exercise of power itself (Harvey, 1996: 83). In both Foucault and Harvey’s schema, power is not homogenous or directed; instead it is ‘internally heterogeneous’ and complex, operating on and through particular kinds of social relations including political, economic and symbolic relations (Harvey, 1996: 78). Here Harvey is particularly instructive:
...[Foucault’s] more general argument seems to be that ‘power’ operates through discursively informed and institutionally based social practices that are primarily organised as disciplinary powers exerted on the body. Discourses form through these relations between power, social practices, and institutions, internalising their forms and powers from these other moments in the social process... The function of discourse is to create ‘truths’ that are in fact "effects of truth" within the discourse rather than the universal truths they claim to be. Such ‘effects of truth’ become particularly pernicious, in Foucault’s view, because they emanate from institutions... which operate as incarnations of power. (Harvey, 1996: 95)

What then are the critical institutional forces impacting on the creation of environmental concern? The environmental movement, particularly the elements of it in Australia which have entered the mainstream (become routinised) in terms of public advocacy, policy and lobbying, and even the polity, can largely be viewed as part of the institutional 'landscape,' and environmental leaders operate as part of this Green 'institution'. Similarly, institutions aligned with anthropocentric development and capital are critical as they not only contest environmental discourse but also contribute to hegemonic discourses about what is normative or legitimate within society. But there is a third important institution which has largely been excluded from sociological literature about the environmental movement and social movements generally -- the media (although see Gamson, 2004; Miller, 2015). This is not to say that there is no academic scholarship around social movement interaction with the media, but that sociological work has largely neglected the political impact of media in a holistic sense (Miller, 2015).

Gitlin (1980), in his seminal examination of the Students for a Democratic Society movement in the US, demonstrates the important but complex relationship between the news media and social movements, giving them a public platform from which to explain and propagate their agenda, but also contesting and reframing their actions and agendas in ways which conformed with hegemonic discourse and undermined their efforts for social change. In particular Gitlin suggests that the media have a strong role in selecting and promoting leaders who have, or take on, qualities which make them 'newsworthy' – qualities which are not always in harmony with movement principles or agendas.
The importance of the media in the selection of movement leaders would be enough to make them an institutional factor in their own right, but the media also provide the dominant form of mass communication for much of western society\(^3\), a role which makes them particularly central to the formation of environmental concern. Pakulski, Tranter & Crook (1998) and Pakulski & Tranter (2004) provide some key insight here: they found that public environmental concern was largely circumscribed to green 'post-materialists' -- those members of society likely to identify with the environmental movement in terms of values -- until the early 1990s, when media coverage of environmental issues, increasing both in number and sensational tone, saw public concern over environmental issues rise sharply, at a time when traditional 'radical' environmental protest was on the wane. This suggests a much more powerful influence of mass media on environmental discourse and concern than might have been otherwise be attributed by social and political theorists, and highlights the importance of considering the media as a key institution in the contestation of discourse.

### Conceptualising Environmental Concern

Environmental concern in Australia is complex and ever-changing. It includes a spectrum of ‘green’ issues and ideological positions – ranging from ‘light green’ managerial stances through to ‘dark green’ positions which view ‘nature’ as intrinsically valuable or sacred\(^4\). Environmental concern also incorporates a group of ‘brown’ environmental issues which are more aligned with the consequences of industrial society and the externalisation of environmental ‘costs,’ including but not limited to pollution, waste, and land use (Pakulski & Crook, 1998).

Environmental concern is also subject to the political economy on local, regional, national and global levels; in an Australian context this means that ‘environmental concern’ is arguably a ‘luxury good.’ There is some basis to this claim:

\(^3\) While mass media has historically had a monopoly on mass communication in Western Societies, social media is increasingly being used as a tool to circumvent the discourses and framings deployed by the institutions which comprise the mass media. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3, but it is worth considering, for example, U.S. President Trump’s use of Twitter.

\(^4\) For an example of ‘dark green’ ideology, see Taylor (2010: 10). McGregor’s (2004) work suggests similar positions are held by some portion of the environmental ‘community’ in Australia.
• Boyce (2004: 106) argues that the ‘double movement’ that followed the rise of capitalism (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 132) and sought to protect both people and nature from the ‘satanic mill’ of the market includes modern ‘environmental protections.’ Key to Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) analysis is that the ‘double movement’ is not linear or inevitable; it is the result of the deliberate application of political will towards a particular end and as a result will increase or decrease the level of protection against the market over time and space.

• Inglehart’s (1977) value change thesis suggests that while economic conditions during the early years of socialisation affect an individual’s tendencies towards materialist or post-materialist values, there is also room for changes to these tendencies (albeit limited) in response to changing social and economic conditions.

• McGregor’s (2004) analysis of ‘environmental imaginaries’ suggests the increasing dominance of an ideological position that Harvey (1996) refers to as ‘wise use,’ a series of managerial stances which largely impose market-based values upon nature. These positions implicitly place society above nature in terms of importance, leaving them open to market interventions for the sake of social gains.

These features (social flexibility, individual flexibility, and managerial approaches to nature, respectively) create conditions by which the public understand that nature can be exploited for the sake of society or, at the very least, capital. Indeed it is telling that Pakulski, Tranter & Crook’s (1998: 240) findings show that environmental concern falls as concern about unemployment (a good signifier of people’s concern for the broader economy) rises.

Additionally, environmental concern influences and is influenced by the media in what may be mutually reinforcing cycles. Pakulski et al (1998) find that media coverage of environmental issues correlates with environmental concern, but the causality is poorly understood. It seems that changing levels of public concern impacts media coverage, and this media coverage acts to further reinforce these views, but the precise dynamics of this feedback remain unknown.

The final piece of the puzzle around environmental concern is the environmental movement, and in particular environmental movement leaders. Their influence is felt in two ways: first, by directly influencing the public through organising, protesting and generally building relationships between movement members and the general public; secondly, by interacting with the media to increase
public awareness of environmental issues. These activities can and often do overlap, but the kinds of work required by each activity, and the impact they have on the public, vary greatly.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have broadly reviewed the literature on social movements and some of the foundations of environmentalism as a distinct social movement. In addition I have discussed briefly the relationship between environmental concern and the environmental movement, exploring how environmentalism has particular dynamics which drive movement participants.

Contemporary movement scholarship is voluminous, but also fairly limited in some aspects. It has principally focused on concerns associated with the political left, in part as a project to discover a movement with the potential to bring about revolutionary conditions where the labour movement had failed, but in part because scholars have been politically aligned with the causes of these movements. As a result movement literature has largely neglected that social movements can emerge from ‘above’ as well as ‘below’ and that movements aren’t just a left-wing or progressive phenomenon but can also emerge from right-wing or conservative culture. Scholarly literature has also placed a large focus on the ‘mass’ of movements and grassroots participation, as well as protest activity, in part to correct early movement scholarship which viewed this as irrational and deviant, but in doing so they have also ignored the role of other social and institutional factors such as the media.

As such there are critical aspects of movement dynamics that are relatively silenced; as has been suggested earlier in this chapter, leadership, along with the media, have been dynamics which have received less scholarly attention. The next chapter explores the literature around movement leadership in more detail and engage more specifically with literature around leadership in the environmental movement to assess the extent of one of these silences.
Chapter Two: Leading the movement

Introduction

In the previous chapter I discussed the existing literature around social movements and highlighted a key silence in this literature around social movement leadership. In this chapter the literature around leadership, and particularly around social movement leadership will be examined more closely to ascertain the extent of this silence.

In doing so, I will show how mainstream discussions and attitudes towards leadership have shaped how leadership is understood from both a scholarly perspective and within social movements, and how this has created resistance to the notion of leadership in many contemporary social movements and a hesitance amongst scholars to examine the contributions of leaders to social movements. As part of this, I examine ‘elite theory’ and critically engage with mainstream understandings of leadership.

This chapter will also extensively review what literature exists around social movement leadership and assess where opportunities for further research might exist.

Mainstream leadership theory

Leadership is an umbrella term that conveys a variety of meanings. Lack of precision is an issue with this concept, and as such it is worth clarifying what ‘leadership’ means both in the popular imagination and in social research. Some of the meanings around leadership are pre-modern, dating back to ages of heroes and kings, and embedded in mythos about the qualities and historical importance of particular figures as ‘leaders’. Others are more recent, and stem from similar myths and ideas about leadership from the political and entrepreneurial elite in neoliberal, late-capitalist society, ideas of heroic genius and self-made men, capitalists who forged a path through their insight and determination. Leadership is largely overlooked in sociology and dominated by elite theory in political science. Most of the theoretical work has a social psychological focus, but has been historically dominated by highly salient forms of leadership – elite politics and business executives, along with ‘management’. Management scholars tend to understand leadership in
terms of efficiency gains and a broader ‘rational-legal’ framework. Social movement leaders have received little if any attention.

This is important because in the same way that modern executive self-help books\(^5\) explicitly promote particular discourses about leadership, academic studies of leadership have promoted, normalised and reified very specific conceptions about what leadership involves, and who is (and who is not) a leader. These salient leadership discourses are arguably critical in understanding the variety of stances modern social movements have taken around the idea of leadership both discursively and politically. Additionally, an extensive survey is required because leadership studies across disciplinary lines have failed to articulate “a coherent paradigm shifting model of approach that both practitioners and scholars can accept and work with” (Jones, 2005: 259).

In sociology, Max Weber’s work has often been claimed as the earliest examinations of leadership. Weber’s early work around ‘charismatic’ leadership focused on the way in which new movements, both social and religious, derive their life and cohesion from a powerful leader (Giddens & Sutton, 2009: 690). According to Giddens & Sutton (2009: 690), these charismatic leaders allow movements to remain fluid; “they do not have an established authority system. However after the death or removal of a charismatic founding leader, the movement is faced with the ‘routinisation of charisma’: the need to create formalised rules and procedures, establishing an authority system along with symbols and rituals in order to survive. This Weberian conception of leadership is compelling from a naturalistic viewpoint, but offers only simplistic views of both movements and leadership.

This is in part because Weber conflates leadership with authority (Giddens & Sutton, 2009: 990), with the ‘charismatic’ being one of his three ‘ideal types’ of authority. For Weber, these ideal types included ‘traditional authority’, the “power legitimised through respect for long-established cultural patterns (\textit{ibid}); ‘charismatic’ in which subordinates are drawn to the ‘exceptional qualities’ of leaders which inspire devotion; and ‘rational-legal’, a power “legitimated through legally enacted

\(^{5}\) For an idea of how extensive and dominant these discourses are, a search of Amazon.com for “leadership” reveals over 180,000 books on leadership under categories such as “business management and leadership”, “motivational management and leadership”, and “success self help.” For specific examples of the kind of leadership discourses I write of, see Maxwell (2013), Stanzma (2014) and Hunter (1998).
rules and regulations” (ibid). Ostensibly, Weber saw these types of authority as means of power in opposition to coercion or brute force. His conception of democracy and politics was shaped by the central role of leaders and political elites; he saw the idea of ‘democratisation’ as misleading “since the demos could never rule, only be ruled” (Beetham, 1974: 106). What was special about the democratisation Weber witnessed was the change in the matter in which leaders and elites were selected, “the qualities required of it, [and] the chance for a different type of person to reach the top” (ibid). These changes led to the emergence of new types of elites, from party officials to journalists, who grow up to fulfil the particular requirements of political parties – “skills of organisation and propaganda, qualities of mass leadership, [and] the ability to contribute finance to the party machine” (ibid). Both Beetham and Pakulski & Körösényi (2012) note that Weber was principally a ‘realist’ in terms of his sociological and political analysis, favouring explanations of empirical events which led him against the ‘classical’ view of democracy, where power flows ‘bottom-up’ and leaders simply reflect the attitudes and desires of the demos.

The other possible contributing factor to Weber’s fairly spartan descriptions of leadership is simply that his socio-political analysis was not particularly interested in leaders but in the broad social changes occurring throughout Germany. By way of example, Whimster’s (2001) extensive survey of Weber’s work and its subsequent interpretation by scholars does not mention leadership at all, and only mentioned twice in the extensive sociological primers by both Giddens & Sutton (2009) and Poggi (2005).

This is not to say that Weber’s work is without nuance. For example he notes that ‘charismatics’ experience an inevitable decline, recognising that charismatic dominance, particularly in democratic politics, “is fickle and difficult to sustain” (Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012: 4). Pakulski and Körösényi (2012: 4) note that Schumpeter attributed this to “the nature of entrepreneurial innovation – it soon ‘self-exhausts’ by becoming a standard expectation and ‘routine’” – that is, it becomes routinised. Weber also recognised the dangers of ‘rational-legal’ authority as a means of conducting human affairs, arguing it suppresses alternatives and removes meaning and significance from the human experience (Poggi, 2005: 76).

Weber’s account of leadership also focused on the tension between charismatic leadership and the “routine, legalised and orderly bureaucracy” (Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012: 17). For Weber,
bureaucratic domination is the source of social and political stability, while charisma is a dynamic force in the same vein as Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ (ibid). Social movements, viewed through Weber’s particular lenses of realist power and democratic bureaucracy, might then be seen as ‘entrepreneurial politics’ (Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012: 17) – the formation of new and creative ways to approach political issues in society. In the same way that entrepreneurial economic activity emphasises the creative power of individuals freed from the broad bureaucratic constraints of corporate economic activity as per Schumpeter (Rienert & Rienert, 2006), ‘entrepreneurial politics’ emphasises the creation of new political ideals and parties through the work of individuals freed from the broad constraints of political parties and bureaucracy.

However, leadership in Weberian theory is essentially focused on the social and political elite as leaders and is leader-centric in its approach; Poggi (2005: 76) argues that Weber overemphasises the role of leaders and suggests that all true leaders are charismatic in some sense. He also limits the role of democracy to a mere selection of elites rather than true representation.

This elite-centred approach has been widely championed in sociological writing around politics and culture. The origins of elite theory as a specific area of study derive largely from the works of Mosca, Parety and Michels (Field & Higely, 1980). These early approaches varied, but Pareto suggests that while ideally elites would be selected on talent and merit, in reality elites were those who mastered the use of force and persuasion, and who enjoyed social advantages such as wealth or connections. Michels took a more bureaucratic approach, seeing leaders as necessary for large organisations to operate efficiently, and the various resources they accrue through their roles allow them to concentrate power. Importantly, these early theorists all argue that the elimination of elites from society was impossible (Field & Higley, 1980).

Other influential work includes that of C. Wright Mills (1956), who proposes the idea of ‘mass society’ and suggests that those outside the ‘power elite’ are increasingly institutionalised, pacified and controlled against action – particularly action against ‘the prevailing system of authority’ and unable to respond to media messaging. Mills argued that the power of the individual had waned and voluntary associations and mass parties had taken their place as the major units of organised power. Mills accentuated that this made leaders more important, more elite and distant from their subordinates. He writes: “as soon as a man becomes leader of an association large enough to count
he readily becomes lost as an instrument of that organisation... he comes to see himself not as a mere delegate... but as a member of ‘an elite’ composed of such men as himself. ...This leads to [a] big gap between the terms in which issues are debated and resolved among members of the elite, and the terms in which they are presented to the members of... mass associations” (Mills, 1956: 307-8). Mills’ analysis of American mass society can be generally read as supportive of Weber’s hypothesis that leaders-as-elites are critical to social and political change, but as Mills repeatedly states throughout The Power Elite, there are competing ideas about what the ‘power elite’ mean for society and how one might respond to his work; it is not simply a confirmation of Weberian ideas of leadership.

Two schools of thought have developed from this scholarship, a divide between those who advocate a ‘plural society’ and those who subscribe to a view of society run by a power elite (Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012). Prewitt & Stone (1973: 7-10) suggest the power elite have traditionally been viewed as the product of the ‘social contract’ inherent in the State: elites both exploit and serve society, using their powers to both gain tribute and deference, and ensure the general welfare of the public; alternatively the pluralist perspective highlights the ‘diffuse’ nature of power and decision making and suggests that decisions are “reached through bargaining” (Prewitt & Stone, 1973: 114).

Pakulski & Körösényi (2012) find the ‘power elite’ or traditional Weberian model of leadership to be a more convincing depiction of democracy; they draw from the work of Weber and Schumpeter to highlight the charismatic and innovative potential of leaders. They also broadly concur with suggestions by social-psychology literature around the idea that effective leadership requires certain ‘elite qualities’, which they see as achieved through ‘internships’ as advisors, assistants or lawyers within the political machinery as per Weber’s thesis (Beetham, 1974)(see also, Pakulski & Tranter, 2015).

An alternative reading of Mills’ work on the power elite as leaders is offered by Gemmill & Oakley (1992) who suggest that elite-centred approaches to leadership comprise a social myth which reifies leaders and the power elite as natural and inevitable. They critically examine ‘charisma’ as a leadership concept, arguing that it is impossible to quantify or otherwise meaningfully define ‘charisma’ in the person it is attributed to in a way that is “entirely independent from the
perceptual distortions of those attributing the ‘charisma’” (Gemmill & Oakley, 1992). They suggest instead that ‘charismatic leader’ is a label stemming from the emotional interaction between such individuals and their followers which allows the ‘followers’ “to escape responsibility for their own actions and inactions... of taking initiative, seeking autonomy, taking risks, or expressing their own fears and feelings of aggression and destructiveness” citing Mills’ (1956) “cheerful robot” along with Fromm’s (1969) “authoritarian personality” as archetypes of such ‘followers.’ Additionally, they cite Smircich & Morgan (1982: 257) whose critical analysis of leadership suggests that “leadership is realised in the process whereby one or more individuals succeeds in attempting to frame and define the reality of others.” Ultimately for Gemmill & Oakley, leadership is a negative and anti-humanist force which arbitrarily raises up individuals at the expense of the masses.

For most of the part Weberian ‘elite theory’ focuses on organisational based power rather than the features of leaders in an individual level. However generally Mills suggested that “to understand leadership, attention must be paid to (1) the traits and motives of the leader as a [person], (2) images that selected publics hold of [them] and their motives for following [them], (3) the features of the role that [they] play as a leader, and (4) the institutional context in which [they] and [their] followers may be involved” (Gerth & Mills in Stogdill, 1974: 19). But Weber and Mills are if not the only then certainly the dominant scholars of leadership in sociology.

Beyond sociology, social psychology offers a number of theoretical conceptions of leadership, all of which take particular stances on social and power relations between leaders and groups, as well as the internal motivations and desires of leaders. Writing from a psychological perspective, Stogdill’s (1974) Handook of Leadership conducts a review of literature around definitions of leadership which included leadership as a focus of group processes, leadership as personality, leadership as inducing compliance, leadership as the exercise of influence, leadership as act or behaviour, leadership as persuasion, leadership as power relation, leadership as instrument of goal achievement, leadership as an interaction effect, leadership as a differentiated role and leadership as the initiation of structure (Stogdill, 1974: 7-15). His analysis also covered theories of leadership, which included leaders as ‘great men’ along social Darwinist lines; leaders as the product of time, place and circumstance, or ‘environmental’ factors which allow leaders to emerge; leaders as the product of the interaction of personal and situational along the lines of Gerth & Mills analysis of leadership; leaders as the result of group interaction-expectation dynamics; leaders as champions
of humanist freedom, empowering individuals to fulfil their needs and contribute to organisational
goals; and leaders as the result of social exchange relations.

From this broad collection of definitions and theories ‘transactional’ and ‘transformational’
leadership emerged as the the most widely used in leadership literature in the social psychology
discipline. Burns (1978: 4) describes these kinds of leaders as distinct from “mere power-holding
and as the opposite of brute power”, with ‘transactional’ leadership being the most common,
where leaders offer followers an exchange, be it “jobs for votes, or subsidies for campaign
contributions” and such transactions comprise “the bulk of relationships amongst leaders and
followers, particularly in groups, legislatures and parties.” Transformational leadership is more
complex but also more potent; “the transforming leader recognises and exploits an existing need or
demand of a potential follower. But, beyond that, the transforming leader looks for potential
motives in followers, seeks to satisfy higher needs, and engages the full person or follower. The
result... is a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders
and may convert leaders into moral agents” Burns (1978: 4). By ‘moral agents’, Burns suggests a
kind of leadership that “emerges from, and always returns to, the fundamental wants and needs,
aspirations, and values of the followers” (ibid). However it isn’t clear that these fundamental
qualities are able to be ascertained unless the ‘followers’ are treated as a homogenous group.

Burns (1978) also notes the problems with naturalised conceptions of leadership, citing examples
where the leader as an individual didn’t behave in ways consistent with the status and power of the
role they filled. He also views ‘transformative’ leadership as both more common and uncommon
than people anticipate – common because such leadership is everyday and not limited to the
power elite; uncommon because most of what is heralded as leadership, “acts of oratory,
manipulation, sheer self-advancement, brute coercion – are not such” (Burns, 1978: 427).

Leadership can also be linked to the use of power (Stogdill, 1974; Burns, 1978; Gemmill & Oakley,
1992), with specific kinds of power and their application affecting claims to leadership and its
practice in different ways. French & Raven (1968) produced a well known study of power which
provided an analytical framework for understanding how differing kinds of power were utilised by
leaders, identifying several common bases of power. These bases are: reward power, the ability of
a leader to reward his followers; coercive power, the ability of a leader to enforce negative
consequences for noncompliant behaviour; referent power, the capacity and desire of followers to identify with their leader, which links closely to the kinds of power wielded by Weber’s ‘charismatic,’ expert power, where the real or apparent expertise of a leader within a particular field of knowledge allows them to influence followers; distinct from this is informational power, the ability of leaders to wield information to persuade others via ‘rational’ arguments, using, creating, falsifying or withholding information towards particular ends (French & Raven, 1968: 262-268). Finally there is legitimate power, which is the power of social and cultural norms and values that distinguish the ‘right’ to lead. Drawing on Weber, French & Raven (1968: 264-65) suggest age, gender, intelligence, caste and physical characteristics are all bases for ‘legitimate power,’ but such authority is dependent on acceptance of the social structures from which these norms and values are derived. Often within democratic society ‘legitimate power’ is a function of particular offices and stations, not the people who hold such offices, although it can also involve the ‘perceived right’ of a particular individual to hold an office.

These bases of power are not discrete, nor are they absolute; individual leaders can maintain several distinct power bases, and as societies and organisations change over time particular bases of power emerge and disappear, become more or less salient, act as strengths or liabilities, even within the same individuals. This is particularly true as organisations become more bureaucratic.

Another key perspective on power is that of Lukes (2005) who theorises on ‘three dimensions of power’. Lukes works to develop a theory of power as an analytical framework to assist in critique, highlighting three key dimensions which can be broadly characterised as decision-making, non-decision-making, and ideological. Each of these dimensions, according to Lukes, need to be considered to appropriately analyse the use of power, with other approaches limiting their focus to simply decision-making (the power to make decisions in the formal political arena) or decision-making and non-decision-making (the informal processes surrounding decision making, that translate into power to set the agenda and determine what is and is not legitimate). Lukes includes with these dimensions a third, which is ideological or ‘preference shaping,’ which is the power to shape “their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things... because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial” (Lukes, 2005).
This suggests that leaders should be understood both in terms of their positions in organisations and groups (decision-making power) and their ability to set the agenda for those organisations or groups, but also their ability to act ideologically to shape preferences, or perhaps simply the ideological landscape in which they operate. Movement leaders, for example, may be much more likely to contest ideological power rather than benefit from it when interacting with other organisations or in politics, but they may benefit from elements of ideological power within their organisations, particularly, as Dowding (2006) notes, when collective action problems arise.

Anthropologist Andrew M. Jones (2005: 264) sees leaders as a “mediating, translating, representational and technical function and capacity, wherein organisational leaders possess legitimacy in both the local cultural order and the global world...” What Jones is suggesting here is that leaders are not just leaders of organisations but leaders of culture “…the symbolic schema, both linguistic and non-linguistic, through which humans apprehend, act in, and interpret their experience in the world” (Jones, 2005: 262). In his study of corporate leadership in the American South, Jones finds that leadership can be seen as the product of a localised response to broader socio-cultural changes and the need for local groups to find identity in an increasingly homogenised global landscape. Leadership is also seen as being shaped by high levels of social capital.

March & Weil (2005) offer up yet another set of approaches to leadership which seek not to glorify leadership but to appreciate it. They recognise that such appreciation rests on particular conceptions of the role of individual human beings, the bases for justifying governance and differentiation, the bases for action in life and particularly organisations, and of oneself and the proper response as an individual to the nature of things (March & Weil, 2005: 8-10). A philosophical reflection of leadership through the lens of Western literature, their work highlights both the importance and fragility of leaders. It is worth briefly outlining some of these reflections, but with the note that March & Weil work largely within the discourse of leaders as part of the power elite.

First, the tension between ‘private life’ and ‘public duties’: March & Weil (2005: 14-15) suggest that for leaders the normally schizophrenic Weberian divide between the two spheres of life is at least partially closed, entwining their public and private lives and making their sense of themselves dependent on their public fates. The public, or followers of a leader, also make demands on a
leader to reveal their private lives and place pressure on leaders. These issues are similar to those reflected in sociological literature around celebrity, for example Rojeck (2001: 10-11) who writes that celebrity – defined crudely as impact on public consciousness – implies a split between the private and public self which often becomes disturbing; “so much so, that celebrities frequently complain of identity confusion and the colonisation of the veridical (private) self by the public face. Additionally March & Weil (2005: 15) suggest these tensions between the public and private self create problems which pervert opportunities for effective leadership. Leaders shouldn’t be conflated celebrities, but as Gitlin (1980) notes, they often are due to the similar roles they can play as public figures.

Second, March & Weil (2005: 30-32) question the idea of leaders as geniuses and creatives heroically creating change in line with the Weberian ‘charismatic’ or the Nietzschean ‘ubermensch.’ They suggest that this view of leadership suffers from selection bias: the view only accounts for leaders with deviant ideas which happen to be good, it does not account for the failed leaders with deviant ideas that happened to be bad. More importantly, “most original [or deviant] ideas are bad ones. Those that are good, moreover, are only seen as such after a long learning period; they rarely are impressive when first tried out” (March & Weil, 2005: 30-32) As such leadership theory has naturalised the successful leaders as geniuses; would-be-leaders who fail in their organisation or operation are heretics or mad.

Third, they broadly critique ideological conceptions of leadership on the grounds that leaders are expected to be able to make meaningful decisions by removing complexities and inconsistencies through planning, and that such ideology emphasises reason over foolishness, strategy and vision over serendipity and improvisation, thinking over imitation, and ultimately the intentionality of action (March & Weil, 2005: 3-4, 41-43). They argue that this ideological position is at odds with the reality of a world in which causality is obscure, effectiveness is problematic and even leaders ability to understand their own power is ambiguous, more “a story-telling myth than a reality” (ibid: 4) but still symbolically important and difficult to manage.

Ultimately March & Weil (2005: 97) conclude that “it is not at all clear that leadership requires any remarkable talents, or that major differences in the success of organisations reflect differences in the capabilities of their leaders, or that history is the product of leaders actions” but they also
suggest that leadership remains important to the functioning of society. Leadership is not grand or heroic, and not for the most part even very interesting; it is about competence, initiative, identification and unobtrusive coordination (ibid: 116). As organisations (and movements) become more complex and bureaucratic, leaders become less distinguishable and thus less indispensable, even at high levels of management (ibid: 118).

In arguing that leadership has become a culturally fetishised act, March & Weil (2005: 97, 113-121) find common ground with political theorists who see leadership as increasingly irrelevant to political process because they argue Western society is moving towards deliberative democracy (see for example Dryzek, 2000) and those who see Weberian leadership as holding humanity back from its potential (see for example Gemmill & Oakley, 1992). In bureaucratic organisations heroic or indispensable leaders are symptoms of an ineffective organisation (March & Weil, 2005: 118); organisational achievement is arguably a function of ordinary competence, individual and sub-unit autonomy, operational redundancy and mutual trust; a point also echoed by Jackson & Parry (2008: 96).

Edelman (1970) argues that this knowledge fundamentally undermines Weberian leadership. He undertakes a dialectic examination of bureaucratic and charismatic leadership as conceptualised by Weber; seeing the former as operating around rational routines to determine decisions while the latter is the “dramatic smashing of routine to demonstrate the genius of the leader” (ibid: 77). He suggests that modern leadership no longer conforms to this dichotomy as a result of modernity: instead a sense of alienation, anomie and despair at having to negotiate ones course through a complex and harsh world, a world which can neither be understood or influenced, has led people to seek reassurance in the potent form of those with power who are willing to act (ibid: 76). Subsequently Edelman is sceptical of the worthiness of leaders, particularly political leaders; he suggests that leaders no longer have to be successful or correct, they merely have to do something. Leaders are judged by their goals and aspirations rather than their actual effectiveness or success.

But even ‘leaderless’ organisations become rigid and authoritarian over time. Barker (1993) draws upon Weber’s idea of the bureaucratic ‘iron cage’ – the irresistible force of bureaucratic rationality: “the same rational activities that enable collective organisational interaction eventually come to constrain that activity in ways often difficult for us to perceive, much less comprehend, the
consequences and ramifications” (ibid: 411). Weber had traditionally viewed leadership as central to the imposition of bureaucratic control; particularly as organisations and movements become ‘expected and familiar’ as opposed to what previously had been ‘new and special’ and move from charismatic to bureaucratic leadership (Pakulski, Tranter & Crook, 1998). What Barker finds in his ethnographic research around self-managing or ‘leaderless’ teams is that the bureaucratic ‘iron cage’ becomes much tighter and more rigid than in organisations with leaders; team members felt more invested in the organisation and responsible for its outcomes, which, somewhat counter-intuitively, constrained their ability to respond to individual needs and concerns. He suggests that these kinds of ‘concertive control’ place more stress on individual team members and can lead to higher levels of burnout (Barker, 1993: 432). This suggests that leaderless-ness can be equally problematic in terms of bureaucratic ‘domination’ but also that the particular organisational configurations can also shape the kinds of leadership and expressions of power that occur.

Traditional or mainstream leadership theories and discourses tend to focus primarily on visible or salient forms of leadership, particularly political and cultural elites and those who reach the top of their industries in business. Leaders are usually cast as exceptional to some degree, which is viewed as either positive and natural or negative and alienating, but as a premise rarely questioned. As will be discussed, this dominance of leaders as elites has profoundly shaped contemporary social movements which share broad direct democratic ideals and encouraged them to outright reject leadership both rhetorically and theoretically. However mainstream scholarship around leaders is nuanced and relatively sophisticated. While definitions of leadership are diverse to the point of being diffuse, they increasingly recognise that leaders and the power they hold are the product of complex group and socio-cultural relationships between ‘followers’ and ‘leaders,’ often subject to the visibility of leaders and their ability to communicate effectively, and that leaders play an a much bigger role than other individuals in an organisation or group in terms of affecting the consciousness of the public. These factors suggest examining leaders is critical to understanding social change.

Movement leadership

At the beginning of their chapter on social movement leadership, Morris & Staggenborg (2004: 171) noted that “leadership in social movements has yet to be adequately theorised,” citing works with
similar arguments which covered the prior twenty years. This deficit was despite the fact that leaders “are critical to social movements: they inspire commitment, mobilise resources, create and recognise opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands and influence outcomes” (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004: 171).

Over a decade later, little has changed. Similar statements have appeared at the beginning of many subsequent sociological works on social movement leadership, highlighting the ongoing deficit in social movement leadership study (for example, see Reger, 2007: 1303; Taylor, 2007: 311; West, 2008: 133; and Tranter, 2009: 708). Progress has remained piecemeal.

This is not to say that there is a critical absence of literature on social movement leadership. Indeed existing surveys of the literature around social movement leadership reveal a small but influential group of voices arguing for the centrality of leadership in social movement theory. Aminzade, Goldstone & Perry (2001), Barker, Johnson & Lavalette (2001) and Morris & Staggenborg (2004) all provide extensive surveys on the state of social movement leadership. Additional investigation during the preparation of this thesis failed to find much of value prior to these publications which wasn’t included in one, if not all three, of these works.

As such, this review will briefly summarise the findings, similarities and differences of these three critical works, highlighting the critical silences that each identify in the literature, and attempting to synthesise an approach to social movement leadership that is theoretically consistent with Saundér’s ‘synthetic approach’ discussed in chapter two. It will also incorporate a brief overview of the additional contributions to social movement leadership subsequent to the three major reviews.

Each of the critical surveys – Aminzade, Goldstone & Perry (2001), Barker, Johnson & Lavalette (2001) and Morris & Staggenborg (2004) – is written for a distinct purpose. While they often draw upon similar sources and discuss similar ideas, the perspectives with which they approach social movement leadership highlight different aspects of the theoretical terrain they survey.

Morris & Staggenborg (2004), contributing to a volume on social movements generally, write with a specific focus on leaders: where they come from, how they emerge, and what they contribute. Positing that the gap in the literature around leadership stems from a failure to properly integrate
structure and agency, Morris & Staggenborg use the individual leader as the means of exploring theory, using case studies of specific historical leaders to highlight a variety of aspects to leadership.

In contrast, Barker, Johnson & Lavalette (2001) focus on leadership as a behaviour or capacity, examining the dynamics of leadership as a dialogical relationship within a particular movement. Rather than offering a specific diagnosis for the lack of leadership research they highlight a variety of possibilities, some reactions to historic positions in the academy, some due to an ideological minimisation of leadership, and some due to theoretical limitations. However, they suggest that leadership is a necessary function for movement coherence and indicate a variety of possibilities for movement leadership as an introduction to a collection of case-studies into movement leadership.

Finally Aminzade, Goldstone & Perry (2001) survey leadership as part of a volume on contentious politics. In particular they focus on the variation of leadership dynamics, which they define as “the relationships among... leaders, or between leaders and followers” and how this impacts the direction and outcomes of ‘contentious politics.’ While there are similarities in Aminzade et al’s approach to both Morris & Staggenborg (2004) and Barker et al (2001), their framework of contentious politics – per Tilly (2008) – presents a different theoretical characterisation of leadership than social movement theories because it focuses on ‘contention’ or social disruption as a unifying concept for a variety of different social behaviours.

The result is that Aminzade et al (2001) conflate the leadership of social movements with revolutionary leaders in ways that highlight the similarities between the two groups in terms of organisational dynamics, but erases differences in power relations between both kinds of organisation and between their opposition groups. Their approach also disguises differences in the relationships towards the dominant social order, creating a false equivalence between movements and revolutionary groups wherein both theory and practice they hold fundamentally opposed ideas to (for example) the state. This does not mean that their analysis is unhelpful, merely that it erases some of the peculiarities of leading a ‘social movement’ as it is popularly understood; for example Aminzade et al (2001) tends to focus on movement-state dynamics rather than movement-public
dynamics, the latter being an important space for movement engagement which should not be overlooked.

However there are also some key common aspects of social movement leadership that appear across these reviews. In particular they all agree that leadership is particularly critical in the context of social movements, perhaps more so than in politics and business, where routine practices and bureaucratic structures make leaders effectively ‘interchangeable’ (March & Weil, 2005). Morris & Staggenborg (2004) and Barker et al (2001) both cite Zald & Ash (1966) in this regard, who write: “Leadership phenomena are an even more crucial aspect of the study of a [movement organisation] than of other large scale organisations. Because the situation of the [movement organisation] is unstable, because the organisation has few material incentives under its control, and because of the non-routinised nature of its tasks, the success or failure of the [movement organisation] can be highly dependent on the qualities and commitments of the leadership cadre and the tactics they use.” (Zald & Ash in Barker et al, 2001: 2).

They are also clear that leadership does not simply comprise of those who act as the face of the movement; figures like Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr. or Dr. Bob Brown, which Pakulski (1990: 76-77) refers to as ‘exemplary figures’. Nor is leadership limited to formal roles or a few ‘leading figures’ who hold influence or authority within a movement. Instead leadership forms an array of practices and strategies performed by individuals throughout the movement and within specific movement organisations at grassroots level, as well as from the more ‘centralised’ command of the exemplary figures and their ‘retinue’ of leading figures and experts. Of particular importance in this regard is the work of Robnett (1997) and Herda-Rapp (1998), who develop ‘bridge leadership’ as a theoretical concept to describe the behaviour of informal leaders who engage in ‘micromobilisation’ and link the community to movement organisations and movement leadership in a “one-on-one interactive style” (Herda-Rapp, 1998: 344). Aminzade et al (2004), Barker et al (2001) and Morris & Staggenborg (2004) all highlight the importance of Robnett’s (1997) contributions around informal leaders.

Bridge leadership is less authoritative or bureaucratically controlled than formal leadership styles, with bridge leaders acting autonomously; it also serves as an avenue for leaders excluded from formal roles due to their education, class or gender. Herda-Rapp (1998) asserts through her study
of civil rights leader Hattie Kendrick that bridge leadership is an important influence not just in recruiting and mobilising the community but also recruiting and mobilising the formal leadership of the movement. Bridge leaders encourage leaders to run for political office or join particular campaigns, as well as encourage individuals and highlight their contributions to formal leadership. This provides the core or ‘formal’ leadership of movements with the information they require to ensure smooth succession as leaders move into politics or are otherwise removed from the movement through scandal, retirement or assassination.

Bridge leadership also contributes to a better understanding of leadership in established and historic social movements, as it illustrates the contributions of veteran, extra-organisational and autonomous leadership. In particular Herda-Rapp (1998) suggests that bridge leaders act as symbolic leaders and bridge generational divides, motivating others through optimism, narrative and by example. They also act instrumentally by counselling formal leadership, using their networks to gauge community sentiment, and recruiting new leaders with similar philosophies to influence the direction of the movement.

Aminzade et al (2001) and Morris & Staggenborg (2004) suggest there are four tiers of leadership that exist within movements, all of which contribute to the success of social movement organisations. Morris & Staggenborg (2004: 188) write that:

The first tier consists of leaders who occupy the formal leadership positions of [social movement organisations]. The second tier consists of those who constitute the immediate leadership team of formal leaders... The third tier consists of bridge leaders... The fourth tier of leadership consists of those organisers who, in addition to building connections between members of a challenging group and helping them develop organisations, also routinely engage in leadership activity.

Kretschmer & Meyer (2007) contribute an additional account of a leadership role which does not appear in these three reviews. They identify an extraordinary diversity of leadership roles, but argue that it is difficult to develop meaningful and generalisable typologies of leadership because of the complex interactions between leaders within a strategic landscape of grievances, organisations and arenas, attributing the poor theoretical explanation of leadership to this complexity. However they do articulate a model for a particular kind of leader: the platform leader, who “speaks on
behalf of a position or a constituency, but beyond this, the actual relationship to the position or constituency is unclear. They remain leaders because they effectively coordinate with other movement actors and organisations, and head organisations which retain members despite the autonomy of leaders” (Kretschmer & Meyer, 2007: 1396). Such leaders don’t have a strong link to the grassroots of the movement or engage in organising, which is usually a core activity for movement leaders; instead they act as individuals to influence the mass media and political figures, using the base of the organisation as a source of funding and little else. Platform leaders are particularly interesting when attempting to reconcile leadership theory with social movement theory, as they do not appear to be strongly dependent on mass mobilisation except as a historical precedent.

Leaders are also a product of their personal circumstances, experiences and opportunities. Morris & Staggenborg (2004: 174-175) assert that – particularly in the case of the formal tiers of leadership – social movement leaders generally have a distinctive social background. In particular they identify ‘at least middle-class status’ and high levels of education relative to the social bases of the movements they lead. They are also disproportionately male, and “usually share the race or ethnicity of their supporters” (ibid: 174). However, they highlight the importance of education capital over and above these other factors, citing amongst others the increasing access to education by black ministers prior to the civil rights movement, and the opening of university entry to women as a precursor to the feminist movement. They also suggest leaders, regardless of background, “advance poor people’s movements through their commitment to education for themselves and their followers” (ibid: 176).

Barker et al (2001: 12) also see formal education and ‘conventional cultural capital’ as being important, but they question the importance of these traditional or conventional kinds of ‘capital’ when compared to the demands of local contexts where “leadership attuned to local idioms is required.” This is particularly true with regard to movements which “question existing patterns of status and privilege in society.” They suggest that education can overcome power disparities, but that “a good deal of real training happens through informal watching, listening, talking and participation.” However, Morris & Staggenborg (2004: 176) counter with claims that leaders without formal education tend to come from “movement families” or exposed to movement experiences by significant others, which allows them to gain experience with leadership activities.
Barker et al’s (2001) analysis is problematic because it conflates ‘traditional cultural capital’ and education capital with outsider status. While education and conventional status can work to separate leaders from the social bases of a movement, many successful leaders work to highlight shared norms, values and backgrounds with the rest of the movement. This is not to say that other forms of knowledge and experience are not important to social movements leadership, but that conventional cultural capital and education convey advantages to leaders regardless of the contexts in which they operate both in terms of the development of the intellectual skills (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004: 175) necessary to compete for the approval and support of the public, and their ability to negotiate with political and cultural elites.

Morris & Staggenborg (2004: 175) found numerous sources who suggest that contemporary social movements tend to have leaders with university level education in the social sciences, humanities and the arts, which they see as relevant because they “constitute a ‘science of human action’ that imparts movement-appropriate skills.” Egri & Herman (2000) paint a more complex picture in their survey of leaders in non-profit and for-profit environmental organisations in North America; they found that while around 30% of non-profit leaders held at least a bachelors degree, with another 30% holding at least a masters degree and 7% holding a doctorate-level qualification, only 46% of leaders came from an arts/humanities background, with 36% holding backgrounds in the sciences, 11% in law and 7% in environmental science. They also found that leaders valued interpersonal, technical and conceptual skills most highly, with political skills seen as less important. This is consistent with understandings of bureaucracy – the result of bureaucratisation is that the knowledge requirements of organisations become more diverse, creating a need for more specialised expertise on the part of leaders (Saul, 1992) which can pose problems for knowledge management in these organisations.

Schussman & Earl’s (2004) examination of online vote trading in the US Elections in 2000 provides some interesting insights into contention about the relevance of educational background on leaders. While agreeing with Oberschall (1973) who suggests that leader biographies are important determinants of movement leadership, with highly educated and professional movement leaders recruited via a history of political engagement and activism, they suggest that technical capacity can be equally critical. They found that leaders who provided options for direct action on the part
of voters, rather than just advice or guides, weren’t generally those with political advocacy experience but those with extensive technical skill – in this case, computer programming – while those with less technological skill were limited to ideological support or more convoluted strategies less appealing to voters – and subsequently less effective. Schussman & Earl’s (2004) research is particularly critical as movements engage with new media and social media, but also highlights that leadership can take a variety of forms, and studying the ‘science of human action’ cannot definitively cover the roles leaders perform.

Other scholars similarly highlight the importance of leader biographies, the educational experiences and opportunities that provide them with the skills necessary for leadership. Vromen (2015) found that Australian activist organisation GetUp! had strong networks of leaders and organisations that it drew from, and that leaders from GetUp! often came from non-government organisation (NGO) backgrounds and usually worked for NGOs after their tenure with GetUp!, although many eventually ended up working in the corporate sector. Arguing that leadership is essentially “providing motivation, building coalitions and commitment and articulating a vision that draws an emotional and enthusiastic response”, she suggests that leadership is a creative process rooted in an appreciation of strategy and motivation, with leaders taking “action frames from their institutional context and [imbuing] them with meaning” (Vromen, 2015: 198). Ultimately she suggests that leader biographies, ‘stories of self’, overshadowed broader collective and contextual frames for leaders in GetUp! in ways that imply increasing individualisation of leadership, with leader becoming celebrities in their own right. Taylor (2007) also draws on biography to show that leaders develop affinities for particular tactics regardless of the dilemmas they face, suggesting that early experiences in activism shape the creative dynamic of leadership responses.

The three reviews into social movement leadership also highlight a number of varieties or ‘forms’ of leadership. Barker et al (2001: 19) examine three in particular: democratic and inclusive leadership, bureaucratic leadership and exclusivist leadership. The form they find most compelling and effective is ‘democratic and inclusive leadership,’ a form of leadership which is diversely networked, and where leaders conduct “regular, open and authoritative deliberation” with a variety of constituents through which they ground their campaigns and gain accountability. Particularly instructive is the work of Ganz (2000) who argues that open and democratic organising forms create conditions for a variety of ideas, permitting leaders to find ‘richer solutions’ to
strategic problems. Johnson (in Barker et al, 2001: 19-20) also suggests democratic leadership is ‘conversational’ in character, with ‘creative generals’ balancing their “‘leading’ and ‘led’ selves, directing but also listening to the mass movement.”

Barker et al (2001: 20-21) find the other two varieties of leadership – bureaucratic and exclusivist – less valuable because they “involve a relative devaluation of potential creativity in actors beyond their own ranks, closing off practical dialogue.” Bureaucratic leadership transitions organisations toward top-down hierarchies, cementing the authority of leaders and moving from elections to appointments. At the same time they render the base of the movement passive and relatively uninvolved. Barker (in Barker et al, 2001: 20) argues that bureaucratic forms are the result of conservatism amongst leaders, with officials drawn towards opportunism which elevates “means over ends, organisational maintenance over collective action, and short-term gains over long-term goals, to using administrative means to isolate critics, and to narrowing the scope of member identities by promoting sectionalism.” Alternatively, exclusivist leadership relies on a small clique of dedicated leaders who seek to lead through ‘heroic example’ in the interest of society, “substituting their own dedicated activity for the potential disappointments of efforts at wider mobilisation,” (Barker et al, 2001: 21) assuming a passive society won’t respond to their repertoires of contention and thus limiting the range of their actions.

Alternatively, Aminzade et al (2001: 129-131) identify what they refer to as ‘dimensions’ of leadership. First, they argue that ‘task oriented’ – pragmatic or rationalised leaders working towards a particular goal – and ‘people oriented’ – ‘charismatic’ or emotive work to “create a community of feeling” – varieties of leadership appear in “virtually all settings.” While some leaders are capable of both types of leadership, Aminzade et al (2001) suggest that many specialise in one or the other, requiring cooperation for successful movement outcomes. The previously mentioned study by Schussman & Earl (2004) particularly highlights the differences between technical (task) and intellectual (people) capacity. Interestingly they also identify another dichotomy in the literature, between ‘autocratic’ or ‘democratic’ leaders, which they expand into ‘self-effacing’ or ‘self-aggrandising’ leaders. Self-effacing leaders are more likely to share power and seek its ‘wide distribution’ in efforts to achieve their goals, including conceding powerful positions; self-aggrandising leaders are unable to separate their personal authority from the success of their mission, where a challenge to their leadership is a challenge to the legitimacy of their movement.
These leadership tendencies, they suggest, are as important in determining the democratic forms of movements or post-revolutionary societies as the broad social-structural conditions from which they arise.

There are interesting similarities between autocratic/self-aggrandising leadership as posited by Aminzade et al. (2001) and the democratic/bureaucratic/exclusivist dichotomy highlighted by Barker et al. (2004). In particular both autocratic/self-aggrandising and bureaucratic/exclusivist leadership forms operate to defend a centralised, usually formalised, leadership from outsiders who threaten the authority of the established leadership or would dilute the organisation as a result of ‘passivity’. Leaders who embrace bureaucratisation may not be indispensable to the movement but they do consolidate their positions and make alternative leadership more difficult (see for example Fantasia, 1988). Exclusivist leaders enact the myth of the heroic individual in ways which cast them as the central, indispensable actor – ironically the same myth so prominent in corporate leadership (Rothman, 2016). These are not dissimilar to the actions of leaders Aminzade et al. (2001) cite as autocratic and self-aggrandising, such Stalin, Castro or Mao.

In an effort to champion democratic styles of leadership and avoid the pitfalls of the previously mentioned ‘anti-democratic’ styles, many movements have tried to minimise leadership altogether, favouring organising which focuses on direct democracy and so-called ‘leaderless-ness.’ Gitlin (1980) presents perhaps the earliest example of this trend in the form of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), with the SDS seeking to democratically organise the movement and prevent anti-democratic leaders from emerging. Other movements subsequently experimented with direct democracy and leaderless organisation, including parts of the environmental movement (Purkis, 2001) and in particular a sub-section of the movement Holloway (1986: 23) refers to as “non-violent action [NVA] enthusiasts.” More recently Occupy Wall Street drew international attention and some confusion on the part of journalists, mainstream politicians and the public, by claiming they too were a leaderless organisation.

Aminzade et al. (2001), Barker et al. (2001) and Morris & Staggenborg (2004) all concur that while such organisations lack formalised leadership, there are still leaders who perform the requisite tasks of leadership behind the scenes. Aminzade et al. (2001: 152) write that:
Even though much grassroots and anti-establishment organising aims for the absence of formal ‘leaders,’ preferring to disseminate authority in collective forms, the key leadership actions – people-oriented actions of providing motivation, building coalitions and commitment, and articulating a vision that draws an emotional and enthusiastic response; and task-oriented actions of plotting a movement strategy and assembling the resources and assigning responsibilities to see that strategy carried out – still need to be undertaken.

Indeed examinations of leaderless-ness in the literature suggest that many such movements do have a core group of individuals who are leaders in all but name, and that there can be negative consequences for organisations which fail to articulate a formal leadership. Gitlin (1980) highlights the existence of a core group of SDS activists who provided strategic and material capacity to the early movement but who lost authority as the media, dependent on framing ‘leaders’ as part of their story-building process selected individuals who Gitlin refers to as ‘celebrity-leaders’ and who favoured self-aggrandising leadership styles. Holloway (1986) writes about a conflict between the existing informal centralised leadership group and a group of outsiders promoting NVA and direct democracy in The Wilderness Society during the Franklin river campaign, where proponents of leaderless-ness saw direct democracy as an end in itself rather than a tactical decision as part of the campaign and organisation, a position which Holloway attributes to a split in the movement after the campaign had finished. Sociological studies of Occupy Wall Street also found leaders (Calhoun, 2013; Gitlin, 2013) although some scholars chose to reproduce discourses of leaderless-ness in movements by referring to them as ‘prime movers’ (see for example Gitlin, 2013: 6).

