Lin Hsien-tang and resistance and adaptation in 20th century Taiwan

by

Chen Pei-pei
B.A., M.A.
Asian Studies, School of Humanities, College of Arts, Law and Education

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD
University of Tasmania
March 2019
Statements and Declarations

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University of any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1968.

................................................
(Signature)

1 / 3 / 2019

................................................
(Date)
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Mark Harrison for the continuous support of my PhD thesis. Without his guidance, insight, constant feedback, patience and encouragement this PhD would not have been achievable. I would like to give special thanks to Dr. Barbara Hartley and Dr. Mitchell Rolls for their guidance and roles in supervision. I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Corry and Dr. Nicki Tarulevicz for their support and assistance.

I am grateful to my parents Chen Shih-tung and Lee Mei-jung, my husband Lin Jie, and my sister Chen Ping-ying. Your belief in me have made this journey possible. I am also grateful to my three sons, Thomas, Duncan and Hayden. You are the pride and joy of my life.

This thesis is dedicated to my family, especially my mother who died of cancer aged 56 before the thesis was completed.
Note on Romanisation

Hanyun pinyin, a system for romanising Chinese ideograms, is used to represent transliterated Chinese words throughout the thesis, except in cases where the Wade-Giles term is more familiar, for example, Chiang Kai-shek and Lin Hsien-tang. For authors whose names have all along been romanised in the Wade-Giles system, for example, Hsu Hsueh-chi and Chou Wan-yao, the Wade-Giles romanisation is retained in references.
## Contents

1. Lin Hsien-tang’s Family Background  1-31  
2. Lin Hsien-tang’s Early Youth  32-55  
3. Lin Hsien-tang’s Social Reform  56-74  
4. Lin Hsien-tang’s Educational Reform—the Taichung Middle School  75-100  
5. Petitions Movement  101-154  
6. Classical Chinese Cultural Revival  155-200  
7. Lin Hsien-tang After the Second World War  201-231  
8. Lin Hsien-tang and His Later Years  232-278  
Bibliography  279-295
List of Tables

1. The genealogical table of Lin Hsien-tang (with only given names) in the male line…….19
2. The enrolment and attendance of Taiwanese students in the Common Schools…………….85
3. Comparisons between Taichung Middle School and other middle schools………………95
4. Number of Taiwanese students in Tokyo around the 1910s…………………………….106
5. Petitions and numbers of signatures, and Lin’s involvement……………………………..119
6. Residence of Taiwanese petitioners………………………………………………………121
7. Educational level of Taiwanese petitioners…………………………………………….122
8. Public lectures held in 1923-1926…………………………………………………………128
9. Examples of activities held by the Yixin Association from March to July 1932….162-163
Abstract

This thesis examines Lin Hsien-tang’s life story that interprets one part of Taiwan’s past and its history. Like a characteristic of area studies where the “object” of analysis was unstable as “Taiwan,” the thesis intersects with a range of scholarly fields: Taiwan Studies, Chinese Studies, history, life-writing, political sociology, sociology of education. The thesis uses Lin’s story as a touchstone to tell the complexity of Taiwan’s story. Lin Hsien-tang (1881-1956) was a socially responsible Taiwanese elite whose life traversed the Qing, Japanese and then Nationalist rule. The thesis highlights Lin’s story through specific events in his life to illuminate Taiwan’s changing circumstances across different periods.

The thesis offered a detailed examination of Lin’s politico-social and cultural life in a chronological order. Each chapter was fundamentally important in representing Lin’s personal development across different periods of his life as well as Taiwan’s story during these different authorities. Grounding on Lin Hsien-tang and Taiwan’s stories, Michel De Certeau’s notions of “strategy of domination” and “tactics of resistance” are introduced to offer an analytical mechanism to map out the conflicts, tension and cooperation between ethnicities, governments, countries, ideologies, and generations. It attempts to be attentive to Lin’s political, social and cultural experience, and then to explore the evolving issues from which knowledge about Lin Hsien-tang and the broader of Taiwan has been produced.
Chapter 1

Lin Hsien-tang’s Family Background

Introduction

In 2016, a series of celebrations titled “Jinian Taiwan yihui zhi fu Lin Xiantang xiansheng 135 zhounian danchen (Commemoration of the 135th Anniversary of the Birth of Lin Hsien-tang, the father of Taiwanese Parliament)” were held in Taichung to commemorate the cultural and political legacy of Lin Hsien-tang.¹ The events highlighted the enduring legacy of Lin Hsien-tang in Taiwan’s political and civic life. Activities included a music concert, calligraphy contest, drawing contest at the Lin Garden (Lai Yuan, 萊園),² and public lectures given by


² Lai Yuan is the family garden of the Lins in Wufeng. It has been a national-designated historical site since 1985. The Lai Yuan is a traditional Chinese-style garden in the central Taiwanese town of Wufeng that was the centre of the Lin family’s power. Lai was chosen as the name of the garden in the 19th century in reference to a traditional figure in Chinese classical literature named Lai Zi. The figure of Lai is characterised as paragon of filial piety of his act of dressing in child’s clothes at the age of 70 in order to entertain his parents. “Guanyu Wufeng Lin jia (About the Wufeng Lin Family),” Wufeng Lins, accessed August 14, 2018, http://wufenglins.com.tw/%E9%97%9C%E6%96%BC%E9%9C%A7%E5%B3%B0%E6%9E%97%E5%AE%B6.
several Taiwanese scholars.

Lin Hsien-tang was an important heir to the Lin family in Wufeng from central Taiwan. He was a landowner, reformer, activist and moderniser who lived from 1881 to 1956. He was one of Taiwan’s most significant civic leaders and his life traversed Taiwan’s late Qing imperial period, Japanese colonization and the early Nationalist period.

The purpose of the thesis is to examine Lin Hsien-tang’s life story against the backdrop of Taiwan’s changing political and cultural circumstances in the transition from Qing to Japanese to Nationalist rule. The thesis tells the story of Lin and places his life in the context of the history of a modernising Taiwan. Tracking through specific cultural and political events in Lin’s life, the thesis describes how Lin Hsien-tang, a leading Taiwanese citizen, undertook a series of campaigns for colonial educational reform, for a Taiwanese parliament, and for classical Chinese education in Taiwan. In these ways, he developed and leveraged socio-political and cultural capital to co-opt, negotiate and resist the forces of power, including colonial power, that shaped Taiwan over his life-time.

Lin Hsien-tang’s life story therefore illuminates Taiwan’s modern history, with the different periods of his life expressing changing political and cultural circumstances in the transition from Qing to Japanese to Nationalist rule. However, describing this is a challenging undertaking. The subject of Taiwan as it is an unstable signifier, with a deeply contested meaning on the geopolitical fault lines of the Chinese, western and Japanese worlds. Taiwan is a post-colonial society, shaped by the legacy of Japanese colonial rule. It is also a self-governing democracy with all of the appearances of a nation-state in the international system, however it is not recognised as such by the international community. It is nominally the Republic of China, and it is claimed as a part of the territory of People’s Republic of China.

For these reasons, using the story of Lin to understand the modern history of Taiwan is a distinctive scholarly strategy. It is tracing a line through the Taiwanese story, in which Lin’s
life functions like a social object, and from which can be read narratives of Taiwan’s history. Taken as a “stable” reference point to produce knowledge about Taiwan, Lin’s story is used to bring structure and analytical force to periods and a place for which the scholarly boundaries and problematics continue to be open-ended.

In using the story of Lin Hsien-tang to untangle the complex story of Taiwan, the thesis touches on a range of topics. These include Taiwan as a frontier society, social class and the elite life of Taiwan’s landowners, Japanese colonial strategies of domination and Taiwanese everyday resistance, generational change among Taiwanese literati, cultural capital and China’s imperial legacy on Taiwan, the experiences of the Taiwanese during the transitional period after the relocation of Kuomintang (KMT), and so on.

Lin’s life illustrates these themes and more in particular ways as his story offers a distinctive pathway through the modern Taiwanese experience. In telling the story of Lin as a way of making sense of the complicated story of Taiwan, this thesis is also therefore engaging with a wide range of scholarly fields, including history writing, life-writing studies, biography, Taiwan Studies, Chinese Studies, Japanese Studies, and social and political history.

Many of these scholarly fields have been used to explain the complex Taiwan story over the decades. History writing is an area in which scholars have constructed historical narratives for Taiwan around its imperial, colonial and modern histories, and more recently its indigenous histories. However, this has never been an easy undertaking, as Taiwanese history story has remained highly politicised because of its specific political, social, cultural and economic circumstances over the past decades. Indeed, the concept of a singular specific history for Taiwan, distinct from that of “Chinese history” has been intrinsically political since the arrival of the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan.

The thesis acknowledges this difficulty, and in the process of using the life of Lin Hsien-tang to trace a Taiwanese history, it sets aside the task of analysing how critical historical events,
such as the relocation of the national government of the Republic of China to Taiwan in 1949, remain contested and politicised in the present day. Neither is the thesis attempting to describe Taiwan as part of a broader modern East Asian history. Instead, while these themes are implicit, the thesis is using Lin’s life to reflect upon them rather than place them at the centre of the analysis.

Nevertheless, within Taiwan, the study of Taiwan history has been developing since the mid-1980s and this work informs this thesis. Over the past decades, scholarship in the study of Taiwan history has been institutionalised at a number of organisations, such as National Taiwan Normal University, National Taiwan University, National Museum of Taiwan History and Taiwan Study Research Centre at the National Taiwan Library. The key institution is Academia Sinica, founded in China in 1928 and re-established in Taipei in 1949. A year before the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 1987, the Project for Taiwan History Field Research was launched at Academia Sinica. Seven years later, in 1993, the Preparatory office of the Institute of Taiwan History was formed, and in 2004, the Institute of Taiwan History was formally established. Since then, the study of Taiwan’s history, including the history of Japanese colonial history, has grown rapidly.

The thesis has benefited directly from this work, specifically that on Lin Hsien-tang in Chinese undertaken at Academia Sinica, and also from the broader legitimisation of the study of Taiwan’s history that these new institutions represent.

At the same time, in focussing on Lin Hsien-tang life as a scholarly strategy to navigate this complex history, the thesis elaborates detailed descriptions of particular events in Lin Hsien-tang’s life and on this basis, this approach therefore brings together history writing and

---

life-writing. David McCooey describes life-writing is an academic field in which the object of study is a life broadly understood through different means, including graphic memoir, photography, film and so on. For McCooey, understanding life-writing as a field of scholarship is a question of its ever-changing boundaries and the proliferation of material that can be used to describe and understand a life.

The thesis engages with life-writing and the question of its boundaries. It is not a biography of Lin Hsien-tang in a narrowly defined sense and it necessarily deploys a limited range of material to understand his life in the era in which he lived. The thesis uses Lin Hsien-tang’s personal diaries as its main source. The Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji, which uses Lin Hsien-tang’s formal name Guanyuan, (hereafter the Diary of Lin Hsien-tang) was published by the Institute of Taiwan History (ITH) and the Institute of Modern History by Academia Sinica in 2004. The diary spans twenty-eight years from 1927 to 1955, and contains 9523 entries. It offers a unique and specific insight into both Lin’s life and by reflection an account of the changing circumstances of Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule and early Republican rule.

On this basis, Lin Hsien-tang’s diary is one of the most important published Taiwanese diaries covering the Japanese colonial period. Lin died in 1956 and the publication of his diary in 2004 was the result of many years of work from both Lin’s family and academics. The material was gathered in many locations in Taiwan and Japan. The process began when Lin’s former secretary, Yeh Jung-chung, started writing a biography of Lin in 1959. Lin’s

---


6 The diaries in 1928 and 1936 are lost. “About the Diary,” Taiwan Diary Knowledge Bank, accessed July 17, 2018, http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98.

7 Yeh (1900-1978) first met Lin Hsien-tang in 1918, and they had known each other for nearly forty years since then. He was Lin’s secretary, translator, protégé and business partner from the 1920s. In terms of the close relationship between Yeh and Lin, Yeh was described as Lin’s representative by Wang Zhenxun. See Wang Zhenxun, Lin Xiantang de she hui si xiang.
manuscripts written from 1927 to 1946 were lent to Yeh by Lin Hsien-tang’s eldest son, Lin Panlong. Years later, in 1974, Yeh Jung-chung came across Lin’s other manuscripts in Tokyo. These manuscripts were written by Lin in Japan near the end of his life, between 1948 and 1955. They had been held by Lin Hsien-tang’s personal assistant in Japan Lin Ruichi. Yeh Jung-chung attempted to bring copies of Lin’s Tokyo diaries back to Taiwan twice in the 1970s, but with martial law still in force and a regime sensitive to any voices in contrast to the ruling Kuomintang, these documents were politically sensitive enough to be confiscated by Taiwan customs.

Yeh Jung-chung did however retain the manuscripts he had borrowed from Lin Panlong until his death in 1978. Lin Hsien-tang’s grandson Lin Bozheng had attempted to reclaim them from Yeh but Yeh had not given them up.8 Lin Bozheng did however convey Lin’s manuscripts in Japan to Los Angeles around this time where they were held safely until they were returned to Taiwan in the 1980s by a member of the extended Lin family who happened to be an airline pilot and was able to subvert customs luggage checks. Finally, too, after Yeh Jung-chung death, his family finally gave up the material he had held to Lin Bozheng.

By the mid-1990’s Lin Bozheng held all the material. In 2004, he donated it to the Institute of Taiwan History at Academia Sinica. Since then, Lin Hsien-tang’s diaries has attracted research attention from a number of academics in Taiwan. Hsu Hsueh-chi from the Institute of Taiwan History has undertaken major studies and from 1999 to 2013, she chaired an Institute study group for the manuscripts. The work of editing and publishing took place through that time. By 2013, Lin’s manuscripts have been all published into twenty-seven books under the name of Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji. Since then, the Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji has been digitised,

|----|
and become part of the collections of the Archives of Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica.

*Guanyuan Xiānshēng Riji* is more than just an account of Lin’s life but is an important work in understanding the Taiwanese experience through the emerging field of diaries studies in Taiwan. It has generated an amount of literature of secondary resources since the 2000s. For example, in December 2006, while *Guanyuan Xiānshēng Riji* was still being published, a symposium entitled “Diaries & Research on Taiwan History—Collected Essays in Memory of Mr. Lin Hsien-tang (1881.12.3-1956.9.8)” was held by ITS and Mingtai High School in Taichung, which discussed details of Lin’s daily life. The discussion of the topics included Lin’s personal hygiene practice, physical activities and music aesthetics. The conference was later compiled into a book under the same title and published in 2008. All of this work from life-writing was taking place in a period of political change in Taiwan in the post-martial law era in which the everyday of Taiwanese life in history had become a major area of interest for scholarship and the public.

In her work, Hsu Hsueh-chi, as mentioned, the chief editor of Lin Hsien-tang’s diary, as well as offering account of Lin’s daily life through his diaries, also noted Lin’s diary writing habit. According to Hsu, Lin Hsien-tang routinely wrote in the morning of the events of the previous, and he would leave his diaries on his desk without putting it away. Hsu noted that Yang Shuixin, Lin’s wife, sometimes quoted from Lin in her own diary that she maintained for a few short years.

---

9 Mingtai High School locates in Wufeng, Taichung. It is a cultural legacy of Lin Hsien-tang. Its predecessor was the Yixin Association in Wufeng, which was founded by Lin Hsien-tang and Lin Panlong, Lin’s son, in 1932. Mingtai High School is run by Lin Fangying, Lin’s grand-daughter-in-law. More information about this school can be found in the conclusion of the thesis.

10 Hsu Hsueh-chi, “Taiwan riji yanjiu de huigu yu zhanwang (Diary Research in Taiwan: Retrospect and Prospect),” *Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research)* 22, no. 1 (March 2015): 172.
Hui-yu Caroline Tsai has also undertaken diary studies in Taiwan that have used Lin’s writing. She looked into Lin Hsien-tang’s diary writing habits in terms of the writing material, and format of the diary Lin used. In Tsai’s research, she detailed that the Lin family of Wufeng including Lin Hsien-tang usually made a note in Hakubunkan’s *tōyō nikki*, a diary book made and sold by the commercial publisher, Hakubunkan of Tokyo, and it was larger than a pocket size diary.\(^\text{11}\)

In Caroline Tsai’s comparative diaries studies, she makes connection between diary and everyday life. Diaries are understood by Tsai as a primary historical source recording the minitiae in everyday life. For Tsai, diaries offer “fragmented” trivia that are transformed into objects of analysis for the everyday and, serve as a “framework” for the study of the everyday.\(^\text{12}\) In this step, a diary-led approach to everyday life facilitates inquiry into such ephemeral and subjective areas as “intentions and actions, non-actions and comprise, resistance and the means of adjustment, as well as the exercise of rationality and a sense of subjectivity.”\(^\text{13}\)

Tsai’s description of a diary-led approach accords with what McCooey described as the modern proliferation of material that contribute to the understanding of the practice of life writing. Tsai uses the diary-led approach to look into everyday life in colonial Japan through the writing of a Japanese settler, Lin and a contemporary of Lin, Zhang Lijun. Her work is limited to a discussion into Lin’s hygiene practice and described Lin as a believer in modern Western medicine, arguing that that Lin’s knowledge of “medical modern” was formed in the colonial period and his identity as a modern subject.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{11}\) A pocket size diary may vary, but here it refers to the size of about 20cm in length and 14cm in width. Hui-yu Caroline Tsai, “Diaries and Everyday Life in Colonial Taiwan,” *Japan Review*, no. 25 (2013): 148.

\(^{12}\) ibid., 146.

\(^{13}\) ibid.

\(^{14}\) ibid., 160.
Lin Hsien-tang’s dietary habits were also touched upon by Tsai. Based on Lin’s diaries, Tsai described that Lin’s acceptance of Western food was influenced by his family who had already started to eat Western food out of concern for modern nutrition, rather than for the reasons of taste or displaying social status.

A diary-led approach that informs scholarship about Lin is fully developed in Hsu and Tsai’s research. The thesis adopts the same diary-led approach Hsu and Tsai as well as other examples of diaries studies. Similarly, the thesis is attentive to the everyday life of Lin. However, it is using his diaries and other records somewhat differently. It deploys these resources as foundational materials to delineate Lin’s life in the fields of politics and culture, and to speak more broadly to the questions of Taiwan’s transition from Qing to colonial to Republican Taiwan. The emphasis here, therefore, is on Taiwan’s social and political circumstances as illustrated by Lin’s diaries.

Beyond the field of life writing studies, the thesis is also engaging in the scholarly field of biography studies. Yeh Jung-chung, as mentioned above, is the earliest biographer, compiling a chronological biography of Lin in the late 1950s. In 2004, Huang Fusan’s book, Lin Xiantang Zhuan (The Biography of Lin Hsien-tang), also presented a study that traced a line through the life of Lin’s life. The thesis draws upon these scholarly works, and as providing a solid ground for understanding the knowledge of Lin.

As Lois W. Banner formulates, “Studying the life story of an individual might be seen as akin to studying the history of a city, a region, or a state as a way of understanding broad social and cultural phenomena.”¹⁵ In this way, for all of these different scholarly approaches and the different field that the thesis intersects with, it is ultimately part of the emerging field of Taiwan

Studie

taking in its cognate areas of Chinese Studies and Japanese Studies. Lin Hsien-tang’s life traversed three different regimes—the late imperial Qing, the colonial Japanese, and the Nationalists, and therefore the thesis draws on scholarship from relevant studies of these periods. For example, Harry J. Lamley’s essay on *Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch’ing Period* and Patricia E. Tsurumi’s book on *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*, which published in 1977, provide accounts of the politics, culture and society with which Lin was associated.

The study of Lin Hsien-tang has generated growing attention from academia in Taiwan. However, there is a lacuna in scholarship on Lin in English. Johanna M. Meskill’s book, *A Chinese Pioneer Family: The Lins of Wu-feng, Taiwan, 1729-1895*, details the history of the Lin family in Wufeng. Published in 1979, her work is a key contribution to scholarship on the social history of Taiwan through the family history of Lin Hsien-tang. However, in her work, she only mentions Lin Hsien-tang in a passing reference to him as her work focusses on Qing dynasty Taiwan and take its history up to the year 1895, when Lin was only five-year-old. The thesis therefore in one sense leads on chronologically from Meskill’s work and draws upon to highlight the importance of the continuity of the story of Wufeng Lins. Needless to say, Taiwan Studies as a field of area studies has developed significantly since Meskill’s research was published, but the story of Lin Hsien-tang remains relatively unexamined in detail in English-language scholarship, and therefore the thesis is aiming to fill this space in knowledge.

Although the thesis makes use of diaries and biographies of Lin, it is not within translation studies and it does not attempt to speak to the deeper questions of translation. However, it does exist as an act of translation to produce scholarship on Taiwan in English. In line with the approach to life-writing outlined above, the thesis deploys a range of primary texts that take in subjective experiences and also historical account, which do not exist in English, and therefore
in account for this material in this thesis, it serves to translate them into a scholarly form. In so doing, part of its scholarly project is to offer an account of the Taiwan story in English based on these Chinese materials.

The thesis is presenting the story of Lin Hsien-tang’s life chronologically as well as drawing out key themes and topics. It describes Lin’s life and the era in which he lived as a way of making sense of the dynamics of power and culture that shaped Taiwan at that time. To understand this, the thesis underscores the dialogic connections between Lin and the institutions and practices of power over Taiwan as a way of elucidating the contestations between them, as well as the relationship between elite Taiwanese society imperial, colonial and national politics.

In so doing, the thesis is attentive to the theoretical vocabulary of Michel De Certeau and Pierre Bourdieu. In De Certeau’s work, he talks about the practice of the everyday on the basis of a conceptual relationship between what he refers to as strategies of domination and tactics of resistance. De Certeau’s framework captures the political and social dynamic of the ways people in Taiwan responded to disruptions of Taiwan’s governance. His vocabulary particularly illuminates the relationship between everyday life in Taiwan and the institutions of colonial Japanese power, and their contestations in the colonial period.

As will be examined through the thesis, Lin was an early civic leader and a socially responsible landowner. In the context of Japanese colonialism, his life was intertwined with the instability of Taiwan’s politics and colonial modernisation. The result is that in his life and

16 The example of the relationship between strategy and tactics can be found in De Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life*. For instance, in the chapter of “Walking in the City,” De Certeau describes the government as the “producers” while walkers in the city are the “consumers.” He argues that although the walkers live in the city that is built and ruled by the strategies of the institutional powers like governments, their lives are not fully determined by the organising bodies. The walkers can still structure a tactical response to the latter. For more information, see Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven F. Rendall (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1988), 91-110.
his actions, the patterns political of contestation and negotiation that characterised the colonial period are especially visible. In his life, Lin engaged in forms of tactical resistance to colonisation for which De Certeau’s theoretical vocabulary is especially illustrative.

De Certeau’s concepts of strategies and tactics offers an interesting base for understanding the power-relations between Lin Hsien-tang and the colonial Japanese government in Taiwan. Lin conformed to the Japanese ruling class and had no intentions of defeating the authorities. However, he sought to exercise his tactical resistance through appropriating the framework forced on him by Japanese colonisers, depending on the situations and opportunities. In this regard, Lin was not merely a passive recipient. He was an active user that evades the pressures of conformity. Thus, his tactical practices like eroding power mechanism can be defined as resistance stemming from everyday life.

Also useful in Pierre Bourdieu work is the concept of cultural capital, which says a great deal about Lin Hsien-tang as a social and political subject. On cultural capital, Bourdieu says: “Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which is presumed to guarantee.”¹⁷ Lin’s social status and enculturation in China’s classical imperial education and socio-cultural world can be captured through these notions of cultural capital in his personal style and participation in a social and institutional world.

Lin Hsien-tang was an heir of the powerful landowning Lin family in Wufeng. In the

context of this family background and wealth, Lin received a classical Chinese education from which in Bourdieu terms is acquired the cultural capital he was able to deploy in his life in Taiwan’s changing circumstances. After Japanese colonisation, Lin’s education in classical Chinese and the Chinese imperial world bestowed upon him a social and political authority that both challenged the Japanese colonial government but was also useful. Lin himself deployed and reproduced his own cultural capital, becoming more than a wealthy landowner with economic status but also with political power and moral authority from the cultural capital conferred on him by his classical Chinese education.

Werner Georg, drawing on Bourdieu, refers to cultural capital as a means for the transmission of social status and the conversion of cultural capital into social and economic capital in his discussion of education and social inequality in a life course. Cultural capital and its relationship to economic wealth are useful concepts when discussing Lin Hsien-tang’s life course and his social and political status. Lin’s cultural capital furthermore illustrates the broader social and institutional conditions in Taiwan through the course of his life and the enduring significance of Qing imperial culture on Taiwan right through the Japanese colonial period.

The Family History of Lin Hsien-tang

Lin Hsien-tang was an heir to the Wufeng Lins, a prestigious and notable family of settlers, landowners and political figures in Taiwan through the late Qing period. Lin’s family background helps develop an understanding of his social status at the transition to Japanese colonial rule. It also sheds light on the context of Taiwan’s isolated frontier society, where settlement, migration, subethnic rivalry, feuding and the limits of imperial governance had all

---

contributed to the peculiarities of Taiwan’s frontier setting. With China’s crises of internal revolts and foreign invasions in the 19th century, local power on the frontier in the form of family structures became significant sites of social, economic and political power. In the context of imperial decline, the Wufeng Lins made use of the times and came to thrive during the late Qing period. Then, the Wufeng Lins continued to prosper under Japanese rule. The Wufeng Lins’ wealth and status also conferred political power on Lin Hsien-tang when he became the patriarch of the Wufeng Lins and entered into Taiwan’s political terrain taken over by Japanese colonial officials in the late 1890s.

In the thesis, Lin’s family history is important in understanding Lin Hsien-tang. His family inheritance was critical in not only shaping Lin Hsien-tang’s subjectivity, but also in understanding Lin’s inherited cultural capital and material resources that he was able to deploy when he became engaged with the Japanese colonial regime.

The examination of Lin Hsien-tang’s family history has been formulated in terms of scholarship and family lineage records, including accounts written by Lin Hsien-tang himself, compiled by his family members and also in the scholarly work of Johanna M. Meskill. In some of these accounts there is a degree of mythologization of the Lin family story. This thesis as a critical encounter with the Lin family history, examines some of these texts acknowledging that there is a certain creativity in their descriptions of the Lin family’s accumulation of wealth, power and status. In other words, these accounts express the success of the Wufeng Lins in historically-specific terms, the terms of which self-reflexively express the complexity of Taiwan’s social and political history.

The following section will focus on Lin Hsien-tang’s early life story up to the 1910s. It firstly describes the Wufeng Lin’s settlement and development in central Taiwan during the Qing period. Then, the heritance of family wealth and education that this family history conferred will be highlighted as a way to preface his socio-political and cultural activism in the
Family History: Taiwan Prior to the Wufeng Lins’ Settlement

At the time of the arrival of the Wufeng Lins in Taiwan, the island was the eastern-most frontier of Chinese imperial rule. While Taiwan remained far from imperial rule, populations were growing in the littoral provinces of China like Fujian and Guangdong. For sheer survival, the Chinese coastal populations developed a specialised economy based on sea-faring and overseas trade, especially after 1500.\(^{19}\)

Although people from China had been travelling to the island for several centuries, Taiwan was never part of the Chinese imperial administrative system of territorial classification until the Qing dynasty. It thus became an ideal base for traders and pirates, who would rest and wait out seasonal weather, using Taiwan as an entrepot to transit, trade goods and replenish supplies. From the 1620s, the Dutch and Spanish pursued competing interests in Taiwan, owing to its advantageous geographical position. The Dutch prevailed in the end and expelled the Spanish in 1624, and established significant territorial control over island until being forced out by the Ming loyalist naval commander Zheng Chenggong in 1662.

Zheng Chenggong and his family governed Taiwan as a Ming loyalist kingdom from 1662-1683. He was the son of a Japanese mother and the Chinese warlord Zheng Zhilong, who had controlled parts of Taiwan before the Dutch era and had given allegiance to the Ming court in 1628. In 1644, the Ming dynasty fell to the Manchus and the Qing dynasty was founded. At first, Zheng Zhilong chose to side with the Ming court. As a reward, his son Zheng Chenggong was bestowed the title Guoxingye (國姓爺), which means the lord of the imperial surname and

popularly transliterated into English at the time as Koxinga. Two years later in 1646, Zheng Zhilong surrendered to the Qing. However, Zheng Chenggong declared his continuing loyalty to the Ming. Zheng Chenggong attempted to resist the Qing dynasty when he attempted to regain possession of the late Ming capital in Nanjing, but he was defeated in 1659. Seeing Taiwan as a base for his anti-Qing military campaign and for a future empire, Zheng Chenggong invaded Taiwan in 1661. He set up the first imperial Chinese regime in south-west of Taiwan. In 1662, he expelled the Dutch from the island.

During the following twenty-two years, there was a rapid growth of Chinese settlement, particularly in south-west Taiwan, where a more settled Chinese society were coming into view. Taiwan featured different groups of settlers from different parts of the mainland. Taiwan’s population also included Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, who had long dwelt on the island before the arrival of the Dutch and the Zheng family. At the same time the Qing dynasty enforced coastal evacuation policies. Yet, the Qing policy ran into conflict with the economic interests of the coastal population who relied on Taiwan for trade. Maritime trade between the mainland and the frontier Taiwan was never completely cut off despite the Qing’s prohibitions.

Taiwan came under central imperial control when the Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty defeated the Zheng kingdom the Ming loyalists-in-exile. Zheng Keshuang, grandson of Zheng

---


21 Ibid., 442.

22 Johanna M. Meskill, 24-25.


24 Shi Hongyi, “Qingdai Kangxi nian jian zhi tai zhengce yanjiu (A Study on Strategies
Chenggong, surrendered to the Qing Admiral Shi Lang in 1683. After the annexation, Qing policy on Taiwan was debated at the Qing court. Some officials like Su Bai suggested that the Qing empire should abandon Taiwan after the removal of the remnants of the Zheng resistance forces because Taiwan was a barren land. The geographical position of Taiwan was too far for effective rule from the court. Shi Lang suggested to the Qing emperor Kangxi that it would not be feasible to evacuate the Chinese population, and Taiwan would be a useful shield for the southeast coast of China if it were under Qing control. Kangxi agreed with Shi Lang and Taiwan was incorporated into the Qing imperial administrative system as a prefecture (fu) of Fujian province in 1684.

Even upon establishing Taiwan’s administration system, the Qing court was still concerned about the remnants of Zheng’s military forces. The Qing therefore put security concerns uppermost in their mind when they framed policy for Taiwan. To dislodge the remnants of the anti-Manchu Zheng forces, the Qing court issued a prohibition that imposed stringent limits on further Chinese settlement. The Qing court thought that they could bring the island under control directly through military and civilisation administration, and indirectly through immigration regulations that only allowed single males to go to Taiwan, and by restricting trade in commodities such as rice between Taiwan and the mainland.

---

25 ibid., 15-16.
27 Johanna M. Meskill, 26-27.
28 The immigration policy stipulated that only single males are allowed to go to Taiwan, so that they would guarantee their return for the sake of their families in mainland China or other reasons. Also, trade regulation between the littoral population aimed to ensure that the food shortage would not be a source of disturbance on the island. See Shepherd, 109-110.
The Lins of Wufeng: from Farmers, Traders, and Strongmen, to Landowning Gentry

While Taiwan’s frontier characteristics of opportunism and tumult is a central theme in the history of the Wufeng Lins’, viewed from the present, their story is also an example of the success of a family in late-imperial China. In the frontier setting of Qing-era Taiwan, they rose from poverty to status, power and wealth.

My account of the history of Wufeng Lins is based on the family history compiled by Lin Hsien-tang, his other family members and the work of Johanna Meskill. As has been noted, the depiction of Lin’s family history in the thesis is both an historical account and also, from the Lin family sources, also a social creation. For the Lin family, their history is almost fabled narrative of the creation of their wealth and status, and through which Lin Hsien-tang established his own story and legitimised his cultural capital. The story of the Lin family is also one part of a social history of Taiwan. For Lin Hsien-tang, the way he compiled his family history enabled him to conjure an epic story of ancestors making the dangerous journey to settle in Taiwan. He invokes a powerful process that validated his status as heir to an esteemed and wealthy family.

The ancestors of the Wufeng Lins came from Zhangzhou prefecture of Fujian. As the genealogical table indicates as below, there were five generations of the Wufeng Lins before Lin Hsien-tang (1881-1956) in Taiwan.
The Lin family pioneer was Lin Shi (1729-1788). In Lin Hsien-tang’s interpretation of Lin Shi’s story, he recorded Lin Shi’s personal qualities of independence and filial piety. Born in mountainous Pinghe district of Zhangzhou prefecture in Fujian province in 1729, Lin Shi set forth alone to Taiwan in 1754, and settled as a peasant farmer in Dalizhi, Zhanghua district (contemporary Dali village in Taichung County) in central Taiwan in the mid-18th century. After

---

29 The disaster stroke Lin Shi while he was young: both parents died when Lin Shi was ten and twelve years old, leaving him and other two younger brothers in the care of his grandmother. At aged 18, Lin Shi teamed up with companies and made an adventurous crossing to Taiwan. Yet, he soon returned home after his grandmother fell ill. He had taken care of his grandmother in the following years until her death. During this period, he refused any possibility that could tie him down, for instance, marriage. See Lin Hsien-tang, “Tai gao zu Shi gong jia zhuan (Biography of Great Great Great Grandfather Shi),” in Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), ed. Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971), 101.
three years, Lin Shi became secure enough to bring his brothers from Fujian, and as a marker of the permanence of his settlement, organised a reburial for his parents in central Taiwan.\(^{30}\)
The Lin brothers remained a single household until, starting from the oldest Lin Shi, each married one after another.\(^{31}\)

The marriages of the Lin brothers were noteworthy. In the context of the frontier society of Taiwan where single males outnumbered eligible girls on the island, it was hard for a single sojourning man without a prestigious background to find a wife.\(^{32}\) Thus, with the marriages of the three brothers taking place only few years after their arrival in Taiwan, it can be interpreted as a sign of the rapid rise in their socio-economic status. Their notable and rising wealth and social standing offers an explanation as to why they were able to find wives so quickly in a society such as Taiwan’s at the time. Also notable is that in the 18\(^{th}\) century Taiwan, Lin Shi’s six sons all lived beyond childhood, which can suggest access to resources and a high relative quality of life.

The following two decades saw the Lin family flourish. Besides their social and commercial achievements, the Lin family established a formal family relationship to the imperial system, when Lin Xun, Lin Shi’s eldest son, married a Miss Huang, whose father, according to the family history, was a prominent Qing official in Lugang.\(^{33}\) This was indeed a golden era for the Lin family. However, the family soon faced setbacks. Sadly, Lin Xun subsequently died at the early age of twenty-one, although his did father two children with his

\(^{30}\) ibid., 102.

\(^{31}\) In 1760, Lin Shi, at the advanced age of thirty-two, married a Miss Chen, who was fourteen years younger than him. ibid., 101-102.


\(^{33}\) Zhang Zhengchang, Lin Xiantang yu Taiwan minzu yundong (Lin Xiantang and the Political Movement in Taiwan) (Taipei: Yi zhi shu yan jiu cong shu, 1981), 24.
wife. Then, in 1786, a member of the Wufeng Lins named Lin Shuangwen set up an anti-Qing uprising.  

Lin Shi did not participate in it. However, he was imprisoned by the Qing authorities. Lin Shi was eventually released and his reputation nominally restored, but having lost his fortune and suffering the Qing imperial penal system, he died on the same day he left prison.

Lin Shi’s misfortune greatly affected the second generation of the Wufeng Lins in Taiwan. The following half century were characterised by bitter family schisms and occasional reconciliations. While most family members moved to Tucheng (another less fertile village a few miles away Dalizhi), Mrs. Huang, the widow of Lin Xun, and her two sons decided to establish a separate residence and moved to Azhaowu (present-day Wufeng village in Taichung County). It was Lin Jiayin, born in 1782, the second son of Mrs. Huang and the third generation of the Wufeng Lins in Taiwan, who eventually brought back the wealth and reputation of his family.

In Lin Hsien-tang’s account of Lin Jiayin, his path to wealth is mythologised as fated. In a


35 Lin Shi was denounced by his discontent neighbour Ho Ao, who had money affair with Lin Shi. Also, while Lin Shi was in prison, Lin Da, Lin Shi’s fourteen-year-old son, voluntarily joined him in prison in order to fulfil his filial piety to serve his father. Yet, Lin Da died in prison soon because of illness. Lin Hsien-tang, “Tai gao zu Shi gong jia zhuan (Biography of my Great Great Great Grandfather Shi),” 102-103.

36 The genealogy delicately hinted that the separation may be a matriarch’s decision of Mrs. Chen, Lin Shi’s wife, who had a deep hatred for Mrs. Huang, her eldest daughter-in-law and Lin Xun’s wife. It is reported that Mrs. Chen was angry about Mrs. Huang because Mrs. Huang’s father did not help Lin Shi and other Lin family members flee to the mainland China at a time of crisis. It is also reported that Mrs. Huang’s father did it on account of that he did not want his widowed daughter to move so far away from Taiwan. Lin Hsien-tang, “Gao zu kao Xun gong jia zhuan (Biography of my Great Great Grandfather Xun),” in Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), ed. Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971), 104-105.
dream, Jiayin was instructed by a local land god to look for a bucket of gold under the seat of a god statue in a nearby temple. He went to the temple the next day and soon found it, and with the fortune he was able to broaden his business ventures trading grains and charcoal. Unlike the Lin ancestors who lived on the soil as farmers, Lin Jiayin gradually rose to become a successful trader by the 1830s. In 1837, he ordered his three sons to establish their own households.37

In Meskill’s description of Lin Jiayin’s story, his efforts to consolidate his rising social position was a gradual process. It included changing expectations he had for his children and grandchildren, who rather than also becoming merchants were taught a classical Chinese education in the hope of competing in the imperial examinations to achieve an official rank.38 His own sons did not achieve an official rank through the imperial examinations as he had wished. However, his grandson Lin Wenqin, the father of Lin Hsien-tang, did achieve the notable scholarly honour of ju ren (舉人),39 the title given to the successful candidates in the imperial examinations at the provincial level in the Qing period.

In a broad sense, Lin Jiayin’s dream of sending his descendants into imperial positions through the imperial examination system epitomised a common social aspiration for ordinary Chinese families who wished to attain upward mobility. As indicated by the ideal social class structure of scholar-gentry (shi, 士), farmers (nong, 農), artisans (gong, 工) and merchants (shang, 商), in hierarchical descending order, the class of scholar-gentry represented cultural and social capital in imperial Chinese Confucian society. In late imperial China, while a certain number of people could acquire the shi class through a money donation or military exploits,

38 Johanna M. Meskill, 79-80.
39 Zhang Zhengchang, 29.
the ideal pathway for people who aspired to upward mobility to the scholar-gentry class was to pass the arcane imperial examination at different levels. They demonstrated their scholarly distinction before they were formally nominated to an imperial rank depending on the degree they obtained.

The nature of Taiwan’s frontier setting where the cultural and educational standards were less institutionalised than in the mainland, meant that the chances that Taiwanese people could compete with mainlanders in the imperial examination system were comparatively lower. However, as Huang have noted, to obtain the shi class through monetary donation or military exploits proved to be a particularly advantageous way for Taiwanese to realise upward mobility, because as a frontier and immigrant society, Taiwan had already achieved significant affluence due to the lucrative commercial oversea trades and entrepreneurial society.

In reading Lin Hsien-tang’s family history, Lin Jiayin’s growing interest in having his descendants be properly educated was significant. It signified how a family moving from farming and trading to an official status had become an important part of the Taiwan frontier story. In this context, the cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 and the termination of the imperial examination in 1905 were both salient for Lin Wenqin, who had achieved scholarly rank before the cession, as well as his son Lin Hsien-tang, who had been educated in the imperial system before its dissolution in the changing and turbulent geopolitics of the period.

Although Lin Jiayin’s grandson Lin Wenqin achieved a scholarly rank through the formal process, his own sons did not follow his wishes to join the scholar-gentry rank though imperial

---

40 Huang Fusun, *Lin Xiantang zhuan (The Biography of Lin Hsien-tang)* (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 2004), 6. To climb up the scholar-gentry ladder through the imperial examination, a Taiwanese examinee had to gain the scholarly honour of ju ren in the triennial examination held in Fuzhou. Then, only few of the ju ren degree-holder men could make their way to Beijing to compete for the most honourable and prestigious scholarly honour of han lin academy three years later.

41 ibid.
examinations nor became traders. Rather, they became local strongmen (tu hao, 土豪) by utilising their father’s wealth and the militia he could command and his social capital in their region. This nominally diverted from the aspirations for social mobility of Lin Jiayin and his ancestors but Lin Jiayin’s sons created a powerbase through their command over a growing local militia, and as noted above this provided an alternative pathway to power and entry into the imperial system. This also consolidated the power of the Lin family, particularly in the broader context of the turbulence of the Chinese society in the 19th century.

The Qing dynasty was tumultuous in the 19th century. The widespread internal revolts and foreign wars, such as the Taiping rebellion and the Opium Wars, weakened the Qing’s imperial power. Many local governments became weak and unable to effectively govern their region. Robbery, piracy and violence and even rebellions occurred more frequently, especially at the empire periphery in the coastal area and in remote countryside.42

In frontier Taiwan, Taiwanese society was turbulent too. The 19th century phrase “san nian yi xiao fan, wu nian yi da luan” (Every three years a minor uprising, every five years a major rebellion) illustrated Taiwan’s lack of law and order at that time.43 Besides the socio-political upheavals, the longstanding problem of subethnic rivalry and feuding between different subethnic communities was further exacerbated by the weakening imperial government.44 One of the effects was to empower local militias to fill the vacuum of an imperial state in need of extra armed force and money. The relationship between the local government and local strongmen, particularly the head of the local leadership, thus developed a form of symbiosis,

42 Johanna M. Meskill, 85.
44 The term “subethnic rivalry” was used by Harry J. Lamley to describe essentially a competitive form of interaction between cultural groups. Harry J. Lamley, “Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch’ing Period,” in The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, ed. Emily Martin Ahern and Hill Gates (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1981), 282.
or, mutual reciprocity. While the former relied on money and armed force supplied by the latter, the latter were rewarded with the official rank *shi* in return.

The Wufeng Lins in the 19th century became part of this shifting dynamic. Lin Jiayin’s two eldest sons, Lin Dingbang and Lin Dianguo, the fourth generation of the Wufeng Lins, became the Lins’ first local strongmen. In the family history of Wufeng Lin, Lin Dingbang was depicted as “a man of loyalty, and described him as a peacemaker among the neighbourhood was chosen as the chief of the communities by his neighbours.” However, Lin Dingbang was killed by another local strongman Lin Heshang in a feud in 1848. Three years later, Lin Wencha, Lin Dingbang’s eldest son, avenged his father’s death with extreme and very public violence. Lin Wencha destroyed Lin Heshang’s residence and cut out his heart and put it in front of his father’s tomb. Afterwards, Lin Wencha turned himself in to the local government.

Lin Wencha was imprisoned by the Qing authorities, but the Qing’s 19th century’s crises created a turning point in Lin Wencha’s life as the weakening Qing empire required the support from the powerful local leadership. Despite Lin Wencha being a convicted criminal, his status as a local strongman was needed by the Qing government. In 1854, Lin Wencha was set free in exchange for his services to the empire to fight on the mainland in the Taiping rebellion.

The following decade was good for Lin Wencha. He made the most of his opportunities and swiftly rose in rank through a series of military exploits. In less than ten years he rose from a major of a district, to brigade general, to commander, and to provincial commander-in-chief (*tidu*, 提督), which was almost the pinnacle of the military hierarchy in imperial Qing society.

---

45 Lin Youchun, “Zeng zu kao tai feng weng jia zhuan (Biography of my Grandfather),” in *Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family)*, ed. Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971), 115.

46 Lin Dingbang was also reported to have had been involved in a love affair with Lin Heshang’s concubine and was therefore killed by Lin Heshang. Cited in Johanna M. Meskill, 94.

47 Zhang Zhengchang, 26.
Using his political capital in the imperial system, Lin Wencha helped his clan, including his brother Lin Wenming and his uncle Lin Dianguo, who was Lin Hsien-tang’s grandfather, to achieve official military rank. With the rise of the Lin Wencha and other family members, the Wufeng Lins together took advantage of their political status to expand their territory. They took control of neighbouring regions in central Taiwan dominated by other local strongmen, and by the early 1860s had become one of the most powerful and formidable clans of local strongmen in Taiwan.

Lin Wencha was a key figure in the expansion of the wealth and power of the Wufeng Lins. Specifically, Lin Wencha guided the Wufeng Lins through the decline of the Qing empire towards social upward mobility, from itinerary farmers to the upper social echelons of the scholar-gentry strata, in the particular setting of frontier Taiwan.

However, from the high point of the early 1860s, the Wufeng Lins experienced a series of reversals after Lin Wencha was killed fighting in the Taiping rebellion in China in 1864. Without Lin Wencha’s patronage, the Wufeng Lins began to suffer retributive attacks from their enemies. Lin Dianguo was jailed in 1866 and died in prison fifteen years later. Lin Wenming was killed in set-up ambush in a yamen, an administrative office of a local bureaucrat, in 1870.

Nevertheless, unlike the strongman-style retributive violence the Lin ancestors had undertaken, the remaining Lin family did not resort to their own revenge. Instead, under the leadership of Lin Wenfeng, the eldest son of Lin Dianguo and the brother of Lin Wenqin, the Lins mostly took the action through the imperial system by bringing criminal complaints. In so doing, they mostly retained their property and enhanced their social status through their deployment of their political power in the imperial system.

---

48 After Lin Wencha died, he was bestowed generously a series of posthumous honours that included the dignified status of Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent, a temple name, and a hereditary rank of qiduwei (騎督尉). Qiduwei was passed on to his eldest son, Lin Chaodong. ibid., 27.

49 The terrible news of Lin Wenming incurred the outrageous indignation among his people
Lin Wenfeng’s leadership was noteworthy during this period. His decision to take legal action by engaging lengthy lawsuits underlined a critical historical moment in the Wufeng Lin’s history. It affirmed the qualitative shift in the nature of Wufeng Lin’s family practices and the transition from local strongmanship to their engagement with non-violent Confucian culture.

Like the fate of Taiwan that had been subject to the politics of China, the fate of the Wufeng Lins was closely bound up with the political history of Taiwan. The year 1883 saw the outbreak of the Sino-French War and the French encroachment in Taiwan. The Qing responded to the crisis of the Sino-French War with investment and administrative attention towards Taiwan.

For the Wufeng Lin’s the war was not only a historic event but an opportunity to further their wealth and power in the last decades of the Qing empire. Lin Wenqin and his second cousin Lin Chaodong, the fifth and sixth generation of the Wufeng Lins, were the central actors in the Wufeng Lin’s response to the Sino-French war. During the war, Lin Wenqin and Lin Chaodong were promoted by the two dominant Qing officials, Liu Mingchuan in northern Taiwan and Liu Ao in southern Taiwan respectively, to lead the military response to the French threat. The Sino-French war therefore presented an opportunity for the Wufeng Lins. However, Lin Wenqin and Lin Chaodong took very different paths after the Sino-French war. Compared to Lin Chaodong, Lin Wenqin was not valued by Liu Minchuan, and in the Qing response to the war, in which Taiwan received greater administrative attention from the imperial court, Liu Mingchuan overcame his rival Liu Ao to be appointed governor when, in 1885, Taiwan’s administrative status was upgraded from a prefecture of Fujian to a province in its own right.

Lin Chaodong became the chief of central Taiwan sub-bureau of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in the imperial administration. Without the support of the new governor, who wished to engage the vengeance. Lin Wenfeng, Lin Wenming’s cousin, stopped them in time and convinced them to seek another way of revenge. However, the name of Lin Wenming was not cleared eventually. Lin Hsien-tang, “Xian bofu Wenfeng gong jia zhuanshu (Biography of my Uncle Wenfeng),” in Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), ed. Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971), 110.
Lin Wenqin forged a different path through the imperial system, embarking on commercial activity and studying for the imperial examinations. However, although he had no formal role in the imperial system, Lin Wenqin worked in partnership with Lin Chaodong who did. They were involved in a wide range of local and regional commercial activities like land investment and export-import business. In this way the Wufeng Lin family had a period of remarkable success and wealth, leveraging the expansion of imperial power in Taiwan with their extended family networks. According to imperial records, the Lins owned nearly 2,600 jia of cropland in central Taiwan by 1890, in contrast to the average family ownership of 1.2 jia of cropland.

Lin Wenqin and Lin Chaodong also established a rice export business. The rice they exported was reported to amount to as much as one tenth of the total central Taiwan rice exports. Besides their operations in the rice industry, Lin Wenqin and Lin Chaodong also formed the Lin Cooperative (Lin He, 林合) to participate in one of Taiwan’s most lucrative industries, the camphor industry. As a sign of Lin Wenqin’s wealth and status and also of the changing political economy of Taiwan in the late imperial period, he began frequently travelled between Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Lin Wenqin’s wealth and military background had laid a firm economic and political foundation for his sons, including Lin Hsien-tang (1881-1956). Lin Hsien-tang was the eldest

---

50 Johanna M. Meskill, 233.
51 Quoted in Johanna M. Meskill, ibid.
52 ibid., 238.
53 According to Meskill, the arrangement between Lin Wenqin and Lin Chaodong was not known in detail, but it was probably an equal partnership. ibid., 240.
54 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, ed., Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuixilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir) (Taipei: Haixia Xueshu Publishing, 2005). During the Qing period, Taiwan had a close commercial relationship with Hong Kong. For example, between 1868 and 1895, 93 percent of Taiwan’s outbound camphor shipments went through Hong Kong en route to other markets. Man-Houng Lin, “Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Pacific, 1895-1945,” Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (September 2010): 1057.
son of Lin Wenqin. He was born during the ascendance of the Wufeng Lin’s family power in the post-Sino-French war period, but the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 created a critical rupture in Lin Hsien-tang’s life, as it did for all of Taiwan.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was fought between the imperial Qing dynasty and the Empire of Japan, primarily over influence of the Korean peninsula. The war demonstrated the Qing’s broader failure of their attempts to fend off threats to its sovereignty and then the extent of their jurisdiction and commitment to Taiwan, especially in the context of a modernising Japanese empire under the Meiji government. The war continued for six months, and was concluded by the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, a document signed between China and Japan at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. In accordance with the Treaty, the Qing ceded the Liaodong Peninsula, the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and Pescadores to Japan.