These reports suggest that a lack of identifiable leadership – or failing to define leadership in advance – contributes, at the very least, to increased potential for movement co-option. However the problems can be much broader. The previous section highlighted Barker’s (1993) work on bureaucratisation which showed how a lack of formal management in organisations can produce ‘iron cages’ of bureaucratic rationality much stronger than those with clear hierarchies of authority and responsibility. Freeman (1999a, 1999b), writing extensively on her experiences in the early feminist movement, sees leaderless-ness as a self-imposed structureless-ness. She argues that if applied to movement organisation beyond simply being a directing principle, leaderless-ness becomes an idea not unlike neoliberalism: “[it] becomes a smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over others,” (Freeman, 1999) by rendering intra-group
power relations invisible. Freeman suggests this “tyranny of structureless-ness” leaves the group vulnerable to co-option or manipulation by agent provocateurs.

Purkis (2004) suggests via his study of Earth First! in the UK that structureless or leaderless organisations can deal with some of these pressures through education projects, and in particular ensuring that those outside a naturally forming ‘core’ of activists are given opportunities to improve their skills and make more contributions to the operation and decision making processes of the organisation. However, as Purkis notes, this process is imperfect and in some ways contradictory. It requires constant vigilance through self-reflection and experimentation with different forms of organising in order to deconstruct power relations as they emerge, but at the same time can be seen as part of a coherent philosophy of environmental concern in which domination of nature is an extension of inter-human domination (Purkis, 2004: 173-177). The practical weaknesses of leaderless-ness remain, however – in addition to the previously mentioned problems, maintaining genuine and healthy structureless-ness in an organisation requires a great deal of time and effort in terms of self-reflection and co-education on the part of all members, but particularly those who begin to accrue more power via authority or influence. More importantly, leaders who accrue such power have to be self-effacing in order to give up their power, a factor which is not readily apparent when individuals join an organisation. While some writers see options to combat this (see for example Martin, 2001), the problem remains that structureless-ness is tenuous, with power structures threatening to emerge at any time unless actively resisted; a process that for those more pragmatically inclined may appear to be a poor use of movement resources.

Pragmatics is a particular concern for some movements, especially the environmental movement, where the looming danger of environmental destruction, extinctions and climate change presents deadlines which can be as small as days or weeks, and where even potential existential threats like climate change require action inside of a decade. While elements of the movement like Earth First! see structureless-ness as a long game to prevent all natural domination through social transformation, many parts of the movement have concerns and grievances with much shorter time horizons. Movements and the ‘core’ of movement organisations may as a result choose to adopt organisational structures (or lack of structures) which meet the demands generated by the framework through which they understand their grievances and their organisational priorities. To
put it another way: how the members of a movement or organisation understand success will influence the leadership dynamics of that movement or organisation.

Gamson (1975) provides some valuable insight into how success and leadership are inter-related. In his study of 53 ‘contest organisations’ in the US between 1800 and 1945, he showed that both bureaucratic organisations and centralised leadership (as opposed to non-or-pre-bureaucratic organisations and decentralised or ‘leaderless’ groups) had positive outcomes for groups in terms of public acceptance and achieving ‘new advantages’ including policy changes or electoral victories, but were generally successes which helped address movement grievances. Moreover, Gamson (1975: 93-95) found that the advantages of bureaucratic structures and centralised leadership were mutually reinforcing when it came to outcomes; organisations with central leaders and bureaucratic structures were significantly more likely to achieve new advantages, although slightly less likely to gain public acceptance compared to decentralised bureaucratic organisations. These findings suggest initially that centralised leadership may alienate a portion of potential public supporters but make up for it in terms of achieving ‘new advantages’ for the movement.

There are a few problems with this assessment, however. Particularly pertinent is that Gamson’s sample ends in 1945, at least a decade prior to the emergence of ‘new’ social movements and post-materialist values discussed in the previous chapter. Both Inglehart (1977; 1997) and Melucci (1989; 1994) suggest that the underlying social changes behind these phenomena may increase pressures towards movement democratisation in part because they respond to a risk society in which the public no longer trusts the reassurances of authorities and experts regarding the risks society faces (Beck, 1992). Numerous theorists in this space, including Harvey (1989), Melucci (1989), Saul (1992) and Furedi (1997), all highlight a suspicion of bureaucracy and existing leadership structures, but as noted in the previous chapter Saunders (2013: 138) argues this ‘culturally challenging participatory aspect’ that rejects bureaucracy has also been overemphasised by ‘new’ movement scholars.

Consequently while there is some theoretical work suggesting a changing place in society for social movements (and subsequent changes for leadership structures in social movements), there isn’t the same kind of broad longitudinal analysis conducted by Gamson in the post-1945 period, which means there is little evidence to make claims about changing leadership dynamics in ‘new’ social
movements. With the particularities of ‘participatory’ or democratic trends overemphasised by scholarship it is difficult to determine whether these pressures on centralised leadership have had an impact on the predominance or success of formal leaders. Importantly, the fundamental socio-political structure of the US has not changed meaningfully since at least the conclusion of the social and political reforms of the New Deal in 1937, in the sense that the arenas and avenues for enacting social change have remained quite similar (with the exception of the emergence of mass media). If leaderless-ness and structureless-ness is to become a significant factor in the ‘post-materialist’ new movement era then one might expect different base conditions – different grievances, arenas, political avenues, social classes and even different responses from traditional power bases and authorities who contest movement goals. Given that many participatory and democratic ‘new movement’ organisations have moved to a bureaucratic, centralised leadership model as their issues become routine – like Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth (Purkis, 2004: 177) – there is good reason to be sceptical about just how central leaderlessness is to modern movements.

Part of the dilemma for movements approaching issues of leadership is the constraints that leaders place on the movement; as this discussion of leaderless-ness has highlighted, movements have an understandable apprehension about the accrual of authority and power around a central figure or figures, and seek more open and democratic forms to organise with. The preceding discussion of leadership roles and forms has highlighted particular ways in which established leadership might constrain the potentiality of a movement. However less recognised in the literature is that these constraints flow in both directions; movements are constrained by their leaders, but leaders in centralised positions experience constraints as a result of their position and function in the movement. An early example of this in the literature is Nelson (1971), who found the role that leaders held in the civil rights movement produced limitations on the options available to leaders strategically.

Charismatic leaders, Nelson (1971: 367) argues, needed to be driving the agenda and focus on areas which had not been institutionalised; in politics they urged movement participants to vote, and “induce otherwise reluctant persons to run for political office,” but were more likely to run for a major office in an election rather than local or regional positions, even when the chances of success were poor. Nelson suggests that the power of charismatic leader’s image and status means
that minor victories would leave them trapped in a bureaucratic system unable to affect change, diminishing their charisma. He argues charismatic leaders are strategically rational in facing ‘insurmountable odds’ for a high political office because they play the role of trailblazing sacrificial lambs, an approach which does not threaten their charisma but in fact may enhance it. Nelson’s survey of the civil rights movement in the U.S. found that charismatic leaders operated almost totally outside of institutional settings, suggesting that the radical practices and protest actions of charismatic leaders made later negotiations unpalatable to opposition leaders, who preferred to bargain with more ‘moderate’ members in public (1971: 364-365).

Nelson (1971: 367) also identifies a dimension of leadership largely ignored by surveys of movement leadership theory: cosmopolitan leadership, those committed philosophically to solving problems, who are largely young and idealistic, versus local leadership, who are practically engaged in solving problems and range from ‘young adults to elderly’. Local leaders are critical in this view because they act pragmatically rather than merely philosophically: they are committed to concrete outcomes where cosmopolitan leaders simply endorse progress rather than acting to realise it. While it is tempting to view cosmopolitan leadership as mere words in opposition to the deeds of local leadership in this dichotomy, cosmopolitan leadership makes a valuable contribution by removing broader public opposition to political and social reforms.

This review has highlighted some of the key debates around social movement leadership in the literature. It has highlighted a general consensus around the existence of clear ‘leaders’ in social movements taking on both formal and informal roles, and the roles that these individuals take on as part of their participation in the movement. Both theorists and movements themselves debate the value and the contributions of leaders to movement activities, and propose alternative organisational paradigms where power-relations and thus leadership might be minimised and done away with altogether, but empirical experience with movements from scholars suggests that leadership is a fundamental quality of movement life. This review has also highlighted the importance of personal qualities on the part of leaders; the education, experiences and circumstances of leaders are fundamental to their emergence as leaders but also to the emergence of the movements they lead. But it has also demonstrated that leadership is more fluid, subtle, dynamic and diverse than common representations of movements would have us believe. Leaders exist throughout movements, from ‘exemplary figures’ to formal leadership positions, bridge
leaders to grassroots leaders, platform leaders, local and cosmopolitan leaders, celebrity figures and those who remain out of the public eye. In many ways a broad view of movement participation reveals all its members as leaders – those who support a novel approach to some aspect of public life – and only by viewing a movement as a microcosm can theorists separate out distinct leaders amongst a mass of ‘leaders’. However, this truism blinds theorists to the internal dynamics of movements and reduces movements to a causal black box. If we do not appreciate the power relations within a movement, the roles and positions leaders hold, and the personal qualities of those leaders, then it becomes impossible to meaningfully understand why movements make particular decisions, why they take on particular organisational structures, why they succeed in addressing grievances, and why they dissipate, bureaucratise, stagnate or fail.

**Environmental leadership: a survey of the literature**

As the previous section has demonstrated, there is not a great deal of literature around leadership in social movements. Environmental movement leadership, as a subset of this field, is even more sparse. It is, however, worth noting what has been previously recorded around environmental leadership in the existing literature.

Egri & Herman’s (2000) survey of North American environmental leaders found high levels of post-secondary qualification, with around 30 percent holding a bachelor degree, another 30 percent holding a masters, and 7 percent holding a doctorate level qualification. Non-profit leaders tended to come from arts (46%) and sciences (36%) although law (11%) and environmental sciences (7%) were also common. For-profit leaders were more likely to come from business (17%) and engineering (17%) than non-profit leaders, although science (30%) and arts (27%) were still well represented, along with environmental science (10%). When compared to ‘general management’, environmental leaders were more open to change but non-profit leaders tended to have significantly stronger beliefs towards environmental issues than for-profit leaders (Egri & Herman, 2000: 584-7).

Egri & Herman (2000) also identified a number of skills and characteristics valued highly by environmental leaders. Leaders valued interpersonal (70%) and technical (66%) and conceptual
(51%) skills most highly, with political (23%) and time management (5%) skills ranked much lower; in terms of personality, need for achievement (69%) and the need for affiliation (34%) ranked most highly, along with self-confidence (25%). An interesting finding is that while emotional maturity and the need for power were equally ranked (20%), significantly more non-profit leaders identified with the former, while significantly more for-profit leaders identified with the latter.

This suggests that while environmental leaders are generally well educated, there is a divide between the kinds and qualities of leaders in non-profit environment organisations – which might be considered synonymous with environmental movement organisations – and for-profit organisations with an environmental focus in construction, pollution measurement, recycling and the use of recycled materials, environmental impact consulting and environmental clean-up specialists (Egri & Herman, 2000: 571). However, it is possible to see that these differences are because despite their environmental focus, for-profit and non-profit organisations do very different kinds of work with very different goals, and subsequently demand very different qualities and skills from their employees or subordinates.

The characteristics and demographics of leaders are also a function of the organisations from which they are derived; what can be counter-intuitive is that ostensibly progressive organisations are often dominated by men. Pellow (Pellow & Nyseth Brehm, 2015; Gaard, 2015) discusses the male domination of even the radical elements of the environmental movement in the United States, with 69 out of his sample of 100 movement participants identifying as male. He finds that eco-activists are largely white, middle class and heterosexual, but that the kinds of activism they undertake reveal “white people unwillingly to adhere entirely to norms of whiteness... [and] cast their lot with oppressed humans and nonhumans... [refusing] to conform to the expectations and benefits of human supremacy” (Pellow, 2014 in Gaard, 2015). Pellow is perhaps overly optimistic about the homogeneity in the movement, and he also conflates animal liberation issues with environmental issues more broadly; while the two do share many similarities, the values and goals of animal liberation are potentially very different.

Tranter (1995; 2009) has previously developed a taxonomy of leadership activities around the Tasmanian environmental movement. In his analysis, he has found that leaders in the Tasmanian movement took on a range of roles, which principally include: acting as media figures or
spokespeople, organising, running for elected office, acting as mentors and exemplary figures and image makers. These roles require skill and experience on the part of the leaders who practice them, and raises questions about Tasmanian leaders as ‘elites’ both in terms of their skill and their status within the movement (as per Pareto in Pakulski & Tranter, 2015: 18). If Tranter’s taxonomy is accurate, then leadership in Tasmania is well defined in terms of their roles and this helps to establish some degree of hierarchy in the movement, although this may not be representative of the wider environmental movement.

Environmental leaders: are they political elites?

As previously discussed, theorisation of movement leadership has been fraught because of the historical associations of leadership as authoritarian. Part of this comes from Weber’s focus on ‘legitimate authority’ and the reasons why a person might comply with a ‘superior’ or ‘supreme authority’ absent coercion or force (Weber, 1964: 326). In particular ‘rational’ or ‘legal’ authority as the basis for bureaucratic organisation, ‘tradition’ or established belief in a position or institution of authority, and ‘charismatic’ or an exceptional, exemplary or heroic character of an individual (Weber, 1964: 328) are seen as potential sources of authority. While it is not clear that Weberian ‘authority’ and a generalisable theoretical ‘leadership’ concept are necessarily one and the same, many scholars tend to conflate them (see for example Giddens, 2009: 690). Some scholars attribute the aversion to visible or explicit leadership within social movements to this conflation of leadership and authority (Barker et al, 2001: 2). Other scholars take a deconstructionist approach, arguing that leadership does not merely have authoritarian aspects but is essentially destructive, concluding that individuals should reject social constructions of leadership to avoid reinforcing the existing social structures (Gemmill & Oakley, 1992).

The result of these attitudes to leadership has been the absence of leadership theory from approaches to social movements. The absence is partly due to a large amount of social movement research being framed in terms of ‘mass movements’ or ‘collective action,’ macro approaches which are concerned with why movements form, maintain momentum, and succeed rather than examining the internal politics and organisation of movements. The other aspect is that a good deal of scholarship is conducted by researchers affiliated with movements or researchers with
constructivist approaches which necessarily “take actors at their word... [using] the same language as actors themselves... language of rational calculation... [which] is a lens through which actors see their own actions, retrospectively and prospectively” (Drobbin, 2001: 74-78). As movement participants have rational reasons to minimise aspects of leadership or render it invisible (particularly when engaging with the media, for example see: Gitlin, 1980), these studies fail to see, adequately account for or explain aspects of leadership throughout the movement.

As the previous section of this chapter has shown, social movements do have leaders, or at least individuals who display characteristics consistent with leadership. Given the relative neglect of leadership theory around social movements, it is worth comparing it to broader understandings of leadership to see if common ground can be found, particularly to inform a dialectical analysis of social movement leaders to uncover what, if anything, makes them unique. In other words, do social movement leaders have anything in common with other kinds of leaders? And more specifically, do social movement leaders – and in the case of this thesis, specifically environmental movement leaders – constitute an elite?

Pareto (in Pakulski & Tranter, 2015: 18) defines elites as both those “superior in any aspect of human endeavour (intellectual, martial, musical, political, etc)” and “those who occupy the top positions in the hierarchy of wealth and power.” While the role of social movement leaders as the former can be debated, there do seem to be individuals in the environmental movement who meet the requirements of the latter.

In making a case for the application of an elite standpoint towards social movement leaders, there need to be a few conditions met. Elite theory accepts the inevitability of power hierarchies – and thus elites – in all large and complex societies (Pakulski & Tranter, 2015: 19). While it might not seem appropriate to conflate a social movement with the wider society in which it emerges and operates, movements which become large and diverse enough should in theory develop similar complex coordination problems as they seek to balance the grievances, ideas, resources and interests of a variety of groups in a social and political environment which is ever-shifting. The individuals who make up movements are also influenced by the structures of the society from which they come; it should not be surprising that those who come from societies that privilege elite forms reproduce those forms in the organisations in which they participate. It is fundamentally this
recognition which drives the leaderless-ness of groups like Earth First! (Purkis, 2001) and their attempts to resist structures of domination, which as highlighted previously is costly and difficult.

There are also some good theoretical reasons why movement leadership might take on characteristics of political elites and conform to elite theory more generally. In the previous section of this chapter I discussed Gamson’s (1975) finding that centralised and bureaucratised leaders more more successful in achieving what he terms ‘new advantages,’ a relationship which implies more pragmatic organisations and movements will try and take on centralised leadership and bureaucratised organisational forms. While it is difficult to ascertain the causality around the role of leadership in this relationship, there are some immediately obvious possibilities. On an intra-organisational level centralised leadership simplifies decision making processes and provides clear exemplary figures who can unite movement participants. This allows for more rapid responses to threats and opportunities and may help members with less capacity become involved in the movement. However the eco-organisational level advantages are possibly more compelling, particularly for organisations with reform rather than outright revolution as a goal. Organisations with centralised leadership and bureaucratic structures replicate the power hierarchies of most modern institutions, potentially making them more understandable and ‘rational’ to those individuals and institutions which hold power or reproduce power relations. Centralised leadership allows movements to provide a more unified front in public messaging, particularly with regards to news media (discussed further in the next chapter, but see particularly Gitlin (1980) for some of the problems around news media messaging with decentralised or leaderless movements), and provides an avenue to present a consistent set of demands to political or social institutions and negotiate outcomes on behalf of their members.

These extra-organisational benefits of centralised leadership are more than just solutions to internal coordination problems; they work because they reproduce existing leadership and organisational paradigms in wider social life, paradigms which form the premise of many normative social relations which characterise representative democracy, capitalism and – more broadly – modernity. Fundamental to these paradigms are questions about legitimacy: whether particular social structures, institutions or organisations have the right to make decisions for those they claim to represent (Lipset, 1983). Political legitimacy is closely aligned with sociological understandings of leadership; both draw on Weber’s (1964) work around kinds of authority to establish their
theoretical models (O’Neil, 2010). Modernity is characterised by institutions, political and corporate, which draw on bureaucratic leadership and legitimacy, developing hierarchies and formal structures of power which at least in principle implies the consent of those a leader or manager represents, either through democratic vote or in exchange for monetary income. Legitimacy in such systems is relatively clear because the scope of a leader’s legitimate authority is well defined: they represent a constituency or a government, a company or a working-group within an organisation. Charismatic authority and legitimacy is in contrast much more dynamic and difficult to ascertain, particular early in movement development where membership can often be in flux and participant consent is difficult to establish. This is exacerbated in leaderless movements where the idea of legitimate authority can be an anathema.

Revolutionary movements who would replace power don’t need to speak to it, but reformist movements who seek particular concessions within an existing paradigm – Western representative democracy, for example – need to be able to speak to power. However the problem they face is that power only recognises power; or to put it another way, movements need to be able to demonstrate they are legitimate, that their members have real grievances, and that they should be listened to. Developing bureaucratic organisational structures, creating a centralised leadership and establishing formal leadership roles are all ways of establishing this legitimacy because they reproduce structures of power to make a movement ‘rational’ and understandable to opposition groups. Those who hold power are more willing to speak to those they ‘know’ represent the movement rather than individuals with nebulous and intangible links to it, and they’re more willing to negotiate with a single group or individual than have to process multiple conflicting demands from a variety of interest groups throughout the movement. Conforming to bureaucratic rationality, and the legitimacy which comes from it, potentially contributes to understanding the trends Gamson (1975) found in his research.

This need for legitimacy extends to elite theory. Mills’ (1956) work on the power elite suggested that elites were becoming more distant from those they represented in terms of exposure and cultural background. It would make sense that those with the knowledge and experience to navigate elite culture would be better received than ‘outsiders’ who lack the qualities necessary to negotiate, debate or deal with news media. Legitimacy for social movement leaders is not just about the consent of followers, but their ability to play the ‘game’.
This is a reasonable argument for the existence of ‘elites’ in the leadership of a movement, but there are also some issues in simply assuming that ‘elites’ are the definitive leadership of a movement. Elites and centralised leadership may be necessary for speaking to power, taking on the forms of power in ways which make the movement ‘rational’ and understandable to outsiders, but the relationship of these leaders to the rest of the movement is unclear. Is the formal leadership of centralised movement an elite in the traditional sense, the top tier of power in movement hierarchy? Or is it more accurate to imagine them as the negotiating arm of the movement, an appendage of movement politics which has some influence but exists primarily to speak to power?

Work around informal leadership, particular by Herda-Rapp (1998) and Robnett (1997) suggests that there isn’t necessarily a clear correlation between formal leadership and the power relations within a movement and that leadership roles with less ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of social and political elites still have strong authority and influence within a movement. This implies that ‘elites’ within a movement may not look like elites in other social contexts and that the elite members of a movement may be submerged, informal and diverse compared to traditional elite groups.

Consider for example Herda-Rapp’s (1998) analysis of Hattie Kendrick’s activism as part of the civil rights movement. Kendrick was a bridge leader who didn’t have any formal status in the movement but by all accounts seems to have accumulated a good deal of power around her person during her extensive tenure as a campaigner, actively shaping the cohort of formal leaders through recruitment and personal advocacy, a role legitimated through her extensive contacts and engagement with the grassroots community. Where should Kendrick appear in a hierarchy of power? Simply examining her position between formal leadership and the grassroots of the movement would suggest that she was simply mid-way up the hierarchy, ‘bridging the gap’ between formal leadership elites and the grassroots. But the power relationship of ‘bridge leadership’ isn’t top-down, it’s also bottom-up, conveying ideas, support and legitimacy from one group to the other. Despite Morris & Staggenborg (2004: 188) suggesting bridge leadership is further down the chain of authority than formal leadership, Herda-Rapp’s (1998) account of Hattie Kendrick implies that an inter-movement view of power reveals formal movement leadership and grassroots movements as equal partners shaped to operate in specific social contexts, with bridge
leaders holding a degree of power over both groups, while an extra-movement or outsider perspective comports more closely with traditional elite theory.

Ultimately it seems necessary to account for both perspectives of power when assessing social movements, rather than privileging one view over another. Movements have both interior and exterior power relations, and considering the dynamics of both are necessary to understanding where leaders as ‘elites’ exist in the movement.

This argument for the application of elite theory to environmental movements in Tasmania should not be read as advocacy of and for political elites. From the literature it is clear that elites have a tendency to emerge in complex systems and can make positive contributions to solving the coordination problems which large movements experience. In this aspect leaders-as-elites can make healthy contributions to the ongoing development of a movement. However as discussed previously in this chapter leaders-as-elites can also create problems for a movement, presenting a weak point for opposition groups to attack (Bob & Nepstad, 2007) or splitting movements by failing to account for the preferences of movement ‘adherents’. While not convinced by the absolute position against leadership taken by Gemmill & Oakley (1992) because of the coordination problems it presents, there is still value in their assertion that elites and leaders-as-elites can have damaging effects, particularly in organisations with distinct civil-society contributions. Leaders-as-elites should be balanced by engaged and active movement participants, rather ordering Mill’s (1956) ‘cheerful robots’ to do their duties.

What this line of argument is meant to demonstrate is the fundamental weakness of a sociological approach which denies leadership in social movements; in assessing the elite nature of leadership in the Tasmanian environmental movement, this research hopes to highlight the chasm between what some movement scholars and participants preach (see Doyle (2001); Thompson’s (1984: 133) “NVA enthusiasts”) about how a movement operates in principle and how it operates in practice. Only by realistically assessing the place of leadership in the movement can we assess the environmental movements relationship to society and its future.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have assessed the literature around leadership as it is understood broadly, as well as examined what literature exists around social movement literature. In doing so I have shown that while leadership is under-theorised in the context of social movements, there is substantial evidence to suggest that leaders exist throughout most if not all social movements in formal and informal capacities. This chapter also highlights that the personal qualities of individual leaders are vital to their roles, and some of the problems that result from ignoring leadership as a dynamic in social movements.

In particular this chapter has raised questions about whether movement leaders, particularly in this case environmental movement leaders, might be considered elites. The lack of previous in depth research around leaders in movements makes it difficult to assess whether leaders in social movements are something unique, or whether they are consistent with other kinds of leadership in wider society. Addressing this issue would assist in providing some insight into the nature of social movement leadership.

In the next chapter I will expand upon some of these findings by exploring the relationship between the media and social movement leadership. Media scholarship has long recognised the capacity for the media to promote particular identities and celebrities around social movements in ways which further highlight the need for a focus on social movement leadership, but also provide insight into the strategic roles of leaders and how they might contribute to movements.
Chapter Three: Media representation and roles

Introduction

In the previous chapters I have examined social movement theory and demonstrated the limitations of the existing literature around leadership in social movements. My research has shown that there is a deficit of literature concerning leadership which reduces the capacity of scholars and theorists to understand the way in which social movements operate, and the means by which they shape their campaigns in order to achieve their goals.

Engagement with the media is one area where the strategies and tactics of social movement leaders are made readily apparent and where the complexities of such leadership can be made relatively stark. The media have long played a critical role in the success and failure of social movements (Gitlin, 1980; Lester, 2007), and the media has depended on individuals who operate as ‘primary definers’ (Lester, 2007) as sources for their stories. This has resulted in the need for leaders, either real or constructed, to run their stories. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the media in Australia have strong cultural power which makes them critical to movements who wish to achieve campaign successes, and the framing which they employ to tell their stories is a critical site of conflict for movements.

Leaders are important in this context because they participate in a complex interaction with journalists to propagate and contest discourses and frames in the media. This is not something which can be achieved on a collective level, as journalists employ a variety of normative hegemonic frames to prefer the views of authoritative individuals over a varied and sometimes conflicting multiplicity of spokespeople and movement leaders (and additionally face a multitude of personal barriers around deadlines and making stories understandable which reduce their capacity to engage directly with the ‘mass’ of a movement). Movements and scholars who ignore leadership are likely to struggle to assess media engagement because of these factors, particularly when movements face problems around celebrity-leaders taking on pseudo-leadership roles which can divide or co-opt movements.

Understanding leadership is also critical to assess the capacities and potential of social media, and vice versa. As Poell, Abdulla, Rieder, Woltering & Zack (2016) note, leadership which engages with
traditional news media looks distinctly different to leadership which originates through social media. But existing leadership also deploys social media for particular ends, and assessing the extent to which social media might be used to leverage campaigns depends largely on leadership around these new media forms.

In reviewing the literature around the media and social movements in this chapter, I will demonstrate some of the contributions that leader-centred research into social movements might achieve.

**News Media, Framing, and Social Movements.**

Critical writing on the ‘fourth estate’ in Australia sometimes appears to border on cynicism. As Davis (1999), Salter (2007) and Dunlop (2013) contend, the Australian media are collectively lazy in their attempts to understand and tell stories, they shun ethical practice and refuse to police themselves, and they are beholden to corporate interests and the interests of political elites. They cheer the virtues and value of journalism in the public good, yet are dismissive and contemptuous of the same public they claim to serve, and dismissive of any critical engagement with their work, particularly from ‘non-journalists’ (that is, someone not working for an institutional media organisation). In addition a generational bloc of ‘boomer’ cultural elites, many in significant and esteemed positions in media organisations around the nation, play a ‘disproportionate’ role in public life and contribute to the marginalisation of younger generations, and subsequently the marginalisation of new ideas, voices and politics (Davis, M.R., 2007).

These problems are not unique to Australia by any means. Consider the historical critiques of the media by Bourdieu (1998), Entman (1993) or even Boorstin (1961) and it becomes clear that the promise of the media perpetuated by popular culture, socio-cultural and political elites and journalists themselves is one perpetually bound to be broken, a standard set largely by the media which it is unable or unwilling to reach. As Salter (2007: 39) writes: “Journalism is a perfectly reputable craft. The problem is the disreputable things journalists do.” He also writes as part of a critique of framing practices that “it always requires far more application to be a considered sceptic than an automatic cynic. Consumers… have… grown to accept that [cynical] tone as a substitute for genuine analysis” (Salter, 2007: 3). It would then be wrong to replicate this sin: it is not enough to
simply adopt a posture of cynicism in response to the similarly cynical stance taken by both the Australian media and their critics. These media institutions might not operate in a manner consistent with their rhetoric, but they still strongly influence public debate and operate to include and exclude particular ideas, values and discourses.

Boorstin (1961) and Bourdieu (1998) both criticise the particular economic configurations required to produce mass-distributed media, and the particular agendas and frames that this imposes on media reports. Traditional media – radio, television and print media – are dependent on regular schedules of news production – monthly, daily, hourly – which requires a particular conceptualisation of news. Perhaps unsurprisingly, news is created, extracted, wrung from the happenings of the everyday rather than ‘newsworthy’ events simply being allowed to emerge. Boorstin (1961) calls the products of this news creation process ‘pseudo-events’. The pressure to produce a certain amount of ‘news’ on tight deadlines means journalists are forced to compromise the depth of research and the critical engagement that would otherwise be possible in any given story, forcing them to fall back upon familiar frameworks of understanding the unexpected, complex, illogical or even “disappointingly mundane” (Salter, 2007: 2), frameworks which are often socially dominant or hegemonic in nature (Gitlin, 1980). With the rise of social media and the internet, these demands have changed slightly; the number of stories a newspaper can print are no longer dictated by how many pages of advertising had been sold for a particular day – instead every story is an opportunity for page views and click-through rates, which means that difficult stories are less likely to be cut, but journalists under more pressure to tell stories which are ‘click-bait’ over and above stories with social importance. Public interest is redefined under such institutional structures to no longer be ‘what the public needs to know’ but rather ‘what the public wants to know’ where ‘wants’ are a list of options preselected by editors and business managers (Dunlop, 2013).

Such a view, particularly championed by Gitlin (1980), tends to be fairly sympathetic to journalists as mere ‘cogs’ in the institutional machinery, producing copy in order to fill space between the ads or otherwise induce a reader to look at more advertising. However Salter (2007: 2-3), himself a journalist and television producer, suggests that journalists are as much at fault for this intellectual ‘laziness’ as the organisations in which they work. He charges that journalists, editors and producers don’t just force stories into familiar frames but that they actively neglect stories which
don’t “fit these templates of violence, novelty, shock, drama, conflict, celebrity or spectacle” (Salter, 2007: 7-8). This concurs with findings from Bartholomé, Lecheler & de Vreese (2015) which suggest that individual journalists and media organisations are equally culpable in the deployment of ‘conflict’ frames. In doing so journalists ‘rob’ the agenda of stories that are difficult or complex. Salter (2007: 65) additionally charges that a disdain for traditional beat-work and a growth in opinion and desktop reportage are also to blame, although he later admits that media bosses interest in saving money may also be behind this trend.

The consequences of this tendency towards the familiar when framing stories is highlighted by Gitlin (1980) in his examination of the relationship between social movements and the media. Gitlin’s (1980) analysis of the Students for a Democratic Society and their interactions with the media were central in conceptualising the role that the media had on social movements and is subsequently useful for understanding the nature of interactions between environmentalists and the media in Australia. For Gitlin the media are central to social movement activities: “the media specialise in orchestrating everyday consciousness – by virtue of their pervasiveness, their accessibility, their centralised symbolic capacity. They name the world’s parts, they certify reality as reality – and when their certifications are doubted and opposed... limit the terms of effective opposition. [They are] core systems for the distribution of ideology” (1980: 1-2). For the SDS and the early environment movement, the media were the only feasible option to make their voices heard. But Gitlin argues that the media don’t just report, they translate the symbolic actions of protesters for the consumption of a wider audience, which in the case of the SDS meant framing the novel, unexpected and complex activities of the movement in negative ways, which included:

*Trivialising: making fun of the language, dress, age, style and goals of the movement, at the expense of the substance of the movement* (pp. 27, 58).

*Polarisation: placing an emphasis on counter-demonstrations and extremists at the numerical and ideological margins over the mainstream movement* (pp. 27, 48-49, 94-95).

*Marginalisation: suggesting demonstrators were deviant or unrepresentative, which included the creation of a ‘generational’ sub-frame that suggested the claims of the movement were unique to young people who were ‘out of control’ or insufficiently controlled by their elders* (pp. 27, 56-58).
The result of these framing strategies was that the media effectively ‘alienated’ the producers of meanings from their products – the process of media framing mediates all meanings, and the social meanings of intentional action are “deformed beyond recognition” (Gitlin, 1980: 3). Central to Gitlin’s frame analysis is the dominance of ‘hegemonic frames’ which include particular normative discourses and ideologies underlying the behaviour and perspectives of reporters; he argues that trivialising or casting the movement as menacing meant that the public did not have to deal with the substantive ideas behind the movement, for example, by emphasising the presence of communists (1980: 69-70). Hegemonic frames were also informed the kinds of questions asked and stances taken by reporters: Gitlin suggests they did not so much fail to understand the organisational structure of the movement so much as deliberately misunderstood in order to frame it in ways which were understandable to both themselves and the public (1980: 96-97). More than this, the kinds of traditional assumptions about what constitutes ‘news’ reinforced this hegemonic view: that news is about the event, not the underlying condition; the person and not the group; conflict, not consensus; the fact that ‘advances the story’ not the one that explains it (1980: 28).

It is important to recognise that Gitlin is writing as a participant in the movement when he ultimately lays blame for the failure of the SDS at the feet of the American media and the way in which they framed the story. In particular he singles out the destructive effect the media had on the leadership of the SDS by promoting both individuals and a model of leader-as-celebrity which distorted and ultimately undermined the purpose and aims of the movement; framing strategies employed by the media which reduced the salience and efficacy of the movement amongst the general public. This isn’t to say that his position is not without merit, merely that he is writing as an insider with a particular perspective.

Broader scholarly literature does largely support Gitlin’s thesis about framing – Altheide (1997) suggests that the political economy of news, particularly demands about entertainment value and commercial viability, puts an impetus on reporters to deploy ‘problem frames.’ This framing strategy simplifies issues down into understandable and ‘interesting’ forms: that something undesirable exists, that it affects many people, it is generally unambiguous, and ultimately it can be fixed through ‘known’ means. Altheide suggests that this simplifies problems and transforms ambiguous and problematic stories into morality plays. This ultimately places pressure on those responsible for dealing with the problem to undertake counter-productive options. Similarly,
Entman & Rojecki’s (1993) analysis of media responses to the anti-nuclear movement also suggest that negative framings prevent the public from joining movements with which they are ideologically aligned; that social movements are framed critically and have fewer ‘legitimate’ options for communication compared with political elites; and most significantly, that the media doesn’t reflect public opinion: they do not have ‘autonomy of official discourse’ but instead reflect the symbolic politics, and thus framing choices, of the state.

However Cottle (2008) suggests that media framing choices are more diverse than either Altheide or Entman & Rojecki are willing to concede. His conception of ‘mediatised conflict’ offers some substantial critique, particularly around the ‘media ecosystem’ in which this framing occurs. He suggests that there are broader dynamics and complexities which need to be recognised, and that the media aren’t inherently against the goals and values of social movements in favour of dominant interests. Taking Cottle’s perspective into account, the view of framing espoused by Altheide et al accounts a great deal of influence – potentially far to much – on the role of the media, marginalising the role that individuals and groups play in engaging with the media. Cottle argues that the media cannot and should not be treated as distinct from other institutions like politics or social movements: the media has critically informed movement practices and logic, and perhaps even formed. Media, mainstream politics, movements and the public all interact with each other in ways which can influence change. This does not necessarily undermine the central points made by Altheide or Entman & Rojecki, but it does place limitations on how much of a role the media play. Cottle suggests that it is necessary for analysis of the media to adopt “less media-centric and more sociologically refined and politically contingent understandings of media-source interactions” (2008: 125).

What makes framing more relevant in contemporary analysis of media interactions is the growing recognition and deployment of frames by both social movement activists and what Hall et al (1999) refer to as ‘primary definers’: that is, ostensibly ‘accredited’ sources from major social institutions – MPs, business leaders, trade-union representatives, ‘experts.’ For example, cognitive linguist George Lakoff (2004) suggests that the political right in the US have actively worked to frame political and social issues and events in ways which play to their strengths; Lakoff advocates that the political left do the same. Indeed much of the interaction between the Tasmanian environmental movement was deliberate and thought through in terms of its symbolic meaning
(see Lester, 2007). Even if this kind of framing is not precisely the same as media framing – the power and social relations involved in frame production are potentially different for both primary definers and social movement activists – it reinforces the usefulness of frames in exploring interactions with the media as groups and individuals are likely to think about their interactions in a similar way. However, it is also worth noting Schlesinger’s (1990) and Miller’s (1993) critique that understanding the way in which organisations use information cannot be media centric or focus on the creators and authors of frames (‘primary definers’) but needs to include the various actors and audiences which make up the economy and ecosystem of mass communication. While framing is helpful for analysis it is also a limited perspective.

For social movements the media – and the political economy within which the media operates – presents a problem fraught with internal contradictions; on one hand they are dependent on the media to both grow their movement and gain public legitimacy, on the other, the media require increasingly more elaborate spectacles and celebrity-leadership in order to maintain their attention as ‘newsworthy,’ and even then are likely to frame movements in ways which may actively contest the agendas of movements. This “increasing need for novel” (Gitlin, 1980: 233-235) creates a kind of ‘event-time’ where time is distorted to focus on the importance of events rather than the organisation and consolidation occurring around them, while the adversarial framing can counter-productively, both alienating the public and encourages individual to join a movement for the wrong reasons: Gitlin (1980: 190-204) found that in the case of the SDS, adversarial framings of the movement led to new members who were increasingly drawn to violence and militancy rather than grass-roots community organising. As such

Gitlin suggests that news stories need to be unambiguous and culturally familiar in order to get coverage (1980: 45) and that journalists had to deliberately misunderstand the organisational structure and goals of the movement in order to make a framing that was understandable to themselves and to the general public (ibid: 96-97) which meant that the journalists and the general public did not have to deal with the political challenges and substantive ideas behind the movement; it was reduced to a novelty (ibid: 69-70). Lester (2006a) sees similar issues in her coverage of the environmental movement in Tasmania, particularly around the problems of the movement in maintaining their ‘newsworthiness’ and having their positions presented through antagonistic frames by the local media.
Hall (1988) understands these broad criticisms of the media as a consequence of their ideological functions within society. The media are part of what Hall calls ‘the ideological model of power’ which suggests that dominant interests and ways of viewing the world are presented as natural and universal while those of the dominated are excluded or presented as deviant (Downey, Titley & Toynbee, 2014). In this view, capital is central to the accrual of power.

However the media is in some ways as negative regarding entrenched interests and power structures as it can be for social movements. Thompson (2005: 38) writes that “ever since the advent of print political rulers have found it impossible to control completely the new kind of visibility made possible by the media and to shape it entirely to their liking; now, with the rise of the internet and other digital technologies, it is more difficult than ever.” Some argue that the inverse is true for social movements; freed of the hegemonic frames and power structures of mass media, they now have the ability to propagate their own messages on their own terms (see Dunlop, 2013). Despite these changes, Rojecki (2011: 95) suggests that the historical relationships the movement has had with the media are still important. Despite the rise of new media, mass media remains a critical if ‘transformed’ source, particularly relevant for their ability to lend legitimacy to certain movement activities. Despite the ability for movements to present their own positions via the internet and social media, journalists are perhaps justifiably sceptical of media content created by ‘self-interested protestors’ (Rojecki, 2011: 95) and ‘stage managed media events.’

Indeed there remain particular limitations to what the media can achieve: Thompson (1995: 125) highlights the importance of the media in “limiting the invisibility” of power, although power is not fully visible, remaining in many ways “shrouded in secrecy and hidden from the public gaze.” He highlights the importance of ‘mediated visibility’ and the symbolic power (Thompson, 2005) as a double edged sword for the political class; offering them new opportunities to communicate their messages but also presenting new risks in terms of public exposure. Thompson (2005: 50) defines symbolic power here as the “capacity to intervene in the course of events and influence the actions of others by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms.”

While much of this critique is centred around the media in the United States, much of it also applies here. Mark Davis (1999) argues that the Australian media is very much dominated by cultural elites;
that “Australian political and cultural debate [is] dominated by a small, homogenous group of prominent public figures who ruthlessly [guard] the gates of commentary in these areas” (Dunlop, 2013: 91). Dunlop (2013) and Davis (2007) argue that this cultural bloc still exists today, with many of the same figures in the media as when Davis first developed his thesis. Australia also has a highly concentrated media landscape, largely dominated by a few corporations, families and trusts which are able to effectively promote particular agendas in the public discourse. In particular Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation has gained some notoriety from commentators and media activists in Australia for its naked partisanship (see Manne, 2011). These similarities in political economy suggest that similar patterns of activity should be present in an Australian context.

Hutchins & Lester (2015) additionally suggest a model of ‘mediatised environmental conflict’, which views frames and debates around environmental concern as part of a ‘dance’ between government, activists, industry and journalists, which each player interacting with the others to shift perspectives on particular issues. This perspective is helpful because it provides a landscape which makes explicit the tensions and power dynamics between the four players to achieve their desired outcomes.

News media and movement leader relationships

Movements are broadly aware of the pressures and complexity of media framing and the effects that it can have on movement campaigns, and this has particular impacts in terms of leadership. As Gamson (1993: 115-116) notes, “each side in the media-movement transaction is dependent on the other, but not equally so.” Media can draw upon a wide range of alternative ‘newsworthy’ events to produce their products; conversely social movements have historically viewed access to and the propagation of their messages by the media as critical to their success. For Gamson (1993) this is because the media fulfil three major purposes for the movement: mobilisation, validation and ‘scope enlargement’ to draw in additional parties around a conflict.

These incentives to engage with the media come with particular risk around framing, with key individuals in the movement, or leaders, acting as ‘frame sponsors’ (Gamson, 1993: 119) to promote particular perspectives around their conflict. As Gamson (1993) notes, “participants in
symbolic contests read their success or failure by how well their preferred meanings and interpretations are doing in various media arenas”. Gitlin (1980) contends that this need for leaders as authoritative voices is in and of itself a framing device employed by journalists; he sees journalists need for leaders as part of a set of hegemonic frames which operate to make alternative positions understandable.

The consequences of these negative hegemonic frames for movements is that movements don’t have total control over who emerges from the movement as ‘leaders.’ Gitlin (1980: 3) argues that the media certify leaders and officially noteworthy ‘personalities’ and convert leadership into celebrity, transforming movement leadership into something with the potential to be diametrically opposed to the movements overall goals and purpose.

Celebrity-leaders are a preoccupation for the media; they don’t need charismatic qualities in the Weberian sense of incarnating ‘consistent new values’ but instead fabricate charisma through a aura of mystery, a ‘star quality’ which can represent the replacement of authentic movement-centred leadership with mere popularity (Gitlin, 1980: 147-149). In Gitlin’s (1980) study of the SDS, the consequences of this were that celebrity-leaders were able to hijack and distort movement goals, and that many with the potential for good leadership were unable to reconcile their ‘star’ treatment by the media with their real (lesser) status amongst co-leaders and the mass of the movement, and abdicated their roles as a result. Other theorists have also noted the problem that celebrity poses for leaders when engaging with the media (Lester & Hutchins, 2009; Oliver & Maney, 2000; Rucht, 2004). However in the Tasmanian context, Tranter (2009) has noted that it is very difficult for celebrity-leaders (or any leader, for that matter) to claim to speak on behalf of the entire movement due to its loosely networked structure, or for those who do so to get away with it.

Dealing with the media is not just a matter of creating and contesting frames, but having those same frames imposed on the movement and its leaders. As Bartholomé, Lecheler & de Vreese (2015) note, journalists engaged around conflict frames operate on a number of levels, including their personal perspectives, their routines, which include normative understandings and approaches to conflicts and the need to follow issues which had already attracted attention, and external factors such as power relationships between conflicted parties. Movement leaders approaching or being approached by the media would almost certainly have similar dynamics at
play; their personal positions on issues and attitudes towards the media, their normative understandings of what the media want, how to make stories ‘newsworthy’ and frame their opponents in advantageous ways, as well as the broader power relationships between various movement leaders, organisations and factions.

As Lester (2007) shows in her assessment of media and social movement interactions in the Tasmanian environmental movement, leadership has previously been critical in deliberately engaging the media and making decisions about how to frame the issues they campaigned around; leaders were making particular judgements about the use of strategies like blockades in order to get the media’s attention and were assessing risk and reward in order to get the media to pay attention to the issues. Particularly relevant is Lester’s (2007) interviewing of both key figures in the movement and the journalists that covered these issues, where both sides seem to indicate that at the outset of the Franklin campaign they were broadly aware of the needs of the other as they worked to establish the rules of the ‘game’ without compromising the integrity of their roles as activists or journalists.

Kretschmer & Meyer’s (2007) previously mentioned study on platform leadership is also worthwhile considering; this emerging form of leadership does not look like traditional activist leadership in that there is very little linkage between the leaders and the rest of the movement. Rather the leaders use their movement ‘base’ as a fundraising source and use the size of this passive ‘membership’ to demonstrate their legitimacy to the media. These figures are much more media centric than traditional social movement leaders because their behaviours focus almost solely on media engagement rather than organisation, campaigning or activism in the traditional sense. This emerging form of leadership has important implications for how movement and media interactions might be conducted and understood moving forward, and the degree to which leaders see this as viable or valuable as a strategy would be of interest.

All of these factors suggest that leadership has a critical role in understanding movement and media relationships; as leadership has been largely overlooked in social movement scholarship, there are similar deficits of knowledge around how social movement leaders critically engage with the journalists and media organisations they rely on to mobilise, validate and expand their campaigns. Further research on how leaders interact with the media would help broaden a
scholarly understanding of their strategies and tactics around media engagement and explore how their roles may change and evolve in a changing media landscape, particularly around the emergence of social media.

New and social media

The previous discussion of ‘mass media’ reflect the discussion in the earlier part of the twentieth century around concerns for the consequences of ‘mass society.’ While subsequent debate has accepted that there is significant room for individual agency in the relationship between the mainstream media and society, the dominant media institutions in the Western world arguably remain print media, television, and radio (Meraz, 2009; Couldry, 2013: 126), although they do not necessarily have the same monopoly on agenda-setting as they once did (Meraz, 2011). These institutions, whilst notably less powerful than they have been previously, retain a good deal of cultural influence, particularly amongst socio-cultural and political elites.

There has been a long history of critique around the role of the mass media and technology which are worth briefly considering when assessing contemporary debates around the promise and threat of social media. Morrow & Brown (1994: 98-99) characterise the essence of critiques against the mass society as twofold; from the left-wing came concerns that ‘mass culture’ represented a pseudo-consensus in that it undermined the specific cultural identities and interests of the working class, whilst conservatives bemoaned the exposure of cultural goods to the marketplace and the subsequent erosion of cultural elites ability to serve as models for socialisation. These changes, brought about by democratisation (particularly mass education) and the mass media, were at the heart of discussions about the role of the mass media in society.

Walter Benjamin participated in these critiques by suggesting that the mechanical reproduction of art had “transformed the relationship between art works and publics” (Morrow & Brown, 1994: 107). In particular he drew attention to the way in which technology had “[destroyed] the aura surrounding the art” (Honneth, 1987: 366) and made them accessible to the public. Consequently he argued that “new technologies might allow arts and communications media to elicit new forms of what today might be called resistance to dominant ideologies, and even to mobilise oppositional collective action in new and unforeseen ways” (Morrow & Brown, 1994: 107).
If existing literature on the topic is to be believed, then the emergence of social media and new media represents the most recent and most effective iteration of this phenomena. Dunlop (2013: 72) refers to new media technologies like blogging as not just journalism but also an act of citizenship; not just an attentive audience of the media but their sharpest critics, whilst Castells (2013) cites the ‘communicative autonomy’ of the internet and social media as central to recent protests movements including the ‘Arab Spring’ and Occupy Wall Street. Castells refers to these online networks as “networks of outrage and hope” (2013: 81) in the sense that they brought people together out of a sense of injustice, but mobilised them through a shared sense of hope found through their online interactions. While social media and new media technologies are often treated as distinct, they share a fundamental technological base which enables their ability to disrupt existing forms of media. Indeed many of the features of the various social media networks were derived from new media such as blogging. The principle contribution of social media is essentially to vertically integrate these technologies into corporate owned silos which create the basis for advertising platforms rather than technological innovation in their own right.

Part of the effectiveness of these new and emerging digital media, including social media, is that they potentially allows for more personalised, expressive involvement in social movements, and reduces barriers to collective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). This should translate into larger and more sustained movements around social issues, according to Hodges & Stocking (2016).

However scholarship is only beginning to touch on the complexity of engaging with social media and how it is used. As Hodges & Stocking (2016: 224) note, social media could be used to “educate the public through information provision, promote fundraising, encourage direct political action... endorse individual expression and/or increase membership.” It isn't clear how social media fits into the repertoires of action deployed by social movement organisations, particularly given their tactics and ideological goals can vary greatly from organisation to organisation. Stein (2009) saw similar trends in her survey of US movement organisations use of the web, with organisations not using the full potential of the technology available at the time. That both Stein (2009) and Hodges & Stocking (2016) see similar behaviour from movement organisations suggests that these groups might be slow to take advantage of technological developments.
Some of the reason for the diversity and ambiguity in how movements use social media is that social media, along with other social changes, have created tendencies towards more ‘entrepreneurial’ engagement with movements, with individuals becoming more loosely affiliated with movement organisations and engaging as a form of personal expression (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). In a study of two climate change protests, Segerberg & Bennett (2011) argue that the use of Twitter varies depending on the issue, the organisations involved and the individuals doing the ‘tweeting, and that Twitter is useful for bring diverse players together around particular issues, is tied up in gatekeeping processes through re-tweeting and shared hashtags, and that it reflects changing organisational dynamics over time. Their work suggests that social media both shapes and is shaped by activist activity to achieve movement outcomes.

White (2016), one of the originators of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ campaign, notes that Twitter was particularly central to the spreading of the original ‘meme’ of Occupy, but that ultimately taking advantage of social media meant giving up control over both the idea and the channels (such as the @occupywallstreet Twitter account) to the wider movement which emerged. His writing and analysis around new opportunities for social movements suggests that traditional leadership within a movement is less applicable with the rise of these new communication technologies. While he had assessed the feasibility of numerous tactics around occupy beforehand, through social media his influence became less directed and collided with the influence of others to change his ideas in ways he couldn’t control. In particular the idea to Occupy Wall Street and the ‘rolling jubilee’ tactic, once shared via social media, transformed in ways he had not envisioned.