According to Lamley, Japan’s annexation of Taiwan was not a goal of its long-term planning. When Japanese colonial officials began to arrive in Taiwan after taking possession of Taiwan, they were not familiar with Taiwan’s social and economic conditions and this created the circumstances for a complex and often contingent encounter between the Taiwanese and the Japanese colonial regime. In central Taiwan, the Lin family mobilised a militia to resist the arrival of the Japanese. Later, when Japanese officials encountered problems when they entered indigenous-controlled territory in pursuit of the camphor trade, the Lin family mobilised the same Lin militia to support them. Therefore, although the takeover of Taiwan by Japan was rupture in Taiwanese history, it also expressed capacity of such moments to enhance enduring social, political and economic structures.

55 The cession of Taiwan was a result of the practical considerations by the Prime Minister of Japan, Itō Hirobumi, and his “southern strategy,” a military plan of benefit to Japan that had just carried out in the spring of 1895. Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in Taiwan: A New History, Expanded Edition, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (New York: An East Gate Book, 1999), 203.

56 Johanna M. Meskill, 241-242
Lin Hsien-tang’s father Lin Wenqin had achieved financial success through this period, but he maintained academic pursuits and achievements, which created a significant cultural legacy for the Lin family. According to Lin Hsien-tang, Lin Wenqin’s academic pursuits stood out among the other family members who mostly pursued agriculture and military activity. In 1883, Lin Wenqin acquired a shengyuan (生員) scholarly degree through the imperial examination rather than through military exploits or public donation, and in 1893 was awarded a ju ren scholarly degree.

The success of Lin Wenqin’s academic pursuits was significant. He became an example for other younger family members. He broadened the scope of their possible career paths to include entry into the scholarly-gentry class. Among Lin Hsien-tang’s generation, Lin Chaozong, Lin Chaosong and Lin Jitang acquired shengyuan degrees by 1895. However, Lin Hsien-tang and his cousin Lin Youchun (1880-1939) were born too late to acquire scholarly degrees in the imperial system. However, the cultural legacy of Lin Wenqin and the cultural capital it carried, was sustained by their continuing engagement with classical Chinese traditions even after the Japanese took over Taiwan in 1895.

In reviewing the family history of the Wufeng Lins, Lin Wenqin’s commitment to the process of “gentrification” represented a significant step in the social development of the family. His academic achievement underlined a transformation of the family towards economic wealth and social and cultural capital, from power based on landholdings and control of a local militia to power in the imperial system and the cultural capital of the Confucian education system.

57 Zhang Zhengchang, 29. Lin Wenqin was also well known for generous charitable deeds both domestically and overseas, and was bestowed an honorific title—Wan An She (萬安舍). It is pronounced as “Man An Xia” in the Taiwanese tongue, “Man An” literally means “all peace,” and “Man An Xia” means “a master that makes things all peace.” ibid., 32-33.

58 Cited in Zhang Zhengchang, 29.
Rising through these social classes took almost two centuries from sojourning to Taiwan to becoming members of the imperial gentry of substantial wealth and power. Although there were reversals in the development of the Wufeng Lin family, in general the trajectory was steady growth, especially in periods of conflict and change that worked in the family’s favour.

After the defeat of the Qing in the Sino-Japanese war and the cession of Taiwan to Japan, many Taiwanese settlers left the island and settled on mainland China, especially members of the scholar-gentry. Lin Wenqin and his branch stayed in Taiwan. Lin Chaodong and his family line, however, left Taiwan permanently.

In 1900, Lin Wenqin died of an illness at the age of forty-six in Hong Kong. Lin Hsientang, as an heir to his father and at the age of twenty, became the head of the family. He took charge of the family business and his life became closely intertwined with the colonial regime, as will be examined in the following chapters.

---

59 Between 1895 and 1897, Taiwan’s residents had to come to a decision of either returning to China as Chinese imperial subjects (the symbolic example of the returner is Qiu Fengjia the vice president of Taiwan Republic of 1896), or staying in Taiwan as the colonised of Japan. Paul R. Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-pa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), 34.
Chapter 2

Lin Hsien-tang’s Early Youth

Understanding Lin Hsien-tang

The proceeding chapter examined the family history of Lin Hsien-tang. Born into the Wufeng family that had established itself on Taiwan over six generations, Lin Hsien-tang’s position in life expressed the very process of settlement, conflict and Chinese imperial authority that was the story of Taiwan from the 18th century.

At the age of seven, Lin Hsien-tang was sent to study at Rong Jing Zhai (蓉鏡齋), a Chinese Confucian private school established by the Wufeng Lins. He was taught by the Confucian scholar He Quting. Zhang Zhengchang, Lin Hsien-tang’s biographer, emphasised the importance of the Confucian education Lin received in his childhood. He ascribed to Lin Hsien-tang particular characteristics, including self-discipline and motivation, that Lin learned from He Quting.¹

In addition to the He Quting’s influence, Zhang Zhengchang emphasises that Lin’s father Lin Wenqin also exerted a great influence on his son. In Zhang’s interpretation, Lin Wenqin was a role model. His enduring academic pursuits and philanthropic acts in particular, all

¹ Zhang Zhengchang, 32-33.
became examples of an ideal Confucian scholar for Lin Hsien-tang to learn from in his early years.²

Born to be head of the Lin family, Lin himself was aware of the expectations this imposed. In a passage he wrote in his sixties about his youth, he expressed that “as far as I can recall, there had already been many women of virtue and many talented youths in my family when I was born… Relatives and friends naturally had high expectation of me and felt sure that my future was full of bright prospects (憶自墜地初，家門多淑德，頭角頗崢嶸… 親朋殷屬望，鵬程謂無極)。”³ His passage suggests his awareness of the social and familial expectations he had to live up to.

One method to characterise Lin Hsien-tang is through the words of those who knew him. Lin Hsien-tang was typically characterised as an upstanding man of amiability and modesty. For instance, Luo Wanzhen, a friend of Lin and the compiler of his writings, described Lin in the following way: “Lin Hsien-tang was a prince and one of the most important figures in Taiwan, but he did not possess the bad habits a wealth family heir would have… He was a modest man, and was willing to listen… He valued young people… and distinguished himself from the so-called imperialised landowners… He was always listening, rather than talking… He was indeed a man with a gentle exterior but a righteous heart (外柔内剛).”⁴ Yanaihara Tadao

---

² ibid., 33. In addition, Zhang describes Lin Hsien-tang as resembling his father in philanthropic deeds, such as sponsoring local construction, subsiding villagers to study abroad and supporting social campaigns.

³ Lin Hsien-tang, “Shiji (Collections of Poems),” in Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji— yizhu, (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Posthumous Work, Poetry), ed. Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji bianzuan weiyuanhui (Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang) (Taipei: Haixia xueshu Publishing, 2005), 30. There are no punctuation in Lin’s poems. However, punctuation is added in this thesis for readers’ convenience.

⁴ Luo Wanzhen, “Wai rou nei gang de Guanyuan xiansheng (Mr. Guanyuan-- A Man with a Gentle Exterior but a Righteous Heart),” in Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, ed., Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang), 33.
also made a similar reference to Lin Hsien-tang. He characterised Lin Hsien-tang as “a man of honesty, amicability and modesty.”

Yeh Jung-chung (1900-1978) was Lin Hsien-tang’s friend and personal assistant. Based on Yeh’s recollection of Lin from the time they lived in Tokyo for some months in the late 1910s, he described Lin as an amiable and approachable man who got along readily with young people, although in middle-age he already had great life experience and significant power, wealth and status.

Lin Hsien-tang was also described as a man of self-discipline. In Yeh’s memoirs, he offered another anecdote of Lin about his drinking habits: “At home or in an inn, Lin put a bean in front of him every time after he finished a glass of wine. When the beans reached a certain number, Lin arranged them and counted them. If the number exceeded ten, Lin stopped drinking. Someone said to Lin that this is only wine and not opium… Lin persisted in his way and took no heed of such comments.”

Besides the example of Lin Hsien-tang’s drinking habits, his commitment to marital fidelity throughout his life was another dimension of what Yeh Jung-chung called Lin’s practice of self-discipline (克己的功夫). It was not uncommon for many of

---

of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir) (Taipei: Haixia Xueshu Publishing, 2005), 82. The following comments on Lin Hsien-tang were made by his other friends: Yan Jiagan commented that the forgiveness was the moral code when Lin dealt with matters and people; Qiu Niantai commented his as a man of amiability and simplicity. Yan Jiagan, “Yi Guanyuanxiansheng (In Memory of Lin Hsien-tang),” in Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuishilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir) (Taipei: Haixia Xueshu Publishing, 2005), 1. Also, Qiu Niantai, “Zhuihuai Xiantang xiansheng (In Memory of Mr. Xiantang),” in Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuishilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir) (Taipei: Haixia Xueshu Publishing, 2005), 34.


7 ibid., 27-28.
his contemporaries and his family members to have concubines in his social circle. All his four cousins had concubines. However, Lin Hsien-tang, a man of means and power, did not have had a concubine at any time in his life.

In addition to self-discipline, Yeh Jung-chung gave other examples of Lin which he deemed as virtues. According to Yeh, Lin was characterised as a man of integrity, and he maintained this quality even in times of crisis:

Mr. Lin and the magistrate of Taichung went to inspect the living conditions of the aborigines at a time during the Second World War. When walking along beautiful lakes, Lin could not help but praise the beauty of the lake, unwittingly saying that it would be wonderful to build a residence and live here. The Taichung magistrate heard him, and told Lin in all seriousness that he could allocate some government land there for Lin to build his residence because the government had landholdings in the area. Lin politely declined the offer given, clarifying that “I merely made a casual comment and was not seriously considering the idea.”

There were many more descriptions of Lin Hsien-tang’s disposition in Yeh’s memoirs and elsewhere than those touched upon here. They consistently show that Lin was remembered positively. The descriptions of Lin by his acquaintances characterise him as amiable, approachable and honest. These observations of Lin, capturing different moments in Lin Hsien-tang’s life give a sense of the person he was.

Beyond these characteristics of Lin described by the people round him, another source of information to characterise Lin is through his own writing style. In Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji, Lin’s extant diaries, Lin used a distinct writing style with a combination of semi-vernacular

---

8 ibid., 27.
9 ibid., 25.
and semi-classical Chinese, and a mingling of with few instances of Japanese. The use of different writing styles of Chinese plus occasional Japanese is a marker of Lin’s cultural capital in the sense invoked by Bourdieu. It also expresses the time in which Lin lived, and Lin’s engagement with those times, when new written forms of Chinese were being explored through the notion of *baihua* (白話), the use of written Chinese to capture the qualities of the spoken language. His distinctive writing style, on the boundaries of classical and modern Chinese neatly captures the complexity of the story of Lin’s life, and illustrates the changing times in Taiwan through which he lived.

Lin Hsien-tang’s life trajectory in this reading is a story of fusion and tension between competing forces that impacted Taiwan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Lin’s life straddled three different ruling regimes in Taiwan, and his life epitomised the fundamental themes of the era of tradition and modernity, imperial domination and colonial resistance. Lin’s life trajectory therefore illustrates the fundamental themes of Taiwan’s modernisation at the end of the Qing period, through the Japanese period and its entry into post-WWII order under the Chinese Nationalists.

**Lin Hsien-tang During the Sino-Japanese War**

While the wealth and status of the Wufeng Lin’s bestowed life opportunities for Lin Hsien-tang, the turmoil of the period meant the path of entry into the imperial system was broken, as it was for an entire generation of young men born near the end of Qing rule. For Lin, the political chaos of the Sino-Japanese war exerted a profound impact upon his life.

Lin Hsien-tang was in his mid-teens when Taiwan was thrown into political chaos. In 1894, during the Sino-Japanese war, Lin Hsien-tang’s grandmother and Lin family matriarch, Mrs.

---

Luo issued a directive for the whole to leave for Fujian. She ordered Lin Hsien-tang to take responsibility for leading the whole household of the Wufeng Lins, more than forty people, to a stay temporarily in Quanzhou, Fujian.\(^\text{11}\) Due to her health problems, she herself remained in Taiwan, accompanied by Lin Wenqin, as noted in chapter one. Lin Hsien-tang and other Lin family members returned the next year.\(^\text{12}\)

The refugee life in Quanzhou was described as a time of hardship by Lin Hsien-tang himself. In a passage written in his sixties, he recorded his frame of mind: “I decided to dedicate myself to learning when I was fifteen, but changing circumstances did not allow me to do so. We were in the travails of the moment when we were on the voyage. My aunts, sisters and younger brothers were around me. We stayed in Jinjiang City to avoid mishaps. I looked up at the clouds in the sky when I missed my relatives, but this was still not enough to give vent to my repressed emotion of sadness (十五方志學，輿圖忽改色。扁舟航海行，風雲告急迫。伯母及諸姊，幼弟亦在側。暫居晉江城，聊以避不測。思親時望雲，悲來不能抑).”\(^\text{13}\)

In Yeh Jung-chung’s writing based on Lin Hsien-tang’s oral account, he gave more detail about Lins’ life in Quanzhou. He wrote that it was challenging and fearful: “A pestilence was raging in Quanzhou at that time, and many people had lost their lives because of it. Mice would fall from the ceiling and dead mice could be spotted in the piles of clean clothes and on the beds… The ancestral home of the Wufeng Lins was in Zhangzhou instead of Quanzhou. They were not familiar with Quanzhou and were carrying limited money. No one knew when the political chaos in Taiwan would end… the whole Lin clan were in disarray….”\(^\text{14}\)

---

\(^\text{11}\) Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir).

\(^\text{12}\) ibid.

\(^\text{13}\) Lin Hsien-tang, “Shiji (Collections of Poems),” 30.

\(^\text{14}\) Yeh Jung-chung, *Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A*
Although the Sino-Japanese War tested Lin, his leadership of the family in this period was also realised by his experience of war. As Yeh Jung-chung notes, the period was important in understanding Lin’s position in the Wufeng Lin family. Lin Hsien-tang was not in fact the oldest in his generation. He, at age fifteen, did have two cousins who were seven and five years older than him. Therefore, Mrs. Luo’s decision to entrust Lin Hsien-tang with the leadership of the family must have reflected her trust in her grandson. Yeh suggested that Mrs. Luo showed favouritism towards Lin Hsien-tang, whom Yeh described as a precocious child (少年老成) with the quality of leadership (大人気概).15

**Taiwan Under the Early Japanese Rule**

After the Japanese takeover in accordance with the treaty of Shimonoseki, the political conditions in Taiwan were unsettled. The colonial authorities and Japanese military encountered anti-Japanese armed resistance throughout much of Taiwan. On May 25, 1895, the governor of Taiwan province, Tang Jingsong declared the establishment of the Taiwan Republic. As well as the actions of local militia, armed resistance to Japan occurred in the name of the Republic. The republic soon collapsed with the leadership, including Tang, fleeing the island on June 5. However, the remnants of the republic persisted for the next two years.16 Subsequently, sporadic opposition to the Japanese military takeover continued for many years.

Taiwan was Japan’s first major colonial expansion. The acquisition of an overseas colony represented one of the unprecedented developments for Japan in the post-Meiji period after 1868. Taiwan was acquired only six years after the ratification of the 1889 Meiji constitution

---

15 ibid., 23.
that created Japan’s modern institutions of government, including its parliament, the Diet. A colonial territory signalled the Meiji government’s intention to be seen as equal to the Western powers that they wished to emulate.

Establishing a colony was a source of national pride and an expression of Japan’s participation in modern imperial civilisation of the time, and last but not least, a symbol of the Japan’s equality with the West.\(^\text{17}\) Taiwan accordingly became an important showcase for them. However, as the Japanese government was in search of its place among the imperialist states, it lacked colonial experience. The Japanese government expressed uncertainty concerning the purpose and function of colonial rule.\(^\text{18}\) Nor were they able to articulate a coherent notion of the new relationship between Taiwan and its inhabitants to Japan and its people.

Similar to Taiwan’s incorporation into the Qing empire in the early 1680s, the ruling policy for Taiwan was debated in the imperial centre, now Tokyo, in early years of Japanese rule. Some suggested that the colonisation of Taiwan should follow Japan’s similar experience of the establishment of Meiji authority on the northern island of Hokkaido between 1873-1883 at a time when other powers, especially Russia, were active in the region. As well as new administrative systems, the Meiji government encouraged Japanese from mainland Japan to settle Hokkaido. However, this sort of colonisation model gained very little support. Rather, a model of colonisation focused on economic exploitation of Taiwan gained currency.\(^\text{19}\)

Meanwhile, certain Japan’s colonial policy-makers began to explore the experience of colonisation and colonial administrative rule accumulated by the Western powers over several centuries. The colonial activities of other nations, such as the European expansion to and


\(^{18}\) ibid., 80.

\(^{19}\) ibid., 81.
colonisation of areas remote from mother countries, all provided Japanese policy-makers with a rich body of thought from the west to inform them.20

In the context where economic utilisation became one of the utmost concerns for Japanese policy-makers, two dominant modes of Western colonisation, the French experience and the British experience, came into the spotlight. The merits and principles of these two experiences for the sort of colonisation model Japan should follow were vigorously debated by the government, intellectuals and politicians.21

On the one hand, the British mode of colonisation featured distinct governance of the colonies, and in which the supreme commander was the monarch. In Japan, this ruling experience was advocated by the British consultant, William Montague Hammett Kirkwood (1850-1926). In his suggestion to Japan’s Ministry of Justice, he held that the Japanese Emperor should have direct and supreme sovereignty of Taiwan, in which the executive, juridical and legislative power should be all performed by a Taiwan governor under the Emperor’s full supervision.22

Kirkwood’s suggestion resonated with some Japanese, who wished to establish a new administrative system in Taiwan separate from Japan.23 However, the British mode of colonisation did not fit with the context of Japan at that time. The Emperor’s power was divine, but it was restricted and limited as formulated in the Meiji constitution that had only been

promulgated a few years earlier in 1889. As a result, Kirkwood’s suggestion was not adopted.

On the other hand, the French idea of colonisation was widely advocated by a French consultant, Michael Joseph Revon (1867-1947), to the Ministry of Justice. According to Revon’s statement in discussion paper on the ruling policy for Liaodong Peninsula and Taiwan, he held that the rule for Taiwan should feature a progressive gradualism. He stated that “the ruling policy for Taiwan should be as close as possible to that of Japan, with the hope that Taiwan would become a prefecture of Japan in the future,” and “gradually make Taiwan be like Japan….”

As can be seen, the French idea of colonialism aimed to turn Taiwan into an extension of the metropolitan imperial state.

The proposals for a French colonial style came up against the reality of Taiwan as the Japanese colonial authorities met strong anti-Japanese armed resistance. As a result, it made difficult for the proponents of French-style integrationism, like Hara Takashi, a prominent Japanese politician, to convince the government.

The Japanese government did not articulate a coherent colonial strategy by the time Taiwan came under Japanese rule. Without a clearly defined colonisation policy, the Japanese authorities adopted an approach of military suppression and a degree of conciliation with the Taiwanese. It was hoped that anti-Japanese armed resistance would be pacified until the Japanese government reached a final decision on the disposition of Taiwan.

In contrast to Tokyo’s uncertain attitude towards a ruling policy for Taiwan, many officials

---


25 Hara Takashi was a member of Taiwan Affairs Bureau (Taiwan *jimu kyoku*) of Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi at that time. Ito Momoko, 40.

supported the notion of an autonomous colonial authority for Taiwan. A key elaboration of this ideas can be found in the statement of the colonial government presented to the Diet. They colonial government suggested colonial autonomy for Taiwan and explained why it is necessary:

Since it has not been long that Taiwan was ceded to Japan, the ruling policy is under discussion, and there are concerns about frequent armed uprisings... Taiwan is far away from the Tokyo government and the transportation between Tokyo and Taiwan is not convenient... Taiwan’s traditions and customs differ from Japan. If we do not have laws custom-made to best suit the local conditions of the colony, our rule would not be effective.27

The colonial government’s suggestion, which outlined the imperative for autonomy for the colonial government, carried forward in the government in Japan. In March 1896 the Japanese government promulgated Law No. 63.28 The Law gave the Taiwan governor sweeping powers and enabled him to exercise absolute authority to control the Taiwanese population. Law No. 63 confirmed the autonomy of Taiwan’s colonial authorities and represented a firm denial of extending the Japanese constitution and law over the colony of Taiwan.

Law No. 63 gave immense power to the governor in Taiwan, and it became a point of origin for colonial iniquity for the Taiwanese.29 As Taiwan developed, repealing Law No. 63 and removing the special powers of the governor as a result became a key political issue in colonial Taiwan, one taken up by Lin Hsien-tang, as will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.

However, Law No. 63 was crucial not just in consolidating colonial authority in Taiwan

28 ibid.
but in establishing a military basis for colonial governance. In Taiwan during the period from 1895 to 1918, a rapid succession of governors was military attaché with the rank of either lieutenant-general or general in the Imperial Japanese Army. The only exception was the first Taiwan governor Kabayama Sukenori, who was a naval admiral when he held office in Taiwan.

Faced with anti-Japanese resistance at a time when the ruling policy was not finalised, the first governors concentrated on military pacification. The third Taiwan governor Nogi Maresuke (October 1896 - January 1898) for example, established, the “Triple Guard System” to suppress and monitor Taiwanese resistance in 1897. According to the system, districts in Taiwan were divided into three zones in terms of the intensity of the uprisings. Labelled as dangerous (危險), unstable (不穩定) or safe (安全), they were policed by the army (軍隊) and military police (憲兵), military police and police (警察), or police only, respectively, all with a view to maintaining law and order.

In the early years of Japanese rule, the development of Japan’s colonial approach fell in large part to Gotō Shimpei (1898-1906), the chief of the civilian administration of the fourth Taiwan governor General Kodama Gentarō. Gotō arrived in Taiwan in March 1898 when Taiwan was in the middle of fiscal and political dire straits. Costly nation-building and military spending in Japan had strained the national budget, and resulted in cuts to the financial subsidies for the new colony of Taiwan. Taiwan’s political situation had also vexed its

---

32 E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1977), 17. The budget of the Taiwan administration for the fiscal year 1896 was 10,610,000 yen, of which only 2,620,000 yen were collected in Taiwan. Japan was subsiding Taiwan by almost seven million yen in the year 1896. Colonialism therefore was a significant financial burden for modernising Japan. Consequently, the subsidy for Taiwan in the year 1897 was reduced by approximately one
colonisers. The failure of the governors to suppress the ongoing Taiwanese armed resistance in the colony had incurred strident political criticism in Japan. There were even proposals by late 1897 that Japan should sell Taiwan to another imperial power like France.\textsuperscript{33}

Gotō Shimpei arrived Taiwan in 1898. As a doctor by training, steeped in the contemporary science of the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, he held that his philosophy of colonial administration should be based on what he called biology politics.\textsuperscript{34} According to Gotō, the ruling approach for Taiwanese must feature gradualism that emphasises a process of gradual reforms rather than abrupt changes in Taiwan. He held that radical and drastic changes made in the colony were inappropriate.

During the term of Governor Kodama and Gotō, one of their objectives was to make the colony Taiwan fiscally self-sufficient, or at least to reduce the subsidies from Japan. To this end, Gotō undertook a systematic approach to developing the government’s understanding of the people and environment of Taiwan. He conducted a land survey and population census in order to gather up-to-date and thorough statistics. He also established a lucrative monopoly system for the colonial government to enhance the colony’s revenue.\textsuperscript{35} In order to facilitate


\textsuperscript{34} ibid., 37, https://archive.org/details/gotoshimpei02tsur/page/39.

communication and transport between the north and south of the island, Gotō developed systematic plans for colony-building. These included infrastructure for a modern transportation system, railways in particular, and other infrastructure like roads, highways, harbours and telecommunications. Under the term of Governor Kodama and Gotō, Taiwan developed a roadmap towards its modernisation and also its financial sustainability.

Simultaneously, Gotō dealt with anti-Japanese resistance. He used the police system and the existing imperial baojia system, the household registration system, in support of policing in order to stamp out resistance to Japanese rule. A decree regarding the punishment of Taiwanese rebels (hito keibatsu rei) was issued with a view to bring the entire island under the colonial control. In 1901, “the Provisional Council for the Investigation of the Old Habits of the Taiwanese (臨時臺灣舊慣調查會)” was established by the colonial government to study Taiwanese traditions and customs with the view of understanding the people they colonised and the place they governed.37

Following the approach of pragmatism and gradualism, Gotō’s economic and social approach yielded positive results in terms of modernisation, economic development and law and order. Gotō’s policies were celebrated as accomplishments in Japan in subsequent decades, such as Tsurumi Yusuke’s Gotō Shimpei den.38

Lin Hsien-tang and Early Japanese Rule

36 Yuan-Liou Taiwanguan, Taiwan shi xiao shi dian (Encyclopedia of Taiwan), 106.
As the Japanese colonial government struggled to develop effective policies towards Taiwan, for Lin Hsien-tang, in contrast, the period between his return to Taiwan in 1895 after his time in Fujian, and his father Lin Wenqin’s death in 1900, was described by him as “one of the happiest family times” he had with his father.  

This period included Lin Hsien-tang’s marriage in 1898 to Yang Shuixin.

Lin’s father Lin Wenqin had been a successful businessman before the Sino-Japanese war. After the cession of Taiwan, the Japanese attempted to win over his cooperation with the new regime, along with other influential Taiwanese. Lin Wenqin was repeatedly called up to serve in the colonial administration because of his social and economic status. However, he declined the offers. He chose to spend more time being with his family as well as focusing on his existing business.

Then in 1900, with Lin Wenqin’s death, Lin Hsien-tang at the age of twenty became the head of the Wufeng Lin family. He inherited his father’s camphor business and expanded it into the sugar refining industry, at a time when colonial agriculture was being developed as part of Gotō Shimpei’s colonial policies. His first two sons Lin Panlong and Lin Youlong were born in 1901 and 1902. He also began developing a public profile that signalled his views on modernisation in Taiwan and his engagement with the broader questions of modernisation in

39 Lin Hsien-tang, “Xian kao Wenqin gong jia zhuan (Biography of my Father Wenqin),” in Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), ed. Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971), 114.
40 Yang Shuixin was the oldest daughter of Yang Yanran, an academic noble from the Zhanghua district. Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
41 Zhang Zhongchang, 39.
42 Lin’s second two children were his daughter Lin Guanguan, born in 1906, and his fourth child, his son Lin Yunlong, born in 1907.
China and Japan at the turn of the 20th century. In 1904 he gave public lectures, promoting ideas such as giving up the practice of foot-binding and the traditional queue.43

Similar to Lin Wenqin, Lin Hsien-tang did not show much interest in serving in the colonial administration. He was appointed as the head of Wufeng district by the colonial government in 1902, however he resigned from the post in 1903. In a passage written in his sixties, inflected with the meter and styles of classical Chinese, he reiterated his unwillingness to take up public employment in the colonial administration: “In my fleeting youth… I felt like a new calf ploughing a field, or an old nag galloping a great distance. I was not fit for the task… (其時纔弱冠… 新犢耕荒原，駑馬騁沙碛，終非能適任…)”44 Despite Lin’s resignation, he continued to be entreated by the colonial government. In 1904, he was redesignated as the head of Wufeng district by the colonial authorities. Then, the next year, he was appointed to the post of the board director of Taiwan Flax Corporation.

Reading into Lin Hsien-tang’s life at this time, and his engagement with the new colonial government, these appointments signalled the social status that Lin carried. Lin Hsien-tang was only in his early twenties, and had just begun to explore forms of political action in Taiwanese society, and these appointments could be taken as evidence of the intention of Japanese colonial officials to use his emerging social profile and social capital in the interests of the colonial government.

Nevertheless, Lin Hsien-tang continued to resist co-option by the Japanese. For example, Lin declined to participate in the new education system that began to be developed in the early years of colonial rule. For some members of Taiwan’s landowning class and their families,

---

participation in the nascent education system was a signal of their orientation towards Taiwan’s new political reality, but Lin Hsien-tang refused to do so. Instead, he continued his Confucian studies. In 1897, he became a student of a Confucian scholar, Bai Huanpu.

Lin Hsien-tang resisted co-option by the colonial government but this does not mean that he stood in opposition to the changes taking place in Taiwan. His Confucian studies did not express his rejection of modernisation in the Taiwan or the Chinese world. He showed strong interest in current affairs and developed contacts with people and the intellectual and political life beyond the island. For instance, through the introduction of his nephew Lin Youchun (1880-1939), Lin came into contact with and became a regular reader of Qing Yi Bao (The China Discussion) and Xinmin Congbao (New Citizen Journal). Through these publications and others, Lin was deeply engaged with modern moral and political ideas. Of particular importance to Lin were the ideas of the journals’ editor and publisher, the celebrated Chinese public intellectual, reformer and essayist Liang Qichao (1873-1929).

**Lin Hsien-tang and Liang Qichao**

The first decade of Japanese colonial rule was the period in which Lin Hsien-tang became the head of the Wufeng Lins. It was also a period in which Lin began to explore his political identity in colonial Taiwan.

As a biographer of Lin Hsien-tang, Zhang Zhengchang highlighted Lin’s self-study at this time. Zhang give particular emphasis to the work of Liang Qichao as opening Lin Hsien-tang to new ideas about modern politics and social life. In the context of Lin’s developing socio-

---


46 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
political status as a landowner, businessman, Confucian scholar and moderniser, Zhang uses the phrase *xinshi* (新士), which can be translated as new scholar, to describe the political identity that Lin Hsien-tang began to take on in these early years of colonial rule.\(^{47}\)

In 1907, Lin Hsien-tang visited Tokyo for the first time in his life. According to the *Lin Xiantang Nianpu*, Lin became aware that Liang Qichao was in Tokyo at that time. As a regular reader of Liang’s work, Lin Hsien-tang sought to meet Liang.

In the *Lin Xiantang Nianpu*, it details how Lin Hsien-tang searched for the whereabouts of Liang Qichao. Through a series of connections and fortuitous circumstances in Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe and Nara, Lin encountered Liang in a hotel in Nara, where Lin and his personal assistant and interpreter Gan Dezhong stayed before they were to return to Taiwan.\(^{48}\)

Lin Hsien-tang and Liang Qichao did not know each other’s languages. Lin did not speak Cantonese or Mandarin as Liang did, whereas Liang did not speak Taiwanese like Lin did. Lin’s assistant Gan Dezhong had limited Mandarin proficiency. Therefore, they communicated mostly in writing. But even so, Gan described an encounter filled with emotion. Liang first greeted Lin by writing that “we were originally from the same root, but now we are from different countries… our meeting tonight is not by chance (本是同根，今成異國… 今夜之遇，誠非偶然).”\(^{49}\) Liang’s writing immediately struck a responsive chord in the heart of Lin,

\(^{47}\) Zhang Zhengchang, 42.

\(^{48}\) Lin went to visit a Chinese scholar in Yokohama first to inquire about the whereabouts of Liang Qichao, and he was told that he should go to Kobe and visit Tang Juedun, who was a friend of Liang and might be of help. Lin carried a referral from the scholar. On the way to Kobe, Lin Hsien-tang and Gan Dezhong had a stay in a hotel in Nara, where Gan Dezhong fortuitously found that the names of Chen Lusheng and other two Chinese were in the hotel’s guest register. Because Chen Lusheng was Liang’s friend, Gan speculated that Liang might be in the hotel under an alias. To find out the answer, Gan Dezhong asked a hostess. However, she refused to reveal any information. Their conservation caught the attention of a passer-by who then revealed his identity to Gan as Liang Qichao. Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).

\(^{49}\) Gan Dezhong, “Xiantang xiansheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation
who was reported by Gan to “nearly shed tears”\textsuperscript{50} upon reading it.

The key theme of their conversation was the discrimination suffered by the Taiwanese under Japanese colonial rule. In Gan’s account, Lin expressed dissatisfaction with the colonial government and consulted with Liang. Gan describes Lin as saying: “Being colonised by the culturally heterogeneous Japanese, we are discriminated against in politics and our economy is exploited. Of their discriminatory treatment, the worst is a colonial education that dupes the people. This is the situation we are in. What do you think? (我們處異族統治下，政治受差別，經濟被榨取，法律又不平等，最可悲痛者，尤無過於愚民教育，處境如斯，不知如何而可?)”\textsuperscript{51} Then, Liang replied:

China is unable to help you Taiwanese for the next thirty years. You Taiwanese should learn from the way the Irish have tackled the English. In the early years, the Irish were relentlessly suppressed by the English army and police because of their violent resistance. But they changed their tactics of resistance. They gave up armed resistance, allied with sympathetic prominent English leaders, and relaxed the vigilance of the English. They obtained the suffrage eventually… The political party the Irish formed is minor if compared to the other two major parties in the parliament, but it plays an important role in parliamentary elections by virtue of their leverage to influence the controlling party. Why do not you copy their experience?\textsuperscript{52}

From Liang Qichao’s statement, it suggests that “both Taiwan and the Taiwanese were far from being a Chinese concern”.\textsuperscript{53} It also suggests that Lin Hsien-tang looked to Liang for

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Shi-Chi Mike Lan, “The Ambivalence of National Imagination: Defending ‘The

50
guidance on how Taiwan could resist the Japanese colonial government. However, as Liang said, China was unable to help Taiwan as it itself was at the very end of its imperial period and beset with its own political strife and foreign incursions. Therefore, Liang suggested to Lin that he should adopt the tactics of non-violent resistance and build relations with leading liberal Japanese in order to resist the worst of the oppressive colonial government in Taiwan.

According to Gan Dezhong, Liang Qichao’s suggestion was an awakening for Lin Hsientang. Lin Hsientang, at age twenty-seven, was a wealthy but nonetheless inexperienced actor in Taiwan’s colonial politics and had limited exposure to modern political ideas. Furthermore, Lin never expressed an interest in engaging in radical revolutionary action. Therefore, Liang’s suggestion for civic resistance exerted a profound influence on the future course of Lin Hsientang’s political movements. One could argue that Lin’s campaigns for social and educational reforms in the years to come were in accordance with Liang’s suggestion. At the end of the meeting, Lin invited Liang to visit Taiwan.

Lin Hsientang became more politically involved in Taiwan's political landscape after he had a meeting with Liang and returned to Taiwan. In 1909, he was asked again by the Japanese colonial government to serve as the head of Wufeng district for another period. He did not recuse himself this time. In 1911, Lin was appointed as an advisor to Taichung Prefecture. Similarly, he did not decline the appointment. As if taking Liang Qichao’s advice, Lin was consciously seeking opportunities to work with the Japanese colonial administration on behalf of the Taiwanese.

While serving in the colonial administration, Lin Hsientang sought to expand his socio-political networks in Taiwanese society. In 1910, Lin joined the Li she, the major Taiwanese

---

Taiwanese’ in China, 1931-1941,” *The China Journal*, no. 64 (July 2010), 180.
54 Gan Dezhong, “Xiantang xiansheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation Society),” 56.
poetry society in central Taiwan.\textsuperscript{55} In this way, Lin was both participating in the new structure of colonial power and also integrating himself into the enduring Qing imperial social institutions. Therefore, Lin emerged at the centre of a dialog between Taiwanese society and the colonial government that played out through the decades until the end of the Japanese rule in 1945.

\textbf{Lin Hsien-tang’s Entry to the \textit{Li she}, the Taiwanese Poetry Society}

In 1901, the \textit{Li she} was founded by Lin Chaosong (1875-1915) and Lin Youchun, Lin Hsien-tang’s cousin and nephew. They were both renowned masters in Taiwan’s poetry circles.\textsuperscript{56} The \textit{Li she}, as characterised by Liao Chen-fu, was known for its high scholarly attainment and the great amount of poetry produced by its members. It was the biggest of the three major Chinese poetry societies in Taiwan under Japanese rule.\textsuperscript{57}

The name of the \textit{Li she} literally means “dead tree society,” and was bestowed by Lin Chaosong, who as noted earlier obtained a \textit{ju ren} scholarly degree in the late Qing period. He once explained that he came up with the name because the meaning of it aptly corresponded to his current situation as well as others of his generation: “My education is not favoured by the world of the era, so I am a rejected intellectual. My heart dies just like dying embers, so I am like a piece of decaying wood. Because \textit{li} literally means waste wood, I think it is pertinent to our situation (吾學非世用，是為棄材，心若死灰，是為朽木。今夫櫟，不材之木也，吾

\textsuperscript{55} Qiu Lihui, Wu Shihong and Gao Chuanqi, \textit{Wufeng lin jia—Taiwan xin wenhua yundong (The Lins of Wu-Feng & Taiwan New Culture Movement)} (Taipei: Department of Cultural Affairs, Taipei City Government, 2010), 18.

\textsuperscript{56} Huang Fusan, 70. The discontinuance of the imperial examination system in China in 1905 and the introduced the Japanese colonial education to Taiwanese had exerted a huge impact on the Confucian Taiwanese scholar-gentry, whose official career aspirations were frustrated and could not be realised anymore. Lin Chaosong was also known as Lin Chixian.

\textsuperscript{57} Liao Chen-fu, \textit{Li she yanjiu xin luen (New Comments on the Studies of Li She)} (Taipei: National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 2006), 1. The other two poetry societies were the \textit{Ying she} in Taipei and the \textit{Nan she} in Tainan.
Therefore, the name *Li she* was a self-mocking term referring to the extended meaning of a group of unregarded people who felt their talents were rejected and unappreciated.

The frustration, resentment and passive attitude of the *Li she* members was often revealed in their poems. Fu Xiqi, the president of the *Li She* in 1922, explained their feelings in the following way: “We traditional Confucian scholars altogether are rejected by the world, but the problem lies in what we have learnt but not in ourselves. So, we the rejected intellectuals can only adopt the passive attitude to pursue the rejected learning (我輩率為世所共棄之人，棄學非棄人不治，故我輩以棄人治棄學).”

Fu’s words depicted the general conditions of the *Li she* members, expressing passivity about their circumstances and an unwillingness to stand up against or attempt to make changes to their situation.

The *Li she* was a small closed cultural group of Taiwanese intellectuals in terms of its size and membership. The average number of its membership was less than thirty people. The *Li she* was not open to the public. It had high entry requirements for a person who wished to become a member. First, the participants had to be either the talented or influential. That is, a candidate must have either had been a recognised talent or a member of the Taiwan elite who had at least one recommendation letter from another *Li she* member before applying. The candidate’s application would only be approved if it was accepted unanimously by all other members.

Such high entry requirements contributed to the homogenous background as well as the level of the poetry of its members. However, these requirements at the same time limited the *Li she*’s influence. The restrictive entry requirements, the aging membership and the changing

---

58 Qiu Lihui, Wu Shihong and Gao Chuanqi, *Wufeng lin jia—Taiwan xin wenhua yundong* (*The Lins of Wu-Feng & Taiwan New Culture Movement*), 19.

59 Fu Xiqi, *Li she yange zhi lue* (*The History of Development of Li she*) (Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1963), 39.

60 Zhang Zhengchang, 62.
times under Japanese rule that did not encourage classical Chinese education, meant that the size of the *Li she* was inevitably on a declining trajectory.\(^61\)

Lin Hsien-tang was an active and generous leading member of the *Li she*. He hosted seventeen out of the thirty-seven formal gatherings at his Wufeng residence the Lai Yuan, over a period from 1910 to 1931.\(^62\) The *Li she* had served as a significant platform for the young Lin to build his social networks and cultural capital.\(^63\) Via the participation in the *Li she*, Lin was able to strengthen his status within the circles of elite Taiwanese, some of whom Lin worked closely in subsequent educational and socio-political movements, as well be examined in the next chapter.

The *Li she* served as a social platform for Lin Hsien-tang in the elite circles of Taiwanese society but it did not serve as an ideal political platform. Because the *Li she* identified itself as a cultural group steeped in the classical Chinese traditions, Lin could not deploy it to fulfill his political aspirations for a serious dialog with the colonial government. Nevertheless, Zhang Zhengchang suggested that Lin Hsien-tang moved beyond the limiting social and cultural nature of the *Li she*, using it to develop his political profile through the cultural capital it bestowed.\(^64\)

From the 1930s the political situation in Taiwan became less conducive to the *Li She’s* activities, with the rise of Japanese militarism. The *Li she* still carried on under its name, but

---

\(^{61}\) ibid., 62-64. The average number of its membership had remained steady at around twenty-three people before its decline in the 1930s.

\(^{62}\) ibid., 63.


\(^{64}\) Zhang Zhengchang, 64.
its development and scale were constrained by the Japanese colonial government, until records of its activities peter out in the 1940s.
Chapter 3

Lin Hsien-tang’s Social Reform

The preceding chapter examined Lin Hsien-tang’s family background and the way he was influenced by the changing social and political environment. As has been examined, Lin Hsien-tang, as the head of a wealthy family, began to develop a political identity in Taiwan’s political life and modernisation under Japanese colonial rule. In Lin Hsien-tang’s developing political activism, he was inspired by the modernising views of Liang Qichao. He also participated in the poetry group the Li she from 1910. The Li She was nominally a cultural group for educated Taiwanese but it helped Lin expand his Taiwanese social circle as well as build his political identity through the society’s cultural capital. However, the Li she was a cultural group and not a political organisation, and Lin’s activism found expression in broader issues and different kinds of organisational activities in the context of the governance style of the colonial leadership.

While Lin Hsien-tang began establishing his social networks in Taiwan’s society, the politics in Taiwan and Japan were changing. In the Taisho era (1912-1926) of Japan, the so-called “Taisho Democracy” collectively referred to the diverse set of liberal movements that began in the late 1910s to institutionalise a democratic system of governance in Japan.¹ It

influenced the style of colonial rule in Taiwan, creating a general atmosphere favourable to the development of activism and popular movements on the island.  

Since the 1910s, the leadership of Lin Hsien-tang and other educated Taiwanese were strongly influenced by the liberal atmosphere of Taisho democracy. Coupled with the assistance and encouragement of many influential liberal Japanese, a relationship alluded to by Liang Qichao, they became part of a period of activism in colonial Taiwan over education and civic rights.

The liberal atmosphere in Japan gave the Taiwanese a certain degree of freedom to express their political views that they had not enjoyed in the initial period of colonial rule. However, any such freedoms were still limited and subject to capricious policy changes in the colonial government, which was highly sensitive to both politics in Taiwan and to changing political trends in Japan. The colonial government could tolerate the development of cultural and social movements, but they could not tolerate political activities that threatened to directly challenge colonial rule.

This is presented here as an interpretive narrative describing the nature of Japanese colonial governmentality and social and political life in Taiwan in this period. In a dynamic relationship, the colonial government gave a certain degree of political freedom to Taiwanese activists in response to policy changes in Tokyo, which also reflected global trends and Japan’s growing international role. However, they also were alert to any political movement that directly challenged colonial rule and could deploy coercive authority over the Taiwanese in ways that maintained Taiwan’s status as a colony subject to imperial rule. On the basis of this interpretive narrative for this period of colonial rule, the social and educational movements led by Lin Hsien-tang in the 1910s tested the limits of colonial authority. Although Lin’s activism in the

---

1910s expressed a response to the specific issues of social and educational inequity that the Taiwanese were facing, they were also one part of a broader challenge to the nature and legitimacy of Japanese colonial authority and the institutions and structures of the colonial government.

This chapter examines Lin Hsien-tang’s activities in this period. It starts from the visit to Taiwan by Liang Qichao, and then the establishment of the Taiwan Assimilation Society. All of Lin’s endeavours sought to improve the circumstances of the Taiwanese in colonial Taiwan. The key text the *Lin Xiantang Nianpu* has limited information about this early period in Lin’s life but an exploration of these specific activities in Taiwan and Lin’s role in them, illustrates the broader context in which Lin Hsien-tang rose to a leadership position in Taiwan, and also the shifting dynamics of colonial rule. The leadership position Lin established in the 1910s also became the foundations for his political actions in the next decade.

**Liang Qichao’s Visit to Taiwan in 1911**

The meeting held by Lin Hsien-tang and Liang Qichao in 1907, and Liang’s characterisation of Taiwan’s circumstances under Japan had greatly influenced the circle of Taiwanese literati in which Lin moved. After the meeting, there were a number of letters written to Liang Qichao by leading Taiwanese, particularly members from the *Li She*. For instance, Hong Qisheng wrote Liang a letter denouncing the colonial policy of monopoly on sugar and detailed the Japanese exploitation of Taiwanese sugarcane farmers. Also, Lin Youchun wrote to describe a wide array of unequal policies towards the Taiwanese by the colonial government, including what Lin characterised as the poor quality of colonial education available to the Taiwanese.³

---

³ Huang Deshi, “Liang ren gong you tai kao (Research on Liang Qichao’s Trip in Taiwan),”
In 1910, Lin Hsien-tang accompanied his sons Lin Panlong (1901-1983) and Lin Youlong (1902-1954), then aged ten and nine, to study in Tokyo. Lin Hsien-tang’s decision to send his sons to study abroad could be interpreted as an expression of his distrust of the Japanese colonial education in Taiwan but also his reorientation towards a new centre of political power and social and cultural capital. On Lin’s homeward journey to Taiwan, he called on Liang Qichao again, and invited him to visit Taiwan. The following year, on March 28 1911, seven months before the Xinhai Revolution that would overthrow the Qing dynasty, Liang Qichao, together with his daughter Liang Lingxian and friend Tang Juedun, arrived in Taiwan.

Because of Liang Qichao’s status as one of the leading Chinese reformist activists and intellectuals of his day, his visit to Taiwan in 1911 was a high-profile event with significant political implications. Before Liang Qichao arrived in Taiwan, Lin Hsien-tang had mediated between Liang Qichao and the Taiwanese groups Liang planned to meet. Lin publicised the visit in his social circle and did not attempt to conceal his activities from the colonial government. Upon Liang’s arrival at Keelung harbour, he was welcomed by Lin Hsien-tang and members of Taiwan’s literati like Lian Heng and Gan Dezhong, followed by another reception at the Taipei station where a great crowd had gathered in anticipation.

Liang Qichao’s status as one of the leading Chinese reformers of his day placed the colonial government on full alert from the very beginning. For instance, Liang and his party were questioned by a Japanese official who went on board their ship when it berthed at Keelung harbour, and they were only allowed to disembark after they presented a referral from the government in Tokyo.\(^4\)

In Zhang Zhengchang’s biography of Lin Hsien-tang, he describes the motives behind

---

\(^4\) Obtaining a referral before their trip to Taiwan was the foresight of Lin Hsien-tang. Yeh Jung-chung, *Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century)*, 200.
Liang Qichao’s visit to Taiwan in 1911, and reduces them to two factors: curiosity and financial need. As an advocate for China’s modernisation, Liang had noted the achievements of modernisation of Taiwan’s colonial government. However, this account of colonial success contrasted with stories told to Liang by the Taiwanese themselves. Liang wanted to see Taiwan for himself. In addition, he hoped to raise funds from wealthy Taiwanese to start a newspaper to promote his campaign for a constitutional monarchy in China.

During Liang’s stay in Taiwan, he observed Taiwan’s material modernisation achieved by the colonial government. Liang, conscious of colonial discrimination, said: “…seeing how the Japanese have modernised Taiwan using the latest modern technology, envied by every country, how I can cast words of aspersions against their achievements against my conscience? How can we not follow their example, and not learn from it without open minds? (…應用最新之技術，萬國所共稱嘆，吾又安能違心以詆之耶? 吾國人又安可不虛心以效之耶?)”

During Liang Qichao’s five-day stay in Taipei, he had close contact with Taiwanese literati. During the day, his itinerary included seeing the new colonial administrative buildings, such as the official residence of the governor, the present-day presidential building. At night, he had private meetings with leading Taiwanese. On Liang’s last night in Taipei, Lin Hsien-tang held a grand banquet. No Japanese officials or citizens were invited, and all of the Taiwanese participants were kept under surveillance by Japanese secret agents who waited outside the

---

5 Zhang Zhengchang, 66.
7 Huang Deshi, “Liang ren gong you tai kao (Research on Liang Qichao’s Trip in Taiwan),” 12.
8 Liang Qichao, Xin dalu youji jielu, Fulu er: You Taiwan shu du, di wu xin (Travel Notes of the New Lands, Appendix II: Letters Regarding the Trip in Taiwan, the Fifth Letter) (Taipei: Taiwan zhonghua shuju, 1975), 167.
9 Cited in Zhang Zhengchang, 68.
door of the banquet venue, *Dong Hui Fang Qi Ting* (東薈芳旗亭).

According to Gan Dezhong, Lin Hsien-tang’s personal assistant, the attendees at the banquet behaved with great caution because “the windows have ears (隔窗有耳).” At the end of the banquet, the participants were approached and questioned by Japanese agents who had been waiting outside. “Guests who did not know how to answer or suddenly found themselves struggling for words, all came up with the same answer, saying that they just came to the banquet on either Lin Hsien-tang’s or my request,” Gan recalled.

The banquet guests wanted to distance themselves from Lin Hsien-tang. From their comments as reported by Gan, these guests were much less willing to be publicly associated with Liang Qichao, in the context of the surveillance by the colonial government. Lin Hsien-tang, in contrast, assumed a straightforward position in facilitating the communication between his circle of Taiwanese literati and Liang. Lin hosted a banquet for Liang in his own name, and he did not fear that his actions might irritate the colonial government. This represented an important statement by Lin in his relationship to the colonial government. Through the very public hosting by Lin of Liang in Taiwan, he demonstrated a willingness to confront colonial authority through civic action that also showed his ascendance to a leadership position in Taiwan’s public life at a time when the nature of public life was being reconfigured by colonisation.

On April 2, Liang Qichao and Lin Hsien-tang headed for Taichung, where they were welcomed by members of the *Li She*. Unlike Liang’s schedule in Taipei, he had more time to talk with members of Taiwan’s literati during his stay in Taichung. Based on the information gathered from the Taiwanese Liang met in Taiwan, he appraised the circumstances of colonial

---

10 Gan Dezhong, “Xiantang xiansheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation Society),” 58.

11 ibid.,” 59.
economic and political disadvantage for the Taiwanese. Liang’s text, *Douliuli* (斗六吏), “The Official from Douliu,” written at that time reflected his understanding of the difficult situation of Taiwanese farmers, and alluded to autocratic nature of colonial governance:

…The sugar industry is an important business in Taiwan, and it serves as an economic foundation for national wealth… The orders of the Taiwan governor are like the words of Heaven, so it is impossible to disobey… The farmer was presented with a document to take possession of his land and hastened to sign it by a Japanese policeman, who even gripped the farmer’s elbow to have him to make his thumb print on the paper… The farmer bought the land at a cost of hundreds of thousands of *taels*, but now it is sold at a price that is less than half the farmer paid… (赫赫糖會社，雲是富國基… 府令即天語，豈天乃可違… 出券督畫諾，肘後吏執持… 昔買百緡強，今賣不半之…)\(^{12}\)

On April 4, Liang Qichao was invited by Lin to stay at his residence in Wufeng in Taichung county. In the following days, Liang and Lin conversed at great length, and through which they exchanged many modern ideas. For example, Liang encouraged Lin and other Taiwanese literati to devote themselves to modern study, such as politics and economics, in addition to their classical Chinese pursuits. Liang also recommended a list of contemporary scholarly works like Yan Fu’s translation of Huxley’s *Evolution of Ethics* and imparted his advice on learning Japanese quickly to Lin Hsien-tang.\(^{13}\) Liang’s visit to Taiwan ended on April 9. When he received a telegram in Taichung from his mentor and fellow reformist Kang Youwei, he immediately set off to return to Japan.\(^{14}\)

Despite Liang’s encouragement of Lin to learn Japanese, Lin Hsien-tang remained

---

\(^{12}\) Quoted in Zhang Zhengchang, 69.

\(^{13}\) Cited in Zhang Zhengchang, 70.

\(^{14}\) Liang cut off his trip. He originally intended to stay in Lin’s house for ten days. Zhang Zhengchang, 70.
reluctant. Cai Peihuo was a friend of Lin, a member of Taiwan Assimilation Society and a teacher in a colonial School. He later a significant political activist in Taiwan in his own right, recounted anecdotally that Lin Hsien-tang seemed resistant to Japanese. He observed that although Lin was eager to read translated books of contemporary political thought, he rarely read books translated into Japanese, despite demonstrating a certain level of proficiency. Cai claimed that the Western books such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *The Social Contract* and Herbert Spencer’s *Social Statics* translated into Japanese on the bookshelf in Lin’s study did not look to have been read.\(^\text{15}\)

The importance of Cai’s observation of Lin’s language preference and dislike of Japanese offers an insight into Lin’s complex negotiation of political power and subjectivity. Right through Lin’s life, his use of language and his refusal to wear Japanese clothes or take a Japanese name expressed a form of resistance towards Japanese colonial authority by mobilising both his classical Chinese education and identity and his modern sensibilities. Therefore, the refusal to use Japanese could be understood as a way for Lin to articulate a cultural identity even as that identity was destabilised by the end of the Qing empire and Lin’s awareness of the promise of modernisation in colonial Taiwan.

Liang Qichao stayed in Taiwan for thirteen days, but his short trip to Taiwan was significant for the legacy it left for Lin Hsien-tang and many Taiwanese. In a broader sense, Liang’s visit to Taiwan demonstrates that how people in Taiwan, particular Taiwanese elites, became more engaged with questions of modernisation and Western thought. By the 1910s, Taiwan contained a cosmopolitan literate cultural and political world, at the same time as the Japanese government continued to suppress Taiwanese militia and aboriginal resistance to their rule.

\(^\text{15}\) Cited in Chen Peifeng, *Tonghua de tong chuang yi meng: ri zhi shiqi taiwan de yuyan zhengce, jidahua yu rentong (The Different Intentions behind the Semblance of “Douka”: The Language Policy, Modernization and Identity in Taiwan During the Japan-Ruling Period)* (Taipei: Rye Field Publications, A division of Cité Publishing Ltd., 2006), 315.
Liang’s trip to Taiwan had also played a significant role in helping structure and consolidate Lin Hsian-tang’s ascendance in Taiwan’s social and political life. However, while Lin’s relationship with Liang Qichao contributed social standing among leading Taiwanese, it also drew the attention of the colonial government as a source of political concern. Lin’s biographer Zhang Zhengchang recounted the following report in the mid-1910s by a Japanese agent on Lin Hsien-tang to the office of the governor:

Lin Hsien-tang, the head of the Wufeng district of Taichung Prefecture, is a descendant of the influential Late-Qing official Lin Wencha, who died as a martyr and whose clan has extended into many parts of the island. Lin Hsien-tang is a member of the Wufeng Lins in Azhaowu… Lin Hsien-tang, full of public spirit, is enthusiastic about helping others uphold their own rights… When he first met the Chinese renegade politician (亡命政客), Liang Qichao in Nara, Japan, he was inspired by Liang’s rhetoric. He has admired Liang and kept up a correspondence with him. When receiving Liang’s telegram concerning his visit to Taiwan, Lin Hsien-tang personally welcomed him in Keelung harbour, and later accommodated him in Taichung for two weeks. During Liang’s stay in Taichung, Liang revealed his political aspirations and vigorously advocated nationalism (民族主義) to Lin Hsien-tang by citing the example of India, Egypt and Vietnam. Lin Hsien-tang was quite moved upon hearing this. When Lin Hsien-tang visited Liang in China in May 1913, he was presented to some Chinese officials and politicians through Liang’s recommendation.\(^\text{16}\)

On the basis of this report, the colonial government expressed growing concern about Lin Hsien-tang. The level of detail of the report into Lin’s family background and political actions delivered twenty years after Taiwan’s colonisation, suggests that Lin had not drawn significant

\(^{16}\) Quoted in Zhang Zhengchang, 71-72.
attention from the colonial government up until the mid-1910s, despite Lin’s wealth and involvement in the *Li She*. That Lin may not have drawn the attention of the colonial government up until the 1910s is also evidenced by the absence of any record of Lin’s interaction with senior colonial administrators such as Gotō Shimpei (1898-1906).

In terms of the broad range of colonial responses to Taiwanese anti-Japanese resistance, the limits of the action by the government towards Lin Hsien-tang is also notable. Lin’s growing political activism and his close contact with Liang Qichao attracted the attention of the colonial government in its surveillance activities. However, Lin was not arrested or interrogated. Indeed, despite Lin’s visible activism and an increasingly belligerent colonial government through the course of the colonial period, Lin avoided any arrest or detention over the whole fifty years of Japanese rule.

**Lin Hsien-tang and the Taiwan Assimilation Society**

Despite Taiwan’s status on margins of the Qing and as a Japanese colony, it was in no way isolated from political change in China and Japan and contemporary ideas about modernisation and modernity that were taking on global currency after the turn of the 20th century. In 1911, China experienced a revolutionary transformation in the overthrow of its last imperial dynasty, the Qing, and the establishment of the Republic of China.

The post-imperial period for China was one of political and social ferment. The Baiyang government was weak and riven with division and Chinese intellectuals, including Liang Qichao, were inspired by powerful global ideas like democracy and modernisation. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism as an ideology and a political movement was consolidated in the writing and actions of the key Republican figures such as Dr Sun Yat-sen.

Meanwhile, a state of political and social ferment was also affecting Japan. The American essayist Randolph S. Bourne’s in his 1916 article “Trans-national America,” referred to “the

17 Japan sided with Allied Powers during the First World War, becoming a key supplier of resources to Europe, and was able to rebuild its state finances after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 and achieve economic growth. Japan’s contribution to the war were part of wide-ranging interactions with the changing world. International ideas and ideologies like democracy, communism, socialism and imperialism all flooded into Japan and contributed to the climate of political change. The Taisho period (1912-1926), also known as the Taisho Democracy, featured a series of liberal social and political movements that drew on these new ideas.

The presence of social and political activism in Japan and China had exerted a profound influence on Taiwan, in which Taiwanese intellectuals became part of the broader international political current. The mid-1910s was an important period that saw Taiwanese people becoming politically active in ways that expressed an emerging civil society in Taiwan in the context of Japanese colonisation, including through tactics of non-violent resistance. The establishment of the Taiwan Assimilation Society and the campaign for the Taichung Middle School, as will be discussed below, signify key moments in the development of Taiwanese political activism but also Lin Hsien-tang’s emergence as a political leader in colonial Taiwan.

Lin Hsien-tang had become more politically active in the 1910s. His interactions with key public figures in China and Japan through this period demonstrate an emerging political trajectory that followed the path suggested by Liang Qichao.

In May 1913, two years after the Xinhai Revolution and two months after the assassination of leading Chinese Nationalist politician Song Jiaoren, Lin Hsien-tang visited Beijing. His trip was recorded by the Japanese police, who noted that he not only met Liang Qichao, who was
supporting Yuan Shih-kai as the president of the new Republic of China at that time but was also introduced to several Chinese officials in the new government. From Beijing, Lin headed for Tokyo. Through a mutual acquaintance, Lin was introduced to the liberal politician Count Itagaki Taisuke. At that time, Itagaki was removed from political life, but was eager to return to the centre of the Japanese politics. During their meeting, he accepted Lin’s invitation to visit Taiwan for a personal inspection.

After Lin’s meeting with Itagaki, Lin carried a referral from Itagaki to meet the leading Chinese reformist figure in Japan Dai Jitao. Lin Hsien-tang looked to Dai for guidance on how Taiwan could resist the Japanese colonial government. Dai’s advice for Lin was the same as Liang’s in 1097. Dai said: “The Chinese government is fully occupied in the struggle with Yuan Shikai… and will not be able to help the Taiwanese for the next ten years… You should try to win support and sympathy from some prominent Japanese officials and the Japanese public in order to restrain the authoritarian power of the colonial government… In doing so, you may mitigate the pain the Taiwanese are suffering now….”

Itagaki visited Taiwan twice with several of his political supporters in 1914, firstly on February 17, 1914. Itagaki’s political status in Japan was reflected in the way he was treated by the Japanese colonial government, who accorded him official courtesies. According to Gan’s description, upon landing, Itagaki and others were greeted by Japanese officials, who

18 Although Itagaki had retired in 1900, his adherence to integrity and upright earned him a good reputation. He was one of the main leaders during the Meiji Restoration era, the establisher of Aikokusha (the Society of Patriots) in 1874, the founder of the Liberal Party (Jiyutō) in 1881 and the Home Minister (1896-1900) of Japan. The Aikokusha (the Society of Patriots) was formed as part of the Freedom of People’s Right Movement in 1874, and was later merged with Jiyūtō (The Liberal Party), Japan’s first political party. Zhang Zhengchang, 80. Also, Edward I-Te Chen, “Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937,” 478-479.

19 Quoted in Lin Bowei, Taiwan wenhua xiehui cangsang (The Vicissitudes of Taiwan Cultural Association) (Taipei: Tai yuan Publishing, 1998), 23.
provided a luxurious car to transport him to Taipei main train station, and there, they were received with a reception held by the Taiwan governor and Japanese civil and military officials. The Taiwanese who observed the reception were struck by its elaborateness and the status it accorded Itagaki, which they understood as reflecting his political status in Japan. The Taiwanese demonstrated their astonishment by referring to Itagaki as being like the embodiment of a celestial being (天神下降).

In his public statements during the visit, Itagaki expressed his views on Taiwan’s colonisation. For example, during a welcoming reception in Taichung, Itagaki spoke of the harmonious relationship between Japanese and Taiwanese. Zhang Zhengchang summarised Itagaki’s speech:

Japanese and Taiwanese should have friendly and harmonious relations. For the cause of Imperial Japan, we should build a new Taiwan together, and let it become a role model for other peoples in Asia. We should unite the peoples of Asia, and assure peace in Asia. To achieve this, we Japanese should engage in introspection, and never act like haughty conquerors of the Taiwanese. We should treat the Taiwanese like our younger brothers: we love and nurture them. Likewise, the Taiwanese as subjects of Japan should treat the Japanese as a respectful elder brother.

In another speech in Taipei, Itagaki indicated Taiwan’s role as a bridge between Japan and China in the defence strategy of Japan, and alluded to Japan’s imperial ambition. Zhang Zhengchang again gave a summary of Itagaki’s speech: “Americans’ opinion on the Japanese is inappropriate. The Japanese should work with the Chinese against them, and the Taiwanese should act as a bridge between Japan and China. Accordingly, the Japanese nationals in Taiwan

---

21 Quoted in Zhang Zhengchang, 80.
22 Zhang Zhengchang, 81.
should respect the Taiwanese and protect their property, and try to assimilate the Taiwanese into Japanese as much as possible. This is the way to achieve the goal of unlocking the south.”

Itagaki’s comments on the harmonious relationship between peoples on the island is notable in the context of the limited information available to Japanese people in metropolitan Japan about the situation in Taiwan. Having never been to Taiwan before 1914, Itagaki’s comments, and his implicit criticisms of the behaviours and actions of Japanese people in Taiwan, suggested that Lin Hsien-tang’s appeal for ethnic equality in their previous meetings in Japan might have influenced Itagaki’s views.

Nevertheless, Itagaki’s comments about the southern expansion of the Japanese empire illustrate that Japan’s future was Itagaki’s priority, rather than the promotion of ethnic equality on the island. For Itagaki, Taiwan’s role was as part of the process of empire-building that would enable Japan to become a world power. However, his message of promoting friendly relations between peoples on the island was very positively received by the Taiwanese. Itagaki received many letters of appreciation and petitions from Taiwanese people before he left Taiwan, leading him to delay his departure because of the overwhelming response.

Based on the positive public response by the Taiwanese to Itagaki’s visit, Lin Hsien-tang and Itagaki proceeded to explore the possibility of setting up the Taiwan Assimilation Society (Taiwan dōkakai), which would promote ethnic equality on the island. Later in 1914, Lin again set off to Japan to visit Itagaki. During their meeting, they reached a broad consensus in their plan to set up the Society. Through Itagaki, Lin was able to meet with the Prime Minister of Japan Ōkuma Shigenobu, as well as other prominent Japanese politicians and presented the

23 ibid.

24 Yeh Jung-chung, Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan), 37. Itagaki originally planned to leave Taiwan in late February, but he postponed it to early March.
plan to them to seek their support. The support Lin received from Tokyo officials was beyond his expectations. Itagaki and Lin Hsien-tang decided to put their plan into action in Taiwan when Lin returned. The application for permission to organise the society was submitted to the Japanese colonial government, listing Itagaki as its founder and president.

The support for the proposed Society was a dilemma for the colonial government in Taiwan. Itagaki was well-known, and the harmonious relationship he and Lin Hsien-tang aimed to promote was not a violation of colonial law. Lin’s meetings at the most senior levels of Japanese politics gave him considerable political capital in Taiwan. Therefore, the act of establishing the Society destabilised the patterns of colonial authority in its intervention in the relationship between the Japanese and Taiwanese as colonisers and colonial subjects.

Faced with Lin Hsien-tang’s increasingly high-profile political actions, the colonial government issued a warning to him. Upon Lin Hsien-tang’s return to Taiwan in November 1914, the chief of the colonial civil administration Uchida Kakichi warned Lin not to overstep the political boundaries set by the colonial government: “Politics is like a double-edged sword, and it is dangerous for children to play with it. You are the leader in Taiwanese society, so please warn others of the dangers so as to help them avoid mishap.”

The timing of Uchida’s warning prior to the establishment of the Society signalled that although the colonial government was not in favour of the Society, with Itagaki’s involvement and support in Japan it did not have the political power it needed to suppress it.

---

25 For instance, Ōkuma Shigenobu clearly showed his support to Lin. He said: “It is unacceptable that the Japanese residents in Taiwan mistreated the Taiwanese…I have heard that the Assimilation Society is going to be established in Taiwan. Please work together and do not be afraid…Let me know by telling me face to face, telegram or letters if you need my assistance.” Gan Dezhong, “Xiantang xiasheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation Society),” 66-67.

26 ibid., 68.
In late November 1914, Itagaki made his second visit to Taiwan. Welcomed by the Japanese officials to a high standard as before, Itagaki put forward an application to set up the Taiwan Assimilation Society the day after he arrived. Although colonial government had signalled its displeasure to Lin, they still approved Itagaki’s application. On December 20, 1914, the Taiwan Assimilation Society was formally established in Taipei, with two other branches established in Taichung and Tainan. According to the formal statement as well as prospectus issued by Itagaki, the aim of the Society was to feature the mutual effort of both Taiwanese and Japanese, and to promote the equality “not only between Japanese and Taiwanese, but among all classes and individuals as well.” In the first month of its existence, the Society attracted 3,178 members, including many Taiwanese who held positions in the colonial administration. However, of the 3,178 members only forty-four were Japanese.

In terms of the mix of membership, although the Society did include both Japanese and Taiwanese, the very small number of Japanese participants could be interpreted as showing that the Society lacked support from Japanese colonial settler community, despite the endorsement of Itagaki. This indicates that the Japanese community in Taiwan may have been responding to the disquiet of the colonial government or did not share the goals of the Society.

29. Assuming at the posts like local chief and counselor, a great degree of Taiwanese served in the colonial administration. Yeh Jung-chung, Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan), 41-42.
30. Taiwan Shiryō Hozonkai (Association for the Preservation of Historical Materials on Formosa), Nihon tōjika no minzoku undō II: Seiji undō hen (Formosan Nationalist Movements under Japanese Rule II: History of Political Movements), 22.
Despite the support the Society received from many Taiwanese in its professed socio-political goals, not every politically-active Taiwanese was convinced by the notion of equality as promoted by Itagaki. For example, some young Taiwanese modernisers like Jiang Weishui and Du Congming expressed their doubts about the motives of Lin Hsien-tang in his creation of the Society. Shortly after the founding of the Society, they requested a meeting with Lin, but were received by Lin’s assistant Gan Dezhong. Gan suggested that Lin Hsien-tang was not genuinely convinced of the notion of equality himself. Rather, Gan indicated that Lin’s views that challenged colonial discrimination was perhaps the best they could hope for under the circumstances: “We have been constrained by many factors... If Itagaki and the Society can help us win support from the Tokyo officials, we might be freed from these factors and could perhaps live an easier life. This is what we aim for.”

Lin Hsien-tang and Gan Dezhong’s intentions was later confirmed by Liu Mingchao, a friend of Lin’s for more than fifty years. In Liu Mingchao’s reminiscences of Lin Hsien-tang, he recalled that Lin Hsien-tang acknowledged to him that “his purpose of initiating the Taiwan Assimilation Society was to lessen the colonial government’s vigilance over the Taiwanese and ease the pressure on them.”

The meeting requested by Jiang and Du expressed the complex debates and strategising around political responses to Japanese colonisation of Taiwan. Gan Dezhong’s account of the meeting indicates that Lin’s responses to Japan were tactical in the sense of De Certeau. Yeh Jung-chung describes Lin as “a Taiwanese gentleman who had never been an advocate of

---

31 Gan’s explanation eventually moved them. Gan Dezhong, “Xiantang xiansheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation Society),” 70-71.

32 Liu Mingchao, “Zhuisi Lin Xiantang xiansheng zhi yisheng (In Memory of Lin Xiantang),” in Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir), 95.
assimilation nor a lover of Japanese culture throughout his life,” but Lin’s establishment of the Taiwan Assimilation Society with Itagaki Taisuke indicates his willingness to compromise and co-opt. Lin pursued the political goal of equality for the Taiwanese and aligned himself with the liberal metropolitan politics of Itagaki for that purpose.

**The Decline of the Taiwan Assimilation Society**

In an indication of the tense politics around Lin Hsien-tang’s engagement with metropolitan Japan, the colonial government did not attack Itagaki directly when he was in Taiwan. However, after his departure in late December 1914, the Japanese-owned newspapers in Taiwan published attacks on members of the Taiwan Assimilation Society. Newspaper editorials accused Japanese and Taiwanese members of the Society of being opportunistic and creating social tension between the “races” in Taiwan. Those who were on the colonial government payroll were forced to withdraw from the Society. Many of them were also forced to resign from their government positions as well. On January 23, 1915, the colonial government accused the Society of mismanaging its finances. Three days later, the permission for the Society was withdrawn and the Society was forcibly shut down by the Japanese police only two months after its establishment.

The Taiwan Assimilation Society was a short-lived Taiwanese social and political movement that mobilised Taiwanese people in the pursuit of their political rights in Taiwan. The Society enjoyed significant support among educated Taiwanese. Nonetheless, it was too

---

33 Yeh Jung-chung, *Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century)*, 42.

34 For instance, Cai Peihuo was forced to resign from his post as a teacher in a colonial school on the same day the Society was shut down. Cai Peihuo, “Guanyuan xiansheng yu wo zhijian (Between Lin Hsien-tang and me),” in Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, ed., *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir)* (Taipei: Haixia xueshu Publishing, 2005), 6.
dependent on Itagaki’s political capital. It lacked the support of the Japanese residents and the colonial government alike, and was unable to counter the government backlash once Itagaki left Taiwan.

The Taiwan Assimilation Society represented the first significant attempt to influence Japanese colonial policy through civic political action. However, its assertion of contemporary liberal ideas by Itagaki and Lin was mistimed, and overreached in the context of the reality of colonisation and colonial policy. The shutting down of the Society expressed the intolerance of the colonial government to metropolitan ideals.

Viewed from a historical perspective, the Society did, however, indicate the emergence of a modern sensibility and a gradual Taiwanese consciousness in colonial Taiwan. The Society was also a key marker of the development of a Taiwanese experience of modernity as an expression of a Taiwanese subjectivity and political agency that was used to discuss an array of political issues that arose in colonial Taiwan. The period after the Society was shut down, in which new social and political movements emerged, advocating for political aspirations in the name of the Taiwanese shows how the Taiwanese experience of modernity, one articulated in distinctive ways by Lin Hsien-tang, was produced in the context of Taiwan’s colonial circumstances.

The Taiwan Assimilation Society motivated Lin Hsien-tang’s political career. For Lin, the Society and the process of its formation could be understood as politically formative in the ways it enabled him to leverage his social and political capital and apply the lessons learnt from Liang Qichao. Although the Society was short-lived, his name became well-known in Taiwan’s public life and he took on a position of social and political leadership.
Chapter 4

Lin Hsien-tang’s Educational Reform-- the Taichung Middle School

The preceding section described the development of the Taiwan Assimilation Society. The Society was brought to an abrupt end, but it expressed some of the key themes of Taiwan’s new modern politics. In the terms of De Certeau, the Taiwan Assimilation Society illustrated the development of new “tactics” of resistance by the Taiwanese to Japanese rule.

De Certeau’s *The Practice of Everyday Life* discusses what he calls tactics and strategies in the practices of social relationships, and this vocabulary can help us understand the development of a modernising politics in Taiwan in the context of the changing relationship between the Taiwanese and the Japanese colonial administration. In De Certeau’s terms, the dominating and the dominated are termed “producers” and “consumers,” and in these terms the Japanese colonial administration dominated the Taiwanese with “strategies” through institutions and structures of power. However, the colonised Taiwanese were not passive subjects under colonial rule. In the contestation of colonial authority, many Taiwanese subjugated by the government used everyday resources provided to them to develop their “tactics” of resistance against the strategies imposed on them.¹

---

¹ Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, xii-xiii.
After the closure of the Taiwan Assimilation Society, Lin Hsien-tang was not discouraged. He sought new ways to assert Taiwanese political agency and turned to education reform. His education reform movement centred on the aspiration to establish a middle school for Taiwanese students in his home town of Taichung. In De Certeau’s terms, the Taichung Middle School was similarly a tactic of resistance against colonial rule. Although the expressed goals of the movement to establish the school were different to that of the Taiwan Assimilation Society, they were both nonetheless tactical responses to colonization, rather than, for example, violent resistance or insurgency. They leveraged the new opportunities created by Taiwanese modernisation, the conditions for which were created by colonial rule, even as they sought to resist it.

The idea of the Taichung Middle School was first formed by Lin Hsien-tang as well as other leading Taiwanese in 1912 prior to the establishment of the Taiwan Assimilation Society. As envisaged by Lin, the Taichung Middle School was to be a secondary school that aimed at ensuring equal educational opportunities for Taiwanese students who were deprived of the right to receive secondary education in the Japanese colonial education system.

As part of Lin Hsien-tang’s broader movement to achieve social equality between the Taiwanese and the Japanese on the island, the establishment of the School therefore signified a specific moment in which Lin was addressing the problems of not only educational inequality, but also the conditions of colonisation that framed education policy.

Understanding the significance of the Taichung Middle School requires an analysis of Japanese colonial education in Taiwan. The following section examines the development of colonial education in Taiwan up to the founding of the Taichung Middle School. I will examine the official statements on education, and the unequal Japanese colonial education system that operated in colonial Taiwan. Then, I will examine the founding of the Taichung Middle School. Lin Hsien-tang’s role in the process highlights his growing leadership and socio-political status.
in Taiwan’s political circles through this period.

**Japanese Colonial Education**

Japanese colonial education developed from education policies formed in the Meiji restoration (1868-1890) aimed at building a modern education system in Japan. The key text that outlined the principles for modern education in Japan was the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890. This text formed the principles for Japanese colonial education policy in Taiwan.

During the Meiji Restoration, Japan embarked on a dramatic and thoroughgoing program of Westernisation. In terms of educational philosophy, Lincicome describes the epistemic changes as neo-Confucian metaphysics giving way to Western positivism and utilitarianism. This prompted a reaction from the conservative Japanese elite who pushed the leadership of the Meiji government to emphasise an emperor-centred philosophy within Japan’s imperial education institutions. The political debate between Japanese conservatives and modernisers culminated in the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku chokugo) of 1890. The Rescript followed from the enacting of the new Constitution in February 1889.

The 315-word text was an ideological compromise that articulated guiding principles for Japanese education. As a founding text, it served as an indoctrinating vehicle to strengthen the hegemonic power of the state by expressing the ideals of close bonds between the emperor and his loyal subjects. The text itself was more than a statement of government policy but functioned as a statement of moral principles for the Japanese empire. It was propagated throughout the Japanese school system to be enunciated by students in classrooms. With the

---

2 Edmund J. King, “Japan’s Education in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Education* 22, no. 1, Special Number (9): Education in Japan (1986), 76.

establishment of the colonial education, the Rescript served to bring the emperor-centred ideology to Taiwan.

Rear Admiral Kabayama Sukenori was appointed as the first Taiwan governor by the Tokyo government on May 10, 1895. Before he left Tokyo, he and his senior administrators began planning a colonial education system. On May 21, 1895, the Education Bureau (Gakumu Bu), within the new colonial Civil Department (Minsei Kyoku), was created to take charge of colonial education affairs. The colonial officials sailed from Japan on May 24, and they arrived in Taiwan on June 14. After Kabayama’s inauguration ceremony on June 17, the operation of the Education Bureau began the following day.4

The chief of the Education Bureau in Taiwan was Izawa Shūnji (1851-1917), who had been one of the most important proponents of modern education in Japan in the Meiji era of the 1880s.5 Before Izawa’s appointment as the chief of Education Bureau in May 1895, he had already presented his proposals for colonial education to Kabayama.

Izawa’s proposal to Kabayama outlined the importance of proficiency in both Japanese and Taiwanese languages. However, based on Izawa’s proposal to Kabayama, the Japanese colonial

---

5 Sent to the Bridgewater Normal School in Massachusetts in the U.S. by the Ministry of Education of Japan in 1875, Izawa Shūnji became an enthusiastic Western-style educator when he returned to Japan. He was credited with the introduction and promotion of the Western-style schooling to Japanese students. Subjects like singing, music, gymnastics were first introduced into Japanese schooling by him. He, the chief of textbook bureau then, worked with Mori Arimori, the Education minister. They were both promoters of state education, but Izawa differed Mori on the one issue that he believed the schooling should be state-financed, whereas Mori did not. After Mori was assassinated in 1889 by a reactionary nationalist, Izawa’s position in administration weakened. Izawa ever tried to bring pressure from the outside to the government by establishing the Society for State Education (kokka kyōiku sha), but his endeavour ended up in an abortive attempt. E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945, 13.
education system distinguished between the Taiwanese and Japanese settlers at the outset of colonisation.

Izawa’s proposal for education in Taiwan were divided into two different activities: “emergency activities” and “permanent activities,” which were to be operated in different levels. The emergency activities aimed at setting up intensive language courses for both Taiwanese and Japanese to develop communication skills as quickly as possible. The permanent activities envisioned the establishment of the post-primary schooling in Taiwan, but they were developed based on ethnicities.

The “permanent activities” contained two main projects: normal schools strictly for Japanese settlers, and a single Japanese Language School. The Japanese Language School was further divided into two departments: an education department and a language department. The education department aimed at training Japanese settlers to be Japanese-language teachers, the language department aimed at training Taiwanese to a level of Japanese sufficient to be interpreters and clerks for the colonial administration. The language department also provided native languages courses for Japanese settlers. Izawa’s educational proposals were supported by Kabayama leading to his appointment in the colonial administration.

**Izawa Shūnji and Zhishanyan**

After Izawa’s investiture on June 17 1895, he took up duties in an office in Dadaocheng (in present-day Taipei) the following day. He was attentive to Taiwanese traditions and undertook fact-finding tours around the island. His developed his understanding of Taiwanese traditional educational institutions like shufang (書房), Chinese private schools, with the help of a Taiwanese interpreter. Following his travels around the island, he found Zhishanyan, a

---

6 ibid., 14.
7 ibid.
small village about four kilometres north from his office in Taipei, as a place to carry forward the colonial education policies he envisioned. In spite of the warning from his Taiwanese interpreter that the region was a site of potential militia resistance, he moved the Education Bureau to Zhishanyan on June 26.  

Zhishanyan became the first experimental site of Izawa’s colonial educational plan as well as the conduit for the dissemination of the Meiji emperor-centred ideology he supported. In a two-hour speech after he moved office to Zhishanyan, he invoked the name of the Japanese emperor, exhorted the Taiwanese to become loyal and law-abiding subjects (ryōmin), and announced the educational goals of opening up a Japanese language school in Zhishanyan (Shisangyan gakudō). He made special appeals to the local Taiwanese to send their children or young men to the school. However, expressing local distrust of the Japanese colonial administration, it was reported that there were about ten pupils at the School the next day after his speech.  

Despite the small classes, the school proceeded. Izawa divided them into two groups as outlined in his proposal. While the older students, who were aged seven to twenty-seven years old and already versed in classical Chinese to some degree, were trained to become interpreters or clerks to serve in the colonial administration, the younger students were placed in the stream to become Japanese-language teachers. By September, there were twenty-one students enrolled in Japanese language courses. In October, six students from the school completed intensive Japanese-language courses receiving certificates in a ceremony held by the Japanese officials. The Shisangyan gakudō became a prototype for other Japanese schools established

---

8 ibid.  
10 Ide Kiwata, Ri ju xia zhi tai zheng (Records of Japanese Administration in Formosa), 237.  
11 E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945, 15.  
12 Taiwan Sōtokufu, Taiwan no gakkō kyōiku (School Education in Taiwan) (Taipei: Taiwan
across the island.

In the following year, Izawa’s vision for colonial education was officially implemented by law on a larger and more systematic scale. In March 1896, the Tokyo government issued the No. 94 Ordinance that authorised the governor’s direct control of colonial schools financed by the colonial government. The Ordinance codified Izawa’s educational system into a formal structure that distinguished between the Taiwanese and Japanese settlers. A system of schools, now known as Japanese Institutes, was established for the Taiwanese across the island. The year also saw the founding of a single Japanese Language School that provided senior education and three “affiliated” schools that provided junior education mostly for the children of Japanese settlers.

The Japanese Language School comprised an education department and a language department. These departments offered limited places only for Taiwanese with a sound literary background in classical Chinese. In 1898, the three affiliated schools were converted to Primary Schools, followed by the establishment of Middle Schools for Japanese boys in 1907 and Secondary Higher Girls Schools in 1910.

Japanese Institutes were divided into two sections—Section One and Section Two. Both sections were legacy of Izawa’s educational institution of Shisangyan gakudō. Section One provided intense languages courses for Taiwanese to become interpreters and clerks, and students of Section One were subsidised by the colonial government. Section Two provided elementary education for Taiwanese school-aged students.

Sōtokufu, 1940), 6.
13 Chou Wan-yao and Xu Peixian, “Taiwan gong xueziao zhidu, jiaoke he jiaokeshu zong shuo (An Overview of the Common School System, subjects and textbooks),” Taiwan Feng Wu (Taiwan Customs) 53, no. 4 (December 2003): 122.
14 Yanaihara, Riben diguo zhuyi xia zhi Taiwan (Taiwan under the Japanese Imperialism), 170-171.
15 After the first Taiwanese students graduated from the Section One of Japanese Institutes, most of them served in the administration and were paid roughly thirteen Taiwanese yen per
After the framework of colonial education was established, a Chinese version of the Imperial Rescript on Education was introduced to Taiwan by Izawa in 1897 during the term in office of the third Taiwan governor Nogi Maresuke.\footnote{Ide Kiwata, \textit{Ri ju xia zhi tai zheng (Records of Japanese Administration in Formosa)}, 276.}

The Rescript that codified the emperor-centred ideology and defined education as serving the needs of the modern Japanese state took on institutional force in colonial Taiwan. Certified copies of the text along with the photographs of the emperor were distributed to schools. In the following years, the Rescript took on the quality of a moral scripture, conveying imperial commitment, for school students to study and memorise. Furthermore, it took on an embodied form as a set of performative rituals in the everyday life of school students. For example, schools required students to read out the Rescript reverentially in classes and school assemblies. According to Chen Wenyuan, students first read out the Japanese version, followed by the Chinese one.\footnote{Quoted in Chen Hongwen, “Riben zhimin xia taiwan jiaoyu zhengce zhi fenxi yanjiu—yi gonzxuxiao guoyu jiaokeshu wei li (A Study of Japanese Colonial Education Policies in Taiwan—the Case of Language Textbooks for Elementary School)” (master’s thesis, National Sun Yat-sen University, 2001), 30.}

In the first years of colonial rule, Izawa’s proposals for colonial education were strongly supported by the colonial government. However, as Tsurumi argues, the costs of colonial development for Japan began to impact upon education policy. Development policies aimed at enhancing the colony’s economic self-sufficiency, such as building the sugar industry, were increasingly demanding, and suppressing armed resistance to colonial rule diverted resources to policing and the penal system.\footnote{E. Patricia Tsurumi, \textit{Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945}, 17.} The promise of Izawa’s state-financed Taiwanese education...
system soon confronted the reality of limited budgets for colonial education.

**Common Schools, 1898-1906**

The arrival of the fourth Taiwan governor Kodama Gentarō and his civil administrator Gotō Shimpei in 1898, and their period in office until 1906 signaled a shift in Japanese colonial policies. Kodama decided that colonial education for Taiwanese was to be scaled back and subsidised by the Taiwanese.\(^{19}\) Izawa resigned from his position as chief of the Education Bureau in early 1898, and the education development was taken over by Gotō Shimpei in his position as the head of the civilian administration.\(^{20}\)

The eight years of Gotō Shimpei’s administration of education featured a cautious and limited approach in contrast to the enthusiastic and idealistic educator Izawa. Gotō said in a speech in 1903:

> The governor has not come out with a definite ruling policy. Neither is the education policy finalised. There is no specific policy for colonial education… What we can and have to do now is to discuss how we can step up the spread of Japanese language learning... (總督連政治的大方針都還未見示，教育的方針更講不到：教育是無方針的。… 只要討論如何普及國語就行…)\(^{21}\)

As a modernizer in the context of Meiji-era Japan, Gotō also believed in the biological principles of evolution and he argued that the transformation of Taiwanese through colonial education involved a time-consuming and gradual process, and that education policy should be

---


\(^{20}\) Izawa had remained as an educational consultant in Taiwan until he was appointed principle of Tokyo Higher Normal School in October 1899. E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*, 17-18.

\(^{21}\) Quoted in Yanaihara, *Riben diguo zhuyi xia zhi Taiwan (Taiwan under the Japanese Imperialism)*, 184. Footnote 16.
Tsurumi summarises Gotō’s position, writing:

Stressing the difficulties of changing the hearts, minds, and customs of a foreign people, he reminded Japanese educators that Taiwan had been Chinese for three hundred years. He himself did not think their spiritual and material lives could be drastically transformed in two or even three generations. He believed that until at least twenty-five years had passed the Japanese could make no definitive policy decision regarding education. What were Japanese teachers to do in the meantime? Their task was to spread the use of the Japanese language, but he cautioned them against opening too many schools too quickly and against looking too soon for favorable results.\

In July 1898, shortly after the arrival of Kodama and Gotō, the so-called Japanese Institutes for the Taiwanese were restructured into Common Schools, which were no longer state-sponsored. The Common Schools were financed by the local communities. The Common School system for the Taiwanese was introduced in accordance with Gotō’s ideas of pragmatism and gradualism. According to the first article of the Common School Regulations, the Common School system aimed at promoting moral education among Taiwanese, teaching them practical skills, and transforming the Taiwanese into Japanese citizens with a Japanese spirit and a good knowledge of Japanese-language. It provided a six-year course for Taiwanese children aged from eight to fourteen.

Under Gotō’s eight-year management, colonial education could be characterised as “elite

---

education,” a term coined by Mochiji Rokusaburō, who was the chief of the Education Bureau in Taiwan (1903-1910). The Common School system was developed systematically but at a slow pace under Gotō. The enrolment and attendance of Taiwanese students in the Common Schools only reached just over 5% of Taiwanese children by the end of the Kodama-Gotō period (see below).

Table 2. The enrolment and attendance of Taiwanese students in the Common Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Common schools (Including branch schools)</th>
<th>Numbers of students at Common Schools</th>
<th>Percentage of children enrolled in Common schools</th>
<th>Percentage of Average daily attendance of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>7,838</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>10,377</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>12,892</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>16,955</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>19,582</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>58.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>22,269</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>59.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>24,032</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>60.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>28,051</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>61.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>32,281</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>65.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: E. Patricia Tsurumi and Wu Wen-hsing.

25 Mochiji Rokusaburō articulated that the aim of ordinary education is to educate children of the middle and upper classes. Quoted in Wu Wen-hsing, *Ri zhi shiqi Taiwan de shehui lingdao jieceng* (*Taiwanese Leadership during the Japanese Colonial Rule*), 85.

Gotō undertook an even more cautious attitude in developing secondary education for the Taiwanese. He discouraged the development of any post-primary educational institution for the Taiwanese, saying:

…We have to remember the example of the Dutch in India while we try to enlighten the colonised… If we opened too many schools too quickly and without careful consideration and caution, or if we did it just because we regard education as a charity, we would have misunderstood the meaning of colonialism. We would be held accountable (盡力所謂開 發智育，而當預防像荷蘭與印度發生許多弊害。… 不經深思熟慮，祗因教育為一 善事，故即開辦學校，這已誤解殖民政策，今後必須自負嚴重的責任).

In the Kodama-Gotō period, what post-primary educational institutions there were for Taiwanese Common School graduates were specifically directed at the colonial regime’s practical needs. The two professions of teaching and medicine were the only higher educational opportunities made available for Taiwanese in the colony.

Professional training in these two areas was available in two institutions. First, the Japanese Language School offered limited places for Taiwanese graduates of the Common Schools. Secondly, in 1899, early in Gotō’s civil administration, a medical training centre which had been established and attached to Taihoku Hospital in 1897 was converted to a five-

---

27 Quoted in Yanaihara, Riben diguo zhuyi xia zhi Taiwan (Taiwan under the Japanese Imperialism), 184. Footnote 16.


29 Later, in 1899, three normal schools were opened in Taipei, Taichung and Tainan. There was approximately a total of 150 students at that year. In 1902, normal schools in Taipei and Taichung were closed and taken by the Japanese Language School that began to offer a training programme for Taiwanese. In 1904, normal school in Tainan was closed and taken over by the Japanese Language School. E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945, 22-23.
year medical school. While the former was established to provide only enough Taiwanese teachers to teach in the Common Schools, the latter was set up to train Taiwanese doctors in Western medical science to provide medical services in response to the prevalent epidemic diseases in Taiwan.  

**Lin Hsien-tang and the Taichung Middle School**

In 1898, Lin Hsien-tang married Yang Shuixin, and in 1901 they welcomed the birth of their first child Panlong (1901-1983). The following year Youlong was born (1902-1955). Lin and Yang had two more children, his only daughter Guanguan (1906-1997) and another son, Yunlong (1907-1959).

By 1915, at which time Lin Hsien-tang had been politically active for several years, there was still no proper secondary education for Taiwanese Common School graduates beyond the two institutions for medical and teacher training. Furthermore, for the medical school and the Japanese Language School available for a limited number of Taiwanese, neither the level of the students they admitted nor the period of study was equivalent to that of the medical schools in metropolitan Japan. The academic standard of colonial education in Taiwan was lower than its equivalents in Japan.

Lin Hsien-tang responded to the inequality of colonial educational policy through practices of tacit resistance rather than open opposition. At the later part of his life, in his sixties, he referred to the Japanese colonial education as one of the policies “that hoaxed the Taiwanese (愚民策).” At the time, however, in the 1910s, his resistance took the form of refusing to

---

30 ibid., 23, 25.


enroll his young children in the colonial educational system in Taiwan despite the exhortation of colonial officials urging him to do this.\textsuperscript{33} He hired a tutor to teach his children when they were young and when his four children became school-aged, he sent them to Japan to receive a Japanese education. Lin Panlong and Lin Youlong were sent to study in Japan at the ages of nine and eight in 1909, followed by Lin Guanguan and Lin Yunlong, at the ages of nine and eight in 1915.

In colonial Taiwan, where education policy was directed by the political concerns of the colonial government, wealthy families could send their children overseas to study while less well-off Taiwanese Common School students discontinued their studies once they graduated from a Common School. In addition to sending his own children to Japan, Lin Hsien-tang used his family wealth to sponsor the children of certain Taiwanese to study in Japan.\textsuperscript{34} However, this was not a meaningful solution for the broader educational needs of the colony. As such these could be understood as only limited and passive responses to the inequality of colonial education in Taiwan.

The idea of founding a secondary school for Taiwanese can be traced back to a proposal presented in a Lin’s family gathering in 1912. During this gathering, Lin Hsien-tang and other family members discussed how to celebrate the eighty-first birthday of the Lin family matriarch and Lin Hsien-tang’s grandmother, known only as Mrs. Luo. Instead of an elaborate family banquet for the Wufeng Lin clan in honour of Mrs. Luo, Lin Hsien-tang and other family members initiated a discussion about using family funds to promote education in Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{33} Gan Dezhong, “Xiantang xiansheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation Society),” 52.

\textsuperscript{34} For instance, Lin Hsien-tang sponsored Gan Dezhong and Yeh Jung-chung to study in Tokyo. ibid. Also, see, Yeh Jung-chung, \textit{Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century)}, 37.
According to Gan’s account, the first proposal was to use family funds to set up a scholarship scheme to fund the education of Taiwanese students in the Japanese colonial system. However, the discussion continued and then reached the conclusion to use the funds to set up a secondary school for Taiwanese.35

In September 1913, sixteen leading Taiwanese including Lin Hsien-tang formally put forward a petition to Kodama Gentarō’s successor, the governor Sakuma Samata. The petition explained the need for a secondary education institution for Taiwanese students, expressed their willingness to fund a school, and sought the governor’s approval. In the text of the petition, it read:

> In Taichung Prefecture, there are hundreds of Taiwanese students who have been sent to study in secondary schools in Japan. That is quite a large amount of monthly remittance outflows to Japan. Therefore, if our proposal to set up a secondary school in Taichung Prefecture is granted, we will donate land as well as raise funds for part of other expenses (現在臺中廳下，內地留學的中等學校學生數約百名以上，因其之故，每個月送往內地的金額頗多，因此，若總督府接受他們的請願，於廳下(按指臺中廳)設立中等教育機關，於此，捐獻校舍建地，其他費用的一部分也會募捐).36

According to Cai Peihuo, the colonial government had been informed of and deliberated on the petition before the petition was presented to them.37 The proposal placed the colonial government in a dilemma. In accordance with the colonial government’s approach to colonial

---

35 Gan Dezkhong, “Xiantang xiansheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation Society),” 54.
36 Quoted in Zhu Peiqi, “Taiwan ri zhi shiqi jingying jiaoyu de yaolan—yi Taichung yi zhong wei li (Cradle of Taiwanese Elite Education during the Japanese Colonial Period—Study of National Taichung First Senior High School)” (master’s thesis, National Tsing Hua University, 2000), 19.
37 Cai Peihuo, Taiwan minzu yundo shi (The History of National Taiwanese Movements) (Taipei: Zili wanbao she, 1983), 17.
education, they were reluctant to see it develop. However, they were also concerned about the consequences they would suffer if they rejected it.³⁸ On balance, the colonial government was favourable towards the Taiwanese proposal. Kumamoto Shigekichi (1911-1919), the chief of the Education Bureau in Taiwan, later gave his account in 1916:

Rather than seeing Taiwanese study abroad and being educated in a non-Japanese way, it would be better to give the Taiwanese greater access to Japanese colonial education. Although there may be some disadvantages for us to allow this, it would prevent Taiwanese from becoming proficient in other language as well as ideologies that may produce a sentiment that we would prefer not to see in them.³⁹

However, the Tokyo government held a different point of view. Takehashi Sakue, the chief of the Legislative Bureau in Japan, for example, made a public objection to the proposal. He recounted that colonial education should emphasise schooling at a basic level, such as vocational training and elementary education, and discourage the Taiwanese from enrolling in higher education. In his report to Okuma Shigenobu, the Japanese Prime Minister, he stated:

Because the Taiwanese show that they are now able think at an advanced level (理解高度之思想), if we grant their wish and provide them with subjects involving more abstraction, they would become more cultured and conscious of themselves, and may even become dissatisfied with the world they inhabit… and this would cause the colonial government inconveniences…⁴⁰

Despite the divergence in the opinions of Japanese officials in Taiwan and Japan, in November 1913 the colonial government gave its permission to establish a secondary school

---

³⁸ Gan Dezhong, “Xiantang xiansheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation Society),” 54.
³⁹ Quoted in Chen Peifeng, 268-269.
⁴⁰ Quoted in Zhu Peiqi, “Taiwan ri zhi shiqi jingying jiaoyu de yaolan,” 19-20.
for the Taiwanese.

The issuance of the government’s approval for the school suggested a certain level of political autonomy and political force for Taiwan in metropolitan Japan, in addition to the authoritarian power of the governor in the colony. At the same time, it indicated the complexity of the relationship between the colonial government and leading Taiwanese. The Japanese scholar of colonial Taiwan Wakabayashi suggests that there was an inevitable compromise in which the colonial government had to offer certain concessions to wealthy Taiwanese landowners, as the colonial government relied on taxation revenue from land holdings to enact colonial governance and policing aborigines.  

After the issuance of the government’s approval, a formal meeting was held by colonial officials and the petitioning Taiwanese. In December 1913, they reached an agreement that the Taiwanese would be responsible for raising 220,000 Taiwanese yen to fund the construction of the school. It would be collected over the following two years and presented to the colonial government in the name of the donors. However, in the agreement the development and administration of the school would remain under the control of colonial officials.

The Taiwanese began fund-raising immediately. As requested by the colonial government, the petitioners engaged in a process of pledging, in which they sought verbal agreements for funds from Taiwanese donors. The first round of the pledging period took place in December 1913. In the initial period, the petitioners secured verbal commitments for an amount of

---


150,000 Taiwanese yen. The amount was less than the total required in the agreement with the government, but it was nevertheless more than enough to reassure the governor that the total would be achieved in the following two years. In March 1914, permission was given for the Taiwanese to collect the promised funds. By the end of two-year period in 1915, the petitioners had raised a total of 248,820 Taiwanese yen from 204 Taiwanese. Lin Hsien-tang donated 10,500 Taiwanese yen to the School.

Takawa Shinichi was a principle of a local Middle School in Niigata, Japan, when he was appointed as the first principle of Taichung Middle School in February 1915 in the period leading up to its opening. Before the end of the two-year funding period, on April 25 1915, construction work on the buildings for the Taichung Middle School began. Only a week later, on May 1 1915, the School officially opened, although it took another two and half year for the buildings of the school to be completed.

Lin Hsien-tang had a central role in the establishment of the Taichung Middle School. He initiated the idea within the Lin family to found a secondary school for Taiwanese, put forward the petition to the colonial government. He took the lead in donating his own money and

43 This was certainly such a huge amount, as compared to the average monthly income for a director of student affairs in a common school was only 15-18 Taiwanese yen in the 1910s. Zhu Peiqi, “Taiwan ri zhi shiqi jingying jiaoyu de yaolan,” 53.
44 The information is from the Monument to the Taichung Middle School. The Taichung Middle School is known now as the Taichung Municipal Taichung First Senior High School. The name, Taichung Middle School, is commonly used in the thesis unless otherwise stated. “Benxiao chuangli jinianbei (Monument to the School),” Taichung Municipal Taichung First Senior High School, accessed November 30, 2018, http://w2.tcfsh.tc.edu.tw/zh_tw/about_tcfsh/tcfsh_history/founding.
45 Zhu Peiqi, “Taiwan ri zhi shiqi jingying jiaoyu de yaolan,” 33.
seeking funding pledges, and assumed a role in the supervision committee of the construction work.

The establishment of the Taichung Middle School was a significant moment in Taiwanese society in the context of colonial development and political activism. Under the circumstances of discriminatory colonial educational policy, the Taichung Middle School was the only school, rather than institutional department, that offered secondary education for Taiwanese students before 1922.

Furthermore, the goal of the Taichung Middle School, which was to achieve a measure of equality between Japanese and Taiwanese, carried with it an important political meaning in the context of a modernising Taiwan. As the idea of founding the Taichung Middle School existed before the establishment of the Taiwan Assimilation Society, Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961), a professor at Tokyo University during the colonial period, noted that the establishment of School can be interpreted as “the first call (translated by Zhou Xianwen as ‘第一聲’)” of a national movement in Taiwan.

**Limitations of the Taichung Middle School**

The Taichung Middle School should have provided the same secondary schooling for Taiwanese as Middle Schools that had been established in Taiwan for Japanese settlers. However, although the Taichung Middle School and other Middle Schools in Taiwan were all under colonial government control, the Taichung Middle School did not enjoy the same level of colonial government support as the Japanese schools.

For instance, the other Middle Schools for Japanese settlers were divided into two streams

---

48 Yanaihara Tadao, *Riben diguo zhuyi xia zhi Taiwan (Taiwan under the Japanese Imperialism)*, 213. Because the idea of establishing Taichung Middle School could be dated back to 1912, which was technically a bit earlier than Lin Hsien-tang’s social movement of Taiwan Assimilation Society that took place in late 1913.
of schooling, known using the same terms as the earlier Japanese Institutes, as “Section One” and “Section Two,” which are illustrated below. The prerequisite for a Section One system student was the completion of year five in a Japanese colonial primary school, and the period of study was six years. Section Two provided the same standard of middle school education as in metropolitan Japan. The prerequisite for Section Two was the completion of a Japanese primary school to year six, and the period of study is five years. The different requirements between the Section One and Section Two was the legacy of the colonial education system for Japanese settlers that developed at the very start of Japanese rule.

Compared to attention to the development of education for Japanese nationals, the colonial government paid less attention to the development of the Taichung Middle School. The following table illustrates the institutionalised differences between Taichung Middle School and other Middle Schools in admission age, study length and course structure. As can be seen, the Taichung Middle School offered classes for students aged ten to thirteen, and the study length for Taichung Middle School students was shorter than that for other middle schools’ students.

49 Not every Middle School (for children of Japanese settlers) had two different educational systems at the same time. For instance, Taipei Middle School comprised both Section One and Section Two systems, whereas Tainan Middle School only had Section Two schooling. The Section One system discontinued recruiting students after 1917, and was abolished in 1921. Zhu Peiqi, “Taiwan ri zhi shiqi jingying jiaoyu de yaolan,” 40.