Poell, Abdulla, Rieder, Woltering & Zack (2016) see similar developments in their analysis of Facebook in the Egyptian protest movement. Leaders who engage in campaigning through social media are much more submerged in the movement than traditionally recognised movement leaders, in part as a response to the individualising trends identified by Bennett & Segerberg (2011), where clearly identifiable leadership acts as a barrier to mobilising and expanding the movements reach. They identify leaders who engage predominantly with social media and participate in leadership activity, but that they are distinct from ‘social movement leadership’.

Where ‘social movement’ leaders, who archetypically engage with the mass media tend to prioritise celebrity, command and proclaim to the wider movement and ask their members to
follow, social movement ‘leaders’, or ‘connective’ leaders as Poell et al (2016) refer to them, tend to prefer anonymity, and invite or steer the movement rather than directly control it, preferring movement members to participate rather than follow. They also tend towards looser forms of organisation than traditional leaders. This has important implications for this study as it presents implications for identifying leaders who may be actively using social media and identifying movement behaviour through social media.

However while White (2016) sees the potential for social media, he also identifies limits to its power. After the suppression of Occupy Wall Street and the ultimate end of the Arab Spring, the theory that communication technologies like Twitter would allow for global witness and thus prevent the repression of non-violent movements was disproven. He appears to view social media as a useful tool for coordination and quickly sharing ideas to spread tactics and memes around the globe, but that broadcasting campaigns is ineffectual. No longer does the threat that ‘the whole world is watching’ appear to carry weight with governments or corporate interests.

Hodges & Stocking’s (2016) survey of Twitter usage around the Keystone XL oil pipeline in the US found that social media use was used by both pro-and-anti-pipeline advocates, and focused around establishing identity and making calls for action. However, the ‘anti-pipeline’ activists (who might be thought of as a proxy for environmental movement members) also used Twitter to request donations, as was necessitated by their smaller, grassroots base. Hodges & Stocking (2016) suggest that corporate funding and elite support in the case of ‘pro-pipeline’ positions made fundraising less necessary.

What is clear from the existing scholarship on social media is that the potential for social media is yet to be fully revealed in terms of its tactical value for social movements, as well as the effects it will have on movements themselves. It is also unclear how leaders might effectively utilise this technology.

Much of the interest in social media in terms of leadership appears to revolve around the success of the Obama campaign in 2008, where the election campaign managed to accrue over 2.5 million Facebook followers (Gozalez, Vodicka & White, 2011; Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer & Bichard, 2010), but leadership theory doesn’t appear to have a meaningful theory of change to which social media
contributes. Gonzalez et al (2011) promote social media for educational leaders as being vaguely about ‘promoting change’ and ‘advocacy’ without any understanding of what it is about these platforms which creates opportunities for change. Zhang et al (2010) similarly conflate the large numbers of Facebook followers and the voters which Obama amassed to point towards to influence of social media, but is not able to provide a meaningful link between these two variables as causative rather than merely correlative.

Political leaders similarly appear to have a limited understanding of the capacity of social media. In New Zealand, Ross, Fontaine & Comrie (2015) found that politicians in particular struggled to use Facebook effectively, with those leaders who did use the technology preferring to use it for broadcast rather than engagement with their constituents. This suggests that these leaders don’t necessarily understand the technology, or as elites they don’t share the same motivations for engaging through social media that other movement leaders might. In many senses political leaders have simply wanted to use social media to replicate Obama’s electoral success, without necessarily understanding what might be unique or challenging about social media as a tactical landscape.

In the Tasmanian environmental movement, leadership around social media, and the internet more broadly, appears (in 2009) to have consisted of attempts to leverage the power of new media to gain access and ‘newsworthiness’ with traditional news media.

The internet is a tool targeted at gaining news media attention for activists, although built within this objective are two discrete functions. In Australian and local coverage it is a representational novelty or ‘point of difference’ that journalists can write about, thereby attracting the attention of the news journalists and the public to the campaign. Internationally, the internet becomes a mechanism valued more for its functionality, with its transnational architecture serving to ‘spread the word’ beyond the shores of Tasmania and mainland Australia (Lester & Hutchins, 2009: 589).

In this sense, as Lester & Hutchins (2009) note, the movement has, like the political leaders in Fontaine (2015), failed to see the unique potential of new and social media. In the case of movements this appears to be the opportunities for self-representation; to circumvent the media and express their positions on their own terms. Leaders potentially make an important contribution to this, as they help set the standard for the effective use of technology; Schussman & Earl (2004)
have previously noted that technical skill is important in leveraging new technologies effectively within movements, and that the skill of leaders has important implications for how movements integrate technological developments like social media. If leaders don’t have the requisite technical skill or knowledge of emerging strategies around social media then they’re less likely to be interested or able to take advantage of these.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature around media and social movement engagement and demonstrated a number of key areas where research into the motivations and understandings of leadership might contribute to a richer theoretical engagement with leaders contributions to the workings of social movements, as well as a further appreciation of the complex dynamics between activists and those working in government, industry and the news media to achieve outcomes for their campaigns.

Leaders play important roles in movements interactions with the media as central authoritative points whom journalists can approach for comment, or who approach journalists to spread a story. Movements need these figures to engage with the media to mobilise, validate their issues and expand their reach; if they ignore the demand for these kinds of figures then the media may potentially nominate figures without them. Leaders who seek to engage in framing issues through media engagement ultimately face a variety of challenges which ultimately draw upon the personal qualities mentioned in previously.

Leaders don’t just play a role in engaging with the news media but also determining how and why they should be engaged; this extends beyond news media and into emerging media like social media. Social media has been touted by scholars as particularly critical to contemporary social movements, but it isn’t clear whether social movement leaders are using social media to its fullest potential; at the moment it appears that social media has been seen as secondary to traditional media forms, and the strategies they have deployed largely resemble historical approaches rather
than approaches which are native to the technological paradigm in which they operate. What form these native approaches might take is too variable to speculate upon at this point in time\textsuperscript{6}.

It is also unclear whether the ‘social movement leader’ as an archetype is capable of making the most of social media, where a different set of skills, approaches and leadership styles appear to be more advantageous in terms of using the medium’s strengths to the movement’s advantage.

Assessing these factors in further detail offers a clear strategic location for engagement with leaders in social movements to assess their capacities and roles, and to develop a fuller theoretical lens around leadership in social movements.

\textsuperscript{6} In the same way that the modern uses of the printing press were incomprehensible upon its invention, the internet still largely replicates the functions of the old paradigm. Perhaps the current implementation is the end game for these emerging technologies, but prediction the uses of this technology is difficult and beyond the scope of this thesis.
Expanded Research Questions

Chapter Five

The previous review of the literature on leadership and social movements has raised questions about the nature of social movement leadership. It isn’t clear based on existing literature whether social movement leaders are comparable to leaders in other domains, or if the theoretical frameworks applied to leaders, such as elite theory, are relevant in the context of social movements. To properly assess the qualities of environmental leaders in Tasmania it is important to clarify the similarities and differences between these leaders and other kinds of leaders. This is particularly true given that leadership is already a concept overburdened by its use across many different disciplines.

As such the first set of questions I want to ask around leadership are:

1. What is the relationship between the environmental movement and its leaders? How similar is leadership of the Tasmanian Environmental movement to ‘mainstream’ conceptions of leadership?
2. To what extent do environmental leaders share the characteristics of political elites?

Chapter Six

Understanding the basis for leadership depends on understanding the contributions of leaders to their organisations, both to assess the resources available to leaders, but also to assess the particular needs that leaders address. Assessing these qualities are important to address questions from the literature about the validity and need for leaders. It seems particularly important to address charges that leaders are unnecessary or irrelevant, or that leaders simply take advantage of organisational dysfunction for personal gain. Assessing the contributions of leaders and the basis for their power is critical to determine the validity of these claims.

3. What skills, resources and ideological positions do leaders bring to the movement and to the organisations that they run? To what extent do these contributions, create selection pressures for leadership?
4. How important are leaders, and the contributions they make, in the context of the Tasmanian environmental movement?
Chapter Seven
Traditionally movement leaders have been viewed in relation to mass movements or protest actions, roles which largely suggest public and political influence is derived from the collective power of the group they represent. However Gitlin’s (1980) examination of the SDS and Kretschmer’s (2007) account of platform leadership suggests that leaders have the potential to operate fairly independently from the mass movement in terms of their collective influence and demands.

This chapter takes the form of a case study into some particular aspects of this phenomena that emerged around the market when conducting interviews with leaders, but is guided by two questions around the strategic locatedness of leaders:

5. How dependent are leaders on mass movements as the basis for their influence outside the movement? How does the relationship between leaders and the broader movement affect how leaders are perceived?

6. What are the principle rationale of environmental leaders in Tasmania? As per Melucci (1994), are leaders revolutionaries or are they ‘oiling the gears’ of societal order?

Chapter Eight
There has been substantive work on the interactions between movement leaders and the news media. This subject is valuable as it is a particular locus where failing to recognise movement leaders fundamentally compromises the ability of analysis to account for the affect of power dynamics between the news media and social movements. With this in mind it makes sense for a study of Tasmanian environmental leadership to investigate how these leaders approach the media and how this shapes the direction and tactics of social movements.

7. Where are the media priorities for environmental leaders? What is the principle focus of their interactions with the news media, and how do they understand their relationship with the news media?

8. What role does social media play in environmental leaders campaigning and the construction of their leadership?
Chapter Four: Methodology

Introduction

In the preceding review of literature in social movement leadership a number of critical issues are evident around the identification and theorising of leadership in social movements including the environmental movement. Part of the reason for these identification problems can be attributed to methodological choices on the part of researchers, particularly a prioritisation of social constructionist methodologies which privilege the perceptions and beliefs of research participants above all else.

Drobbin (2001) makes this clear in his criticism of research silencing the role of emotions in social movements, where theorists viewed movement participants as wholly rational actors because actors had incentive to speak only in rational ways. Researchers “take actors at their word... [using] the same language as actors themselves...” (Drobbin, 2001: 74-78), thus casting the perceptions of their subjects as objective reality.

Barker, Johnson & Lavalette (2001: 2) highlight similar issues in their review of social movement leadership literature, pointing out that discomfort with sociological theories of leadership may have contributed to movement tendencies to promote collective decision making or ‘direct democracy’. This view toward circumventing leadership is consistent with Hacking’s (1999: 6) thesis on how social constructionism is popularly used, where some feature of society – here, leadership – is seen as socially constructed and negative and thus – by virtue of its having been constructed – can be eliminated or radically transformed7. Barker et al (2001) suggest that this attempted deconstruction has been part of why social movement leadership has not been adequately theorised.

Indeed social constructionism lies at the core of many ‘new social movement’ philosophies, providing both critical analysis of societies and grievances for movement adherents along with a

7 Examples of this in the field of sociology would include understandings of race and gender as socially constructed and thus, perhaps somewhat naively, that these constructs might be reshaped to the whims of the individual. Recognition of race as socially constructed was unable to prevent the many ways in which societies make race ‘real’; similarly recent debates on the social constructed-ness of gender have sought to alter the historically dominant understanding of ‘two genders’ in Western societies. This isn’t to say that their ideas may not have merit, but fails to recognise that socially constructed ‘truths’ have weight because they are mediated by broader society. Recent public and academic discussion of ‘transracialism’ have been sites of significant contention due to these ‘real’ social understandings.
powerful if simplistic theory of change: x is not inevitable, therefore we can create a society without x. This appealing epistemological position colours both movements and those who study them, particularly when those researchers are activists in movements themselves – see for example Jeffery Juris (2011) or Timothy Doyle (2001).

Both the critiques of Drobbin (2001) and Barker et al (2001), along with the previous review of literature around social movement leadership, highlight that social constructionist perspectives do provide helpful perspectives of movement life, but some fall short of gaining true explanatory power because they take the perceptions, beliefs and values of movement participants and render them as unproblematic truths, disregarding the foibles and limitations of human knowledge. Movement theory is filled with the silences and quiet zones which result from taking participants at their word, glossing over structures and power relations simply because activists claim they are not there, or in any case would see them done away with. But as Freeman (1999a; 1999b) and Barker (1993) show, the structures and power relations that are ‘deconstructed’ may have ways of reappearing in forms far less compatible with human flourishing than their originals.

As such, social constructionism appears to be an inadequate research methodology when dealing with social movement research beyond the merely perceptual, and more so when considering that this research is concerned with how power relations involved in leadership operate, not merely how they are constructed. Social constructionist epistemologies fail to adequately theorise the complex dynamics of social movements because they consistently fall into an epistemic fallacy, that is, they collapse epistemology into ontology to claim that an empirical view of a phenomena is able to accurately describe the ‘real’ phenomena (Bhaskar, 2008).

Part of the solution to the problems which plague social movement research must then come not just from the theoretical lenses through which researchers view movements but also from the methodological frameworks they deploy to investigate them. Addressing the silences in social movement literature requires a nuanced and strategic methodological approach which recognises the limitations of empirical knowledge and the necessity of the ‘real’ in sociological endeavours. Critical realism (Bhaskar, 2008) presents a potential methodological framework to address these problems, principally because critical realism prioritises the integrity and applicability of knowledge over epistemological positions around positivist or socially constructed knowledge. Bhaskar (2008:
26-28) asserts that both positivist and constructionist positions depend upon empirical realism – the idea that a law-governed reality can be uncovered through the experience of ‘events’ – but that both fail to produce a meaningful understanding of causality as a result of this dependence. Realists are particularly interested in causality and the “actual mechanisms that are involved in particular events and situations” (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2007) as they represent not just variables but “an account of the makeup, behaviour and interrelationship of those processes which are responsible for the regularity” (Pawson & Tilley, 1997: 65). This is particularly critical for identifying the emergence and influence of leaders because it allows a deep examination of how authority and influence operate within the movement.

Beckett (2007) contends that methodological realism is an essential part of ethical social research, particularly when that research may influence practice or policy-making. Without the ‘depth ontology’ characteristic of realist approaches – particularly critical realism – research can either impose a false objectivity or fail to address anything outside of the perceptions of its participants. Some theorists and scholars in the field of media studies similarly see an important role for the realist perspective: Jensen (2002: 269-270) argues that realism is important for what Anders & Machin (2013) refer to as methodological ‘convergence’ to overcome a longstanding quantitative/qualitative divide – these being the methodological conclusions of positivist and constructionist ontological perspectives, respectively.

A realist approach is fundamental to this research because it addresses the fundamental problem with social inquiry: that theory is by necessity an abstraction, similar to Weber’s – and subsequently Rootes (2004: 610) – critical view of theoretical abstraction. The ‘transcendental realism’ which forms a central aspect of critical realist thought doesn’t purport to provide a perfect understanding of reality, but reflects the necessity of imperfect abstraction in making meaning. We draw on theory to understand the social world, but each specific phenomena described by a theory will inevitably differ in a variety of ways specific to the context they inhabit. A theory might describe the contributions of leaders, but each individual leader with conform and diverge from that theory as a result of their biography, the organisation they work in, the movement they participate in and the issues relevant to that movement in a particular place and time.
Similarly ‘transcendental realism’ recognises that close examinations of the social world, through ethnography and other means, are only small parts of a larger puzzle. This assists in locating this particular research as part of a broader effort around social movement leadership and leadership more generally; sociological approaches to questions of leadership will never be able to provide a definitive understanding. If real leaders differ from theory in a variety of ways which depend on their context, and we can only examine particular leaders using the tools of sociological enquiry, then it is never possible to get a ‘neutral’ perspective of leadership that isn’t shaped by the individuals studied and the processes used to study them. It is necessary to include sociological inquiry alongside other disciplinary approaches in order to produce a holistic picture. This research does draw on a variety of approaches in part to address the weaknesses of narrowly focused investigations, but it is important to recognise that even this can not be entirely sufficient and that multiple approaches from different researchers and research teams is ideally best practice in achieving a full view of a phenomenon.

Principally this research is realistic about its ‘locatedness;’ its context in time and space and the specifics of the social, political and economic norms and ideologies which produce the ‘social landscape’ in which the phenomena of social movements in Tasmania emerge. This necessarily limits the kinds of findings this research might produce to a fairly modest analysis, or at least one with conditions and acknowledged limitations. It also requires this research to draw from a rich and diverse background of sources – not just qualitative interviews but other kinds of qualitative and quantitative data such as news reports and broader social and economic analysis, in order to provide multiple sources for the findings of the research and provide a deep picture of the kinds of changes that are occurring throughout the Tasmanian environmental movement. Ultimately this study will attempt to look towards the ‘mechanisms’ of these social changes and determine how well current theoretical positions match the reality.

Identifying Movement Leaders: Who counts, who matters?

The identification of leaders is an important part of understanding how leaders contribute to the environmental movement in Tasmania, one which was as much philosophical as methodological. How leaders and leadership were defined for methodological purposes would ultimately constrain the potential insights from the research by either broadening the definition of leadership to a mere
behaviour which anyone could partake in over the course of their lives or reducing it to a mere hierarchical position. Either extreme creates problems for researchers. Consider the consequences of Gemmil & Oakley’s (1992) argument against leaders, or the position of activists who claim their movements are leaderless: research which took such a stance would find a countless number of individual ‘leaders’, the vast majority of whom might make no appreciable impact on the tactics, resources, philosophies or campaigns of the movement. As one interviewee put it: “the environmental movement is actually made up of several thousand leaders, even in Tasmania I often say there are something in the order of ten to twenty thousand silent leaders who devote a huge amount of their time and effort working on some aspect of environmentalism.” [L08] The logistics of undertaking such research would be well beyond the scope of this PhD project, although certainly worthwhile in terms of assessing the overall power dynamics of the movement. On the other hand the literature on leadership has made it clear that there are important leadership functions for individuals who do not occupy the top of an organisational hierarchy or are excluded from the formal hierarchy altogether (Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998; Morris & Staggenborg, 2004). It would be problematic to exclude those voices altogether, particularly when, as discussed in the previous chapter on social movement leadership, these ‘bridge leaders’ often appear to be much more influential and powerful at an intra-movement level where formal leaders project extra-movement power.

As such it made sense to develop a view of leaders with a focus on their influence and authority but without simply drawing on the existing organisational hierarchy of the Tasmanian environmental movement as a guide to identification (i.e. Using the ‘head of organisation x’ as a proxy for leadership). An alternative measure was required to get a more dynamic view of who was influential in the Tasmanian environmental movement, without excluding those ‘heads of organisations’ who usually – and almost by definition – are leaders.

A criterion sampling strategy (Patton, 2001: 238) was used to determine the first round of environmental leaders for interviewing, in order to find leaders who were both influential and engaged with the media, although these two criteria were not necessarily mutually exclusive. In order to understand leaders in terms of their extra-movement and intra-movement influence, two measures were chosen. The first was to assess extra-movement influence through the representation of leaders in the media to gain an understanding of who was seen as newsworthy
and authoritative. Leaders who were viewed as credible and who could speak ‘on behalf’ of the movement in the public sphere are often viewed as newsworthy, but leaders who can be cast as ‘extremists’ or ‘radicals’ and could serve as foils in stories around development projects were also likely to appear in the media based on a review of media activity around social movements (see for example Gitlin, 1980; Lester, 2007). The second measure was to assess intra-movement influence through a survey and snowball sample of environmental leaders identified through the media sample, as a way to confirm or deny findings from the media sample but also uncover other potential leaders who operated behind the scenes as bridge leaders or other specialist roles. These approaches were taken at two levels; first, a preliminary (for this research) media sample and survey conducted nationally, followed by a survey of Tasmanian media and snowball interviews in Tasmania.

The first phase was a survey of media at a national level, looking at leaders in all states and territories of Australia; this phase had been completed before I joined the research team as it formed the basis for a broader research project than this thesis, and is extensively detailed in Lester, McGaurr & Tranter (2015: 7-8):

[The survey] focuses on two weeks in each Australian federal election campaign, usually held every three years, from 1990 to 2013. Election campaigns are useful points of departure for more detailed analysis of the construction of environmental concerns because they are critical discourse moments—periods that “entail a potential for transformation in understandings of a problematique and constitute a test for ‘established’ discursive positions” (Carvalho and Burgess 2005: 1462). We chose the third and second last weeks before election days because we judged campaigning would be well under way by then with news routines unlikely to be as disrupted as they might become closer to the poll.

Our principal source of printed articles for our longitudinal analysis is Fairfax’s *Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)*. Established in 1831, the SMH is a moderately progressive publication aimed at an educated readership. It was published as a broadsheet during the first eight election campaigns we investigated but has since moved to a format it describes as “compact.” We chose the metropolitan SMH rather than Australia’s only national generalist newspaper, News Ltd.’s [now News Corp.] *Australian*, because Fairfax’s News Store online searchable database of its printed editions starts in the 1980s, more than a decade earlier than most other Australian news organizations.
To trace the importance of the environment in many of its manifestations across all federal elections since 1990, we began by searching for approximately sixty words/ phrases (and their extensions) associated with environmental issues. With reference to previous studies of environmental news texts (e.g., Cox 2012), surveys of public opinion on environmental issues, and statements by environmental advocates, we ensured our sample was both comprehensive and able to accommodate changes to issue visibility, labelling [sic] or dominant discourses across our sample period—for example, the shift from “global warming” to “climate change” in public discourse (Leiserowitz et al. 2014; see also Dryzek 2013). During our searches, we downloaded and scanned articles containing these words to cull duplicates, articles in advertising or community supplements, most articles in sections such as motoring, real estate and sport, and other articles that did not contain references to environmental issues (e.g., those that only contained constructions such as “economic environment” or “retail environment”). We included letters to the editor.

From these articles, leaders were identified by searching for individuals positively associated with pro-environmental stances and/or associated with an environmental organisation. The findings from this media sample identified 70 individuals who were associated with environmental reporting nationwide. These leaders were also contacted by email and asked to nominate those people within the Australian environmental movement which they considered to be most influential. These responses were used to confirm the media sample and assist in accounting for those who were influential ‘behind the scenes’ and may not have been present in the media sample. The results of this survey were tallied to identify the influence of individuals at a national level. Those who featured predominantly in stories about Tasmanian campaigns or whose most recent coverage was around a Tasmanian campaign were identified as prominent potential leaders.

The second phase of this research was an attempt to replicate the first phase with a specific focus on Tasmania, in order to gain a closer view of potential leaders in Tasmania and widen the potential sample of leaders (as only 10 individuals predominantly associated with Tasmanian campaigns were significantly identified at the national level). For this phase the research focused on a six-week period prior to the 2014 state elections, held on the 15th March. The extensive period of this sampling was to allow for the emergence of stories over time.
The media sources used for this phase were principally News Corporations *Mercury*, whose distribution is predominantly Hobart and southern Tasmania, but also covers issues around the state. It additionally drew upon Fairfax’s *Examiner* and *Advocate*, which respectively cover Launceston and the Tasmanian north-east, and Burnie and the Tasmanian north-west. Finally, the State-owned Australian Broadcasting Corporations *ABC News* online Tasmanian coverage and independently owned *Tasmanian Times*, an online publication with a contrarian perspective on politics rounded out the collection of sources.

The *Mercury*, along with the *Examiner* and the *Advocate* have long standing histories of taking anti-environmental stances (Ajani, 2007; Krien, 2012), although the *Mercury* in particular has softened its position on environmental issues as it became clear that they were alienating a significant portion of their readership by actively campaigning around pro-development positions including dams and forestry (Lester, 2007). These three publications represent the major newspaper coverage throughout the state. *ABC News* is an online publication which acts as an extension of the ABC’s radio and television broadcasts, which many view as holding a centre-left perspective (Holmes, 2016) although this appears to be true of journalists as a cohort in Australia, not just within any one publication (Hanusch, 2013).

Some additional coverage was provided by *SMH* and the *Australian* to provide perspectives on Tasmanian issues from a national standpoint; this was largely incidental coverage which was identified through a Google News Alert for the keywords: enviro*, green, conservation*, climate change, Tasmania*, forest*, dams8. This coverage proved to be fairly minimal, with only 6 articles appearing in the *Australian* during the survey period, and a single article in *SMH*, compared with 36 articles from the principal state-based publications.

Articles were identified largely through close reading; the physical publications – *Mercury, Examiner* and *Advocate* – were assessed by hand, reading the paper each day and searching for articles about environmental issues, identified by a discussion of the environment, pollution issues, logging, dams

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8 The asterisk (*) indicates where a wildcard was used for search purposes, returning results which shared the same ‘root’; for example ‘enviro*’ might return articles containing ‘environment, environmental, environmentally, environs...’ etc.
or green politics. These articles were copied for analysis. A similar process was used for *Tasmanian Times*, which usually posted 1-3 new articles each day, making assessment of new content straightforward. *ABC Online* was a more automated process, as the ABC makes available a ‘Really Simple Syndication’ (RSS) feed for Tasmania. Using online tool IFTTT, I wrote a script to automatically email any stories in the RSS feed which featured the terms “enviro*, green, conservation*, climate change, forest*, dams”.

These articles were analysed and potential leaders identified; again, this was done by searching for individuals associated with pro-environmental stances and/or associated with environmental organisations. Individuals who appeared in more than one story were then coded as possible leaders, and cross referenced with the findings of the national study to identify those leaders whose influence was more significant.

The third phase of leader identification was a snowball sampling strategy conducted during interviews; Tasmanian leaders who were approached for interview were asked either as part of the interview or via a follow-up email to identify individuals who they believed were influential in the Tasmanian environmental movement. These ‘nominations’ were tallied over the course of the research both as a way to further identify leadership contributions behind the scenes and also to triangulate the findings of the media surveys and to attempt to control for any ‘false’ or ‘celebrity leaders’ who do not represent the core beliefs or positions of the movement but play into media narratives (see Gitlin, 1980).

**Justification**

This approach to sampling is consistent with sampling strategies in sociology (Mason, 2007) and previous approaches to social movement research (Blee & Taylor, 2002) as well as qualitative approaches in media studies (Hansen & Machin, 2013). Gitlin (1980) and Morris & Staggenborg (2004) have previously highlighted the critical role that media interactions have for leaders and movement leadership, particularly when there is a clear and explicitly recognised leadership on the part of the movement. As previously discussed, leader identification is much harder for the media when leadership is submerged or denied (Gitlin, 2013; Calhoun, 2013). Because leaders require

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9 Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/tas/
media amplification in order to reach the broader public, they tend to form mutually reinforcing relationships with the media which affirm their status as leaders, with individuals displaying leadership qualities around their media skills, ability to articulate arguments, and charisma more likely to approach the media. Their subsequent presence in the media solidifies and expands their status as a leader in the eyes of the public. In the Tasmanian context there has been a long history of this kind of sophisticated media engagement on the part of leaders beginning with the Franklin campaign, despite journalists and the media pushing back on the agendas of activists (see for example Thompson, 1984 but also Krien, 2012; Hutchins & Lester, 2006; 2015).

As such a media-centric sampling approach appears appropriate as a first-wave sampling strategy for leadership identification; it identifies leaders who are prominent not just within the movement but also within public discourse. These leaders are not just significant to the movement, they are important because they represent the most prominent connection between the movement, mainstream social and political elites, and the public (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004; Tranter, 2009).

Content analysis forms the basis of this sampling strategy. As a well established method within media studies and sociology, it forms a strong base from which to extend social inquiry (Hansen & Machin, 2013). As Hansen & Machin (2013: 93) note, it is “rarely possible or desirable to analyse absolutely all media coverage of a subject, area or issue. At the same time, it is precisely one of the major advantages of content analysis... that it lends itself to the examination of large bodies of media content.” This makes content analysis a valuable approach from which to survey as broad a range of media sources as possible to identify potential leaders. Lester, McGa ur & Tranter’s (2015) prior research into this area also deployed this strategy with good results.

Content analysis in this case comprises of a simple keyword search and count, which also minimises some of the problems with the approach that scholars have highlighted, which appear to fundamentally revolve around issues of meaning in textual analysis (Burgelin, 1972; Sumner, 1979). Simply counting the appearance and repetition of words without a broader theory of significance is meaningless – that “it is not the significance of repetition that is important but the repetition of significance” as Sumner (1979: 69) puts it – and that items or words should not be viewed as significant apart from the text as a whole. In the case of this research, repetition is not in and of itself significant. The approach does not seek a broad quantitative approach but is instead looking
for specific, significant repetitions – those of named individuals and the organisations to which they belong, and specifically environmental organisations and their leaders/representatives.

As this approach only forms one aspect of a tripartite sampling strategy (national content analysis and survey; state-based content analysis; snowballing) the repetition beyond the single appearance in any given sample isn’t especially significant; it can inform analysis of leader prominence but obviously not whether that prominence is overall characterised as positive or negative by the media. Of course this is not the purpose of this content analysis – it seeks simply to identify prominence rather than assign meaning beyond the assertion that media prominence is likely to reflect leadership status in the environmental movement. Here the appearance in two or more of the national, state and snowball samples has been treated as more significant for the purposes of leader identification, rather than prominence in any one sample. As such the previously mentioned critiques of content analysis, whilst well founded when applied to research where content analysis forms the central part of social inquiry, appear less applicable in the context of a sampling strategy.

The principal selection criteria for the media population for the state-based content analysis was geographical. As the research is concerned with the Tasmanian environmental movement the focus was primarily on Tasmanian media. Historically, the Tasmanian media have been at times hostile to environmental campaigners and forced activists to go to mainland newspapers (Lester, 2011). Over time, state-based media have become more receptive to the coverage of environmental issues (Lester, 2007), and more likely to have regular coverage of local campaigning, even if that coverage was negative. As the sampling strategy principally assesses leader prominence rather than meaning, any and all coverage was valuable.

The period of the sample was guided by the prior national sampling undertaken by Lester, McGaurr & Tranter (2015) with the 6 weeks prior to the state election being chosen because the election campaign presented a valuable opportunity for the movement to exert pressure through the media and would likely result in a higher level of coverage of environmental issues compared to a randomly chosen sample period. Again, as overall representation of the movement in the media was not the principal concern of this approach, the election period sample was judged better for the purposes of leader identification. It is possible to make an argument that this sampling strategy may have excluded leaders in smaller campaigns and organisations due to a focus on the political
campaign, but environmental issues may have also been less salient to journalists and editors outside of this period, resulting in their exclusion from the sample. Snowballing strategies were adapted to ameliorate this problem. The election period was also chosen because of convenience, as it occurred only 6 months after the project commenced; presenting a unique opportunity.

While the content analysis sample strategy appears relatively unproblematic, previous work on movements has shown that there are also ‘invisible’ or silent leadership behind the scenes, particularly bridge leaders (Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998) or other submerged leaders (Gitlin, 1980). Other Australian campaigns such as the anti-fracking ‘Lock the Gate’ movement are increasingly emphasising a grassroots approach over and above a centralised leadership – although on close inspection there is still a clear but submerged leadership cadre (Hutton, 2012a; 2012b; 2014). Lester (2011) and Lester & Hutchins (2012) have also highlighted the changing dynamic of movement-media interactions and the role that invisibility plays out around critical moments of campaigns in Tasmania. Leaders increasingly do not need the spotlight of the media in order to be effective, and they are willing to approach their goals in pragmatic and entrepreneurial ways. In this regard a media sampling approach is not salient, as leaders are more and more likely to be viable and effective outside of the media ‘sphere’ as they are inside.

Targeted ‘key informant’ snowball sampling presents a way to overcome these problems by drawing on the expertise of leaders uncovered through other sampling strategies to identify those individuals who are viewed as influential. Heckathorn (1997: 174) suggests that the study of ‘hidden populations’ – those with no sampling frame, and/or with privacy concerns – is usually addressed by “snowball sampling and other chain referral samples, key informant sampling, and targeted sampling.” Blee & Taylor (2002) suggest that key informant sampling is highly appropriate for social movement research, particularly because it focuses on the role of the participant within the broader movement, with the chief criterion for key informant sampling being the “amount of knowledge he or she has about a topic and his or her willingness to communicate with the researcher” (Blee & Taylor, 2002: 105). Key informant sampling approaches are however not enough on their own; the broader media sample in this research is in itself an attempt to identify key informants and subsequent approaches are necessary to identify other key informants who might not be visible through this approach. Key informant sampling also usually employs participants as ‘third-party’ witnesses rather than for their first-person accounts (Heckathorn, 1997: 106).
This raises some questions about the appropriateness of key informant sampling in this context, although social movement researchers Rupp & Taylor (in Blee & Taylor, 2002: 105-106) have used this strategy in a more ambiguous fashion where they utilised both third-person confirmation and first-person accounts as part of their documenting of leadership in the ‘women’s movement’.

For these reasons it is necessary to combine key informant sampling with traditional snowball sampling to identify otherwise invisible leaders, drawing on the networks of previously identified individuals to determine who they interact with and who they view as influential in the movement. However snowball sampling also has limitations. As Hackathorn (1997) notes, snowball sampling – along with other chain-referral samples – suffer because they are dependent on the size and breadth of the initial sample, particularly because it is nearly impossible to draw the initial sample randomly or without a known bias. Drawing on a media sample to establish the initial sample reduces researcher bias, but may relocate potential sources of bias to the media and individual journalists. Despite this, the previously mentioned relationship between environmental leaders and the media makes this an appropriate compromise, as media bias is more likely to reflect community perception and meaningful power relations (Gitlin, 1980) in ways that researcher bias would not.

Snowball sampling is also limited because of who participants choose to refer, and which of those referrals choose to participate (Hackathorn, 1997: 175). This is particularly critical in the context of social movements because movements are almost always factional (Blee & Taylor, 2002: 98), where ‘siding’ with one group may mean being denied access to another. Participants may choose not to nominate individuals they believe are vulnerable or who are part of another faction, or simply only nominate individuals who are politically palatable. Blee & Taylor (2002: 98) also note that factionalisation makes it significantly more difficult for researchers to remain ‘outsiders’ as their inquiry can itself become politicised. This is a notable concern in the case of this research as the environmental movement in Tasmania had, just prior to the commencement of this research, undergone a well publicised factional split around the Tasmanian Forestry Agreement (TFA). However at least some of the concerns around selection biases are mitigated because a) the previous media sampling strategy has helped establish an ‘organisational landscape’ of the key organisations and potential factions within the movement; and b) the fact that the factional split has been well publicised means that it can at least be accounted for when assessing the overall
sample. Often the concern with factionalism is that researchers are not aware of factions prior to engaging in the research (see for example Taylor, 1996) and that these divides – the Rumsfeldian ‘unknown unknowns’ – will hinder accessibility or bias the research towards a particular faction. Having prior warning of factionalism within the movement allowed the researcher to better navigate inter-organisationally to interview leaders on both sides of the factional divide and specifically target each side to allow a plurality of perspectives.

This attempt to at least partially correct for factionalism and achieve further representation through snowball sampling resembles at least in part targeted sampling (Hackathorn, 1997), because the preliminary media sample allows for some ‘mapping’ of the environmental movement in Tasmania. However best practice targeted sampling requires a thorough ethnographic mapping of the movement (Hackathorn, 1997: 175). This was not feasible because the Tasmanian movement wasn’t geographically discrete enough for this to occur, while time limitations on the project prevent thorough mapping. Rather, the approach adapted here drew philosophically from the targeted sampling approach to draw on the findings of other sampling strategies, along with some low-level ethnographic engagement in the form of attending public events, seminars and rallies, to guide the ongoing snowball sample.

Data Collection

Qualitative Interviews

Qualitative approaches, particularly ethnographic approaches, dominate the existing literature around social movements and the media. Gitlin’s (1980) *The Whole World is Watching* is instructive here as a key text; one which examines both leadership and the interactions with the media, Gitlin writes from his perspective and experience as a member of Students for a Democratic Society during the 1970’s. Others such as Routledge & Simons (1995), Juris (2011), Smith (2005) and Mason (2004) make similarly persuasive arguments for its use. However the particular focus on leadership within social movements for this research makes a pure ethnographic approach problematic.

Ethnography, as a methodological tradition with its roots in anthropology, places a strong emphasis on participant observation and immersion (Picken, 2011; Kottak, 2009; Cresswell, 2007) and is particularly focused on understanding social practice in broad detail within subcultures. As a
researcher and movement outsider this raises particular questions about the feasibility of immersion and participant observation given the particular constraints of time and geography. More importantly, even if an ethnographic study of environmental leaders as a particular and sometimes powerful sub-section of a sub-culture were theoretically justifiable, by what measure would a researcher claim immersion and participation within such an elite group, save by becoming an environmental leader themselves? Beyond the issues of just how comfortably the research questions fit with ethnographic practice, the idea of immersion and participant observation sit uncomfortably with realist research approaches, where attempts towards objectivity and distance are preferred (see Hammersley, 1990; 1992).

Consequently, this research is inspired and informed by the practices and theoretical depth of ethnography (Mason, 2004), but employs a strategy of ‘generic qualitative inquiry’ (Patton, 2001) which is “not guided by an explicit set of philosophical assumptions… [but] has to be valid and apply rules and methods recognised in qualitative research” (Waller, 2013). Rather the use of interviews, informed by ethnographic methodology and praxis, form the basis for data collection.

Given the need for specific insights on environmental leaders, qualitative or ethnographic interviewing was an obvious choice for the chief research method. This is particularly true because ethnographic interviews are a fairly standard research method in sociology (Mason, 2007; Gillham, 2000; McNeill & Chapman, 2005; Neuman, 2011) as well as in media studies (Hansen & Machin, 2013). The interviews used for this research are not ‘pure’ ethnographic interviews in the strictest sense; they draw as much from more general qualitative interviewing due to the limitations of researching leaders as opposed to broader movement participants in the midst of actions. Qualitative interviews, Mason (2007: 62) argues, involve the interactional exchange of dialogue, involving one-on-one interactions or larger group interviews, and can take place face-to-face or mediated via various communication technologies. They typically take a relatively informal style compared to the highly structured ‘question and answer’ format, being “conversations with a purpose” rather than direct question and answers, and tend to be thematic, topic-centred, biographical or narrative in approach. Similarly, Babbie (2001) sees ethnographic interviews as “guided conversations”. Researchers are unlikely to have a complete and sequenced script of questions, conversations have a fluid structure, and researchers understand and account for the context in order to produce ‘situated knowledge’.
Neuman (2011: 451) distinguishes between survey interviews and ‘field’ or ethnographic interviews by highlighting typical features of both. The semi-structured interviews employed in this research would fit somewhere between these dichotomous positions; due to the pressures of time on leaders and the broad cross-section of leaders and organisations the research sought to examine, the interviews had a clear beginning and end, and some standardised questions, along the lines of survey interviews. The interviews were also one-on-one. Particular care was taken to maintain the conversational tone in line with Babbie’s (2001) view of semi-structured interviews as ‘casual conversations’.

Mason (2007: 66) warns that qualitative interviewing can be difficult to conduct when the basis for employing it is purely pragmatic. ‘Conversation with purpose’ does not always produce the kind of data researchers requires. Yet it is difficult to get the insights on leadership I am interested in other ways. While there are pragmatic reasons for employing qualitative interviews in this research, there are also previously mentioned compatibilities with the broad case-study approach and the underlying epistemological positions inherent in qualitative interviewing, where leaders are viewed as central to producing knowledge about their actions and tactics.

The use of semi-structured qualitative interviews for this research is consistent with existing best-practice into social movement analysis. Semi-structured interviews are seen as “particularly useful for understanding social movement mobilisation from the perspective of movement actors or audiences” (Blee & Taylor, 2002: 92) as they can reveal interviewees experiences and interpretation of reality. Semi-structured interviews are also valuable because they can be used as “as streamlined means of obtaining the rich, detailed data typically generated through field research without committing the investigator to prolonged involvement in the lives and activities of social movements” (Blee & Taylor, 2002: 93). While there was some limited opportunities for field observation in this research, much of the social movement activity during the research period was directed away from Tasmania as a fixed geographic locus towards national politics (the collapse of the TFIA/TFA and the federal Coalition government’s attempt to roll back the World Wilderness
Heritage Area expansion) or internationally (leaders preparing for the COP 21\textsuperscript{10} negotiations, or the World Wilderness Heritage campaign) which limited the viability of field work and direct observation.

Blee & Taylor (2002) argue that interviewing is also helpful because it allows for more diverse coverage of a movement, particularly where the movement is dominated by a few distinctive leaders or spokespeople. It “allows researchers to access members of social movements whose activities and understandings would be otherwise lost or filtered through the voices of others” (Blee & Taylor, 2002: 94), and has been particularly valuable in uncovering new forms of leadership as in Robnett’s (1997) study around bridge leadership. As such semi-structured interviewing offers a good fit for the aims of this research to uncover voices which are otherwise submerged. However it is also potentially problematic because by drawing on leaders it risked highlighting the experiences and beliefs of a group who already had a strong social presence and spoke on behalf of the movement. The risk is failing to meaningfully draw upon other kinds of leadership, particularly grassroots leaders and those who operate out of the media spotlight.

The previous discussion about the sampling strategy for this study attempts to deal with some of these issues, but potential limitations remain. It would be valuable to undertake further research into the organisations in which these leaders operate, and to conduct interviews with employees and volunteers, as well as members. This approach could provide a picture of not just how these leaders understand their roles in the movement, but how such roles are understood by other movement participants. Exploring this dimension of social movement leadership in a rigorous way was, however, beyond the scope of this research due to time constraints.

The research strategies which follow have been approved by the UTAS Human Research Ethics Committee under reference number H0013096, as part of a wider research project entitled \textit{Leadership and the Construction of Environmental Concerns in Australia}. This project received funding from the Australian Research Council under Project ID DP130102154. The findings of this broader project into environmental leadership diverge somewhat from the scope of this thesis in

\textsuperscript{10} COP 21 is the shorthand for the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, which was held in Paris from 30\textsuperscript{th} November to 12 December of that year. A number of leaders attended events both in Australia and internationally as part of their preparations for the negotiations which would form the Paris Agreement.
terms of analysis, but may be of interest to the reader. See Tranter, Lester & McGaurr (2017) for these findings.

The Interviews

As leaders were identified, they were approached by phone or email for interview. Interviews were conducted at a mutually agreed upon time and place, and usually lasted about an hour. Interviews were usually conducted in person, with the exception of one follow-up interview which was conducted by phone, and a single interview conducted using Skype videoconferencing software. Participants were asked a battery of questions devised as part of the broader national research project, including questions about leader biographies and origins of environmental concern; personal and organisational decision making, strategic planning and campaigning; understanding of leadership concepts, views of their own leadership and succession planning; the leaders use of networks; and engagement with the media. The full schedule of questions can be found in Appendix I. In total I approached 31 leaders for interview and was able to secure 19 interviews with 17 different environmental leaders.

Due to time constraints, not all questions were asked of every participant during the semi-structured interviews. Some participants would often expand upon particular topics or issues of interest or concern to them, or spoke at length about a particular campaign. During interviews I attempted to allow a certain amount of time for each broad topic and attempted to cover as many questions as possible in order to contribute to a suitable data set around each topic of interest; this was a flexible arrangement, as during the course of discussions participants would often anticipate later questions or recall details and ‘return’ to a previous question to fill in blanks. This approach allowed the interviews to remain fairly relaxed and encouraged conversational tone to build rapport and create opportunities to explore issues as deeply as possible in the limited time available.

Because some participants are, or were, in positions of political importance and could be subject to public critique or attack, leaders were given the option to be anonymised or named as part of consenting to be interviewed. However no individual asked to be anonymised. Participants were also asked to indicate whether they consented to the transcript of their interview being stored in
the Australian Social Science Data Archive in perpetuity, rather than the usual 5 year storage period. Again, no individuals took issue with this request. Interviews were recorded on two electronic recording devices and these files were then transferred to a computer, encrypted, and stored on a secure server maintained by the University of Tasmania along with a backup on a password protected, encrypted hard disk. I then personally transcribed the interviews in a strict verbatim style, including some elements of conversational analysis such as pauses, sighs and laughter. While this was not strictly beneficial for the analysis proposed for this specific research, because these transcripts are proposed to become part of the Australian Social Science Data Archive in perpetuity, and including as much information in these transcripts as possible was a personal judgement I made to maximise the potential utility of the transcripts for future researchers.

The transcripts were subsequently returned to the respective participants. This was done in part to provide participants with a record of their conversation and recognise their contributions as co-producers of knowledge, but also to allow participants, particularly those in sensitive positions, to either request the anonymisation or redaction of particular comments or quotations, or confirm that comments they had requested be made anonymous or redacted had been treated accordingly. Providing this opportunity to participants, and outlining this process to them prior to conducting the interviews, was part of establishing rapport and allow in depth discussion of the issues at hand. Many of the participants have had extensive dealings with the media, and as is revealed in this research, some quite negative experiences with journalists that may make them wary of being ‘on the record’ regarding sensitive internal organisational issues. Allowing participants to have control over their accounts made them comfortable enough to share insights into the dynamics of intra-movement relationships that helped guide my research questions and critical observations of movement activity. Transcripts that had been sent to participants and had any requested changes made were then stored for analysis.

Overall the changes requested by leaders were very minor; of 149,851 words in total of transcript produced by this research, only 800 words were requested to be made anonymous and 467 words redacted. This is less than 0.85% of the total transcript. The changes totalled 3 specific instances and all related to the specific sensitivity of inter-movement relationships. In one case the interviewee held an unorthodox and potentially unpopular view amongst other leaders, in the
other the interviewee was speaking about an ongoing public campaign that required some sensitivity so as not to harm relationships with other parties.

More commonly leaders wanted to ensure that they weren’t quoted with all the “ums and ahs,” which come with transcriptions in verbatim, and all were comfortable once reassured that these conversational analysis elements would be removed from their quotes for clarity.

Media Sample

As previously discussed, a news media sample was drawn to help identify leaders, but also to assist in understanding the context in which leaders operated. This sample was taken from Hobart’s Mercury, along with the Launceston based Examiner and the Burnie Advocate, along with ABC News online and the independent Tasmanian Times. A small collection of articles which appeared in SMH and the Australian were also included. The final data set included articles from the 20th January, 2014, until the 10th March, 2014, which was the date of the Tasmanian state elections. A detailed description of the collection of these articles appears previously in the section ‘Identifying Leaders’. These articles were then copied and saved for later analysis, with information including the article page number (if available), the date, the source, authors, and keywords (particularly the names of the individuals mentioned in the story). This returned a total of 39 articles for analysis.

A social media sample was also collected over this period to assess how movement organisations and environmental leaders were using social media, particularly given the emergence of social media as a powerful factor in the development of concern, the coordination of protest and the emergence of leadership in the existing literature (Bennett 2012; Eimhjellen, 2014; Ross, Fountaine & Comrie, 2015; Poell, Abdulla, Reider, Woltering & Zack, 2015). Identifying the uses of social media could be particularly helpful in assessing how movements and leaders view the grassroots of the movement and where they focus their time and resources in terms of organising and generating results. This was achieved by following the organisations and individuals (where a public-facing account was available) identified in the media sample and recording the content of their posts over a four week period from the 1st of February to the 1st of March, 2014. Their accounts on social media websites Facebook and Twitter were both tracked, where possible, with the date and
platform, account, full text, any hyperlinks and media content all saved along with a full link to the
original post. These were saved in a spreadsheet for analysis.

Facebook and Twitter were selected because they represent the two predominant social media
networks both in terms of size but also in terms of use by environmental movement organisations.

A survey of Tasmanian environmental movement websites and mailing lists during early
investigations into movement activities revealed that nearly all organisations using social media
used these networks. This was confirmed in later interviews where the only other network
mentioned was the Facebook owned Instagram network, by Greens senator Nick McKim (McKim,
N. Personal Communication, 27th January, 2015). Facebook and Twitter also dominate the literature
around social media and social movement activity (Bennett, 2012; Eimhjellen, 2014; Ross et al,
2015; Poell et al, 2015) making surveys of these networks in particular important for the sake of
comparison and understanding the holistic use of social media by social movements as an emerging
communication technology.

These approaches are well established media-centric research strategies around social movements,
particularly for analysing how and why movements and movement leaders engage with the media.

Article selection and analysis was based on the existing approach by Lester et al (2015) which
guided the broader research project behind this thesis, and the approach is consistent with media
studies practice as recommended by Hansen & Machin (2013) and a more generally qualitative
approach by Mason (2007). Similar approaches were also employed around social media by
implementation of this approach carries few exceptional risks, with the serious problems around
the approach being the amount of time required to collect and collate the data, and given the
manual nature of the data collection, an inability to account for deleted or edited posts – a problem
with social media in particular. Deleted and edited posts would be an interesting area of
investigation because they may reflect a change in the author’s intent; a reconsideration of what
they mean or the suitability of the post to achieve its desired goal. However this is a minor
consideration and this kind of ‘event’ anecdotally appears to happen infrequently, with the narrow
sample period in this study inappropriate to examine this issue in depth.
The analysis of these data is similarly straightforward and established through existing studies, as the data was principally used in conjunction with qualitative interviews. Its purpose was to assist in facilitating a discussion of news media and social media usage during the interview. Additionally it was used to compare and contrast participants accounts and narratives with the kinds of accounts and narratives used in news stories versus their social media channels to assist in analysis. This ‘triangulation’ reduces the both the regularity and depth of the researcher’s interpretation in assessing the use of media, instead privileging the accounts of leaders and allowing their ‘texts’ where relevant, to exist with as little intervention from the researcher as possible. This approach consistently considers these texts not as independent or even objective, but as creations which are inextricably linked to their authors and requires analysis through an author-centric lens.

However the principal use of the texts is the identification of key leaders and key issues for those leaders and their organisations. Both news texts and social media posts were coded around their key issue or campaign (e.g. “Anti-Trawler Campaign” or “World Wilderness Heritage Campaign”) to ascertain priorities for each environmental organisation or leader prior to conducting their interviews. As such the potential for problems around researcher interpretation of texts are very limited.

Preliminary Results and Leader Identification

The provisional sampling of the *Sydney Morning Herald* from 1990-2013 which formed the starting point for identification and recruitment of environmental leaders in Tasmania, identified 10 environmental leaders in the state who regularly appeared in the media sample and/or were identified as influential by their peers. There were other individuals who appear in the overall sample who were also part of this provisional sample, however they were excluded because they operate at a national level or in other states, and this research is in Tasmanian leadership. The Tasmanian individuals who appeared in the provisional sample are noted in the ‘National’ column of Table 1, below.

The second phase of the sample approach, which focused on news texts in the 4 weeks prior and 2 weeks following the 2014 state election, identified a number of other local leaders in addition to the provisional sample. The results of this survey are indicated under the ‘state media’ column of
Table 1, below, indicating the number of stories which included each leader during the sample period.