50 ibid., 42.
Table 3. Comparisons between Taichung Middle School and other middle schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student age</th>
<th>10y</th>
<th>11y</th>
<th>12y</th>
<th>13y</th>
<th>14y</th>
<th>15y</th>
<th>16y</th>
<th>17y</th>
<th>18y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle Schools (for Japanese)- Section One system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Middle Schools (for Japanese)- Section Two system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung Middle School (for Taiwanese)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japanese officials ascribed the educational disparity between the Taichung Middle School and other Middle Schools to Taiwanese students’ deficiency in Japanese language competence and their national characteristics. Kumamoto Shigekichi, the chief of the Education Bureau in Taiwan, claimed:

Although Taiwan has been ruled by Japan for twenty years, Taiwanese as a whole cannot compete with Japanese in the national language (referring to Japanese) proficiency. Also, as for their Japanese national spirit and their own local customs, there is still room for Taiwanese to improve. I am sorry to say that the national character and customs of the Taiwanese were quite different from and do not match those of the Japanese…
風俗習慣，尚多有憾者，比之母國相去甚遠，未可謂能為比肩…)

If Kumamoto’s comments were correct about Japanese language proficiency among the Taiwanese, the lack of investment and attention to Taiwanese education by the colonial government could be identified as a cause. In Kumamoto’s comments about the Taiwanese, he was articulating in his statements colonial attitudes that were institutionalised in the education system that the colonial government created and which the leading Taiwanese including Lin Hsien-tang were resisting.

The limited years of teaching available in the Taichung Middle School had a material impact on the opportunities for Taiwanese graduates, who continued to struggle in the colonial educational system. Because of their study period in the School, they were not eligible to sit an entrance examination of higher education system, nor did their academic background compete with the Japanese graduates from the other Middle Schools.

If the original intention of the prominent Taiwanese establishing the Taichung Middle School was to improve the colonial education for Taiwanese students and have them catch up with the academic levels of Japanese nationals in secondary schooling, the government’s management of Taichung Middle School failed to live up to their expectations of the School.

Although the School was initiated and funded by wealthy Taiwanese for the Taiwanese students, the level of control held by the colonial government was an illustration of the constraints under which the Taiwanese were living. Lin Hsien-tang’s own diaries, written over twenty-eight years from 1927 to 1955, do not offer his own record of his early political activism. Nevertheless, Lin’s contemporaries Cai Peihuo (1889-1983) wrote about this period. Cai was a friend of Lin who also participated in the Taiwan Assimilation Society. In Cai’s criticism of

---

51 Quoted in Zhu Peiqi, “Taiwan ri zhi shiqi jingying jiaoyu de yaolan,” 43.
the colonial government’s administration of Taichung Middle School, he said: “Although there is a higher educational institution for Taiwanese, it exists in the name only (擁有虛名而無實).”

A similar historical reference to the development of Taichung Middle School was made by Takawa Shinichi, who was the School’s first principle. Operating within the colonial government’s education policy that exercised control over the Taichung Middle School, Takawa expressed his personal observations on the development of the School from his perspective as an educator. His observations reflected some dominant themes, which include the arbitrary rule by the colonial government, the political powerlessness of the Taiwanese, and the difficulty for upward progression for Taiwanese students enrolled in the colonial education system:

The establishment of the Taichung Middle School was the realisation of a long-cherished wish (宿願) for Taiwanese, no matter whether they had directly participated in the movement or not. However, they found their efforts were compromised when they were informed of how the colonial government planned to manage the School. Before the School opened, they originally hoped that the education year levels and the academic standards of the School would have been the same as the other Japanese Middle Schools in Taiwan, and that Taichung Middle School graduates could be eligible to take the entrance examination for senior schools or be competitive for employment. However, in reality, the admission requirements for the School is only the completion of four years of study in the Common Schools, and the period of study is only four years in the School. Consequently, they cannot

---

52 Cai Peihuo, “Guanyu Taiwan jiaoyu zhi yi er sijian (My Perspective of the Taiwanese Education),” *Taiwan Youth* 3, no. 3 (1921).
take the entrance examinations for senior schools. Nor does their academic level compete with their Japanese contemporaries. They often came to me and expressed their hopelessness and bitterness…\(^{54}\)

Takawa’s statements depicting the plight of Taiwanese students enrolled in the School illustrated the implications of colonial education policy. His statement can also be distinguished from that of the chief of the Education Bureau Kumamoto Shigekichi, and aligned with the liberal education ideals of Izawa Shūnji validating Lin Hsien-tang’s political aspirations for Taiwanese colonial education.

**Tapani Incident in 1915**

The Taichung Middle School has continued in one form up to the present day, being known now as the Taichung Municipal Taichung First Senior High School.\(^{55}\) In the Japanese period, like the development of the Taiwan Assimilation Society, the Taichung Middle School can be understood as one of a series of Taiwanese political and cultural movements responding to colonisation. These events marked the growing political activism in Taiwanese society in the mid-1910s, signaling that the Taiwanese aspired to greater political and civic freedom than the colonial government allowed.

However, the growing political and civic activism of the Taiwanese was overtaken by the Tapani Incident in 1915. Paul R. Katz had written extensively on the Incident, describing it as one of the most drastic acts of armed resistance against the colonial government during Taiwan’s colonial era. He writes:

> Beginning in early July 1915, Yu Qingfang (1879-1915; a former police officer, clerk and

\(^{54}\) Quoted in Zhu Peiqi, “Taiwan ri zhi shiqi jingying jiaoyu de yaolan,” 44.

\(^{55}\) After the establishment in 1915, the Taichung Middle School had undergone several name changes. “About TCFSH: Development,” Taichung Municipal Taichung First Senior High School, accessed April 22, 2018, http://www.tcfsh.tc.edu.tw/english/index.html.
rice merchant) and Jiang Ding (1866-1916; a former district head [kuchô] from the Nanhua area who became an outlaw after being implicated in a murder case) led an armed force of Han Chinese and Aboriginal fighters that quickly overwhelmed numerous police stations in the mountains of southern Taiwan (today’s Tainan and Gaoxiong counties).56

The uprising lasted for over two months, and was suppressed by a combination of Japanese military and police forces. According to Katz, over 1,000 people, including both Taiwanese and Japanese, were killed during the fighting.57 After the Incident, a further 1,957 Taiwanese were arrested, and among them, 915 Taiwanese were sentenced to death.58 In the following years, “a total of 135 Taiwanese were executed before the Taishô emperor issued a decree of clemency, while scores more died in prison.”59

The severity of the response by the colonial government to the Taiwanese involved in the Tapani Incident was, as suggested in the Lin Xiantang Nianpu, a warning against political activism to all Taiwanese, including who had been involved in activities like the Taiwan Assimilation Society.60

For Lin Hsien-tang, there is very little recorded about his political and social life in the period after the Tapani Incident. In the Lin Xiantang Nianpu, there are no entries from November 1915 to April 1918. The political and social silence of Lin also represented a larger silence created in Taiwanese society by punitive colonial policy directed at political activism.

57 ibid., 389.
60 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, ed., Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
Under these circumstances, opportunities for political expression by the Taiwanese, literati in particular, were very constrained.\textsuperscript{61}

In the context of the early period of colonial Japanese rule, Lin Hsien-tang took the tactical opportunities that were available to him, which expressed a sense of a developing Taiwanese political consciousness. At the same time, his social standing and family wealth protected him from the hardening of colonial policy in the post-Tapani Incident period. Indeed, as an indication of the status he retained, he was appointed by the colonial government to be the president-director of the Taiwan Hemp Joint-stock Company in October 1915.

According to Zhang Zhengchang’s biographical account, Lin was inactive in political circles in Taiwan in the years immediately after the Tapani Incident.\textsuperscript{62} In 1919, Tokyo appointed Taiwan’s first civilian governor, Den Kenjirō, and the colonial government initiated the policy of Integration. It was not until the lead-up to the initiation of the Integration policy that Lin returned to an active role in Taiwan’s colonial politics. In next chapter, an examination of Lin’s political aspirations and the petitions movement will be developed.

\textsuperscript{61} Zhang Zhengchang, 93-94.
\textsuperscript{62} ibid.
Chapter 5

Petitions Movement

The preceding chapters described Lin Hsien-tang’s family background, his social activism and participation in the Taichung Middle School campaign in the 1910s and how through them he developed political tactics to negotiate the power of the colonial government. These activities also enabled Lin to establish his leadership of Taiwan’s political scene. Although the crisis of the Tapani Incident of 1915 led to a government response that suppressed political activism, including Lin’s, the story of his political activism did not end. The Taisho democracy in Japan (1912-1926) eventually exerted its influence on Taiwan. In 1919, the new colonial ruling policy of Integration changed the tone of governance and the level of control over social and political life in Taiwan. The shift in Tokyo’s governance over Taiwan also created the conditions for a change in Taiwanese society, where new possibilities for action for the Taiwanese enabled them to engage with different and new political issues. This chapter examines Lin’s return to an active role in Taiwan’s political and cultural life in the late 1910s, his leadership in the petitions movement in the 1920s, and his political marginalisation by a younger Taiwanese generation in the late 1920s. In these analyses, the examination of the petitions movement is emphasised as a way to understand the peak of Lin’s political and cultural activism that coincided with the most liberal period of colonial rule in Taiwan.
The Post-Tapani Incident Period: Lin Hsien-tang’s Political Retreat

The late 1910s were a tumultuous period around the world. In the aftermath of the First World War new ideas like national self-determination, associated with Woodrow Wilson, became part of a thorough-going rethinking of geopolitics in a post-imperial world order. Countries surrounding Taiwan, including China and Japan, and Japan’s other colonial territory Korea were engaged with these political ideas.

China was undergoing its own political upheavals. After the Xinhai revolution in 1911, China’s imperial system ended and modern ideas like democracy, nationalism and communism began to circulate in association with reformers like Liang Qichao and revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen, and Li Dazhao. Chinese intellectuals and activists examined and produced intense critiques of the foundations of China’s intellectual and political traditions in Confucianism and other tenets. ¹ This intellectual and political ferment was mobilised in socio-political movements like the New Culture Movement (1915-1921) and the May Four Movement in 1919. They expressed both the political disillusionment of urban intellectuals with China’s traditions as well as their pursuit of individual freedom in a post-imperial China and of cultural and political solutions to China’s problems.

The decade of the 1910s was also a turbulent one for Japanese society. Japan had already shown that it was a great military power following its victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Japan’s alliance with victors in the First World War, as well as Japan’s post-First World War economic boom, created a surge in confidence in the force of Japanese imperialism. Through the mechanisms of empire, modern ideas like democracy and liberalism were imported along with a wide range of science, philosophy, and military technology. The period of the Taisho democracy from 1912 to 1926 created the conditions for these new ideas to

flourish in Japan’s public and intellectual culture. It saw Japanese society in a ferment of social movements. Students, for example, were inspired by a variety of democratic, socialist, syndicalist, anarchist, and other Western ideas.\(^2\)

These movements found notable expression in political activism in Japan’s other colonial territory, Korea, taking the form of an independence movement whose resistance culminated in the March First Movement in 1919.\(^3\) The movement, to quote from Ryoko Nakano, “showed the obvious resentment of the Koreans against the ‘military rule’ (budan seiji) of Japan.”\(^4\)

Despite the political ferment in Japan, Korea and China right through the decade, political activism in Taiwanese society remained in very subdued in the period after the suppression of the Tapani Incident of 1915. Taiwan’s political life after 1915 expressed the repressive colonial policies that suppressed the Taiwanese political activism that begun to emerge in the first half of the decade. However, colonial control could only suppress politics within Taiwan. The second half of the 1910s saw Taiwanese political activism continuing, but in metropolitan Japan, not in Taiwan itself.

In the literature both in English and Chinese, there are no references to any forms of political activism in the period between the Tapani Incident and mid-1918, which accords with the overall suppression of political activism in Taiwan by the colonial government in the post-Tapani Incident period. Zhang Zhengchang, describing this period of Lin’s political inactivity, called it “zhifu (蛰伏),” which means abiding one’s time.

---

\(^2\) Michiya Shimbori, “Comparison Between Pre- and Post-War Student Movements in Japan,” *Sociology of Education* 37, no. 1 (Autumn 1963): 64.


Lin Hsien-tang’s biography, the *Lin Xiantang Nianpu*, notes his role in a colonial hemp company. Luo Wanzhen also observes that in the period after 1915, visits to his children and some Taiwanese he supported in Tokyo had become a yearly routine for him.⁵ In August 1918, Lin Hsien-tang went to Tokyo and lived in a property he acquired and named “Yu Sheng An (雨聲庵),” which can be translated as a hut with the sound of rain drops. It became not only a residence for Lin to stay while he was in Tokyo but a meeting place for him and other overseas Taiwanese.⁶

Lin’s secretary, Yeh Jung-chung (1900-1978) wrote an account of leading Taiwanese citizens of the colonial period, published posthumously by his daughter in 2000, and it includes a description of Lin’s daily life during this period. Yeh observed that even approaching middle age, Lin lived as an amiable and approachable gentleman:

The first time I met Lin Hsien-tang was in the spring of 1918. I was just an eighteen-year-old lad and Lin was already the famous “Third Prince of Azhaowu (阿罩霧三少爺)”… Lin was thirty-eight years old then… he was dedicated to advancing Taiwanese talents (獎掖後進)… Thanks to the recommendation of my teacher Shi Jiaben, I was lucky to receive financial aid from Mr. Lin, and become an overseas student in Japan… I went to Tokyo in August the same year… and lived with Mr. Lin in his own house “Yu Sheng An” over two months until the late October when Mr. Lin returned to Taiwan… This period is one of the memories I have of my life I cannot forget… There were many children of the extended Lin family in Tokyo at that time… On Sundays, festivals or school holidays, Mr. Lin always took us to Asakusa downtown to watch movies and eat grilled eels, or go to famous parks for a walk in Ueno, Shiba and Hibiya. Our trip usually ended with eating fried prawns

---

⁵ Luo Wanzhen, “Wai rou nei gang de Guanyuan xiansheng (Mr. Guanyuan-- A Man with a Gentle Exterior but a Righteous Heart),” 81.
⁶ Zhang Zhengchang, 106.
at Tian Jin or Western dining at Jingyang Xuan, or eating Salashina soba in Kanda…

We youth were treated as equal in the eyes of Mr. Lin… Once, Mr. Shi brought us a box of western-style cookies, and everyone was pleased and couldn’t wait to eat them. After a calculation, we all knew that the number of cookies was determined to be enough for all of us if we have one each, but not enough if we all wanted more than one cookie… We also knew that Youlong was fascinated with western-style cookies in particular and would not feel satisfied until he had three cookies or more… Understanding the situation, Mr. Lin announced pre-emptively in an unhurried and calm tone to the maid about to portion the cookies: “One cookie per child is enough (小孩子們一人一塊就夠了).” His deliberate injunction became an axiom (話柄) for us. Whenever we had western-style cookies, there was always someone who announced: “One cookie per child is enough” in Mr. Lin’s intonation, which always made us all burst into laughter…

Yeh’s anecdote illustrates Lin’s persona in the social, cultural and political circles in which he lived as a patrician figure, even at the relatively young age of thirty-eight. Yeh’s anecdote is also important as an expression of Lin Hsien-tang’s relationships with overseas Taiwanese students in Tokyo because it indicates the nature of inter-generational relationships in his attitude to younger educated Taiwanese who were born after Taiwan’s colonisation. In the 1920s, these inter-generational relationships would take on political force in that era of Taiwanese political movements. Therefore, although the period after the Tapani Incident in Taiwan was one of political repression, political action and discussion was being sustained in distinctive and discrete ways in Tokyo and this formed the basis the revival of Taiwanese

---

7 Azhaowu is the present-day Wufeng village in Taichung County. Yeh Jung-chung, Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century), 37-38.
political activism in the 1920s.

From the 1910s to the 1920s, there was a rapidly growing number of Taiwanese students studying in Tokyo (see table below). They as a whole could be seen as a coherent group with common characteristics: they were in their early twenties, were born into colonial Taiwan, and so were a product of Japanese colonial education policy. In this way they were the first generation of a colonial Taiwanese literati elite. They were in sharp contrast to the generation of their parents, who were an imperial Taiwanese elite, educated in the Qing system.

Table 4. Number of Taiwanese students in Tokyo around the 1910s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Zhang Zhengchang.8

The two generations, as defined by the education system in which they grew up, were in a dynamic political and social relationship. Lin Hsien-tang was educated under the Qing, but actively sought out the new reformist thinking that was circulating in China, Japan and globally and was exemplified by Liang Qichao. Through the institutions of education, he developed strong political and intellectual relationships with the new generation of politically-active Taiwanese emerging from the Japanese colonial education system.

8 Zhang Zhengchang, 104.
Yeh Jung-chung’s account of Lin Hsien-tang’s life tracks Lin’s relationships to the emerging generation of overseas Taiwanese students. In Yeh’s memoirs, he offers more than anecdotes about Lin’s persona and activities in Tokyo. He also points out that Lin Hsien-tang was one of the leading figures from the imperial Qing era who enjoyed a particular status among overseas Taiwanese students in Japan. Yeh’s description of Lin’s everyday life includes that “every Sunday his residence is always full of guests and lively conversations” ranging over Taiwan’s political future.9 Yeh is describing the social field in Tokyo in which key Taiwanese political relationships were formed and foundational ideas were circulated, and these would be the basis for subsequent political developments in Taiwan in the coming decade.

**Lin Hsien-tang and the Qifa Association**

Lin Hsien-tang’s times in his residence in Tokyo in the second half of the 1910s, and the relationship with younger overseas Taiwanese students10 began to build towards a revival of political activism in Taiwan.

In the winter of 1918, Lin hosted a formal gathering for around twenty Taiwanese students in Tokyo. Invitations were sent for the gathering which recorded its program of activities, and which included an address entitled “How to Improve the Status Quo of Taiwan (對臺灣當如何努力).”11 Therefore, the nature of the event could be clearly understood by the participants as a political gathering that would openly discuss Taiwan’s future as a Japanese colonial

---

9 Besides Lin Hsien-tang, another popular figure was Cai Huiru. Lin’s three sons and Cai’s three sons all studied in Tokyo, so they both visited there quite often. See Yeh Jung-chung, *Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)*, 101-102.

10 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuishilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir)*.

11 Quoted in Zhang Zhengchang, 106.
Unlike the gatherings Lin hosted previously, where the guests only talked informally about their visions of Taiwan’s future, the formal nature of this gathering signalled the end of the political chill after the Tapani Incident, and the initiation of a new period of Taiwanese political movements.

During the event, the possibilities for the future of Taiwan were explored and heatedly debated. Some argued that Taiwan should pursue greater autonomy in the Japanese imperial system, others said that Taiwanese should resume the anti-Japanese armed resistance. The final outcome of the gathering indicates that the topic of Law No. 63 of the colonial statute was discussed. Law No. 63 gave sweeping powers to the office of the governor of Taiwan to enact laws and regulations governing the Taiwanese without the oversight and consent of the Japanese Diet in Tokyo.

At the end of the gathering, a proposal was affirmed by the majority present to establish a new body, the Qifa Association. Qifa (啟發) can be translated “enlightening.” The main purpose of the Association was to campaign for the abolition of Law No. 63 of the colonial statute. Lin Hsien-tang and Lin Chenglu, an overseas Taiwanese student, were elected to be the president and general secretary of the Association respectively.

According to Zhang Zhengchang, the membership of the Qifa Association was reported to be more than a hundred, which was around one quarter of the total overseas Taiwanese students in Tokyo at that time. Besides Lin Hsien-tang, the association included a number of younger Taiwanese who would go on to be important activists and political leaders in the 1920s.

---

12 Huang Fusan, 31.
14 There were colonial Taiwanese elite such as Lin Chenglu (1886-1968; Meiji University), Cai Peihuo (1889-1983; Tokyo Higher Normal School (now called University of Tsukuba), Wang Michuan (1889-1942; Waseda University), Cai Shigu (1884-1951; Waseda University), Chen Xin (1893-1947; Keio University) and Wu Sanlian (1899-1988; Tokyo College of Commerce (today’s Hitotsubashi University)).
The revival of Taiwanese political activism, both within Taiwan and overseas after 1918 expressed the relationship between colonial policies and Taiwan’s political life, and was in the context of a complex set of relationship between Chinese and Korean politics as far back as from the end of the Qing dynasty, much of which took place in Tokyo.

For example, Chinese political activism was sustained right throughout this period in Japan. The Zhongguo Tongmeng Hui (中國同盟會), for instance, the precursor to the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) had been established by Sun Yat-sen in Tokyo in 1905 and formed from the merger of many Chinese revolutionary groups in the late Qing. Similarly, Korean students in Japan had formed several resistance groups in Tokyo in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese colonisation of Korea in 1911, attempting to bring pressure on their colonial government in Korea over similar issues of governance and discrimination experienced by the Taiwanese.

The period in the second half of the 1910s saw Taiwanese students and literati actively engaged with modernisers and activists from China and Korea in Japan. For example, some Taiwanese students joined up with Chinese students in 1918 to form the Shengying Association (聲應會). Shengying means sounds that echo. When the May Fourth Movement began in China and the March First Movement broke out in Korea in 1919, these political events took on a transnational dimension through the connections between Taiwanese, Chinese and Korean activists brought together by Japanese imperialism. Also, some Taiwanese students like Lin Chenglu and Cai Peihuo, for example, were on familiar terms with Liu Taeching and Cheong

---

15 The Zhongguo Tongmeng Hui, founded by Sun Yat-sen and Song Jiaoren in 1905, was a secret underground resistance devoted in revolutionary cause of overthrowing the Chinese Imperial Qing dynasty. The ideology of Sun Yat-sen also spread into some overseas Taiwanese students. For example, Jiang Weishui was deeply influenced by Sun’s ideology, and he was also a member of the Taiwan Tongmeng Hui. The Taiwan Tongmeng Hui was a branch of Zhongguo Tongmeng Hui. It was established by Weng Junming, the first Taiwanese who joined the Zhongguo Tongmeng Hui, in September 1910. Lin Bowei, 20.

16 Cited in Zhang Zhengchang, 108.
Yutai, the editors of the journals The Asia Review (亞細亞公論) and Korean Youth (青年朝鮮) respectively, to which they frequently submitted their writings.¹⁷ Cai Peihuo was even a member of the committee of the Asia Review.¹⁸

Although the Qifa Association represented an important expression of the revival of Taiwanese political activism after the Tapani Incident, the Association itself, however, was quickly overtaken by internal disputes. Within the Association, several factions were created on the basis of differences in political aspirations.

The leaders of each of the major two factions were Lin Hsien-tang and the Taiwanese student Lin Chenglu.¹⁹ Within the context of the Association as an expression of civic and political activism by Taiwanese, they represented a distinction between conservative activism and more thorough-going reformism. This distinction took on a generational dimension between those born before and after Japanese colonisation of Taiwan, and also different political styles and public personas. Lin Hsien-tang was landowner with inherited wealth and a classical Chinese education, while Lin Chenglu was an overseas student who mobilised the modern political subjectivity of Taiwan’s colonial era.


¹⁸ Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, Taiwan Sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi II, ryōtai igō no chian jyōkyō—Taiwan shakai yundō shi (Chronical of the Police Affairs of the Government-General of Formosa II: Security After the Japanese Governed Taiwan—The Development of Taiwanese Social Movement) (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1939; reprint, Tokyo: Ryuukeishosha Co. Ltd., 1973), 25.

¹⁹ Zhang Zhengchang, 109.
The conservatism and reformism of the factions was manifest in different political goals. While Lin Hsien-tang’s group prioritised the task of abolishing Law No. 63, Lin Chenglu’s group aspired to the more radical idea of establishing a Taiwanese parliament which he envisioned that it would serve as a legislative balance against the office of the governor.\(^{20}\)

Lin Chenglu’s advocacy of a Taiwanese parliament, that is a degree of Taiwanese self-rule, also articulated a growing and crucial Taiwanese political and cultural subjectivity. For Edward I-Te Chen, Lin Chenglu’s belief in a Taiwanese parliament represented “a definite expression of Formosan nationalism.”\(^{21}\) Lin emphasised a sense of belonging to a common Taiwanese cultural memory, and believed in a cultural distinction between Taiwanese and Japanese. Based on his belief, he rejected the idea Taiwan being culturally and politically assimilated into Japan, but neither did he advocate the idea of Taiwan’s incorporation into the new Chinese Republic.\(^{22}\)

Disputes within the Qifa Association escalated and fractured it irrevocably. The Association left very little in terms of identifiable political outcomes, although its legacy of ideas endured. In the end, the mishandling of the Association’s funds resulted in Lin Hsien-tang withdrawing his financial support, and the Qifa Association was brought to an abrupt end in 1919.\(^{23}\)

**Lin Hsien-tang and the New People’s Society**

Despite the failure of the Qifa Association in 1919, the revival of Taiwanese political activism continued and strengthened in the context of global politics, and a change in colonial policy from the Tokyo government who intended to opened up a new colonial era of “the

\(^{20}\) ibid., 109.


\(^{22}\) ibid.

\(^{23}\) Zhang Zhengchang, 110.
adoption of ‘cultural rule’ (bunka seiji).” In particular, the Taisho democracy period began to be felt in Taiwan. The Tokyo government headed by the Prime Minister Hara Takashi, the tenth post-Meiji Prime Minister, in office from 1918 to 1921, enacted a fundamental change in ruling policy for Taiwan by introducing civilian rule and a policy known as Integration.

In October 1919, Den Kenjirō, a member of the House of Peers, the upper house of the imperial Diet, was appointed as the first civilian governor in Taiwan with the major colonial objectives of assimilation and economic development.

In his inaugural speech made on the day after he arrived in Taiwan on October 11 1919, he outlined the change in Japan’s governing policy for Taiwan:

Taiwan is an integral part of Japan’s territories governed under the guidance of the Japanese Constitution… Based on this principle, the ruling policy for Taiwan should aim at assimilating Taiwanese to be loyal Japanese subjects with Japanese national spirit… We aim at carrying out the ruling principle. However, we should always take Taiwan’s current situation into consideration when implementing our actions… For Taiwan, a place so different from Japan in terms of the geography, people, language, and customs, we would only trouble ourselves if we try to forcibly implement the same Japanese law on this island. Therefore, we should first aim at implementing colonial education… Only thus can we bring political equality of the peoples on the island… (夫臺灣，構成日本之一部領土…因此，統治方針，皆以此大精神為前題，作種種經營設施，使臺灣民眾成為完全之日本臣民，效忠日本朝廷… 統治方針雖然如是，而當在實地施行時，對其施行方法，須為慎重查核… 對於地勢、民情、言語、風俗相異之臺灣民眾，如遽予實行與內地同一法律制度，勢必齾齾扞格，反招苦惱。必先致力推行教育… 使其到

---

Den’s statement contributed to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the development of the Taiwanese political movements as well as the formation of “the nascent ethnic consciousness”\(^\text{26}\) under colonial rule in the 1920s.

Under these changed political conditions for Taiwan, in Tokyo Lin Chenglu and Cai Huiru came together to form a new organisation, the New People’s Society (新民會), in March 1920.\(^\text{27}\) Lin Chenglu and other participants wanted Cai Huiru to lead the new group. Cai, however, declined and insisted that it should be led by Lin Hsien-tang. Lin Hsien-tang gave financial support to the Society, however, he was not very enthusiastic about participating in its activities.\(^\text{28}\) During the period after the dissolution of the Qifa Association, Lin Hsien-tang continued working on the political campaign for the repeal of the Law No. 63. In October 1919, for instance, Lin visited Den Kenjirō in Japan before he took up the office of governor in Taiwan, conveying his views of political reforms in Taiwan.\(^\text{29}\) In mid-1920, Lin met with Japanese politicians in order to build support for the repeal of Law No. 63.

From its establishment, the members of New People’s Society agreed on three basic goals.


\(^{27}\) The New People’s Society was established in Cai Huiru’s residence in Tokyo. Like Lin Hsien-tang, Cai Huiru was born in 1881. Cai relocated his business to Fuzhou after the Japanese arrival in 1895, but he still retained a close relationship with Taiwanese. He always traveled among Fuzhou, Shanghai, Taiwan, China and Tokyo. He joined the *Li she* in 1906, and was also a member of Taiwan Assimilation Society. He was popular among Taiwanese overseas students. Yeh Jung-chung, *Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century)*, 229-236.

\(^{28}\) Zhang Zhengchang, 111.

\(^{29}\) Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuishu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir)*.
They were to develop a political movement that aimed at reforming Taiwan’s colonial government, to publish a journal to inform the Japanese public of the condition of Taiwan and to enlighten people in Taiwan, and to solicit support from people from China.\(^ {30}\)

In the existing literature, there was no evidence to support the notion that New People’s Society members did gain any substantial Chinese aid. However, for the journal publication, members of the Society established a publishing company in Tokyo, and raised 7,500 Taiwanese yen from wealthy Taiwanese. Lin Hsien-tang donated 1000 Taiwanese yen.\(^ {31}\) On July 16 1920, a monthly journal called *Taiwan Youth* (*臺灣青年*), containing both Chinese and Japanese articles, was launched under the editorship of Cai Peihuo.\(^ {32}\) *Taiwan Youth* expanded into a daily newspaper *Taiwan Xin Min Bao* (*臺灣新民報*) in 1932, and operated as Taiwanese-run publication until the late 1930s.

Despite these successes, the New People’s Society faced the same problem of factionalism as the Qifa Association. The Society was divided in its goals for the level of autonomy for Taiwan it wished to achieve. Despite being a supporter of the Society, Lin did not take part in the intense debate about these different aspirations. He only played the role of “hosting the discussions and listening to members’ statements.”\(^ {33}\)

In November 1920, as these political activities continued, the Diet in Japan voted to extend Japanese law to Taiwan as much as possible. In these changes, Law No. 63 was retained as a supplement to the Japanese legal code in the cases where there was no appropriate Japanese law for Taiwanese or when, in the governor’s judgement, its implementation would be very

---

\(^{30}\) Quoted in Lin Bowei, 47.

\(^{31}\) Xie Chunmu, *Taiwanjin no yōkyū (The Taiwanese Claims)* (Taipei: Taiwan xinmin baoshe, 1931), 9.

\(^{32}\) Cited in Lin Bowei, 48.

\(^{33}\) Zhang Zhengchang, 112
difficult.\textsuperscript{34} Although the governor still retained arbitrary power under Law No. 63 under some special circumstances, this did represent a significant legal reform enacted by the Diet. Law No. 63 remained a political problem for many Taiwanese, but the urgency of the issue dissipated, and in a limited way the goal of the Qifa Association was realised.

This political and legal progress for Taiwan was reflected in changes in the New People’s Society. In December 1920, Lin Hsien-tang was appointed as president and Cai Huiru took up the role of vice-president. Around the same time, the majority of the members of the New People’s Society agreed to adopt Lin Chenglu’s idea of campaigning for a Taiwanese parliament. The process of the finalisation of the Society’s political goals as well as Lin Hsien-tang’s appointment as president, could be identified as a significant alignment of intergenerational compromise between the imperial generation and colonial generation.

Lin Hsien-tang’s role as the president of the Society conferred legitimacy drawn from his status as a leading Taiwanese citizen. It was also important in terms of his capacity with his political and cultural capital, to reconcile different views within the Society concerning its political goals. Finally, Lin’s access to the Japanese imperial government in Tokyo and the colonial government in Taipei made him a critical conduit for political ideas being cultivated by a new post-colonisation generation of young Taiwanese.

In the next decade, Taiwanese political movements proliferated, both in Taiwan and in Japan. The new governing policy of integration from 1919 was less repressive and Taiwanese activists took advantage of the political climate. They initiated a range of political movements and activities, and contended with colonial power and tested its limits. That dynamic relationship was most powerfully expressed in what was perhaps the defining political issue of the colonial period, the campaign for a Taiwanese parliament.

Lin Hsien-tang and the Petitions Movement (1921-1934)

As the New People’s Society was being established in Tokyo, a new group was formed in Taiwan, the Taiwan Cultural Association (臺灣文化協會). The Association was established by Jiang Weishui, a doctor in Taipei, in October 1921, and Lin Hsien-tang was conferred as the president of the Association at its founding.

The Taiwan Cultural Association claimed as its goals the improvement of Taiwan’s cultural standards (本會已助長臺灣文化之發達為目的). The Association expressed the institutionalisation of the emergent civil society in colonial Taiwan. It sponsored a variety of activities and classes open to the public, such as summer schools (夏季學校) and island-wide lecture tours (文化講習會). It also published bulletins (會報). The Association established dubaoshe (讀報社) or reading rooms for the public to read newspapers. It hosted workshops (講習會) that covered a wide range of topics including public health, women’s rights, astronomy and European history. Like the education campaign of the Taichung Middle School in the mid-1910s, the Taiwan Cultural Association enacted carefully defined activities rather than campaigns on broad political themes that could antagonise the colonial government.

With strong connections between Taiwan and metropolitan Japan through figures like Lin Hsien-tang, the 1920s and early 1930s were a period in which Taiwan’s civil society and political activism flourished, of which Taiwan Cultural Association was just a part.

---

35 Yeh Jung-chung, *Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)*, 334.

36 The summer schools were held in the Lai yuan in 1924, 1925 and 1926. They lasted for two weeks, recruited 40 students each time, and offered free accommodation and meals for the students. *ibid.*, 342-343.
These changes were exemplified by the petitioning of the Diet for the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament. During a fourteen-year period from 1921 to 1934, a total of fifteen petitions, roughly one a year, were submitted to the Imperial Diet in Japan. The purpose of each petition was to establish a Taiwanese parliament that would function as an independent legislature. The petitions called for a legislative body in which elected representatives would have power to enact laws and to approve colonial budgets put forward by the governor.\textsuperscript{37} The petitions took the form of lengthy statements that explained these political programs,\textsuperscript{38} aiming at justifying the Taiwanese demand for a voice through the formation of the parliament.

The petitioning that called for the creation of a Taiwanese parliament in Taiwan was arranged in Tokyo by some of the members of the New People’s Society. However, the first three petitions between 1921 and 1923 were not submitted to the Diet in the name of the New People’s Society, because some of the Society’s members were reluctant to be involved in such a potent political issue.\textsuperscript{39}

In 1923, the petitions were institutionalised in a new organisation in Japan, the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament (臺灣議會期成同盟會). The League was established mostly by members of the New People’s Society including Jiang Weishui and submitted subsequent petitions to the Diet under that name.

In Taiwan, the Taiwan Cultural Association took up the issue of a Taiwanese parliament. Although the Taiwan Cultural Association carefully delimited its activities as “cultural” in order to avoid antagonising the colonial government, it became the centre for the petitions movement in Taiwan itself. The Association became the key organisation for gathering signatures for the petitions in Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{38} ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} ibid., 483-484.
During the fourteen-year petitions movement, the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament and the Taiwan Cultural Association cooperated closely. Many key members, like Lin Hsien-tang, Jiang Weishui and Cai Peihuo had dual affiliations.

In terms of the different roles adopted by Taiwanese activists to enable the collaboration, Yeh Jung-chung notes with respect to the Taiwan Cultural Association’s publication, *Taiwan Youth*:

While the petitions movement led by the League can be seen as a diplomatic campaign that attempted to win support outside Taiwan (外交攻勢), *Taiwan Youth*, including the future publications of the journal *Taiwan*, and the newspapers *Taiwan Min Bao* and *Taiwan Xin Min Bao*, were understood as waging the [domestic] campaign (宣傳戰), and the Taiwan Cultural Association was in the vanguard of the movement that confronted the reality of the colonial government on the island (短兵相接的陣地戰).40

Yanaihara Tadao made a similar point. In the Chinese translation of his work, his point is rendered as “*yi shen tong gen* (異身同根),” which can be translated “different bodies with the same origins,” to describe the petitions movement in Tokyo and Taiwan.41

The table below details the fifteen petitions submitted to the Diet. The first petition was initiated among the activist members of New People’s Society at the time that Lin assumed the office of the president in December 1920. By January 1921, Lin and other members of the Society collected a total of 178 signatures from Taiwanese people in Japan and submitted the petition to the Diet just before its session in early 1921.

---

40 Yeh Jung-chung, *Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi* (*A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan*), 327.

41 Yanaihara Tadao, *Riben diguo zhuyi xia zhi Taiwan* (*Taiwan under the Japanese Imperialism*), 215.
The idea of the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament had attracted initial support from Taiwanese intellectuals and medical students like Jiang Weishui, who went on to establish the Taiwan Cultural Association in Taiwan later that year with Lin Hsien-tang’s support. After the submission of the petition to the Diet, Lin Hsien-tang returned to Taiwan. Taiwan

---

42 Data are extracted from Zhang Zhengchang, 116-119.
Shinbun (Taiwan News), the Japanese-run newspaper in Taiwan, on April 22, 1921, described the warm welcome Lin received:

As expected, the ship Xin nong wan that carried Lin Hsien-tang berthed in Keelung harbour at dawn on April 20. The night before Lin arrived, several dozen of his family and friends from Taichung and friends from Taipei were already awaited his arrival in Keelung… They boarded the ship before it was steamed into port... At night, a welcome party was held for Lin at [the restaurant] Chunfeng deyi lou (春風得意樓) by important and influential people in Taipei. An animated conversation was seen in the party. Everyone returned home after thoroughly enjoying themselves. The next morning, Lin took an express train to Taichung, where he knew that his family and his friends, who came all the way from places like Houli and Tanzi, already awaited him at the station. Lin arrived home after five o’clock in the evening.43

The petitions submitted by Taiwanese activists were given support by influential Japanese in order to be submitted to the Japanese Diet. According to Chen, petition supporters were politicians from the House of Representatives and the House of Peers, and also included political party leaders.44 Meanwhile, leading university professors like Yanaihara Tadao and Yoshino Sakuzō in Tokyo Imperial University gave support, and several leading newspapers, such as Tokyo Mainichi and Osaka Mainichi, also editorialised in favour of the petitions.45

43 Houli and Tanzi were the names of places in Taichung. Quoted in Yeh Jung-chung, Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan), 148.

44 For example, supporters from the House of Representatives included Abe Isoo (Social Democratic Party), Tagawa Daikichirō (Labour-Farmer Party). Supporters from the House of Peers were Watanabe Nobu (a leading criminal lawyer) and Sakatani Yoshio (one-time Finance Minister under Premier Saionji). Supporters of the two major political party leaders were Uzawa Sōmei (Seiyukai) and Shimada Saburō (Kenseikai). Cited in Edward I-Te Chen, “Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937,” 486.

45 ibid.
The widespread support from the Taiwanese and progressive political atmosphere of the Taisho Democracy period were part of the social conditions which stimulated the petitions movement. In December 1921, Lin Hsien-tang went to Japan in order to prepare for the second petition. On February 16, 1922, the second petition, signed by 512 Taiwanese, more than doubled the number of signatures given in the first petition, was submitted to the Diet by Lin. Among the Taiwanese petitioners this time, more than half were residing in Taiwan (See table below).

Table 6. Residence of Taiwanese petitioners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence/Numbers of literati</th>
<th>1st Petition of 1921</th>
<th>2nd Petition of 1922</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residing in Japan</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residing in Taiwan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other places</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zhang Zhengchang.  

The Colonial Government’s Stance on the Petitions

The increasing Taiwanese activism soon attracted the attention of the colonial government in Taiwan. The colonial government, under civilian governor Den, upheld Japanese law and its enforcement in Taiwan, and on this basis faced the dilemma that although the petitions movement was a challenge to colonial authority, it conformed to the rule of law. Therefore, the colonial government had limited legal recourse to suppress it but did not wish to see the

---

46 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).

47 Data are extracted from Zhang Zhengchang, 134-135.
petitions movement grow. The notion of a Taiwanese parliament, in which any electoral process would ballot all the residents in Taiwan, both the Taiwanese majority and Japanese settlers, would create very different political conditions in the colony and for colonial government officials.

This situation reflected a distinctive contradiction in Japan’s approach to colonisation and modernisation. Japan sought to be a modernising colonial power, and directed policy and resources at education, health and development in its colonial territories. But, at the same time, it sought to sustain imperial authority over Taiwan, and this created a complex negotiation of the contested boundary between imperial power and the power afforded to the Taiwanese by the experience of modernisation itself.

The following table shows the educational level of the Taiwanese petitioners, who gave their signatures in one or more of the fifteen petitions.

Table 7. Educational level of Taiwanese petitioners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literate</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>1,139</th>
<th>6.6%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>6,810</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary-equivalent</td>
<td>3,831</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>4,380</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17,262</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taiwan Shiryō Hozonkai (Association for the Preservation of Historical Materials on Formosa).48

---

48 Taiwan Shiryō Hozonkai (Association for the Preservation of Historical Materials on Formosa), Nihon tōjika no minzoku undō II: Seiji undō hen (Formosan Nationalist Movements under Japanese Rule II: History of Political Movements), 333.
The table shows that, twenty-five years after colonisation, a majority of signatories of the petitions had received some level of education in colonial Taiwan or metropolitan Japan. In this sense, therefore, the petitions movement could be understood as a political movement in Taiwan that mapped across social development, including education and urbanisation, which was the expressed outcome of colonial development policy.

At the very outset of the submission of the first petition, the governor Den Kenjirō clearly expressed his position of opposition to the Diet. In order to convince the Diet to reject the Taiwanese petition, the governor sought to link the problem of a potential Taiwanese independence movement with the petitions. In the petition committee of the House of Peers on February 28, 1921, Den said:

The aim of the Japanese rule in Formosa was not to make the island into a self-governing entity with legislative and financial autonomy, such as the one we see in various autonomous colonies of England. Rather, by elevating the cultural standard of Formosans to that of Japanese, it purports to convert the island into an area to which the Japanese constitution may eventually be extended…. The Formosan demand for a separate legislature, therefore, is incompatible with the basic policy of Japan. It is nothing more than a scheme to transform the island into an independent country not dissimilar to England’s Australia or Canada…49

The argument put forward by Den carried. The Diet did not accept the petition and in the following years, Den’s argument was reiterated by the successive Taiwan governors.50 As a result, all fifteen petitions were effectively dead proposals when they reached the petitions

50 ibid.
committees and were never debated in the formal sessions of the Diet and House of Peers.

In Taiwan, the colonial government contended with the leaders of the petitions movement. The governor attempted to entreat the Taiwanese from petitioning the Taiwanese parliament proposal by making concessions on the institutions of colonial authority.

On June 1 1921, after the submission of the first petition, the governor proclaimed a change in the regulation of the composition of the Consultative Council (Hyōgikai), a government advisory body comprised only of Japanese colonial officials in Taiwan. The governor changed the membership regulations to allow Taiwanese with high education levels or colonial experience to be eligible to be appointed. In mid-1921, Lin Hsien-tang was appointed as a Councillor. Yet, Lin continued the petitions movement despite the nomination, which indicated that the governor’s mollification and conciliation did not work on him.

The colonial officials then resorted to a more drastic response. In August 1922, after the submission of the second petition, an official order dismissing any Taiwanese involved in the petitions was sent to colonial offices and schools. Japanese companies also received similar instructions from the colonial officials. Monopoly licenses of Taiwanese merchants were withdrawn if they were supporters of the petitions. The Bank of Taiwan began to recall loans from Taiwanese who were active in the petitions movement, including Lin Hsien-tang, whose financial assets were tied closely to the bank.

---

51 ibid.
52 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir)*.
53 Edward I-Te Chen, “Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937,” 487. Also, in Yeh Jung-chung’s memoir, he said that he was forced to leave the sugar company, a company financed by the Japanese, due to his participation in the petitions movement. Yeh Jung-chung, *Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)*, 194.
In 1922, the administrator of Taichung prefecture pressured Lin to participate in Xiang Yang Hui (向陽會), literally, the Association for facing the rising sun, an official pro-Japanese group for influential Taiwanese. On September 29, 1922, Lin Hsien-tang and seven other Taiwanese leaders were summoned to meet Den Kenjirō at the request of the Taichung prefectural administration. In the meeting, Den expressed his opposition to the petitions movement, warned the Taiwanese that their petitions would never be accepted by either Houses, and suggested that they cease their political activities. To this, Lin Hsien-tan responded politely: “The most activist supporters of the petitions are Taiwanese students in Tokyo and the Taiwanese literati in Taiwan, so it is out of my reach to dissuade them just on my own… I understand Your Honour (貴總督), and hope that Your Honour would understand….”

Lin Hsien-tang did not concede in response to the governor’s request.

However, after the meeting, agents of the colonial government circulated a rumour, both in Taiwan and Japan, that Lin would give up the petitions and accede to the wishes of governor. The rumour had currency with some Taiwanese, particularly those far away in Tokyo and who were aware of Lin Hsien-tang’s involvement in either the Xiang Yang Hui or the meeting with Den. In public in Taiwan, Lin was accused of betraying the movement. The sarcastic term “eight fine horses (bajun, 八駿)” gained currency to describe Lin and seven other Taiwanese and their loyalty to the governor. The Taiwanese writer Xie Xinglou in Tokyo wrote a satire in Taiwan Youth entitled “Quanyang huo (犬羊禍),” “The Calamity of the Dog and the Goat,” to describe the way that Lin harmed the people. In the satire, Lin Hsien-tang was bewitched and deceived by a dog and a goat to support the colonial authorities. In October 1922, Lin received

---

54 Zhang Zhengchang, 141.
55 Yeh Jung-chung, Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan), 191.
56 ibid., 191. The satire was written by Xie Xinglou, under his pseudonym of Liu Shanjun. Zhang Zhengchang, 142.
a number of threatening letters from Japanese residents. Confronted with attacks and pressure from both the colonial officials and Taiwanese, Lin Hsien-tang was reported to be “in rather low spirits” by Yeh Jung-chung.

Another anecdote recorded by Yeh also illustrated the coercion by colonial officials over Lin through close surveillance. According to Yeh, a Japanese policeman Mr. Miyazaki, who was well-versed in the Taiwanese language, was designated to call on Lin’s house every single day to inquire into Mr. Lin’s private affairs and social life. Under this pressure, before the third petition was submitted in 1923, Lin announced his temporary withdrawal from the petitions.

Lin Hsien-tang’s temporary withdrawal from political activity in Taiwan was acknowledged by himself as being the result of the coercion of Japanese officials. He later confided to his friends that his participation in the Taiwanese movements risked jeopardising his financial assets tied to the Bank of Taiwan.

The colonial government applied pressure to Lin and some of his business and institutional interests but failed to foment disunity between the Taiwanese petitioners. After Lin’s temporary withdrawal, the leadership of the petitions movement temporarily shifted to the younger Taiwanese like Cai Peihuo and Jiang Weishui. They took over Lin’s role and carried on the third, fourth and fifth petitions with Lin’s continued financial support.

58 Yeh Jung-chung, Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan), 191.
59 ibid., 192.
61 In Yeh Jung-chung’s memoir, he recalled that Cai told him that it cost thirty thousand to fifty thousand Taiwanese yen yearly to run the petitions movement, and Lin Hsien-tang was
In early 1923, Cai Peihuo and other younger Taiwanese leaders felt that there was a need to create a political organisation with its headquarters in Taiwan. Cai submitted an application to Taipei Police Headquarters applying to launch the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament. But, as could be expected, his application was denied. Yet, he did not give up. After Cai submitted the third petition to the Diet in Japan, he then applied to establish the League to the Tokyo Police, and the application was approved. The League then so formed in Tokyo. It came to gradually replace the role of New People’s Society in campaigning for a Taiwanese parliament.\footnote{Yeh Jung-chung, \textit{Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)}, 221.}

The League in Tokyo cooperated closely with the Taiwan Cultural Association in Taiwan. In supporting the activities held by the Association in Taiwan, many overseas Taiwanese students studying in Japanese higher education, for example, returned to Taiwan during their summer recess and were speakers in public lectures, one of the most popular activities held by the Association. The following table shows the steady growth of the number of public lectures run by the Association.

---

Table 8. Public lectures held in 1923-1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinchu</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tainan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>132</strong></td>
<td><strong>315</strong></td>
<td><strong>315</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yeh Jung-chung.63

In Yeh Jung-chung’s memoir, he described how the lectures were welcomed by the Taiwanese, particularly those living in rural areas: “…the speakers were greeted with marching bands and sedan chairs in a typical grand reception in the countryside, as if they were [the god] Mazu…”64

However, the operation of the League in Tokyo and the Association in Taiwan attracted the increasingly negative attention of the colonial government, and precipitated retaliation. In the early morning on December 16, 1923, the governor launched a swift attack on Taiwanese leaders involved in the movement. The Japanese officials were reported to have raided Taiwanese properties from Yilan to Kaohsiung and arrested forty-one leading Taiwanese within

63 Data are extracted from Yeh Jung-chung, *Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)*, 351.

64 Mazu is one Chinese patron saint. Yeh Jung-chung, *Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)*, 348.
The event, known as the “Incident of Violation of the Police Law (治安警察違反事件),” was a shocking moment for Taiwanese all over the island.

Yeh Jung-chung wrote an account of his personal experiences of the Incident. According to Yeh, December 16 was a normal day and neither he nor Lin Hsien-tang were aware of the planned crackdown: “Lin Hsien-tang and Zhuang Yiruo had been to Guanziling hotspring the previous morning. Lin had chronic pain around his waist and bowel disorders, so he often visited Guanziling for a remedial trip… After seeing them set off, I did not return to Wufeng that day. Together with Lü Panshi, I stayed at a house of his eighth uncle Lü Jiyuan that night.”

However, the next morning the house was raided by colonial officers:

Between six or seven o’clock or so, I heard some sound from downstairs. I did not really pay attention to it at first, but I became startled after being informed that police were searching the house. I went downstairs. I saw a plainclothes policeman blocking the front door, and three policemen searching the master room and study room. It was not until nine o’clock that we were allowed to go outside of the house. I realised how serious the arrests were going to be that day after I inquired of other Taiwanese in the neighbourhood. I called Mr. Lin straightaway, and told him what had just happened. Lin hurried back to Taichung at three o’clock that afternoon...

The arrests were a retaliation for the activism of the Taiwan Cultural Association and the Tokyo-based League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament. Taiwanese activists used the gap between the two sites of institutional and political power in Tokyo and colonial Taiwan as a tactic of political resistance against the colonial government. In this way, they leveraged the deep links that overseas Taiwanese has established in Tokyo as imperial subjects.

---

65 ibid., 235-238.
66 ibid., 238-239.
67 ibid., 239.
The colonial officials responded very aggressively to this sophisticated challenge to their authority. However, this prompted a coordinated counter-response by Taiwanese activists, under the leadership of Lin after he returned to Taichung.

On the day of the Incident, Lin coordinated the distribution of food and supplies to arrested Taiwanese from Taichung. Lin then dispatched Yeh Jung-chung the next day to secretly go to Taipei to facilitate communication among the Taiwanese. As part of the sweep of arrests across the island, the colonial government issued no statements or communication about the crackdown and Yeh’s mission to Taipei included meeting with a few Taiwanese and a Japanese reporter from the *Asahi Shinbun (Asahi News)* from Tokyo. Because of the control of information by the colonial government, the *Asahi Shinbun* had no reporting of the event. However, like the deployment of the Tokyo police in the approval of League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament, *Asahi Shinbun* represented an alternative site of power for Taiwanese activists in their tactics of resistance. The newspaper was not under the control of the colonial government and could not be censored by it. Its subsequent reporting of the crackdown became a key conduit for information among Taiwanese activists. Yeh Jung-chung detailed:

After dinner, I visited Mr. Naoya, a reporter from the *Asahi Shinbun*, in the night without star or moonlight. I told him what happened yesterday, and he apparently was not aware of the events at all.... I asked him to publish a story about the Incident as soon as possible, and liaise with the politicians who always gave their support to the Taiwanese petitions movement… I felt much relieved after he promised me that he would. Then, I went to visit Jiang Weichuan in Da’an Hospital in Dadaocheng (now it is Yenping North Road). He was mobilising members from the Union of Workers, and organising a political demonstration… Lin Hsien-tang knew what Jiang was planning. He was very worried that Jiang would fall into a trap set up by the Bureau of Police… Jiang took Lin’s advice...
At 6am the next morning, I took a train to Keelung Harbour to look for a berthed ship *Yinpan Wan* (its route is between Japan and Taiwan) where a friend of mine worked as a waiter. I entrusted him with three important letters that I asked him to mail for me only after he landed in Kobe (because the police would check the mail in the on-board post boxes) …

Yeh Jung-chung’s letters sent in Japan provided the first news about the Incident received by the Taiwanese in Tokyo and were followed by the coverage in the *Asahi Shinbun*. The colonial government had attempted to limit the flow of information about its actions within Taiwan, but by the 1920s, Yeh’s letter and the reporting in the *Asahi Shinbun* showed the way Taiwanese public life and civil society had developed and become sufficiently integrated into metropolitan Japan for the control of information by the colonial government to be ineffective.

The colonial government arrested eighteen Taiwanese leaders who were imprisoned from December 1923 to early 1925 and subjected to lengthy hearings and trials. However, the fourth and fifth petitions were still submitted to the Diet in 1924 by remaining Taiwanese members of the League and the Taiwan Cultural Association. Although Lin Hsien-tang was made to withdraw from the petitions movement at the end of 1922, he showed his support for the 1924 petition by hosting a political event that symbolically spoke to the authoritarian nature of the colonial government. In mid-1924, the colonial government staged a conference called Youlizhe Daohui (Convention of the Powerful, 有力者大會), to which it invited colonial residents who expressed support for the colonial government. The *Lin Xiantang Nianpu* reports that the attendees were a group of Taiwanese gentlemen who had shared interests with the colonial government, alongside seven or eight prostitutes. Shortly after, on July 3 1924, Lin

---

68 ibid., 240.

69 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng*
Hsien-tang organised conventions called Wulizhe Dahui (Convention of the Powerless, 無力者大會), in Taipei, Taichung and Tainan, as a response to the earlier colonial event. He himself was one of the lectures in Taichung. In addition to Lin continuing to find ways to support to the petitions movement, Lin remained actively involved in the Taiwan Cultural Association. He also hosted a summer school in the Lin residence Lai Yuan in August 1924.

In the meantime, trials were held for the arrested activists in 1924, and they received the support of being defended by noted criminal lawyers like Watanabe Nobu. Jiang Weishui and other seventeen Taiwanese leaders including Cai Peihuo, Cai Huiru and Lin Youchun were acquitted on charges on August 18, 1924. However, an appeal was lodged by the colonial prosecutor, and retrials were held in October, and the defendants were found guilty. These outcomes were appealed against by the defendants, until at a third trial in February 1925, seven Taiwanese including Jiang Weishui and Cai Peihuo were sentenced to four months in prison, while others were either fined or finally acquitted.

While these activists were in prison in early 1925, Lin Hsien-tang made the decision to return to Taiwanese politics and lead the petition movement. Lin’s return to a leadership role had an impact on the petitioning in terms of the numbers of signatories. In 1923 and 1924,
when the colonial government was working to suppress Taiwanese activism, only 287 and 71 signatures respectively were secured. In 1925, for the sixth petition that number jumped to 782, and then 1,996 and 2,470 in the seventh and eighth petitions in 1926 and 1927.

Despite the growth in the numbers of Taiwanese petitioners after Lin’s return to a leadership role, there was a message from the Tokyo government that represented a major setback for the aims of Taiwanese petition movement. Responding to an inquiry by members of the House of Representatives in early 1926, the Japanese Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō, made it clear that “Japan, including Formosa, is one country. There cannot be two legislative bodies.” In another response by Prime Minister Wakatsuki to Sakatani Yoshirō, a member of the House of Peers, he also pointed out that the creation of Taiwanese parliament would be in violation of the Japanese Constitution. The message which Wakatsuki delivered was clear. Despite the receptiveness of the petitions by the Diet, these petitions stood very little chance of being accepted in either House.

Lin Hsien-tang and other Taiwanese had recognised the fate of future petitions, but for them, while the Diet continued to accept them, petitioning remained an important practice of resistance which they could use to campaign for Taiwanese political rights. The members of the League as a whole continued to support the petitions movement until the fifteenth and final petition in 1934. In the context of the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s, on September 2, 1934, Lin and other twenty-nine key members of the League jointly issued a statement terminating of the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament.

---

75 Quoted in Zhang Zhengchang, 153.
Lin Hsien-tang’s Relations with the Taiwan Cultural Association, Taiwan Popular Party, and the Taiwan Federation for Local Autonomy

The activities of the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament were unsuccessful, but in addition to the opposition of both Tokyo and colonial government, Taiwanese activism of this period was also beset by growing radicalisation and factionalism among members of the League and the Taiwan Cultural Association. This challenged the period of unity in the first half of the 1920s between the founding of the New People’s Society and the Taiwan Youth journal, and the active period of the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament and the Taiwan Cultural Association.

The suppression of activism, including the Incident of the Violation of the Police Law in 1923, had a great impact upon the Taiwanese, particularly those who were younger and more radical. Some became radical enough to move from the centrist political liberalism exemplified by Lin Hsien-tang to a belief in socialism and communism, which mobilised the political categories of labour and the peasantry in Taiwan. The emergence of leftist Taiwanese was an important reason for the factionalism among the members of Taiwanese political organisations.

The unity of Taiwan Cultural Association was undermined by its intensifying factional strife from 1926. In a meeting held in September 1926, for example, members of the Association argued vehemently over political ideologies and disputed over the organisational regulations of the Association. These arguments centred on whether the Association should transform from a cultural organisation to a political organisation.77

In examining the intensifying factional strife within the Taiwan Cultural Association, Lin Hsien-tang’s diary, Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji, is an important source that provides a rich first-

77 “Zhengzhi jieshe de taolunhui (Discussion on Political Association),” Taiwan Min Bao, November 7, 1926, 6-7. For the references to the left-wing ideologies supported by the radical Taiwanese like Lian Wenqin and Wang Minchuan, see Huang Songxian, Taiwan wenhua xiehui de sixiang yu yundong (1921-1931) (The Ideology and Movements of Taiwan Cultural Association (1921-1931)) (Taipei: Haixia xueshu Publishing, 2008), 159-162.
hand account and detailed information on Taiwanese activism at this time. According to Lin’s diary, the problems of radicalisation and factionalism eventually culminated in an election held on January 3, 1927, in which leftist factions dominated the results. In the election, Lin Hsien-tang, Cai Peihuo, Jiang Weishui and Peng Huaying were the only conservative members to be elected to the leadership committee of the Association. However, Lin immediately resigned, triggering an eruption of division among members. Lin Hsien-tang recorded in his diary:

My resignation of the post of a committee member was followed by Cai Peihuo, Jiang Weishui and Peng Huaying, who resigned from their positions and left the committee on the spot in succession. Their departures threw others into confusion immediately… (余首先起辭委員，次培火、次渭水、次華英，彼三人辭後，即刻退場，因而會場混亂…)

The conservative members then left the Association. However, Lin Hsien-tang held back his resignation from taking effect immediately because “based on the situation, I was afraid that my departure would harm the interests of the overall situation if I left on the spot like them. Therefore, I agreed to remain as a committee member, but with two conditions. First, I could not be elected the chair of the committee. Second, I would remain as a committee member only until the date I planned to set off for a journey to Europe (余觀此情形，若似彼三人之一蹴不顧，恐有害於大局，乃付兩條件而承諾委員。一、不可選余為委員長，二、負委員之名義至於歐遊出發之日止).”

After the meeting, through January 1927, Lian Wenqing with other leftist members of the Association, repeatedly asked Lin Hsien-tang to stay in support of the leftist-dominated

78 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji yi, 1927, 15.
79 ibid.
leadership and take up the post of the chair of the committee.\textsuperscript{80} However, Lin declined.

Lian Wenqing’s attempt to retain Lin Hsien-tang as committee chair despite the ideological division within the Taiwan Cultural Association can be read as an illustration of the nature of Taiwan’s political and public life in this period. Lian Wenqing’s actions towards Lin Hsien-tang showed both Lin’s personal resources, social status and political capital and also the salience of the conservative politics that Lin’s represented in that context. On this basis, one could speculate that were Lin’s resignation to have been accepted, the effect would have been to delegitimise the Association. Similarly, Lin’s capacity to mobilise elite Taiwanese and his relationship with the colonial government remained meaningful despite the schisms in the Association.

Despite Lian’s efforts, and Lin’s agreement to remain in the leadership committee, the Taiwan Cultural Association began to be riven with division, leading to the Association’s break up. Writing about the end of the Association as an observer, Yeh Jung-chung directed criticism at Jiang Weishui for appeasing and failing to counteract the rise of a left-wing faction in the Association.\textsuperscript{81}

After the split of its more conservative leadership members from the Taiwan Cultural Association, the new leadership of the Association took it further to the left through affiliations with other radical political groups emerging in Taiwan at this time. They expressed opposition to the colonial government and called for a peasant movement. Yeh Jung-chung described that the Association became like “an affiliated group (外廂團體) of the Taiwan Communist Party,”\textsuperscript{82} advocating class struggle, and no longer a cultural association as its name denoted at

\textsuperscript{80} ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{81} Yeh Jung-chung, \textit{Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)}, 383. Also, Huang Songxian held the same view. Huang Songxian, 146.
\textsuperscript{82} Yeh Jung-chung, \textit{Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)}, 397.
its founding.

As an expression of the radicalisation of the Association that followed the split, it no longer supported the petitions movement, and went so far as to declare opposition to the ninth petition in early 1928.83

At the end of the 1920s, with Japan severely impacted by an economic crisis caused by the Great Depression and Japan’s increasing imperial activity in China, especially Manchuria, politics in Tokyo shifted again towards a hard-right position. After the Tokyo government launched nationwide arrests of suspected communists in April 1929 and the following year, in February 1930, most of the leaders of the Association were arrested by the colonial government and the Association was brought to an end.84

After their withdrawal from the Taiwan Cultural Association in 1927, the more conservative members including Jiang Weishui and Cai Peihuo decided to establish a new group. However, indicating the shifting political terrain at the end of the 1920s in Taiwan, rather than a formal association or society, they decided to form a political party. This was also in the context of the lack of any institutions in Taiwan in which a political party could conventionally function.

Therefore, the notion of political party tested the boundaries of colonial authority, and as indication of this, a process of negotiation with the colonial government took place that included Lin Hsien-tang. In May 1927, Lin Hsien-tang had set off for his journey around the world, returning after twenty months in December 1928. Two months later, in July 1927, approval was granted by the colonial police after repeated refusal, and the Taiwan Popular Party

83 Zhang Zhengchang, 223.
(臺灣民眾黨) was formed. Lin Hsien-tang and Cai Peihuo were listed as consultants to the party. The Party declared aims were to establish a people-oriented politics (民本政治), develop a fair economic system and eliminate social inequities. The Party also called for greater local autonomy in Taiwan’s counties, and the development of a labour movement. However, it was not long before the Party experienced its own internal rivalries and factionalism. While the more activist members led by Jiang Weishui emphasised the importance of supporting a labour movement, the conservative leaders, led by Cai Peihuo, argued that promoting a labour movement would only elicit colonial government’s repression. However, indicating that Jiang’s group became the dominant stream in the party, by 1929, a labour movement had grown under the leadership of Jiang, taking the form of labour unions and strikes. These were met with police action by the colonial government.

The Taiwan Popular Party therefore began to take on some of the radical politics of the Taiwanese Cultural Association, despite its earlier ideological split on those grounds. In the meantime, Cai Peihuo and other moderate members of the Taiwan Popular Party, including Lin Hsien-tang, stepped back from the Taiwan Popular Party as it became more radical. While their withdrawal consolidated the move to the left of the Taiwan Popular Party, they themselves decided to form a separate and more conservative organisation.

The preparation for establishing a new organisation began in January 1930. During a gathering in Beitou, Lin Hsien-tang, Cai Peihuo and other moderate leading Taiwanese like Cai Shigu had concluded that they would establish a group with limited purpose of reforming local

---

85 Yeh Jung-chung, Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan), 426.
86 Taiwan Shiryō Hozonkai (Association for the Preservation of Historical Materials on Formosa), Nihon tōjika no minzoku undō II: Seiji undō hen (Formosan Nationalist Movements under Japanese Rule II: History of Political Movements), 429.
autonomy and it would be acceptable to the colonial government. Later, Yang Zhaojia, a wealthy Taiwanese landowner from central Taiwan who was the president of New People’s Society in Tokyo at that time, responded to a request from Lin Hsien-tang and returned to Taiwan to preside over the future organisation.

On August 17, 1930, these moderate Taiwanese established the “Taiwan Federation for Local Autonomy (臺灣地方自治聯盟).” It was an organisation “for the sole acclaimed purpose of improving the existing system of colonial self-government.” Lin Hsien-tang was invited to be the advisor to the Federation.

Members of the Taiwan Federation for Local Autonomy distinguished themselves from their rival groups like the Taiwan Popular Party in two ways. Firstly, they disavowed the politics of class struggle, and kept their political goals within the limits imposed by Taiwan’s colonial ordinances. The meetings were even held in Japanese. Secondly, in the context of the wariness of the colonial government towards the Taiwanese political organisations, the Federation included the membership of several Japanese and some Taiwanese who had strong and close connections to the colonial government. Chen described the inclusion of these members as a way of being “doubly cautious.”

The rejection by the Federation of the contemporary politics of class struggle led to it being challenged by left-wing Taiwanese political groups. The Federation was under constant attack.

---

87 Yeh Jung-chung, *Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)*, 504.

88 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).


90 Yeh Jung-chung, *Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)*, 504.

For example, the Taiwan Popular Party expelled all its members who joined the Federation.\textsuperscript{92} Lin Hsien-tang noted in diary entry another example of an attack from left-wing Taiwanese.

On August 18, 1930, Lin wrote:

Liu Ming’en came to visit me at midday today and reported that the public lectures held by the Federation last night was interrupted. None of the lecturers, who were Shigu, Zhaojia, Qingyao, Zhaoqing, Yuanhuang, Suixing, and Jung-chung, escaped the verbal assault from the members from Taiwan Cultural Association, the League of Taiwanese Workers and the Farmers’ Union. Although there was an audience of over one thousand, there were only twenty or so trouble-makers. The public lecture became an uproar of voices, which resulted in the suspension of the lectures by the police… (午劉明恩來，報告昨夜在樂舞台自治聯盟所主催之演講會，辯士式穀、肇嘉、清耀、朝清、元煌、遂性、榮鐘，無一人不受文協、農組、工友總聯盟之惡語相傷，聽眾千餘人，而搗亂之分子僅有二十餘人，會場因之不能肅靜，警察取締之…)\textsuperscript{93}

In January 1931, five months after Lin’s assumption of the advisor to the Federation for the Attainment of Local Autonomy, he resigned from his post as a consultant to the Taiwan Popular Party.\textsuperscript{94} On February 19, 1931, the governor cancelled the permission for the Taiwan Popular Party.\textsuperscript{95} After that, the Federation was the only Taiwanese political organisation

\textsuperscript{92}Yeh Jung-chung, \textit{Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi} (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan), 505.


\textsuperscript{95}Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, \textit{Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu} (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography
registered in Taiwan. However, the Federation ultimately did not attract enough support from the Taiwanese because, as Chen observed, “to many Formosans, however, the League was at best an organization of landlords and wealthy merchants and at worst a Japanese puppet willing to compromise principles for personal gain.”

96 Although several attempts were made by its members to rally more Taiwanese for support during a period from 1932 to 1934, these attempts were failures. In August 1937, the Federation dissolved as Japanese militarism intensified and after then, no Taiwanese political organisations were able to function.

**Lin Hsien-tang as a Figurehead**

The preceding sections examined the growing political activism in Taiwanese society up to the mid-1930s. Lin Hsien-tang was a leading figure in many groups that engaged and contended with Japanese imperialism in complex ways. There was overlapping membership between many of the activist organisation but also divisions and schisms over political aspirations and tactics. Despite the tense interpersonal relationships within these many groups, taken together they express the development of a very active and meaningful civil society in Taiwan in the 1920s and 1930s.

After the emergence of a leftist faction in the Taiwan Cultural Association in January 1927, and the split away of more conservative members including Cai Peihuo and Jiang Weishui and himself, as noted above, Lin Hsien-tang decided to again recuse himself for a period of time from Taiwan’s political scene as he did after the Tapani Incident. The trajectory of Lin Hsien-tang’s political activism after the Taiwan Cultural Association was therefore different through this period from 1927 to 1929 from that of his Taiwanese contemporaries with similar political

---

experiences. In comparison to Jiang Weishui and Cai Peihuo, whose political activism continued through the late 1920s and into the early 1930s in Taiwan, Lin Hsien-tang’s politics were signalled by a journey he had been determined to take around the world, from May 1927 to December 1928.97

In the edited volume of Lin Hsien-tang’s writings during his journey, Huan qiu youji (環球遊記), which can be translated as Travel Account From Around the World, he noted at the very the beginning that he has been interested in embarking on the journey (蓄志漫遊) for eighteen years, and the idea was inspired by the time he took his sons Panlong and Youlong, at the age of ten and nine, to study in Tokyo.98 Prompted by the Association’s spilt in 1927,99 from May 1927, Lin Hsien-tang left Taiwan’s political life and went on a twenty-month journey to South East Asia, North Africa, Europe, America, and Japan, with his son Lin Youlong.

Lin Hsien-tang’s long journey was significant both in terms of Taiwanese politics and also for his personal life. Lin’s journey away from Taiwan’s politics, like the split in the Taiwan Cultural Association that precipitated Lin’s trip, was an expression of the changing terrain of politics in colonial Taiwan in the 1920 and specifically the emergence of a left-wing politics.

97 Lin Hsien-tang was urged not to embark on this journey by Cai Huiru, Jiang Weishui, Cai Peihuo and other Taiwanese. They wished that Lin could donate the fare, up to forty thousand Taiwanese yen, to the publishing of the future daily newspaper, Taiwan Min Bao. Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji yi, 1927, 101. Taiwan Min Bao was permitted to be published weekly in Taiwan in July 1927. Its first publication was issued on August 1, 1927. Yeh Jung-chung, Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century), 622.

98 Lin sought to take it into action after both his sons graduated from universities, who did in 1925 and 1926 respectively. However, his journey was delayed by the public and private things. Lin Hsien-tang, “Huan qiu youji (Travel Account From Around the World),” in Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji — yizhu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Posthumous Work), ed. Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji bianzuan weiyuanhui (Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang) (Taipei: Haixia xueshu Publishing, 2005), 1.

Up to 1927, as signified by the split in the Taiwan Cultural Association, the kinds of conservative politics and accommodating political practices exemplified by Lin Hsien-tang in his involvement in the numerous organisations, were dominant. After then, Taiwanese politics and the broader circumstance of Japanese imperial governance began to shift towards extremes.

From 1927, many political movements Lin had been engaged in took a turn towards a leftist politics through the end of the decade. During the election in January 1927 for the leadership of the Taiwan Cultural Association, Lin and his supporters were identified as conservative Taiwanese literati, and supplanted by more radical left-wing Taiwanese. The election was in a sense a marker of the change in Lin Hsien-tang’s political and social leadership in Taiwan, as his conservative politics and tactics of engagement with the colonial government were out of step with this shifting political terrain in which he found himself increasingly marginalised.

After the Association’s split in 1927, Yeh Jung-chung observed that Lin Hsien-tang withdrew “with an increasingly passive attitude.”100 Luo Wanzhen made a similar comment regarding Lin’s changed attitude to engaging with Taiwanese political movements in the Lin Xiantang Nianpu. For Luo, Lin’s long journey represented a statement regarding his feelings about Taiwan. Although Luo acknowledged that Lin’s stay in Japan, as part of his journey, had something to do with Lin’s health problems, Luo tended to look at it more as something associated with Lin’s resistance to the ongoing Taiwanese political movements. He recalled:

… Although Lin suffered from migraines, this health problem was not that serious from our perspective… We think that it perhaps had a lot to do with the politics because it was not long ago that the Taiwan Cultural Association split. If Mr. Lin returned to Taiwan at that time, he would definitely wind up with the lobbyists sent by the Association, which

---

100 Yeh Jung-chung, Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century), 49.
Lin disliked very much. Second, Lin’s long stay in Japan suggested that he probably needed some more time to carefully think over the new plans for future Taiwanese movements and Taiwan’s political reforms. Mr. Lin indeed needed time to think over these problems (… 雖有頭昏之疾，但據我們旁觀情形並不如許嚴重… 我們現在追想起來似乎政治作用較多，蓋當時文協分裂未久，先生若立即南旋必再被文協左派諸人糾纏不清，此事為先生所衷心懼惡者，其次文協分裂後，臺灣民族運動之陣線亦須調整，今後對於台政改革亦應確立新的路線，這些問題均須先生加以一番檢討考慮者). 101

While Lin travelled the world, his political activities were limited. According to the Lin Xiantang Nianpu, although Lin was nominated as an advisor to Taiwan Popular Party in July 1927 after he left Taiwan, there was no record to indicate that he was active in support of the party. Even during his eight-month stay in Tokyo at the end of his journey, his political activity was confined to the specific political issues that interested him, such as the petitions movement, to which he consented to give his signature to the ninth petition proposal.

In April 1927, Lin Hsien-tang’s son Youlong married Aiko, daughter of a well-to-do Japanese family. 102 Then, the following month, Lin Hsien-tang left Taiwan and went on a world cruise with Youlong on May 15, 1927. From Keelung Harbour in Taiwan, he travelled through Xiamen and Hong Kong, where he met with old friends, and continued on to Singapore, Penang, Sri Lanka and Cairo, where he toured each city. By way of Naples and the island of Corsica,

101 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir).

he landed at the Marseilles port in France on June 20, 1927. There he met with his other son Lin Panlong, who made his way from England to meet Lin and Youlong.\textsuperscript{103}

Lin Hsien-tang wrote extensively on his trip. He gave an emotional account of his meeting with Panlong in Marseille. He used the first half of a classical proverb, “qianli ta xiang yu guzhi (千里他鄉遇故知),” which means that after a thousand miles in a distant land, meeting an old friend [is like refreshing rain after a long drought], to described his happiness as “beyond expression and replaced by the running tears on my face.”\textsuperscript{104} From then on, Lin and his two sons toured Europe together for more than eight months. During this period, they visited over forty cities in France, Britain, Germany, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Spain and Switzerland. In March 1928, Lin Panlong returned to the University of Oxford to study and Lin Hsien-tang and Lin Youlong continued their trip to America. In May 1928, Lin Hsien-tang and Youlong arrived in Tokyo, the end of their trip, and stayed for eight months.

On the long journey, even after his arrival in Japan at the end of the trip, Lin Hsien-tang continued to write about his experiences. The large volume of writings of a total of 200,000 Chinese characters were serialized in the \textit{Taiwan Min Bao (臺灣民報)}, the newspaper run by the Taiwan Cultural Association. Starting in August 1927, three months after Lin started the journey, his travelogues were published in 152 issues until October 1931.\textsuperscript{105} His work was popular among Taiwanese readers. His informative writing on Western politics as well as his exotic experiences abroad were part of his cultural legacy that were claimed to have helped

\textsuperscript{103} Lin Hsien-tang, “Huan qiu youji (Travel Account From Around the World),” 14.
\textsuperscript{104} ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Xu Qianhui, “Rizhi shiqi tai ren lv wai youji xi lun—yi Li Chunsheng, Lian Heng, Lin Xiantang wei fenxi chang yu (Study of Taiwanese Travelogues—Based on the Writings of Li Chunsheng, Lian Heng and Lin Xiantang)” (master’s thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 2002), 10.
Lin’s writing was analytical in nature, with particular attention to the history and politics of the places he visited. In his writing about Cairo, for instance, he gave an account of Egypt’s history, and attributed the realisation of the Egyptian independence in 1922 to many revolutionaries who had shed their blood in desolate deserts. In another example, in Lin’s writing about London, he described the administrative systems of the City of London and also Britain’s parliamentary system. In a section of his writing titled “Scotland,” Lin gave an account of his trip to Edinburg, but also the English cities like Manchester, Liverpool and York en route. He also described that he heard about King George V and his family members doing charity work on the street and how the King helped a child retrieve a toy bear. He described King George V as being a people’s emperor (皇帝民众化) and predicted that Britain would be the monarchical state with the longest history.

Yeh Jung-chung in his epilogue to Lin’s published account of his world trip, noted that in Lin’s visit to Morocco he was surprised that even a small country could gain independence. Yeh wrote in the epilogue that Lin said, “there is no land and no people that cannot be independent.”

107 Lin Hsien-tang, “Huan qiu youji (Travel Account From Around the World),” 12.
108 ibid., 39.
109 Yeh Jung-chung, “Huan qiu youji jiaoding houji (Huan Qiu Youji Epilogue),” in Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—yizhu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Posthumous Work), ed. Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji bianzuan weiyuanhui (Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang) (Taipei: Haixia xueshu Publishing, 2005), 187. Note that Morocco was still under Spanish and French authority in 1928.
In Lin Hsien-tang’s *Huan qiu youji*, as the examples given above, he usually included both objective observation and subjective experience, depending on the position which he adopted to describe his experiences. One could say that his writing was a self-reflexive account of his long journey, offering both a form of scholarly engagement with the countries he visited and personal reflections. In a sense, Lin’s writing could be seen as a distinctively modern kind of “journey of self-discovery” that was typical of Chinese modern activists and philosophers of the period. John Fitzgerald in his text *Awakening China*, for instance, describes Chinese literary travellers in the republican era who would undertake self-exile and journeys of self-discovery, and how they wrote about their experiences applying “lyrical elements of the literary tradition” through which they understood the interpretation of their experiences as one of awakening their souls.¹¹⁰ Lin’s secretary Yeh Jung-chung suggested that Lin’s distinctive account was an expression of the complex interplay of subjectivity and objectivity by Lin in mediating his experiences through his understanding of the circumstances of Taiwan (觸景傷情感慨繫之).¹¹¹

Lin Hsien-tang’s travel writing covered in great detail his everyday encounters with locals, in the form of detailed descriptions of events and a self-conscious reflection on their meaning. For example, in Paris, Lin’s observed a group of Germans at dinner who divided the bill after the meal:

I was sitting next to a group of five Germans, three men and two women. After they had a meal together, they asked a waiter to divide the bill. Upon seeing how they paid for their individual expenses with perfect exactness, I felt they were very stingy. The Japanese also pay for their own expenses. Even though they do not pay their own bill with that exactness,

¹¹¹ Yeh Jung-chung, “Huan qiu youji jiaoding houji (Huan Qiu Youji Epilogue),” 187.
they do not haggle for every penny. For Chinese (中國人), there is always one who would insist on paying for the table and would never have the bill spilt… However, after further thoughts, I think each of these three paying habits has its own advantages, depending on the different circumstances… If [we only dine with a friend] once, there is no harm in paying like a Chinese. If [we go out with a friend] a couple of times, we might well pay like a Japanese, but if we want to make lifelong friends with someone, we had better divide the bill like a German. The longer the friendship is, the clearer the money matters should be. Otherwise, money could be a major issue to the friendship.¹¹²

In March 1928, Lin Hsien-tang and Lin Youlong headed for America and toured for two months. During this period, Lin Hsien-tang visited dozens of American cities and places. He even took a scenic flight in a light aircraft for the first time of his life in Los Angeles, describing in great detail.¹¹³ In May 1928, Lin Hsien-tang and Youlong arrived in Tokyo, where they stayed for eight months before they returned to Taiwan in the winter of 1928.

After Lin’s return, he maintained the attitude toward Taiwanese political movements that had emerged before he left. In continuity with the sentiments that prompted the journey, he was circumspect in the political movements that he supported, such as the petitions movement.

On February 4, 1929, a few weeks after Lin Hsien-tang’s return to Taiwan, he gave a farewell dinner for Taiwanese representatives who were going to submit the tenth petition to the Diet in Japan for the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament.¹¹⁴ During the dinner, Lin gave an rousing speech to the audience:

> There have been ten petitions for Taiwanese Parliament since the Tenth year of Taisho up

¹¹² Lin Hsien-tang, “Huan qiu youji (Travel Account From Around the World),” 54.
¹¹³ Ibid., 177.
until now… Our political cause cannot be achieved within a day and a night, and we have to be aware that the petitions movement might be passed down to our sons and grandsons (子子孙孫). We have to fight until the end. Perhaps some will laugh at us, calling the petitions movement a task of stupidity and no hope… We must show our perseverance…\textsuperscript{115}

In addition to the petitions movement, the other issue Lin Hsien-tang maintained an interest in after his return was publishing a daily newspaper in Taiwan. At this time, Taiwan had Japanese newspapers, such as \textit{Taiwan Nichi-Nichi Shinbun}, and also \textit{Taiwan Min Bao}. \textit{Taiwan Min Bao} began as \textit{Taiwan Youth}, a monthly magazine that was first issued by overseas Taiwanese in Japan in 1920. It became the monthly magazine \textit{Taiwan (臺灣)}, and then became \textit{Taiwan Min Bao (臺灣民報)}, first published in Tokyo on April 15, 1923 as a fortnightly publication.\textsuperscript{116} After four-years of negotiation between Taiwanese and the colonial government, \textit{Taiwan Min Bao} was eventually permitted to be published weekly in Taiwan in July 1927.\textsuperscript{117} Its first publication in Taiwan was August 1, 1927. The same month, Lin Hsien-tang’s travelogue was serialized.

In January 1929, the Xin Min Newspaper Publishing Company was established in Taipei with Lin Hsien-tang as company president. The campaign to issue a daily newspaper ensued but faced the same obstacles of colonial government opposition as the earlier four-year campaign to publish \textit{Taiwan Min Bao} in Taiwan. Lin Hsien-tang was fully taken up by the

\textsuperscript{115} Gao Riwen, “Taiwan yihui shezhi qingyuan shimo (The Whole Story of the Petitions for Taiwanese Parliament),” \textit{Taiwan wenxian} 16, no. 2 (June 1965): 83.

\textsuperscript{116} Yeh Jung-chung, \textit{Ri ju xia Taiwan zhengzhi shehui yundong shi (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan History: Social and Political Movements in Colonial Taiwan)}, 618. \textit{Taiwan Min Bao} became published three times a month after October 1923, \textit{Taiwan} featured classical Chinese while \textit{Taiwan Min Bao} used vernacular Chinese. The issuance of \textit{Taiwan} and \textit{Taiwan Min Bao} was overlapping until \textit{Taiwan} discontinued in June 1924. Then, from July 1925, \textit{Taiwan Min Bao} became published weekly.

\textsuperscript{117} ibid., 620-623.
bureaucratic and political process. He deployed the same political tactics he had developed early in the colonial period that used his political and cultural capital. For example, in late February 1929, Lin Hsien-tang and the general manager Luo Wanzhen visited several Japanese politicians in Tokyo in order to mobilise support for a daily newspaper in Taiwan. On April 14, 1929, Lin, Luo and the chief editor Lin Chenglu appealed to Mr. Kawakarada, the former chief of the civil administration in Taiwan, over the cause of publishing a daily paper.\(^{118}\)

However, the then governor Ishizuka Eizō (1929-1931) was not interested in the proposal put forward by Lin and other Taiwanese. On January 13 1930, Lin Hsien-tang, Luo Wanzhen and Lin Chenglu visited Governor Ishizuka, who deflected their proposal by saying that he would approve their application once appropriate personnel for a daily publication were employed.\(^{119}\)

In March 1930, the Xin Min Newspaper Publishing Company took over *Taiwan Min Bao*. In the same month, *Taiwan Min Bao* became *Taiwan Xin Min Bao* (臺灣新民報), but remained a weekly newspaper. On June 30 1930, Lin, Luo and Lin Chenglu visited Ishizuka again. They did not reach an outcome because Ishizuka “in the end did not express his intentions (始終不明言).”\(^{120}\) It was not until on January 9, 1932 that permission for a daily newspaper was granted. The same month, Lin Hsien-tang resigned from the post of president of the Xin Min Newspaper Publishing Company.\(^{121}\) *Taiwan Xin Min Bao* began publishing as a daily newspaper on April 15 1932.

\(^{118}\) Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).

\(^{119}\) Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji san*, 1930,16.

\(^{120}\) ibid., 215.

\(^{121}\) Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
Despite the success of Lin’s efforts to get the colonial government to agree to a daily edition of the *Taiwan Xin Min Bao*, Lin Hsien-tang’s limited political activities after his return from Europe and Japan contrasted with his earlier political activism. It signalled his responses to Taiwan’s changing political circumstances. His activities could be interpreted as an indication that Lin rejected the left-wing politics that had emerged in Taiwan in the late 1920s, and had become increasingly radical and a significant force in Taiwan’s political terrain.\(^{122}\)

Therefore, the late 1920s, and the change in the leadership of the Taiwan Cultural Association and Lin’s subsequent overseas tour marked a change in the nature of Lin’s political engagement with colonial Taiwan. The split in the Taiwan Cultural Association in 1927 indicated that Lin Hsien-tang’s conciliatory and conservative political style was out of step with the younger radical left-wing Taiwanese.

**Taiwan in 1930**

For Lin Hsien-tang and for Taiwan more broadly, the year 1930 marked a change. As Lin Hsien-tang’s political status changed in the face of the reconfiguration of power within and among Taiwanese activist political organisations, Taiwan’s broader geo-political circumstances were also changing. In Japan, according to Crowley, the Japanese Army “was unhappy over the ‘domestic unease’ brought on by liberalism and over Tokyo’s restraints on military spending.”\(^{123}\) The Army became increasingly assertive in Japan’s domestic politics. Subsequently, seeing their position waning under Japan’s foreign policy of non-intervention in

\(^{122}\) Lin Hsien-tang did not participate in any Taiwanese organisations led by the left-wing Taiwanese by the end of the 1920s. Although he was listed as an advisor to the Taiwan Popular Party, the title was titular to him as he kept himself aloof from the politics of the Party that had come under the leadership of the left-wing Taiwanese. Zhang Zhengchang, 213.

China, which began to unify under Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists, a group of radical Japanese army officers decided to intervene in China’s politics. In September 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria instigated the Mukden Incident in Shenyang.\(^\text{124}\) The crisis, leading to the annexation of the north east of China and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo, preaced the wider conflict between Japan and China through the rest of the decade.

Under the influence of Japanese militarism that began to assert itself in Japanese politics, the ruling policy for Taiwan shifted towards a much harder response by the colonial government towards Taiwanese political organisations and activism at the beginning of the decade. Members of the Taiwan Cultural Association were arrested in 1929 and 1930, which severely curtailed the organisation. The Taiwan Popular Party continued to develop but it was plagued with its own factionalism, particularly under the leadership of Jiang Weishui as he became increasingly radical in his politics. Lin Hsien-tang and Cai Peihuo left the Taiwan Popular Party in 1930, establishing the Taiwan Federation for Local Autonomy, all of which expressed the changing terrain of Taiwanese politics.

In 1930, while Taiwanese political movements weakened, Lin continued to be valued by the colonial government for his political status. On July 3, 1930, Lin was appointed as a councillor to the governor-general. However, indicating Lin’s ambivalence towards the colonial government, on July 5, he expressed his intention to decline the post in front of the governor Ishizuka Eizō. The governor demurred, and on August 8, indicating Lin’s enduring political power, Ishizuka visited Lin in Wufeng. As recounted in Lin’s diary, Lin hosted Ishizuka that evening with a large party in a restaurant in Wufeng. But they did not discuss

politics.¹²⁵ The similar attention to Lin Hsien-tang was also given to his family members. For instance, Lin Yunlong, Lin Hsien-tang’s third son, got married on September 28, 1930 and according to Lin’s diary, he reported that more than eighty Japanese prefectural officials and influential Japanese came to Lin’s house in Wufeng offering congratulations in a wedding celebration held the next day.¹²⁶ The wedding celebration was conducted in Japanese, with a Japanese flavour, and therefore signified the complex negotiation of power and culture between Lin Hsien-tang and the colonial authorities, with each acknowledging the other’s social and political position.

The political movements in Taiwan entered a new phase in 1930 with the change in politics in Tokyo. Other aspects of Taiwanese politics, far removed from Lin Hsien-tang, also changed. The Taiwanese Aboriginal anti-Japanese resistance, which had continued throughout the 1910s and 1920s as a result of the colonial abuse of the aborigines,¹²⁷ reached suddenly surged with the Wushe Incident in 1930.

The Seediq nation were a branch of the Atayal in the Wushe area in central Taiwan, a place which had seen significant investment and development by the colonial authorities.¹²⁸ On October 27, 1930, over three hundred Seediq, led by Maebo chief Mona Rudao, attacked and killed 134 Japanese and two Han Chinese at an elementary school sports day in Wushe township.¹²⁹

According to Lin Hsien-tang, he noted in his diary that the Wushe Incident was reported

¹²⁶ ibid., 323. The chief of Civil administration also delivered the congratulatory message to Lin Hsien-tang. ibid., 325.
¹²⁸ ibid., 89.
¹²⁹ ibid. Also, see for more information about the Wushe Incident, see Paul D. Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan’s Rule on Taiwan’s “Savage Border,” 1874-1945* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2018), 43.
by *Taiwan Shinbun* newspaper office on the same day of the uprising on October 27, but “was immediately suppressed (旋被禁止)” by the colonial government.\(^{130}\) It was not until on October 29 that more details of the Incident were disclosed by the Tokyo government in a public address on the mobilisation of the Japanese Army. In the following two months, the colonial government mobilised over 4,000 troops, who rounded up the Seediq rebels and their families, killing approximately 650 aborigines using modern weapons, including aeroplanes, incendiary bombs and poison gas.\(^{131}\)

On November 2 1930, Lin Hsien-tang formally again declined the position of councillor to the governor. In the context of the Japanese suppression on the Seediq in late 1930, Lin Hsien-tang’s action was politically sensitive. Lin’s refusal was a political act that challenged colonial authority. Accordingly, the colonial government forbid the report of Lin’s refusal of the position in any newspaper in Taiwan.\(^{132}\)

On November 14, 1930, Hamaguchi Osachi, the Prime Minister of Japan, suffered an assassination attempt inside Tokyo station, and died in August 1931. With the rapidly rising Japanese militarism and changing political landscape in Japan, Lin Hsien-tang’s social and political standing in Taiwan expressed the unstable political circumstances in colonial Taiwan. In response, Lin directed his activism away from Taiwan’s politics towards its cultural realm, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

---


\(^{131}\) Kimberly Kono, “Writing Colonial Lineage in Sakaguchi Reiko’s ‘Tokeisō’,” 90.

\(^{132}\) Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
Chapter 6
Classical Chinese Cultural Revival

The preceding chapters examined Taiwanese politics through the lens of Lin Hsien-tang’s educational and political movement in Taiwan up to 1930. As has been examined, Lin Hsien-tang served in different capacities in different organisations. He worked with other Taiwanese literati and opposed the institutions of colonialism on the island in the name of the Taiwanese with support from Japanese liberals from metropolitan Japan.

In the flourishing Taiwanese political movements in the 1920s, Lin Hsien-tang and other activists directed themselves towards Japanese liberals and the political, cultural and social institutions of the Japanese empire. After the end of the Qing and the Second Revolution of 1913, Liang Qichao in particular was a source of political inspiration as a model modern reformist intellectual and public figure in Taiwan’s literati’s circles, but beyond that there was very limited support for Taiwanese political movements from Republican China. Lin Hsien-tang’s contacts with leading Chinese figures and their advice to him affirms this point. As examined in the previous chapters, Lin had contact with the Chinese reformists Liang Qichao and Dai Jitao in Tokyo in 1907 and 1913, and Liang visited Taiwan in 1911. However, both of them advised to Lin that he should not seek support from China in its circumstances. Later, in 1913, when Lin had a chance to meet with Chinese officials in Beijing, there was no evidence to show that the Chinese government “undertook any measure to influence the Formosan
political movements.”

In the context of the lack of interest from China, Taiwanese political movements continued to develop in the 1920s and were fully oriented towards Japan and its imperial project. From the 1930s, therefore, Taiwan’s political landscape changed rapidly with Japan’s rising militarism. Lin Hsien-tang’s distinctive approach to activism in Taiwan, working with the colonial institutions over civic and political issues, became less meaningful. He shifted his activism from Taiwan’s politics to its cultural realm as a result of these political changes.

This chapter examines Lin Hsien-tang’s life under Japanese rule after 1930. It is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on Lin Hsien-tang’s cultural campaign of the Wufeng Yixin Association, a revival of a classical Chinese learning organisation that functioned up until 1937. The tension between Lin Hsien-tang and the Japanese army in Taiwan will be elaborated too. Then, the second section examines Lin’s role in the pre-war period and the Japanisation period (1937-1945) until Japan’s defeat in the Second World War in 1945.

**Lin Hsien-tang and the Wufeng Yixin Association**

The changing political circumstances in Japan and Taiwan in the early 1930s led Lin Hsien-tang to reassess the possibilities of political activism. In the vocabulary of De Certeau, Lin deployed new tactics of resistance to imperial domination. Lin did not confront the colonial rule, and he exercised his resistance through appropriating the limited freedom within the framework laid out by the colonial government.

In the 1930s, Lin Hsien-tang shifted his attention from Taiwanese political movements to the notion of the revival of classical Chinese culture. This represented a less politically-sensitive undertaking that he could promote under the political restrictions imposed by the

---

Japanese colonial government as metropolitan Japan turned towards right-wing militarism. This cultural project was realised in his participation in the Wufeng Yixin Association.

In 1932, Lin Hsien-tang, his eldest son Lin Panlong, and their supporters saw value in promoting the revival of Classical Chinese culture that was being marginalised by the colonial government. On 24 February 1932, Lin Panlong and Lin Hsien-tang hosted a discussion with respect to establishing a cultural association in Wufeng. During the meeting, decisions about its name and structure were finalised. They named the association the “Yixin Association (Yixin Hui, 一新會),” literally the “First New Association,” defining it as an association that would enhance the cultural standard in the countryside and foster a sense of autonomy, so as to further build a new culture in Taiwan. The Yixin Association would consist of eight departments, and would be managed by a committee. After the February meeting, the Association sought members. On March 19, 1932, the Wufeng Yixin Association was formally established. The establishment of Wufeng Yixin Association within such a short period of time could be understood in the context of the continuing interest in political and social activism in Taiwan in its changing political circumstances as Japanese politics hardened.

The Association was active from 1932 to 1937. Among the members, Lin Panlong and Lin Hsien-tang played the most important roles in its creation, organisation and operation. Lin Panlong and Lin Hsien-tang were the director and the advisor respectively of the Association,

---

2 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir)*.

3 These eight departments were Department of Investigation (*diaocha bu*), Department of Hygiene (*weisheng bu*), Department of Social Affairs (*shehui bu*), Department of Arts (*wenyi bu*), Department of Sports (*tiyu bu*), Department of Industry (*chanye bu*), Department of General Affairs (*shuwu bu*), Department of Finance (*caiwu bu*). Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji wu, 1932 (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang, Vol. 5, 1932)*, ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica; Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2003), 88.
with Lin Hsien-tang acting as director on behalf of Panlong while he was away from Taiwan.\(^4\)

Lin Panlong was well-known as an educated and active Taiwanese by the 1930s. Born in 1901, he began receiving private Confucian lessons at home from the age of six. In 1910, he was sent to study in Tokyo, where he completed Japanese elementary, secondary and higher education. Immediately after Panlong’s graduation from the Imperial University (present-day the University of Tokyo) with a bachelor degree in Laws in 1925, he moved to Great Britain and became a student at the University of Oxford. There, he majored in Religious Studies and Philosophy and graduated in 1928, and then returned to Taiwan.

After Lin Panlong’s return, he was interested in further study in Europe. However, this was not initially supported by Lin Hsien-tang and Panlong’s mother Yang Shuixin. On February 26, 1929, Panlong came to ask Lin and Yang to finance his study in Europe with “tears streaming down his face (至於泣下),”\(^5\) but his request was rejected. However, his parents subsequently relented. Later that day, Panlong was informed by the second brother Youlong that his parents finally agreed with his request, and he came before his parents again with tears in his eyes. In March 1930, he left for Paris to study Philosophy and Literature in Paris-Sorbonne University, and then transferred to his study to the University of Munich in Germany. On February 2, 1932, Lin Panlong finished his studies and returned to Taiwan.

Panlong’s level of education was extremely high for the time. As Chou Wan-yao has observed, “Panlong’s studying experience was one of the best and second to none in the context of Taiwanese society. His career prospects would be very promising if he ever sought after an ambitious career.”\(^6\) However, Panlong showed little interest in pursuing career options in

---

\(^4\) Lin Panlong was away from Taiwan from May to December 1934 and was away from Taiwan again from April to December 1935. Lee Yu-lan, “Lin Xiantang yu funv jiaoyu—yi wufeng yixin hui wei li (Hsien-tang Lin and Women’s Education—A Case Study of Wufeng I-sin Association),” *Taiwan Xue Yanjiu (Research in Taiwan Studies)* 13 (June 2012): 102.


\(^6\) Chou Wan-yao, “Jinbu you jiaoyu, xingfu gong jia zao—Lin Xiantang yu Wufeng Yixin hui
business or government available to him in colonial Taiwan. Instead, he expressed a commitment to dedicating his life to education for the community of Wufeng, echoing his father’s earliest political and social activist aspirations. Panlong’s words were quoted in Lin Hsien-tang’s diary in 1932: “if we ordinary people cannot illuminate the world like a moon, we can at least be a candle light that lights up a room (凡人不能如月之光明照遍世界，亦當如灯火之光照遍一室).”

In the period between the initial meeting in February 24, 1932, and the establishment of Yixin Association on March 19, 1932, the preparation work occupied most of Lin Hsien-tang’s time. During this period, Lin was busy, for example, securing chambers to house to the Association and a proposed library. On March 2, 1932, a lease for a building in Wufeng was signed after he, Panlong and second son Youlong inspected it earlier that day. The following day, he employed a builder to renovate the property. While the renovations were in progress, Lin mobilised his men to take out the books he had treasured and stored for a long time from the Lai Yuan, the family garden of the Wufeng Lins, and have them exposed to the sun in

(Advancement from Education, Happiness Made by the Multitude--Lin Hsien-tang and Wufeng Yixin Association),” *Taiwan Feng Wu (Taiwan Customs)* 56, no. 4 (December 2006): 43.

7 Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji wu, 1932*, 127. Panlong’s expression became more and more self-referential in the following years. In 1946, he was nominated as the principle of a few prestigious schools, such as the provincial Jianguo High School in Taipei and the provincial Taichung first High School in Taichung. However, he declined these nominations. He only agreed to assume the post of principle at the prefectural Wufeng Middle School. Chou Wan-yao, “Jinhu you jiaoyu, xingfu gong jia zao—Lin Xiantang yu Wufeng Yixin hui (Advancement from Education, Happiness Made by the Multitude--Lin Hsien-tang and Wufeng Yixin Association),” 43.

8 Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji wu, 1932*, 100. The rent at that time was unknown, but it was 30 dollars per month as recorded in Lin Hsien-tang’s diary in 1933. Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji liu, 1933 (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang, Vol. 6, 1933)*, ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica; Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2003), 197.

batches before he catalogued and showcased them in the Yixin library.\textsuperscript{10}

The opening ceremony of Yixin Association came on March 19, 1932. For Lin Hsien-tang, this was a significant moment in which he began to reframe his activism as cultural activism. The opening of the Yixin Association and its professed goal of cultural understanding and local autonomy was freighted with meaning in the context of a militarising Japan and its encroachment into China. The Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo,\textsuperscript{11} occupying the northeast of China, with the last Qing emperor Puyi as its head, was founded on February 18, 1932.

In Lin’s diary of March 19, 1932, he wrote that “today was the grand opening ceremony of Wufeng Yixin Association. I knew I had to speak quite a lot during the ceremony, so I made a point of visiting Shuilai for a treatment of my recurring throat problem. Yiruo was coming with me. Then, I made an inspection tour of Qingnian Huiguan to see the preparation... At half past eleven, I composed [the calligraphy] ‘In Mutual Support’. It was hung at the Yixin Association chambers as a shared exhortation (本日為霧峰一新會成立大會，定必要多說話，故到水來處抹咽喉，伊若亦同往。次到青年會館，看大會場所之準備⋯十一時三分書「互相扶助」，將以懸之一新會會館，以為共勉).”\textsuperscript{12}

The opening ceremony begun just ten minutes behind schedule, with 245 out of 300 enrolled members attending. At the beginning of the ceremony, Lin Hsien-tang was elected as the president, and then in that capacity he selected a committee of thirty. This included Lin Panlong, and also Lin’s choice of twenty-five male members and five female members. During the ceremony, several members gave speeches. In Lin’s account, Cai Peihuo’s speech excelled

\textsuperscript{10}ibid., 103-116.


\textsuperscript{12}Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji wu*, 1932, 123. Shuilai was a doctor. Zhuang Yiruo was a friend of Lin Hsien-tang. He became the Chinese teacher in the Yixin Association later. Qingnian Huiguan was the venue of the ceremony.
because “Peihuo explained that the spirit of the Yixin Association was to contribute to society rather than sanction conflict (培火說明會之精神，是為社會奉伺，不是斗爭團體).”

Following the opening ceremony was a banquet, during which ten speeches were delivered by Lin Panlong, Yeh Jung-chung and other eight speakers. Afterwards, photographs were taken.

The number of Yixin Association membership grew steadily from 300 members in 1932 to 503 members in 1934. More than half the members were from the Wufeng district while some of them were from nearby villages or Taichung city. The steadily growing number of its membership denoted that a significant number of local Taiwanese were drawn into classical Chinese cultural activities in the 1930s despite the context of deepening tensions between Japan and China.