Table 1: Collation of all three Media Samples: National, State and Snowball.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>State Media</th>
<th>Snowball</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vica Bayley (TWS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bob Brown (TWS, Greens, BBF)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geoff Law (TWS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine Milne (TWS, Greens)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phill Pullinger (Tarkine National Coalition, ET)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Jordan (Tarkine National Coalition, Greens)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jenny Weber (TWS, Huon Valley EC, BBF)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peg Putt (Greens, M4C)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Nick McKim (Greens)</td>
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<td>Rebecca Hubbard (ET)</td>
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<td>Kim Booth (Greens)</td>
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<td>Elizabeth Taylor (TWS, Fossil Free UTAS)</td>
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<td>Lyndon Schneider (TWS)</td>
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<td>Alistair Graham (TWS, I)</td>
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<td>Rocky Sainty (Aboriginal Heritage Council)</td>
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<td>Ula Majewski (SWST)</td>
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<td>Todd Lambert (Stop the Trawler Alliance)</td>
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<td>Geoff Cousins (ACF)</td>
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<td>Michael Stokes</td>
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<td>Rosalie Woodruff (Greens)</td>
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<td>Richard Atkinson (Greens)</td>
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<td>Simon Burnett (Greens)</td>
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<td>Zoe Kean (Greens)</td>
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<td>Anthea Denholm</td>
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<td>Siddhartha Chakravarty (Sea Shepherd)</td>
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<td>Adam Meyerson (Sea Shepherd)</td>
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<td>Peter Hammarstedt (Sea Shepherd)</td>
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<td>Ruth Langford (Aboriginal Legal Centre)</td>
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<td>Rohan Church (Doctors for the Environment)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul O’Halloran (Greens)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Michelle Grady (PCT)</td>
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<td>Toomey Marta (ACMS)</td>
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<td>John Bryan (TCT)</td>
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<td>Alec Marr (TWS, BBF)</td>
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<td>Peter Simms (Tarkine National Coalition)</td>
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<td>Rod West</td>
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<td>Paul Oostings (TWS, BBF)</td>
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<td>Don Henry (ACF)</td>
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<td>Peter Hay (ET)</td>
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<td>Vanessa Bleyer (ET)</td>
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(cont.)
Gerard Castles (ET) 1 1
Michael Kennedy (HSI) 1 1
Richard Jones (UTG, ACF) 1 1
Bianca Jagger 1 1
Claire Rewcastle-Brown 1 1
Baru Bian (Sarawak) 1 1
Harrison Ngau (Sarawak) 1 1
Jan McDonald 1 1
Warrick Jordan (TWS) 1 1
Alex Tomlinson (Fossil Free UTAS) 1 1
Vicky Fish (350.org) 1 1
Naomi Kline 1 1
Bill McKibben (350.org) 1 1
Jess Feehley (EDO) 1 1
Adam Beeson (EDO) 1 1
Rob Blakers 1 1
Matt Newton 1 1
Dan Bruen 1 1
Nick Fitzgerald 1 1


Table 2: Organisational Representation in the Tasmanian State Media, February-March, 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Media Appearances</th>
<th>Associated Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Greens</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wilderness Society (TWS)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Tasmania (ET)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmanian Conservation Trust (TCT)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Electrical &amp; Plumbing Union (CEPU)*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop the Trawler Alliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Shepherd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors for the Environment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal Legal Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birdlife Tasmania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Brown Foundation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarkine National Coalition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launceston Environment Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This sample also included a count of environmental organisations mentioned in news texts. While the fact that journalists generally use ‘The Greens’ to refer to both the national and state parties made a meaningful count difficult to establish (although the Greens did appear in 21 stories during the sample period), it was more useful for Tasmanian environmental movement organisations. Most organisations which the story affiliated with environmental or pro-conservation perspective were
only mentioned in a single story (for example the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre or Doctors for the Environment). However a handful of organisations were mentioned multiple times – The Wilderness Society (mentioned 14 times, usually synonymously with Vica Bayley), Environment Tasmania (mentioned 9 times, with 4 of those simply identifying the organisation rather than an affiliated spokesperson), the Tasmanian Conservation Trust (mentioned 2 times) and the Stop The Trawler Alliance (mentioned 2 times). The Communications, Electrical and Plumbing Union (CEPU) was also mentioned 3 times, but this was not because the union had taken a particular environmental stance, but because Todd Lambert, who was a prominent spokesperson for the Stop the Trawler Alliance, was also a senior organiser for the CEPU and some journalists speculated his involvement was part of a partisan campaign on behalf of the Tasmanian Labor Party.

There are some clear correlations between the provisional, nationally focused, sample and the state election sample. Vica Bayley at The Wilderness Society, Christine Milne of the Australian Greens, Bob Brown, formerly of the Australian Greens but now running the Bob Brown Foundation, Phill Pullinger of Environment Tasmania, along with Geoff Law are all present in both samples. But there are some other voices who are also prominent, particularly Nick McKim and Cassy O’Connor of the Tasmanian Greens, Todd Lambert of the Stop the Trawler Alliance, and Geoff Cousins, then a business-man turned anti-pulp-mill campaigner, and at the time of writing the President of ACF.

Additionally, some of the most prominent Tasmanians in the national sample do not rate as highly in the state based media sample. Bob Brown, for example, was identified as highly prominent in national media throughout the sample period, but is only mentioned twice during the state election coverage. Similarly Christine Milne has quite a high profile nationally but ranks only a single mention in the state media. This may be in part because as former federal leader of the Australian Greens, and (then) current leader of the Australian Greens respectively, they weren’t directly associated with state-level politics.

The state election sample also neglects and marginalises some individuals and organisations who play an important part in the community of environmentalists in Tasmania, particularly those individuals who may not align with the priorities or concerns of the media. For this reason snowball sampling was included as part of the interview process, where leaders were asked who they found
to be influential. The results of this sampling approach, which show the number of nominations for each individual, appear in the ‘snowball’ column in the table above.

Here it becomes clear that not only are Tasmanian leadership networks extensive, but they extend beyond the state to other leaders nationally and even internationally. Again, Brown and Milne as leaders of the Greens are highly influential, but other Tasmanian leaders like Geoff Law, Vica Bayley and Peg Putt also appear more than once. It’s also clear that most if not all of these leaders are attached to movement organisations, most of them bureaucratic, rather than operating as independent agents.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed and reviewed the methodological approach and specific methods used for this research. It has examined the critical methodological issues which have previously hampered research into social movements, particularly the use of social constructionist approaches when examining the complex power relations and interacting interests which exist in movements, and how these approaches assist in rendering leadership invisible. Rather than taking participants at their word, this chapter has proposed applying modified realist approaches to social movement research. This would assist in revealing aspects of social movement activity around leadership which are usually submerged or suppressed by researchers.

I have also discussed the specific methods applied as part of this research, including the multifaceted approach used to identify leaders and the semi-structured interviews, and covered the additional methods around media and social media sampling used to assist the research process. Utilising these approaches together generated data from which the rest of the thesis draws.

In the next chapter the broad findings of this approach will be discussed, assessing the identity and influence of leaders throughout the Tasmanian environmental movement and the relevant organisations which are associated with these leaders and the broader movement. It will use these to assess whether leaders can be considered ‘elites’ in a consistent manner with Elite Theory and
examine the activist biography of Dr. Bob Brown as a case study into the potential for environmental leaders to be ‘elites’.
Results and Discussion
Chapter 5: Are Movement Leaders Elites?

Introduction

Previously this thesis has discussed the extant literature on social movements and the limits of existing research around leadership in these movements. In particular it has noted that discussions on leadership in social movement research have tended to restrict their theoretical engagement to within the sub-discipline. There was no real interaction between social movement theory and broader leadership theory in sociology or political science. Elite Theory was a particularly notable absence in this regard. While there were strong ideological reasons for movements and many movement scholars to reject notions of leadership and ‘elites,’ this does not excuse the failure to engage with and consider these theoretical constructs. The alternative is to accept social movement leaders as a completely unique figure with little or nothing in common with other social roles where the ‘leadership’ label is applied.

In the previous chapter a methodological approach that allows a more critical enquiry into leadership in social movements was outlined, including a means of identifying leaders. It also outlined how these leaders were approached and interviewed about their roles.

In this chapter I will begin to discuss the findings, presenting a broad overview of the movement and the diversity of leaders within it, and the various key organisations which these individuals act on and within. I will then use these findings to assess the consistency of leadership within the Tasmanian environmental movement with elements of Elite Theory. Initially this will focus on how the structure of the movement and prominence of particular individuals allow for elites, before drawing on interviews and biographical details of leaders to show how education and the move into Green politics has created more ‘elite’ leadership, and how these changes reflect a split in terms of the recruiting base for the Tasmanian environmental movement between the political and the strictly social elements.

Finally, this chapter will examine the activist biography of Dr. Bob Brown. As the most well-known and influential member of the Tasmanian movement, Brown is considered by many in the movement to be the archetypical leader. His prominence can reveal much about the kind of
leadership present in the movement, and in examining his biography as an activist this chapter will argue that much of his influence is consistent with Elite Leadership.

Evidence For Elite Leadership

This thesis has previously discussed the literature around leadership both generally and in social movements and highlighted some of the problems with leader identification in social movements. Prior scholarship (see particularly Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998; but also Freeman, 1999a; 1999b) has particularly focused on the problems of power dynamics in movements and suggested that even where movement hierarchies exist, such hierarchies are not perfect or even reliable proxies for understanding power and leadership within a movement.

This thesis has also argued that while leadership is inadequately theorised (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004), there is still a good deal known about leaders in the context of social movements, but that for a variety of reasons, including trends in scholarship and ideological motivations (Barker et al., 2001), social movement leadership has been treated as distinctive from other scholarly leadership discourses and theoretical frameworks. Such distinctions appear to lack an empirical basis, particularly in relation to leadership research in political science. While the literature around social movements has clearly established that leaders exist and make valuable contributions to the success of movements, it has been – likely for the same reasons stated above – silent about the nature of these leaders and whether they represent an elite both in terms of skills and their position in the power relations of a movement. Establishing if leaders, or a group of leaders, comprise an elite is a logical first step in assessing the applicability of these broader sociological theories of leadership to social movement theory, and thus a logical starting point for discussion in this thesis.

An examination of the Tasmanian environmental movement provides an opportunity to answer some key questions about the nature of social movement leadership and the applicability of broader (non-social movement) theories of leadership to social movements. Examining trends around centralisation of leadership and organisational influence as well as biographical insights into
movement leadership play a key part in developing answers around the relationship of hierarchy, influence and power within a movement.

Establishing a compendium of environmental leaders and examining their qualities (or lack thereof) as elites forms the first stage of this research. However, doing so requires a multi-modal approach to ensure leaders are consistently identified. As previously noted, leaders can be submerged within a movement (Gitlin, 1980; 2013) or have taken on informal roles as bridge leaders or grassroots leaders (Robnett, 1997; Morris & Staggenborg, 2004).

As mentioned in the previous chapter on methodology and approach, the identification of leaders for this research was a multi-phased approach which helped to identify influential figures for the purposes of interviewing but also assisted in identifying the structure of the movement – the key figures and organisations which contributed to the public debate around environmental concerns. What follows is a discussion based on the results of the preliminary tri-part survey of environmental leadership in Tasmania. These results can be found in Table 1 at the end of the previous chapter.

Hierarchy in the Environmental Movement: Inter-and-Extra-Movement Structures

As a result of its long history, the Tasmanian environmental movement has already developed systems to deal with its size and complexity. Part of this process has been the formation of environmental NGOs like The Wilderness Society, which has a long history of organising to affect change through direct action and political campaigning (see for example Thompson, 1984; Gee, 2001), while more recent developments have included the emergence of Environment Tasmania, a peak body which represents 18 different organisations ranging from national organisations such as The Wilderness Society and Australian Youth Climate Coalition, through to specialist groups like Peak Oil Tasmania and Nature Photographers Tasmania (Environment Tasmania, 2016). This represents a clear strategy to coordinate resources and strategies across a broad group of environmental groups with otherwise diverse interests, but also assists in the creation of hierarchy. As such the predominant organisations in the state media sample (The Greens, The Wilderness Society, Environment Tasmania) are all hierarchical organisations consistent with bureaucratised and routinised movement development (Pakulski & Crook, 1998), with clear formalised positions,

Not only does the Tasmanian environmental movement have hierarchical organisations but it can be argued that it also includes a hierarchy of organisations, with a small group of organisations wielding most of the social and political influence around environmental issues. In particular The Wilderness Society and Environment Tasmania have a strong presence, along with the national Australian Conservation Foundation. The national and state media and snowball samples suggest the Greens and The Wilderness Society are particularly influential. The Greens are influential because of the huge shadow both Brown and Milne cast over the movement as figureheads, but also because they represent the political arm of the environmental movement, with then Greens state leader McKim commanding a strong public presence in news media. The Wilderness Society is perhaps more influential in the Tasmanian movement because in addition to being highly influential in its own right, many key figures in the Tasmanian movement have held positions or volunteered in the organisation, including Bob Brown, Christine Milne, Geoff Law, Alistair Graham and Jenny Weber. The tri-sample approach confirms this, with the individuals who appeared in all three samples all having experience with TWS at some point during their careers. Other leaders prominent in the national sphere have also spent time in TWS in Tasmania, including Paul Oosting and Warrick Jordan. Indeed TWS may represent a good example of an organisation which allows leaders or potential leaders to ‘apprentice’ and learn the ropes of environmental activism in similar ways to union organising or political staffer positions in mainstream politics (see Pakulski & Tranter, 2015).

Some leaders agree with this assessment, arguing that these organisations do have a role in the development of leaders but aren’t as effective as they could be because political pressure makes these environmental movement organisations the ‘end game’ as opposed to a launching point for leaders into political and public life:

...there haven’t been succession strategies, and the reason for that is that the environment movement has never had the next place to go. So when people have got to the front of the environment organisations they’ve stayed there, stayed there much longer than they should have... Whereas the union movement... where people are involved in campaigns and so get to head up the various aspects of the union movement... they have gone straight into Labor
politics, and so there’s this constant flow through of new people, new creativity, generational change. In the environment movement there wasn’t. So for a long time, the same people stayed at the top of the organisation and did not move on. ...They... have never seen Green politics as the activist arm of environmentalism, simply because Liberal and Labor have always, uh, refused access and punished anyone in the environment movement who associated with the Greens, and as a result they all try and stay apolitical because they believe that that will get their campaign a better outcome, but the frustration is of course it– doesn’t - what it does is leave them there at the top of the movement, whereas they could be preselected and use that experience in Green politics. [L06]

This lack of progression means that leaders in movement organisations are likely to spend more time in their roles and that those with leadership potential are more likely to be forced out into the corporate sector or other not-for-profit organisations, particularly as they move into stages of life where low or no income and a lack of job security are increasingly undesirable.

I think that I’ve recognised over the years that if we had been able to employ 5 people a year for the last 5 years, we would have incredible people working for us, who I’ve seen go off and work for Oxfam in Melbourne, work for Friends of the Earth in Melbourne, work for Alice Springs Environment Centre, work for Sea Shepherd over in the US, you know people who have actually come in, spent years and years and years volunteering, and then moved on because they need to get paid work. [L01]

This trend is not only exacerbated by the lack of career progression paths from the environmental movement organisations (EMOs) but the dominance of a few large organisations, particularly The Wilderness Society and Environment Tasmania at a state level, where their leaders and the organisations themselves dominate media coverage and the public imagination – with consequences for the viability of smaller organisations and leadership around marginal or local issues, as will be discussed in chapter 9.

It also incentivises the Greens to seek candidates from the fringes or outside the movement, where leaders are less likely to represent specifically environmental values. For example Cassy O’Connor, who at the time of writing is the leader of the Tasmanian Greens, has a background in journalism. Nick McKim, now a federal senator for the Australian Greens, built a career in marketing and PR.
Kim Booth, who was the leader of the Tasmanian Greens when these interviews were conducted, was famously a saw-miller before becoming an MP (Booth, 2015). These leaders might share some of the environmental concerns and grievances as their NGO counterparts, and may have been participants or volunteers in various protests or campaigns, but their priorities and networks are different to movement leaders. Political leaders are also less invested in maintaining partnerships with the movement when the movement leadership isn’t part of the formal recruiting base.

As such the modern environmental movement could arguably be considered two distinct entities; the Green movement as a political manifestation of environmental concern, and the environmental NGO sector focusing on civil society and political access to whichever government of the day. While the ‘base’ of the movement might associate both entities as a consolidated whole – and they may indeed work together on a regular basis – they are, from an organisational perspective, effectively separate; particularly now that Brown and Milne have left the Greens.

The findings from the three samples suggest that there are a small number of key leaders and organisations who dominate news media conversations and the community of environmental activists in Tasmania. These individuals often hold the top positions in their organisational hierarchies, in addition to being figures of media attention and ‘legitimate’ representatives of the movement in the political sphere if not political representatives in their own right.

Vica Bayley, Tasmanian Campaign Manager for The Wilderness Society, and Phillip Pullinger, Director of Environment Tasmania, are examples of individuals who appear at the top of the local hierarchies and who effectively provide the ‘face’ of the ‘apolitical’ wing of the environmental movement in Tasmania. Bayley is quoted extensively in media reports on environmental issues, effectively a figure synonymous with The Wilderness Society, while Pullinger appears somewhat less – due to his then recent retirement from Environment Tasmania and a return to general practice as a medical doctor – but retains a place in the networks of influence among environmentalists in Tasmania. Despite this, Environment Tasmania maintained a strong media presence in its own right. Both were cited by other environmentalists as influential or otherwise important as part of the snowball sample. Bayley and Pullinger were also part of the critical negotiation team who developed the terms of the Tasmanian Forestry Agreement along with the Australian Conservation Foundation, reflecting their status as ‘legitimate’ representatives of the environmental movement in the eyes of other elite-
driven business and political organisations\textsuperscript{11}. This suggests they should share some characteristics of elite leaders as postulated by elite theory (Weber, 1964; Mills, 1956; Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012; Pakulski & Tranter, 2015).

Meanwhile figures like Bob Brown and Christine Milne have transcended their roles as leaders in the movement to become members of the political elite in their own right, holding positions in the Tasmanian and Australian parliaments and becoming leaders of both the Tasmanian and Australian Greens, in addition to their influence in international politics. This in itself helps to explain their presence in state and national media, but they also retain a great deal of influence within the environmental movement at a state level based on the snowball sampling. However, if Brown and Milne are elite members in the traditional sense of leaders, then they appear to be exceptional examples within the Tasmanian environmental movement. The previously discussed emergent ‘divide’ between the activist arm and political arm of the movement makes it difficult to argue that the Greens are the clear ‘top’ organisation in the movement hierarchy. This is particularly true given that, as previously discussed, the emerging leadership in the Greens do not appear to have the same biographical background and ‘apprenticing’ in the movement as non-Green environmental leadership and even movement leadership more broadly.

The centrality of hierarchical leadership with a few highly influential public figures in the Tasmanian context is certainly a good initial indicator of conditions which might indicate that movement leadership comprises an elite, but also reflects the fact that the wider society which movements engage is characterised by a culture of elites and dominated by leader-centric perspectives. As the literature on social movements suggests, hierarchy is not a proxy for power and leaders can be submerged behind the scenes. However there seems to be a strong correlation between appearing in at least one media sample and being viewed as influential in the snowball sample. This is not a perfect relationship; Jess Feehely at the Tasmanian Environmental Defenders Office (EDO), for example, was only nominated once and only in the snowball sample, but revealed in her interview important links between her work as an organisational head and the wider network of movement organisations in Tasmania.

\textsuperscript{11} ‘Legitimate’ here reflects that Bayley and Pullinger are seen as authoritative representatives by business and political interests, but don’t necessarily hold the same status amongst all elements of the movement.
A lot of our clients are environment groups... So the bigger ones, Tasmanian Conservation Trust, Environment Tasmania, The Wilderness Society and then your coastcare groups, landcare groups, more on-ground groups. So certainly we have a good network in the sense that most of those people would have contacted us at some point for advice... We also do quite a lot of collaboration around publication of reports or delivery of workshops... we are kind of getting better at getting them to realise the value of getting legal advice early on... particularly collaboration between the NGOs, and them actually working out what it is they want to get out of that process, and involving us very early on to plan that, who the people they need to influence at particular stages are, what their opportunities are within the legislation, so they can design their campaign, their media strategies, around influencing the right people at the right times to make the decisions that need to be made. (Feehely, J. Personal communication, 15th June, 2015).

This kind of collaborative, behind the scenes work assisting other organisations with knowledge, processes and procedures, or acting as a legal representative for another organisation, means the EDO stays out of the media spotlight but also remains relatively submerged within the campaigning and operations of other environmental organisations. Arguably this makes the EDO relatively invisible in the sampling strategies used for this research, while still being a highly influential position within the movement. It reveals the difficulty of identifying leadership within the movement and the limitations of the sampling strategy in assessing the movement as a whole – if individuals are not important to organisational leaders or the media then they disappear from view. At the same time it suggests that organisational visibility is a critical part of establishing a viable and sustainable presence within the movement. Feehely’s anecdote also helps confirm the dominance of these large, visible organisations: Environment Tasmania, The Wilderness Society and Tasmanian Conservation Trust as the ‘bigger’ groups are also the most represented in the sampling out of the organisations the EDO partners with. These organisations might dominate environmental discourse in Tasmania by virtue of their ‘named’ status (Feehely doesn’t refer to any other environmental organisations by name in this discussion of EDO’s networks).
The presence of inter-and-intra-movement hierarchies is one aspect which might point towards environmental movement leaders being elites. However, other factors need to be considered, particularly personal factors such as education and biographies. Education is particularly pertinent to the emergence of movements according to the social movement leadership literature (Barker et al., 2001; Morris & Staggenborg, 2004) but also factors as a strong element of elite theory where it provides leaders with skills and knowledge which place them at an advantage over the wider population (Pakulski & Tranter, 2015). Education also plays a part as an aspect of leader biographies, the prior life experiences which Schussman & Earl (2004) and Vromen (2015) identify as a critical part of emerging leadership. Biographies are particularly helpful in assessing similarities between environmental movement leaders and traditional elites, as both political elites and movement leaders tend to undertake ‘apprenticeships’ which provide them with the skills required to lead (Pakulski & Tranter, 2015).

The leadership cohort interviewed in this study displayed educational traits reasonably consistent with the existing literature around movement leadership in that the vast majority of leaders were undertaking or had completed some kind of post-secondary education. Bob Brown, the ‘exemplary figure’ of the movement, trained in medicine and practiced as a GP before moving to Tasmania and becoming involved in the environmental movement (Norman, 2004). Phill Pullinger, former CEO of Environment Tasmania, also has a medical background and returned to practice when he stepped down from his formal leadership position. Rohan Church, spokesperson for Doctors for the Environment, appears only once in the sample but comes from a similar background. Medicine is a particularly interesting educational background for environmental leaders because it does not comport with theories about knowledge of ‘human action’ (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004: 175) and does not seem to appear in Egri & Herman’s (2000) survey of leaders education in the U.S., although it could simply be included in the ‘sciences’ category.

Education and teaching also has a strong presence amongst the most centralised figures. Both Christine Milne and Vica Bayley trained as teachers before becoming involved in the movement. Miranda Gibson, an activist who achieved some standing in the movement shortly before this study for her extensive 15-month-long tree sit, was also a teacher (BBC News, 2013). Educational training appears to be more consistent with knowledge of ‘human action’ theories around leadership, particularly given that education is important to the emergence and success of movements. Given
the role of education in the leadership literature it is not surprising that teachers would do well in movement settings, but it is also interesting that Milne and Bayley lead highly centralised organisations where education is often associated with a flattening of hierarchy in movements (see Purkis, 2001). The counterpoint here is that being a teacher does not necessarily translate into an educational focus in movement contexts, and that teaching, like medicine – and pastoral roles, as in the emergence of the civil rights movement (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004) – are roles which have strong authority components which may prepare practitioners for leadership.

Medical and teaching educational backgrounds featured strongly among the top of the leadership hierarchy, a large number of other leaders in the movement had educational backgrounds which were specialisations around environmental concern or environmental management. For example, Alistair Graham, former head of The Wilderness Society, studied agriculture and forestry sciences and had begun a doctorate around sulphur dioxide pollution before he began his activist career in New Zealand. Rebecca Hubbard, who leads marine campaigns at Environment Tasmania, has a degree in environmental science. Charlie Sherwin, who replaced Pullinger as head of Environment Tasmania, had a background in engineering before he became involved in environmental work, but returned to university to study socio-environmental assessment and policy. Jess Feehely at the Tasmanian environmental defenders office has degrees in both environmental science and law. These are all specialist degrees which qualify their holders for work specifically in the environmental space rather than more generally as movement leaders in terms of their relationship to ‘human action’. They reflect the increasing professionalisation and specialisation of roles within the movement but also the particular rationality of environmental movements where knowledge is viewed as a critical resource to influence public debate, either through research, policy development or legal strategy.

These field-specialised positions make important contributions to the movement, particularly where those positions interact with highly specialised fields outside the movement (law, for example). However, they may also represent a closure of knowledge and reinforcement of hierarchy within the movement by requiring – either formally or through perception – the holding of specific qualifications in order to take on leadership positions in the movement. Saul (1992) takes particular issue with the role of specialisation within bureaucratic rationality, arguing that it reduces the overall capacity of organisations by making the knowledge of specialists unassailable through jargon
and specialist language, reinforcing the role of specialists as an organisational elite who must effectively be taken on their word. As such the strong presence of specialisation in the leadership of the movement represents the accumulation of power. This knowledge-power doesn’t necessarily mean that specialised leaders comprise an elite, especially when these leaders engage with elite-driven institutions in broader society which require qualification either formally or for the sake of perceived authority, but it does mean that the capacity for an elite to emerge exists.

Other aspects of an elite in the Tasmanian environmental movement

There are other aspects which may indicate an elite culture that are worth discussing, particularly the degree to which personal and organisational networks integrate leaders as well as the extent to which they adhere to a set of political ‘norms’. This research focused primarily on individual biographies and questions about networks were generally interpreted by respondents in a professional context rather than a personal one, but there was some anecdotal evidence which suggests that there are some loose networks of interpersonal relationships within the leadership of the Tasmanian movement which are consistent with notions of an ‘elite’.

Nick McKim, now a federal Senator for the Australian Greens, highlighted the strong role that interpersonal relationships played in his running for political office:

[Prior to working in advertising] I’d worked as a wilderness guide. And one of the people I’d worked with as a wilderness guide, Steph Cahalan, was working in Bob Brown’s office in the lead up to the 2001 federal election… I ran into Steph in town one day and we were talking about the election, and she said they were looking for people with experience in advertising to do pro-bono work on Bob’s campaign and I was interested and after a meeting or two I ended up being responsible for the paid media side of Bob’s campaign, so his TV ads and other media strategies that his campaign team were running. ...And during that period I joined the Greens, got to know Bob a little bit better and Bob asked me to run.

McKim also highlighted that these kinds of close friendship networks were fairly pervasive in Tasmania due to the small population and geographic concentration.
Many of the people in the movement are my friends and we run into each other at parties and barbecues and beach cricket matches as often as we do in ...formal meetings. ... and that’s I guess reflective of the fact that Tassie is a pretty small place and those of us that have been kicking around for a few decades down here in the environmental movement, I mean you’re almost bound to run into each other and form relationships with each other.

These personal relationships also form a strong part of the Tasmania’s environmental leadership. McKim himself is in a relationship with Cassy O’Connor, now leader of the Tasmanian Greens, while Steph Cahalan, who McKim mentions above as Bob Brown’s assistant, is in a relationship with Vica Bayley, head of the Tasmanian branch of the Wilderness Society. Alistair Graham and Peg Putt are similarly domestic partners. It is of course natural that people with similar passions and drives would cohabitate, form friendships and socialise. Such relationships inherently help reinforce power by providing access and opportunities not available to outsiders.

This is particularly true in Tasmania, where social circles are quite small and there are relatively few degrees of separation. As McKim mentions above, leaders often run into each other at social events, but they also provide public support at campaign events and rallies, acts which reaffirm the links between the organisations they represent and bring emerging campaign leaders into the ‘fold’ of the inner circle of leadership. At the campaign events that I attended as an observer, it was common to see a small group of organisational leaders exchanging pleasantries, sharing information and discussing tactics.

It is also worth noting that these individuals all largely agree on the ‘rules of the game’ in terms of what constitutes legitimate action. In many ways their positions, particularly those at the core of the movement leadership, are quite conservative. They view politics and lobbying as the principal forms of action, and although many have been involved in non-violent civil disobedience this is seen as a kind of last resort and doesn’t form the mainstay of campaigning activity. Civil disobedience is supported, but largely remains a peripheral action to be undertaken by the young and radical.
Political Leaders and Education: A Divergent Recruiting Base?

The previously discussed divide between the Greens and the wider environmental movement in Tasmania also appears in the educational backgrounds of their leadership. While Brown and Milne, as the ‘senior’ leadership of the Greens and now retired, had medical and teaching backgrounds respectively, they also played formative roles in the development of the environment movement in Tasmania before they moved into politics. Arguably these two Greens leaders ‘set the stage’ for the hierarchical structure and leadership style of the current movement. In this sense they can be seen as unique as ‘founders’ who were relatively freer to act in the absence of a well defined movement.

In contrast, the current generation of Tasmanian Greens leadership has lacked the previous ‘apprenticeship’ of environmental campaigning, instead coming from outside the movement into political life.

Peter Whish-Wilson, who replaced Bob Brown as a federal senator for Tasmania, holds degrees in Economics and Politics, as well as a Masters of Economics. Before becoming involved in politics he worked for Merrill Lynch and Deutsche Bank, then started a winery in the Tamar valley (“Greens name Brown’s Senate Replacement”, 2012) where he became involved with the campaign against the proposed pulp mill in the area.

Nick McKim, who recently replaced Milne in the federal senate, protested at Farmhouse Creek during his youth but was otherwise uninvolved in the movement, working in public relations and advertising before doing some pro-bono work for Brown and re-engaging with the Greens (rather than the environmental movement more generally). McKim is unusual in his background; he didn’t mention his education at all during our interview and his parliamentary biographies list no qualifications, but in conversation reveals deep and sophisticated understandings of social and environmental issues which hint at autodidact tendencies.

Cassy O’Connor was a journalist and worked as a staffer for a Labor party politician before she joined a campaign against a proposed development in Ralph’s Bay and then ran for political office. This trajectory appears completely backwards when compared to the ‘apprenticeships’ of other political parties – where individuals tend to campaign, then take on assistant roles, then run for office (Pakulski & Tranter, 2015) – but makes sense when considering O’Connor had long aspired to
contribute to the Greens, having moved from Queensland to Tasmania after having been “inspired by the 2002 election result” (O’Connor, C. Personal communication, 27th January, 2015).

As mentioned previously, Kim Booth, who was briefly leader of the Tasmanian Greens after the 2014 state election before his retirement, was a sawmiller who joined the Greens in response to irresponsible resource management on the part of the state-run Forestry Tasmania (Booth, 2002).

These backgrounds are distinctly different from the rest of the environmental movement for the fact that they don’t represent a distinct specialisation towards either the knowledge of ‘human action’ or authority work in the same way medicine or teaching might, or the specialist knowledge bases that have emerged around environmental sciences and environmental ‘management’. Their experiences with campaigning and activism come generally after having established education, careers and expertise around other fields which they then apply to their engagement with the movement. As an example of how much this has changed, consider Peg Putt, who led the Tasmanian Greens from 1998 to 2008: she started campaigning while in high school, participating in moratorium marches against the Vietnam War, then campaigned around proposed developments in northern NSW in the mid-70’s before moving to Tasmania in the mid-80’s and becoming a spokesperson for the Huon Protection Group. She became coordinator of the Threatened Species Network in Tasmania in 1990, and then the Director of the Tasmanian Conservation Trust in 1991, before running for office (Moore, Brown & Jordan, 2010; Elix, 2011). Putt then continued to participate in protest actions while sitting as an MP (Moore, et al, 2010). Putt also held degrees in international relations and later a post-graduate degree in environmental science (Elix, 2011).

Peg Putt is significant because her biography represents something much closer to the ‘ideal type’ of apprenticeship one would expect to see in a politician closely aligned to the environmental movement, particularly when that leader isn’t necessarily an ‘exemplary figure’: An extensive period of experience in the grassroots of the movement, moving up through movement organisations and into formal roles and finally to elected office; a ‘journey’ not dissimilar to apprenticeships in the Labor party (Pakulski & Tranter, 2015). Unsurprisingly Putt’s environmental activism has remained consistent after her retirement from politics; on paper she appears to have much more in common with environmental NGO leaders in terms of biography and education than she does with the current generation of Greens political leaders.
Elite Qualities in Movement vs. Political Leaders

Green politics is an interesting proposition when discussing the role or existence of elites in the environmental movement because participation in representative politics is in essence advocacy for and (re)production of political elites as per Pakulski & Körösényi (2012). In this sense the Greens as a political party is dependent on elites. They seek to further the goals of the environmental movement by participating in a domain of society which is predicated on elites as a means of making policy. In this extra-movement sense Green politicians are by definition elites and we should expect them to operate in ways which are consistent with elite theory. But it does not necessarily follow that Green politicians have the status of elites within the movement, particular if enough of the movement is sceptical of political institutions to act in ways which limit the potential power of elites. This certainly might be the case in Tasmania, where Pybus & Flannagan (1990) have previously suggested the Green vote is cyclical: higher when they hold few seats and are perceived as ‘outsiders’ and lower when they hold relatively more seats or power and are perceived as ‘insiders’ (particularly when the Greens form part of a minority government)\(^\text{12}\). Furthermore, the large EMOs in Tasmania have tried to remain consistently apolitical in terms of their public messaging and avoided both associating with the Greens as an explicit ‘arm’ of the movement and moving ‘up’ from EMOs into Green politics, with the contemporary Greens leadership in Tasmania having come from more ‘mainstream’ backgrounds which are likely more consistent with their politician peers than the rest of the movement.

As such it does not appear possible to make a convincing argument that the current Greens represent the ‘top’ tier of the environmental movement and thus constitute an inter-movement elite, although Brown and Milne may have been early exceptions to this. It seems more plausible that the Greens and the EMO sector instead ‘share’ a common base of supporters who express their environmental concern through participation and membership in both political and social sectors; though the fact that the movement base is likely politically aligned with the Greens poses problems

\(^{12}\) The 2014 Tasmanian state election suggests this might still be the case; after holding 5 seats and forming minority government with Labor following the 2010 elections, the Greens suffered a -8.1% swing and lost two seats, almost as strong a swing as Labor (see: http://www.abc.net.au/news/tas-election-2014/results/).
for the supposedly apolitical EMOs. Furthermore, while early Greens leaders such as Bob Brown, Christine Milne and Peg Putt used their experiences in The Wilderness Society as a stepping stone into politics, the most recent generation of environmental leaders have had more divergent biographies. Where previously there was evidence of leadership crossover between EMOs and the Tasmanian Greens, the two groups appear to have a divided leadership cadre.

Indeed Greens leaders, based on their educational and biographical backgrounds, might even have less authority on an intra-movement level than EMO leaders, who are relatively more specialised around environmental concerns, holding qualifications and specialist knowledge which distinguish them from the movement base and the ‘volunteer class’. While there are still a variety of prominent EMO leaders who have backgrounds in authority work and the knowledge of ‘human action’, they appear to share nearly equal footing in terms of numbers with environmental specialists. This shift towards specialised leadership is consistent with a bureaucratised movement but raises questions about the ongoing relationship of EMOs to the movement base and the viability of EMOs built entirely around specialist knowledge, particularly in a political context where organisational funding is continuously threatened and otherwise made tenuous.

One interviewee discussed how the development of specialised environmental knowledge was challenged by government and university funding regimes:

In sciences there’s been a massive shift, in the 70s and early 80s, there was funding and capacity within scientific organisations to, to do research that would lead to good conservation outcomes... the system has now developed into one in which it’s now almost impossible to do that research. In the 70’s and 80’s it was hard not to get money to do conservation research. So at the same time the politicians are mouthing green stuff, even Abbott mouths green stuff all the time, I mean, [but] at the same time they’re cutting back on anything that interferes with the implementation of a growth paradigm in any whatsoever, and doing it very effectively, I have to admire their techniques, it’s very good. [L13]

While Jess Feehely discussed how funding had become a serious challenge for the EDO, an organisation whose charter is characterised by its specialist knowledge requirements around the practice of law:
There’s definitely been a downturn in the last couple of years around people’s acceptance that [the] environment is important, and I think it sort of reached a peak a while ago and now it’s back to looking like its some sort of indulgence, a middle class indulgence that people care about the environment, and I think that’s reflected in some part in the cuts to our funding as if it’s just discretionary spending... In the last 18 months we lost our federal funding and have become... reliant on, to some degree, public funding... we’ve had to really ramp up our profile. There wasn’t that broader awareness that (a) we existed, (b) what we did or (c) that we needed money. So we have really been on the back foot with that, because we really needed money almost immediately and we had to do all that work around profile raising before we’ve had any real prospects of doing that.

These two quotes highlight some of the problems of specialist knowledge as a prerequisite for movement leadership: specialist knowledge development, while important, isn’t necessarily appealing to the government or to the movement base, and in some cases is relatively invisible even to those involved in environmental campaigning. Specialist information, by necessity, is directed up towards social and political elites: decision makers, influencers, experts. As a result, these kinds of knowledge work resonate less with movement participants. As such, specialist leadership and organisations are vulnerable when removed from the traditional charismatic work or community organising activities of other varieties of leadership. This isn’t a novel revelation by any means, but it is important to point out because specialists, while operating in ways compatible with elite theory, cannot command a position in a hierarchy without the support of other types of leadership, a role which can be fulfilled by the specialist or another individual. This is particularly true when that movement is under-resourced or under-bureaucratised (or both). In the case of the environmental movement in Tasmania, the movement seems to lack the organisational breadth and diversity as well as the economic resources to sustain specialist leadership independently from more public-facing leadership roles.

This leaves the classical model of movement leadership, those with knowledge of ‘human action’ (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004) or experience with authority work. While these leaders, particularly those who lead the major EMOs in Tasmania, are well educated and knowledgeable, they have struggled to maintain movement solidarity and successfully direct movement activity. In particular they appear to have struggled with maintaining movement cohesion around the Tasmanian Forest
Agreement (TFA) campaign, where some leaders have seen compromise as a viable strategy and others have viewed the forestry conflict as a zero-sum game.

The biggest [failure] personally I think has been [the] perceived split, or split of perspectives within [the movement], following the signing of the TFA [and the] acceptance of the legislative councils and the members to implement that agreement. On a personal level you know that was incredibly challenging because I’d heard all the arguments before, I’d been through all the arguments in my own mind before as to why people thought we shouldn’t have done this and so I kind of knew what they were saying was entirely valid and entirely reasonable, it was just that I ...[and my organisation]... had gotten... to a position where [we understood] that is a problem but this is also, this is worth doing because of x, y and z. We didn’t seem to have that opportunity [to communicate] with the movement largely because communications were cut, or were very one way. I guess the rest is history and I think that’s sad not only at a personal level in terms of relationships and so forth, but I think we as a movement lost an opportunity to get behind something collectively that was really good and was worth giving a go. If we’d been able to do that maybe we could have changed the course of things... I don’t know. Maybe not. But more than anything we lost the opportunity to get behind something that was worth giving a go, and obviously we have some legacy issues and trust issues and so forth that flow from it that we still have to deal with. [L03]

In retrospect, one of the things that we struggled with was the transition between running an external campaign which involved media and events and publicity and constant communication with the public, and stepping into a complex negotiation which involved issues of confidentiality. Because there was so little trust between the various parties in those negotiations there needed to be a lot of sensitivity around how information was managed and creating a space for people to provide, put forward ideas without prejudice, so managing that and the external communication, we didn’t do well. I think there was a human resource issue where we were literally tied up, disappeared into those negotiations and didn’t have the time or capacity to do that external campaigning, so as a result of that what the public saw was just things going quiet and so some of that public momentum disappear[ed]. And also there was a lot of mistrust in the community over Gunns, some of the history, so people filled the vacuum with conspiracies and that’s something that we struggled with. [L02]
Critical here is that these leaders were acting as quasi-elites to negotiate on behalf of the movement, but weren’t able to maintain support for their campaign approach when out of the public eye. Part of this may be due to postmaterialist values on the part of movement participants, particularly around democracy and transparency (Inglehart, 1990; Melucci, 1989). These values may make the movement base intolerant of closed-doors negotiations and disengage from leadership which undertakes such action; a response which resists the kind of tendencies consistent with elites (Mills, 1954). Another aspect is that the leadership cadre in Tasmania were themselves split on the issue, a split which seems to have reflected the broader sentiment identified in the above quotes [L01].

Central to Mills’ (1954) examination of the power elite is that elites as a collective foreclose on certain options for action before presenting pre-approved prescriptions to movement members. Mills’ concern is that as elites become increasingly distant from their base of supporters, their perceptions of palatable or reasonable options grow to more closely resemble their fellow elites. While Mills’ work was in a specifically political context, there is nothing to suggest the same pressures would not apply to social movement leaders. However, the strong reaction from the movement around the TFA, and the fallout of this split for leaders suggests that either the movement is actively resisting the emergence of such elites, or that an existing elite have not yet effectively consolidated in ways that allow foreclosing.

As such, despite the hierarchy that exists on an inter-organisational and intra-organisational level in the environment movement in Tasmania, it isn’t clear that the environmental leadership constitute a homogenous elite, nor does it appear that any particular cadre of leadership currently has the capacity to emerge as an elite in terms of being ‘top’ of the hierarchy in terms of real power relations and the ability to direct movement activity. The leadership of the movement is instead split among three interdependent groups: classical movement leaders, specialist knowledge workers who assist in interfacing with elite culture in wider society, and political leaders who form part of the broader political elite but who aren’t closely linked to the rest of the movement in terms of education or biographical experience. No single group of leaders is strategically placed or resourced to consolidate their authority. While the organisational structure of an increasingly bureaucratised and routinised movement appear to meet the conditions for a cadre of elites to
emerge, this hasn’t yet happened, and may not happen in the foreseeable future given the divides the TFA has created among movement members and leadership alike.

However, even with these differences between the leadership ‘cadres’ of the Tasmanian environmental movement, it is important to recognise that in a broad philosophical sense they still have much in common in ways which could make them an elite. They generally subscribe to the same rules of the game in terms of acceptable behaviours and tactics (a trait which recalls Mills’ (1956) notion of ‘foreclosure’), and they share in the close-knit circle of social interactions which characterise Tasmanian life – attending each others events as well as seeing each other outside of their formal roles. Almost all have tertiary education, and many have degrees which provide experience as some kind of authority work. Additionally, despite the diversity of their educational backgrounds, they still have some range of experience which can be described as an apprenticeship which provided them with the skills required for their success as leaders.

But more importantly, they all share a common concern for a very particular issue; the preservation of Tasmania’s wild areas. The force of Tasmanian geography is difficult to over-state in this regard; it supports a variety of landscapes and environmental issues; from brownfield development and the preservation of human history, through to mining impacts and remediation, through to logging and ‘wilderness’ preservation and wildlife protection. These issues are diverse enough to support a wide variety of environmental concerns but contained in a small enough geographic region with a suitably concentrated population to create numerous opportunities for coalitions and cooperation.

Environmental leaders may all find different parts of Tasmania special, but they all feel compelled to come to her defence, especially around issues like climate change – which nearly every leader interviewed identified as a key concern. The unique qualities of the island provide a central focus for leaders which go beyond individual interpersonal grievances, and provide a point of unity that historically has served to overcome a variety of philosophical divides. The fact that all of these leaders are united around Tasmania, an island that has such a singular impact on so many, and whose preservation is practically complex but remains a straightforward ideal, shouldn’t be discounted when assessing the unity of the environmental movement in Tasmania. Where geographically larger and more populous states can have a variety of distinct environmental movement organisations working on their own local issues and competing for attention and
resources, every local issue in Tasmania is presented by politicians, the news media and environmental leaders as though they belong to all Tasmanians.

Bob Brown: Elites Personified?

The previous section of this chapter has presented evidence around the presence of ‘elites’ in the Tasmanian environmental movement, and argued from this evidence that the movement lacks a clear ‘top’ hierarchy. The lack of a clear centre of power and the practical split between Green politics and the ‘apolitical’ EMOs makes it difficult for a meaningful intra-movement group of elites to emerge. While there is an argument to consider these groups of leaders a unified class of elites despite their differences, there is an absence of clear evidence that this is the case which leads me to conclude that the movement lacks an ‘elite’ comparable to political ‘elites’.

However it is also possible to present a counter argument around the elite in the Tasmanian environmental movement; a case which suggests there is a clear and unambiguous centre of power which sits atop both the Greens and the EMO sector and contributes to the overall direction of the movement in Tasmania. That argument takes the form of a single man: Dr. Bob Brown.

While an individual can’t by definition comprise a political elite on their own, Brown has been a singular figure in the history of the movement from its earliest days, and he, along with Christine Milne, have been effective trailblazers in defining the trajectory and quality of environmental leadership. From campaigning to EMO leadership, to state politics, to federal politics and into international policymaking, Brown is, as others have noted, a – if not the – exemplary figure of Australian environmentalism (Pakulski, 1990; Tranter, 1995; 2009) and has maintained a continuous presence campaigning around environmental and human rights issues in Tasmania for much of his career. As much as he has remained influential in the public sphere, he has also been active behind the scenes engaging in ‘bridge leadership’ (Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998) to encourage potential leaders to run for office and mentoring emerging leaders throughout the EMO sector. He has also maintained a consistent conflictual stance to forestry and human interference in ‘wilderness areas’ (which appears justified given his experiences with opposition groups over the course of his campaigning) which given his influence in the movement may have contributed to the extent of the split in the movement around the TFA discussions.
As such, if it is difficult to establish a particular cadre or segment of leadership which operates as an elite in the environmental movement it may be because Brown (and to a lesser extent Milne) sets the terms for the rest of the elite in the movement. They help to define conflicts and foreclose on ‘less radical’ options, establishing new leadership and supporting leaders in particular roles, linking the movement base to leadership and pushing the movement in particular directions. In addition they are highly authoritative and influential within the Greens, and political elites in their own right. In this section I will argue that if an elite has failed to emerge in the movement it may be because Brown in particular overshadowed all other leadership for both movement leaders and the movement base during his career and continues to influence the direction of the movement in the state and nationally despite his ‘retirement’ from politics.

There are a number of factors which suggest that Brown as an exemplary figure has established a position as the effective leader of the Tasmanian environmental movement, each of which are worth examining in turn. The first is his exemplary status in and of itself: his personal charisma and career experience, and the influence – both perceived and real – that he holds in the movement both historically and as identified in this research. The second is his contemporary presence in the movement. Since his retirement from the Federal Senate, he has established the Bob Brown Foundation (BBF) and conducted ongoing campaigns through BBF, particularly in ‘contested’ wilderness areas like Lapoinya. As part of BFF’s work, he has recruited campaigners and movement leaders with extensive experience in the Tasmanian environmental movement, all of which is broadly indicative of a shift towards Tasmanian issues as a priority over national issues, although BBF also appears to have an international focus. The third factor is his ‘bridge leadership’ (Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998) in the movement, actively engaging with the grassroots of the movement and recruiting new leaders, particularly into the Greens.

A Lifetime of Environmental Concern

Brown has a long history of activism in the environmental movement, particularly in Tasmania. This has been well documented by a variety of sources (Thompson, 1984; Norman, 2004; Lines, 2006; Moore, Brown & Jordan, 2010; Hungerford, 2012) as well as by Brown himself (Brown, 1987; 2014; Brown & Singer, 1996). While Brown has historically been involved in a range of issues, including
nuclear disarmament and anti-uranium and jail reform, his environmental work has been the issue with which he has been most associated (Norman, 2004; Lines, 2006). Lines (2006: 177, 220-222) argues that Brown is ‘an incorrigible humanist’ and that his environmental campaigning is more a factor of the immediacy and locality of particular environmental concerns. Brown seems to confirm this position (Brown, 2014: 194) in his “Green Oration” that environmental values are simply part of a broader framework to ensure ‘human flourishing and survival’. As a result of his successes in the Franklin campaign, Brown emerged as an influential figure at a time when there were few competing voices in the Australian environmental movement, becoming the de facto face of Australian environmentalism (Lines, 2006: 222).

Brown’s leadership has often been described by scholars as charismatic, and his career certainly aligns closely with charismatic leadership as it appears in the literature. Norman (2004: 4) argues that Brown’s persona “invites audiences... to reconsider... what is in fact radical. He creates the possibility of a different perspective; the formerly unthinkable can come to be seen as reasonable and rational.” One of his sources noted “[Brown] has a habit of [getting people involved]... he doesn’t deliberately manipulate people, but he’s got a very infectious personality. How did I get involved? I blame Bob Brown” (Norman, 2004: 95-6). Lines (2006: 209-211) suggests that Brown is ‘highly charismatic’ but that this charisma exists largely for those who want to be captivated; elements of the movement saw in Brown what they wanted to see to the extent that some made exaggerated or nonsense claims about Brown and the movement: that the movement was free from any kind of conflict or that Brown was self-interested but that his self-interest “encompassed all of humanity”. At the same time Brown had qualities which made him an attractive leadership figure; he was absolutely sincere in his concern, dedicated to the campaign, and an ascetic, all of which factored into his developing influence (Lines, 2006; Thompson, 1984).

Examinations of his early leadership are also contentious. Thompson argues that in TWS, Brown consistently addressed accusations of sexism and the abuse of hierarchy, working for a consensus to “the point of personal exhaustion” (Thompson, 1984: 88-89), but resisted pressures for direct democracy and consensus building as a means of operating TWS itself, arguing the Franklin campaign was more important than structural issues (Thompson 1984: 133; Lines, 2006: 197). Thompson (1984: 109) claims “Brown... was first amongst equals.” He also argues that Brown disliked the ‘eco-messiah’ image the media cultivated around him. Scholarship on Brown, and
Brown’s own writing, creates an image of a man thrust into a series of leadership roles he didn’t really want, a product of circumstance. Brown claims there is nothing ‘extraordinary’ about his leadership but that “the penalty clause for ordinary intelligence is reflection and conscience and the urge to make things better” (Brown, 2014: 39). But Brown certainly did nothing to counter the messianic or monastic image that the media created (Norman, 2004: 137). Lines (2006: 218) argues his broader humanistic philosophy of optimism and hope is indicative of what was effectively a “messianic complex and a desperate, unwavering concern for the salvation of humanity.” Brown acted in highly strategic ways, taking Peter Thompson’s (the same Thompson, 1984) advice to cultivate a media image (Lines, 2006: 187), and is also credited with continually looking at the bigger picture (Norman, 2004: 180). Brown’s style of leadership appears to be about keeping as many people happy as possible while maintaining a united direction for campaigning. He attempted to keep campaigners, the media and the government on side as much as possible, to be all things to all people.

Brown’s rise to the head of TWS came from his attempt to put a positive spin on the state government’s Cartland report into the damming of the Franklin river in 1978. While the TWS and other groups denounced the report as failing to oppose development, Brown wrote a missive under his own letterhead which praised the positive aspects of the report and hoped that the government would act on the findings around the potential World Heritage area. This resulted in a story in the Examiner concerning a ‘split’ in TWS which led to then director Norm Sanders’ resignation. Brown, the sole nominee, became director in his place (Lines, 2006: 179). Lines (2006) suggests that this incident indicates that Brown principally viewed his own opinion as more valuable than the consensus view of TWS, particularly when it came to putting positive pressure on governments rather than simple opposition: he would continue to undertake such behaviour throughout the Franklin campaign, even when he felt the cause was hopeless (Lines, 2006: 189).

Brown has also been key in establishing the Greens as a political presence in Tasmania, Australia and internationally. Ben Oquist, a former adviser to Brown, suggests he is deeply committed to the internationalisation of the Green movement, and believes that such a movement can only emerge from the periphery, not from Europe or the US (Norman, 2004: 180). The Greens policy positions reflect his broader humanist concern rather than mere conservation (see Brown & Singer, 1996). Brown has actively campaigned to raise the profile of the Greens. He realised he had to run
because he was the only person with the stature to make an impact politically (Norman, 2004: 165-6), but throughout he was also a consistent participant in public, nonviolent, protest. Lines (2006: 220-222), in particular, makes a clear link between Brown’s extensive campaigning and community activity prior to the Franklin, and the Greens overarching (if inconsistent) philosophy (Lines, 2003: 92-94), seeing clear differentiation between the Green movement as championed by Brown and conservationist philosophy which lacks a particular concern for human life above all else.

All of this has contributed to Brown’s dominance as a charismatic leader and media figure in Tasmania. For many years he was the ‘go to’ voice for journalists looking for a quote on environmental issues. He has stature within the local movement, in state politics, in national politics, and in international policy development through the Green charter and his campaigning around issues like climate change and the world heritage status of Tasmanian rainforests. In many regards Brown has taken on the qualities of a celebrity, featuring regularly in the media even if both he and the media regularly paint each other in a negative light (Brown, 2014: 180-218; 2004: 65,95; Lines, 2006: 187).

Brown’s stature is particularly significant because by most measures he could be considered the figurative ‘big fish’ in the extremely ‘small pond’ of Tasmanian society. With a state population of only 500,000, and active environmental support only a small percentage of that, Brown holds a political status disproportionate to the demands or requirements of a small island effectively considered a regional area at a federal level. In terms of public perception and status in relation to population, try to conceptualise a figure like Martin Luther King Jr. focusing the vast majority of their attention in a state with a population similar to Wyoming over a period of 40 years. Brown has certainly taken a wide perspective of environmental issues and engaged with national and inter-governmental institutions, but his belief in the importance of the periphery in guiding the Green movement has kept a focus on Tasmania throughout his career, which appears to be a very different tactical change from previous exemplary movement figures.

‘Retirement’ and a return to Tasmania

After his retirement from the federal senate in April of 2012, some might have expected Brown to leave leadership in the movement and make room for new leaders to emerge. Certainly his
statement to reporters failed to mention any interest in continued campaigning, although he claimed he would “be green until the day I die, if not for a long time after that” (Ireland & Wright, 2012). However, he has subsequently returned to campaigning through the Bob Brown Foundation (BBF), an organisation he started post-retirement\(^\text{13}\). The BBF has retained a number of experienced environmental activists, notably former Tasmanian Greens leader Peg Putt and campaigner Jenny Weber, and is involved in a variety of campaigns throughout Australia, with some loose affiliations internationally.

Despite Brown’s quote on the BBF homepage that “The Bob Brown Foundation is all about action with a vision to protect Australia's wild and scenic natural places of ecological and global significance” (Brown, 2015), the BBF’s campaigns are almost all Tasmanian as opposed to national. As of September 2016, these include saving the Swift Parrot and reserves on Bruny Island, incorporating the Tarkine in the World Heritage Wilderness Area, a native forests campaign centred around preventing logging at Lapoinya in Tasmania’s north-west, and preventing the roll back of the Tasmanian World Wilderness Heritage extension which occurred under the TFA. The other two official campaigns are the creation of Great Forest National Park in Victoria in order to protect the Leadbeater’s possum, and a campaign to prevent BP’s exploration for oil in the Great Australian Bight – which is ostensibly a South Australian campaign but also had potential ramifications for the north-west coast of Tasmania were a leak to occur.

It seems clear that Brown intends to keep focusing on Tasmania as a periphery as a way of further developing environmental concern, and has maintained and established local relationships as part of this campaigning. His historical relationship with the state, his stature in the movement and his contemporary focus mean that for many in the movement, particularly those who subscribe to his principled stance that all native forest logging needs to end, he is the figure of influence in the movement. This is particularly true for supporters around the Lapoinya campaign. For example, the Lapoinya forest was excluded from the protected areas in the TFA, but many locals (and Brown himself) feel it has incredible value as a native forest, and Brown has campaigned to make it an issue throughout the state. As such, BBF’s campaigning establishes his influence in parts of the movement that feel otherwise abandoned by the major EMOs in Tasmania.

\(^{13}\) Brown additionally spent a short period with Sea Shepherd, including three months as its chairman in 2014.
Bridge leadership and recruiting the next generation

Brown has also been highly influential throughout his career in terms of recruiting new members into the movement, and particularly into the Greens. This is usually considered a powerful aspect of bridge leadership, even though bridge leaders tend not to have formal roles, because they link the grassroots and the formal leadership, helping to identify new leadership. Brown doesn’t appear to have ever stopped engaging with the grassroots of the movement, or at least has maintained strong relationships with bridge leaders throughout the movement which keep him engaged with the grassroots. In doing so he has been able to identify and encourage a large number of key individuals in the movement to take on leadership roles.

In interviews for this research, at least 4 leaders credited their participation in the movement leadership or running for political office to the influence of Bob Brown. For example, Nick McKim:

I joined the Greens [and] got to know Bob a little bit better through that period having, as I said, first met him at Farmhouse Creek in the 80’s, and Bob asked me to run for the Greens and I said no, because I’ve never seen myself as a politician... I said something like ‘Bob, if you want to wreck your life by being a member of Parliament that’s a matter for you, I’m happy to give you all the support I can behind the scenes but I don’t really see myself as a public figure.’ But Bob’s quite a persuasive person and he asked me a couple more times and in the end I guess I buckled and uh, and said ‘Yes, I’ll throw my hat in the ring for preselection.’ (McKim, N. Personal communication, 27th January, 2015)

Or Cassy O’Connor’s account, where the implication is that Brown convinced her despite her opposition but framed it in a way where she almost denies any agency in her running for office – Brown says it, and then it happens:

...and then I had a phone call from Bob Brown one day who said ‘You should run for parliament,’ and I said ‘Nope!’ And anyway, here I am. (O’Connor, C. Personal communication, 27th January, 2015)

Elix (2011) also claims Brown asked Peg Putt to run as a support candidate in 1992, which led to her election after a count-back when he resigned in 1993. Meanwhile, Jenny Weber suggests that
Brown offering her a position in BBF was a critical part of her decision to remain an active campaigner in the movement:

I had a bit of an identity crisis, because I thought ‘well what am I going to do with my life, I really want to keep advocating for forests but I can’t provide for my family and I can’t keep going on like this, it’s not sustainable’ so it was an absolutely critical moment to have been with Bob Brown and him say ‘how about you start working for us’ so that was extraordinary for me, and I’m very thankful for that. (Weber, J. Personal communication, 11th November, 2014)

Additionally, Brown has actively supported emerging leaders by engaging and encouraging young campaigners, although he sometimes steals the limelight from emerging leaders:

I find it difficult when I’ve suggested something and everyone has gone, ‘uh, maybe,’ and then Bob Brown suggests the exact same thing and everyone is like, ‘that’s an amazing idea!’ and you’re like… ‘yup, alright, well, we’ll just let that one slide.’ [L15]

However, despite his potential to overshadow emerging leaders, his presence is still seen as helpful to small campaigns:

It’s good for morale. It’s good for the group to have people listen and know that they’re watching, they’re here to help, they’re here to care. [L15]

The effect of this recruiting and encouragement is two-fold in theory: Brown has an established relationship with leaders that makes it easier to influence change in their organisations – drawing their attention to particular issues or campaigns he feels are important. There are also some of the aspects of recruitment seen in bridge leadership (Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998) where leader selection reinforces particular values, concerns and tactical styles privileged by the recruiter. So in many ways the strong role Brown has had in recruiting and support may represent an attempt at the broad reproduction of the values and philosophies of the Green movement as he has conceived it.

In this sense Brown has more influence than any other figure in the Tasmanian environmental movement. He has a long career, establishing his influence through experience and campaign success. He has achieved broad public prominence throughout this career which has been largely
redirected into Tasmania, a small state that lacks individuals of similar stature; and he has actively recruited and supported individuals who broadly share his values and goals for the environmental movement and Green politics. This does not mean that Brown has authority over the movement; the split which occurred after the TFA left Brown and Milne in opposition while many of his ‘recruits’ like O’Connor and McKim supported it. But his influence is much stronger because of these three aspects working in unison than any other individual in the movement, and acts to prevent a genuine challenge to the philosophy and tactics that Brown promotes. Even senior leaders in the environmental sector find merely disagreeing with him publicly to be a challenging proposition:

Christine [Milne] and Bob [Brown]... [I was a] bit more challenged by their engagement in this, there was media releases prior to the vote in the upper house that totally tried to position the state Greens and us and others into rejecting the legislation, which I feel is totally inappropriate... but there’s probably a whole bunch of different views in the federal Greens as well. ...You know, it was a challenging time. It’s not often you have to... take counterpositions... with the likes of Bob, and that was really uncomfortable, but I think it was really necessary, because I feel like we wouldn’t have got anything had we walked away. We wouldn’t have a World Heritage Area, we’d still have a logging industry logging places that we want to protect and Tassie would be the poorer. And it wouldn’t have demonstrated some of those things I outline before about being willing and able to work in an entirely different paradigm, so it was really important to sort of step up and do that, albeit very uncomfortable. [L03]

If the environmental movement in Tasmania is viewed as a single unified group, then Bob Brown is the most important figure in it. His background and contributions to the movement may well make him an ‘elite’, as much as it is possible for a single person to have these qualities. However he lacks any particular institutional power, particularly since retirement, and his ‘positive’ approach to politics tends to shy away from openly attacking potential allies. Additionally, the philosophical differences between the Greens and the broader environmental movement raises doubts about the capacity for an elite culture to emerge in the movement; as Lines (2003) suggests, the movement is really two distinct groups, a green progressive humanist faction and a conservationist faction less interested in humanist concerns; Brown has consistently indicated that he sides with the Greens over the strict conservationists. All of this suggests that Brown cannot be considered an ‘elite’, but
rather simply the most influential individual operating in the Tasmanian sector. Further to this, it appears unlikely that a clear hierarchy that would allow for elites, like that of the Labor party, would emerge in the environmental movement when Brown is no longer in a position to contribute.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the leadership of the Tasmanian environmental movement and assessed the qualities, characteristics and behaviours of these leaders through a lens of elite theory. In doing so it has shown that these leaders do meet some of the broad characteristics of elites on an individual level. However the environmental movement does not appear to have elites in the classical sense. Dr Bob Brown is not exception to this: his formidable presence in and influence on the Tasmanian movement looks in many ways to be similar to the behaviours and roles of classical elites, but despite these characteristics he lacks the authority or bureaucratic structure necessary for true ‘elite’ status, and it isn’t clear that the movement would develop these qualities in his absence.

The movement has evolved over its history in Tasmania, and the result of this has been more sophisticated campaigning and the emergence of bureaucratic organisations within the movement. Leadership has taken an increasingly important role as hierarchy becomes a core organising principle amongst movement organisations and as individuals take on roles in state and federal politics, where hierarchical power and traditional elites are normative. This has led to environmental leaders taking on aspects of elites, and may indicate a move towards something like traditional elite leadership over time. However at the present time there isn’t the unity present amongst these leaders, nor the power and authority over followers, for the leadership cadre to be considered elite in and of itself.

The next chapter will examine some of the evolution of leadership within the movement and the changing roles and responsibilities of movement leaders. While this chapter has discussed the increasing prominence of key individuals within the movement and how they have taken on some aspects of elite leadership, the next chapter will explore the advantages and disadvantages of this perspective in terms of what these roles require from leaders and the tension between being
responsible to a hierarchy wielding pressure from above while still being aware of and influenced by the grassroots of the movement exerting pressure from below. In doing so it will further highlight the differences of this leadership cadre to traditional elites.
Chapter Six: The Changing Role of Leaders

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed whether or not the leadership of the Tasmanian environmental movement could be considered an elite, and how the increasing bureaucratic changes within the movement had not necessarily translated into a leadership cadre which was consistent with a traditional elite. This chapter will examine some of these changes both in terms of organisation as well as the roles and responsibilities of leaders. In doing so it will explore the consequences of these changes for movement leaders, demonstrating that the variety of capacities leaders undertake, the increasing pressure of concertive control in their personal and professional lives, and how leaders understand their place with relation to the movement all act to shape potential action and constrain the options available to leaders.

In the earliest stages of the environmental movement in Tasmania leadership was fluid and informal; leaders attempted a variety of strategies and made various appeals to the public, and those who were successful in bringing followers on board helped drive the later direction of the movement. There was a relative freedom to environmental leadership because in many ways there was not an established model of what environmental leadership should look like. On the mainland, environmental campaigners were only starting to develop a repertoire of tactics which distinguished themselves from previous environmentalist activity as a ‘new’ social movement (Hutton & Connors, 1999). Tasmanian proto-leaders drew from these developments as well as their professional experience, from the philosophies of non-violent direct action and other social movements of the 1960’s and 70’s. They experimented to see which tactics, rhetorical styles and leadership qualities would work best. In many ways the early environmental movement can be understood as a struggle between ideas where those who developed and promoted the most appealing and successful strategies were given more authority by the majority of the movement to lead. This kind of emerging proto-leadership seems typical of social movements of the era; Gitlin (1980) talks about this emerging leadership within movement organisation Students for a Democratic Society, and Herda-Rapp’s (1998) discussion of leadership in the civil rights movement also highlights the informal nature of the emergence of leaders. Environmental leadership in Tasmania doesn’t appear to be substantively different in its quality; Thompson (1984) discusses
similar struggles over direction and tactics as well as more abstract contests for power over the movement.

During this period of movement emergence, leaders fulfilled a plurality of roles that were largely undefined. Their roles were defined by necessity, by skill, and by willingness to ‘have a go’ rather than through organisation or hierarchy. However the sheer size of the environmental movement and the variety of issues they faced inexorably transformed this informal and undefined leadership into relatively more concrete and rigid roles. Tranter’s (1995) study of the environmental movement revealed a fairly well established taxonomy of environmental leadership roles, arguing that the Tasmanian environmental movement had a ‘polycephalous structure’ which reflected the history and formation of the movement but made consensus building a complex affair. Tranter identifies spokespeople, organisers, experts, green politicians, image-makers and exemplary figures in his taxonomy of movement leadership (Tranter, 1995: 85-88). While leaders can and often do extend beyond these kind of circumscribed positions, the structure and form of the environmental movement also shapes how leaders understand themselves and their relationship to the movement.

Based on the findings of this research, environmental leaders have continued to engage in a wide variety of different roles in order to drive environmental campaigns forward. Some of these roles have been more implicit, behind the scenes or otherwise submerged, whilst other roles have been explicit and performed principally in the public domain. Additionally, the polycephalous nature of the movement has continued to play a role in both the emergence of new leaders and the way these leaders have been required to respond to environmental conflict within Tasmania. Throughout the interviews conducted for this research, environmental leaders spoke extensively about their careers both in and out of environmental activism. Through these interviews, and drawing upon other media sources, it is possible to re-examine Tranter’s typology of environmental leadership and explore the roles of leaders in the present day environmental movement.

This is critical because understanding the roles and contributions of leaders beyond the purely theoretical is fundamental to demonstrating the necessity of leaders within social movements. As discussed previously, the vast majority of literature has overlooked the contributions of leaders, most implicitly but some explicitly as the result of an ideological rejection of leadership as valuable
to social organisation. Gemmill & Oakley (1992) expound this line of reasoning when they suggest leadership is ‘an alienating social myth’ which serves no purpose other than to allow the enrichment and empowerment of those who declare themselves ‘leaders’. If arguments around direct democracy and grassroots movements are right, then it is difficult to explain the emergence of leaders other than as a corruption of a ‘pure’ social movement – leaders are, in such a view, a sign of a broken and dysfunctional social movement where self-appointed ‘leaders’ impose their views on the movement and hijack issues for personal gain. There is a similar argument typified by Dauvergne & LeBaron (2014) who associate formalised structures and leadership with corporatisation and the ‘selling out’ of activist organisations to fund campaigns. Whilst recognising the increasing importance of leaders (something that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter) along with the increasing neoliberalisation of private life, Dauvergne & LeBaron frame these developments against and in contrast with grassroots activism, implying a purity in the latter that the former lacks. Subsequently their tacit disapproval of more structured movements also implies a criticism of the leadership roles inherent within them.

Generally these arguments reject leadership as either parasitic authoritarianism or as an open invitation to corporate raiders looking to cash in on activism chic – see for example ‘greenwashing’ (Hutchins & Lester, 2015). Such viewpoints struggle to find a legitimate role for leadership. The arguments here are not to suggest that the kinds of leaders identified by such critics don’t exist at all. There are obviously opportunities for the kinds of predatory and problematic behaviour identified by critics of leadership. Indeed the history of the Tasmanian environmental movement contains examples of such behaviour. What is problematic is the dominance of this typology of the ‘destructive leader’ in the existing literature on environmental movement leaders, when the broader literature, as has been covered previously, suggests that there are leaders who contribute materially and practically to the betterment of movement goals, often at no small expense to their personage, social standing and finances.

This chapter will present a counter-point to arguments against leadership, using leaders in Tasmania as a case study to demonstrate some of the contributions that leaders make in terms of skills and abilities, time and personal assets when compared to the average movement participant. The Tasmanian environmental movement has also produced leaders who operate as moral or authoritative figureheads for the rest of the movement, both locally, nationally, and in the case of
Bob Brown and Christine Milne, internationally. These leaders may not be functionally necessary for the movement to exist, but they do make important contributions to its success. In this sense these arguments also hope not just to address the basis of their power and authority but also to meet Morris’s (2000: 450) charge that theorists of movement leadership should focus on “what leaders do… and why that matters” and subsequently begin addressing some of his critiques of leadership’s place in social movement theory.

What Leaders Do

Leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement make a variety of contributions to the organisations to which they belong, as well as to the broader movement. Tranter’s (1995; 2009) analysis of Tasmanian environmental leadership established a taxonomy of leadership behaviour which outlined the broad elements of what leaders contributed to the movement. Using Tranter’s (1995; 2009) taxonomy as a framework for analysis, the interviews conducted for this research were examined for similarities and differences around the roles that leaders took on.

Spokespeople and Media Figures

In Tranter’s original taxonomy, he identified leaders who acted as ‘spokespeople’ (Tranter, 1995). These individuals liaised with the media to present their stories to the public, and dealt with questions and requests for comment from the media. Tranter (1995; 2009) notes some contention as to whether or not these ‘spokespeople’ qualified as leaders in that they had influence over participants, but they remained influential figures in the movement.

In this study interactions with the media appeared to be less a specialised role and more a requirement for acting as a leader in the modern environmental movement in Tasmania, with leaders viewing their interactions as a central aspect of their activity, but not necessarily their sole focus. Over half the leaders interviewed for this study suggested their roles tied directly to interacting with the media, and others put a high value on media skills.

... my role is everything from sitting with the board, HR, the campaign, media, it’s kind of everything really, the finances, ...you know, the entire business. (L03)
...you’ve got to get the message out. ...A well informed public is critical to a democracy, and the only way people are going to be informed about the environment is by getting the message out through the media, so naturally you have to be engaged with the media. (L06)

The sheer breadth of focus by leaders on media engagement suggest that leaders have developed beyond being mere ‘spokespeople’ and into more generalist ‘media figures’, integrating media roles from a distinct discipline into a skill required of many leaders. As messaging around the environment has become routine and expected by editors and reporters, leaders have had to become more savvy and sophisticated in their interactions with the media, moving beyond ‘managing’ the media towards actively creating and propagating media messages through social media. Indeed leaders capacity to engage with media is perhaps key to their becoming leaders. These changes will be explored in more detail in the later chapter on the media and movement leadership.

For now it is worth mentioning that the media has taken on a much more central role for political leaders and those in large environmental NGOs. It has also become critical to leaders of smaller organisations for whom any media attention would dramatically increase their public profile. These leaders compete against both the expectation by the media that their message is routine and other, larger environmental figures who dominate the environmental public sphere. Leaders in these positions require a great deal of savvy and sophistication, and lacking the public stature of the more prominent public figures in the environmental sphere, these leaders tend to look more like the traditional ‘spokesperson’ model Tranter (1995; 2009) highlights in his taxonomy. This suggests that spokespeople tend to be younger and more engaged with contemporary media, and develop into media figures in their own right as they gain experience and prestige within the movement.

Organising
Many of the leaders in this study have undertaken some kind of campaigning or community organisation during their careers, usually around specific environmental issues, but always requiring leaders to coordinate and organise a team of people. For many this was a central part of their early experiences in the movement and forms a part of their ‘apprenticeship’ into movement leadership.
...the forest where I was setting up to do my research, so I discovered, had been zoned for clear-felling and conversion to pine plantations... I sort of fell into the hands of a local conservation group and... never looked back, really... started working at one of their offices as a volunteer, and learned the trade, literally on the streets... doing petitions and other basic stuff, and yeah, that’s how that started, and that’s literally how I learned my trade. (L07)

I realised that I had the skills to organise the local community. ...they all wanted to protest, or wanted to oppose the mill but had no idea how to go about it. These are all conservative farming families, none of them very political... so a few people organised a meeting at one of the farm houses, we got together, decided that we’d hold a meeting at the Wesley Vale school hall... So I had the meeting at the hall, formed a committee, Concerned Residents Opposing the Pulp Mill Siting, and I was the spokesperson for the committee, and these were all local volunteers, but all elected by that meeting there at the town hall, so we had the legitimacy of being elected by the local community with the purpose of running a campaign. (Milne, C. Personal communication, 28th January, 2015).

The centrality of organising to leadership in this case reflects to some degree how movement ‘leadership’ is understood in both the public imagination and the academic literature. The civil rights movement and the labour movements in particular, appear to have influenced Tasmanian leaders, as evidenced by many leaders’ strong focus on democratic discourses:

...realising the power of freedom of speech, and the power of a democracy where we can fight back and say, ‘well no, we’re not going to be silenced, and we will fight’ and I think that has become more resonant to me through the years... (L01)

...the polity are getting cynical and hardened to the rhetoric of environmentalism, and to the science of environmentalism, but because of our fortunate democracy, they can’t be hardened to the social glue [social bonds] of environmentalism, so we’ve got to pay attention to that, I think. (L09)

These kinds of statements appear to reflect some of the claims that Alexander (2006) makes about social movements as contributing to the civil sphere, balancing tensions between different social demands. Indeed, towards the end of this research I had a few informal discussions with leaders where they saw a need for a renewed emphasis on grassroots organising as the central activity of
the organisations they ran, championing bottom-up growth to achieve their goals rather than top-
down media messaging.  

Interestingly, this move challenges in part the relevance of the previously mentioned media figures
and the importance of leaders as individuals, but will re-emphasise the role of organising.
Established leaders highlighted how central organising was to their emergence as leaders, but also
did not mention organising that much as a central activity of their present roles. Leaders of small
and emerging organisations were much more likely to talk about organising activity, though when
they did so the activities they undertake weren’t usually explicitly referred to as ‘organising’. This
may be in part because as Tranter (1995) notes, organising isn’t a high profile role, and is so central
to movement life that it is in many ways a ‘submerged’ role which is latent in the basic operation of
a movement organisation.

For example, the following leader struggled to articulate his leadership role. This is a long passage
even after it has been edited for clarity, which is characteristic of leaders’ attempts to explain
something which they’ve not necessarily had to articulate previously:

...coming into it I had already been a part of the [organisation]. I had done a few things,
organised camps and stalls, awareness, stuff like that... There was no real leadership built
into the format of the [organisation]. However ...I feel like I’m pretty good at assessing
shortfalls in the structure of an organisation, so where I felt as though there had started to
be... people left out.. but even when it was just a group of people, I would jump on a role, a
particular task, and lead that task. I just said, I’m going to start doing this and think about
allocation and it just comes out of nowhere. It’s hard to pinpoint when it happens. ‘Cause
before that happening [sic] I hadn’t really thought about leadership too much, but at some
point it came to the point where when it came to allocating formal roles, I [ended up in a
number of formal roles]. So in my education tried to learn about being part of an
organisation, how to be the best leader I could be. Leaders don’t necessarily have to be the
single person at the top of the peak hierarchy, but they’re everywhere and just by having
the initiative and having the passion... you can be [a] leader. I guess that’s something that

14 The Wilderness Society’s Movement for Life campaign represents one such ‘return’ to grassroots organising, and is
framed in explicitly democratic terms. See for example their video promoting the campaign:
I’ve learnt by doing this kind of stuff. And trying to work with leaders that have similar kinds of passions, and not going to butt heads and just work together effectively. More recently, the organisation has grown a fair bit and has needed a bit more structure. There has been a bit more tension at times but we’ve been able to work it out and just allocate different roles... It doesn’t really get into a pointy shape [organisational hierarchy]... it spreads out quite neatly. (L12)

Most, if not all, of what this young leader outlines here is learning how to organise and work with people to coordinate the actions of the movement. This seems very simplistic at first glance, but as can be seen from this leader’s account there is a surprisingly sophisticated collection of activities and experiences required to undertake effective organising, including a range of social skills that translate into other leadership roles.

As mentioned previously, more senior, established leaders do not speak about organising activity to the same extent. In this context organising appears to be an apprenticing role where leaders develop their skills in authority work and prove their dedication to the cause, rather than a role which remains central throughout the movement. A move towards an increased focus on organising would shift focus away from an individualised movement and towards building public support, and in doing so could also create opportunities for emerging leaders to learn the trade, an entry point for new leadership to be apprenticed and vetted by the movement. This change may well be vital to the ongoing success of the movement15.

Experts and Specialists

Many leaders engaged with the media or in organising. However some do not. These leaders tend to operate behind the scenes to contribute the intellectual resources of the environmental movement in Tasmania. These leaders often operate as academic researchers or in other professional capacities, rather than acting in public facing roles.

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15 It is worth noting that Tranter (1995) originally identified organisers as individuals who specifically acted to organise rallies, protests and mobilise support, but did not make strategic decisions. These roles were absent in this study, although this may have been a limitation of the methodology. Instead organising here refers to an activity that leaders participate in rather than a distinct role.
I’ve never really done much media engagement, I’ve always regarded myself as a bit of a backroom nerdy, boffin-y kind of person. Not that I have any great coy-ness or whatever, but generally I got that frustrating thing where you can never really reduce what you want to say to a sound bite, writing press releases is bad enough. (L07)

Expert or specialist leaders may not explicitly lead, but they provide specialised knowledge and expertise which expand the tactical opportunities available to the movement and shape the overall direction of the movement beyond the grassroots level. For example, a specialist in environmental law used research to illuminate particular avenues to respond to environmental threats as a result of development:

...we provide [environmental organisations] with advice, but we also do quite a lot of collaboration around [the] publication of reports or delivery of workshops, so we would speak at events that they’ve organised, or ask them to speak at events that we’re organising. We are getting better at getting them to realise the value of getting advice early on, so when they’re actually designing... campaigns. I guess the wilderness world heritage area is a good example, particularly collaboration between the NGOs... actually working out what it is they want to get out of that process and involving us very early on to plan how you do that, who the people they need to influence at particular stages are, what their opportunities are within the legislation, so they can design their campaign, their media strategies, around influencing the right people at the right times to make the decisions that need to be made. (L10)

These kinds of activities allow other leaders and campaigns to strategically prioritise resources to achieve their goals. The work of experts and specialists also provides other leaders with legitimacy and authority in their arguments against counter-interest groups and entrenched political interests:

...understanding [opponents] makes you acceptable to them... people respond really well when they understand that you know who they are and where they come from, listen to them, and then are able to hold an argument. That’s been my main way of becoming influential, and that’s made me very useful to the leadership of NGOs to have me with them when you go to see ministers, because I’m the one who runs the arguments with the miners, and the ministers have to decide who they’ll listen to. (L07)
However, there are some indications that experts have become less important as scientific discourses becomes politicised and routinised, with experts and researchers aligning with each side of the debate around environmental issues. For many leaders the authority of scientific discourses has been reduced as they have become increasingly routine and contested in the public sphere; leaders are now looking towards psychology and interest groups as the preferred way of affecting change.

...science is necessary, not sufficient. You can’t just rely on scientists... We did that with climate and look where it got us. We pushed the science quite heavily and it was just pushed straight back in our faces... they couldn’t give a shit about the science, it was all about culture. Culture trumps science, culture trumps strategy and tactics and everything else. I think [its] important to be aware [that] ...scientists can get lumped in there with politicians as ‘the other,’ “they’re not part of my community, they’re trying [to] tell me what to do and I don’t like being told what to do, I hate politicians and scientists.” You’ve gotta be aware of that. (L09)

I have been saying for many years that climate change intensifies and makes more frequent extreme weather events, and cyclone Yasi was a case in point, and Bob Brown was doing exactly the same as I was at the time. The scientists were saying, ‘well, you can’t really prove [that yet]... the probability is that climate is intensifying them but... [makes non-committal sounds].’ So if anything, they blunt the attack you’re mounting because of their need to have scientific integrity with peer review. (L06)

One leader I spoke to made it clear that both sides of the debate were to blame in diminishing the authority of scientists:

[Some environmental leaders]... just want to use science as, as a certifier for their own particular issues at the time ...some environmental activists are respectful of science, but others try to drag you in to say things that you can’t really say on the basis of the science... [The] forces of darkness have hired their own scientists, which is very easy... one of the most insecure occupations in this world is being a scientist, on a two or three year contract... so you can always find a scientist who can convince themselves they’re doing the right thing by speaking out for a particular industry, and if all the jobs for scientists are in the industry... [it’s] a totally corrupt process. (L13)
The environmental leaders interviewed for this research indicated a clear demand for knowledge, seeking to develop, control, defend and implement knowledge not just on an organisational level but as part of their individual mandate as leaders in the environmental movement. As such expert and specialist leaders find themselves torn between the demands of their discipline and the desires of environmental groups and leaders to wield science as a discursive weapon. These leaders can help movements translate knowledge into action, but they also run the risk of being co-opted or compromising their work. These changes suggest that while leaders talk about science being important, the strategic role that it contributes to the movement is limited largely to rhetoric within the public sphere.

If this trend continues, experts and specialists will likely become less important in terms of providing legitimacy and authority to the movement in the public sphere as their findings become increasingly contested and ‘routine’. However expertise and specialist roles will continue to be important in helping direct the energies of movement organisations and leadership, providing them with insights into potential legal strategies or reporting on biodiversity to help prioritise resources to protect areas of strategic importance.

**Public Office**

In Tranter’s (1995) taxonomy, independent Green politicians were identified as a key role because of the political power they held at the time, as well as their strong media profiles. However he also noted tension between these political figures and the wider environmental movement, with some leaders expressing concern that political representation had reduced activism at the grassroots level. Since then the Greens have consolidated at a state and national level, and become influential in setting direction for the Greens internationally.

As mentioned in the previous chapter on the elite qualities of leaders, the contemporary cadre of leaders in the Greens aren’t necessarily leaders in the wider movement. Where Bob Brown, Christine Milne, Peg Putt and others had long histories within the movement which demonstrated their talents as leaders, the current Green leadership has been much less engaged with the movement in terms of their prior history. As such roles in public office may be starting to become distinct peripheral roles rather than roles central to movement leadership.
That said, public office holders remain important because they confer power and authority beyond that available within the relative confines of the environmental movement. Campaigners are limited to lobbying political elites and building power bases of public support to put pressure on elected officials; leaders who hold public office are political elites in their own right, able to directly influence public policy and achieve outcomes for their constituents.

If elected office has become a distinct role because of the changing origin of leaders, then it has also become distinctive because it is no longer a strictly environmental role. Elected leaders have a range of responsibilities and commitments which direct them away from purely environmental concerns, although leaders interviewed for this research did tend to put a ‘green’ spin on these other issues: energy, health or education policies do not necessarily intersect with environmental issues in an immediate sense, but have implications for an environmentally responsible society.

...a lot of my week to week, day to day stuff is people, the challenges and [portfolio] policy and conservative ministers who can’t see the benefits of [this policy position] and that sort of stuff, so... you still have the Green lens applied to everything, but I don’t have as much kind of core Green stuff because of the shadow portfolios I got. (L04)

This broadening of focus by leaders in elected office has intensified as the Greens have consolidated and established themselves in Australian politics; taking on shadow-cabinet and cabinet ministry roles which require them to dedicate more of their time to issues such as health, social services and education. As seen in the quote above, environmental philosophy then becomes an overarching principle allowing these leaders to be more pragmatic about their roles.

An additional dilemma for political leaders is that traditional environmental movement activities, typified by protest and resistance, act against dominant social paradigms; conversely elected officeholders find themselves as insiders, working on and in those same paradigms which in some ways contradict the ethos of environmental action. Pybus & Flannagan (1990) have previously suggested this tension is responsible for the cyclical pattern of growth in the Green vote: when viewed as political outsiders they attract sympathy and a substantial protest vote, but victory results in their being viewed as insiders, undoing most if not all the gains of the previous cycle (see
also footnote 12 in the previous chapter). Political leaders seemed to be aware of this tension and increasingly seek to expand their vote beyond the typical ‘green’ constituency to avoid this trend.

All of this suggests that roles for elected officials face pressure from multiple directions to move away from a direct association with the environmental movement, and away from being merely a role that environmental leaders are ‘promoted’ into. Instead these leaders have the potential to be distinctly ‘Green’; promoting issues which sometimes align with the broader environmental movement but empowered and constrained in ways which mean that they aren’t merely the political arm of a protest movement but something altogether unique. This is consistent with Lines (2003: 91-94) critique that conservationist philosophy and Green philosophy are deeply divergent with regards to their position on humanism, with politics (and subsequently the Greens) aligned with human interests and conservation relatively unconcerned with human existence as worthy of special consideration. Whether this divergent trend continues remains to be seen, and has ramifications for the environmental movement and the Greens alike.

Mentors and Exemplary Figures

A handful of leaders in this sample meet the requirements that Pakulski (1990) and Tranter (1995; 2009) highlight as exemplary leadership. The obvious example here is Dr. Bob Brown. He has maintained a formidable presence in the Tasmanian environmental movement even as his charismatic influence has expanded to become the most prominent environmental campaigner and Green politician at the national level, and been formative in the establishment of the Green movement internationally.

Brown has performed a variety of leadership roles throughout his career, and in many ways serves as the inspiration and reference point for most if not all of the leaders interviewed in this study. However, Brown also deviates from Pakulski’s (1990) conception of exemplary figures because he has consistently maintained a strategic role in the movement in addition to maintaining his status as a figurehead. The previous chapter on elite qualities in leadership discussed the extent of his influence in detail, but of particular interest is his campaigning in retirement and his influence in recruiting new leaders, the latter of which recalls Herda-Rapp’s (1998) ‘bridge leadership’. As previously noted, almost every political leader interviewed spoke about being contacted by Brown,
encouraging them to run for office, and many spoke about it as being a formative part of their political careers.

However, Brown is by no means the sole exemplary figure in the Tasmanian movement; Christine Milne holds similar status within the movement, although she is in many ways overshadowed by Brown’s continued influence in the movement. Milne’s influence is particularly key for women in leadership positions. When asked about good leadership, for example, one leader said:

I learnt a lot of this from Christine Milne, who thinks very deeply about these things. A leader has to always be thinking about where are things going to go to. Not where, not just where are we now, but where is this going to? So you’ve always got to be thinking out in front of... situations. (L11)

Other women noted Christine as one of the women in leadership who inspired them and who they viewed as exemplary in terms of their own conduct. Certainly Milne doesn’t have the same presence in the movement that Brown has, but she does have strong strategic knowledge and possibly a better understanding of policy processes than Brown. This provides her with a very different set of skills with which to wield influence. Since her retirement in 2015, not long after she was interviewed for this research, she has stayed largely off the public’s radar and does not appear as yet to have been as active as Brown has continued to be, but it would be worth investigating her post-retirement career further in the future to assess how different kinds of mentors and exemplary figures influence the Tasmanian movement.

What is interesting about both Brown and potentially also Milne is that Pakulski’s (1990) work on exemplary figures suggested they had to be shielded from the strategic demands of the movement in order to succeed in their roles. They had to be above the messiness of the internal politics of the movement. For Brown and Milne this has not been the case at all. They have remained largely engaged with the strategic work of the movement even as they have emerged as exemplary figures; for Brown in particular, his figurehead status seems to be linked to his ongoing preparedness to get himself arrested at blockades, and was a key figure in the recent divide in the movement over the Tasmanian Forestry Agreement. This challenges some of the assumptions about how exemplary figures should operate within the movement, and is deserving of further research in the future.
**Advocacy**

One role which hasn’t previously appeared in surveys of leadership in the Tasmanian environmental movement was a set of behaviours that I refer to as advocacy. While media figures often engage in public advocacy, there are also semi-public or private advocates for the environment who operate behind the scenes. These figures are also not necessarily experts, but engage with politicians, staffers, lobbyists and corporations to achieve better environmental outcomes.

Advocacy roles are particularly critical in financialised campaigns, where leaders engage with the market to pressure corporations to improve their environmental impact. These behaviours will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but the key to advocate’s success is that they focus on elite players, be they in politics, commerce or civil society, to have an bigger impact compared to more traditional movement tactics around mobilisation and organising. In the case of the leaders discussed in the next chapter, they don’t have a large movement of people behind them, but instead leverage the power of consumers or investors to achieve their goals; a much more amorphous source of authority compared to mass movements, although they may have status and recognition from previous campaigns.

This is critical because the literature on movement leaders has tended to focus on more democratic activities and leadership; advocate roles tend to be highly individualised, with fewer connections to the broader movement. Advocacy appears in this regard to be an extension of roles which empower individual leaders over and above the movement, such as experts or media figures.

**Image Makers**

Many leaders identified image makers and artists as key players in movement activities, particularly around the development of movement campaigns and approaches to the media. For these leaders, image makers played a critical role in capturing the public imagination and expanding their influence, and photographers in particular were cited as influential individuals in the movement. For example when asked about who they saw as other leaders in the movement, one leader responded:
Rob Blakers, Matt Newton, Dan Bruen... all photographers but very much part of the movement. Rob and Dan as activist image takers for campaign purposes, Matt more as a documenter of the campaigns. (L03)

Another leader explained why photography was so central to their campaigning:

there's so very few that are able to stand in intact forest of the Weld Valley and experience it, so it’s getting that incredible experience to be able to be put into a picture. The World Heritage Campaign as an example, Bill Hatcher was someone who came to us from, his work with National Geographic and wanted to be a part of the campaign... (L01)

Photographers have had a strong historical influence in the movement, which creates precedent for their recognition as ‘leaders’. Peter Dombrovoskis’ contribution of *Morning Mist, Rock Island Bend* is archetypal in this regard, often credited as the image which captured the public imagination and helped prevent the damming of the Franklin River. However, leaders also highlighted an increasing role for other creative talents in campaigning:

There's also the graphics, and we have a fantastic graphic designer who works with us here. ...I would place him as one of the most talented designers in the environment movement in Australia, and he has developed a practice where he can turn any of our messages into savvy graphic ...and to transfer those into a social media and engage with people. (L01)

Another leader also briefly mentioned getting pro-bono work done by graphic design firms as a key part of many of their campaign platforms. However, all of these roles appear to be peripheral roles (and likely have historically been peripheral roles) rather than explicit leadership roles, with full time photographers and designers largely freelancing for the movement and providing it with resources rather than taking on prominent positions of authority themselves.

The principle question around this role is whether image makers have become more peripheral than they have been previously. As Lester (2006) has noted, celebrities have become increasingly central to news-making activities, and prominent movement leaders have become media figures in their own right (in particular Bob Brown). Meanwhile, images of wilderness have become somewhat routine in the public imagination. This isn’t to say that the images contemporary photographers produce aren’t powerful, but that changes throughout the movement may have
reduced the weight of these contributions as part of the movements overall media mix. Certainly this was the least represented role in this study, but deserves mention because of the weight image making has historically held.

Campaigning and protest

Another role which emerged from this analysis was campaigning. Distinct from organising, the vast majority of leaders in the Tasmanian movement have some background in campaigning around environmental issues. This role is a little different from the others discussed here in that it is not a dedicated position, but it was such a central part of leadership behaviour is worth discussing here.

Campaigning serves two roles. The first is developing a formative experience in the movement and creating personal and group motivation and inspiration. The second is extending these experiences to constantly reaffirm their status in the movement. Campaigning defines the environmental movement, and so it is unsurprising that campaign action also defines movements leaders.

A number of leaders spoke of campaigning as formative in developing their early environmental concern beyond a philosophical or rhetorical position, and viewed this as critical to their later leadership.

...the seminal involvement for me in the environment movement was Farmhouse Creek... I was arrested down there in the mid 1980’s and that’s where I first met Bob Brown, that was the first time I became actively involved in the environment movement. ...So that was, I guess, ...my political awakening as an environmentalist... (L05)

Tasmanian leaders joined campaigns because they wanted to defend places of personal significance, in response to broader feelings of political voicelessness, or because of a direct threat to the amenity or economies of their local areas. Often they mentioned how campaigning was something they were compelled towards, rather than a role they necessarily would have chosen themselves.

I was vaguely interested in the environment... but how I got involved ...I studied environmental science at university and... became very unhappy and dissatisfied with the level of protection that forests were being given... [and ] I was just really outraged by the
way our government was treating our environment. ...It stimulated me to engage in advocacy and campaigns, whereas before that I was quite open to just doing something engaged in the environment, it wasn’t necessarily in an advocacy position. (L12)

This leader was happy to do something to help the environment, and looked to contribute through expert knowledge and university qualifications. However campaigning was a response to particular circumstance rather than something she had particular ambition for. This was true for many leaders; they joined campaigns in response to some personally felt injustice rather than to become environmentalists.

Campaigning appears to be a consistent behaviour practiced throughout leaders careers. Leaders likely maintain their status as grassroots campaigners because it affords them networking opportunities and helps maintain solidarity across the movement. While they didn’t talk about it explicitly during their interviews, leaders in this study were observed in attendance at numerous rallies and events held by other environmental groups and campaigners, providing other leaders with physical and emotional support, talking with old friends and meeting new contacts. All of this maintains a social posture which affirms the status of leaders and keeps them engaged in the broader movement.

Campaigning – whether attending rallies, taking part in protests or occupations, knocking on doors – is important because it is the role in which leaders develop influence, learning skills and testing theories about tactics and strategies about social change (White, 2016). In doing so continuously and with discipline, they become leaders. They learn how to lead, how to persuade and influence, and over time, with equal parts success and persistence, they become leaders. They can take on other identities, and sometimes take on other roles which take the majority of their time, becoming experts or advocates affecting change behind the scenes. This means that they operate at slightly more abstracted levels than their early engagement, but the fact that all of the leaders in movement organisations continue to maintain a presence in this way suggests that it contributes in some way to their ongoing authority and legitimacy as leaders. Indeed the fact that Bob Brown continues to campaign strongly in retirement sets the standard for other leaders in this regard.
Campaigning isn’t a true leadership role but it is a role which is central to leadership in the Tasmanian environmental movement, and thus deserves an increased focus as part of discussions about what leaders do (as per Morris, 2000).

**Leadership roles: a shifting tactical landscape**

In Tranter’s typologies of leadership roles (1995: 85-88), his ‘roles’ are indicative of a division of labour between different individuals within the movement. What has emerged from this research is that some of these roles have remained similarly distinct, but others appear to have been consolidated or become more peripheral.

For example, experts and specialists remain largely a distinctive role, as maintaining specialist knowledge requires time and dedication which tends to exclude other leadership opportunities, particularly for those working as scientists or scholars. However, these specialist or expert roles are also becoming less salient in terms of their public impact as science becomes routinised and contested, which reduces the importance of these roles to the movement to be more internally focused.

Conversely, it seems that ‘spokesperson’ as a role has been consolidated into other leadership roles as key individuals have become media figures. While individuals do spend a good deal of time liaising with the media, as is discussed in a later chapter on leadership and media, this is certainly not something particular leaders dedicate their time towards, to the exclusion of all else. Engaging with the news media has become much more normative, an expected part of being a leader regardless of how or what one leads.

The leaders interviewed displayed traits consistent with many of these roles, and there was significant overlap between some roles to the degree that it is not feasible to meaningfully distinguish a definitive or ‘primary’ role. This is particularly true for leaders who act as exemplary figures or ‘bridge leaders,’ (Robnett, 1997) as these leaders often continue performing the roles responsible for the high status afforded them, in addition to the additional responsibilities of being a figure of renown in the movement.
Elected office, in contrast, is becoming a much more distinctive role, which doesn’t necessarily relate to the movement in the same way that it has historically. While these leaders do have status as media figures, they aren’t recruited from the same base of campaigners as the rest of the movement, which suggests they are becoming something distinct from other leadership. As Lines (2003) notes, the Greens and conservationists have somewhat incompatible philosophies, and so this divergence may be an ongoing reflection of this fact.

There is also tension between roles which prioritise the identity of leaders and those which prioritise the organisation or mass movement over the individual. Media figures, for example, are more individualised roles, with these leaders drawing upon their personal qualities as ‘key figures’ in campaigns. Bob Brown is perhaps the best example of this, where he is essentially a celebrity in his own right and his comments may well be inherently ‘news worthy’. While media figures have emerged as common leadership roles which centre on the individual leader, organising roles appear to be becoming more important to the movement again. Organising roles by their nature place more of a focus on the mass movement rather than particular individuals, which may represent a return to some kind of equilibrium between individual leaders and the mass movements from which they emerge.

These two trends where some roles are converging and others becoming more divergent, and where some roles which are increasingly highly individualised while others return to the ‘mass’ movement, suggest that leadership in the Tasmanian movement is in a state of flux as the older movement leadership paradigms are contested and the movement splits around particular issues (the Tasmanian Forest Agreement and the changing dynamic of Green politics would be the most salient here).

**How Leaders ‘Lead’**

The previously mentioned roles may represent the activities that take up much of a leader’s time, but absent from this analysis is the tactical and strategic decisions and opportunities which are submerged in these roles, and the potential for power and authority that leaders have. If leaders are not elites, as has been previously suggested, then by what means do they lead? Certainly their
roles themselves do not necessarily offer obvious clues as to how these leaders lead or come to lead.

Some insight into where leaders might derive their authority, if not from their activities or elite status, comes from leader’s discussion of what good leadership is. The questions asked around leadership qualities provided some opportunities for leaders to reflect upon their own leadership and may offer hints into how they understand their status as leaders.

For many of the leaders interviewed, good leadership, and their sense of what authoritative leadership looked like, was pinned on dedication and persistence within the movement, rather than on the tactical roles that leaders played.

[If] you put yourself out there as a leader, you sort of lose credibility amongst the people that you’re working with... but funnily enough it was always the case that a couple of us were doing all the work. We were working every single day on the issue and other people would step in every couple of days... or they’d volunteer once a week. ...I’m a leader because I’m... giving time and... my life, to actually working for the environment. (L01)

[You have to be] determined that you work hard... If you want to win a campaign you have to be prepared to work on it twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. If that means there’s a big rally coming up or a big decision... or cabinet is going to meet on something or whatever... then you don’t have the weekend off. That is just not possible. (L06)

It just means that you’ve got to be available for people, even when it’s not personally convenient. Being a leader means that you put yourself way second... behind the people that you’re representing and the team that you’re leading. (L11)

For many leaders, leadership is in many ways about self-sacrifice to the cause, in terms of the time and effort that one dedicated to campaigning when compared to others in the movement. At face value the fact that the most dedicated individuals rise to leadership positions seems self-explanatory, but this is not the whole picture. There are likely some individuals who are incredibly dedicated but do not necessarily rise to leadership positions, or move on from the movement into other positions. Dedication and time may be necessary, but are not sufficient.
Dedication in the context of leadership is not just a leader demonstrating that they care more about an issue than others in the movement, or being able to spend time on it. Dedication provides a leader with opportunities to gain experience and test strategies and tactics, to attempt things and learn from mistakes. As one leader noted, “good leadership means sometimes you’ll fall flat on your face, but you have to get back up again.” (L04) Over time this translates into intimate knowledge of how to fulfil roles in the movement.

Dedication also assists would-be leaders as it exposes them to the people who make up the movement, building relationships and understanding the interests and concerns of various parts of the movement. These relationships are a critical part of leadership because they provide the knowledge and soft-skills required to persuade and direct movement activity in particular directions.