The Yixin Association was mostly financed by Lin Hsien-tang and his family members. Since the annual membership dues was nominally one Taiwanese yen, it was insufficient to offset the operating cost of the Association. For example, the cost of the Yixin Yishu (一新義塾), which means the Yixin Private School, as will be examined in the next section, already ran to 1500 Taiwanese yen per year. Furthermore, after the Association was established, Lin purchased the building he rented at a cost of 4200 Taiwanese yen. On basis of Lin’s philanthropic contribution, the Yixin Association could be understood as a form of social movement, one that existed in continuity with the previous movements that Lin had supported since the 1910s.

13 ibid.
15 ibid., 49.
16 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji liu, 1933, 201.
17 ibid., 286.
From the outset, the Yixin Association had offered a wide range of cultural and educational activities open to the public. Based on Lin Hsien-tang’s diary, the activities, of which there were many more than those touched upon here, consisted of weekly lectures on many and various topics, drama performances, competitions in the traditional board game *weiqi* (圍棋), costume parades, excursions, debates, exhibitions, and sports events, meetings for women, and yearly celebrations of the Association.

The table below is the examples of activities and events held by the Yixin Association from March to July in 1932.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Month</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31/03</td>
<td>Exhibition of postcards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/04</td>
<td>Tea party for women</td>
<td>20 women and 5 men</td>
<td>Lin appealed to women to emulate men and dedicate in vernacular learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/04</td>
<td>Weiqi game</td>
<td>More than 20 people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/04–12/04</td>
<td>Lin Hsien-tang was in Taipei and Tainan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/04–18/04</td>
<td>Lin Hsien-tang was in Taipei.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/04–29/04</td>
<td>Lin Hsien-tang was on a trip.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/05</td>
<td>1st Meeting for women</td>
<td>More than 100 people</td>
<td>At the Lai Yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/05</td>
<td>Lectures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/05</td>
<td>Gathering for the elder. Lectures</td>
<td>103 people attended the gathering</td>
<td>Topics of lectures included “Reflection on my trip to Hong Kong” and “How to improve Taiwan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/05</td>
<td>Ball game</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/05</td>
<td>Weekly lectures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Topic included common sense in agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/06-09/06</td>
<td>Lin Hsien-tang was on a trip.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/06</td>
<td>Art exhibition</td>
<td></td>
<td>Around 100 artworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/06</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics included hygiene, PE, Social services, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/06</td>
<td>Weekly lectures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics included “equity between genders” and “feminism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/06</td>
<td>Gathering for children</td>
<td>More than 140 out of 180 local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among the all activities, weekly lectures were one of the most important activities. They were held every week for four years until 1936. In Huang Tsu-ning’s research, she notes that topics related to Christianity accounted for one tenth of the total over two hundred lectures given by the Yixin Association and two thirds of all of the religious-themed topics.19 Such high ratio of lectures on Christianity related to the composition of the key members of Yixin

18 Information are collected from both Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji wu, 1932, and Chou Wan-yao, “Jinbu you jiaoyu, xingfu gong jia zao—Lin Xiantang yu Wufeng Yixin hui (Advancement from Education, Happiness Made by the Multitude--Lin Hsien-tang and Wufeng Yixin Association).”

19 Lin Panlong even held a weekly study group for Christianity on Wednesdays for a period of time. Huang Tsu-ning, “Lin Hsien-tang and Christianity (1927-1945),” in Diaries & Research on Taiwan History—Collected Essays in Memory of Mr. Lin Hsien-tang (1881.12.3-1956.9.8), ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi et al. (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2008), 691.
Associations. According to Huang, five out of thirty-seven committee members, including Lin Panlong, were Christians.\textsuperscript{20}

The connection between Lin Hsien-tang and Christianity grew stronger through his participation in the lectures and close contact with Christians around him. Lin acknowledged the practical function of the teaching of Presbyterian Romanised Taiwanese written language,\textsuperscript{21} and saw value in promoting the educational function of Christian ethics.\textsuperscript{22} However, he did not convert to Christianity. Based on Cai Peihuo’s understanding of Lin, he remarked on Lin’s religious views that they were “a fusion made up of seventy percent of Confucianism, twenty percent of Buddhism and ten percent of Christianity... However, if Confucianism could not be seen as a religion, Lin Hsien-tang could be understood as an atheist (沒有宗教的人).”\textsuperscript{23}

Enhancing women’s rights was an important dimension of the Yixin Association’s goals. As chosen by Lin Hsien-tang in 1932, five of the thirty-member committee were women, and the Association engaged in a significant number of activities directed specifically at women. In Lin’s dairy in 1932, he wrote that he “encouraged female members to go out into the society like male members (婦人進出沒[莫]落男子之後以鼓舞之)” in a tea party for women.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} ibid., 688.
\item \textsuperscript{21} For example, Lin Hsien-tang taught his grandson Lin Bozheng the Presbyterian Romanised Taiwanese written language. Lin Hsien-tang \textit{Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi wu, 1943 (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang, Vol. 15, 1943)}, ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica; Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2008), 85.
\item \textsuperscript{22} For example, when Lin saw his nephew Lin Laichun thoroughly reformed himself from an addict to gambling and womanising to a pious Christian, he expressed in his diary: “I feel really grateful to Christianity for bringing such change to Lin Laichun (余之衷心生無限之感激焉).” Lin Hsien-tang, \textit{Guanyuan xiansheng riji liu, 1933}, 295.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Cai Peihuo, “Guanyuan xiansheng yu wo zhijian (Between Lin Hsien-tang and me),” 15.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Lin Hsien-tang, \textit{Guanyuan xiansheng riji wu, 1932}, 156.
\end{itemize}
Yixin members’ efforts to encourage women’s participation was notably more successful than many of the other women’s groups in Taiwan at that time.\textsuperscript{25}

Lin Hsien-tang’s actions and expressed attitudes towards education for women were longstanding. As early as in the 1900s, as examined in Chapter 2, Lin was promoting ideas such as giving up the practice of women’s foot-binding when he was appointed as the head of Wufeng district in his twenties.\textsuperscript{26} Later, he encouraged his daughter Lin Guanguan’s education, sending her to study in Tokyo in 1915 when she was nine, like her three brothers.

As for Lin Hsien-tang’s marriage, he, in common with mainland Chinese liberals, eschewed the tradition of concubinage. In Taiwan, as in mainland China, taking concubines was a common practice among the Confucian scholar-gentry and wealthy landowners. Lin Hsien-tang, despite his wealth and social status insisted on taking no concubine, whereas his brother and cousins all maintained households with concubines.\textsuperscript{27}

As well as his support for modern relationships, Lin Hsien-tang also expressed liberal attitudes towards women who were themselves concubines. Such an attitude was reflected in an anecdote told by Lin Hsien-tang himself. On March 16 1932, Lin Zibin and Lin Liulong, who were both members of the Wufeng Lins, came to Lin to express their discontent over Lin’s designation of Hong Wancui, a concubine in the extended Lin family, being nominated as one of the thirty committee members of the Yixin Association. Lin replied to them, “Concubinage has been a bad practice. However, we cannot blame it on concubines per se. Although she is a

\textsuperscript{25} Lee Yu-lan, “Lin Xiantang yu funv jiaoyu—yi wufeng yixin hui wei li (Hsien-tang Lin and Women’s Education—A Case Study of Wufeng I-sin Association),” 97.

\textsuperscript{26} Gan Dezhong, “Xiantang xiansheng yu tonghuahui (Lin Hsien-tang and the Assimilation Society),” 48.

\textsuperscript{27} For more information on Lin Hsien-tang’s marriage and the marriages of his cousins, see Wang Zhenxun, \textit{Lin Xiantang de she hui si xiang yu she hui huo dong xin lun} (New Comments on Lin Hsien-tang’s Social thoughts and Social Activities), 84-93.
concubine, we have to show our respect to her (自來蓄妾之制度不好，並非妾之罪也，她雖為妾，亦當尊重其人格).”

In the Yixin Association, the weekly lectures were another example that indicated Lin’s encouragement of women’s participation. The weekly lectures from the outset usually consisted of two lecturers, one male and one female, with women lecturing on topics directed at women’s concerns. Topics included as post-natal hygiene for women and newborns and a lecture entitled “The correct path for women in the new era (新時代婦人之正道).” 30 Lin Hsien-tang is reported to have advised women lecturers in public speaking. 31 By 1935, the female lecturers outnumbered the males in the weekly lectures. As noted in Lin’s diary on March 6, 1935, “There have been… a hundred and fifty weekly Sunday lectures. There were forty-one male lecturers (including an Englishman and three Japanese) and forty-five women lecturers (including two Englishwomen) (日曜講座…計百五十回。講師男子四十一人，[內英人一，日人三] ；女子四十五人，[英人二] ).” 32 Therefore, Lin was identifying women as an important component of the operation of the Yixin Association.

Lee Yu-lan in Taiwan Xue Yanjiu credited Lin Hsien-tang with the substantial improvement of the status of women in Taiwanese society. The Yixin Association was not the only

---

28 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji wu, 1932, 119.

29 Fan Yan-chiou, “Lin Hsien-tang’s Practice of body Concept and Hygiene,” in Diaries & Research on Taiwan History—Collected Essays in Memory of Mr. Lin Hsien-tang (1881.12.3-1956.9.8), ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi et al. (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2008), 780.

30 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji wu, 1932. The title of the lecture is seen in the photos with no page number in the book.


organisation that promoting women’s rights, neither was it a women group. However, compared to other organisations that also promoted women’s rights of the period, Lee identified the Yixin Association as one of the organisations of the most sustainable structure, in which women gained the most access to contemporary ideas and in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Lin Hsien-tang and the Yixin Private School}

In addition to the activities described above, the Yixin Association also operated a school, the \textit{Yixin Yishu}, namely, the Yixin Private School. Formally established by Lin Hsien-tang on May 15 1933,\textsuperscript{34} the Yixin Private School was a private Chinese school that aimed at cultivating classical Chinese learning among the Taiwanese.

In the context of the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s, Lin Hsien-tang’s initiative to establish a private Chinese school could be seen as an undertaking with a political dimension distinct to that of his earlier efforts to promote education in Taiwan. The seriousness with which Lin understood the establishment of the school was a marker of how the question of his cultural identity emerged more forcefully in the rapidly changing political and cultural landscape through the 1930s. In taking the initiative to campaign for the revival of traditional Chinese culture, and put it into practice by opening the Yixin Private School, Lin Hsien-tang was countered by the colonial government’s tightening control of Taiwanese private schools as well as the broader status of traditional Chinese culture in Taiwan as a Japanese colonial territory.

Even as Japan promoted education and Lin Hsien-tang contended with Japanese colonial education policy, Chinese private schools, \textit{shufang}, had continued as educational institutions


\textsuperscript{34} Lin Hsien-tang, \textit{Guanyuan xiansheng riji liu}, 1933, 201.
for Taiwanese to acquire knowledge of classical Chinese culture. After Japan’s colonialisation of Taiwan, despite its interest in Japanese education, the colonial government did not implement punitive policies towards the Chinese-language shufang. Rather, in the early decades of colonial rule, the Japanese government often sought to use the buildings and infrastructure of the existing shufang to create the new Japanese schools. The advantages of keeping the Chinese private schools was outlined in a report by a Japanese official Kinoshita Kunimasa. In October 1896, he said:

*Shufang* has a long history and is a very important educational system in Taiwan. If we abruptly abolish this system without supplementary measures, teachers at the private schools would be out of employment. If they became a social problem, we then would have to help them get employment by setting up other educational institutions. This would be a costly expense that the colonial government could not afford… I suggest that we just keep *shufang* while opening the task of transforming them.\(^{35}\)

Kinoshita’s suggestion expressed the colonial government’s intention to take advantage of the existing the *shufang* system and facilities, and have them become institutions that eventually taught Japanese language to the Taiwanese.

The *shufang* that taught the Confucian classics and Chinese language to the Taiwanese survived in the early Japanese period, while the colonial government was making efforts to promote Japanese colonial education. In 1896, for example, *hanbun* studies, meaning classical Chinese studies in the Japanese language, was incorporated into the Japanese Institutes by Izawa Shūnji to encourage Taiwanese parents to send their children to Japanese colonial schools.\(^{36}\) However, the colonial government’s position on *hanbun* studies gradually hardened.

---

\(^{35}\) Quoted in Kawaji Sachiyo, “Cultural Unification in Colonial Taiwan and Traditional Taiwan Confucianism Society” (PhD diss., National Cheng Kung University, 2002), 133.

\(^{36}\) ibid., 124.
In 1919, when the structure of the Japanese colonial education system was revised under governor Akashi Motojirō, the government “banned the creation of any more private equivalents of common schools” directed by the colonised people themselves, and reduced the importance of classical Chinese studies by making it as an elective subject in the Common Schools.

That Lin Hsien-tang believed that this attenuation of classical Chinese studies was a political and social issue for Taiwan is evidenced in actions that he took in subsequent years. For example, in a meeting Lin had with Ikoma Takatsune, a Tokyo official from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs on September 7, 1932 in Tokyo, Lin made a complaint to Ikoma that “since the hanbun studies is elective, it is nothing other than a subject of no meaning (又漢文為隨意科，實與全廢無異),” and expressed his concern for Taiwanese Common School graduates that “these children are not able to compose a plain letter even in simple Chinese after they graduate (故兒童卒業後不能寫淺白之書信).”

Despite Lin’s earlier commitment to modern education for the Taiwanese, his comments on the importance of classical Chinese education in Taiwan reflected its decline through the colonial period and Lin’s enduring commitment to Chinese imperial traditions. In any case, his complaints to Ikoma were immaterial under both Japan and Taiwan’s changing circumstances in the 1930s. By late 1932, the colonial government had begun to ban shufang in Taiwan. In Lin’s diary on November 18, 1932, he noted that “after the government of Taichung Prefecture had banned shufang last month, the newspapers this morning reported that forty-eight shufang were banned by the government of Kaohsiung Prefecture, and more than two thousand students


38 Chou Wan-yao and Xu Peixian, “Taiwan gong xuexiao zhidu, jiaoke he jiaokeshu zongshuo (An Overview of the Common School System, subjects and textbooks),” 128.

were affected by it. What a pity that more than two thousand students were forced to leave school, and forty-eight teachers were made unemployed. By 1932, the colonial government’s hardening policies on shufang signalled their ending in Taiwan.

Before then, around 1931, Lin Hsien-tang had already embarked on an educational programme, the “Classical Chinese Seminar (漢文研究會),” that offered classical Chinese classes to Taiwanese. The Seminar was divided into two groups based on gender: one for males and the other for females, with the classes for men at night and for women during the day. Both classes were taught by Zhuang Yiruo, a Chinese Confucian scholar in central Taiwan and a member of the poetry society the Li she.

The significance of the Seminar was twofold, socially and politically. Firstly, the creation of a class specifically for women expression of Lin’s emphasis on women’s education. The gender division in the Seminar was taken up later in the Yixin Private School with male and female students also taught in separate classes. Secondly, the teaching content that consisted of classical Chinese learning could be understood as a reflection of Lin’s resistance to the colonial government’s suppression of shufang in the 1930s.

The Classical Chinese Seminar was maintained by individuals who became members of the Yixin Association under which the Yixin Private School was established. The attention of the colonial government to these activities was signalled when an additional Japanese police officer Kanazawa Nobukatsu was dispatched to the police station in Wufeng in the months after the establishment of the Association. On October 26, 1932, Kanazawa was formally introduced

40 ibid, 470.

41 Zhuang Yiruo was paid forty Taiwanese yen per month. Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji si, 1931, 409.
to Lin by his senior officer, Yanagisawa. Lin noted in his diary: “The Wufeng police station has an additional officer, named Kanazawa Nobukatsu. With his senior, Yanagisawa, he came to visit me. Wufeng is attracting attention from the authorities. Is it out of their concern about the Yixin Association? It is as yet unknown (霧峰派出所增加特務一名，名曰金澤信雄，柳澤警部補導之來訪問。當局視霧峰較前更重，或云為一新會，未知然否)。”

In Lin’s account, the police officers did not explain the additional personnel in Wufeng. However, Chou Wan-yao suggests that the personnel change was directed at the Yixin Association, with a Japanese police officer permanently assigned to monitoring its activities.

In Lin’s diary, Lin was visited more frequently by a Japanese police officer, usually Kanazawa. Furthermore, Lin would be questioned on a wide range of topics. For instance, Lin notes that on November 3, 1932, Kanazawa came to Lin’s house to ask that whether there was going to be a personnel change in the Xin Min Newspaper Publishing Company, and Lin replied, “No, there was not (曰無此事).” Then, Kanazawa went on to ask whether there were any problems in one of Lin’s business interests, and Lin replied, “No, there was not either. It was just a disagreement over a few shares that we should have received from some of our stakeholders. This was not a problem (曰亦無此事，株式未拂込者不過百餘株耳，實無問題).” On December 30, 1932, as another instance, Kanazawa and Yanagisawa came to visit Lin. During their meeting, they talked about the inheritance of Lin Lansheng, a relative of Lin Hsien-tang who had passed away two days prior.

---

45 ibid.
46 ibid., 515, 517.
In early December 1932, however, Lin’s son Youlong was informed by Yanagisawa that the running of the Classical Chinese Seminar would require official permission, and he just had closed down a Chinese private school in Beigou earlier that month because it did not have such permission. A discussion between Yixin members ensued. They reached the conclusion on December 14, 1932, that they would not submit the application because they feared that submitting an application for the Classical Chinese Seminar was a pretext for the colonial government to act against it. In the same discussion, they also decided that the Classical Chinese Seminar would be incorporated into the Yixin Association as a kind of cultural activity in the following year.\(^{47}\) On January 17, 1933, Lin Hsien-tang hosted two separate graduation ceremonies for female and male graduates of the Classical Chinese Seminar. The graduation ceremonies were the last two activities held under its name.

The Yixin member’s decision of not comply with the Japanese official’s “advice” was an attempt to avoid direct confrontation with the colonial government. As a political practice it marked out a tactic of passive resistance, or a political act that implicitly rather than directly challenged colonial rule.

Then, as planned, on February 20, 1933, the Classical Chinese Seminar was incorporated into the Yixin Association. It was renamed as the “Classical Chinese and Japanese Language Seminar (漢文國語研究會),” mindful of the concerns of the colonial authorities. The Seminar now consisted of both Chinese and Japanese languages classes taught by Zhuang Yiruo and Pan Rui’an respectively. These classes were provided to students at no cost.\(^{48}\) On February 24,

\(^{47}\) They also decided to move the site of the Classical Chinese Seminar to the Yixin Association building then. ibid., 499.

however, the Seminar was nevertheless forced to be suspended by Yanagisawa because it did not possess the required permission. Lin wrote that, upon hearing the news later that day, he “was very upset… and could not sleep that whole night (余聞之甚不快…終夜不能成寐).”

On 4 March, in response to the suspension, Lin Hsien-tang, Lin Panlong and other members decided to make an application in which the Classical Chinese and Japanese Language Seminar was renamed as the Yixin Private School. The application detailed the running of the proposed school including its curriculum and a four-year course of study.

It took two months before the permission was officially granted on May 9. The two-month period involved a process of constant negotiation with the colonial government by Lin Hsien-tang as well as other Yixin members. Lin Hsien-tang recorded that the colonial officials questioned the tiniest details of the proposal, including questions raised by officials from the colonial Education Bureau, for whom the issue of Japanese language teaching was paramount. For example, on April 6, Lin dispatched Wen Chenglong, a friend of his who was literate in Japanese, to the Education Bureau to answer questions regarding the proposed Yixin Private School on his behalf.

During the meeting, Wen addressed the concerns of colonial officials like Tsuchiya Ichirō, a prefectural school inspector, about whom Lin wrote “he was rather sceptical about whether the sixteen hours of Japanese language learning per week would feasibly be undertaken (他頗疑所定之時間每週國語十六點鐘能否實行).” Then, Tsuchiya asked a question about the enrolment that whether the Yixin Private School would “recruit new eighty students every year, or prioritise the enrollment of the current students and recruit new ones after these students graduate (每年募新學生八十名乎，或是待現在之八十名學生四年修業後，然後再募新)

49 Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji liu, 1933*, 76.
50 ibid., 91, 192.
51 ibid., 141.
學生),” followed by another question on “whether the hours of Japanese language classes would be allocated to both female and male students studying during the day and at night (晝間女子、夜間男子皆有分配國語之時間乎).”\(^{52}\) Wen answered them with detail, and reminded the Japanese officials that the information had been “noted in the application (願書中曽有記明).”\(^{53}\) On April 7, Lin recounted that he was asked by another Japanese official to provide a written account of all the conversation between Wen Chenglong and colonial officials.

Two months later, on May 9, the official permission was granted. Lin expressed his excitement in his diary: “I was so happy upon hearing it. The cultural standard of Wufeng would be enhanced quite a lot. The Yi\(\text{shu}\) is indeed one of the most important undertakings of Yixin Association (聞之甚喜，霧峰文化因是而助長不少，此義塾亦是一新會之一大事業也).”\(^{54}\)

For Lin Hsien-tang, the granting of permission was indeed important for his cultural aspirations. It expressed the enduring force of his political and social capital in the context of the hardening of colonial educational policy in the 1930s and the progressive banning of the shufang. Therefore, the permission for the Yixin Private School was a product of the complex relationship between Lin and the colonial government. Considering the end of the petitions to the Diet for a Taiwanese representative assembly in 1934, the acquiescence of the colonial government to the Yixin Private School could be perhaps understood as a political bargain in which a degree of cultural freedom was exchanged for a limiting of Taiwanese political activism.

On May 15, the opening ceremony of Yixin Private School was held. It was attended by

\(^{52}\) ibid.
\(^{53}\) ibid.
\(^{54}\) ibid., 192.
160 Taiwanese, including guests, members of Yixin Association, teachers and approximately 120 enrolled students. After the ceremony, a grand celebration was held. Lin Hsien-tang recorded that they:

waved the Yixin Association flag and sang the Association anthem, and marched around to the *Kao pan xuan* in the Lai Yuan, where Youlong taught gymnastics for five minutes. Then, in the following twenty minutes, everyone rested, and games such as a treasure hunt were held. Afterwards, everyone marched back to the school building, in front of which we took group photos. We sang the Association song three times before we were dismissed.

The Yixin Private School began the day after the opening ceremony. It provided both classical Chinese and Japanese language classes to both Taiwanese males and females. They were taught in separate classes held at night and during the daytime respectively. In accordance with application, there were sixteen hours of Japanese language classes for both males and females per week. Classical Chinese classes for men and women were further divided into four levels, depending on their educational background and their choice of the Chinese classics. Lin Hsien-tang described the teaching curriculum in his diaries, noting that the teaching content for male students was different to that of female students. Male student began with a class called Letter writing (*Chi Du*, 尺牘), before moving on to the *Four Books* (*Si Shu*, 四書) and then to the collection of comments on classical Chinese essays, the *Guwen Xiyi* (古文析義). Female students began with a class called *Liubaizi Pian* (六百字篇), which means The Basic 600

---

55 ibid., 201.
Chinese Characters, before studying *Chi Du* and then using textbooks for classical Chinese.\(^{56}\)

In Chou Wan-yao’s study of the Yixin School, she notes that sitting in on the classical Chinese classes became one of Lin Hsien-tang’s daily activities after the establishment of the Yixin Private School, and Lin showed more interest in the classical Chinese classes than in Japanese language classes.\(^{57}\) Lin played an active role either as a student, an auditor of the classes, or as a tutor for other students. For example, in 1933, when he found that teaching a class of fifty-one female students had become a demanding job for Zhuang Yiruo because their educational backgrounds varied greatly, he noted in his diary that “it was hard for the teacher to look after each student, and it was difficult for the students to progress (教師實難兼顧，而學生亦難進步也).”\(^{58}\) Lin therefore volunteered to be a teaching assistant and a tutor:

There were still mistakes in students’ writing, and Yiruo was unable to correct all of them. So, I gave them a tutorial on Sundays. There were five steps in my teaching: one, reading; two, comprehension; three, tests; four, question and answers; five, writing review (學生所讀之書有字音訛誤、解說悖謬者，伊若不能為之訂正。余乃用日耀[曜]日使其復習，而復習之法有五：一、讀，二、解說，三、試驗，四、質問，五、讀書所感).\(^{59}\)

During the tutorial, Lin also chose four students to share their thoughts on the book they read this week.\(^{60}\)

In addition to the classical Chinese classes and Japanese language classes that were held

\(^{56}\) Information collected from Lin Hsien-tang’s diary. *ibid.*, 196.


\(^{59}\) *ibid.*, 207.

\(^{60}\) *ibid.*
from May 1933, Lin Hsien-tang participated in a wide range of educational activities held by
the Yixin School. In 1934, he hosted the “Yixin Reading Club (一新讀書會).” 61 In 1935, he
held “Yixin Classes for Alumni (一新塾友會),” 62 and the “Yixin Poetry Club (一新詩文
會).” 63

In Chou Wan-yao’s study of Lin Hsien-tang’s participation in the Yixin Private School, she
presents an evocative description of Lin’s involvement in the cultural life of the Association as
well as of his contribution to the local Wufeng community in the 1930s. Chou said:

Imagine you were a student from outside of the Wufeng district but had come to study in
the Yixin Private School. You would soon find out that there were Mrs. Lins (林家的奶奶),
Miss Lins (小姐) and Ms. Lins (媳婦) in your class. You would also see Lin Hsien-
tang, a rich landowner, wearing a long gown and a pair of black leather shoes, often come
in to the classroom to audit the class (觀看大家上課). You might come across Lin Hsien-
tang in the Yixin library, where he would either read books alone there or be showing others
around the library. He liked speaking to Yixin students… After you graduated, he would
also organise a regular gathering, Yixin Classes for Alumni, for alumni to stay in touch…
Imagine how much time this famous and wealthy landowner who associated himself with
important Japanese politicians and celebrities, would have? He would not absent himself
from the weekly Classes for Alumni on Tuesdays, Reading Club meetings on Thursdays
and Sunday lectures unless he most certainly had to. 64

---

61 The Yixin Reading club was established on May 7 1934. It was held on every Monday until
27 December 1934. Then, it was changed to Thursdays. Lin Hsien-tang, GuANYUAN XIANSHENG
RIJI Qi, 1934 (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang, Vol. 7, 1934), ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi (Taipei: Institute
of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica; Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica,
2004), 189, 476.


63 ibid., 377.

64 Chou Wan-yao, “JinBu You Jiaoyu, Xingfu Gong Jia Zao—Lin Xiantang Yu Wufeng Yixin
In the mid-1930s, Lin Hsien-tang’s activism expressed a transition from politics to culture, and this reflected the changing political terrain and institutional and political constraints in colonial Taiwan. The rise of militarism and anti-Chinese sentiment in metropolitan Japan in the 1930s played out in Taiwan as a harder colonial politics in which activist like Lin had limited scope for resistance. However, one could argue that for Lin, steeped in imperial classical Chinese traditions, the hardening of colonial politics and policy towards opposition or contestation with colonial authority, conferred greater salience upon his self-identification with those classical traditions. Lin’s pursuit of a classical Chinese cultural revival through the Yixin Private School was inevitably compromised by the political reality of colonial power and the requirements for the school of the colonial authorities. Although he acquiesced to certain demands, his political and social capital, as well as personal wealth, created an opportunity for him to continue to develop activities in Taiwan which functioned as tactics of resistance to colonialism.

The Decline of the Yixin Association and the Yixin Private School

In the mid-1930s, after the annexation of Manchuria and as Japan increased its military activity in mainland China, Lin Hsien-tang’s pursuit of classical Chinese education can be understood as a self-conscious articulation of a sharp distinction in cultural identity.

On March 19, 1935, the Yixin members celebrated the Association’s third anniversary. The celebration lasted for two days, attended members and also other local Taiwanese. The anniversary was celebrated with a ceremony and a variety of activities such as lectures, a tea party, exhibitions of calligraphy, oil paintings and crafts.65

hui (Advancement from Education, Happiness Made by the Multitude--Lin Hsien-tang and Wufeng Yixin Association),” 67-68.

65 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji ba, 1935, 98. According to Lin Hsien-tang’s diary, two or three out of ten Taiwanese participants had joined the tea party. The Yixin Association in total had sold more than four hundred eighty tickets on that day. Accordingly,
However, changing circumstances in imperial Japan, and China’s continuing crisis, meant that the boundaries of culture and politics in colonial Taiwan were unstable. In his dairy, Lin Hsien-tang recounts that the celebrations went smoothly, but that the authorities forced the Association to cancel its annual procession of lanterns. Lin felt that “it was a pity that these lanterns prepared by the members were useless (會員準備之花燈一概無用，實為可惜).”

This was the first time that the colonial government interfered with the anniversary celebrations of Yixin Association. For the following year, 1936, Lin Hsien-tang’s diary is lost. This makes assessing the fate of the Association and identifying specific events or action in that year very difficult. Chou Wan-yao offers no account of the Association in 1936, except to imply that in 1936, most of the cultural activities like Sunday lectures and Reading Club run by the Yixin Association were discontinued.

In 1937, Lin’s diary makes no mention of an anniversary event for the Yixin Association, suggesting that the interference in 1935 was an indication of growing sanctions on Taiwanese activism by the colonial authorities that continued through the following year.

Both Chou Wan-yao and Huang Fusan suggest that from the mid-1930s that the Japanese colonial policy became very inhospitable to the forms of cultural and social activities promoted by Lin. Under these circumstances, the Yixin Association fell to same fate as the other shufang in Taiwan offering classical Chinese culture and learning.

___________________________________________________________
the participants of the celebration could be conjectured at least more than a thousand Taiwanese.

66 ibid.


68 ibid., 71, 78-79.

69 ibid., 77-81. Huang Fusan, 72-72.
Although Lin Hsien-tang’s diary from 1936 is lost, in 1936, there were two events that highlighted the changing political mood in Taiwan. One was the insult to Lin Hsien-tang by a Japanese military veteran, known as the zuguo shijian (祖國事件), which can be translated as the “motherland incident,” and the other was the return to the Tokyo government’s practice of appointing military governors in Taiwan.

In March 1936, Lin Hsien-tang visited major cities in south and coastal China, including Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shantou, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Shanghai as part of a delegation hosted by the Xin Min Newspaper Publishing Company, of which Lin was the former president. In a speech to overseas Taiwanese in Shanghai, Lin used the phrase Lin mo guihuan zuguo (林某歸還祖國), which mean “a return to the motherland by a certain Mr. Lin.” The loaded phrase, referring to China as Lin’s motherland, was reported by a Japanese agent to the Japanese Garrison in Taiwan.70

A sanction against Lin Hsien-tang ensued. In May 1936, Lin’s speech was published in Taiwan Nichinichi Shinbun, the Japanese colonial newspaper. Then, in June 1936, months after his return to Taiwan, he was invited by the chief of Taichung prefecture to attend the official Commemoration of Japanese Rule. However, during the ceremony, Lin was insulted by a Japanese right-wing activist, Uruma Zenbei, who denounced Lin and then punched him on the right cheek. Taiwan Nichinichi Shinbun reported the incident in a way that reflected positively on the actions of Uruma.71 Subsequently, Lin announced his resignation from the post of Consultative Council, which he had held since 1932.

70 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir).
According to Yeh Jung-chung, the insult to Lin Hsien-tang was instigated by Ogisu Rippei, the Chief of the Japanese Garrison in Taiwan, who intended to administer a punishment to Lin for his earlier comments about the motherland of China. Because Lin’s words did not legally constitute a crime under law, Ogisu had to seek an extrajudicial way to punish Lin.

In the second half of 1936, Taiwan’s changing colonial circumstances were manifested by the Tokyo government’s appointment of Kobayashi Seizo as the seventeenth Taiwan governor on September 2. Although he was a retired admiral in the Japanese Navy at the time of his commission, his appointment ended the series of nine consecutive civilian governors that had started in 1919. It signalled the growing power of Japanese military institutions in Taiwan, and the changing attitudes in the Japanese empire towards war and expansion heavily influenced by military thinking.

By 1937, the pressure on activities fostering classical Chinese learning in Taiwan continued to grow. The Yixin Association and Private School still operated under Taiwan’s changing political conditions, however the numbers of students were falling rapidly. In the graduation ceremony held on March 27, 1937, there were only sixteen graduates, three males and sixteen females. On May 15, 1937, Lin wrote that Yixin Association celebrated its fifth anniversary. However, it was held with a much smaller event that in previous years.

---

72 In Yeh’s book, he recounted Lin Panlong’s observation of Lin Hsien-tang after Lin returned home that day. Panlong recounted that Lin Hsien-tang did not mention the insult to the family members in the first place but only revealed it after they all had finished their meal. Yeh Jung-chung, *Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century)*, 147.

73 Taiwan was used by Japan as the fortifying base for Japan’s *nanshin* (southward expansion) policy. Soeya Yoshihide, “Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 165, Taiwan in the 20th Century (March 2001): 132.

On May 18, 1937, Lin Hsien-tang left Taiwan on a journey to Tokyo, and stayed there for twenty months. According to Luo Wanzhen, Lin’s retreat to Japan at this time was not an impulsive decision but rather, one he had taken after the assault in 1936.\(^75\)

**Lin Hsien-tang’s Role in the Japanisation Period**

In the period before the Second Sino-Japanese War, Lin Hsien-tang had been placed in an ambivalent position by the colonial government. On the one hand, the government attempted to coerce Lin over his cultural activism through colonial administrative process and personal pressure because his promotion of classical Chinese culture was adverse to Japan’s colonial assimilation policies. On the other hand, they continued to recognise Lin’s social and cultural capital and sought to co-opt Lin and maintain his engagement with the colonial system.

In the period leading up to the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Yixin Association was a way for Lin Hsien-tang to express Taiwan’s cultural distinctiveness, which became a form of political resistance as colonial policy hardened. For example, Lin gave an account of a visit by Kubota Seishiro, a captain in the Japanese Army and the president of the Army Hospital in Taichung. Kubota dressed in his military uniform and made a special visit to Lin Hsien-tang on January 1, 1937, a public holiday. During the visit, Kubota first expressed sympathy to Lin regarding the assault six months prior, but then began cautioning Lin on the following three issues: “First, you shall hang a pine tree decoration at the entrance. Second, you shall prioritise Japanese language studies in the Yixin Yishu, and it is better not to teach classical Chinese classes. Third, you shall appoint a Japanese to the post of village administrator.”

\(^75\) Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir.*
Kubouta’s “advice” to Lin on his support for classical Chinese education in Taiwan was followed up by the Chief of Japanese Garrison on January 7 and 8. Ogisu visited the Xin Min Newspaper Publishing Company, pressuring Luo Wanzhen and Lin Chenglu, the General Manager and the Chief Editor of the Newspaper, to give up publishing in Chinese and only publish in Japanese.  

Lin Hsien-tang’s family members also became involved in colonial government coercion. On February 13, 1937, Lin’s nephews Lin Songling and Lin Henian were arrested because they had a dispute after drinking and were detained for nineteen days. Then, on February 16, Lin Hsien-tang’s nephew Lin Zibin was arrested and charged for his illegal possession of a shotgun and was detained for thirty-four days. According to the *Lin Xiantang Nianpu*, both charges were fabricated and the arrests were indicative of a warning from the Japanese Garrison in Taiwan towards Lin.

As well as coercion, the colonial government also sought Lin’s acquiescence to and acknowledgement of Taiwan’s Japanese rule. On February 22, 1937, Guo Tingjun and Huang Chunqing, who were from northern Taiwan and close to the government, visited Lin in Wufeng. They attempted to convince Lin to visit the Taiwan Grand Shrine on the day of commemoration

---

76 Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji jiu*, 1937, 1-2. Putting a pine tree decoration in the front door area is one of the Japanese traditions practiced during the New Year. Also, Lin Yulong was the head of the Wufeng district at that time, so he had the power of holding personnel appointment in the district.

77 ibid., 14.

78 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuishilu* (*Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir*).
for Japanese colonisation as a way of showing his patriotism to the Japanese empire so as to facilitate collaboration and appease the suspicions of the Japanese authorities.79

Another incident took place the next day. On February 23, Nakahira Masa, the Chief of Police in Taichung district, together with a group of Japanese officials, visited Lin Hsien-tang at his home. Wen Chenglong was the interpreter that day. During their meeting, Nakahira purposely sent his subordinates away with an excuse before he began to have a private conversation with Lin. Combining conciliation and coercion, he cautioned Lin:

Right-wing elements are colluding with the Japanese Garrison in Taiwan to suppress the Taiwanese. However, Governor Kobayashi’s policies are misunderstood as being in line with the Japanese Garrison. But Governor Kobayashi in fact has always believed that Taiwanese are imperial subjects, and he hopes that the Taiwanese will show their loyalty to Japan… However, Taiwanese have the defect of selfishness and are too focussed on the pursuits of material life (近來右派份子勾結軍部壓迫臺人，使人誤會總督政治與軍部同調，但小林總督視臺人為日本帝國臣民之一部分，務期其以至誠奉公成為忠實之國民… 然臺人亦有缺點，僅知利己，執著物質而無精神之向上活動云云).80

A few months later, on July 7, 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred, in which the bombing of the Lugou Bridge about thirty miles from Beijing triggered a military engagement between troops of Japanese imperial army and the troops of the Republic of China, led by the Chinese Nationalists (KMT).81 From this event, the Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 began.

Lin Hsien-tang, still in Japan, wrote to his wife Yang Shuixin on October 12, and said that

79 ibid.
80 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji jiu, 1937, 74.
“the Yishin Yishu discontinued classical Chinese teaching on October 4 to accord with the times (曰一新義塾於十月四日廢止漢文教授，順應時機),” and told Yang that “I decided to have a retreat here, so not return to Taiwan for a while (余決定在此靜養，暫不歸臺).” Lin’s account suggests that the Yixin School voluntarily dissolved, however clearly its activities had become untenable in Taiwan’s political climate by late 1937.

In contrast to the politics of his status in Taiwan, Lin Hsien-tang seemed to be given more freedom in Japan to express his views about Taiwanese political life and continued to access elite levels of Japanese society. In June 1937, for example, Lin visited Izawa Takio, the former Taiwan governor from 1924 to 1926, and with whom Lin discussed Taiwan’s political problems. Izawa told Lin that he socialised with the Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, and that he might be able to raise Lin’s concerns with him. On October 12, 1937, Lin was hosted at a party by Iwanami Shigeo, a business tycoon, and the attendees included Izawa Takio, the member of House of Peers Sekiya Teizaburo, and the chairman of the Shōwa Bank Tajima Michiji.

Although Lin Hsien-tang moved in these circles, his circumstances continued to be shaped by the situation in Taiwan and he continued to debate whether he was best placed to remain in Japan or return to Taiwan. In the account of Lin’s thoughts by Yeh Jung-chung, he reflected:

My wife and Yulong had Lingshi come to visit me in Tokyo to keep me posted about the present situation in Taiwan, and wanted me to think carefully as to whether it is better for me to go back to Taiwan or just stay here. Someone had reminded me of the

---

82 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji jiu, 1937, 354.
83 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
84 ibid.
promise I made to the captain of Japanese Garrison in Taiwan Hayashi Hidezumi that I would return to Taiwan in October, and said that I should keep my promise in order not to arouse any suspicion. However, I cannot return to Taiwan now. My migraines and arthritis were ones of the reasons. Dr. Uramoto said I would only recover if I have good rest here. Furthermore, my wife has been kept hostage (人質) in Taiwan. Although Yulong is the head of the Wufeng district and responsible in his job, he is not trusted by the authorities. They sent out Japanese agents to visit my house every day, sometimes three times a day. If I return to Taiwan, it would only make things worse… Because of these two things, therefore, I have decided to stay here for the time being…  

During Lin’s twenty-month stay in Japan, there were many changes occurring in Taiwan. The appointment of the retired admiral Kobayashi Seizo as governor had signalled the changing climate before Lin Hsien-tang left for Japan. After assuming the office, Kobayashi proclaimed three ruling goals for Taiwan that reflected Japan’s national priorities during the wartime. They were “Japanization with the emperor system as the foundation, industrialization, and the fortification of Taiwan as a base for nanshin, expansion towards the south.” The cultural and political dimension of Kobayashi’s rule were expressed in the campaign known as the Kōminka movement, launched in 1937. All of these goals began to be realised while Lin was away.

The term Kōminka in Japanese literally means imperialisation, and it sought to transform colonial subjects into imperial subjects. The practice of the Kōminka movement involved an intensification of culturalisation through the “national language movement” (kokugō undō), the “name-changing program” (kaiseimei) and the “national service system” (shiganbei seidō).

---

85 Yeh Jung-chung, *Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century)*, 206.
86 Soeya Yoshihide, “Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations,” 132.
87 Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity*
Through these different aspects, the *Kōmin* movement intensified the policies and ideology of imperial assimilation. Kobayashi said in 1937:

Since the beginning, to demonstrate the meaning of the national polity, to elucidate the resolve of the people, and to accept and carry out the imperial wish of “impartiality under His gaze” to produce the reality of assimilation have been the steadfast and unchanging [goals of the] policy of Japanese rule in Taiwan. Given the imperial nation’s mission, the position of Taiwan, and current world affairs, the imminent task is to have the five million islanders unite equally in acquiring the qualification of Japanese people, in renewing their resolution together for the prosperity of the nation. In order to do so, we must strive for an extensive and thorough imperial spirit by promoting common education, rectifying proper language and customs, and cultivating the groundwork for loyal imperial subjects.\(^8\)

During the *Kōmin* period, and in recognition of Lin Hsien-tang’s social status and contacts with elite Japan, his absence from Taiwan where the political circumstances were changing became an issue for the colonial government and he was encouraged to return to Taiwan. On September 14, 1938, Lin visited Numakawa Sakichi, an old friend of his, a then captain in the Military Police force in Taiwan, and a captain in the Military Police force in Tokyo. Numakawa said to Lin that “Mr. Masuoka, a captain in the Military Police force in Taiwan hoped that Mr. Lin would return to Taiwan soon (謂增岡臺灣憲兵隊長甚望先生早日歸臺).”\(^9\) On November 4, 1938, Lin was paid a special visit by Ueda Hirotaka, a reporter from *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinbun* in Taiwan. He said to Lin that his visit to him had been approved by Mr. Morioka, the Minister of General Affairs in Taiwan, and the purpose of his

---

\(^8\) Quoted in Leo T.S. Ching, ibid.

visit was to urge Mr. Lin’s return to Taiwan. He then went further and explained specifically why Lin’s presence in Taiwan at that time was important: “it would reflect very badly on the colonial government if they feel that they cannot make Mr. Lin feel at home in Taiwan in this wartime period.”

The significance of the meetings with Numakawa and Ueda was twofold. Firstly, it suggested the enduring attention on the relationship with Lin Hsien-tang by the colonial government, indicative of the continuing political and social capital that Lin Hsien-tang held in the Japanese empire. Although Lin’s status had been contended with by Japanese colonial government through the 1930s, they nevertheless recognised his continuing importance both in Taiwan and in metropolitan Japan as the war with China intensified. At the same time, both meetings were informal, suggesting that the colonial government had its own political difficulties in initiating a direct dialogue with Lin and it recognised the political legitimacy that would be conferred upon Lin by such direct contact.

On 11 December 1938, Lin Hsien-tang did indeed end his twenty-month stay in Japan and returned to Taiwan. According to the *Lin Xiantang Nianpu*, Lin was prompted to return to Taiwan at this time by his private affairs and his choice to stay away from the cold winter in Japan, rather than the entreaties of the Japanese colonial authorities. After Lin Hsien-tang’s ship berthed in Keelung harbour on 15 December, he was welcomed by Lin Yunlong, Yeh Jung-chung and Li Lingshi who went on board the ship for a reception, followed by another reception at Taipei main station where around a dozen of his friends had gathered. After Lin rested a while in a hotel, he was hosted by his friends in the restaurant, *Jiang Shan Lou*, in Taipei that night.

---

90 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (*Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir*).

91 ibid.
However, after these social and familial activities, the following day, from early in the morning, Lin conducted a series of meetings with senior colonial officials, first at the hotel where he stayed, and then the Taiwan governor’s building, the army headquarters and the military police headquarters. During that day, Lin met with governor Kobayashi, whom Lin described was very friendly, four ministerial chiefs and several section managers in the colonial government, as well as the Chief of Japanese Garrison, the Chief of Staff of the Army, a rear admiral, a colonel, and a captain from the military police.92

These meetings signalled an accommodation of Lin Hsien-tang’s political standing by the colonial government that continued to the end of colonial rule in 1945. Although the relationship between the colonial government and Lin had always been complex and ambiguous many years before Lin’s long stay in Japan in 1937, these meetings held after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese war and Lin’s return from Japan delineates a period in Lin’s relationship with the colonial government in which his engagement and acquiesce with Kōminka-era Taiwan was sought.

Just seven months after these meetings, Lin Hsien-tang left Taiwan again. In July 1939, Lin set off for Tokyo,93 where he had another long stay up until October 1940.

During this time, Lin’s literary writings and his exploration of Buddhism were key aspects of his long stay. In addition, in September 1939, Lin fractured his left leg on his way home from a dinner with his nephew in downtown Tokyo, and had to spend over two months bedridden with the injury. During Lin’s convalescence was described in the Lin Xiantang

92 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi, 1938, 325.

Nianpu as a torment for him. He therefore kept up very frequent correspondence with his family and friends in Taiwan. These letters, together with his literary work during his 1939-40 stay in Japan, were later compiled into Haishang Chang He Ji (海上唱和集), which can be translated as “echoing voices over the sea.”

In February 1940, Yang Shuixin and Lin Yunlong came to visit Lin Hsien-tang in Japan. According to the Lin Xiantang Nianpu, their reunion was “a bittersweet moment, in which their eyes brimmed with tears of joy and sorrow (悲喜交集熱淚盈眶).” During Yang and Yunlong’s short visit, they visited the nearby hot springs for therapeutic bathing. Yang and Yunlong had to leave Lin Hsien-tang and return to Taiwan after two months. Lin recounted the departure scene with an emotional style, saying “a lump was brought to my throat (不禁俱嗚咽)” after the bells in the train station rang hurriedly.

Lin Hsien-tang turned sixty in 1940. In addition to these emotional and physical challenges, the Lin Xiantang Nianpu characterises this year as especially bitter and difficult (大為傷懷) for Lin as there had been a number of deaths among his family members, including the death of his second daughter-in-law, Aiko, Lin Youlong’s wife and Lin Bozheng’s mother.

94 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
95 Lin Hsien-tang complied his writings of this period into Haishang Chang He Ji, which was published in October 1940. After the book was published, Lin Hsien-tang gave his books to his families and friends. ibid.
96 ibid.
98 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir). In addition to Aiko’s death, Lin Yansheng (Lin Hsien-tang’s nephew) died in 1938, Lin Youchun (Lin Hsien-tang’s nephew) died in 1939, Lin Zhongheng (Lin Hsien-tang’s nephew) died in January 1940, and Lin Chongzheng (Lin Hsien-tang’s grandnephew) died in October 1940. Lin Lanfang, “Reasons for Lin Hsien-tang’s Conversion to Buddhism (1927-1955),” in Diaries & Research on Taiwan History—Collected Essays in Memory of Mr. Lin Hsien-tang (1881.12.3-1956.9.8), ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi et al. (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan
Lin Hsien-tang’s writings during this period made reference to Buddhist teachings and language that he practiced and can be seen in the context of his life events and health. His use of phrases drawn from Buddhist classical texts, such as “Jingang (金剛),”99 “Shi er yinyuan (十二因緣),”100 and “Miaofa fahua (妙法華)”101 in poems that he wrote in Japan at this time are all examples. Also, Lin said himself in his diary that “I have a growing interest in Buddhism (余對於佛教之信仰漸次濃厚也).”102

After recovering from his leg injury, Lin Hsien-tang eventually returned to Taiwan in late October 1940, a time when Taiwanese society was mobilised into the Köminka movement. After his return, the wartime colonial government continued to seek to co-opt Lin in its policies and politics.103 On January 14, 1941, Lin Hsien-tang was invited to a formal lunch by senior officers from the government and the Japanese Garrison in Taiwan at Jiang Shan Lou. According to Lin, the lunch was “conducted in a great atmosphere, and we did not talk about the current affairs in Taiwan (席間暢談而不及時事).”104 Afterwards, Lin met with Saitō Ki, the Chief of General Affairs, in the official residence of the governor. Saitō said to Lin: “I want to expunge the difficulties of former Japanese officials towards the Taiwanese, and let us be

---


100 ibid., 9. Shi er yinyuan can be translated as the twelve nidanas.

101 ibid., 11.


103 Yeh Jung-chung, Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century), 51.

loyal subjects to Japan’s empire, setting ourselves to the task to the very end (欲除去前任所
作使島民不快之事，而同協力為國家盡瘁云云)。”

In November 1940, a new governor, the eighteenth, had been appointed in Taiwan, Hasegawa Kiyoshi. In April 1941, Lin Hsien-tang was designated by the colonial government to be a member of the board of the committees of the Kominhokokai (the Imperial Subjects’ Public Service Association). The following month, Lin Hsien-tang received a written invitation from Governor Hasegawa, who referred to himself in the letter as shōsei, a term used to signify deference to a senior person. In November 1941, Lin was reappointed to the colonial administration’s Consultative Council, a post from which he had resigned in 1936.

In the Kōminka period, although Lin Hsien-tang’s cultural activism in organisations like the Yixin Association had been suppressed, his social capital was still valued by the colonial government as a means through which it sought to mobilise the Taiwanese in the name of Japan. However, in his diary, Lin noted that he was frustrated with the appointment to the Kominhokokai but he could not decline. In a letter Lin wrote to a friend, Hong Yuanhuang, in 1941, Lin expressed his frustration: “I have no choice but to follow the orders of the government. I will do what I do to the limit of my ability. Beyond that, I will hold my counsel,

105 ibid.

106 Kominhokokai was an association established on April 19, 1941. Under Hasegawa’s direction, it created a tighter control over the Taiwanese through networks within and between local communities. It dissolved on June 17, 1945. While the Kōminka movement focused on implementing the cultural policies among Taiwanese, the Kōminhōkōkai aimed at achieving a wide range of goals through social mobilisation including both Taiwanese and Japanese settlers. Hsu Hsueh-chi, “Huangmin feng gong hui de yanjiu—yi Lin Hsien-tang de canyu wei li (The Kōminhōkōkai in Taiwan During the Second World War: A Case Study of Lin Hsien-tang’s Involvement),” Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan 31, (June 1999): 167. Also, see Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” 238.

107 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
and keep myself to my study (吾人惟有政府之命是從，盡吾力之所能為者而為之也，此外勿多言，惟讀書而已).”

In Lin Hsien-tang’s diary, it was not uncommon to see that he was requested to deliver speeches in public and on radio to promulgate imperial edicts, to attend official meetings, and help fund the expense incurred by the Kominhokokai. Hsu Hsueh-chi argues that Lin accepted the need for cooperation with the colonial government because he saw it as being in the best interests of Taiwanese in the context of hardening colonial policy. However, Lin’s cooperation did not necessarily mean his acceptance of the Kōminka policies of indoctrination into Japanese imperial ideology.