...the biggest challenge as a leader is the relationships you have with people... (L05)

How do I express myself... construct what I’m going to do in such a way as to represent the people who are looking to me to take the right action and explain to them what’s going on... but also to provide the feedback loop about... what does it mean, where it could go. (L11)

A good leader... helps people take responsibility for doing things... they prefer not to do. Whether that’s administrative tasks, or fronting up to an unlikely ally... standing up in front of a camera... (L09)

These soft skills appear to largely substitute for authority in the movement, and require leaders to have sophisticated social knowledge of both intra-movement and extra-movement tactics. Leaders recognised the lack of traditional authority in their roles, with some discussing the ‘tall poppy syndrome’ in the movement, where, as the leader quoted earlier put it, “you sort of lose credibility” in explicitly claiming leadership (reflecting the wider movement distaste for leadership as a kind of authority). Others saw the lack of authority in the instability of organisational leadership:

It’s a fact that in many organisations there will be people who won’t be happy with current leadership and they’ll think they can do a better job. That’s fine, that’s a part of being a leader, is dealing with people who want to knock you off and become leaders themselves.
I’m pretty relaxed about that because that’s just the nature of organisational leadership...
I’m not bemoaning that in any way... but how you deal with those sorts of situations can make a great deal of difference to whether you achieve the goals that your organisation has. (L05)

Ultimately, dedication on the part of leaders means making demonstrations of their commitment to the movement. For exemplary figures like Brown and Milne, these would include things like arrests and imprisonment for their cause.

I... joined the blockade, got arrested and went to Risdon Women’s Prison. That was a particularly important experience for me, because what it taught me was that... if the worst thing they can do to you in Tasmania is... put you in prison, and... you survive that, then there is nothing more they can do... And the other thing that it very much taught me was that you can survive prison if you’re there for what you believe in. ...I think that was one of the most liberating experiences I’ve ever had, actually, because it just meant that the world was my oyster in terms of if I wanted to do something I could do it. (Milne, C. Personal communication, 15th January, 2015)

These demonstrations of commitment, along with demonstrations of success, and longevity in the movement, all contribute to these individuals being conferred with respect and to some degree deference within the movement. This isn’t the same as having traditional power or authority, but it appears to be a suitable substitute within the Tasmanian environmental movement.

There are two other factors which were widely noted in discussions with leaders around what constituted good leadership: vision and authenticity. These are of course important to leaders because a dedicated leader needs to have some internal driving motivation, but vision and authenticity also help defend the movement from elite interests and co-option.

A good leader [needs] a very clear vision, to be absolutely committed to that vision... to be willing to take risks, personal risks in terms of their name and reputation, to achieve an outcome. (L02)
Good leadership is about having a really sound set of values, and never losing sight of them. (L04)

People have to trust you and know that you’re authentic, and the values that you espouse, that you’re determined to work hard. (L06)

I do think it’s important for a good leader to be principled, and not change their views on things because they realise that something’s unpopular. (L10)

If dedication were the sole requirement for good leadership then the movement would be at risk of its leaders being those with the economic resources to be able to dedicate themselves most fully to the cause. Potentially gaining the experience and status required for movement leadership would be a kind of luxury. However the strong focus that the movement places on vision and authenticity, the values which drive leaders, mean that the movement is less susceptible to elite interests than other sectors of public life.

Ultimately, influence in the movement doesn’t appear to stem from the roles that leaders themselves play in the movement, but the status of those leaders within the movement. This status is the result of enormous dedication on the part of leaders rather than any hierarchical power or authority, with leaders having to develop knowledge and skills over time, and constantly bring the rest of their organisation (and broader movement) with them when they wish to lead.

Why Leaders Matter

As the prior analysis has shown, leaders play a broad range of roles within the movement. These elements have some similarities with previous discussion of leadership but there are also divergences from the literature. The roles that leaders have taken on in the context of this research seem to confirm that increasing bureaucratic rationality and trends towards financialisation have made aspects of leadership route processes. As hypothesised by Drobbin (2001), there is not a great deal of difference between the way environmental movement leaders approach their work and deal with problems and the way corporate leaders might deal with the same problems. At first
glance there are also similarities in hierarchical structure and roles, with clearly defined hierarchies in organisations and leaders taking on titles consistent with corporate bureaucracy complete with ‘managers’ and ‘executives’. Yet a closer examination suggests these similarities are surface level, with much deeper inter-relationships and personal pressure than mere bureaucratic hierarchy. Leaders do not have the same power and authority that corporate leaders have, requiring a much greater focus on soft-skills and relationship management to maintain their positions in the movement.

Passion & Concertive Control

One of the defining characteristics of environmental leaders interviewed for this research is that for many of them their roles as leaders extended beyond a ‘career’ or a position in an organisation. This is a fundamental limitation of the previous analysis which focuses on specific activities or roles that leaders undertake. For many leaders their leadership was an extension of their social identities – not just something they do, but an essential part of who they are. For leaders the development of environmental concern was almost always part of their early socialisation. When asked about the origins of their involvement with environmental issues, around half the participants in this study talked about their childhood experiences as central to their relationship with nature, and the emergence of environmental concern was a consequence of this early association with the environment. A typical example of this phenomenon:

Well I think the reason I got involved, not necessarily how I got involved but the reason I got involved was because I personally grew up in the country on a farm, and my parents... well my father particularly was a surfer and my parents were quite into the environment, so I spent a lot of time outside in the bush or at the beach. So I had a really strong connection to the environment and in a way that, you know, kind of watches, observes, engages with seasonal changes and changes in the environment. So I think that’s why I was... interested in the environment. (L12)

In contrast, most of the remaining participants developed environmental consciousness in adulthood, describing places they’d visited and destruction they’d witnessed first hand, or particular threats to their traditional relationship with a place that necessitated some kind of response. What comes across as central to this dynamic is some sense of ‘shock’ which disrupts the
lives of these individuals and the very conservative sensibility which drives them to some kind of initial action. For example, a few senior leaders talk about the damming and subsequent flooding of Lake Pedder as central to the formation of their environmental concern and subsequent action. Christine Milne speaks about some early, tentative participation in the campaign to save Lake Pedder but felt that the government would make the ‘rational’ decision and cancel the project.

[At] the time I just believed it was so obvious that the lake should be saved, and [there was] such a poor case for inundating it, that I really thought it was just logical and the politicians would make the right decision. So I was completely horrified when Lake Pedder was flooded, and made up my mind at that point that if it ever happened again that I would get involved. So that’s why I’ve ...argued that Lake Pedder saved the Franklin [River] because there were so many other people like me who were in disbelief, that the evidence base was there and yet the politics intervened and the power of the hydro-electric commission in Tasmania was really evident at that point. (Milne, C. Personal Communication, 28th January, 2015)

Other leaders shared similar sentiments:

I went with some friends early in the piece, back in the 60s, into Lake Pedder, and there was... a road to Damascus moment where I was sitting on this mountaintop overlooking Lake Pedder and being informed at the same time that it was going to be destroyed, and that was... a shocking moment, a lot of people felt that way about Lake Pedder in particular, it was iconic and ...[its] loss influenced a lot of of people in their attitude to the world... (L08)

However their environmental concern came about, the root of leaders concern – their principal motivation for environmental action – was felt quite personally, motivated not just for an abstracted environment but for specific places they had deeply formed attachments to. Their involvement in environmental campaigns and by extension their roles and capacities as leaders can be understood fundamentally as an outworking of their personal relationship with the environment. What this means is that leaders do not really distinguish their professional roles and capacities from their personal lives. The high level of personal investment leaders have in their work is critical when trying to understand the impact of financialisation and bureaucratisation on environmental movement organisations and the movement as a whole. Dauvergne & Lebaron
(2014) are critical of these processes on NGOs because they suspect organisations regularly compromise their core values to secure funding and expand their staff and executive compensation. Some of the leaders interviewed are similarly cynical about the professionalisation that has followed, as discussed in the next chapter on ‘financialised’ leadership.

The charge laid here is effectively that the creation of paid positions – hierarchical relations which in many ways resemble contractual employment (i.e. a job) – encourages activists holding such positions to think about their actions in the same way they would treat any other employment contract (in the vernacular: a job is a job). Drobbin (2001) is also critical of this creeping bureaucratic rationality. Inexorably drawn towards the logic of capitalism, activists begin acting in their own self interest rather than in the interest of the movement or a particular campaign. If this were the case then it would be expected that environmental leaders in organisations would display the same kind of divide between personal passions and professional identity that is present in other areas of late-capitalist society, where existentially meaningful work is seen as a luxury (see for example Graeber, 2013) and individuals increasingly seek additional sources of identity outside the workplace. Leader-professionals don’t do this. Instead their identities are highly integrated, with their passions driving their work – they seem to resist the long cited pressures of modernity against the claims of Hirschmann (1977), Drobbin (2001) and McGregor (2004).

The consequence of this personal commitment to environmental causes, for leaders and potentially for other environmental activists in professional or paid roles, is an intense rationality which is not dissimilar to Barker’s (1993) concertive control, despite the relative lack of bureaucracy in the environmental movement. Leader-professionals and campaigner-staff recognise the ‘privilege’ and responsibility of holding rare and coveted paid positions within the movement. Those in such positions carry prestige but also prominence which means that they are in many ways held ultimately responsible for campaign success – or failure. If the quasi-hierarchy that has emerged has dissuaded the laity of the movement from becoming involved, then it is a double edged sword which simultaneously places more pressure and responsibility on the professional class.

Barker (1993) notes that concertive control in for-profit organisations creates environments which trend towards highly restrictive norms and that require new members to ‘buy-in’ to the cultural norms and rationality of the organisation. In the absence of hierarchy, members of an organisation
develop and subsequently enforce bureaucratic structure amongst themselves. This rational order, Barker found, was much more rigid and controlling than one established through hierarchy – as a consequence team members require absolute commitment to the cause, working harder, longer and at greater personal expense in order to achieve the goals of the team. These changes rapidly shift motivations away from the logic of labor-value exchange towards a shared set of group values. In the case of the environmental movement, the shared values and passions around environmental concern remove any need for ‘buy-in’ for new members. Potential leaders already accept at least some of the cultural norms and rationality behind the organisation before they even apply for a position, which implies the potential effects may be even stronger.

This research into movement leaders suggests is that strongly held shared values, and hierarchy have acted within environmental movement organisations to create a phenomena similar toconcertive control in both its personal and organisational aspects. Leaders in particular display both the positive and negative effects of this process in their discussions of their contributions to the movement and their respective organisations. Leaders recognise the great weight of responsibility they carry, and are clear in their commitment to positive campaign outcomes and the ongoing stewardship of the organisations they run. The personal aspect of the issues they campaign around creates an immense drive, amplified by the broader momentum of the movement and those they work with.

As a consequence, leaders interviewed in this study appear to sublimate themselves into the organisations they run and into the broader environmental movement. Leaders hinted at extremely long hours, cancelling holidays and family commitments at short notice, working for years or decades without meaningful (if any) remuneration, a sense of precariousness, mental health issues, an extreme scarcity of resources and the constant pressures of funding and the necessity of having to make the least-bad choices. One leader highlighted the struggles of poverty and trying to raise a family while doing environmental work. Another spoke of how many had left the movement and found work in the private or NGO sector to find the stability necessary to raise a family. For some leaders this sublimation is absolute: one leader interviewed for this study quit his position as the head of an environmental organisation because they faced funding difficulties and he felt his position was the most expendable.
This isn’t to say that these kinds of issues don’t affect other professional occupations, or that leaders have made irrational decisions to (in many cases) sacrifice their earning potential in pursuit of positive environmental outcomes. What is worth pointing out is that leaders in environmental movement organisations (and this may not be true for other institutions in the environmental movement, particularly the Greens) simply don’t display the kinds of motivations that anti-leadership theorists, movement activists and other movement scholars with concerns around corporatisation claim (such as Dauvergne & Lebaron, 2014). These leaders are not self interested and are not involved out of a desire for authority or control. They are doing it because they’re passionate about the environment, often to the exclusion of nearly everything else.

The other aspect which reinforces concertive control is the existential importance that leaders attribute to their work. Staff and leaders in EMO’s grapple daily with the enormity of the problems they face alongside the limits of what is tactically possible and realistically achievable. Climate change in particular presents a looming threat that has the potential to undo the long work of campaigners on both an individual and organisational level. Even without the existential threat of climate change, there can be a tendencies to view failure in absolute terms: every day without an outcome might mean more deforestation or fishery depletion, fewer whales or less biodiversity. Even victories can be seen as compromises where less ‘valuable’ nature – by whatever metric one determines said value – is sacrificed to save that which is more valuable; a problematic proposition when that which is sacrificed still has intrinsic value in-and-of itself. Listening to leaders talk about the greatest challenges they face, to hear them discuss the consequences if they fail to prevent human-induced climate change, makes this kind of thinking clear:

We’re looking at a situation where we can celebrate thirty or forty or more years of incremental [environmental] gains: parks, reserves, reefs, trees... and climate change threatens to stuff them all. They’ll burn or they’ll bleach or [be destroyed]. (L03)

If we do not [stop] global warming, if we can’t constrain it to less than two degrees, and the recent science says Australia’s on track for five degrees by 2090, then all of the rest will be in vain. ... I’ve been an environmentalist most of my life and I realise now it will be in vain in terms of protecting those areas. Eight years to protect the coral reefs of New Caledonia... ocean warming and acidification will destroy them regardless. Same with the Great Barrier Reef. ... So we are seeing massive extinction, loss of habitat and so from my point of view,
you can fight to save an individual area but you can’t save that area in the face of global warming, even if you get it protected from extraction or human development. And therefore, we are on a last stand for human survival on a warming planet and my frustration is that [we’re] almost like Cassandra, in a mythological sense. (L06).

There is a sense from leaders that this ‘pessimistic realism’ might hollow out the meaning of a campaign and the work required to achieve any kind of victory. Others attempt to see it in more broadly positive ways, arguing that climate change makes it clear that the historical view of an anthropocentric/ecocentric divide needs to be abolished, that what is good for nature is also good for humanity. For leaders these existential concerns tend to act as a constant pressure on their organisations, creating burn-out amongst current campaigners and acting as a disincentive for action amongst the movement base.

[A key challenge of my job] is dealing with the despair and depression arising from the groaning weight of the issues we’re trying to address... (L09)

A lot of people [in the environmental movement] burn out because they can’t cope with what they see as being a very difficult work arena, but also the state of the world plays on their minds... I think the most successful environmentalists are able to work knowing that a large part of the world is going to pop... and so [regardless of] success or failure [they] have to give an... expression to what they believe. You’re not influenced by failure... you just plug on. That’s not for the majority of people, it’s difficult especially when most things that happen are defeats. (L08)

Concertive control and existential despair create distinct and powerful selection pressures on the environmental movement in Tasmania, shaping the leadership that emerges and constraining sustainable campaigns and long-term mobilisation. As such, they hint at some of the reasons why leadership and hierarchy have emerged from the grassroots of the movement beyond mere bureaucratic efficiency. While coordination and efficiency are important motivators, hierarchy also shields rank-and-file members from the worst psychological effects, a process that allows movements to grow and accommodate a variety of contributions to the movement in terms of money, time and political support as members situations allow. Leaders in the Tasmanian
environmental movement do not resemble the cynical vision of social movement organisations laid out by Dauvergne & LeBaron (2014), where organisations compromise their values in exchange for security and remuneration. Perhaps this is true of the large global organisations that Dauvergne & LeBaron survey, where organisations like WWF and Greenpeace command public influence and brand ‘authenticity’ but it seems like these negative effects of bureaucratisation, financialisation and corporatisation drop exponentially the closer an organisation is to the grassroots of the movement.

The organisations and their leaders in this study did not display the kinds of behaviours Dauvergne & LeBaron (2014) see at an international level. Certainly leaders made compromises but when these compromises occur they seem to be consistent with the values leaders hold, rather than compromises of the values they hold. As noted in the next chapter on financialisation, there is some sense that the larger organisations in the Tasmanian scene direct resources and public attention away from the smaller organisations and grassroots campaigns. Potentially the same is true for the organisations prominent in Tasmania when compared to national and international organisations. Larger organisations by their nature have more resources and influence. If it is the largest organisations that are vulnerable to co-option as Dauvergne & LeBaron assert, then this research suggests that these kinds of effects become less serious or disappear altogether further down the ‘organisational hierarchy.’ It is worth remembering that some of the organisations and leaders in Tasmania have negotiated with federal governments and industry, and been representatives on World Heritage hearings at the United Nations. They’re as legitimate and competitive on an international level as the large organisations Dauvergne & LeBaron (2014) take issue with.

Leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement are not necessarily what those critical of leadership would claim they are. Many of these individuals give every indication of being highly dedicated, sometimes to a point some might consider pathological. Their chief interest, at least from this research, is achieving the best outcomes for the environment as well as the people who live in it, rather than trumpeting hollow or symbolic victories. While further research into the intra-organisational relationships of movement participants is required to gain a better picture of the power dynamics of leadership, this research suggests leaders’ status in the movement is not about social dominance, it’s the result of perseverance, dedication and mental fortitude, making personal
and professional sacrifices that others can not or will not. These factors raise serious doubts around leadership as an “alienating social myth” (Gemmil & Oakley, 1992).

The ‘exponential curve of co-option’ which is suggested by behaviours of these leaders has potential ramifications for individuals concerned about corporate interference with environmental organisations. Smaller, locally focused organisations tend to focus on the social, economic and environmental consequences of developments or policies for their local communities. While it isn’t clear that the Tasmanian movement is growing, when examining the difference between Tasmanian organisations and the international organisations critiqued by Dauvergne & LeBaron (2014), it appears that as movement organisations grow the pressures to bureaucratise combine with the routinisation of public environmental concern to create increasingly abstracted ideas of nature. This abstract ‘nature’ is much more vulnerable to co-option or compromise, to be thought of in terms of value which reduces the worth of some places over others. What I hypothesise from these findings is that there may be a ‘sweet spot,’ where Tasmanian bureaucratised organisations have most if not all of the capacity to engage with corporate and political interests that the dominant organisations like Greenpeace and WWF have, but lack the same pressures of corporatisation that such large, highly abstracted organisations are vulnerable to. Organisations in this sweet spot are likely to represent a good balance between the positive and negative consequences of bureaucracy and hierarchy in social movement organisations. However, finding this ‘sweet spot’ is well beyond the scope of this study.

Other aspects of leadership

There are similarities between the kind of behaviours Dauvergne & LeBaron (2014) condemn in large organisations and Nelson’s (1971) identification of cosmopolitan versus local leaders. As previously noted, cosmopolitan leaders tended to be younger and more idealistic, but merely endorse programs rather than act to realise them. Local leaders varied in age but were much more pragmatic and committed to concrete outcomes. The leaders interviewed for this research seemed to be much more consistent with Nelson’s local leadership rather than the cosmopolitan variety. Part of this might be due to participant recruitment, and also in part due to the relatively small population of Tasmania. Given that the island has a population smaller than most cosmopolitan cities, it seems likely that the capacity or tolerance for leaders who simply provide lip service to the cause but don’t get involved would be lower when compared to the large base populations Nelson
was surveying. Cosmopolitan leadership also implies a distance between the leader as a person and the issue they advocate against; a distance which can be achieved through the corporatisation and geographic abstraction inherent in international environmental organisations as well as differences in class and social status (Harvey, 1996). In short, it is easy for ‘cosmopolitan’ leaders to speak rather than act when they are distant from the effects of what they speak out against. Local leaders are compelled to act because they, and their communities, will feel the brunt of the changes, whether they be civil rights issues in Nelson’s (1971) case, or environmental issues in this research. The dominance of local leadership in this research reflects the geographic proximity of ‘nature’ and environmental concerns as well as the pragmatic approach of leaders who seek positive outcomes for places they care deeply about. It is difficult on a small island with a small population to be distant enough that the need or ability for action can be marginalised or ignored.

The environmental leaders interviewed here also raise questions about the political aspirations of charismatic leadership in social movements as outlined by Nelson (1971), who suggested a tendency for charismatic leaders to campaign for political offices with high status, rather than easy offices at a local level, as successful campaigns for these relatively minor offices don’t provide a meaningful increase in political influence and threaten to reduce their charismatic influence. In practice this meant that charismatic civil rights leaders ran for the most prominent office they could, usually the United States Senate or Congress, rather than state seats or local council. However, the environmental movement in Tasmania seems to run counter to this theory, with numerous charismatic figures in the movement running for political office at a state level before expanding political efforts to a national level. A good deal of this comes down to political context. The environmental movement has historically been divisive in Tasmania, making running for any office as a public figure potentially contentious and consistent with a public perception of ‘insurmountable odds’ (Nelson, 1971: 367) necessary to maintain their charismatic status. Tasmanian elections are unique amongst Australian states in that they are conducted under the Hare-Clarke system (Green, 2006), which provides proportional representation and improves candidates electoral chances, as the quota for election is only 16.7% of all votes. Finally, due to the fact that most of the issues the movement campaigns around are local issues, the Tasmanian

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16 Although the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) also uses the Hare-Clarke system, Tasmania is the only state to do so.
17 It is also worth noting that this 16.7% figure represents an increase compared to the earliest elections the Greens participated in. Prior to 1998, there were seven representatives for each seat, with quota of 12.5%.
parliament is a valuable strategic target. These factors help to explain the emergence of the political arm of the Tasmanian environmental movement at a relatively low level compared to the civil rights movement in the U.S., where campaigners were addressing what was fundamentally a national issue.

Leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement were generally consistent with the demographics highlighted in the literature. As mentioned previously when discussing elite qualities of leaders, many of the leaders interviewed indicated some level of tertiary education, including a number of specialised degree holders. The leaders interviewed and surveyed were also prominently male; while around 58% of those interviewed were male, approximately 66% of leaders identified as influential in the movement were male. In this sense it is not clear that Tasmanian movement is entirely consistent with Pellow’s (2014) findings that eco-activists are largely white, middle-class and heterosexual, although certainly they are the largest group in the Tasmanian movement leadership. Some of this might be, as Pellow suggests, a partial rejection of a culture that privileges white heteronormative masculinity, but in some ways it reflects the dominance of this same privileged culture in broader society. A number of leaders – particularly men – suggested that the conservative political culture of Tasmania, and Australia more broadly, resisted female leadership actively by not taking women seriously (and sometimes treating them contemptuously), and passively through a particularly combative and aggressive culture dominated by patriarchal institutions and ‘unreconstructed philistines’ to a degree they hadn’t experienced internationally.

...in Australia arguments [are] pissing contests... the whole game is a different game, played by rough and angry men. (L07)

The implication many of these leaders made was that a masculine culture beyond the confines of the movement tended to privilege male voices, making male environmental leaders if not more effective then experiencing fewer barriers to achieving their goals when focused on elite decision makers.

I wouldn’t say that I’ve not got a particular job because I am a woman, but certainly I’ve experienced engaging with other key leaders in the environment movement, other key leaders in politics, and in industry, where the fact that I am a woman is absolutely an issue, and it absolutely reflects and affects their opinion of me, and its blatantly obvious. ...the impact of that though is that you need to present in particular way to those people, and if
you don’t present in a particular way they don’t take you seriously. Part of that is using other people to endorse your position. (L12)

I don’t think of myself as a woman first doing these things, I just think I’m a person doing it, and when I hit, you know, bizarre roadblocks, I think to myself, ‘oh, why is this happening?’ and occasionally I’ll have this blinding ‘oh, I know, its sexism!’, you know [laughs]. ...so there is sexism there. (L11)

I can tell you having been involved in many, many, many campaigns over the years... In the back rooms of those campaigns [you’ve got] women working... incredible hours, and not just the hours, but in strategy, in public relations, in design of materials, in research, you name it, they’re in there doing it all. But... it’s been the blokes out the front. (L06)

Movement leadership in Tasmania seems to skew towards men in formal leadership positions but anecdotally has a slightly larger proportion of women in the broader movement. This is consistent with accounts of social movement leadership in the literature which suggests women leaders are regularly submerged in the movement, performing informal leadership roles and mobilising the community (Robnett, 1997; Herda-Rapp, 1998). While there are talented women in formal positions in the movement, the majority of senior or ‘executive’ positions in the movement are held by men; the political sphere on the whole appears much friendlier to formal female leadership that the movement proper, with a number of highly visible women leaders having won political office in Tasmania. As of writing, all three Tasmanian Greens representatives are women: Cassy O’Connor, Andrea Dawkins and Rosalie Woodruff. Christine Milne, and to a lesser extent Peg Putt and Cassy O’Connor may be notable exceptions, having taken leadership of campaigns in their own right before having taken office. Some of the more visible women in records of Tasmanian campaigns, such as Ula Majewski or Miranda Gibson, theoretically appear to be strong candidates for movement leadership, having established charismatic presence and achieved campaign outcomes, but these women have either gone back to their previous careers or work in the NGO sector on mainland Australia.

This difference in gender between the leadership of movement organisations and Green politicians may relate to the fact that as elected representatives, women in office have some measure of
traditional power and authority, and are elites in their own right. Women in the movement lack these traditional sources of power and authority and so are more easily circumvented by patriarchal interests. Even when women in politics are belittled, this doesn’t completely undermine their ability to affect change in the same way it does within the rest of the movement. Peg Putt hints at this dynamic in an anecdote she shared during her interview:

I was sitting on an estimates committee, and the head of Forestry Tasmania is calling everybody else respectfully on the committee Mr. This and Mr. That, and calling me “Peggy.” When I objected to the chair, the chair just laughed. I know when someone calls me “Peggy” as opposed to “Peg” exactly what’s going on [chuckles]. They are being deprecating. And it is sexist. They’re sort of saying “little girl, it’s okay, we’ll call you a cutesy name,” and sideline you. But of course usually that happens because I’ve just done something that was effective that they don’t like, so they’re lashing out. (Putt, P. Personal communication, 15th May, 2015)

While many of the women in the movement interviewed for this research saw sexism as a barrier to effective communication, some of the women with experience in politics saw it as a strategic advantage which short-circuited the ‘pissing contest’ of ‘blokey’ politics:

I think there is still some …entrenched sexism within the environmental structures across the country. But I don’t feel it in parliament, I never feel my gender is actually anything but an advantage because... it’s actually really difficult for some of your male colleagues to run some of the more puerile arguments when you’re a woman who’s quite well informed and forthright, because they have to deal with you as much as possible on the facts, rather than do the name calling thing, otherwise they’re at risk of being called sexists. (L04)

As such representative politics appears to be a much more appealing leadership opportunity for women because it has a relatively more level playing field than the rest of the domains the movement engages in. By taking positions of elected office, women take positions where they are much more difficult to circumvent or ignore when compared to positions in the movement, although as more women take positions in politics it seems possible that these changes would also carry over into the movement as barriers to women’s success as movement leaders are removed.
Conclusion

Leaders maintain an important position in the environmental movement in Tasmania, undertaking a variety of strategic and pragmatic roles to further movement outcomes. Rather than dominating the movement, they seem primarily to make enormous sacrifices to expand movement influence and reduce barriers to movement participation. In doing so, they achieve prominence within the movement, in the media and the public imagination, but these are on the whole secondary effects which leaders take advantage of to further leverage movement goals. This chapter has argued that the negative views of movement leadership appearing in the literature do not match the reality of the Tasmanian environmental movement. Whilst this research is limited in geographic and temporal context, it suggests that leaders and leadership have been fundamental to the success of the Tasmanian environmental movement rather than a detrimental force.

Leaders have traditionally contributed a range of difference capabilities and roles to the movement. This chapter has shown that these roles appear to be in a state of flux as leadership roles consolidate or split from the core of the movement. Engaging with the media has become a central part of most public facing leadership, while other roles such as image-making have become more peripheral. There also appears to be evidence of an emerging split between movement-or-organisationally centred roles, and roles that are more driven the skills and passions of individuals than by the broader movement. These individually centred roles have some important implications for trends such as financialisation in the environmental movement.

The following chapters on market-based leadership and media discuss some of the implications of these trends around media-centrism and organisational-individual leadership dynamics in more detail, and provide insight into some of the behaviours and activities leaders undertake which make these kinds of leadership distinctive and critical to the future direction of the environmental movement in Tasmania.

This chapter has also suggested that the roles that leaders perform don’t have power or authority inherent to them, so their status as leaders has to come from elsewhere. In examining leaders understanding of leadership, this chapter suggests that displays of dedication and consistency of values play an important contribution, not because they are in and of themselves sufficient for
leadership, but because they provide a range of opportunities for leaders to develop skills and experiences which equip them to lead via soft skills.

Some of the critical discussions around leadership have also been engaged with, particularly those voices who view leadership as negative, particularly concerned with power and authority, or as prioritising the interests of leaders over and above the rest of the movement. In doing so, it has suggested that leadership is not the authoritarian or self-interested position that many make it out to be, and that leaders in the Tasmanian movement resist these framings. Leadership in this research has shown itself to be personally difficult and demanding, with leaders facing pressure from all directions to achieve successful outcomes, and that leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement are consistently personally engaged in seeing these changes occur rather than just providing rhetorical support.

Finally, the role of women in movement leadership has been briefly discussed. Women make particularly valuable contributions to movements. Women similarly have a central role to play in the Tasmanian environmental movement. Women in the Tasmanian context operate within a fairly patriarchal social context, and this research suggests that this reduces their capability for leadership in movement organisations where soft power is the predominant mode of leadership. Women appear to be more effective in political contexts where their power and elite status is explicit and more difficult to circumvent.

All of these factors are critical for understanding how leadership has operated and will evolve through the Tasmanian environmental movement. While some of these aspects of leadership are specific to the historical and geographic context of the Tasmanian movement, the global stature and importance of the Tasmanian movement also has implications for how environmental movements globally might respond to threats and opportunities. Particularly key is the increasing diversification of Green politics from the rest of the environmental movement and conservationist philosophy, even as it becomes more critical for environmental action directly through policy and indirectly by changing political culture to be more hospitable to environmental groups. While the consequences of this emerging divide are outside of the scope of this research, further investigation would be valuable to understand the tactical landscape for future movement activities.
Chapter Seven: Financialised Leadership & Movements

Introduction

The previous chapter has looked at the roles and pressures that leaders take on within the Tasmanian environmental movement, and how these requirements shape both the movement and the leaders themselves. This chapter will focus on a few case studies that represent a unique direction for leaders and the movement, in part in response to the pressures and demands of leadership and the competing demands from other leadership and the movement. Analysis of this emergent leadership style holds suggestions about the directions in which movement leadership may evolve.

For the purposes of this discussion, I will refer to these leaders as ‘financialised’ leaders. This is a reference to the preferred mode of activism which they employ to achieve results. This should be seen as distinct from the kind of corporatised leader that Dauvergne & Lebaron (2014) allege is coming to dominate social movements. In their scenario, activist leadership is a means of extracting capital from corporations in exchange for providing the corporation with marketing that allows it to appear socially conscious, and provides personal financial benefit to movement leadership.

Financialised leaders should also be seen as distinct from altruistic capitalists who increasingly wield influence in defence of the environment, for example, Graeme Wood, founder of Wotif.com. Wood used his wealth to ensure, amongst other things, that the Triabunna woodchip mill was removed from the market for Tasmanian native timbers by purchasing the mill and then critically sabotaging its workings to prevent the Tasmanian government from resuming it (Van Tigglen, 2014).

The groundswell of environmentalism during the 1960s and 1970s in Tasmania and Australia more broadly, swept upon the social and political landscape in ways that eroded many of the conventions and norms of a largely socially and politically conservative state with an uncompetitive economy. Tasmania was dominated by special interests; first the Hydro Electric Commission and then forestry, which is characterised best by the government-run Forestry Tasmania and the now-defunct Gunns Ltd (see for example, Ajani, 2007; Krien 2012; Bibby, 2013). The Australian economy was generally similar to that of Tasmania, with strong protectionism via tariffs creating vested
interests in supporting particular industries and relatively low quality consumer goods (Megalogenis, 2012: 33-37).

The resistance to development typical of environmental protest provided impetus for a variety of views about how environmental philosophy might respond to the dominant paradigm of cold-war era capitalism. Some saw the Green movement and environmentalism as a promising alternative to communism as a means to overthrow capitalism (Saunders, 2013: 124). For others, environmentalism has represented opportunities towards a series of alternative capitalisms: zero-growth capitalism (Jackson, 2009), sustainable capitalism (Harrison, 2014), eco-capitalism (Sarkar, 1999), even right-wing anarcho-capitalism has been incorporated into environmental thought (Anderson & Leal, 2001). Some critics seek limitations to the market but demand no broader reformation of the socio-economic order. Rather they suggest there are some places that are ‘too important’ to be included within an economic sphere. Arguably many in the grassroots of the movement are active for the sake of a particular place or lifestyle rather than a broader structural critique – what in urban development discussions are pejoratively referred to as NIMBYs (Not In My Back Yard).

As such there is a genuine diversity of views around the relationship between environmentalism(s) and capitalism which constitute a range of legitimate responses to the market in regard to environmental outcomes. During the campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s, protectionism and the dominance of government-run industries in Tasmania meant that the political and economic spheres essentially overlapped – the state was the market, and the market was the state. The dominance of this ‘market-state’ submerged the market into the polity, rendering market mechanisms invisible and subsequently limiting the tactical options available to campaigners to the social and political spheres. This tactical landscape shaped the thinking of many of the leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movements who went on to become ‘elders’ or ‘exemplary figures’ both nationally and globally. Bob Brown, for example, saw campaigning as principally political (and perhaps still views campaigns in this way, although it is not clear either way). Brown’s discussion of tactics is dominated by protest action, the strength of which “lies in bringing an issue to public attention; in appealing to the people at large so that they will influence politicians or developers to alter their course... their power is moral rather than physical” (Brown, 2004: 23). Christine Milne, another key figure in early campaigns, spoke in her interview of ‘protection’ being the highest
priority for the environment, something which she said “ultimately comes down to political decisions” (Milne, C. Personal communication, 28th January, 2015).

This philosophical position about the importance of the political process can exist independently of the tactical landscape which Brown, Milne and others inhabited during their early campaigning experiences, of course. Eco-socialist schools of thought, for example, predicate a similar focus on the state and the political sphere (Pepper, 1993); there were a variety of intellectual stances fermenting within Australia at the time which could have influenced the position of early environmentalists. The political economy in which they operated would have, at least, reinforced the appropriateness of these philosophies as it prevented a number of tactical alternatives. The combination of these tactical and philosophical factors influenced the direction of the Australian movement for several decades, perhaps characterised best by the emergence of the United Tasmania Group as the first Green political party in 1972, followed by its successor the Tasmanian Greens (Brown, 1987) and The Wilderness Society’s campaign for Hawke’s Labor government in marginal seats during the 1983 federal election campaign.

Since these early campaigns, Australia has undergone significant economic changes, from the early tariff reductions of Whitlam to the broader economic reforms of the Hawke-Keating governments and the later Howard government (Megalogenis, 2012), which are broadly in support of neo-liberalism and market rationality. In Tasmania, the Franklin campaign saw the end of HEC expansionism and a shift in focus towards forestry, but forest industries remain reliant on and vulnerable to competitive international markets for the sale of their goods in ways the older economic paradigm was not. The emergence of the neo-liberal regime in Australia, along with the trends towards globalisation inherent within it (Saul, 2005), opened new fronts in environmental campaigns as corporations searched internationally for softer pollution standards, putting pressure on existing environmental regulations (Frieden, 2006). Additionally, the collapse of Bretton-Woods in 1971 and the subsequent floating of the Australian dollar in 1983 reduced the capacity of policy-making on a national level, as governments faced pressure to avoid currency devaluation by foreign exchange markets, a trend exacerbated by financial deregulation and technological improvements which mean international capital can deeply punish nation-states which do not conform to normative policy expectations (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003: 57). This economic transformation has
reduced the number of acceptable policy prescriptions for states and their ability to represent their citizens, while increasing the exposure of citizens to the unfettered values of the market.

For theorists like Harvey (2004), these processes represent the creation of avenues for private capital searching for investment opportunities and subsequently transforming space and place in ways which demolish barriers to capital accumulation. However, Harvey also asserts these investments in fixed geography renders capital ‘real’ and thus vulnerable to risk in ways that ‘abstract’ capital is not, and as a result less willing to tolerate political or social intervention around the environment. Some of these environmental ‘risks’ might include World Heritage or national park nominations, environmental approvals and other regulatory structures, threatened or endangered species management and remediation requirements around activities like mining. Others are less visible or are contextual, for example social license – generally understood as public acceptance or meeting the demands of civil society (Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, 2004), which can have consequences for capital if not granted or revoked. Effectively this means that capital is vulnerable to market forces even as it threatens places of environmental significance.

A number of activists and campaigners in this study have responded to the emergence of the market as a potential space for action on environmental issues in Tasmania and internationally, moving away from the traditional lobbying and direct-action activities of environmental campaigns or using market-focused tactics to leverage and amplify the efforts of political and social actions. In doing so they reveal a broader trend found in this research: that environmental leaders are on the whole much less radical in terms of their relationship to capitalism and the market than broader political and media discourses often suggest, and raises some interesting potentialities for the status and role of the environmental movement in ways which both conform and digress from Melucci’s (1994) conception.

A Tale of Two Activists

Many of the leaders who participated in this study were clear about the role, both positive and negative, that the market played in their activities as campaigners for environmental issues. However, two leaders I spoke to stood out because they have led campaigns which are in many ways the antithesis of the traditional campaigning as characterised by the earlier Pedder and
Franklin campaigns and the tactical repertoires employed by ‘exemplary figures’ like Brown and Milne. Older forms of environmental action were socially and politically focused, drew on ‘mass-movement’ strategies and mobilisation tactics, and developed large and increasingly bureaucratic organisational structures to support actions. In contrast, the two cases discussed here represent strongly market focused actions (although in support of broader social and political campaigns) operating as ‘elites’ relatively divorced from mass-movement forces and with extremely small support operations which at times can incorporate a single person.

The first example which appeared in this research was Peg Putt. Putt was parliamentary leader of the Tasmanian Greens from 1998 until 2008, and currently works as the CEO of Markets for Change, an environmental NGO which seeks to create “impetus for retailers to adopt environmentally and socially responsible procurement policies to help create an environmentally responsible market” (Markets for Change, 2012). When I interviewed her in the Autumn of 2015, Putt was leading a small team at Markets for Change, downsized after the organisations initial funding had run out. Putt has strongly leveraged her experience and networks from her time in parliament along with extensive knowledge of forestry practices to pressure manufacturers of native forest products to move to sustainable alternatives, including plantation timber.

Putt’s role as a leader and campaigner in this capacity is fundamentally informed by her previous experience in politics. While she was involved in environmental campaigns for a number of years prior to her election, she used her status as a political insider to develop the relationships with purchasers of Tasmanian wood products that she now utilises at Markets for Change.

Almost as soon as I’d become a member of parliament, I did something I’d wanted to do anyway, which is go to Japan and talk to the purchasers of Tasmanian wood chip about the circumstances of production… and also to talk to politicians about the issues, and being an MP helped to open doors to do that. It’s been one of the themes from then until now, and ongoing, that I work with companies in Japan and have quite long-standing relationships with them, and that they have become increasingly responsive to concerns about their wood supply, which is in part due to that work… but also due to changing community perceptions in Japan and around the world about the sort of responsibility you have to take for the products you buy (Putt, P. Personal communication, 22nd May, 2015).
The position that Putt previously occupied, it is worth noting, was ‘elite’ in terms of the power and authority conferred on her as an elected official, as discussed in the earlier chapter on elite characteristics of the movement leadership. Putt is not alone in this. Leaders within the movement, including Bob Brown and Christine Milne, have accrued influence amongst social and political elites both nationally and internationally through their years of political experience, and this allows them access that their early campaigning did not. However, the overwhelming focus on the grassroots of movements in the literature conceals just how critical and effective these high-level players can be in shaping the movement and achieving movement goals, thanks to the relationships, knowledge and experiences that are irrevocably connected to individual leaders and not easily transferred to the wider movement.

For example, Putt used the relationships, experience and institutional knowledge she had gained – from her time as an MP and after – to leverage negotiations during the Tasmanian Forest Agreement and pressure forestry industry representatives to move away from native timber while campaigners waited for a moratorium on logging forests under consideration for protection.

I was asked to put additional pressure on [the buyers] so they would be sensitised to that, and there would be movement inside the talks. So that’s when we stepped up the campaign with the companies in Japan, and had quite a dramatic result... inside a couple of weeks, of suspension and loss of contracts, which I have to say was as much the company’s work as it was ours in the sense that they [the producers] had misled the customers about what they were receiving, so it wasn’t... you know, all we really had to say was, “you’re not getting material from plantations”... [it] put a bit of public pressure onto the companies (Putt, P. Personal communication, 22nd May, 2015).

There are a variety of factors involved in this tactical approach. Trust is a central issue in negotiations of this kind – Putt’s role here is clearly as an antagonist to the status quo, but she has also established personal relationships over time that demonstrate the ‘good faith’ of her actions. The work she undertakes here is clearly movement activity, as it is in service of other movement organisations on the other side of the negotiating table (The Wilderness Society, Environment Tasmania, and the Australian Conservation Foundation) but is closer to corporate diplomacy than
traditional activism, involving soft skills and institutional knowledge inherent in diplomatic practice.

These kinds of activities are not wholly novel. The movement has always lobbied politicians, particularly at a federal level. However, these activities have traditionally operated as peripheral activities which leveraged the strength of the popular movement, particularly as represented through protest action, to demonstrate the legitimacy of their representatives. What is particularly of interest in this case is that Putt derives her authority not from the movement but from her position as an elected representative, and the force of her claims are not dependent on the strength of the popular movement but on the perceived power of consumers.

Traditionally campaigning by the environmental movement in the political sphere featured leaders who negotiate on behalf of the mass movement behind them as a kind of informal democratic representation. In that context, an outcome via political response was elicited by a politician or party seeking to maintain their office, or by opponents looking to wedge an incumbent. Putt’s campaigning influence is relatively divorced from the broader movement, instead derived from international consumer demands for sustainable and ethically produced products. Using native Tasmanian forest offers particular reputational risks for companies on a global stage, not just from forest campaigners, but from competitors looking to gain an advantage over market rivals. This is particularly important for timber products such as paper, where there is relatively little difference between products, making them more vulnerable to information economics (Stiglitz, 2002), where differences in price are largely attributed to the way in which consumers perceive the product.

Consumers present a much larger and more diverse group than the traditional movement base, but also a more nebulous and abstract demographic in terms of their perceptual force. Consumers don’t have the same presence in the public imagination. They don’t protest, they don’t stage blockades, and they don’t attract media attention. Harnessing consumer power takes skilled advocacy on the part of key individuals to transform latent demand into a potent threat to ‘business as usual’.

It is possible for skilled leaders to present consumer power as a threat in part due to fundamental weaknesses in the market, particularly problems around information asymmetry (Stiglitz, 2002). Early paradigms of economic thought understood information as effectively symmetrical, with both
parties in any given transaction having perfect knowledge about the value of a product, which includes details of its origin and manufacture (Sharp, Register & Grimes, 2006). This shared knowledge allowed both parties to agree on a fair price. Stiglitz (2002) demonstrated that all market transactions are clouded by doubt or distrust of claims made by transacting parties which can create inequalities. These asymmetries of information aren’t just a natural product of the market but are actively created by actors within it in ways that can destroy value. This suggests there are incentives for those in the forestry industry and/or producers of forest products to conceal the origin of timber that is not sustainably or ethically harvested to improve the perceived value of their product.

Putt’s work here, viewed through an analytical lens of information asymmetry, isn’t simply applying economic pressure around an action in the same way some campaigners apply political pressure: instead Putt and Markets for Change actively provide information to the market, both consumers and producers, allowing them to make better decisions about the products they purchase and the prices they pay. These behaviours support the market by reducing information asymmetry – by market standards native Tasmanian forest is generally more valuable when left standing (Ajani, 2007) and consumers similarly place a high value on Tasmanian forests both in terms of avoiding using products and visiting these places as tourists. Additionally, reducing uncertainty on the part of producers also allows them to signal confidence in their business model to the market, which improves their standing when seeking investment (Stiglitz, 2002). Relative to political action, where ideological interests and pet projects can make achieving successful outcomes difficult, using information to alter price and demand signals in this way can be fairly straightforward and effective:

It’s not a campaign that’s conducted through the media, so it's not like the sort of campaigning we see to influence public policy. It’s sort of a different way of approaching things, getting companies to make decisions about their procurement policy and pushing that message back down the supply chain from the demand side, changing demand. So rather than trying to... get politicians to adopt a policy position on the basis of public opinion and then have that policy position eventually implemented, all of which is quite time consuming, laborious and imprecise in terms of what you eventually end up with... its a process which relies... more on company image and how they want to be perceived vis-à-vis their rivals in
the market, the sorts of issues they see their consumers caring about, building relationships with companies around... what is and isn’t acceptable (Putt, P. Personal communication, 22nd May, 2015).

The second example reinforces these themes in relation to the market. Scott Jordan is the campaign coordinator for the Tarkine National Coalition (TNC), a group dedicated to protecting the rainforests known as the Tarkine in north-west Tasmania. Jordan’s journey to movement leadership is different to Putt’s in that he lacks ‘elite’ qualifications, particularly around traditional markers such as education. Jordan left school at 15 to work in mining exploration, and later worked in youth work and community development before getting involved with TNC. However, the campaigns he helped run were similarly strongly market focused, utilised information asymmetry and were very successful.

The chief example of this was a campaign the coalition ran against several mining proposals in the Tarkine during the height of the mining boom; while the coalition had been successful in protecting a large portion of the forest from logging, only 5% of it was protected from mining. Jordan utilised tactics around specialist information and shareholder rights to gain access to investors, using information, whether publicly available or collated by TNC members, to raise questions about the viability of the projects.

In taking on that campaign we’d taken advice on where mineral prices were likely to be going, and we’d read a lot of economic commentary around that and it [was] very clear that the mining operations that were being proposed were very short term, and the economic climate that was supporting [these projects] was also likely to be very short term... and so the task before us was how do we deny investment funds to these organisations long enough to make the projects unviable? (Jordan, S. Personal communication, 17th November, 2015).

In my discussion with Jordan the language and logic of economics provided legitimacy for the campaigning and long-term vision that the TNC held for the region. Having campaigned to protect the forests of the area for a long period prior to Jordan’s involvement, TNC had worked to present not just a conservation agenda but one which actively promoted the economic potential for the Tarkine if it was left standing.
We genuinely believed that if tourism was allowed to thrive in that area without the threat of destructive activity that it would provide the jobs dividend that the community could rely on into the future... so we made a decision to try and deliver on some of the promises we’d made... we found we were working with local councils, at times with Forestry Tasmania or Parks as the land managers, we were working with tourism bodies, aboriginal groups, and so it was a useful time for us... showing people that we were serious about it, we didn’t just wave the [tourism flag] to get conservation reserves, that we had a genuine commitment to it and we understood that unless we provided an economic platform... we couldn’t expect the community to come with us (Jordan, S. Personal communication, 17th November, 2015).

This focus on an economic platform provided a framework for the TNC to approach the emerging threat of mining in the region. Economic analysis suggested that the local communities would see little in the way of long-term job growth given the projects would only remain viable at extremely high mineral prices, providing a fairly short term campaign target: all they had to do was wait for mineral prices to drop. The irony was that much of the information Jordan and TNC used to plan this strategy was widely available from the mining industry.

It was freely available, and some of the best stuff came from the mining industry, so for a few years there we brought our ticket and went to the Minerals Council conferences, we listened to the economists that they’d rolled out that were giving out the industry projections and we perused the online materials available, and... when iron ore was being hailed in Tasmania as... what was going to save the economy, all the projections were that prices were going to drop below US$100 a ton... and it’ll happen within two or three years. In the case of [the projects] they needed a price of around US$120 a ton to be profitable (Jordan, S. Personal communication, 17th November, 2015).

Where Putt’s strategy with Markets for Change was largely about putting pressure on manufacturers to get results in a broader social and political campaign, Jordan suggests the market approach TNC took recognised the political reality that the government was unlikely to negotiate, and that there was ‘very little appetite’ for taking on the mining industry at the time due to political circumstances around the super-profits tax proposed by the federal Labor government. In this
context, it was a more effective use of resources to talk directly to investors:

So we did things like... I became a shareholder in [mining company] and made a huge loss [laughs]. We trundled off to AGMs and asked them questions, but not questions about ‘why are you going to destroy my rainforest’... but asking questions around failures to disclose, so [they’d] never told their investors that they were in an area that had been nominated for National Heritage Listing... in the period where it [the forest] had an emergency listing placed on it, they’d never disclosed that to their shareholders. They’d never told them they were in [a forest reserve] and so we went and asked them questions about their failures to disclose, and so the first AGM we went and asked those questions, we saw the share price drop over 20% in four hours (Jordan, S. Personal communication, 17th November, 2015).

Information asymmetry between mining companies and their investors is the central feature of this particular tactic. The threats to financial return associated with working in an area that may be subject to additional environmental protections are unpalatable to investors who aren’t otherwise engaged in speculative activity. As a consequence, a mining project struggling to meet investment requirements has incentive to obscure these elements of their proposal in order to secure funding, which may lead to over-valuation by the market when compared to their real potential for returns. Jordan’s line of questioning here serves his stated purpose to make the company look bad and deprive them of funding streams – punishing their actions through economic means. However in doing so he also reduced information asymmetry between the executive and board of the company and their investors, allowing investors to avoid losses further down the line and move their capital to investments where they could achieve higher returns.

These are reasonably novel cases within social movement literature, where social and political strategies tend to dominate discussions (for example Carmin & Balser, 2002). The kind of tactical choices displayed here by movement leaders simultaneously subvert and reproduce capitalist market systems. Reducing information asymmetry in this way responds to the environmental threats created by the markets endless quest for profit by wielding the values of the market against itself, but in ways which improve profitability and equilibrium for the market as a whole. As such, this kind of activity occupies a remarkably conservative political position in relation to neoliberal capitalism and the inequalities inherent in the neoliberal project. The use of information in these contexts sent negative price signals to manufacturers and investors, but it is also conceivable that
movement actions around responsibly developed projects could produce positive price signals and impart competitive advantage to companies operating sustainably and ethically. Given the increasing hostility of state and federal governments towards environmental issues, moving into the market represents a savvy tactical choice on the part of movement leaders.