As Japan drew deeper into war, Lin Hsien-tang continued to deploy tactics of resistance against the colonial government. For example, according to the Lin Xiantang Nianpu, Lin had been urged to change his name to a Japanese-style name by colonial officials at least five or six times by December 1941. However, Lin had already taken a firm stand on this issue that he would not change his name. He responded politely but disingenuously, as recorded in his diary in November 1940: “It is not uncommon to find that there are a number of Japanese whose surname is Hayashi. The colonial government has wanted us to be assimilated, so how is it that I cannot retain my surname as the way it is? But they agree if I change it into Nakabayashi, Kobayashi, Hayashida or Tahara? The colonial government are quite unreasonable (内地人之

---

110 ibid., 186-188.
111 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).*
姓林者不少，既言欲同化吾辈，何故不能姓林，若改为中林、小林或林田、田原则可，殊令人不解。"\(^{112}\)

While Lin’s resistance to name-changing was tolerated by the colonial government in the context of Kōminka movement, he did not have a say in other matters. As the war escalated and the mobilisation effort intensified, Lin Hsien-tang as well as his family members were required to serve in colonial bureaucracies. For example, after Lin Hsien-tang’s appointment as a member of the committee of Kominhokokai in April 1941, he was later asked to take up five additional roles in the local Taichung branches of the Youth and Young Women’s Corps.\(^{113}\) Lin’s family members, such as Yang Shuixin, Panlong, Youlong, Yunlong and Lin Hsien-tang’s son-in-law Gao Tianchong, were all drafted into the activities of the Kōminka movement by the colonial government.\(^{114}\)

Despite the cooperation of Lin Hsien-tang and his family, they were subject to intense surveillance. For example, on April 22, 1941, Lin Hsien-tang was informed by Dr. Miyahara that an elderly woman had informed on Lin to the police in Taichung that he still possessed cache of illegal weapons that the Lin family had buried since the Meiji era.\(^{115}\) Lin Hsien-tang made a declaration to Miyahara on the falsity of the charge, saying that these weapons had been

\(^{112}\) Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi er, 1940, 322. The Chinese character of “Lin” can be pronounced as Hayashi in Japanese, which is also a common Japanese surname.

\(^{113}\) Hsu Hsueh-chi, “Huangmin feng gong hui de yanjiu—yi Lin Hsien-tang de canyu wei li (The Kōminhōkōkai in Taiwan During the Second World War: A Case Study of Lin Hsien-tang’s Involvement),” 183.

\(^{114}\) Yang Shuixin was a consultant of a women’s association. Panlong was a head of a training dojo after his return from Japan in July 1944. Youlong was a head of a training dojo before he was transferred to the post of standing committee in Huanan Bank in May 1944. Yunlong signed up as a volunteer soldier. Gao Tianchong was a volunteer navy surgeon. Cited in ibid., 192-193.

\(^{115}\) Miyahara was a councillor of Taichung Prefecture and a doctor. He was socialised with the Taiwan governor and Taichung Prefecturer. He volunteered to settle this matter with Lin in private before he met Lin Hsien-tang. Lin explained to Miyahara that these weapons had been turned in in the early years of Japanese rule. Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi san, 1941, 158.
turned in. The *Lin Xiantang Nianpu* commented that if such an accusation had been brought earlier around the time of Lin’s assault in 1936, he might have found it more difficult to avoid an injustice.\(^{116}\)

Yet, similar charges came one after another in the following years. On January 15, 1942, as another example, it was reported to Japanese police that Lin had taken canned food and wine from a store but had failed to pay.\(^{117}\) In another later instance, on July 2, 1944, an informant reported to the police on a speech given by Lin.\(^{118}\) Despite the accusations made against Lin, he was able to prove his innocence to the colonial government each time.

These false charges as well as the constant surveillance of Lin Hsien-tang indicated the ambiguous relationship between Lin and the colonial government under Japan’s imperial wartime politics. Homi Bhabha, writing about European colonialism, captures the notion of the contradictory nature of such a relationship, in which the colonial subject was always “incomplete” within the empire and intrinsically a potential site of dissent. Transforming the colonised into imperial subjects was the purpose of colonisation, therefore the completion of such a task would remove the purpose of imperialism itself. As that project intensified in the *Kōminka* period, despite Lin’s many years of accommodation to colonial Taiwan, he would always be a potential source of resistance as someone who could never become fully Japanese, and this itself was validating of the imperial project.\(^{119}\)

\(^{116}\) Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (*Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir*).

\(^{117}\) Lin Hsien-tang explained to the police that these cans and wine bottles were gifts given by his families and friends as a gift for his sixtieth birthday last year. Lin Hsien-tang *Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi si, 1942* (*The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang, Vol. 14, 1942*), ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica; Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2007), 19.


\(^{119}\) Homi Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,”
In more quotidian sense, Kōminka was ultimately a movement that aimed to ensure Taiwanese compliance with wartime demands including a commitment to Japanese military service, rather a movement that would end with Taiwanese enjoying rights and equality within the empire after being transformed into Japanese subjects. Lin’s circumstances indicated the continuing lack of trust between the colonial authorities and leading Taiwanese as Japan’s war effort deepened.

By the 1940s, Taiwan’s economic development gave it a critical place in Japan’s imperial expansion through war. It assumed an important strategic role as a joint planning and logistical centre after Japan attacked Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941.120

Despite the enormous strength of Japan’s military power, it was tested by US power in the Pacific leading up to the huge naval engagement at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. Japan’s navy suffered a decisive defeat by a smaller US force from which it never recovered.121 The Japanese Imperial Army made significant advanced through south east Asia, overturning European colonial power in the process in Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and Indonesia, before also being met by US, Australian, New Zealand and other Pacific armies in the long and bitter military campaigns of the war.

The Chinese Nationalists, too, were fully engaged in the war against Japan in China. The Republic of China formally declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941. The Nationalists were also engaged in the Burma campaign (1942-1945). Recognising that the consequences of a Japanese conquest of Burma “would mean the cessation of vital supplies over the Burma Road

---


and a dangerous threat to China’s ‘back door’ through Yunnan,” the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had offered Chinese troops to aid the Allied side in the defence of Burma.\textsuperscript{122}

In 1942, an army volunteer system was established in Taiwan. Many Taiwanese, including a significant contingent of indigenous Taiwanese, applied for the military service amid the patriotic appeals persuaded by the Kōminka campaign, as well as pressures exerted within the informal networks of local communities.

The history of the Second World War is one of extraordinary violence and geo-political significance, of which Taiwan is only one part. By 1943, Japanese military power was being met by greater allied power from the US, the Chinese Nationalists and the Soviet Union in the Pacific. The allied leaders met in Cairo in late 1943 and began planning for Japan’s eventual defeat. In the negotiations, the Chinese Nationalists made a claim over territories occupied by Japan since the founding of the Republic in 1912, but also included Taiwan in that claim. At the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, it stated that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."\textsuperscript{123}

As a colony, Taiwan suffered as Japan experienced military reversals through 1942 and 1943. Reflecting the deteriorating situation in Japan itself, Governor Hasegawa proposed that Taiwan should become economically and militarily self-sufficient. During the latter part of 1944, Taiwan began to experience massive U.S. air raids on many parts of the island while Hasegawa was relieved of office at the end of that year.\textsuperscript{124} In April 1945, general conscription


was established in Taiwan. According to Chou Wan-yao, by the end of the war, the number of Taiwanese recruited for military duty totalled 207,183, and of this total, there were 80,433 servicemen and 126,750 civilian employees. Among the servicemen, were the Takasago Volunteers, for example, a military force comprised of indigenous Taiwanese who engaged in combat through south east Asia.

**Problems of Livelihood in Taiwan**

At the level of the everyday near the end of the Second World War, the Taiwanese were facing significant deprivations, including shortages of staples such as rice.

Signifying Japan’s military involvement with China and its war footing from the late 1930s onwards the “Rice Distribution Control Act (米穀配給統制法)” had been introduced to Taiwan as early as 1939, two years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Act empowered the colonial government to take strict direct control of the purchase, sale, storage and rationing of rice. However, the problem of rice shortage worsened through the early 1940s. Taiwan was required to be self-sufficient in its own rice production, at the same time as increasing demands were made by Japan’s military forces. In 1943, the colonial government issued the “Food Control Act (食糧管理令),” putting nearly all food production under the control of the colonial government.

The shortage of rice was keenly felt by all Taiwanese, including Lin Hsien-tang. Lin even

---

125 Chou Wan-yao, “Riben zaitai junshi dongyuan yu Taiwanren de haiwai canzhan jingyan (Japan’s Military Mobilisation and the Taiwanese Overseas War Experiences),” *Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research)* 2, no. 2 (June 1995): 96.


127 Lee Li-yung, “Riben diguo zhimindi de zhanshi liangshi tongzhi tizhi: Taiwan yu Chaoxian de bijiao yanjiu (Grains Regulation System in Japanese colonial Empire: A Comparative Study between Taiwan and Korea (1937-1945)),” *Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research)* 16, no. 2 (June 2009): 76.
needed to take out loans to meet his expenses the output of his own landholdings came under colonial control and did not generate sufficient income in the wartime economy.¹²⁸ Despite Lin’s privilege and social status, on November 16, 1943, he wrote: “we had no rice to cook last night (昨夜無米可炊)…”¹²⁹

The problem of rice shortage persisted in Taiwan throughout the wartime period. On February 16, 1945, Lin note in his diary that “the peasant Lin Jincheng came and asked me that what he could do about his future because he was ordered to deliver all the crops he had to the Japanese authorities (佃人林金城來，言郡當局命令伙食粟全數供出，此後無飯可食將如何).”¹³⁰ Lin was in a helpless situation. He comforted the peasant, “The rice portion for my family has been cut in half, but I dare not to say a word of objection to this order. I hope you would say nothing to this order like I do. What we can do now is to endure and eat yams (余之伙食米亦被減半數，尚不敢異議，願汝亦勿多言，惟有忍耐以食番薯而已).”¹³¹

At the end of 1944, the governor of Taiwan Hasegawa Kiyoshi was replaced by Andō Rikichi, who became Taiwan’s last Japanese governor general. Over the last few months of the Second World War, the Andō government maintained a tight control over the economy and social life of the Taiwanese. However, at the same time, as Japan’s circumstances deteriorated, the empire made concessions to the Taiwanese that fulfilled some of the aspirations for Lin Hsien-tang and other activists earlier in the colonial period.¹³² For example, on March 21, 1945,
the Imperial Diet passed an act stipulating that five Taiwanese representatives would be elected to the Diet. Two days later, on March 23, a rescript was issued saying that three Taiwanese would be appointed to the House of Peers. The election for the five Taiwanese representatives to the Diet was not held before the Second World War’s end. However, on April 4, 1945, Lin Hsien-tang became one of the three Taiwanese appointed to the House of Peers.\footnote{133} This was the first time that the Taiwanese were allotted representation in the Tokyo government after Taiwan’s cession to Japan in 1895. This gesture was ultimately ineffectual as the war ended before Lin was able to take up his peerage.

In Lin Hsien-tang’s diaries, he describes the U.S. force landing in Okinawa\footnote{134} as the empire entered its final months. On May 31 1945, the official residence of the governor and a number of administrative buildings were badly damaged in U.S. air raids. On August 6 and 9, the US dropped atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively, and on August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. Under the terms of Japan’s surrender, Taiwan and the Pescadores were passed to the authority of the Chinese Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek. In October 1945, US naval attaché George Kerr escorted Andō Rikichi to surrender Taiwan to its new Chinese governor Chen Yi. Accordingly, Taiwan and its people entered a new era of Chinese Nationalist rule. Lin Hsien-tang’s life also changed dramatically, as will be elaborated in the next chapter.

\footnote{133} Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, \textit{Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu} (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).

\footnote{134} Lin Hsien-tang, \textit{Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi qi, 1945}, 118.
Chapter 7

Lin Hsien-tang After the Second World War

Lin Hsien-tang in the Transitional Period

The Taiwanese population was taken surprise by Japan’s sudden surrender on August 15, 1945, and the news that Taiwan would soon be handed over to the Chinese Nationalist government of the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek.\(^\text{1}\) Japan’s surrender and the end of colonial rule produced many different responses among the inhabitants, which reflected an awareness of the political implications for Taiwan. For instance, some Taiwanese expressed their anger towards Japanese colonial officials and police on the street and assaulted Taiwanese who publicly demonstrated a Japanese identity and collaborated with the colonial government, while other Taiwanese eagerly anticipated the investiture of the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan.\(^\text{2}\)

Reflecting his status in Taiwan, Lin Hsien-tang positioned himself in relation to the Taiwan’s post-war changing circumstances. On the night of the Japanese surrender on August 15, Lin Hsien-tang, Panlong, Yunlong and other Taiwanese gathered at his house discussing the political change. Lin recorded his surprise for how swiftly the events of Japanese surrender proceeded, and commented in his diary that “what they gained by armed force fifty years ago

---


\(^{2}\) ibid., 247.
they were to lose by armed force (五十年來以武力建致之江山，亦以武力失之也)。”

Over the following days, Lin Hsien-tang held numerous meetings with the Japanese colonial officials and his Taiwanese friends. During these meetings, the notion of Taiwan’s security and social stability in the transitional period was a key dimension of Lin’s concerns, as he worried that the hundreds of thousands (數十萬) of Japanese army soldiers in Taiwan, particularly those young officials, would become belligerent and out of control.

Lin Hsien-tang’s concern was perhaps grounded in a meeting that occurred that he did not attend. On August 16, 1945, the day after the Japanese surrender, a group of Taiwanese including Gu Zhenfu, Xu Bing and Lin Xiongxiang were invited by young Japanese army officials including Nakamiya Gorō to join a discussion with respect to the potential for Taiwanese independence. The idea of establishing the Taiwan zhian weichi hui (臺灣治安維持會), which can be translated as an organisation for maintaining Taiwan’s security, was explored. However, on August 22, the governor Andō Rikichi strongly expressed his position of opposition to these young Japanese army officers. Accordingly, their proposal was not carried forward.

Then, after Japan’s surrender, leading Taiwanese citizen, including some who had met to discuss Taiwanese independence, began to mobilise in preparation for the arrival of the Chinese

---

3 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi qi, 1945, 245.
4 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
5 Huang Fusan, 147. There were different versions regarding who took the lead in the meeting. See the discussion in Hsu Hsueh-chi, “Taiwan riji yanjiu de huiyu yu zhanwang (Diary Research in Taiwan: Retrospect and Prospect),” 168.
6 Chen Yi-shen, “Taidu zhuzhang de qiyuan yu liubian (The Origins and Development of Advocacy for an Independent State of Taiwan),” Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research) 17, no. 2 (2010): 140.
7 Itō Kiyoshi, Taiwan si bai nian de lishi yu zhanwang (The Four-hundred-year History and Prospect of Taiwan), trans. Jiang Wanzhe (Taichung: Xin Yuandong Publishing, 1994), 121.
Nationalists. On August 19, 1945, Xu Bing, who was also one of the three appointed Taiwanese to the House of Peers by the Tokyo government, and Lan Guocheng came to Lin Hsien-tang’s house and invited him to join them in a delegation to meet important Chinese Nationalist officials (民國要人) in Shanghai and Nanjing. To their proposal, Lin was circumspect and did not give Xu and Lan an immediate commitment. However, he did agree to go to Taipei with them the next day to meet with the Taiwan governor Andō.  

On August 20, a meeting was held in the Taiwan governor’s residence in the presence of Andō, Lin Hsien-tang, Lin Youlong, Xu Bing, Lan Guocheng and other civilian and senior Japanese army officials. Lin first appealed to the Japanese officials to maintain the security situation in Taiwan. Then, he went further and asked if there was a need for him to come forward as a mediator to facilitate communication between the Japanese colonial officials and the Chinese Nationalists. Lin was told that the order would be maintained during the colonial governance but any assistance he could give to maintain ethnic harmony between Japanese settlers and Taiwanese as well as the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists would be greatly appreciated. Then, regarding the delegation to China, the Japanese authorities suggested that the delegation to Shanghai would be the most appropriate if led by Taiwanese because “a delegation representing the Taiwan governor would not be timely (若用總督特派，今尚非其時也).”

In Lin’s account in his diary, the proposal for the delegation seemed to have lapsed after the meeting. In late August, Lin was engaged in maintaining the security situation with Japanese colonial officials through community meetings. Regarding political discussions on

---

8 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi qi, 1945, 249.
9 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
10 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi qi, 1945, 250.
Taiwan’s future, Lin Hsien-tang remained very discreet. For example, on August 23, Lin stated his position in a meeting with the politically-active Taiwanese Yang Gui and Li Qiaosong at his house. In response to Yang and Li’s political aspirations for “liberation,” Lin responded in opposition: “The question remains who it is that one means to liberate...We must wait and remain vigilant in order not to act on someone’s instigation and not to disturb the social order (所謂解放者，對何人而言也… 此時惟有靜觀，切不可受人嗾使，以擾亂社會秩序也).”

Few days later, the colonial government resumed the discussion about a Taiwanese delegation to China. On August 30, 1945, a Japanese major came to Lin, urging him to meet with Chen Yi, the Chinese Nationalist general and future Taiwan governor in Shanghai. Lin, feeling obliged (義不能辭), undertook the task although Yang Shuixin and Lin Yunlong were both worried about Lin’s flight in an aircraft. Lin hurried to Taipei with the major the same afternoon. On August 31, 1945, the delegation including Lin Hsien-tang, Xu Bing, Taiwanese representatives and three senior colonial government officials arrived in Shanghai by plane.

The delegation stayed in China for two weeks. However, without a formal invitation from the Chinese Nationalist government and despite their attempts to utilise their social and political networks in China, they were not able to secure a meeting with Chen Yi during the visit.

On September 6, while Lin Hsien-tang and other five Taiwanese delegated were in Shanghai, they were informed that they were invited by General He Yingqin to attend the September 9th ceremony of “Act of Surrender” in the Nationalist capital Nanjing. On

---

11 ibid., 253.
12 ibid., 259.
September 8, Lin and others flew from Shanghai to Nanjing, where they were told by Isayama Haruki that he himself would be the representative so that Lin and others did not have to attend the ceremony. Accordingly, Lin Hsien-tang and other Taiwanese did not attend the ceremony the next day.

In Nanjing, the closest the Taiwanese got to the centre of the Chinese Nationalist government was meeting with General He Yingqin on September 10, 1945. Although the meeting was reported to be conducted in a friendly atmosphere, it began awkwardly for the Taiwanese. General He first inquired of Lin Hsien-tang and other Taiwanese delegates regarding their absence from the September 9th “Act of Surrender” ceremony in Nanjing yesterday. When General He learned that Lin and other Taiwanese delegates had been misinformed by Isayama, he expressed his unhappiness (他頗不悅). General He then showed the documents he signed yesterday to Lin and the Taiwanese, and escorted them to the hall where the signing ceremony took place and arranged a viewing of the signed Statement of Surrender (他… 即取出受降書示余等，又導觀受降式禮堂，在是處再演昨日之狀況).\(^\text{13}\)

On September 13, 1945, Lin Hsien-tang and other delegates returned to Taiwan. The goal of the delegation to hold a meeting with the incoming National governor Chen Yi prior to his arrival in Taiwan had been dashed. The failure to secure a meeting was perhaps a precursor to the unwillingness of the Chen Yi administration to invite Taiwanese political participation in the Nationalist governance of Taiwan.

The specific interest in China among the Taiwanese at that time was reflected in a number of invitations Lin Hsien-tang received to deliver speeches upon his return. Despite the failure of the delegation to secure a meeting with Chen Yi, Lin was receptive to the invitations, and accordingly gave a number of public accounts of what he saw and experienced in China to

\(^\text{13}\) ibid., 284.
audiences of curious Taiwanese. For instance, on September 20, 1945, Lin made a speech regarding his impressions of Shanghai and Nanjing. In Lin’s account, he noted that the audience had filled the venue. Also, in another speech held on October 3, Lin recorded that a crowd of nearly one thousand people filled the Wufeng Theatre in Lin’s hometown. The topic of the day concerned Chiang Kai-shek’s magnanimous attitude towards the Japanese, and the New Life Movement (新生活運動) that had been implemented by the Nationalist government and promoted by Chiang in China since the early 1930s.

In the transitional period, while the power of the colonial government was limited, Lin Hsien-tang’s social standing was valued by both the Japanese and the Taiwanese community. This point can be emphasised by numerous examples recorded in the Lin Xiantang Nianpu as well as Lin’s diary. For example, the Japanese chairman and Japanese and Taiwanese senior managers of the Zanghua Bank visited Lin several times in September and October 1945. They requested Lin to step forward and protect the bank during the change of government. At the same time, Lin was requested to assume the posts of president of an insurance company

---

14 The Lin Xiantang Nianpu had suggested that after Lin’s speech on September 20, there was an increase in the commodity price in Taiwan the very next day owing to Lin’s mentioning of the high commodity price in Shanghai. Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).  
15 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi qi, 1945, 317.  
16 The “New Life Movement” was launched by Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Soong Mei-ling in 1934. It was a civic educational movement that “represented the Kuomintang effort to overcome public alienation from the government, to mobilize the public not only to support the state but also to help in its reform,” and “its basic intention was to substitute “political mobilization” for social mobilization, thus replacing revolutionary change from the bottom (which threatened the social structure) with closely supervised change orchestrated from the top (which would serve the goals of the state).” Quoted in Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution,” The Journal of Asian Studies 34, no. 4 (Aug. 1975): 947.  
and of the South Japan Chemical Industrial Company as a way of protecting their companies.\textsuperscript{18}

However, Lin Hsien-tang did not accept any of these offers. He remained circumspect towards the in-coming Nationalist government. In a statement Lin Hsien-tang made to Lin Chenglu and other Taiwanese who sought his support for an organisation called the \textit{Tongzhihui} (同志會), the Comrades Association, he suggested to them that they “should make their decision after Zhang Bangjie consulted with the secretary-general Ge Jing’en on their behalf (將欲組織之意託張邦傑先商之葛秘書長，然後決定也).”\textsuperscript{19} Lin’s actions indicated that he sought to maintain a position of deference to the Nationalist administration at that time.

In reviewing Lin Hsien-tang’s conduct in the transition period, Huang Fusun says that Lin Hsien-tang was a man of integrity. On Lin, Huang writes: “Some worthless officers and Taiwanese appropriated the property that belonged to the Japanese in the post-war period. Lin Hsien-tang was offered an array of tantalising opportunities. However, he did not arrogate himself of any of them. He was indeed a man of exemplary conduct and was worthy of a praise. In terms of his actions, on the one hand, he showed his integrity. On the other, he showed his absolute sincerity to the future Chinese Nationalist government (戰後有些不肖官員、百姓，藉機私佔日產, 林獻堂大利當頭，卻一毫莫取，其高風亮節，值得稱道。此一方面顯現其操守，一方面時亦欲向表達效忠之赤忱).”\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Lin Hsien-tang and Chen Yi’s Rule}

At the end of 1945, Lin Hsien-tang began to study Mandarin. He hired a tutor to teach him twice a week.\textsuperscript{21} On December 13, 1945, as a way of signalling his commitment to the new

\textsuperscript{18} ibid., 319, 359.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid., 329.
\textsuperscript{20} Huang Fusun, 130.
\textsuperscript{21} Lin Hsien-tang, \textit{Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi qi}, 1945, 406.
government, Lin Hsien-tang, together with Lin Yunlong, officially became members of Kuomintang. The initiative by Lin to study Mandarin and become a party member could be read as key moments in Lin’s attempt to express his respect to Republican China. It also expressed his pragmatic understanding of the steps he needed to take to engage effectively with Taiwan’s Nationalist government. These were, nevertheless, in contrast to Lin’s attitude towards Japanese language learning and his participation in the Japanese administration.

Despite the respect Lin Hsien-tang sought to show to the Nationalist government as a leading Taiwanese, he was soon confronted by the reality of the ineffective governance of Taiwan by the Nationalists.

According to the *Lin Xiantang Nianpu*, a key social issue that emerged during the transition period was the circumstances of demobilised Taiwanese soldiers in the Japanese army in China, Japan and south east Asia. As Nationalist forces began to arrive in mid-October, on October 15, Lin Hsien-tang was informed by his son-in-law Gao Tiancheng in Tokyo that Taiwanese servicemen in Japan who had been summarily dismissed upon Japan’s surrender had perished from starvation. On the same day, Lin received a number of telegrams saying that demobilised Taiwanese soldiers in Hainan, Guangdong and Shanghai were in need of immediate relief and repatriation.

Lin Hsien-tang dealt with the problem immediately. He requested Yeh Jung-chung to publish the news in the newspaper *Xin Bao* (新報) with the aim of raising funds for demobilised

---


23 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinian ji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
Taiwanese. On October 23, one day before the Taiwan governor Chen Yi arrived in Taiwan, Lin Hsien-tang and other leading Taiwanese made a special visit to Ge Jing’en, Chen Yi’s secretary-general, who was already in Taipei. During the meeting, Lin urged Ge address the emergency when Chen Yi arrived in Taiwan.

Although Lin Hsien-tang had reported the circumstances of these overseas Taiwanese servicemen before Chen Yi’s arrival in Taiwan, the Chen Yi government did not take immediate action.

On October 24, 1945, Chen Yi arrived in Taiwan by plane. After the aeroplane landed, Lin Hsien-tang and Lin Xionghui followed Ge Jing’en to the aircraft to salute Chen Yi. Chen’s arrival in Taiwan was a high-profile public event:

After Chen Yi flew from Shanghai and arrived in Songshan airport in Taipei in the afternoon of the twenty-fourth, he was welcomed by his civil and military officials and three hundred or so leading Taiwanese citizens representing local districts across Taiwan who had gathered in anticipation and were led by the secretary-general Ge Jing’en… Tens of thousands of enthusiastic Taiwanese also lined the streets to welcome the new Taiwan governor as his motorcade passed by and headed for his office (陳儀於二十四日下午由上海飛抵臺北松山機場，由葛敬恩秘書長文武官員，以及各地仕紳代表三百餘人迎接。… 後乘車往前進指揮所出發，沿途民眾數萬熱烈歡迎).

25 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
26 Quoted in Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji qi, 1945, 352. Footnote 2.
After greeting Chen Yi at the airport, Lin Hsien-tang, Chen Xin, Lin Chenglu and Luo Wanzhen attended a meeting with him at the Governor-General’s Office building. They exchanged greetings but the Taiwanese were not able to raise the issue of demobilised servicemen in front of Chen Yi.

On October 25, known as guanfu (光復) or retrocession, Chen Yi signed a surrender instrument with the last Japanese governor Andō Rikichi, and Taiwan and its people were formally transferred to the Nationalist government.

In Lin Hsien-tang’s biography, the Lin Xiantang Nianpu, there are no references to any responses by the Chen administration to Taiwan’s immediate issues in the subsequent days. On October 30, 1945, Yeh Jung-chung presented Lin a letter he drafted and was going to put forward to Huang Zhaoqin, a special officer (tepaiyuan, 特派員) from the Foreign Ministry of the Chinese Nationalist government who stationed in Taiwan.27 In the letter Yeh appealed to Huang to open negotiations with General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, to secure his help to distribute the funds he raised to Taiwanese soldiers in Tokyo, Lin signed the letter before it was mailed.28

The relief funds that Lin Hsien-tang raised were only an emergency measure. In the following months, Lin received more letters asking for his help. In early December 1945, he received a letter fingerprinted by more than four hundred Taiwanese asking for his help. On December 15, 1945, Lin received another letter from Qiu Niantai, who asked Lin to help more than ten thousand Taiwanese servicemen in Guangdong. On the same day, Lin was told by

27 ibid., 360.
28 Lin Hsien-tang and other Taiwanese’s efforts were successful. It was estimated that one hundred and fifty thousand Taiwanese yen would be remitted. Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir).
Wang Qianyi, a survivor who had just made his way back to Taiwan two days ago, that there were over eight thousand Taiwanese who were stranded in Xiamen.  

Lin Hsien-tang was conscious of the need to present the problem directly to Chen Yi. On December 20, 1945, Lin Hsien-tang, Youlong, Yeh Jung-chung and Lin Zhong paid a visit to Chen Yi, but they were told that Chen was in a meeting and were received by Ge Jing’en instead. While they were waiting for responses from Chen in Taipei over the following days, Lin Hsien-tang visited Chinese Nationalist officials to secure their support.

On December 22, Lin visited Chen again, but again was not able to secure a meeting with him. On December 23, Lin finally met with Chen. In response to Lin’s appeal, Chen said to Lin that he would to dispatch delegates to ask local government officials not to mistreat the demobilised Taiwanese soldiers, and “these Taiwanese would begin to be repatriated when the ships were ready after the remaining Japanese soldiers in Taiwan were repatriated to Japan (俟載完日本兵之船，然後載其歸來也).” Lin Hsien-tang argued that Chen’s response would not be timely. Chen replied, “it is merely a difference of two months (不過再兩個月間而已).”

Despite Chen Yi’s promise, the overseas Taiwanese servicemen were not properly looked after because, according to Lin Hsien-tang’s diary, Chen Yi kept claiming that there are no ships available (皆言無船). Consequently, the circumstance of the demobilised overseas

---

29 Wang said that the property of these Taiwanese was confiscated while around two hundred of them were detained by the Xiamen government. Also, many of them were restricted on their departure to Taiwan because the Xiamen government refused to grant them the travel document they would need. Lin Hsien-tang, *Guan yuan xiansheng riji qì, 1945*, 422.

30 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (*Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir*).


32 ibid.

Taiwanese servicemen continued to deteriorate. On June 20 1946, six months later, Lin Hsien-tang was told an even more dreadful story by Lin Zhengsheng, a distant relative of Lin who had just returned from Hainan on June 17:

…It costs forty-five thousand French francs to rent a ship in Hainan, and a ship could only accommodate a hundred and twenty people. However, they were asked for bribes by the military policemen, army, policemen, customs guards and local government officials in exchange of their return. Their pants are the only precious things these poor Taiwanese had now. They are starving and suffering from disease, and their lives are at stake. There were more than twenty thousand Taiwanese there. If the Taiwan provincial government did not offer them timely help, they were likely not able to make their way back (…在該島雇船，每人四萬五千法幣，計百二十餘名，而憲兵、國軍、警察、海關、市政府皆要行賄賂，不然決不能出口，現在貧者僅餘短袴一枚，飢病交逼，危在旦夕，人數尚有二萬餘，若省政府不從速拯救，恐無歸來之日矣). 34

In June 1946, eight months after Chen Yi’s inauguration in Taipei, Lin Hsien-tang criticised the Chen government in front of six hundred Taiwanese at a fundraising assembly. He recorded in his diary that he explained to the audience that why he held the assembly today, calling Chen Yi a man “of no sincerity (殊無誠意)” 35

In Lin Hsien-tang’s public life under Japanese colonial rule, he remained meticulous in his discretion and caution with respect to public comments about the colonial government, even in moment of great provocation such as the assault incident in Taichung in 1936. Therefore, Lin’s public statement that called Chen Yi a man of no sincerity was a significant departure from the

---

34 ibid., 220.
35 ibid., 215.
political practices that Lin deployed in his relationship with the Japanese colonial government. While it indicates the seriousness of the Chen government’s failure to address the issue of demobilised Taiwanese soldiers, it also expressed Lin’s personal frustration and willingness to directly challenge the Nationalist administration by signalling on whose side Lin wished to be seen.

In the immediate post-war Taiwan, the task of repatriation of overseas Taiwanese servicemen was only part of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist governance of Taiwan and the broader political context of the deterioration of the relationship between the Nationalist government and the Taiwanese. As Lin Hsien-tang was addressing the question of demobilised Taiwanese servicemen, the Chinese Nationalist government drafted proposed laws against people it classified as traitors to China.

On September 27, 1945, even before the Nationalist takeover of Taiwan, the Draft Regulations for Traitors to China (漢奸條例草案) was issued in Nanjing. Then, after Chen Yi assumed the post of Taiwan governor, the Regulations for Handling Traitors to China (處理漢奸案件條例) and the Regulations for Punishing Traitors to China (懲治漢奸條例) were issued in November and December 1945.36

No Taiwanese were arrested or charged in the first few months of Chen Yi’s rule. However, the Chen government was planning the systematic arrest of Taiwanese that followed. On January 17, 1946, the accusations against Taiwanese began. Then, on February 21, Chen Yi ordered the sudden arrests of over thirty Taiwanese under the Regulations. Leading Taiwanese including Gu Zhenfu, Xu Bing and Lin Xiongxiang were placed under arrest.37

36 Huang Fusan, 147.
37 The arrests of these Taiwanese were known as the “Incident of 815 Independence.” Gu Zhenfu, Xu Bing and Lin Xiongxiang were Taiwanese who were accused of their betrayal of the Nationalist government because of their involvement in the discussion with respect to
Lin Hsien-tang was accused in January over his connections with these Taiwanese as well as his engagement with the Japanese colonial government. However, he managed to escape arrest with the help of his nephew, Lin Zhengshu, who was a policeman in the Nationalist administration. On February 20, just one day before the order of the arrests of Taiwanese under the Regulations was issued, Lin Hsien-tang met with Chen Dayuan, the chief of the Bureau of Investigation on Lin Zhengshu’s recommendation. During the meeting, Lin successfully defended himself against the allegations.38

Lin Hsien-tang, however, appeared to have been unaware of the impending arrests that followed the next day. The news of the arrests of leading Taiwanese shocked him. He recorded the event in his diary on February 21 while expressing his discontent over the Nationalist governance:

I was very astounded upon hearing such news. Whereas there are so many bandits all over Taiwan who were not arrested, these gentlemen were accused of unwarranted charges. The darkness of Taiwan’s governance is only deepening (聞之頗為愕然。全臺盜賊橫行不能治，而以莫須有之事虐待紳士，臺灣統治之黑暗從此更甚矣).39

The Nationalists’ distrust of the Taiwanese before and after the Nationalist takeover in October 1945 and the government’s actions in 1946 established a dominant theme in post-Second World War Taiwan, of growing tension between the Chinese Nationalists and the Taiwanese on the basis of Taiwan’s colonial experience.

---

38 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946, 66.
39 ibid., 68.
The Chinese Nationalist government’s distrust of the Taiwanese was evidenced in the attitudes of the governor, Chen Yi, himself. According to Huang Fusan, Chen was an opinionated man of contradictory temperament:

He studied in Japan, married a Japanese wife, adored Japanese culture, and admired the political and economic policies in Japan... He considered himself as a man of open-mindedness and democracy. However, in fact, he was autocratic and conceited, and he disdained the Taiwanese... [He] rejected the appointment of Taiwanese local landowners to the Nationalist government... (他留日，娶日本妻，也崇日，嚮往日式政治經濟政策… 他自認開明、民主，實際上專制自負，鄙視臺人… 排斥臺灣本土仕紳…).

In accordance with Chen Yi’s attitude, Lin Hsien-tang was not offered any prominent position in the government or accorded any particular respect by Chen Yi. Chen’s attitude was in contrast to the policies and strategies of the Japanese colonial government towards leading Taiwanese figures.

The arrests of Taiwanese under the Regulations took place in early 1946. At the same time, the deterioration of Taiwan’s broader domestic situation under Chen Yi’s rule was evidenced. According to Lin Hsien-tang’s diary of 1946, for example, he recorded a total of eleven cases of homicides, robberies, thefts, blackmailing in a period from February 3 to February 13, 1946. In mid-February, Lin Hsien-tang and others organised a local neighbourhood watch in Wufeng district called the Yi yong jingcha dui (義勇警察隊) in order to address crime and social problems as a result of the government’s inability to deal with them.41

40 Huang Fusan, 146-147.
41 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946, 62.
Facing the seriousness of these social problems, Lin Hsien-tang was outspoken in his criticism of Chen Yi’s punitive and ineffective rule. In a meeting between Lin Hsien-tang and Cai Boliang, a visiting city major from mainland Republican China on March 8, 1946, Lin expressed his disappointment in the Nationalist governance without reservation. He pointed out that “the government was incompetent and inactive in maintaining law and order (政府無能，以致不能維持治安).”

In mid-March 1946, the undisciplined conduct of Nationalist soldiers in stealing and appropriating rice stores from the local Taiwanese became another issue indicating Taiwan’s deteriorating situation. In Taiwan, the rice rationing system had been implemented in Taiwan under the Japanese by April 1940, but it collapsed during the transitional period as “the price of rice began to soar in September 1945.” Upon the arrival of the Nationalist government in October, Lin Hsien-tang had repeatedly conveyed the urgency of the rice shortage problem experienced by many Taiwanese people to the Nationalist government. However, the Nationalists did not implement any effective solutions.

Rather, on January 10, 1946, the Nationalist government abruptly issued a set of orders including the cancellation of the rice rationing system to be put into effect the following day, which included controlling all the granaries in local districts across Taiwan. Such demands secured the rice supply for the Nationalist officials and army in Taiwan, but the Taiwanese civilians suffered. Through January 1946, according to Su Yaochong, “many Taiwanese,

42 ibid., 89.
43 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
44 Hsu Hsueh-chi, “Taiwan riji yanjiang de huigu yu zhanwang (Diary Research in Taiwan: Retrospect and Prospect),” 167.
45 Huang Fusuan, 156.
particularly those from the economically disadvantaged townships, starved to death because they were not able to purchase rice."\(^46\)

In Lin Hsien-tang’s home of Wufeng, the granary stored approximately 3,000 sacks or 300,000kg of rice. Despite the rice shortage problem, two thirds of these rice stocks were reserved for the Nationalist army. On February 14, 1946, Lin Hsien-tang served as a mediator in negotiations between Liu Cunzhong, the Nationalist magistrate of Taichung County, and the Wufeng district locals. After the negotiations Liu would only agree to sell 1,200 sacks, or 120,000 kilos of rice to the Wufeng community.\(^47\) Nevertheless, this amount of the rice were less than required to feed the Wufeng locals.

Over the following weeks, negotiations over the remaining 1,800 sacks in the granary continued. On the morning of Wednesday March 13, Lin Hsien-tang suggested to Liu Cunzhong and Cai Jikun, a major general in the Nationalist army, that 600 sacks in the granary out of the remaining 1,800 sacks be handed over to the Nationalist army and the rest 1,200 sacks would be saved for the Wufeng locals. However, Cai did not agree. Instead, Cai insisted on taking all the remaining 1,800 sacks. For Lin, it was an unreasonable expropriation. After two further hours, Lin wrote that he himself “could not restrain his anger, condemned their unreasonable measures, and left with a gesture of his sleeve (不禁大怒，痛罵其無理辦法，拂袖而歸).”\(^48\)

The Nationalist army then intervened to appropriate the rice store. On March 14, the next day, Cai Jikun led over twenty soldiers to surround the Wufeng granary. In Lin’s account, they were “each armed with machine-guns with the intention to rob the granary (各持短鎗來包圍)


\(^{47}\) Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946, 59.

\(^{48}\) ibid., 96.
Lin Hsien-tang and other Taiwanese were unarmed and could not fight back. Accordingly, 1,227 sacks of rice were expropriated.

Immediately after the military action, Lin Hsien-tang was urged by the residents of Wufeng to file a lawsuit against the officials in Taipei. However, Lin expressed with frustration that “there was no point of it when we were faced with such unreasonable authorities (當此不講道理之時，雖告訴亦無用也).”\(^\text{50}\) Similar comments were made by Yeh Jung-chung, who claimed that “their acts were outrageous and it was hard to discern whether such robbery was contrived by a military officer or a bandit (其行動之蠻暴令人莫辨其為官軍與土匪).”\(^\text{51}\) The next day, Lin was “deeply dispirited (大為不快)”\(^\text{52}\) when he was informed that Cai Jikun had falsely denied expropriating any of the rice store.

Through 1946, the worsening rice shortage was only part of a deterioration of Taiwan’s economic and social conditions. In March 1946, an example of inflation as well as the security situation was recorded in Lin’s diary. Lin wrote: “the second-class carriage fare for a trip from Taichung and Taipei was only ten Taiwanese yen, but it has risen to sixty-seven Taiwanese yen in the last month. The fare is so high, but there are still no seats as the second-class carriages are occupied by third-class carriage passengers (火車之二等車由臺中至臺北不過十元，前月已升至六十七元，賃金高而無車可坐，因被三等客所佔領也).”\(^\text{53}\)

**Political Marginalisation of Lin Hsien-tang by the Nationalist Government**

\(^{49}\) ibid., 98.  
\(^{50}\) ibid.  
\(^{53}\) ibid., 89.
Like the broader relationship between the Taiwanese and the Nationalist government, Lin Hsien-tang’s personal relationship with the Nationalist government was deteriorating. By the middle of 1946, the Nationalist government under Governor Chen Yi had left Lin politically marginalised.

As part of its governance, the Nationalists established a provincial assembly, the *Taiwansheng canyihui* (Taiwan Provincial Council, 臺灣省參議會) in May 1946. At its establishment, the Taiwan Provincial Council created a new terrain of politics, which Taiwanese elite sought to politically engage with Nationalist Taiwan after being constrained by the colonial Japanese authorities in the wartime period. In Dai Ziyu’s study of the political activities of the post-war Taiwanese elite, he notes the continuing interest in political participation by the Taiwanese elite in Nationalist Taiwan despite the contentiousness of the Nationalist administration, and suggests that it was a reflection of the continuous political activism of the Taiwanese elite from the 1920s.

As one of the leading Taiwanese, Lin Hsien-tang was involved. Before the election for members of the Taiwan Provincial Council held in mid-April, Lin had been actively running in elections in his hometown that were put on by the Nationalist government. In March 1946, Lin Hsien-tang was elected as a councillor to the Taichung county assembly, and then, following a...
subsequent election held in April 1946 within the Taichung County assembly, he became one of the four Taichung County councillors to sit in the Taiwan Provincial Council.\textsuperscript{56}

As a Taichung County councillor in the Taiwan Provincial Council, Lin Hsien-tang met the eligibility requirement to run in the election for the president of the Taiwan Provincial Council. Lin originally aimed to run in the election.\textsuperscript{57} However, Lin was urged by Qiu Niantai\textsuperscript{58} and Cai Peihuo, followed by Li Yizhong, the chief of the Kuomintang Party Committee in Taiwan, in separate meetings, to withdraw from the election for the president on the grounds that an outcome favoured by Chen Yi would not include Lin. Huang Zhaoqin, the then mayor of Taipei, was a Taiwanese-born ally of Chen Yi. Huang, who had spent many years in mainland China under the Nationalists and returned to Taiwan in 1945, was Chen’s preferred candidate. As a result, on the day of the election on May 1, 1946, just moments before polling, Lin made an impromptu declaration of his abstention from the ballot on the pretext of his old age. Huang Zhaoqin won the election and was elected as the president of the Taiwan Provincial Council.\textsuperscript{59}

However, Lin Hsien-tang’s withdrawal from the election and his explanation were met with scepticism by the Taiwanese public. The next day, it became a serious issue in Taiwanese newspapers with significant coverage. The newspaper headlines were inflammatory, such as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{57} Cited in Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946, 159. Footnote 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Qiu Niantai wrote that he did this “out of public and personal concerns.” Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, \textit{Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhusilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir)}, 32.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} Taiwansheng canyihui, “Lijie yiyuan chaxun: Lin Hsien-tang xiansheng (Index of Former Members: Mr. Lin Hsien-tang).”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Lin Hsien-tang “was bribed (被收買),” “Lin Hsien-tang was coerced to withdraw (威脅林獻堂),” and “The arbitrary presidential election in the Taiwan Provincial Council (議長專制).”

The dispute carried on in the newspapers over the following days. However, Lin Hsien-tang himself did not make any further public comments on his withdrawal. On May 2, Huang Zhaoqin acknowledged the controversy but claimed in the provincial assembly that he was not the representative of the government but of all of the people (絕不為政府的代言人，乃為全體民眾之代表).

While the dispute was continuing, Fan Shoukang, the section chief of the Education Department of Taiwan, made the situation even worse. In a speech by Fan on May 1, he spoke from the point of view of a Chinese mainlander, referring to the Taiwanese in a dismissive tone by distinguishing them from the Chinese mainlanders. He claimed:

One, Taiwanese have an independence ideology; two, [Taiwanese] exclude waishengren staff; three, [Taiwanese] have the thought of having Taiwanese rule Taiwan; four, the Taiwanese were totally enslaved… (一、台胞有抱著獨立思想。二、排擊外省工作人員。三、有以台治台之觀念。四、台灣完全奴化…)

The statement ascribed to Fan was indicative of the growing hostile relationship between the Nationalist government and Taiwanese society. Accordingly, his speech evoked a hostile relationship between the two communities. It soon prompted the Nationalist government to

60 Quoted in Huang Fusan, 150.
61 Cited in Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946, 162. Footnote 1.
62 Quoted in Li Xiaowen, “Cong Minbao kan zhanhou chuqi de Taiwan shehui (The Taiwanese Society in the Post-war Period From the View of “Minbao”)” (master’s thesis, Tunghai University, 2009), 33. The alleged “slavish Taiwanese culture” in the face of colonialism was propagated by the Republican Chinese officials. It was one of the strategies which they exploited to justify their Sinicisation campaign in Taiwan. See Daniel C. Lynch, “Taiwan’s Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project,” Asia Survey 44, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 518.
take steps to atone for Fan’s speech. In an assembly held in the Taiwan Provincial Council on May 7, 1946, Fan made a subsequent clarification in which he claimed that only a small number of Taiwanese were enslaved by the Japanese and that he did not mean to insult the Taiwanese. However, his statement, which remained pejorative towards the Taiwanese, did little to ease the crisis. The hostility between the Nationalist government and the Taiwanese was still spreading.

In the meantime, the issue regarding the election in the Taiwan Provincial Council continued to escalate. Within a week of Fan’s statement on May 7, Huang Zhaoqin announced his resignation to a council assembly on May 10 and walked out of the chamber. Lin Hsien-tang was present. He made an immediate appeal to the other members in the chamber: “There is indeed no need to resign from the post just because of being misunderstood. Such act would only invite more unnecessary conjectures. Please urge Huang to come back (因受人誤解而便辭職，實無必要，反惹紛紛，請為挽留).” After the entreaty from Lin and the other members, Huang eventually agreed to resume the post of president the next day, and the dispute dissipated.

In Taiwan, Lin Hsien-tang’s withdrawal from the election for the president of the Taiwan Provincial Council was significant in two ways. Firstly, it signalled that Lin’s enduring political capital, through which he had successfully traversed from the Qing dynasty and the Japanese colonial period, was to be devalued under Nationalist rule. Chen Yi’s favouritism towards

---

63 The Nationalist government sent two special officers to look into this matter. “Liu Chuanlai yu Han Shiquan jianyi jiang sheng xunlian tuan suo song Fan Shoukang jiaoyu chuzhang yanjiangci yu baoduan fabiao (Liu Chuanlai and Han Shiquan’s Suggestion of Publishing the Speech of Fan Shoukang, the section chief of the Education Department of Taiwan, in the Newspaper).” Taiwanshi dangan ziyuan xitong (The Archives of Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica), accessed April 7, 2018, http://tais.ith.sinica.edu.tw/sinicafrsFront/search/search_detail.jsp?xmlId=0000042474.

64 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946, 166.

65 ibid., 171.
Huang Zhaoqin was an indication of the reconfiguration of Taiwan’s political terrain around new Nationalist politics brought from the mainland. As part of that reconfiguration Lin’s withdrawal from election was a political act in which he demonstrated a tactical resistance to a Nationalist government that sought the symbolism of Taiwanese participation but nevertheless worked to exclude Taiwanese people from real power in the new political processes and institutions being established.

After Huang Zhaoqin reassumed the post of president on May 11, 1946, Lin Hsien-tang expressed his intention to renegotiate his place in Taiwan’s shifting politics. In a private meeting on May 18 with one of his family members Lin Peiying, a son of Lin Youchun, Lin announced his intention to resign from the post of Provincial Taiwanese Congressman. Lin Peiying then said, “politics are as a river flowing away day by day, with no hope of change (言此後政治如江河日下，斷無改善進步之希望也).”66 In addition to Lin Peiying’s emotional support to Lin, on May 21, Luo Wanzhen and Yan Bixia, also met with Lin to convey their support. On July 8, Lin Hsien-tang submitted his letter of resignation to the Taiwan Provincial Council.

In Lin Hsien-tang’s diary, he did not record what he wrote in the letter of resignation. However, he was outspoken in the diary. On July 8, he wrote: “my resolution to resign is firm and it is a decision made long before the council meetings adjourned because it is shameful to be with you (省參議員之辭職，自未閉會之前已決意辭退，蓋羞與噲等為偶).”67 He also described the Provincial Council as merely an advisory organ with limited power to confront the Nationalist government.

66 ibid., 183.
67 ibid., 241.
In the *Lin Xiantang Nianpu* and Lin Hsien-tang’s diary, there is no record of public meetings or letters from Nationalist officials urging Lin to remain in the Council. However, on July 18 1946, Lin’s diary records that Huang Zhaoqin made a visit to him in Wufeng.

Subsequently, on July 31, as an indication of the complex and uncertain reconfiguration of Taiwanese politics underway, Lin Zhong and Lin Huangyan visited Lin on behalf of Huang Zhaoqin. They urged Lin to run in the election for the office of the Alternate Members of the National People’s Political Congress (國民參政會).68 Lin declined, however, on August 3, the Provincial Council nominated Lin Hsien-tang as a candidate regardless. On August 5, Lin Hsien-tang’s position in Taiwan Provincial Council was filled.69

On August 16 1946, the election by the members of the Provincial Council for the Alternate Members of the National People’s Political Congress took place. There were approximately forty candidates, and the eight candidates with the most ballots would become the Taiwanese representatives to sit in the National People’s Political Congress in mainland China.70 The result of the ballot was announced the same day. Both Lin Zhong and Lin Hsien-tang became two of the eight Taiwanese congressmen (參政員) to the National Congress. While Lin Zhong won twenty-two ballots and the first place in the election, Lin Hsien-tang won fourteen ballots and the fourth place.71

---


Despite Lin Hsien-tang’s successful election, however, Hong Huolian and Lin Lianzong, who were both Lin’s friends in the Taiwan Provincial Council, were not satisfied with Lin’s ranking of fourth. On August 18, Lin Lianzong came to visit Lin. He expressed that the result was inconsistent with the expression of widespread support for Lin from the other Provincial councillors, and said to Lin that these councillors had a great failure of trust (大失參議員之信用也). The next day, Lin received a letter from Hong Huolian, who also made a similar point, saying these councillors were dishonest (參議員之無信).

Lin Lianzong and Hong Huolian were describing an internal politics within the council that was indicative of the change in Lin Hsien-tang’s political status. Furthermore, Lin’s political marginalisation was an expression of a broader reconfiguration of Taiwanese politics by the Nationalists. The change highlighted how the contestation of the Japanese period between Lin and other leading Taiwanese and the colonial government had become a relatively stable political terrain. Under the Nationalists, however, old certainties were dispelled. Lin Hsien-tang’s political influence and prestige was, to quote Huang Fusan here, “now no longer what it was (今非昔比).”