Again, this approach is not wholly unique, nor is it a silver bullet for the environmental movement. McGaurr (2015) notes from the perspective of tourism that places, including the Tarkine, are ‘branded’ and this place-branding makes them susceptible to political pressure. As natural tourism is economically valuable, much effort is put into countering or marginalising stories around environmental destruction in the state. This suggests that there are opportunities for political interests to counter these market tactics through public relations strategies, although there are possibly limits to the success of these counter-approaches as they are largely focused on news media and travel journalism. Many other social movements in Australia have also made similar overtures towards the market in the absence of political support. For example the LGBTI movement has worked to achieve a broad base of corporate support for gay marriage (“Corporates come out in support of gay marriage,” 2015) as a way to create alternative sources of political pressure. However these campaigns differ because they fundamentally represent alliances between corporate interests and activists to produce ‘brand activism’. The environmental movement incorporates similar trends where corporations tout their environmental credentials. This sometimes leads to suggestions of ‘greenwashing’ (Hutchins & Lester, 2015) by corporate interests. A brand leverages the value of environmentalist and environmental movement discourse without making organisational changes that reflect a commitment to the philosophy they espouse, but can also include positive progress towards environmental outcomes.

The relationship that Putt and Jordan have to the corporations they interact with is very different. The brands do not derive benefit from their interaction, and there is not the same ‘positive’ corporate activity seen in brand activism. This leadership activity doesn’t ask corporations to come alongside the movement, and it doesn’t present the kinds of opportunities for brand differentiation that more mainstream market-movement relationships tend to feature. Rather Putt and Jordan present and represent corporate risk and negative value. A corporation in this model of activist leadership is the subject of, not a partner with, which makes this a fundamentally unique model of activism in an Australian context.
Such market tactics can be very effective and efficient in terms of the resources (both human and material) and mobilising activity required for success. Yet they also have the capacity to distance leaders and movement organisations from their base, and thus threaten the opportunities for civil society development that many movement theorists and activists champion. Movement tactics that rely on mass-mobilisation force leaders to think about how to bring their supporters ‘along for the ride’ to maintain their momentum; Gitlin (1980) and Thompson’s (1984) accounts of movement campaigns highlight how central these discussions were for the leadership of the respective movements. Mass-movement tactics impart a kind of democratic accountability which market tactics lack given that interventions into the market draw their power principally from the endless search for profit. In this way a move towards market tactics may reflect the broader financialisation of politics (Reich, 2007; Foster & Holleman, 2010). The development and deployment of knowledge as information in the market also parallels the emergence of knowledge elites (Saul, 1992), where increasingly specialised and commoditised knowledge is held and defended by experts to the exclusion of the public. This suggests is that market tactics may be used to exclude the movement base or otherwise create barriers to participation if movement organisations don’t actively work to include them.

It is also important to note that these two cases do not represent the totality of market-based tactical responses available to movement leaders, but are products of the specific social, political and economic contexts in which they emerged. It is entirely conceivable that a range of different tactics have and will emerge in response to environmental threats both in Tasmania and globally. The importance of these cases for this research is that they represent a range of behaviours that do not appear in the social movement literature, and have implications for the way theorists approach the environmental movement, and environmental leaders in terms of their relationship to capital.

**Eco-Capitalism and Movement Leadership**

In the political sphere, the pejorative of choice for Greens is ‘watermelon,’ a term premised on the notion that beneath a facade of environmentalism lies a secret communist. However despite the popularity of this idea, particularly amongst the political right, the leadership of the environmental movement in Tasmania is remarkably economically conservative. As previously discussed,
movement leaders are beginning to view the market as part of their tactical landscape, and operate in ways that serve, deliberately or otherwise, to reproduce and strengthen market mechanisms. Movement leadership, even prominent leaders and ‘exemplary figures’ in the movement, have fairly conservative views of the relationship between the environmental movement and capitalism which helps explain a willingness to move towards the market, which generally contradicts popular discourse about the role of the environmental movement.

The appearance of market-based tactics suggested that discursive attitudes towards capital and broader philosophies of leaders might be less radical than the popular imaginaries displayed in environmental literature (see for example Taylor, 2010). The emphasis on ‘deep green’ or ‘dark green’ imaginaries and ‘radical’ environmental groups and activities in the literature (see Crouch & Damjanov, 2011; Carmin & Balser, 2002; Purkis, 2001) and radicalism in movement literature more broadly (see Routledge & Simons, 1995; Rojecki, 2011) at the expense of less sexy or ‘inspiring’ philosophical and tactical postures suggests these positions are relatively ‘centrist’ representations of environmental movements. To determine how Tasmanian environmental leaders understand the relationship between their movement and capitalism, it is worth exploring a few typologies of environmental discourse around capital.

Harvey (1996) develops a framework around discursive attitudes to capital around conceptions of justice and nature. This system considers the relationship a set of discourses has between capitalism and nature in dialectic, but also examines the relative privilege these discourses afford humanity both in terms of human life and human values. For Harvey, ‘environmentalist’ positions represent a continuation of the classical ‘culture-nature’ dichotomy (see Cosgrove, 1984) where the environment is ‘other,’ an external element that needs to be managed. Harvey suggests this construction of nature reflects particular power relations towards race, class and gender. He also identifies a dialectical ‘ecologist’ position that views humans as embedded within nature. These two stances operate to create discrete social, political and philosophical outcomes, and have broad implications for the possibility of an ethic of environmental justice. Of relevance here is Harvey’s discussion of the divisions that might be expected in the environmental movement as a result of this dialectic, resulting in positions with “their own blend of complicity and dissent with respect to the existing beliefs, institutions, material social practices, social relations and dominant systems of organising political-economic power” (Harvey, 1996: 373). These represent “arguments about
society and, therefore, complex refractions of all sorts of struggles being waged in other realms” (Harvey, 1996: 372) including national identity, religion and science.

McGregor (2004) provides another view of environmental thought through his investigation of environmental imaginaries – ways in which societies commonly imagine nature, or “how the raw material of existence is transformed, interpreted and conceptualised within the collective (un)consciousness of society” (McGregor, 2004: 594). Exploring these imaginaries is helpful because it turns attention to the “forms of social and individual practices which are [socially considered] ethically and morally right in regard to nature” (Watts & Peet, 1996, in McGregor, 2004: 594). For McGregor (*ibid*) imaginaries can be thought of as social hierarchies of discourses that provide the “languages, norms, metaphors and meanings for constructing and expressing nature.” His simplified taxonomy of environmental discourses suggests a loosely constructed spectrum running from anthropocentric to ecocentric core principles.

These two frameworks of environmental thought serve to cover both ethical dimensions as well as the practical and philosophical regard for nature as conceived by movement leaders. Using these discursive schemas (outlined in Appendix I) as a guide, a close reading of all the transcripts of interviews with Tasmanian environmental leaders was conducted to identify how regularly they employed discourses associated with each category. Each interview was examined and coded based on the discourses used. Responses could include multiple discourses, but each response could include, for example, discussions where the leader drew upon ideas of ‘sustainability,’ ‘sustainable practice,’ ‘balance,’ or ‘maintenance’ were coded as *sustainable development*. Discourses around risk, usually in relation to pollution and climate change, were coded as *survivalist*. Often discourses would appear in tandem, particularly *sustainable development* and *ecological modernisation* discourses, that have similar ideas about sustainability and the role of science, for example. Interestingly in several cases interviewees deployed particular negative discourses, which led me to categorise these instances separately. For example, an interviewee might talk about *standard views* of the environment, but framed by language about it as destructive or ignorant. This kind of behaviour clearly reproduces the discourses in question, but doesn’t reflect a positive association between the participant and said discourse, so they were coded as *anti*-discourses (i.e. *anti-standard view*).
A count of the regularity with which these discourses appear suggest that leaders express beliefs which are generally consistent with Harvey’s (1996) ‘ecological modernisation’ paradigm and strongly weighted towards the anthropocentric end of McGregor’s spectrum of beliefs. This generally held true on an individual level across the cohort, with those who described themselves as more ‘radical’ than the majority of the Tasmanian environmental movement still overwhelmingly deploying discourses around ‘sustainability’ and ‘survivalism.’ Discourses around ‘ecological modernisation’ and ‘sustainable development’ were dominant, appearing on 43 and 77 occasions respectively. ‘Survivalist’ discourses also featured strongly, perhaps unsurprisingly given the salience of pollution based issues in the form of climate change, appearing 32 times.

The dominant environmental discourses in these analyses – ecological modernisation and sustainable development – broadly constitute a set of values critical of capitalism and the neoliberal order only at a superficial level. Both Harvey (1996) and McGregor (2004) suggest these stances are scientific and managerial views of environmental destruction that are relatively conservative and don’t consider broad social and economic changes as a necessary part of environmental conservation. Survivalist discourses tend be more radical in terms of their view of the threat that environmental issues present to ongoing human existence, but are still grounded in managerial stances rather than demanding social change (McGregor, 2004).
these views suggests that leaders are much less socio-politically radical than portrayed in many media accounts.

Given the dominance of ecological modernisation (EM) discourses in this context, it is also worth considering Christoff’s (2009 [1996]) work into the dimensions of ecological modernisation discourse. Examining the early literature around ecological modernisation, Christoff (2009: 104-108) argues that these discourses have technological, policy and belief system implications which can render the concept ambiguous. He argues that ecological modernisation exists on a spectrum from weak to strong. ‘Weak EM’ focuses on economistic, technological and instrumental approaches, with a closed or technocratic decision-making model, a national focus and a unitary or hegemonic model of development which suggests that all societies must progress through the same set of stages as ‘western’ countries.

In contrast, ‘strong EM’ is focused on ecological, institutional and systemic, and communicative approaches, with an open or democratic decision-making model, an international focus and a model of development which suggests a diverse range of options by which societies might modernise. It is this ‘strong’ environmental modernisation which Christoff argues provides the best opportunities to “lead to the sorts of embedded cultural transformation which could sustain substantial reductions in material consumption..., significant and rapid structural transformations... and major international redistributions of wealth and technological capacity” (Christoff, 2009: 112).

Leaders’ discussions around the environment portray the market and capitalism in fairly positive terms, or anthropocentric values consistently associated with normative hegemonic capitalism (Harvey, 1996; McGregor, 2004). Nick McKim, who is now a federal senator for the Greens, has been quite outspoken about his support for capitalism. For example, he delivered a public lecture which broadly championed what might be described as ‘green neo-liberalism’ just prior to the Tasmanian state election in 2014.

Other leaders discussed their understandings of environmental issues in ways that clearly show how interplay occurs between ecological modernisation, sustainable development and survivalist discourses, and how capitalism is either marginalised as a risk or embraced as a saviour:
I mean, failure is probably too strong a word, [but] the world is nowhere near a sustainable operating model at the moment, we’re a million miles from it... Global carbon equivalent emissions are going through the roof, it’s really only global economic slowdowns that have... slowed down the rise in our greenhouse gas emissions. If we don’t get some kind of strong global consensus, or something approaching a strong global consensus on climate within a decade or two... it will go down as one of the greatest failures in human history. (L05)

I’d like for there to be a breakdown in the division between what is called development and environmentalism, so that environmentalism and economy are seen as... the same rather than contrary. ...You’re seeing that a lot of [corporate] leaders are... seeing their prospects suffering as a result of environmental harm and so forth, and so we’re starting to see some of that merger. I think probably the environmental movement is partially guilty of maintaining that division, some elements of it, rather than [saying]... on some occasions there’s a need to back away and try to foster some understanding. (L10)

While the practicalities of such a project are not explicit, the fundamental ideas represented here are essentially the overarching goal of the neo-liberal project: to impose prices on everything, including nature, so that costs can be accurately calculated. Effectively these discourses support the expanding financialisation of the environment and environmental issues (Millward-Hopkins, 2016).

Taking into account Christoff’s (2009) spectrum of ecological modernisation, these leaders tend to reflect more economistic dimensions in terms of their discussion, which is indicative of a move towards the ‘weak EM’ end of the spectrum, but they also displayed a strong democratic and international focus which is associated with ‘strong EM’. Of course as Christoff (2009) notes, these categories aren’t exclusive or binary; and aspects of ‘weak’ EM are necessary if insufficient for ecologically sustainable outcomes. These leaders may also be reflecting the kind of discourses which are seen as effective in the broader public sphere of Tasmanian society where economic concerns play a central role.

Even when referring to a personal ecocentric stance with regards to the environment, participants tended to draw upon anthropocentric discourses such as sustainability to make sense of their relationship to the environment:
Climate change is evidently the... largest thing we’re going to face as a species, as a society...
I never saw myself as above or distinct from the natural world, I always saw it as a
fragmented natural place that humans had kind of built onto. I could see that as
[development] was happening, we were losing natural areas... That’s what led me to... take
part in fixing that issue. So it’s obviously one of the biggest issues we have, how do we
become sustainable on a finite planet? (L17)

On the other end of the spectrum, deep ecology discourses appear only 6 times, over the course of
4 different interviews. Two participants identifying as ‘deep-green’ or ‘dark-green’
environmentalists were included in this result, although it is important to note that these schools of
thought are considered more pluralist, de-centralised and inclusivist than ‘deep ecology’ (Hay,
2004). However, a number of participants also cited specific instance of psychological crisis in which
an event or place triggered identification with, or emotional attachment to, nature. Hay (2002: 2)
suggests this phenomena leads either to rationalisation of feelings, or understanding through a
system of thought like deep ecology. However I chose to code these as ‘eco-feminism’ as they more
closely met the ‘special relationship to place’ criteria McGregor highlights.

I still feel emotionally attached to wilderness areas around the planet, particularly in my
homeland of Tasmania (L05).

I’d like to tell you it was all based on science and rational arguments and decisions, but
that’s not why we choose to save things... it really comes down to an emotional connection
with it. ... I can provide you with lots of details on the science and why its important, and all
of those things, but at the end of the day I think for most of us it really does come down to
an emotional decision. (L18)

It is unclear what the relative lack of ecocentric discourses like ‘deep ecology’ mean in terms of the
relationship between leaders and the broader movement. Cianchi’s (2013: 27) previous
investigation of radical environmentalism in Tasmania only uncovered two grassroots activists who
identified with deep ecology as a philosophy, which he considered quite low when accounting for
the sample used. While both Cianchi’s work and this study deploy small qualitative samples, his
findings when combined with this analysis suggest that movement leadership is philosophically
similar to the movement base. This isn’t to say that there aren’t those who subscribe to ‘deep ecology’ in the Tasmanian movement, but that the mainstream groups which dominate the public sphere do not, and nor do mainstream leaders.18

Participants who drew on ecocentric discourses would often deploy them as part of a dialectic with anthropocentric discourses. Many activists used this as a strategy to reject what might be called a ‘biocentric’ ethic often associated with ‘dark green’ philosophies. Biocentrist discourses as they occur here are best understood as anti-humanist, oppositional stances to anthropocentrism, like the radical deep ecology of the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (Ormrod, 2011). Leaders who identified with ecocentric discourse would often deploy anthropocentric discourses alongside the dominant narrative, suggesting that there was a clear place for people and culture in the world they hoped to bring about. For example, some spoke of social justice and human rights as fundamentally intertwined with environmental perspectives:

I consider all environment and conservation issues, and actually all human rights, kind of social justice issues, high on the list [of priorities]... I would say carbon dioxide pollution, which can be slightly separated from climate change, is also really high for me because of the ocean acidification it’s going to cause... It’s very difficult for me as a very deep green environmentalist to disconnect those things... ...I think human rights and social justice issues, or people issues, attract... I think its like over ninety percent of funds and resources, and the environment attracts less than ten percent... (L11)

Others simply deployed anthropocentric discourse in ways which could possibly be attempts to pre-empt accusations of ‘biocentric’ prioritisation of nature over human life:

It’s more of the social aspect of climate change for me, so I’m more worried about communities going under water, I’m more of a... climate change battler for the human perspective. ...Deep down it’s not about saving the planet, its about saving ourselves... And

18 It is also possible that there is a disconnect between the proponents of deep ecology as a philosophy and the leadership of activist movements, where leadership and theorists use the same term but understand it in different ways. This may be one reason why deep ecology and the other more radical discourses are absent from this study, but it doesn’t explain the strong anthropocentric discourses leaders display (as will be discussed shortly).
it’s not, I mean we’ve definitely spend it up, with industrialisation, and its not great, the speed with which we’re losing our flora and fauna, we’ve definitely provoked that, but... it’s about how we can adapt to climate change now (L16).

It’s a huge battle trying to get the point across... that climate change isn’t about possums and trees, its not about mother nature... the only reason I care about nature is that humans have to live in it... so people don’t understand the effect that this has on human beings. ...I think the climate change movement is about saving people (L15).

Even if there were more ‘deep ecology’ discourses present in this sample, it’s not clear that ‘deep ecology’ is necessarily or inherently against the market or anti-capitalist. Certainly, practitioners of deep ecology provide substantive critiques of capitalism, and include groups like eco-anarchists and the previously mentioned human extinction movement, but at its core, the original practitioners of deep ecology saw it simply as a movement associated with spiritualist approaches to nature, prioritising self-realisation and biocentric equality (Devall & Sessions, 1985 in Benton & Short, 2000: 193-198). Deep ecology finds a place for ‘simple materialism’ where it serves the goal of self-realisation, appropriate levels of technology (‘non-dominating science’) and a sense of frugalism (‘doing with enough’). With the exclusion of biocentric philosophy, the individualism, frugalism and self-realisation inherent in this philosophical practice is strikingly similar to the beliefs and practices associated with Calvinist Protestantism and the Protestant work ethic that Weber associates with the rise of capitalism. For Weber, the ‘protestant ethic’ was so powerful because despite the official teachings of the church, believers applied Calvin’s teachings against the grain of his thought in ways that engendered the spirit of capitalism (Hughes, 2003: 98). The similar philosophical features of deep ecology, I suggest, render it—similarly vulnerable to co-option by capitalism - it’s not inherently antithetical to markets in the same way that left-green ideology is. Tellingly, the latter ideology’s discourses were almost totally absent from this sample.

Tasmanian leaders tend to privilege discourses of sustainable development and ecological modernisation, but per Christoff (2009) it isn’t entirely clear from this discourse analysis the degree to which leaders lean towards a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ view of ecological modernisation. Taking into account the types of campaigns and actions leaders are involved in, some of which are discussed earlier in this chapter, as well as the chapter prior, I would argue that Tasmanian environmental
leadership lends itself more to the ‘strong’ model, where broad ecological and systemic views are prioritised, with communicative, democratic and open approaches. These ‘strong’ EM discourses are important to creating effective change, and are broadly resistant to co-option or dismissal. More targeted research around this question would be helpful to confirm this hypothesis, but was beyond the scope of this thesis.

*Ideas into Actions: the emerging financialisation of the environmental movement*

Given the discursive landscape that Tasmanian environmental leaders operate in, the kinds of behaviours and tactics that are emerging around the market are in hindsight predictable. In both Harvey and McGregor’s schemas, discourses that support market intervention principally as a way to prevent market failure, either due to information asymmetry or pollution (particularly carbon pollution) dominate. Most leaders are happy to operate within a market system or are too busy fighting smaller battles over a particular environment or a particular species to be concerned with broader structural issues. The two environmental leaders who self-identified as ‘deep green’ environmentalists with an anti-capitalist streak suffered from the Žižekian axiom that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism (Žižek, 2011).

A move into market-facing tactics is consistent with the broad discursive position that environmental leaders in Tasmania have taken. Tasmanian environmental leadership does not look like left-green eco-socialism, but instead can be seen as a broad response to a series of market failures where nature has been under-valued, markets have suffered from information asymmetry and the public is forced to bear the costs of carbon emissions. Leaders and movements have incentive to deploy the language and tactics of the market in a neo-liberal regime where market rationality is given precedence over scientific, aesthetic or emotional claims, particularly when the political context leaders find themselves in is hostile to environmental agendas. While the political sphere in Tasmania has always been hostile to environmentalism, the routinisation of environmental issues has also made it more difficult to mobilise the public to the same degree as early campaigners, and the previously mentioned neo-liberalisation and globalisation have further reduced the range of policies palatable to the political establishment. Moving into the market and adopting discourses more consistent with capitalism allows environmental leaders to circumvent these barriers to achieving sound environmental outcomes, at least in the short term.
These trends also reflect the increasing marketisation of environmental movement organisations which have become more bureaucratic and structured, as well as an increasing focus by activists on paid positions, which creates long term financial pressures and responsibilities for organisations. This phenomena has a profound impact on leadership of organisations, as will be explored in the next chapter, but also has ramifications for movement organisations in relation to the market.

During the early years of the movement, the core group of activists were effectively volunteers. Bob Brown worked irregularly as a GP to support himself (Norman, 2004) and others maintained forms of part-time or casual employment. Others still drew upon the relatively liberal government assistance schemes of the time to support their activity. Chris Harries, who worked behind the scenes in the movement for many years and served as an assistant to Brown during his time as MP, claimed that “we used to top up the dole with a little bit of money in the early days, people would be on the dole but be activists, and we’d top them up with a little bit of money to keep them going” (Harries, C. Personal communication, 28th April, 2015).

As the movement has developed and routinised, it has become more critical for organisations to retain activists who have strong skill sets. Where previously activists would move away after a period, sometimes into government departments or other areas, and new volunteers would emerge to take their place, the skill sets of activists have become too important to lose, particularly when organisations are employing increasingly specialised and sophisticated tactics. In addition, activists are increasingly seeking a ‘career’ or ‘vocation’ rather than activism as a ‘season’ of life or transitory phase. These activists can also struggle to find work outside the movement as a result of their specialisation, and they face pressure from their peers to avoid being seen as ‘selling out’.

I’ve been volunteering for the last fifteen years and it was about time that I went off and got a job... I’ve sort of been thinking ‘one day I’ll get paid, you know, I’ll keep doing good work... and someone will recognise me and give me money to work, to keep doing what I’m doing’ and it never did come, and so it was a moment were I... had a bit of an identify crisis, because I thought ‘well what am I going to do with my life, I want to keep advocating for forests but I can’t provide for my family and I can’t keep going on like this, it’s not sustainable... (L01).
In this sense, the arrival of paid positions has provided some much needed security for activists and leaders who have been involved with campaigns for long periods of time, and helps movement organisations retain institutional knowledge that would otherwise be lost as activists depart for paid work. Yet the consequence of this has been an increase in base-rate fundraising requirements as payroll becomes a larger burden, and an increasing divide between the professionalised organisation staff and the volunteers of the movement base.

One leader claimed that money and professionalisation has led to activism being views as a ‘career’ with the same kinds of routine human resource requirements one would expect to find in the private sector. Effectively they saw professionalisation as having removed the urgency and significance of environmental campaigning. This downplays the fact that their work to save the environment is critical, and required different relationships to holidays and weekends than a private sector job. For this leader, passion for the environment had been sacrificed to professionalism.

Another leader highlighted the ramifications of this change in terms of the relationship professionalised organisations have with their base:

The movement became corporatised, significantly... ...they shifted over to a significant number of positions being fully waged, and the environmental groups became so professional they... learned their skills from marketing and through their membership have sustained an income without the support of the government. ...It used to be very egalitarian... there is now a big separation between the ...people who are employed, and the volunteers. That’s become terribly disappointing for people from the early days who put a lot of effort into voluntarily developing things and then find that someone else has come in and taken over in a paid capacity, and they’re jettisoned out in the street [chuckles]. (L08)

However another leader, running a professionalised environmental organisation, suggested that the fundraising process takes a toll on organisations:

Money... its a huge barrier. Everything costs money and anyone who says it doesn’t is a fool. It’s very difficult... in the US philanthropy is huge, in Australia it’s not so huge and much of it goes to other sectors, which is fine and wonderful, but there’s very little money for
environmentalism in Australia. I think ‘the movement’ people like myself have to take some responsibility for that... there's a lot of inefficiency in the competition for funds, and we could work better to find efficiencies and use the money more effectively... ...we spend a huge amount of time fundraising, and you can fund projects and campaigns, but you can’t fund your core business, you can’t fund your office managers and your fundraisers and CEOs and cleaners and rent. That’s really hard to raise money for. (L09)

For organisations facing these fundraising requirements, the financial landscape is unfriendly. Ongoing routinisation of environmental issues (with the possible exception of climate change) and an increasingly ageing movement base implies a shrinking number of grassroots donors, and evidently philanthropic donors are few and far between. While donor lists are closely guarded and valuable resources for environmental organisations, the major environmental organisations in Tasmania (and Australia) are all drawing from a small pool of regular and occasional donors. The only way for organisations to escape an effectively zero-sum game, where all major organisations are competing for a small pool of donors, is to fundraise around local and regional environmental concerns that translate into a broader collection of affected citizens than the normal fundraising base. Problematically, the fundraising pressure is so intense that a number of large national organisations allegedly fundraise around campaigns which they are only tangentially associated or haven’t contributed to at all.

For example, the leader of a small regional environmental group told me:

The reason you... keep people engaged is because to run these campaigns you’ve got to keep the donations coming in, and so that became problematic at times when you would put the information out there and it would be our organisation taking action, but you would have other organisations... presenting it as something they’d created. It was a reality that... somebody puts out a rendition of something you’ve broken and called for action on, and they go and call for the same thing without referencing you, the donations go to them and they’ve got a much bigger reach, that would happen quite a bit... they’d make sure that they had the members listings and the donations that might come from that came from them... it became difficult to work collaboratively in that space where I guess the realities of fundraising and membership, you know, base management, which is essential to any public campaign, started to overlap with this stuff. (L17)
Another independent campaign leader with extensive campaign experience, edited to protect her identity and the identity of the other organisations:

I’m not trying to involve [other groups] too much, this is about [campaign grievance]. A lot of the other campaigns I’ve done, especially in the forest movement, doing things with [small organisation] and then [large national organisation A] will take all the credit for it, or [large national organisation B] will be like, ‘oh look, we’ve had a huge win for World Heritage’ and it’s like, ‘no, you didn’t, [small organisation] and this particular group did, you didn’t do anything. ...I’m very sceptical about who we work with... like, I’m aware [large international organisation] is actually ruining one of the campaigns I’m doing at the moment... you’ve got to be really selective about the NGOs that you work with, and who backs you (L16).

Other leaders commented on growing community cynicism regarding organisations that have “done virtually nothing on a campaign that looks like winning or has won,” where the group “puts out a big glossy fundraiser – having done not much to secure that outcome – to raise money for [that] organisation” but asked that their comments be kept anonymous. These comments reflect previously noted risks that smaller environmental organisations face around having their identity and goals assimilated into that of larger groups (Hodges & Stocking, 2016: 227). While previously these scholars have noted that ideology and tactics were sites of assimilation, it is clear that finances are another way for these assimilationist tendencies to be expressed.

These developments fundamentally alter the relationship between movement organisations and the movement base. When movements are driven principally by volunteers engaging in mass-mobilisation and direct action, as earlier iterations of the Tasmanian environmental movement did, engagement between core leadership and the broader movement is relatively organic. Leaders who do not account for the motivations and demands of movement participants would expect to see a loss of movement momentum, and movement participants would be more closely aware of leadership decisions and the direction of the movement as a result of their personal involvement. Increasing professionalisation and the subsequent funding demands has created a new kind of movement participant who displaces the older generation of highly engaged volunteers, a
movement participant who is essentially part of a fundraising base rather than involved in civic engagement and movement mobilisation.

How then do these large movement organisations gather feedback from the movement base about the campaigns they’re involved with? How do movement organisations ensure they’re bringing people along with them? Certainly, petitions and responses to calls to apply pressure to particular political offices must provide some metrics, but finance is also a key factor. Campaigns that meet and exceed fundraising targets are continued, those to which fall short are cut. Above all else, organisations increasingly exposed to the logic of the market may allow the market to make decisions about what will and won’t be protected in order to keep donor funds flowing.

Conclusion: There will be no revolution to televise

These kinds of developments are fairly consistent with the theoretical postulation around ‘new social movement’ theory and in particular Meluccian conceptions of social movements. Recalling discussions in the literature review, Melucci (1989) postulated that environmental movements, and a broader array of ‘new’ social movements, were novel in part because they ‘oiled the machinery’ of the state in response to the emergence of interdependent transnational relationships. Tasmanian environmental groups aren’t particular revolutionary. Rather they act to prevent the previously mentioned market failures and environmental destruction in a political context where the state has little will or capacity to intervene.

Even though many large organisations have drifted away from an operating model in which explicit civil society development plays a part, they still hold an important role in a broad civil society model to help develop good environmental outcomes both with and without political intervention. Informal discussions I’ve had with environmental leaders in Tasmania and nationally indicate an awareness of the long-term problems for environmental movement organisations excluding these strategic options, and they are moving back to a community organisation model around specific environmental concerns in ways which should ensure sustainable outcomes both socially and environmentally.
Despite the strong financialisation occurring both practically and discursively throughout the movement, civil society development within the environmental movement remains a fundamentally anti-neoliberal proposition. While many of the discursive positions taken by leaders are vulnerable to co-option by neoliberal rhetoric, and larger organisations within the movement have appropriated the power and logic of the market, they remain resistant to the dominant myth of neoliberalism, which is, in essence, that the state of affairs we now find ourselves in is both *natural* and *inevitable*. Neoliberalism is ultimately not about the free market or even the workings of capitalism; as Davis & Monk (2007) attest neoliberalism is ultimately an ideological construct of crony capitalism, the product of “the direct application of state power to raise the rate of profit” for capital holders (Davis & Monk, 2007: x). At the heart of neoliberalism lies a redistributive project that seeks to portray itself as normative and natural; the environmental movement, at least in Tasmania, has consistently questioned the veracity of these claims by applying the market logic of neoliberalism to its proponents and finding them wanting. It is important to separate the trends towards financialisation shown in this chapter from broader neoliberalisation. With the possible exception of Graham Woods’ intervention to purchase and destroy the Triabunna woodchip mill, the environmental movement has consistently acted as a foil to the broad interests of the capitalist class in Tasmania, a position which sets it against neoliberal agendas.
Chapter Eight: Media and Movements

Introduction

In previous chapters I have discussed the organisational capacities and some of the new tactics that are emerging as leaders investigate novel approaches to achieving their goals. In particular the financialisation of leadership activity presents a novel approach which is in many ways distinctive from the traditional activities of the movement. What has emerged through the previous discussion is that leaders are taking on roles that place them in increasingly critical positions in terms of their ability to influence outcomes at an individual level.

Interactions with the mass news media have traditionally been one area of environmental activism where individualism has featured strongly. Gitlin’s (1980) work in particular has emphasised the tendency of news media to fixate on and elevate particular individuals in ways that establish or cement their claims to leadership. In the Tasmanian context the interplay between activists and the media was an important factor in the early victories of the movement (Lester, 2007). An examination of the interactions between movement leaders is critical to understanding how the relationship between the mass media and the movement has changed over time, how movement leaders have responded to changing media and social media, and to gain insight into a domain where individualised leadership has been historically normative.

This chapter will assess these three aspects through an examination of leader attitudes to traditional news and social media, discussing how leaders approach the different communication options available to them to achieve their goals. I will show that leaders within movement organisations continue to prioritise traditional news media for their communications, preferring the authority and predictability of news media even when environmental interests are usually framed by the news media in negative ways. Social media appears to be used in a perfunctory manner in this context, rather than as a unique approach which might require new strategies and provide new opportunities.

Conversely, leaders who are elected representatives or outside of the larger NGOs are more open to approaches that incorporate online media, where they have options to control narratives and
engage more directly with the public without having their positions mediated by potentially hostile journalists.

Through a discussion of these trends, this chapter explores some of the strengths and weaknesses of leader-centred movement activity in terms of the advantages it provides to first-movers and incumbents, as well as the resistance change and novel approaches once the rules of the game in a particular domain are established. Finally, it explores the implications of these trends for media engagement and movement leadership more generally.

Mainstream News Media

As discussed previously, social movement leaders and the mass media have traditionally had an antagonistic relationship that provides mutual benefits (Gitlin, 1980; Lester, 2007). Movements depend on the news media to increase public awareness of campaigns and grievances, but are simultaneously threatened by journalists and news media outlets who impose conflict frames or ‘promote’ individuals who operate as celebrity-leaders against the interests of movements and genuine leaders (Gitlin, 1980). The power of the media to reach audiences has traditionally bound movements to the interests of journalists, and journalists in search of ‘newsworthy’ stories to movement actors.

The Tasmanian environmental movement has historically demonstrated these same dualistic relationships between the movement and the news media. From the earliest anti-dam campaigns, movement leaders worked to court and frame their activities for the news media, and subsequently the general public. At that time, the emerging aspects of environmental concern which drove movement activity were largely novel to both journalists and the public, and leaders had to work against established interests in both politics and business.

Conflicts between movement leaders and the news media as seen in Gitlin (1980) and in the early days of environmental campaigning in Tasmania (see Lester, 2007) were characterised by their news value as novel contestations which created dramatic and powerful images. Leaders struggled to ensure their ideas were taken seriously and convey the weight of public sentiment behind them. The ‘routinisation’ (Pakulski, 1991) of environmental concerns along with changes to journalistic
practice has dramatically altered this tactical landscape for leaders, with new challenges in terms of attracting the media and holding their attention, as well as being recognised as authoritative voices around environmental issues.

Leaders interviewed for this study reaffirmed the difficult relationship with the news media, which in Tasmania is principally newspaper, radio and television media. Environmental leaders demonstrated a sophisticated approach to journalists and news media organisations which benefits the historical experience of the movement and leaders alike. Leaders recognised that they struggled to get journalists to fairly represent their opinions and issues, or to use the media to gain serious public support; despite this frustration they viewed news media platforms as critical to raising awareness and influencing political interests to achieve their desired goals.

In exploring how leaders approach the media, the first problem which needs addressing is: why? What motivations do leaders attribute to media engagement which might indicate the continuation of the symbiotic relationship even as social media ostensibly provides a means to circumvent journalistic bias or prejudice? When talking about reasons for media engagement, leaders provided a surprisingly consistent set of explanations:

Well, you’ve got to get the message out. Information, a well informed public is critical to a democracy, and the only way people are going to be informed about the environment is by getting the message out through the media. (L06)

[We engage with the media] to increase awareness of a particular issue or a particular point of view or particular perspective, ...or countering an alternative. And it’s a vehicle to talk to different segments of the community, so depending on who you want to talk to, you tailor what you say to that audience as best you can. (L03)

[We might] react to a request from the media. [We do it] to have a profile, which is important when you’re asking the public for funding. To have influence over an issue of public policy. And to build a social change constituency around an issue. The media is a necessary but not sufficient part of that stuff. (L09)

For movement leaders the news media – in particular print media – simply continues to be an effective medium through which to advocate social change. Leaders seem to perceive that news media, particularly in Tasmania, are widely read and influential because of their authority and
readership – and perhaps especially their political readership.

Despite the necessity for leaders and environmental organisations to access news media outlets, this doesn’t mean that such efforts are uncontested or unproblematic. Indeed media access remained a contentious and difficult issue for the vast majority of leaders in roles that required media engagement, and nearly every leader in such a position recognised that successfully communicating in the media without having their message distorted was an active challenge.

The challenge with mainstream media... it has to be extremely timely, something extraordinary needs to be demonstrated as to why they should cover it, and usually it has to have some level of conflict. Things that are difficult to get them to cover are positive news stories. (L12)

There was certainly a period there where we were the big story... and I think the paper was less interested in what the campaign actually was rather than getting opportunities to draw in lots of people to argue about it. ...It was very much limited reporting... and certainly the local newspaper was very much about harnessing the antagonism [to] provide sales. (L17)

I think you have to work a lot harder to find the hook for a news story that has a pro-conservation message as opposed to a pro-development message. Maybe it’s because of the calibre of people that you can line up next to a pro-development message, politicians in particular who have their own newsworthiness in terms of filling the daily cycle, but I think it’s slightly more challenging to get a pro-conservation message out there, just entirely... on the values of a forest... (L03)

These kinds of quotes typify the attitudes of leaders towards the news media, which many characterised as not negative so much as inherently difficult: difficult to gain and hold attention, and difficult to escape from the general attitude of the media that ‘bad news’ sells. News media in this view forms a part of the strategic landscape which is necessary to contest even though the act of contestation could be difficult and frustrating for leaders. Interestingly, the language that leaders use suggests a rather sophisticated understanding of, and approach to, media issues. At least four leaders talked explicitly about the demands of ‘conflict’ as a framing device for news stories (Hansen & Machin, 2013), with the media trying to demarcate clear ‘sides’. A number of leaders recognised the deficiencies and limitations of media coverage and elaborated frameworks of how to work within these constraints to provide at least a little positive coverage.
Learning from Conflict

Discussions of how leaders engaged with the news media often included a particular narrative that I have chosen to refer to as ‘the lesson’. The narrative of ‘the lesson’ was often the central discursive element of these discussions, the primary way leaders outlined their position in relation to the media or summarised their discussions.

‘The lesson’ as it appears in these interviews is a cautionary tale wherein the leader is taken advantage of by a journalist, often naively, but sometimes as a knowing player bluffed by their opponent. The leader engages with the journalist, discovers the ‘deception’ - the twisting of their words or framing of their position – when the piece is published, and thus learns ‘the lesson’: a sense of caution, cynicism or understanding of the ‘game’ when engaging with the media.

The following example of ‘the lesson’ from one leader characterises this narrative:

I’d been called by a journo… and they said something along the lines of Gunns had made a commitment not to use native forests in the pulp mill, and they asked me what I thought of that. And I said, ‘well look, we’ve been campaigning against the pulp mill, but if there’s been that sort of change… we need to be truthful and acknowledge that.’ I hadn’t really got any broader context of the story that they were putting together, and then there was a front page story that basically implied – didn’t quite say, but implied – that we supported the pulp mill, and then it had local anti-pulp-mill groups that were then ropable against us for supporting us. That was the implication, it was portrayed as a big split in the environment groups. That was, you know, personally shocking and caused major ruptures, yeah, major ruptures. (L02)

Having outlined the narrative of deception, the leader then imparts the lesson:

... What I’ve learnt out of that experience, [is] to try and understand better what the context is, and what the story they’re actually putting forward is... I thought I was answering a question basically ‘what do you think about them... committing that they’re not using native forests for the mill,’ and that would have been the response they would have used, but I didn’t understand what was being pieced together was a story about a split in the
environment movement; if I’d known that I would have probably made it painfully clear that it didn’t change the fact we remained opposed to the mill for a range of other problems and made sure it was crystal clear, on the record, unambiguous. ... I felt a little bit like I’d been trapped. (L02)

A few things are immediately apparent from this discourse. The first is that this account fits closely with Gitlin’s (1980) analysis of media frames in social movements, in particular the ‘alienation’ of meaning from its producer (the leader) by the media (Gitlin, 1980: 3) and the use of ‘emphasis on internal dissension’ (Gitlin, 1980: 27) as a way of either creating an additional inter-movement conflict frame or shifting the existing conflict away from a movement-versus-pulp-mill narrative towards movement factionalism. The reportage in this account flattens the complexities and nuance of the leader’s responses – trying to be truthful and acknowledge meaningful changes in an opponents position – and ‘mis-understands’ them. The practical effect for such a story is to create real tensions within the movement. It is also interesting that Gitlin’s analysis remains so relevant despite the length of the environmental conflicts in Tasmania and the routinisation of environmental concern.

The second aspect is the way in which this leader responds to being ‘alienated’ from the meaning he produced: asserting his own agency in telling the story and minimising the role of the journalist in terms of the choices made around the framing and reportage of the story. The leader emphasises his potential responses in a way which treats the tendencies of journalists as innate – the leader misunderstood the question being asked, and could have achieved a better outcome if he had understood the intentions which motivated the journalists questions. Such a narrative suggests a tendency towards conflict and and deliberate misrepresentation as a permanent aspect of media relations, with nearly all leaders who interacted with the news media imparting these ‘lessons’ in their interviews.

Other ‘lessons’ reflect these aspects. The following leader discusses her position more abstractly, but her narrative displays a similar issue with media practices and a tendency for reporting to highlight rifts within the movement. However her response is a more cynical realisation that the media tends to be personality or celebrity driven.

The thing about working with the media is that the media wants drama, and the media wants
conflict. So when you get in that arena, that’s what’s going to happen to you, whether you want it or not. In fact we’ve found that particularly difficult... in recent years... because the media kept going to one side of the story to report, and never came to us about the assertions that were made about us, either by the government or by other groups, and reported a lot of stuff that was just completely incorrect. ...It’s become standard perception in some cases, and its all based on misrepresentation by people and misreporting by media as a result. So there are all sorts of bizarre ideas about what we might have said or done, that worked really well for a conflict story and a drama, but bear very little relationship to reality. And I suspect that goes on a lot, although its particularly difficult when you don’t have complete agreement in the environment movement and very unfortunate to have some vilifying others... Someone comes up with a position statement about what should happen on an issue, and the response is, ‘oh, they would say that because they’re a...’ this, that or the other type person, which has nothing to do with the issue but is a very good way of side-lining the issue. That’s a serious difficulty for messaging, but the media is not really about messaging, [its] about entertainment. I’m sure it’s great entertainment [laughs]. (L11)

These two leader’s narratives strongly emphasise the conflict frames deployed by the news media. This is typical from interviews I had with leaders; 11 of the 18 leaders I interviewed explicitly referred to conflict as the essential modus operandi of their news media relationships. Indeed, conflict was probably the primary means by which these leaders made sense of the strategic landscape shared by the environmental movement, the media, and opposition groups.

For the most part, leaders tended to talk about this conflict as a recognition that the political economy of media production placed their agenda and the agenda of journalists at odds with each other. Environmental leaders were interested in conveying facts and exploring the complex social, political and environmental ramifications of particular policies and proposals, where journalists working to make a story interesting and understandable to the public. Leaders tend to portray themselves as objective voices, seeing their role as putting forward facts and figures and ignoring the role they play as individuals in the construction of environmental discourse and the theatre of public life. Leaders also generally understand that when their ‘factual’ agenda is at odds with the dramatic and ‘newsworthy’ demands of the media, the media’s purposes take priority, even if this is arguably not in the ‘public interest’. These attitudes form the basis for their understanding of the
media and the approaches they take when engaging with journalists.

These recurring narrative ‘lessons’ suggest a strong role for the experiences of leaders and their direct engagement with the media. Despite a great deal of history around movement/media relationships, leaders who engage with the media can still be put in situations where they are surprised or feel taken advantage of by media actors. Perhaps in some ways it represents the potential weakness of an approach dependent on the interaction of individuals – leaders might demonstrate a strong grasp of the historical relationship between the movement and the media, but this historical knowledge is very different to the experiential knowledge of the ‘game’ between leaders and journalists to meet their respective goals. It suggests that apprenticing or other experiential engagement with media is the chief way leaders learn how to interact with the media, through trial and error or previous insider roles. In short: the best way to learn to play the game is to play the game.

However sometimes leaders highlighted a more problematic aspect to their engagement with the media, including misrepresentation as seen in the previous story about the pulp mill, and outright manipulation of sources to produce a particular perspective:

   Every now and then the news will come to me and interview me… [but] I don’t like to be used by the media. … I’ve felt most used when I was rung up by [a news organisation] and they had a story they wanted to do, and they wanted me to say something. They... had it in their heads, what they wanted to come out of my mouth, because it balanced their story... the journalist at the time had a single-minded purpose of wanting someone to say something. So they interviewed me and in my innocence I replied to all of this stuff. They weren’t quite happy after 20 minutes of interviewing and so they virtually asked me to say what they wanted to come out of me, and I sort of said it. And I regretted it after, because its not the main thing I wanted to get across, its what they wanted to get across. (L08)

Here we see the clear conflict between the priorities of leaders and the priorities of journalists, and how the tension between these priorities can present clear problems for leaders. The leader in this example initially misunderstands what the journalist expects of him, and then regrets complying with their demands, whilst the journalist misunderstands or misappropriates the role of the leader within the framework of his story. This narrative is particularly interesting because the leader had
extensive experience with the media before this ‘lesson’ occurred, which in part highlights that inter-personal dynamics are a central part of understanding the conflict between leaders and the media. But it also shows that experience doesn’t guarantee better outcomes for leaders or that experienced leaders can’t be manipulated by the media.

Clearly the ‘game’ never stops being difficult for leaders, though becomes more understandable as they gain experience. But because leaders generally understand the news media as an excellent opportunity to influence the public and reach out to key decision makers they remain tied to playing the ‘game’ with journalists. Indeed for smaller organisations or newer leaders without an established media presence, a lot of time is spent trying to improve their standing with the media and gain access, and often leverage social media not merely as a communication method with the public but as a means of establishing news-worthiness in their own right, as will be discussed in the next part of this chapter. These ‘outsiders’ don’t see circumvention of the media as an option, they aspire towards being able to play the ‘game’ in their own right:

Working in [a small organisation] or by myself, getting media attention is quite hard because they don’t know the background of the campaign, and... they’re like, ‘who are you?’ That’s when it becomes difficult. (L15)

Generally local media is pretty easy to get, to be honest. They’re starving for stories. ... On a national level you have to be a bit more enterprising and do something that’s a bit more worthy, something that’s going to have value to them in terms of their audience. Generally that would be a big event... It’s easy to get media when you’ve got 100 people. (L14)

These smaller organisations and their leaders struggle towards being considered newsworthy, actively working for the attention of the media, a role which arguably puts them in contention with other environmental organisations but also with a wide variety of ‘newsworthy’ issues.

News Media and the Dominance of Mind

To discover whether or not news media was talked about more than social media, the interviews were coded for discussions around media. News media was coded to include conversations about interactions with journalists, along with more abstract discussions involving newspapers, television or radio, along with references to ‘the media’ as an institution. Social media was coded to include
conversations about ‘social media’ as a generic concept as well as specific references to platforms such as Facebook or Twitter. Passages or sentences which included references to both types of media were coded as both.

The length of these passages was then used as a guide to gain insight into how much leaders discussed each kind of media. This count is not an accurate measure, but does provide a gauge and some insight into the priorities and salient subjects for leaders. It does not necessarily provide insight into how *much* more important traditional media is versus social media, or vice versa, but does indicate that a given leader displayed a preferences for discussing certain types of media over others. There were more questions about news media than social media, leaders included discussions of media throughout the interview process. The fact that a number of leaders spoke equally of both kinds of media suggests that even if questions may have skewed towards news media, this didn’t prevent leaders from speaking at length about social media. Again, because this measure is an attempt to find patterns in different approaches to media, rather than to definitively measure bias, and all leaders faced the same battery of questions bias in the questions should not be an issue.

Differences in the duration of discussion of news media and social media were calculated by finding the percentage difference between the length of passages discussing social media and the length of passages discussing news media. For these purposes ‘news media’ included discussions of media organisations which operated in print, radio or television, while ‘social media’ was principally discussion of Facebook and Twitter, although it did include some generic discussion of ‘the internet’ where it was used as a shorthand for the kind of activities associated with these social media services. The median of these percentage differences calculates a normative baseline of difference between social and news media. The deviations and standard deviation were also calculated. The median was chosen because of strong outliers in the sample, including one leader for where difference could not be calculated because they didn’t mention social media at all, and another who spoke about news media to the point they were nearly 3 standard deviations from the mean. Moore (2007) suggests that median is the more resistant option for analysis given these strong deviations. Following Moore’s advice, descriptive statistics for four cohorts and the entire group were calculated. Descriptive statistics, sometimes referred to as ‘five-number summaries’, calculate the minimum and maximum, first and third quartiles, as well as the median value, to provide a
broad overview of the trends for a group or sample.

The sub groups were principally leaders for movement organisations (‘NGO’), and those who currently or previously in roles as elected politicians (‘Political’). However, as analysis proceeded two other groups emerged: leaders who were not aligned with any movement organisation in particular (‘non-NGO’) and the previously mentioned leaders who were part of smaller organisations trying to establish a presence (‘Outsiders’). These groups represented the four distinct cohorts of leaders within the sample; there are of course other options for categorising the broader movement but these four groups encompassed enough research participants to enable meaningful analysis.

News media is clearly the primary focus of a wide array of leaders from their comments in the interviews. However the news media doesn’t just represent the primary focus but the dominant mode of media thought for leaders, particularly those leaders working in the NGO sector. The quantitative content analysis of media discourse confirms that when comparing the amount of time leaders spent discussing mainstream news media versus social media, news media is by far the dominant focus for Tasmanian environmental leaders, with a median difference between news media and social media of 41.68% (see Table 5, below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-NGO</td>
<td>-25.9</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-3.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsider</td>
<td>-25.9</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL</td>
<td>-25.9</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The descriptive statistics broadly indicate the maximum, minimum and median difference between the various categories of leaders interviewed for this research. While quite a basic analytical tool, more complex statistical analysis are problematic with the small data set used for this study. A positive result indicates the degree to which leaders within this category preferred news media over social media. For example the 32.0% minimum result for NGO aligned leaders shows that
these leaders spoke about news media at least ~32% more than they did social media, and the 100% maximum result for non-NGO aligned leaders shows that at least one leader didn’t talk about social media at all. Conversely negative results indicate the degree to which leaders preference social media over social media. The -25.9% minimum result for ‘outsider’ leaders shows that this group had a member who spoke about social media ~25% more than news media. A result of 0.0 would indicate an equal 50/50 split in terms of a given leaders speaking time.

These figures aren’t meaningful in isolation; they should be read as a cluster with the maximum, minimum and median values showing the general weighting of each group, with the 1st and 3rd quartiles (Q1 & Q3) helping to establish the degree to which the maximum or minimum values are outliers. An example of this would be the non-NGO cohort. There is a large jump between the Q3 and Max value, which suggests that the 100% Max result is an outlier and that overall the cohort would skew more towards the Median value.

These results suggest that while overall leaders have a strong focus on news media, the vast majority of this focus comes from those leaders aligned with the major environmental NGOs rather than the movement as a whole, with non-NGO aligned leaders median difference very close to parity (-0.27%). Although the group is still weighted towards more mainstream news media as evidenced by the 1st and 3rd quartile results, this is in part due to the previously noted outlier who didn’t mention social media at all during their interview and whose inclusion in this analysis represents a strong deviation from the norm.

With the exception of this outlier, the strongest weightings towards news media were all leaders in positions at large or influential NGOs in the Tasmanian environmental movement, or what might be characterised as the ‘institutional’ organisations in the movement. This group had a median difference of ~70%, with a strong positive association with news media, and the minimum variation for this cohort was ~32%, still representing a heavy focus towards news media when remembering that 0% represents a leader giving both kinds of media equal attention.

These results suggest that news media is a strong concern primarily for leaders in large, established movements, and as such likely plays a larger part in how they think about their roles as leaders. Other kinds of leaders are perhaps relatively less concerned with news media or are more likely to
consider social media as part of their strategic repertoire.

Interestingly, leaders who were involved in electoral politics were much more cognisant of social media and felt more comfortable talking about it at length, perhaps in part because they saw clear benefits to engaging with it, as is discussed in the next section of this chapter. On average they spoke only slightly more about social media (median -3%), with only one leader speaking about news media more than social media. While the sample size here is too small to make definitive claims about their media preferences, it suggests that political leaders are much more comfortable with social media as a platform and a strategy than leaders in institutional NGOs, or that leaders in institutional NGO’s don’t need to worry about social media approaches.

The other group – that featured social media strongly was the cohort of ‘outsiders’ - as discussed previously, those who aren’t linked in to the networks of the institutional movement. These leaders were generally younger and had fewer resources, but had extensive campaigning experience. This group was the most cognisant of social media as part of their roles, on average mentioning social media slightly more than news media (median -6.7%). Again, while this difference is too small and the study was not designed to make statistically meaningful claims, it indicates that social media is likely to be as salient an issue to news media approaches. The way these two cohorts, political and ‘outsider’, make use of social media will be discussed at length in the next section.

When it comes to news media outlets and social movement leaders, it appears that organisations with strong public presence and institutional links tend to have leaders who are more comfortable with, or spend more time considering, news media approaches. Yet given the conflict inherent in these approaches, it isn’t clear why leaders continue to engage with news media when movements might increasingly turn to social media to propagate their message to the general public, especially considering that despite their influence and status (perceived or otherwise) in the movement, leaders have little trust the media to clearly or accurately convey their position. Ultimately it seems that leaders expend a great deal of effort for what they indicate are unsatisfying outcomes.

Some leaders discussed their engagement with the media in a way that helps explain the state of movement-media relationships in Tasmania, and the continued focus on news media outlets by environmental leaders:
Media has a big influence on public opinion... there are some people in the environmental movement who eschew media and know that face-to-face and public meetings for instance, are much better than advertising. But if you don’t creatively use the media then the media will work against you... the media has enabled... a rational dialogue between opposing world-views, but if you let go of the rope... then [opposition groups] get an even stronger voice than they otherwise would. (L08)

[Social media is] communicating with existing members and also building, building a network, yeah. But it’s not, I don’t think, ...a tool to then reach out to the broader public or to people who are uninterested, because the nature of [social media is] that it gets shared with people who are likeminded, you build a network from there, so I think that trying to connect with the broader public is still through the traditional media. (L02)

These explanations get to the heart of why the Tasmanian environmental movement still predominantly prosecute its arguments through news media sources and may contribute to the failure of the environmental movement to capitalise on any unique potential that social media might offer (as will be discussed at length later in this chapter). Certainly news media remains influential in Tasmania, particularly for social and political elites. Yet considering the historical ‘conflict’ between ‘pro-development’ and ‘pro-conservation’ interests and the role that news media has played in these conflicts – particularly the two major Tasmanian newspapers, The Mercury and The Examiner –in both the anti-dams and forestry campaigns, engagement with the media remains a totemic issue, a highly visible space of contestation that has been the site of important symbolic victories for campaigners over the decades.

Lester (2007) highlighted the increasing acceptance of environmental discourse in the Tasmanian media, and discussions with leaders suggested a recognition of this fact. Two leaders spoke specifically about how the editorial direction of The Mercury had ‘radically changed’ during their time in the movement to incorporate more serious environmental content, with management recognising they couldn’t sell papers to a ‘very environmentally educated’ population without incorporating environmental viewpoints.

*The Mercury* has changed completely... in the 1970’s they couldn’t report anything to do with environment accurately. They were pretty good on the AFL football scores... but now they
can’t get the AFL football scores right [Laughs]. The environmental stuff has... [laughs]. So it’s been a bit of a sea change. (L13)

News media might then represent a status quo, a battleground for conflicts between environmental interests and opposition groups that is important to environmental leaders for its historical symbolism to the movement as much as representing pragmatic access to the public and elites. Neither environmental leaders nor opposition groups are prepared to concede newspapers, television or radio and allow the ‘other side’ to have unfettered control over public messaging, because these media represent, at least symbolically, the contestation of the public imagination. To continue to contest issues in news media might be to indicate a continued willingness to fight in all domains of public life, a role social media cannot fill now, or perhaps ever, thanks to the historical connotations of news media (not to mention the array of concerns regarding social media, including echo chambers (Quattrociocchi, 2017) and fake news (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017)).

The broader implications of the relationship between news media and the environmental movement in Tasmania are unclear. It may be that the continued dominance of news media approaches is generational, with the vast majority of leaders interviewed having come of age in the movement before the advent of the public internet, let alone social media. The fact that Tasmania has an older average population, and thus a population potentially less engaged with social media reinforces this tendency. The changes wrought by social media have happened too quickly for leaders to effectively incorporate them in their tactical repertoire, and it is not regarded highly as a medium for creating change.

Engaging with Social Media

Given the increasing focus scholars place on new and social media as part of social movement practice (Segerberg & Bennett, 2011; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Castells, 2012; Bennett, 2012; Eimhjellen, 2014; Hutchins & Lester, 2015) I expected these emergent medias to have a critical place in the operation of established environmental movement organisations in Tasmania. Given that the Tasmanian environmental movement is often considered to be highly influential
internationally, it seemed reasonable that leaders would be highly engaged – particularly with social media – and would draw upon emergent media to bolster their campaigns.

What I didn’t expect to find was a media landscape that, from the perspective of many leaders, remains almost functionally unchanged from that described by Gitlin (1980). As discussed in the previous section, the majority of leaders, particularly those with senior positions in movement organisations, were ambivalent about social media or unsure of its potential:

I don’t tweet, I haven’t got Facebook, ahh… you know, I’m challenged by that. …I accept that there is great potential there, but it’s not my thing, I try to focus on what I can do well. I think social media should be led in some ways by the mainstream communications approach, not just media but communication to members, and others… I leave it to [those] who are better informed, better aware of the opportunities and risks. (L03)

[We don’t employ social media] consistently. We use it to generate petitions, generate vibrancy and activity around an issue… [and] for fundraising to some extent… we’ve got to get better at that. I think there’s hope in [social media], in [the] ability to have a dialogue… you can work to have a real community, rather than be the greenie in the ivory tower telling everyone what the solutions are… that could have a huge importance over coming decades. (L09)

What these kinds of comments highlight is the challenge social media represents. Developing social media strategies requires expertise and experience and subsequently management. In the first example, this meant the leader was relatively disengaged from the social media presence of the organisation and in many ways viewed it as yet another communication strategy. For the second leader, taking a more hands on approach to social media led to the recognition of the specific potential of social media, but also imposed costs in terms of the time and energy involved in developing social media strategies, and the cost of experimentation. Indeed there was a consistent refrain from leaders who championed social media about the ‘potential’ of such platforms to transform their operations, but also the lack of clear strategy on how to get to this ‘potential’ promised land.
It is understandable then that many leaders were disengaged from social media issues and pushed these approaches to communications managers or deployed them as ‘necessities’ rather than central elements of their campaigns. Indeed, in the survey I conducted of Facebook activity in the four weeks leading up to the Tasmanian state elections in 2014, sixty-two percent of posts made by environmental groups or individual leaders were links to opinion pieces written by leaders and published in mainstream media outlets both locally and nationally, press releases on the groups official website, or invitations to public events. This isn’t to say that conversations aren’t happening at all on these platforms, but that the majority of social media strategy developed by these organisations consists of broadcasting – they could, and often did, include the same information in emails.

Much of the academic fascination with social media stems from an unspoken idea that what happens on social media couldn’t happen anywhere else. This notion of social or digital media as singularly important lies at the heart of much of the discussion around the ‘Arab Spring’ and the ’success’ of Occupy Wall Street (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). However in terms of strategic utility there is little separating social media from ‘new’ media such as blogs. Movement actors and leaders instead seem to use social media to broadcast media productions in ways largely identical to news media. Social media has the advantage of accessibility. It encourages media consumption within the walled gardens of various platforms. It is telling that a great deal of the content posted onto social media networks by the environmental movement in Tasmania consists of media developed for purposes outside of social media. Political advertising developed for network television is uploaded to YouTube (and may even appear as ads played between clips on YouTube, thus replicating its original purpose)\(^{19}\). Reports written for government are made available on organisation websites and posted to Facebook. A flyer advertising a guided tour through the Styx forest is printed and left at strategic locations, and a facsimile of the flyer is posted on Twitter. From a strategic point of view, none of this is new and all of it has been part of the environmental movement’s approach to

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\(^{19}\) For example on 22\(^{nd}\) February, 2014, both Cassy O’Connor and Nick McKim shared a YouTube clip for an advertisement which formed part of a campaign against a ‘supertrawler’ which it was proposed would be allowed to fish off the coast of Tasmania. This clip was shown on Tasmanian television and could have potentially been used as an advertisement on YouTube. The clip was originally available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8qnJ09EpMg](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8qnJ09EpMg) but has since been taken down.
media from the beginning. Effectively it closely resembles the historical strategy but is ‘on the internet’.

For some leaders a social media strategy was about ticking another box; social media presented one more opportunity to connect with the public. This was particularly true for leaders operating independently or in environmental organisations where accountability centred on members. Politically minded leaders, however, generally saw social media as a valuable tool for getting feedback from their electorate and the public at large:

[Social media] certainly holds you more accountable as a leader, but I guess it depends on how you view it. You can view it as something negative, or you can view it as a real opportunity as a leader to get some sort of gut reaction feedback to what you’re doing, and that context can be quite beneficial for a leader, it can be quite helpful. (L05)

[Social media is] massive, and perhaps not as well understood as it could be. Politicians need to understand who’s using social media, what they’re using it for... and what they get out of it. ...There’s no more great gulf between politicians and their constituencies [because of social media]. I think there’s a couple of things social media has caused; a flowering of democracy in some ways, and a death of politeness in other ways. Social media gives people license to be vile, because they’re anonymous, but it gives other people a voice they didn’t have before. (L04)

This difference in approach makes sense given that political leaders depend on public opinion to secure their position on a mid-to-long term basis. The ability to engage in dialogue or get feedback on policy announcements and local issues that is inherent in social media subsequently becomes an important part of the management of politicians public image and ensuring they meet the public’s expectations of elected representatives. The absence of this desire for, or possibly fear of, rapid and free feedback from the public also explains to some degree the ambivalence of established environmental organisations and leaders towards social media.

Leaders also have to weigh up the costs and benefits of social media strategies. Leaders who weren’t directly engaged with social media saw it as an important but unknown quantity, as something they should involved in but not necessarily sure how helpful the approach was. Those
who were engaged highlighted the complexity needed for social media approaches, with different strategies needed to make the most of each platform. Regardless of where leaders might fall on this spectrum, engaging with social media presented leaders with an opportunity cost which reduced the capacity of the individual or organisation in another professional or strategic capacity. Leaders who developed a sophisticated understanding of social media might risk dividing their attention and failing to “focus on what [they] can do well” (L03). Organisations who hire a communications manager inevitably take resources away from research and other campaign strategies.

It’s really hard to tell [how important social media is]. I think we’ve, we’ve assumed it’s very important and part of a profile raiser, so we’ve put quite a bit of energy into Facebook but we’ve also made sure our website is quite good and easy to navigate, and we tweet quite regularly. It’s certainly increased our profile but... I don’t know how influential that’s going to be. I don’t know that there’s a bunch of people that now come to our events that wouldn’t have come if we didn’t have a [presence]. Other than counting how many people like our Facebook page I’m not sure what it translates into. ... It seems very important, I just genuinely have no way of gauging whether it’s important or not. (L10)

As a result some leaders in Tasmania have weighed up the strategic opportunity cost of social media, and found the value proposition of social media unsatisfactory. One leader argued that the nature of social media makes campaigns less visible because of the saturation of issues and concerns presented to users:

It’s harder and harder to do now, because there’s so much competition, there’s so many campaigns happening. You log onto Facebook and you get 25 exhortations to support some cause or another... if one of those campaigns wants to rise above all the other stuff that’s happening and be noticed, you have to put extraordinary effort into elevating it... [Potential] activists need to be able to discern what is worth doing and what isn’t, it’s not like you’re short on opportunity on how to engage, but you can just be so drowned [in social media] and I think most people are just drowned, they end up having small conversations with other people and that’s the extent of their engagement. (L08)

If you did a cost benefit analysis on [social media], its more negative than positive in that it debilitates activism. Most people who have an environmental sensibility use Facebook as a
means of dissolving their despair, they post [something] that dissipates their energy, they go
to bed feeling like they’ve said what they want to say, but they’re not connecting with the
outside world nearly as much. I worry about that. I don’t altogether talk down about social
media, but I think in terms of activism it’s become a negative. (L08)

Another leader suggested that the community of social media users was largely too toxic for their
campaign to use social media as anything other than a publishing platform:

When we started I thought social media was this wonderful tool and we would get people
lots of information, but it was more a tool for trying to hook people to do stuff. Not much
different to how companies are using social media to [advertise]... we [also] tried to provide
a [social media] space where we could exchange a dialogue. And what became apparent
was that you can't have a dialogue with people who are intent on trolling your site. So at the
worst of it we had 3,000 likes on Facebook and we had twelve people who were generating
95% of the content, and they were all from the other side. ...So it got to a point... that our
social media space needed to be a space for us to get our messages out, not a space to
waste time arguing with people who didn’t agree with [us]. (L17)

For these leaders, and a few others, social media was either an active distraction or completely
irrelevant from a strategic perspective. Leaders, for the most part, focused on influencing social and
political ‘elites’ through research and policy development, writing op-eds for publication in the local
paper, or even writing letters to politicians. These strategies, in the estimation of the leaders that
employed them, represented a more effective use of their skills and resources, by targeting those in
the best position to effect change. This isn’t to say that leaders weren’t trying to convince the
public of their positions or recruiting new members into the movement, rather they didn’t see
social media as an effective way to achieve these goals, struggling to translate a social media
presence into meaningful action on the part of users.

Established environmental organisations and leaders falling back on social media as a simple
broadcast service is potentially partly due to the specifics of population and geography in Tasmania.
As mentioned previously, it is not unusual to see the same groups of campaigners and leaders at
various campaign launches, public rallies, or at a local coffee shop. This creates a sense of
‘smallness’ which for many leaders which, as mentioned in a previous chapter provides an elite quality to leaders’ networking activities:

In a small place like Tasmania in particular, big networks and relationships can be really important. Sometimes they come to nothing... depending on the quality of the people I suppose, or how close [your] positions [are], but it’s a very small place and networks are important. (L03)

The ‘elite’ networks that leaders establish through their real world connections are the result of long careers campaigning. Given these networks were developed well before the advent of social media and in some cases the widespread availability of the internet, it makes sense that offline networks dominate local campaigning and engagement.

The media landscape in Tasmania also influences this approach. Hobart and Launceston both have a single daily newspaper; Hobart’s The Mercury in particular is seen as influential by environmental leaders, if not always helpful or unbiased in its reporting. In the same way that The Australian is considered to have an outsized influence based on its perceived authority and elite readership on a national level (Manne, 2011), The Mercury may play a similar role amongst political elites in Tasmania. Combined with a generally more conservative population associated with high levels of news media engagement, environmental leaders may be justified in continuing with established strategies, particularly when seeking to influence decision makers over and above the general population.

There are two groups of leaders for whom social media remains critical to their strategic operation. The first consists of leaders engaged in campaigns on a national or international level, where there are distinct advantages to social media in terms of recruitment, public awareness and coordination. The second comprises leaders who could be characterised as outsiders – those working on fringe or ‘radical’ issues. The latter are not networked with the leaders and organisations that dominate public environmental discourse in Tasmania, and seek broad public support to influence institutions or corporations on a local level.

Leaders operating in an international context often used social media to stay up to date with developments around the world, using social media as a kind of passive ‘news feed’ rather than for
‘conversation’. This seems consistent with the previously discussed finding that social media is more often used by movement organisations for broadcast rather than dialogue.

I get a lot of my latest environmental news from Twitter more than anything else. Because I’ve very carefully chosen the people I follow around the world, I get the Tyndall Centre, I get Grist out of the States, I get a range of CSIRO’s publications and so on... After I open my eyes in the first hour I can know what’s happened on the environment from one end of the planet to the other. That was never possible twenty years ago. (L06)

Leaders also used social media to communicate with, but more importantly broadcast the concerns of communities they work with in the ‘developing’ world. One leader spoke about the ability for her organisation to give voice to groups otherwise ignored by their governments, and suggested that social media helped raise international recognition of their treatment.

International campaigns are likely where social media can offer the most to campaigners, particularly where campaigns need to be able to point to a supporter base who are diffuse and divided by geography, language and potentially even values. Tasmanian campaigners tended to focus on issues related to Tasmanian or Australian contexts, limiting what this research might tell us about the capacity of social media in an international context. While social media may not appear exceptionally relevant in a local or national context for most leaders, this doesn’t mean they aren’t relevant in others.

 Outsider groups offer an interesting counterpoint to the general lack of interest in social media. Of all the leaders interviewed, leaders of ‘outsider’ organisations saw the most potential in social media and utilised it most heavily in their campaigns. ‘Outsiders,’ as used here, refers to organisations and individuals who operate outside the informal hegemony that exists within Tasmanian environmentalism. The ‘outsiders’ interviewed for this research wanted to avoid being associated with an “environmental group,” as they felt that these organisations had negative public connotations, but they also espoused ideas and participated in campaigns which were significantly more radical than those of the mainstream or dominant environmental movement organisations.

For these outsiders, social media played an important role because of the relative lack of resources available to them, but it also provided a source of reassurance to leaders and campaign participants.
about the effectiveness of their actions through the quantified ‘reach’ of the various social media platforms they used.

    [Social media]... is incredible. There’s a certain thing in Facebook... and Twitter, that you can see how many people have seen your post. So even if only 600 liked it, 26,000 might have looked at it. ...So when I was looking at the social media, although we had maybe 200 likes on a photo, we had thousands and thousands of views, some of them from like, Germany. So I can go to that source and realise that a university in Germany had reposted our status, and... that’s incredible. We had [other organisations] showing support with photos... you’d never be able to do that without social media. And especially Twitter, people like Bill McKibben retweeting us, other prominent people, we’ve had politicians meet with us... I don’t think any of that [would have happened] without social media, we wouldn’t have gotten the general support. (L15)

    It’s probably been the most essential tool for getting the message out, so even when we get big media chains we still share those things on social media. You can take a photo and put it on Facebook or Twitter... and it’ll be seen by 10,000 people or whatever. Actually some of our posts were interacted with by 50,000 people. (L16)

For these leaders being able to quantitatively document their support was a way of making sense of the impact that they were having, even if the number of ‘interactions’ didn’t correlate with outcomes. Another outsider in the same campaign clarified that social media was more important for organisational maintenance than it was for gaining public support.

    Social media is a ‘big swing, little ding’ type thing... you talk to a lot of people on social media through a post, and only a few will come. So we rely very little on sharing... I can’t emphasise this enough, the most important thing is one-to-one contact, be that verbal or the internet, in person. Social media is, in terms of posts... not that effective to be honest. (L14)

    Social media is used as outreach, as [a] way to attract people who might be interested, let them know this stuff is going on, and I guess to spread the word a little bit. ... While [social media] might not be a really effective way to get people along to an event, but I think just being there... can release some of the stigma... (L14)
These two approaches to social media suggest that even for outsider environmental leaders and groups, social media doesn’t have the kind of impact on public awareness and the capacity for social change that might be imagined. The ‘virality’ or quantitative reach of social media helps create feelings of solidarity and success for leaders and organisations, but ultimately contributes more to the stability and consistent growth of movement organisations than it does to achieving movement outcomes. Even in outsider groups, where social media is championed because it lowers the barriers to communication with the public, it is not clear that social media is a critical or even necessarily central part of the tactical landscape leaders and organisations operate within. This was most apparent when discussing the first major protest action this outsider group undertook:

Most people in this campaign only got involved when the [protest action] happened, so I met 15 people that I’ve never met before but apparently move in the same circles. I’m like, ‘where the hell have you come from? Like, how do I know know who you are?’ and they’ve just never been involved in stuff like this before… (L15)

For this organisation, a growth of 15 people represented a significant increase in numbers, and was achieved not through social media or even general word of mouth, but by holding a protest action – the most traditional form of communication available to movements. These were individuals linked by cultural and geographic proximity who clearly share similar values, but who had not become involved with the campaign prior to the protest action despite campaigners actively working on campus for over a year before the action took place. These are the kinds of people who may have been expected to link up and working together via social media, but it took a clear public call to action to bring these people on board.

It is not clear why the links between these like-minded individuals had not been made prior, but they are consistent with the previously mentioned concerns on the part of leaders about the lack of a clear call to action that goes hand-in-hand with social movement activity. Social media in this view exposes the public to a wide variety of demands and opinions that make action difficult to undertake, or allow potential movement actors to vent their concerns in non-materially constructive ways. The fact that it took a clear public action to bring like-minded individuals together suggests that traditional organisations can not be taken wholly online, and that there are distinctive benefits to real-world connections and actions that make traditional movement
strategies not merely useful but critically relevant to movement building and public communication in the digital age.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the relationship between environmental movement leaders and the media – both traditional news media and the emerging ‘new’ and social media. In doing so it has argued that leader and news media relations in the Tasmanian environmental movement are consistent with the traditional view propagated by theorists like Gitlin (1980) of an antagonistic relationship where both sides have very different goals. This supports previous research by Lester (2007), Krien (2012) and others who have documented the conflict between movement leaders and the media.

What is clear from leaders’ accounts of their media use is that this antagonism is only one part of the story. While some leaders – particularly leaders with roles in large movement NGOs and those who are elected representatives – face challenges dealing with the news media, others struggle to get the attention of the media at all. These ‘outsiders’ aspire to have a meaningful relationship with news media, even if it is antagonistic and complicated, because they see these traditional media as valuable for achieving their goals. New media promised a way to circumvent gatekeepers in traditional media institutions (Dunlop, 2013), but traditional media remains authoritative and influential, able to provide legitimacy to leaders which makes them desirable targets for emerging or marginal leaders.

This chapter also demonstrated that leaders in large movement NGOs were significantly more likely than other leaders to focus on traditional forms of media. While social media usage is understandable and widely employed by elected representatives to communicate with their constituents, those in the activist arm of the movement tended to focus on traditional media, or spoke more about social media when they were trying to establish that relationship. This suggests a kind of incumbent advantage in which prominent leaders and organisations monopolise public attention away from smaller, marginal organisations and leaders. This theme of large organisations and leaders forming a kind of hegemony has appeared several times throughout this research.
Leaders also discussed the role that social media has within their activities. What is clear from their responses is that social media remains an emerging force within movement organisation and that it remains unclear whether the Tasmanian environmental movement will find a way to meaningfully leverage social media to achieve their goals, or whether movement organisations are even structured in a way that allows them to take advantage of these technological changes. This ultimately means that the present dynamic between movements and the media will persist for the foreseeable future.

These findings are open to different interpretations. One is that the media presently pick and choose the leaders most worthy of public attention and that ‘outsiders’ represent fringe issues that are salient to the concerns of the general public. This of course paints media framing as normative, which is both simplistic and problematic in terms of critically analysing the role of the media and movement leaders in shaping public discourse. However the media do still perform a gatekeeper role in that they generally require issues to have some degree of public salience.

A second interpretation is to view the problem through an economic framework. Organisations and leaders that established themselves early in the history of the movement have a ‘first mover’ advantage in that they can establish the rules of the game and determine what is normative. Their status as incumbents allows them to shut out competitors (‘outsiders’) but also reduces their impetus for innovation (as indicated by the relative lack of focus on social media). In the same way that corporations in a capitalist system can be disrupted by new technologies once they have lost the ability to innovate, large movement organisations may be vulnerable to disruption if the media landscape continues to change. The emergence of GetUp! in mainland Australia might be considered classically indicative of the effects of this kind of technological disruption in terms of approaching the media, but this is yet to play a large role in Tasmanian activism. For now the incumbents continue to have an advantage when it comes to the media.

Previous chapters have discussed leaders becoming increasingly prominent figures within the movement, and becoming influential as individuals in their own right, without necessarily having the backing of a large mass movement to provide perceptions of influence. The news media has long provided a domain where a similar logic of individualism presides. The discussion in this chapter reveals two potential threats to leadership in individualistic domains: that leaders are
selected or ‘made legitimate’ by a third party organisation rather than the movement; and that leaders who are ‘first movers’ into a particular domain such as the market may lose the ability to innovate as these domains transform in response to both their presence and other changes such as technology. Leaders in these established organisations may find it more difficult to respond to new needs and opportunities as a result of the dominance of individual leaders over and above the grassroots movement.
Conclusion

This thesis has explored the contributions of leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement, both what they bring to the organisations they lead and to the movement as a whole. Exploring movement leadership through this case study of the ‘greenest’ Australian state, it has investigated the degree to which Tasmanian environmental movement leaders resemble classical ‘elites’, outlined the diversity of leadership roles and considered the basis of leaders’ authority. The increasing financialisation of the movement, and the responses of leaders and the broader movement to these forces have been explored, as has the relationship between leaders and the media, including leaders’ responses to new media technologies.

While the Tasmanian environmental movement provides a valuable opportunity to assess the contributions of movement leaders, movements are dynamic and varied, and their leadership is equally so. This research contributes to an understanding of how movement leadership varies across conflicts and societies, and suggests potential avenues for future research into movement leaders in other contexts.

Movement Leaders are not Elites

A key finding of this research is that Tasmanian movement leaders do not comprise an ‘elite’. This is important because Tasmanian leaders are much more prominent than other Australian environmental leaders, and they tend to operate in ways more consistent with traditional leadership where classic ‘elite’ theory is more applicable. However, while Tasmanian movement leaders share some characteristics with political and other elites, particularly in terms of the education of leaders and their location within strategic networks, they lack the power and authority that underpin traditional elites.

Pakulski and Körösényi (2012) have argued that the traditional Weberian inspired model of ‘elite’ is the most convincing model for understanding leadership in modern democratic societies. Such leaders draw upon power and authority as the basis for their status, forming an ‘elite’ group that is distinct and distanced from their followers. Elites consist of “those who occupy the top positions in
[a] hierarchy of wealth and power” (Pareto in Pakulski & Tranter, 2015: 18), while for French and Raven (1968), the basis of this power stems from reward, coercion, referent, expertise, information, and legitimacy.

The Tasmanian environmental movement is interesting because of its distinct and acknowledged leadership. Previous research into social movements, particularly other environmental movements, suggests that participants are sceptical of leadership as an example of authoritarianism (Barker et al., 2001). Movement leaders do not appear to have power within the movement (although charismatic leaders may have ‘referent’ power [French & Raven, 1968]) and the movement does not have a clear or structured hierarchy. Assessing the applicability of elite theory to movement leadership, this research shows that movements represent an example of ‘entrepreneurial politics’ (Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012: 17), and that in the Tasmanian case, a clear hierarchy of power is absent.

While leaders in the Tasmanian movement share some qualities with elites in other contexts, particularly, this lack of power and the lack of hierarchy (beyond the very limited hierarchy within large social movement organisations), suggests that Tasmanian environmental leaders do not comprise an ‘elite’.

The exception to this claim are leaders who enter representative politics, standing for the Tasmanian Greens in state parliament, or as Tasmanian Senators in the federal arena. These politicians, particularly the leaders of state or national Greens parties are arguably members of the political elite, yet the basis of their elite membership lies in representative politics, rather than within the environmental movement per se. This research has highlighted that while early movement leaders were able to move from being movement leaders to political leaders, contemporary Greens leaders tend to be recruited from the periphery of the movement. Political roles are not viewed as ‘promotions’ for senior movement figures, as was the case, for example, in the U.S. Civil Rights movement (Nelson, 1971), or to a lesser degree, within the Australian Labor Party (Pakulski & Tranter, 2015). These recent developments contrast the case of early Greens leaders, such as Bob Brown, Christine Milne and Peg Putt, who had first established themselves as environmental movement leaders, prior to becoming leaders of the Greens party.
It is not precisely clear why the recruitment base has changed, although Lines’ (2006) suggestion that it is the result of a deep philosophical rift between conservation and green humanism provides an interesting line of inquiry. While Lines’ work is now over a decade old, it is only since the retirement of Christine Milne as national leader of the Greens in 2015, that the divergence between the Greens party and the environmental movement has become particularly apparent. However, these divisions are likely to deepen as the historical linkages between the two groups recede into the past. Future research comparing the philosophy and environmental imaginaries (McGregor, 2004) of movement leaders and Greens leaders, seems a fruitful way of assessing the degree to which these philosophical differences play a role. While the practical ramifications of these divisions are currently minimal, the debate around the Tasmanian Intergovernmental Forestry Agreement demonstrated the space for conflict between the Greens and the wider movement. The potential for differences will most likely only increase as the Greens seek to expand their influence nationally, moving away from focusing principally on environmental issues in an attempt to expand their voting base to become a ‘progressive mainstream’ party (Seccombe, 2017).

More broadly, there are implications for how movement leadership is understood. If movements comprise a form of ‘entrepreneurial politics’ (Pakulski & Körösényi, 2012: 17) then movements leaders are examples of how other leaders might be expected to operate in the emerging values and political ideals created by these movements. Given the historical links between the Tasmanian environmental movement and the Greens, both groups should have different social norms around leadership (‘legitimate power’ as French & Raven (1968) refer to it) when compared to other political parties and organisations. As this research has focused principally on leadership, rather than the broader movement, further research into what constitutes ‘legitimate power’ from the perspective of movement participants would be invaluable.

This raises questions about how to conceptualise leadership in the Tasmanian environmental movement. Tasmanian environmental movement leaders are not elites, but at the same time they are not representatives of deliberative democracy or another configuration of power. That is, they are still recognisable as leaders within the mainstream paradigm of leadership, even if the classical theories in that paradigm do not adequately describe their roles or activities. Previous movements that entered into the political process (Labour and Civil Rights movements) were understandable through existing theoretical lenses because they maintained a clear hierarchy where leaders could
be understood as elites. In the absence of hierarchy, existing theoretical approaches do not explain Tasmanian environmental leaders adequately.

The existing literature on social movement leadership, sparse though it is, has contributed some theoretical understanding of the qualities and characteristics of leadership within movements, but does not examine movement leadership interactions with external leadership. Studies that assume movement leaders are theoretically similar to political leaders are subsequently likely to form poor conclusions about the motivations and range of legitimate tactical options available to movement leaders. Further work is necessary to develop a theoretical framework that appropriately encompasses non-elite social movement leaders.

**Leader roles are not directly linked to leadership**

Leaders undertake a variety of roles as part of their contributions to the Tasmanian environmental movement, but it is not clear that these roles inherently define their leadership. To put it another way, for the most part it was not the roles leaders played that made them leaders, but the qualities and knowledge they brought to the tasks they undertook. Following from the previous finding that leaders are not elites in the classical sense, this research found that the roles that leaders held did not confer any particular power or authority that allowed them to operate as leaders. Rather leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement appear to hold their positions through their dedication to the movement and their experience. Long-term involvement provides leaders with the skills to negotiate the internal politics of the movement and influence change, but they do not wield direct power or authority over the movement as a whole.

The consequences are that leaders face an array of pressures including concertive control, and existential concerns, as well as the precarity that comes with taking on leadership roles where finances are constrained. While some social movement scholars express concern that leaders of large organisations compromise movement values for the sake of material comfort (Dauvergne & Lebaron, 2014), this was not the case in the Tasmanian environmental movement. While structurally the Tasmanian movement has bureaucratised to a degree, its leadership appears to have been largely unaffected by these developments. Leaders are not simply managers, roles that are interchangeable with other sufficiently trained individuals (as per March and Weil, 2005), but
the result of specific inter-personal relationships that have been built over time, making the
movement and their leadership resistant to co-option.

The market offers opportunities and threats

Following from the examination of leadership roles in the Tasmanian environmental movement, I
turned my attention to a particular kind of leadership that offered potential insights into new
avenues of movement activity. These leaders were particularly novel because they engaged in
‘financialised’ or market-based activity, relying less on social pressure or political influence to
regulate environmental offenders, and instead harnessing investor or consumer power to achieve
environmental outcomes.

These opportunities call for a distinct and novel set of roles and relationships compared to those
employed by other social movement leaders. Market-based leadership does not require a base of
active movement participants, or political campaigners, and as a result far greater emphasis is
placed upon the skills and resources of ‘financialised’ leaders. As a result, leaders can be effective
without relying upon tactics such as mass mobilisation, the concomitant support roles that
underpin mobilisations, or the resources required to lobby politicians and their staff. Alternatively,
financialised actions lack the participatory democratic aspects of many other types of movement
engagement. This trade-off has a range of potential consequences for the movement in terms of
the roles and contributions of leaders, but also the ability for the grassroots of the movement to
participate in achieving positive environmental outcomes.

There is presently no theoretical account to explain these kinds of market-based activities. The
closest is perhaps Kretschmer and Meyer’s (2007) ‘platform leadership’, where leaders use their
membership as a fundraising base and as a passive indicator of their legitimacy to gain media
attention. Market-based leadership has a relatively passive relationship with the broader
movement base, but it does not draw on the movement membership at all for legitimacy. Rather,
the status of the leader is stems from their previous movement roles, or the information these
leaders possess. This means that leaders are able to operate with fewer resources and more
independently from the wider movement, even compared to ‘platform leaders’. This raises
questions about the relationship between leaders and the movement base, and reinforces the previously mentioned need for further expansion of social movement leadership theory.

‘Market-based’ leaders appear to occupy peripheral roles in the movement. This is because these leaders require far less direct engagement with the movement compared to mainstream social movement leaders. As mentioned previously, this enables leaders to act with relative autonomy. However, many mainstream movement leadership roles are ‘transformational’ (Burns, 1978), in that they encourage movement participants to engage with social issues in ways broadly consistent with Melucci’s (1994) charge that movements are responsible for ‘oiling the wheels’ of democratic society rather than revolutionary change. Market-based leadership does not have the same incentives for ‘transformational’ leadership and principally operates on a market (i.e. ‘transactional’) basis. This kind of leadership does not reproduce the benefits of social movements for civil society and does not create opportunities for broad engagement around particular social issues. In and of itself this is not problematic, but it requires other types of leaders to maintain or expand the grassroots of the movement and ensure there are opportunities for new leaders to emerge. If ‘market-based’ leaders or similar leadership roles become more than peripheral roles, there are implications for the longevity of the Tasmanian environmental movement, and for other movements where similar tactics are employed.

Extending from this, a key finding was that most movement leaders are fairly conservative in their discourses regarding the market. Rather than being opposed to capitalism and holding radical anti-capitalist beliefs that some detractors stereotype environmentalists as holding, leaders hold positions that are more consistent with sustainable capitalism. This is critical, because while much of the literature on green or environmental ideology has focused on radical perspectives, these market-friendly views have not been linked to the environmental movement. My research supports McGregor’s (2004) claim that ‘deep green’ perspectives are only held by a small minority of movement participants. I find a similar pattern amongst Tasmanian environmental leaders. Scholars such as Doyle (2001) and Lines (2006) have argued that many of the key leaders and organisations in the Tasmanian environmental movement were relatively conservative in terms of their social attitudes. This research suggests this conservatism is still apparent, and that it extends beyond key individuals and organisations into the movement leadership more broadly. My research suggests the Tasmanian movement is not comprised of radical organisations but reformist organisations in
line with Melucci (1994). However, it is not clear whether this relatively conservative sustainable capitalist framework reflects the research participants’ status as leaders, or if it is a reflection of the broader movement in Tasmania. Leader attitudes towards capitalism, and indeed those of the movement in Tasmania more generally, is another avenue for future research.

Organisation leaders are slow to respond to a shifting media landscape

The final key finding of this research is that leaders’ engagement with the media varies accord to the type of organisation they lead. Consistent with previous examinations of the Tasmanian movement (see for example Lester, 2007), leaders of large movement organisations maintain strong relationships with traditional news media. However, other leaders, particularly Greens politicians and leaders of smaller peripheral organisations, while recognising the importance of traditional media forms, have increasingly focused on new and social media when compared to movement organisation leaders.

This is important because leaders of larger organisations have a ‘first mover’ advantage when it comes to the news media that allows them to take precedence over peripheral organisations. Yet it also suggests that such leaders are less able to innovate. As the media landscape changes in Australia and internationally, leaders of larger environmental organisations may be disrupted by new organisations. While not as influential in Tasmania as on mainland Australia, GetUp! and the Australian Youth Climate Coalition (AYCC) are examples of this disruption (Vromen, 2015; McDonald, 2016; for further discussion of the disruptive potential of these groups in an American context, see Karpf, 2012). These organisations and their leaders emerged as influential voices in the public sphere, diverting attention, funds and potential membership away from other organisations in ways that continue to shape how other organisations approach campaigning.

Practical and Theoretical Implications

Social movement leadership is a distinct if not unique form of leadership. While there are similarities between social movement leadership and mainstream leadership, Tasmanian environmental movement leaders occupy an interesting middle ground. As discussed, they have
elite characteristics but are not elites; they are not consistently charismatic but also lack legal-rational authority and power; they occupy quasi-bureaucratic roles but are not interchangeable or replaceable in the same way as bureaucratic leaders are (March & Weil, 2005). The diffuse nature of environmental leaders’ external influence also raises questions around how effective leaders are in translating movement participation into social or political change.

This research contributes to the small but growing body of literature around social movement leadership by arguing social movement leaders are worthy of scholarly attention. It affirms that leader centred research into social movements provides insights into the way in which social movements operate. Leaders play a critical role in the success of movements, and understanding how and what they contribute, and the basis of their leadership, is fundamental to understanding how movements succeed or fail.

This study also has implications for how future research approaches the environmental movement in Tasmania, and in Australia more generally. This research suggests that the leadership of the Australian Greens and the environmental movement is largely divergent and represent two distinct groups who are united by expedience rather than shared values. Treating the environmental movement and the Greens as distinct entities is a valuable consideration for future research. More broadly, there are several implications for stakeholders. The immense existential pressure that many leaders feel needs to be recognised, and the interaction of these concerns with pressures at both an organisational and grassroots movement levels creates pressure akin to concertive control that has the potential for negative outcomes for leaders and organisations alike.

Tasmanian environmental movement organisation leaders may also look to investigate how to use new and social media more effectively, as they tend to favour traditional media more than their counterparts do in representative politics, or leaders on the periphery of the movement. While the traditional news media will remain important for some time, leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement are potentially missing opportunities by neglecting emerging media forms. While social media may have been over-hyped, it holds a great deal of potential for organising and recruitment that leaders in the larger Tasmanian organisations have overlooked. Yet this is not just a problem in the Tasmanian context. With traditional media under increasing financial pressure or captured by distinctly ideological interests (Manne, 2011), movements may
not necessarily be able to depend on news media in the same way they have in the past. Exploring new tactical opportunities to preserve lines of communication with the public seems prudent.

Limitations and Future directions for Research

This research is based on a case study of leaders in the Tasmanian environmental movement, and relies on a relatively small sample of interviewed leaders and other documentation. As the list of leaders cited in the methodology chapter of this thesis shows, the movement is much larger and dynamic than these core players, and there is significant peripheral activity that escaped this study. The research conducted here is a small part of the larger picture of Tasmanian environmentalism, and was limited in scope in terms of time. The period of study spanned a contentious period for inter-movement politics in Tasmania, particularly as it encompassed the (later rescinded) Tasmanian Forestry Agreement, which resulted in conflicts within the movement over the value of negotiating with what was seen by some as a doomed forestry industry. These conflicts highlighted particular aspects of leadership. However, the leaders in this study were less prepared to discuss how they networked and linked with other external leaders and organisations because of inter-movement conflict. While some leaders spoke briefly about their networks off the record, for the most part there was a conspicuous silence in this regard.

As such, there are several avenues for further research. Additional interviews with leaders outside of the core group studied here would be informative in determining the degree to which leadership is consistent across the Tasmanian movement. Such an approach would also allow for an assessment of the similarities and differences between leaders and the broader movement in terms of their beliefs, education levels and social and political background. This would also be valuable for assessing and isolating leadership qualities in the movement.

One of the key limitations of this work has been the focus on leadership in relative isolation to the qualities and characteristics of the social movement organisations which they lead. Discussions of social movement leadership would be strengthened by a systematic analysis of movement organisations internationally to better inform an assessment of the strategies, tasks and constraints of leadership. While the inclusion of this analysis was beyond the scope of this thesis due to time constraints and word limits, this would be a worthwhile approach for future research.
This focus on social movement organisations extends to additional research using an institutional approach. While this thesis has focused on the movement more generally, there are still opportunities for studying power and control within organisations that remain relatively submerged. An institutional ethnography (Smith, 2005) of particular movement organisations would be ideally suited to assess the degree to which the findings of this research hold true within individual organisations, and further extend analysis of leadership.

As mentioned previously, several scholars have noted that leadership in social movements requires further research (Aminzade, Goldstone & Perry, 2001; Barker, Johnson & Lavalette, 2001; Morris & Staggenborg, 2004; Reger, 2007; Taylor, 2007; West, 2008; and Tranter, 2009). While this thesis makes a contribution towards expanding a sociological appreciation for social movement leadership, it is worth repeating their refrain. Leadership in social movements appears to be notably different from other forms of leadership. The core contribution of my research is to demonstrate that environmental movement leaders are distinctly different from extra-movement leaders and that they are worthy of ongoing scholarly attention. I have outlined the characteristics of environmental leaders and shown how they play a critical role in the direction and activities of this important social movement. Based upon a case study of environmental leaders in Tasmania, developing a comprehensive model of social movement leadership is beyond the scope of this research. However, it does demonstrate that existing models of leadership are not satisfactory for explaining the emergence of social movement leaders, or their behaviour.

Conclusion

The Tasmanian environmental movement has a long and rich history, and at every step of its history there have been leaders who have managed resources and developed tactics that influenced the outcome of environmental conflicts. This is true of all of the social movements in the modern era. Movements are defined by key individuals, even when they remain behind the scenes and elude the history books. These are the figures who motivate and inspire, provide expertise, determine tactics and evaluate plans, inspire with their speeches, act as the public face of the movement, and run for elected office. These people are social movement leaders, even if the very notion of leadership is a loaded term for many involved in the movements they lead.
I have identified the need to highlight the roles of leaders in research on social movements in order to understand the way power operates within a movement, how decisions are made, and why particular tactics succeed in one context but fail in another. Whether called out explicitly, or euphemistically identified as ‘prime movers’, these individuals provide important contributions to movement dynamics, and failing to properly understand leaders, leaves a gap in our understanding of social movements.

Many theorists have lauded the contributions of social movements to ‘oil the gears’ of society (Melucci, 1994). Ignoring or marginalising leaders in theory and practice allows those with ulterior motives to shape movements to their own ends, or to become a ‘tyranny of structurelessness’ (Freeman, 1999a). The grassroots of social movements are also critical for leadership, because they hold leadership to account. Research into social movements demands a balance between understanding the mobilisation of the masses and recognising the contributions of the leaders as individuals who organise and inspire those same people to mobilise. This research represents a small step towards moving the scales in that direction.
Appendix I: Interview Schedule

Date:
Place:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
Subject Name or ID:
Subject Title:
Current Role:
Dates of Involvement in Current Role:
Summary of current positions and functions:
Influential Environmental Leaders:

Summary of career history
- Key Campaigns
- Please identify critical moments in your career and in environmentalism more broadly
- If no longer active, why not?

Reflections on personal and organisational decision-making, strategic planning and campaigning
- How do you increase public awareness of an issue?
- Key challenges and failures
- What environmental issues are important to you? What issues are important more generally?
- Did this change/has this changed?
- If you could achieve one outcome, what would it be?

Views on the concepts of leadership, own leadership, and succession planning
- Models of influence
- Targets of influence
- Example of influence
- Key elements to achieve influence, including networks, arenas, media engagement
- What are the roles and responsibilities of leadership?
- What makes a good leader? (How does gender play a role in leadership)
- Thoughts on the role of scientists as issue promoters and leaders, particularly in relation to climate science

Leader’s local, national, and international networks
- Interactions with other environmental networks
- Interactions with media, business and other organisations to achieve environmental outcomes
- Who do you work with?
- Who is part of your network? Which of those individuals would you identify as movement leaders? As influential?
- How do you use your networks? Key contacts and strategies?
- How do you perceive your network in terms of breadth and significance?
• In the last week, who did you engage with as part of your work promoting environmental issues and campaigns?
• How does this compare with your normal interactions?
• Is there a person you use as a sounding board or a ‘debriefer’ in the course of your week-to-week activities, or when you’re facing particular challenges? Who are they? (Can keep this person’s identity anonymous).

Media Uses
• What are the main reasons you engage with media?
• How do you use media?
• Who do you use social media?
• What is the relationship between media and leadership in environmental campaigning?
• Does social media enhance or flatten leadership roles?
• In terms of new media specifically, what stories are taken up easily, and why?
• In your experience, what is excluded from contemporary news coverage, and why?
• In the last week, how did you engage with media (as an audience, as media source, as user)?
• How does this compare to your normal interactions?
• Prompts: if appropriate, ask to discuss nuts and bolts of particular media stories, and dig into details around media failures.
Appendix II: Summary of Environmental Discourses

Adapted from Harvey (1996):

1. The “standard view” of the environment, in Harvey’s estimation, is the ‘status quo,’ a general approach utilised by advanced capitalist societies in which intervention occurs only ‘after the event,’ reflecting a belief that no environmental concern should stand in the way of capital accumulation. Effectively this suggests the environment is something to be cleaned up, rehabilitated and restored, and fundamentally ignores problems with species extinction or habitat destruction, and that intervention is only feasible in the case of market failure (through externalities or “the tragedy of the commons”). Harvey (1996: 376) suggests a “powerful and persuasive array of discourses are embedded... in this standard view and its associated practices, institutions, beliefs and powers,” including environmental economics, environmental engineering, environmental law, planning and policy analysis and a wide range of scientific fields.

2. “Ecological modernisation” is centred around a belief that economic activity systematically causes damage to the environment and that preventative action is preferable to ‘after the event’ or ad hoc practices. In response it advocates for ‘sustainable’ interventions to ensure that economic growth and development can continue in the long run. Harvey (1996) suggests that while the thesis of ecological modernisation is quite old, it has been refreshed by the work of Beck (1992) around ‘risk societies.’ Especially central is the role of science in revealing the problems with the standard view of the environment. However this stance also emphasises the compatibility of environmental concerns with economic growth, suggesting ‘win-win’ scenarios are normative outcomes for ecological control and that sustainability is in many ways directed towards more efficient capital accumulation. As this serves the interests of particular powerful sections of the economy, both Harvey and Sachs (1993) fear ecological modernisation may eventually represent a new language of domination. Harvey suggests that the ecological modernisation thesis is appealing to many environmental groups because tactically it represents convenient and persuasive public arguments, but can also represent a deeper conviction that it represents the only way to make global capitalism a little more sane and a little more just.

3. “Wise Use” movements have emerged as a response to the increasing influence of ecological modernisation and the potential for domination in defence of private property. Representing a traditional of libertarianism which suggests property owners hold a rational interest
in ensuring the long term environmental viability of their properties. It tends to make zero-sum arguments for economic against environmental interests, and is ostensibly democratic and populist, although it has been “powerfully co-opted and funded by corporate, industrial... commercial logging, ranching and agribusiness interests” (Harvey, 1996: 385). In the US it tends to represent the environmental position of the Republican party, in Australia the National party take similar stances.

4. “Environmental Justice” movements have similarly emerged as a response to the influence of ecological modernisation, but from the political left rather than the right. It generally rejects a biocentric approach (where nature as other is privileged over human life) and instead views environmental issues as centrally about people and in particular those people who experience social and economic inequality. Resistant to dominant forms of rationality, environmental justice stances search for new rationalities or even ‘irrationality’ when necessary, and is often bound up in the issues of the marginalised, disempowered, and ‘racially marked’ positions held by those affected by environmental injustice. While the hyper-locality of environmental justice stances limit it, it is also strongly democratic and resistant to co-option, and tends towards advancing views of the environment which include “the totality of life conditions... air and water, safe jobs... at decent wages, housing, education, health care, humane prisons, equity, justice” (Southern Organising Committee for Economic and Social Justice, in Harvey, 1996: 391). Harvey also identifies particularly urban concerns in the environmental justice movements around the contradictions of urban organisation under capitalism and the environmental consequences of these configurations in terms of pollution.

Adapted from McGregor (2004):

Sustainable development: similar to Harvey’s ‘ecological modernisation’ discourse, sustainable development asserts that ongoing development is achievable through principles of scientific environmental management. It is particularly structured around expertise and human management of nature-as-resource.
*Left-greens:* a slightly more radical position, left-green discourses suggest that capitalism inevitably results in the destruction of its resource base and “must be replaced by ecologically-informed socialist modes of production” (McGregor, 2004: 596).

*Survivalism:* characteristic of many of the early environmental writers (for example Carson, 1963), survivalism views development as a threat to ongoing human existence, requiring radical responses to prevent tragedy. These discourses include resource depletion and ‘limits to growth’ but also arguably now includes elements of risk as per Beck (1992).

*Eco-regionalism:* this position shares similarities with Harvey’s ‘environmental justice’ discourse, particular the distinct localism and interest in small groups living within local ecological systems, but remains largely biocentric and seems to lack socio-political concerns about justice. It privileges non-hierarchal groups and social ecology.

*Moral extensionism:* characteristic of animal rights groups, moral extensionism argues that certain non-human species should be included in systems of liberal values due to their “morally considerable characteristics” (McGregor, 2004: 596).

*Eco-feminism:* this view suggests a need to value “repressed feminine traits when interacting with nature and develop special relationships to place” (*ibid*), viewing nature as a friend or companion.

*Deep Ecology:* a spiritualist philosophy which argues that humans and non-human nature are indistinguishable, and that protecting nature is protecting a ‘trans-personal’ self; nature in this view is a single organism of which humanity is merely a small part.
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