The political marginalisation of Lin Hsien-tang continued after the election for Alternate Members. On August 21, Chen Yi issued a new ordinance that stipulated that the civil servants who had been served in the Kominhokokai (Imperial Subject Service Association) under Japanese rule would be suspended from their current positions. Lin Hsien-tang had been a member of the Kominhokokai but Chen Yi did not make it clear whether Lin should be suspended from his position in the Nationalist administration. However, the timing of the

---

72 Cited in Lin Hsien-tang. ibid., 284.
73 Cited in Lin Hsien-tang. ibid., 285.
74 Huang Fusan, 152.
75 ibid.
ordinance was significant, as it was issued just few days after Lin was elected as an Alternate Member.

According to the ordinance, Lin Hsien-tang stood very little chance of assuming the post of an Alternate Member of the National People’s Political Congress. However, the ordinance was soon redressed by Qiu Niantai, the supervisory commissioner (監察委員). Qiu maintained that the ordinance was problematic because “it would make the native Taiwanese talents out of employment and the civil administration could only employ the Chinese from the mainland.”76 The ordinance was accordingly suspended.

In the context in which Lin Hsien-tang’s political standing was being diminished by the Nationalists, his comments about government remained dispassionate, but also expressed his understanding of his changing circumstances. Such an example can be highlighted in a comment made by Lin Hsien-tang on August 22, 1946, in a meeting with Liu Wendao, a visiting Nationalist official from China. Liu came to Taiwan to investigate whether there was maleficence in the Nationalist administration in the handling of the confiscation of Japanese businesses in Taiwan. Lin suggested that Chen Yi’s governance was problematic, saying to Liu: “Although Governor Chen was diligent, he appointed unsuitable personnel. As a result, most of the existing businesses have ceased (陳長官雖勤勉，但其所用人殊不適當，以致凡所接收之工廠多中止作業).”77

Lin Hsien-tang continued to experience Chen Yi’s antagonism towards the Taiwanese and received specific opprobrium because of his personal links to the Japanese colonial government and to the Japanese imperial establishment in Tokyo.

---

76 Quoted in Huang Fusan. ibid.
77 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946, 289.
In late August 1946, this was evidenced in Chen Yi’s meddling in a delegation of Taiwanese scheduled to visit China. The Taiwanese delegation was to be a dalituan (答禮團), to pay homage to Republican China through visits to Republican sites and meetings with officials. The proposal for the delegation was made in February 1946, by Li Yizhong, the chief of the Kuomintang Party Committee in Taiwan, who advised Lin to organise the dalituan to Nanjing. On March 31, a discussion regarding the dalituan was held between Qiu Niantai and Lin Hsien-tang. The purposes of it were to pass on donations to the families of the deceased soldiers, salute Sun Yat-sen, pay visits to Chiang Kai-shek, and visit to the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor in Shaanxi province. In the following months, Lin agreed to fund the delegation, but he showed little interest in participating in it because of his experiences with the Taiwan Provincial Council and the political machinations around his election to the National People’s Political Congress through that year.

On June 7, 1946, Qiu Niantai urged Lin to participate in and lead the delegation to meet senior Nationalist officials in Nanjing “in order to escape the political pressure in Taiwan (庶免在臺灣受壓逼).” However, Lin declined: “I had already made up my mind to resign from the seat in the Provincial Council, to find sanctuary in the forests and mountains, and no longer hear the news of the world. I was afraid if I joined the delegation, I could not make such plans for retirement (余已決定辭退省參議員而隱遯於山林之間，不復聞問世事，今若為代表，恐不能如所預定而引退也).” Through June and July 1946, Qui continued to urge Lin to participate. On July 28, Lin received a letter from Li Yizhong, who also hoped Lin would join and lead the delegation on the basis of Lin’s social and political status. Li claimed “if Mr. Lin

---

78 ibid., 71.
79 Qiu Niantai, “Zhuihuai Xiantang xiansheng (In Memory of Mr. Xiantang),” 32.
80 Cited in Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946, 204.
81 ibid.
did not participate, the delegation would be without a meaning (非先生出馬，此會不能受人看重也).”

Lin eventually reneged and decided to take part in the delegation.

The delegation was scheduled to leave on August 29, 1946. But they received a message from Chen Yi just a few days before their departure. Chen made several requests, which included “(1) Lin Hsien-tang, who had been appointed as a member of the House of Peers by the Japanese, cannot be the head of delegation; (2) Chen Xin, who has been detained by the government, cannot be a delegation member; (3) [The delegation] should fly from Taipei to Nanjing directly, and cannot stay in Shanghai and be received by overseas Taiwanese groups; (4) [The delegation] cannot have a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek in Lu shan; (5) They [need not] visit to the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor in Shaanxi Province.” From these comments, Lin’s involvement in the Japanese colonial administration motivated Chen’s hostility, and the limits Chen placed on the delegation’s activities were clearly an attempt to constrain the political impact of the Taiwanese delegation to mainland China.

On August 29, the delegation took off as scheduled with Lin Hsien-tang, then just as a delegation member, and fourteen other delegates including Qiu Niantai and Yeh Jung-chung. The delegation had no formal leader.

However, once outside of Taiwan, forms of counter-hegemonic resistance against the Nationalist government in Taiwan became possible for Lin Hsien-tang and the other delegation members. The delegation planned to stay in China for five weeks. Their itinerary for the first few days fully complied with the requests made by Chen Yi. After the delegation visited the

82 ibid, 259.
83 Quoted in Huang Fusan, 154.
84 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhusilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing on August 31, they met with senior officials from the Nationalist government to pass on financial donations to the families of deceased soldiers.

However, the rest of their itinerary defied Chen Yi. On September 6, Lin Hsien-tang and the others flew to Shaanxi province in order to visit to the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor.\(^{85}\) Then, On September 30, Lin Hsien-tang and others met with Chiang. With Qiu Niantai acting as an interpreter for the delegates Taiwanese and Chiang’s Ningbo-accented Mandarin, Lin gave eulogy to Chiang, and then he presented Chiang with the record of financial contributions. Before the meeting was finished, Chiang invited Lin and other Taiwanese to have an afternoon tea reception (午後茶會).

During the reception, Chiang asked Lin about the circumstances in Taiwan. Lin made a clear response to Chiang, describing the unemployment rate (失業) and the collapse of commodity prices (物價騰貴).\(^ {86}\) Then, Chiang went further and asked Lin whether he had meetings with Chen Yi. Lin replied yes. Before their conversation was finished, Lin invited Chiang to pay a visit to Taiwan.\(^ {87}\) On October 5, the delegation returned to Taiwan.

Lin Hsien-tang’s discontent over Chen Yi’s rule was fully reflected in his response to Chiang Kai-shek. Lin’s comments to Chiang were a clear criticism of the failures of Chen Yi’s governance of Taiwan. Yet at the same time, as implied in his diary, Lin was seeking to clarify his own responsibility for Taiwan’s deteriorating circumstances. He expressed both a sense of his responsibility towards Taiwan and its people and also his view that he had been unable to influence the Nationalist government.

---

\(^{85}\) The delegation did not actually visit the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor because the roads to it was closed that day owing to the heavy rain. Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji shi ba, 1946*, 324.

\(^{86}\) ibid., 358.

\(^{87}\) ibid.
Lin Hsien-tang’s political standing under Chen Yi’s rule did not improve after his trip to China, as he continued to be marginalised by the Nationalist government. In late October 1946, Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Soong Mei-ling’s visited Taiwan to celebrate the first anniversary of Nationalist rule. Their visit became another instance of Taiwan’s changed politics and also the marginalisation of Lin.

After Chiang and Soong arrived in Taipei on October 21, 1946, they headed to Taichung and visited Sun Moon Lake on October 23. For the Taiwanese and the local Nationalist government alike, Chiang’s visit was a big event. Lin Hsien-tang joined approximately fifty Taiwanese representatives, to greet them at Taichung airport.\(^88\) However, earlier that morning, Lin was informed by Chen Xiceng, the director of General Affairs, to pack up the national flags hanging outside because “Chiang was not coming to Taichung today (蔣主席今日不來),” and “it was more than enough for the mayor to greet Chiang at Taichung airport (到飛行場迎接，市長一人就可以).”\(^89\) For Lin, he “was surprised at the cancellation of Chiang’s flight (余聞之頗為意外),” and commented that “Chiang’s failing to keep his promise would have great impact on Taiwanese (對人民無信，影響莫大焉).”\(^90\) However, he and other Taiwanese still lined up at the airport as scheduled. At twelve o’clock, Chiang’s aeroplane arrived at Taichung airport.

In the literature both in English and Chinese, there are no references to any explanations for Chen Xiceng’s statement to Lin Hsien-tang. Neither are there reference to any comments by Lin concerning Chen Xiceng’s statement. However, the anecdote of Chen Xiceng’s strange comments were a sign of disrespect and a political slight directed at Lin that illustrated the hostile attitude of the Nationalist administration in Taiwan. Lin continued to hold considerable

\(^88\) ibid., 390.
\(^89\) ibid.
\(^90\) ibid.
political and cultural capital in Taiwan but his status was wholly problematised by the Nationalists and the reconfiguration of power that their arrival created.
Chapter 8

Lin Hsien-tang and His Later Years

Lin Hsien-tang and the 2-28 Uprising

Lin Hsien-tang had welcomed Taiwan’s incorporation into Republican China following Japan’s defeat. However, he was confronted by the reality of the Nationalist administration, which was corrupt, inefficient and capricious. The Nationalists behaved arrogantly, and they came to rule the Taiwanese as if they were dealing with a defeated nation.¹ They deconstructed the texture of post-colonial Taiwanese culture with the military control as if they were the only judges of the rules of the game.² Many Taiwanese like Lin Hsien-tang were dismayed by the Nationalist governance in the island. Writing in 1950, the leading Taiwanese independence activist Joshua Liao wrote “Suddenly the Formosans, who had expected the Confucian Way of Right to replace the Bushida Way of Might, found themselves driven into the KMT Way of Bite.”³ The lack of law and order made the Nationalist rule more rampant than the earlier Japanese colonisers.⁴ Later in 1963, the exiled Taiwanese nationalist Ong Joktik described the

² Tu Weiming, “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan (Dec., 1996): 1123.
Taiwanese discontent of the time. According to Ong, the Taiwanese began to compare the Nationalists to the Japanese in an extremely negative way. He wrote: “The Formosans began to say that ‘the dogs have gone but the pigs have come to replace them. Dogs are to be feared, but at least they protect you from thieves. Pigs can only eat’.”

Within sixteen months after the handover of Taiwan, the Taiwanese rose up against Chinese Nationalist rule. In events that are now well-known, the 2-28 Uprising was a story of violent opposition by the Taiwanese against the Nationalists. It began on the evening in Taipei on February 27, 1947. Lin Jiangmai, a middle-aged female contraband cigarette seller was assaulted by two Nationalist customs guards from the Monopoly Office. These guards were surrounded by a crowd. Then, a warning shot was fired, and it killed Chen Wenxi, one of the onlookers. A demonstration ensued.

On the morning of February 28, angry unarmed Taiwanese, marched through the main streets to the Monopoly office. Petitioners and bystanders approached the governor’s office, but they were struck down by machine-gun fire. A group of Taiwanese youths managed to take over a radio station, and broadcast what was happening in Taipei. In the following days, unrest spread across the island. Taiwanese, including students, civilians and veterans formed alliances to fight the Nationalist government.

In the first few days of March, the Taiwanese controlled almost the whole island except the Nationalist military bases. However, the political uprising seemed to quieten down as the Chen

---

6 Xu Zongmao, Zouguo bainian (Traversing a Hundred Years—Taiwan in the 20th Century) (Taipei: Taiwan Gospel Book Room, 2010), 52.
Yi government agreed to negotiate with a group of leading Taiwanese who had formed the Committee to Settle the February 28 Incident (二二八處理事件委員會). Lin Hsien-tang was nominated to sit on the committee in Taipei but was also committed to actions in Taichung and so did not travel to Taipei for negotiations with the government.\(^9\)

Because Chen had only 2,000 troops in Taipei at that time which was not enough to control the situation, he agreed to the reforms of the Monopoly and Trading Bureaus as suggested by the Committee, and asked them to prepare formal proposal by March 10.\(^10\) However, the Taiwanese were deceived by Chen Yi. At the same time as he conducted negotiations, he had called on the Nationalist government in mainland China to send troops to Taiwan to crush the uprising.

According to George Kerr, who was the US naval attaché in Taiwan at that time, the Chen Yi government was planning its military response from the outset:

On March 6... the proposals for reform were ready. By this time, although confusion continued in towns and villages distant from the capital, the situation in Taipei had improved... There was, however, a mystifying and intensive movement out of the city of the household goods and families of high officials to a well-defended concentration point and pillboxes and barricades were being thrown up around the Governor General’s offices.\(^11\)

On March 7, the proposals for reform was submitted to Chen Yi, but he refused to negotiate with the members of the Committee as he knew that the Nationalist Army forces, estimated to be between 50,000 and 70,000 troops, would arrive in Taiwan imminently. Then, on the afternoon of March 8, Nationalist troops landed at Keelung harbour and began so-called

---

\(^9\) Cited in Huang Fusan, 164.


\(^11\) ibid., 225.
“clearing-up (清鄉),” that is island-wide massacres of any and all anti-Nationalist resistance.\textsuperscript{12} Innocent people were machine-gunned in the streets, members of the Committee and students were seized and killed or disappeared. The brutality of the Nationalists in Taiwan resulted in the deaths of approximately 20,000 Taiwanese,\textsuperscript{13} and among them at least 10,000 Taiwanese were slaughtered because of their demands for demanding democratisation and quasi-autonomy.\textsuperscript{14} According to \textit{Taiwan Youth} in 1960, the 2-28 uprising ended up in failure on the grounds that:

(1) The rebellion was, like previous rebellions in Formosan history, spontaneous. There was no planning or central control. (2) The Formosans could expect no foreign assistance. The United States was supporting the Nationalist government and Japan was impotent with defeat. (3) The Formosans underestimated their enemy. While they knew that they could not rely on Ch’en Yi, the Governor of the island, to redress their wrongs, they felt that Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking would assume the task of correcting the injustices against which they complained.\textsuperscript{15}

For Lin Hsien-tang, he quickly understood the seriousness of the 2-28 Uprising. He refused to take sides. Rather, he gave his support to those who he considered to be innocent, Nationalist Chinese and Taiwanese alike.

One of the best-known examples was his sheltering of Yan Jiagan at his own house in


\textsuperscript{13} ibid.


\textsuperscript{15} Quoted in Ong Joktik, “A Formosan’s View of the Formosan Independent Movement,” 109.
Wufeng. Yan was the Minister of the Treasury in Taiwan and a so-called mainlander waishengren (外省人). He and Lin had become acquaintances when they both participated in the restructuring process of the Zhanghua Bank in Taichung. On February 28, Yan was on a business trip in Taichung. When he found out that he was unable to make his way back to Taipei that night, he came to Lin for help.

According to the footnote Hsu Hsueh-chi added to Lin’s diary, Lin was not home when Yan arrived, but Yang Shuixin agreed to shelter Yan in their estate. However, Yan’s presence there leaked out. Over a tense and dangerous period of time, Lin’s estate was besieged by approximately two thousand local Taiwanese, who even threatened to burn down Lin’s residence. Yet, upon his return to his residence in the ensuing hours, Lin insisted on sheltering Yan. During Yan’s stay in Taichung, Yan even managed to maintain correspondence with Chen Yi with the help of Lin.

On March 8, the Nationalist troops arrived in Taiwan. On March 9, Yan Jiagan decided to return to Taipei and asked for Lin Hsien-tang’s assistance. On March 12, Lin Hsien-tang ordered Lin Youlong to escort Yan to Taoyuan, where Yan met with the Nationalists who escorted him back to Taipei. The next day, Lin was urged to go to Taipei by Yan.

By the time Lin Hsien-tang had arrived in Taipei on March 14, he knew that some of his friends had been rounded up and imprisoned by the Nationalists but he did not know that they had already been killed. On March 15, Lin had a meeting with Chen Yi, and entreated that the events of 2-28 were accidents and appealed for Chen’s leniency towards the Taiwanese involved. In response to Lin’s appeal, Chen expressed “let bygones be bygones (己往不咎)”

---


17 ibid., 139. Wang Jinhai and Chen Weinan came to Lin’s house to pick up the letters and transfer them to Chen Yi.
but according to Lin that Chen held “an impassive visage (神情頗不佳)” because he believed that the Taiwanese were guilty of treason towards the Republic.\textsuperscript{18} Neither did he intend to tell Lin that some of the Taiwanese Lin knew had already been put to death.

Out of the political crisis caused by 2-28, Lin Hsien-tang’s insistence on performing the role of securing Yan Jiagan and attempt to speak up on behalf of Taiwanese was noteworthy. As the relationship between the Nationalist government and the Taiwanese was increasingly hostile, such behaviours became explicitly political acts.

Despite Chen Yi’s actions as governor to enforce Nationalist governance over Taiwan, by March 1947, his governorship was failing as a result of 2-28. Leading Taiwanese who remained free engaged in a tense debate over Chen Yi’s status. On March 16, when some members from the Taiwan Provincial Council like Huang Zhaoqin and Li Wanju sought to contact the Nationalist government on the mainland to express their support to Chen Yi, Lin Hsien-tang immediately expressed his opposition to them. Lin claimed:

The ultimate cause of the uprising was due to the failure of Governor Chen to make the right decision to appoint the right persons in the administration. Most officials in the government have been corrupt and incompetent. If we seek to express our support, then the legitimacy of the governance of Taiwan will be undermined. We needed to be very circumspect (蓋此回之暴動原因為人民怨陳長官用不得其人，多貪汙而不能任事所致，若極力擁護，恐成為人民怨府，須當慎重不可輕率).\textsuperscript{19}

Just as Lin publicly expressed his criticism of Chen Yi, the Nationalist government in China quickly understood the problems the events of 2-28 created for them. On March 17, 1947, Bai

\textsuperscript{18} ibid., 158. Lin Hsien-tang’s friends like Lin Maosheng, Chen Xin and Ruan Zhaori had been imprisoned and put to death for their participation in the Committee to Settle the February Incident in Taipei.

\textsuperscript{19} ibid., 163.
Chongxi, the leading Nationalist army general and Minister of Defence, was sent to Taiwan. In the aftermath of the 2-28 Uprising, he had made an official effort to repair the damage created by 2-28 and restore the relationship between the Nationalist government and the Taiwanese.

Several meetings were held between Bai Chongxi and Lin Hsien-tang while Bai was in Taiwan. According to Lin, Bai said that “Chiang Kai-shek would handle the events with leniency (蔣主席將以寬大為懷之處置),” and gave Lin his promise that nobody “but a few communists and rioters (除少數共產黨及暴徒之外)” would be charged. When Bai went further and inquired to Lin about the cause of the events, Lin, via the interpreter, listed the problems of Nationalist governance, including corruption, poor economic management, social issues, and Chen Yi’s deliberate exclusion of benshengren (本省人, native Taiwanese) from the higher-level Nationalist administration.

In terms of Lin’s reply to Bai, Lin was critical of Chen Yi and his problematic rule. Furthermore, Lin’s wording of benshengren in his reply to Bai suggested an awareness by Lin of a growing formation of a Taiwanese identity separate from that of the mainland Chinese that had occurred after 2-28.

The events of 2-28 led to the end of Chen Yi’s rule in Taiwan. In April 1947, Taiwan was transferred to a new provincial-level structure under the Republican administrative system. In May 1947, Chen Yi was removed and replaced by Wei Daoming. By mid-1947, as part of political reform proposed by the Committee to Settle the February 28 Incident, Wei abolished the Monopoly Bureau and set up a fourteen-member Taiwanese Provincial Commission (省府委員), which included seven Taiwanese-born members. The nomination of the Taiwanese-born citizens

---

20 ibid., 170.
21 ibid., 179.
22 ibid., 181.
members in higher administration reflected an awareness of the Nationalist government’s attempt to restore a measure of stability in Taiwanese society and credibility for the Nationalists.

Lin Hsien-tang was credited by the Nationalists for his services during the events of 2-28. In May 1947, Lin Hsien-tang was appointed as one member of Taiwanese Provincial Commission.\textsuperscript{23} Then, on June 20 1948, sixteen months after the 2-28 massacre, Lin Hsien-tang was appointed as the first curator of Taiwan Provincial Archive Office (臺灣省通誌館).\textsuperscript{24} However, Lin did not have real political power from his assumption of these two positions. The Taiwanese Provincial Commission was an advisory body only, and the Taiwan Provincial Archive Office was a cultural organisation.

In the \textit{Lin Xiantang Nianpu}, these are the only two official positions held in Taiwan by Lin after 2-28. There were no other references to any form of political activity recorded in the \textit{Nianpu} during the Wei Daoming period. This suggests that these appointments were merely nominal acknowledgments for Lin’s assistance for Yan Jiagan in the 2-28 Uprising. Lin did not build on these appointments to reassert his political capital and status in Taiwan. He remained politically marginalised and his political standing irrevocably diminished by the Wei government.

\textbf{Lin Hsien-tang and Chen Cheng}

In early January 1949, Chen Cheng became the governor of Taiwan. On January 19, Lin Hsien-tang proffered Chen his resignations from the Commission and the Archive in a meeting.

\textsuperscript{23} Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, \textit{Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu} (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir).

But Chen did not accept his resignations, saying instead that he would consider them later (斟酌).\textsuperscript{25} Despite Lin’s constant reiteration of his intentions, his resignation was deferred over the following months. In June 1949, Taiwan Provincial Archive Office was restructured and renamed as the Historical Research Committee of Taiwan Province (臺灣省文獻委員會). Lin Hsien-tang was again appointed as the director (主任委員).

Lin Hsien-tang’s repeated efforts to resign from his roles in the Nationalist administration illustrates his disillusionment and his assessment of his political standing. Lin quickly understood that he was continuing to be subject to a process of political marginalisation by the Nationalist government, so he sought to recuse himself from Taiwan’s political life.

While Lin Hsien-tang announced to Chen Cheng his intention to withdraw from official roles in Republican Taiwan in early 1949, his economic and financial circumstances were significantly undermined by Chen Cheng’s land reform policies. According to a dialogue between Lin Hsien-tang and Yan Jiagan, the provincial treasury minister in Taiwan recorded in Lin’s diary that alluded to Lin’s changing circumstances, Yan expressed his concern about Chen Cheng, whom he claimed “did not understand finance and economics too well (對金融經濟無甚理解).”\textsuperscript{26}

In March 1949, in the context of growing US involvement in China through the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), Chen Cheng decided to undertake a similar method of land reform policies in Taiwan to that of the Nationalist government’s Rent Reduction Act on the mainland in 1930. This 1930 Act “was supposed to limit farm rent to a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the annual main crop yield, although it was


\textsuperscript{26} ibid., 12.
poorly enforced on the mainland” at the time.  

According to Wang Hong-zen, enforcing land reform policies became one of Chen Cheng’s priorities when he assumed the post of the Taiwan governor in 1949, and “his aim was to create a new alliance with the rural population, which made up more than half of Taiwan’s labour force.”

In March 1949, the Taiwan Provincial Council that had been established in 1946, adjourned. During its recess, which lasted until June 15, 1949, Chen Cheng enacted an array of land reform policies including the rent reduction program. Chen’s intention was to enact and implement the land reform program at a time before the first crop harvest of this year (第一期稻穀收穫前辦完這一樁全省減租的工作), which was also conveniently at a time during the Council recess.

Enacting the land reform policies within such a short period of time and without the oversight of the Taiwan Provincial Council can therefore be understood as a deliberate strategy to bypass the Council. As many members of the Council were landowners themselves, it suggested an awareness of the problematic relationship between the Nationalist government and entrenched power structures and financial resources of Taiwanese landowners.

The use of coercion was a dimension of the land reform policies at that time, and it was an element of the Nationalists’ effective implementation. After the land reform policies were enacted, the government’s willingness to resort to force to implement them, even after the violence of the 2-28 Uprising, was clearly expressed by Chen Cheng. For example, Chen announced in April 1949 that “if someone seeks his own personal interests and attempts to

---

28 ibid.
29 Dong Zhongsheng, “Taiwan tuixing San Qi Wu dizu de jiantao yu zhanwang (A Review and Prospect of San Qi Wu Rent in Taiwan),” in *Taiwan「San Qi Wu」dizu yundong de toushi (A Perspective of the Taiwanese Movement of the 37.5 Arable Rent Reduction Act)*, ed. Zhao Wenshan (Taipei: Ziyou Publishing, 1949), 22.
30 Huang Fusan, 180.
disobey the policy, I, as the Governor who aims to improve the living standard of the majority of Taiwanese and maintain social stability, am determined to remove the obstacles and punish him severely.”  

In early May 1949, Chen Cheng made similar comments in a speech in Taichung. His made a back-handed reference to Lin Hsien-tang as an example to warn local landowners in Taichung who were resistant to the land reform program. Chen said, “I will never forgive those who attempt to disobey the order. The rumour has it that the Provincial Councillor Lin Hsien-tang has taken the lead in disobeying. However, this was not true, and this was a slander to Lin. It was unquestionable that Lin would uphold the Act.” It was unclear whether Chen’s implied threat was directed at Lin as one of the Taiwanese landowners to whom Chen referred, but his message was unequivocal that anyone who disobeyed Nationalist governance was at risk.

While the land reform policies were taking place, on May 19, 1949, Chen Cheng promulgated the “Order of Martial Law,” formalising Taiwan’s authoritarian rule under the Nationalists. Lin Hsien-tang recorded that, as a leading Taiwanese figure, he was told that “people were paying attention to your views (一般皆注意先生之措施).” Lin recognised the implications of the land reform program on his financial status, however, as its politics institutionalised into authoritarianism, he had little choice but to cooperate with the Nationalist

---


33 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi yi, 1949, 195.
government. On May 27, he clearly expressed to a friend that he had decided to cooperate with the policy (余告知曰，決定實行). 34

Throughout 1949, as Chen Cheng was implementing his land reform program, the Chinese Nationalists on the mainland were losing ground to the Chinese Communists. As Wei-Der Shu describes, the Nationalist government was in full retreat in the civil war and had lost the Chinese mainland to the Chinese Communist forces by the end of 1949: “In late 1949, the Nationalist government, the organs of the KMT party machine and about 600,000 soldiers and 640,000 civilians, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to Taiwan.” 35 The governance of Taiwan under Chen Cheng was changing through 1949 in accordance with the deteriorating military situation, and the enforcement of the land reform policies became a political imperative for the Nationalist government.

The significance of the land reform programs by the Nationalist government, supported by the United States, was to restructure Taiwan’s political life and also stabilise the economic situation. Land reform restructured land ownership in Taiwan, which reconfigured economic, social and political power. In the aftermath of 2-28, land reform created the conditions for a contingent alignment of interests between the new owner-farmers and Nationalist authorities. Land reform was also part of the stabilisation of the Taiwanese economy in which agricultural productivity recovered very strongly. In particular, the social and political tension created by rice rationing in the context of the influx of Nationalist refugees eased significantly. 36 Over time, the land reform program facilitated new patterns of socio-economy mobility in Taiwanese society. The entrenched power of land-owners was displaced by the creation of a new class of

34 ibid.


36 The ratio of the Chinese mainlander refugees who fled to Taiwan and Taiwanese residents at that time were reported to be approximately one to seven. Huang Fusan, 176.
Taiwanese small-holding farmers. The political power of the land owners was therefore reconfigured by the land reform policies, starting the so-called economic miracle that decades later would see Taiwan as an Asian “tiger economy,” and the rule of the Nationalist government in Taiwan was also strengthened.

In mid-1949, Lin Hsien-tang was sixty-nine. The land reform policies of Chen Cheng resulted in the loss of ownership of much of his landed estates, and this continued the trajectory of his political marginalisation in the Nationalist period.

In the lead up to the formal relocation of the national government of the Republic to Taipei in the second half of 1949, Chiang Kai-shek visited Taiwan in August. He stayed in the Caoshan Binguan (Grass Mountain Guesthouse) near Taipei. On August 22, Lin Hsien-tang received an invitation to have a meeting with Chiang the following day. Despite being such a high-level meeting, it was a moment that affirmed Lin’s political marginalisation under the Nationalists. In Lin’s diary, he recorded that “Chiang asked him about the winter and his family, followed by topics about the Taiwanese, and their talk lasted for ten minutes or so (問年冬及余之家族，次問老百姓，約談十餘分間).” However, topics regarding military affairs, politics and economics were, according to Lin’s writing in the diary, “not touched upon (皆不言及)” during the meeting.

Luo Kedian acted as an interpreter for the meeting between Lin and Chiang on August 23 and offered an account of the discussion in the late 1980s. In his memoir, he commented that “it is a pity that Lin Hsien-tang, who was learned and full of thoughts, could only hold a twenty-minute-long conversation in the form of laudatory statements about Chiang’s rule (可惜獻堂

---

37 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi yi, 1949, 317.
38 ibid., 324
先生滿腹經綸，卻只以歌頌蔣公德政結束二十分鐘談話。”39 Luo’s statement implied an acknowledgement by Lin of the status of meeting but also that it was largely was symbolic for Chiang in the new Nationalist Taiwan. It also suggests that Lin understood the way he was regarded by the Nationalists at that time, so he tactically positioned him outside of Taiwan’s politics and as subordinate to the authoritarian regime.

In late 1949, Lin Hsien-tang responded to the reality of his place in Nationalist Taiwan by not merely recusing himself from Taiwanese public life, but going further and deciding to relocate to Japan. On August 29, he appointed Lin Ruichi to be his personal assistant for the move.40 On September 3, 1949, Lin formally stated in a meeting with Chen Cheng his intention to take a trip to Japan in the end of this month. He outlined a three-point plan for his trip, which was to research the post-Second World War experience of recovery in Japan, study Japan’s trade relations, and seek medical advice from Japanese doctors over certain health issues.41 Chen Cheng accepted Lin’s plan.

However, Lin Hsien-tang’s trip to Japan generated comments among his friends and social circles over his motive for the trip, in which his true motive was questioned. The suggestion emerged that Lin was aspired to build support for self-rule (自治) for example.42 The rumours among Lin’s circle were an indication of the continued contestation by elements of Taiwanese society of the legitimacy of the Nationalist government.

In reaction to the rumours, Lin Hsien-tang defended himself, saying “these were all groundless conjectures (皆為無常識之揣度也)” and reaffirmed the purposes of his trip.43 On

40 ibid., 327.
41 ibid., 333.
42 ibid., 342.
43 ibid.
September 12, Lin Hsien-tang wrote a letter to Chen Cheng, reiterating his motivations. He also expressed to Chen that “I believe that our mutual acquaintance has not been short, and there should not be any doubt (想相知有素，定不為所惑也).” Lin’s communication to Chen was to clarify the situation, however his wording could be said to indicate the lack of mutual trust in the relationship between them.

Lin Hsien-tang’s letter to Chen Cheng presented his trip in a particular way. However, on September 13, 1949, Lin was encouraged to delay his trip to Japan by his relatives and friends. Nevertheless, Lin believed that: “Now is very opportune, and if I do not leave now, I may never be able to go (此時正好機會，若遲則不能往矣).”

From mid-September 1949, Lin Hsien-tang bid farewell to his relatives, friends and colleagues. In a farewell dinner in Taichung on September 19, Lin was feted by a dozen of his friends. Later that night, Lin recorded, he was advised not to make any political moves (不可談政治) during his stay in Japan. On morning of September 22, Lin visited the offices of Chen Cheng and Yan Jiagan in Taipei. However, Chen did not receive him and Yan was on sick leave. In the afternoon, Lin attended a farewell party held by his colleagues from the Historical Research Committee of Taiwan Province at its new offices on a site for which Lin had secured funds from Chen Cheng earlier that year. On September 23 1949, Lin, seen off by his family and friends at the airport, flew to Japan. Lin was never to return to Taiwan.

Lin Hsien-tang’s Life in Japan

---

44 ibid., 345.
45 ibid., 346.
46 ibid., 351.
47 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
After Lin Hsien-tang arrived in Japan, Lin had a gathering with Hasegawa Kiyoshi, the former Taiwanese governor (1940-1944) on September 25. This was not a political meeting but rather a social gathering between the two old friends. In his diary, Lin described being “very delighted (相見甚喜)” to meet with Hasegawa, and they “reminisced about the old times together for quite a while (共談往事數十分間).”

After Lin Hsien-tang arrived in Japan, as he had promised, he did not engage in political activity. Neither did he make any public political comments. In this way, he positioned himself as outside of Taiwan’s politics in its Taiwan’s changing political circumstances. However, Lin was in fact very sensitive to Taiwan’s politics. His writings in his diary can be understood in the context of his awareness of the Nationalist governments’ tenuous position both in Taiwan and internationally.

For example, Lin noted that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on October 1 1949 and was immediately recognised by the Soviet Union the following day. Lin expressed his concern about the future of the Republic of China by commenting that “Concerned countries will offer recognition one after another (其關係之國家亦將陸續承認矣).” Then, after the relocation of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government to Taiwan at the end of 1949, Lin continued paying close attention to the on-going conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists and the prospect of an imminent invasion of Taiwan by the Communists. With the US intention not to intercede in the fight between the two regimes at that time, Lin surmised on December 11 1949, that “Taiwan would be attacked by the Communists soon, and Chiang’s government would not be able to defend it (臺灣必受中共之)

48 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi yi, 1949, 361,
49 ibid., 378.
However, Lin’s fears were not realised as the international situation quickly changed after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and shift of American policy to active support of the Nationalists.

While Lin Hsien-tang captured in his diary the tenuousness of Taiwan’s international situation, he also paid close attention to changes in Taiwan’s domestic politics. For instance, on December 15, 1949, he recorded in the diary that Chen Cheng had resigned as a governor and would be replaced by Wu Guozhen, the former mayor of Shanghai. Lin then went on to comment that, based on Wu’s background, he was a man of “great political experience”.

In addition, when Lin heard that Chen Yi had been executed, he commented in his diary:

Chen Yi did not do anything for the welfare of the people in Taiwan, so the Taiwanese were very dissatisfied with his rule, which led to the 2-28 Uprising. Chen Yi did not reflect on his mistakes. Rather, he slaughtered the Taiwanese. Thousands of Taiwanese including Lin Maosheng, Chen Xin, Shi Jiangnan and Lin Lianzong were killed by him. He deserved the execution. If Maosheng and others knew what had befallen to Chen Yi now, they would have smiled in their graves.

---

50 ibid., 444.
52 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi yi, 1949, 450.
53 ibid., 456. Lin Hsien-tang wrote this comment on December 20, 1949, but Chen Yi, who
Lin’s bitter comments reflect his anger and disillusionment with Republican China and also his identification with Taiwan and the Taiwanese.

Despite the continuing interest in Taiwan’s politics Lin showed in his diary, he was determined to stay removed after he had recused himself from involvement in the Nationalist administration. In December 1949, Lin’s resignations from his seat in the Taiwanese Provincial Commission and as head of Historical Research Committee of Taiwan Province, which he had submitted to Chen Cheng in January 1949, were finally approved.54

However, the circumstances of the Nationalist government in 1950 had changed very sharply following their retreat from the mainland. As the Nationalist authority was consolidated on Taiwan in the early 1950s, there began increasingly emphatic efforts by the government to secure Lin’s return from Japan to Taiwan. Such efforts can be understood as an expression of the Nationalist government’s recognition of its critical situation and of the way it needed the political capital people like Lin had carried to support its legitimacy. They also signalled the Nationalist’s recognition of the threat to the regime that overseas Taiwanese presented, free from state control.

In January 1950, Wu Guozhen, who became the Taiwan governor on December 21, 1949, invited Lin Hsien-tang to take up the role of advisor (顧問) to Taiwan province.55 However, Lin declined Wu’s invitation with a passage:

A special telegram was dispatched to an old fellow like me to say that I am appointed. However, I feel that I would not be competent to fit in this job because I have little talent and lack the ability to make good plans. There were so many talents to be appointed, so

was sentenced to death, was in fact executed on June 18, 1950.

54 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).

55 Ibid.
please allow me to recuse myself from the post and to recuperate in Japan (特電傳來聘老
夫，自殘學淺寡良圖，人才濟濟堪登用，容我扶桑養病軀).\textsuperscript{56}

On February 26, 1950, Lin was informed that he was nominated by Zhen Yanfen, the chief
of the Overseas Community Affair Council of the Republican China, to be a councillor to the
Executive Yuan. Again, Lin was not interested in the nomination. Nor did he wish to assume
the post in Taiwan because, according to Lin, “I was afraid that I would not able to leave Taiwan
once I returned to it (歸即恐不能復出也).”\textsuperscript{57} In early May 1950, Lin Hsien-tang moved house
to Kanagawa Prefecture.\textsuperscript{58} He named his residence “Dun lou (遁樓),” which literally means a
house of escape.

While Lin Hsien-tang rebuffed the Nationalist regime, neither was he interested in
participating in overseas Taiwanese political movements. On May 7, 1950, a political alliance
was formed by twelve Taiwanese political groups in Japan under the leadership of Thomas
(Wenyi) Liao.\textsuperscript{59} On May 14, 1950, Lin was contacted by the political activists from the alliance
and asked to take part in what was a nascent movement for Taiwanese self-determination.

\textsuperscript{56} Lin Hsien-tang, “Shiji (Collections of Poems),” 45.

\textsuperscript{57} Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi er (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang, Vol.
22, 1950), ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica; Taipei:
Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2011), 89.

\textsuperscript{58} Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng
jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography
and Memoir).

\textsuperscript{59} Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi er, 1950, 187. Thomas (Wenyi) Liao was
an important pro-American Taiwanese nationalist and an activist. His ideology of Formosan
independence represents one of the strongest and most unequivocal statement of Taiwanese
identity during the 1950s. For more information about Thomas (Wenyi) Liao, see Mark
Harrison, “Legitimising ‘Taiwan’: The Formation of a Taiwanese National Identity” (PhD
diss., Monash University, 2005), 116-131. Also, see Ong Joktik, “A Formosan’s View of the
Formosan Independent Movement,” 110-112.
Despite being acquaintance of Lin, he turned down their proposal and took a “distanciated position (敬遠主義)” from their political movement.\(^{60}\)

The *Lin Xiantang Nianpu* describes the simplicity that was a feature of his lifestyle during his life in Japan. Seeking medical treatment for chronic health problems,\(^ {61}\) keeping a diary, writing poems, studying Buddhism and associating and keeping correspondence with his families and friends, new and old, both in Japan and Taiwan, all became important aspects of his life in Japan. Among these activities, seeking medical treatment and recuperation became a significant dimension to Lin’s later years. He moved house between cities in order to live closer to clinics and receive treatments he needed.\(^ {62}\)

Lin Hsien-tang’s declining physical mobility became evidenced when he needed to extend his visa or renew his passport. After traveling to different places in order to obtain the appropriate documents within a fixed timeframe, Lin wrote in his diary on October 21, 1949, for example, that he “felt very tired and therefore went to bed immediately after dinner (身上非常疲倦，飯後即就寢).”\(^ {63}\)

At the end of 1950, Lin Hsien-tang applied for permanent residency in Japan on account of his declining health,\(^ {64}\) with the hope of avoiding the administrative issues he had to go

---

\(^{60}\) Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi er, 1950*, 180.

\(^{61}\) According to *Lin Xiantang Nianpu*, Lin at least suffered from vertigo, high blood pressure, benign prostate hypertrophy. Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (*Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir*).

\(^{62}\) Lin Hsien-tang moved house five times within a total of his seven-year stay in Japan. On October 21, 1949, Lin moved from Atami to Kamakura. In May 1950, he moved to Kanagawa. In September 1951, he moved back to Tokyo. In April 1952, he moved Shizuoka. In September 1952, he moved to Tokyo, where he had stayed for the rest of his life. *ibid.*

\(^{63}\) Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi yi, 1949*, 393.

\(^{64}\) Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi er, 1950*, 342.
through when renewing the visa. In the following months, there were protracted negotiations between Lin and various authorities, including the Japanese government, the Nationalist government representatives in Japan and the offices of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). On September 14, 1950, a month before his seventieth birthday, Lin received the pre-approval from SCAP. On the morning of October 6, Lin had a meeting with Liu Zenghua, the head of the Nationalist representative office in Tokyo. With respect to Lin’s application for permanent residency, Liu first expressed his concern that Lin’s passport was going to expire, but then showed his willingness to help after Lin assured him of the pre-approval from SCAP.

The responses from SCAP and the Nationalists indicated that Lin’s application for permanent residency was not fully adverse to their policies and politics. However, this was not the case for the Japanese government. On the evening of October 6, after Lin’s meeting with Liu Zenghua, Lin visited Mr. Kimura, an official from the Ministry of Justice in Japan. In the meeting, Kimura objected to the grounds for Lin’s permanent residency application, claiming that the pretext of poor health was insufficient. He then presented Lin with a draft in that used strong political rhetoric, in which Kimura mentioned the 2-28 Uprising and impugned the politics of Nationalist Taiwan. Lin did not want to use Kimura’s draft, but he had no choice but to accept Kimura’s suggestion at the end of their discussion. The encounter illustrated the continuing febrile political relationship between Japan and Nationalist China.

On January 30, 1951, the application was translated into English in order to be presented to the office of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. Yet, in the translated application Lin found that he was described as an advisor to the Taiwan Independence Party in Japan. Lin

---

65 Huang Fusan, 189.
66 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi er, 1950, 343.
67 ibid.
immediately expressed his objection to be so listed, but he was told that the visa “would not be granted if it did not have political grounds (若非有政治關係，不能許可也).” After Lin confirmed with an official from SCAP, Lin submitted the application as an advisor to Party, which meant he was seeking political asylum in Japan.

Lin Hsien-tang’s application for Japanese permanent residency was illustrative of broader and very contentious politics that endured in the years after the Second World War between Nationalist Taiwan, Japan and the occupying forces. Lin Hsien-tang clearly expressed his unwillingness to be described as an advisor to the Taiwan Independence Party, from which can be seen his general position towards Taiwanese politics and its direction after 1945. On that basis, his acquiescence to the compromise of being listed as an advisor was significant in terms of the choices presented to him, which were to stay in Japan identified as a political refugee or to return to Nationalist Taiwan. Lin’s choice is a marker of his position on Taiwan’s circumstances.

However, Lin Hsien-tang’s declared grounds for Japanese permanent residency did not appear to change the seemingly cordial relationship between the representatives of the Nationalist government in Japan and him. On January 31, 1951, General He Yingqin visited Lin. They exchanged greetings and had lunch together, but they did not discuss any politics (不談政治).

On February 17, 1951, as a further illustration of the multilayered politics of the time, the Nationalist official Qiu Niantai came to visit Lin in Japan. Qiu suggested to Lin that he not to

---

69 ibid, 45.
return to Taiwan: “One can be happy that President Chiang Kai-shek and Premier Chen Cheng trust you. However, many of their officialdom do not because they suspect that you are a communist… It is best for you not to return to Taiwan (稍喜蔣總統、陳誠院長能信他，以下之人多有疑他為共產黨者… 勿歸去為是)”. In light of Qiu’s words, it can be seen that Lin retained a degree of political capital at the centre of the Nationalist politics, but as that politics terrain shifted dramatically in the context of the developing Cold War, there was perhaps a mutual recognition that staying in Japan was the best way to deal with a political reality problematic for both the Nationalists and Lin.

In 1951, Lin Hsien-tang’s health problems became particularly acute and he moved in and out of hospital for treatment through the year. During this period of recuperation, Lin engaged himself with literary activity, particularly writing poems. In May 1951, Lin compiled his literary work into a book Dong You Yin Cao (東遊吟草), which means “a manuscript of recitations while travelling in Japan.” After the book was printed in Tokyo, Lin circulated it to his family and friends. In September, Lin moved house again to Tokyo in order to live closer to a medical clinic, but his health continued to deteriorate.

In February 1952, Lin resigned from the post of the president of Zhanghua Bank, a position he had assumed in March 1947. On May 25, 1952, Yeh Jung-chung paid a ten-day visit to Lin in Shizuoka Prefecture on behalf of the Zhanghua Bank. During this period, Lin and Yeh had discussions with respect to current affairs in Taiwan and the business activity of the Zhanghua Bank. Lin was described by Yeh as being full of interest in these topics although Yeh noted that

70 ibid, 68.
71 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
72 ibid.
Lin was suffering from the chronic pain around his waist. Yeh wrote: “After we chatted for a while each time, Lin would say that ‘Let us take a rest!’ and I would then help him get up. After Lin stretched up and walked to and fro, we sat down again and continued our talks.”

On May 28, Lin wrote Yeh a poem with the title “Delight at Shaoqi’s visit to Daren estate at the end of the 5th month of the 29th year of heaven and earth (Ren chen wuyue xiaxun Da ren biezhuang xi Shaoqi guo fang, 壬辰五月下旬大仁別莊喜少奇過訪)”: 

It is three years already since we met, but was our meeting in Japan by chance? It is nice to stay in a foreign country for a time, but who would look after my garden in Taiwan for me? The sound of the drizzling rain is like a conversation in my bed. The low light in this cold day is enough for me to have a good sleep. My poor health stops me from returning home, so I have to wait to bundle my belongings and return in the autumn (別來倏忽已三年，相見扶桑豈偶然；異國江山堪小住，故園花卉有誰憐。蕭蕭細雨聯床話，煜煜寒燈抵足眠；病體苦炎歸未得，束裝須待菊花天).”

The poem expressed Lin’s delight in Yeh’s visit and evoked Lin’s nostalgia for Taiwan at the same time. In the poem, Lin expressed a hope that he might return to Taiwan at the end of his life, however, he did not. In October 1952, Lin injured his shoulder in an accident at his house and was admitted to hospital for a month. Although he recovered one month later, he remained in Japan.

73 Yeh Jung-chung, Taiwan renwu qun xiang (A Glimpse of Contemporary Taiwan: A Panorama of Taiwanese Leadership in the early 20th Century), 55.
74 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang), 28 May 1952, Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History), Academia Sinica, last modified March 2015, http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1952-05-28.
75 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuishilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
In April 1953, four years after Lin left Taiwan, Wu Guozhen resigned from the post of Taiwan governor, and in May the post was filled by Yu Hongjun. Upon taking office, Yu appointed Lin to the post of an advisor to Taiwan province, which was the same position Wu had offered to Lin in January 1950. Similarly, Lin declined Yu’s offer just as he had declined Wu. In Lin’s own words: “I do not want to be suspected of making invidious distinctions (庶免厚此薄彼之嫌也).” Lin’s comments indicate his continuing awareness of Taiwan’s political situation and the significance of his actions for the Nationalists.

In the first half of 1953, Lin Hsien-tang continued to maintain a disinterested position towards politics in Taiwan, but he did become drawn into Taiwanese exile politics in Japan. He acted as an intermediary in the dispute within the internal rivalries and factionalism in the “Formosa Democratic Independence Party (臺灣民主獨立黨),” a political party that had been established by Thomas Liao in Tokyo in February 1950.

In the context of Nationalist authoritarian rule in Taiwan, and the specific context of the end of Korean War in July 1953, in which the Nationalists found themselves in a new role in the emerging Cold War, Lin Hsien-tang’s connection to the Formosa Democratic Independence Party was a political issue for the Nationalist government in Taiwan. In an essay written after Lin’s death, included in the Lin Xiantang Nianpu, Qiu Niantai suggests that there were rumours in Taiwan that Lin supported the ideas of Taiwan’s communism and a UN trusteeship status.

76 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang), 15 May 1953, Taiwan shi yanjusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History), Academia Sinica, last modified February 2018, http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-05-15.

77 The lack of money and competent personnel led to internal friction. Huang Fusan, 216.


79 Qiu Niantai, “Zhuihuai Lin Xiantang Xiansheng (In Memory of Lin Xiantang),” in Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, ed., Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—
That Lin’s activities in Japan aroused the concern of the Nationalist government was indicated by the increasing urgency of the Nationalist government’s efforts to encourage Lin to return to Taiwan in the second half of 1953.

In August 1953, Qiu Niantai visited Lin again in Japan. However, this time Qiu came with a clear message to urge Lin’s return to Taiwan. In the meeting held between Qiu and Lin on August 14, 1953, Qiu first notified Lin of impending visits from the Nationalists Zheng Jiemin and Yan Lingfeng, who would come to urge Lin’s return. Then, Qiu mentioned that the other purpose of Zheng and Yan’s trip to Japan this time was to form an unlikely alliance with the Formosa Democratic Independence Party in order to support the goal of recovering the mainland from the Communists. However, Lin responded to Qiu that “there is no chance to recover the mainland because of the Korean armistice (余謂朝鮮休戰，大陸反攻已無機會矣).” Last but not least, Qiu presented Lin with a letter written by Ye Shizhi, a secretary to the Nationalist government. Ye’s letter conveyed a sense of urgency, warning Lin of the consequence of “becoming discredited (將身敗名裂矣)” if Lin did not return to Taiwan.

The ambivalent nature of the relationship between the Nationalist government and Lin Hsien-tang at this time was reflected in the meeting between Qiu and Lin. In terms of the frequency of the Nationalist visits in the second half of 1953, it suggested that the Nationalist government was responding to Lin’s continuing political capital within Taiwan’s political life and also his ambiguous status in Japan. It captured the Nationalist’s authoritarian impulse, too,

---

nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang— Chronological Biography and Memoir), 33.

80 Huang Fusun, 217.

81 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang), 14 August 1953, Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History), Academia Sinica, last modified November 2015, http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-08-14.

82 ibid.
reaching out to Lin to draw him into Nationalist politics, but also warning Lin of the consequences if Lin chose not to cooperate.

In the context of the Nationalist’s efforts to understand the political and geo-political forces ranged against them, the Nationalist’s appeal to Lin Hsien-tang to return to Taiwan, could be understood as a part of a strategy to forestall Lin from participation in the overseas anti-Nationalist movements, as well as their paranoia about Communism. With Lin’s enduring status, one can surmise that the Nationalists concluded it would be better to control Lin in Taiwan, rather than to see him participate in overseas Taiwanese independence movement. Therefore, Lin’s refusal to return to Taiwan was also his own tactic of resistance against the Nationalist government. He demonstrated his refusal to be directed by the government and mobilised his cultural capital as a Confucian gentleman who had recused himself from political life to engage in literary and artistic pursuits.

On September 27, 1953, Zheng Jiemin visited Lin in Japan. The purpose of Zheng’s visit was consistent with the previous statement by Qiu. According to Lin’s diary, Zheng urged Lin to return to Taiwan. As usual, Lin responded, “I would return to Taiwan right away once I restore my health (余言若病能全癒，即便歸去).”

Lin did not detail the conversation he had with Zheng in his diary although the meeting lasted nearly one hour. However, it is interesting to note that Lin reported a strong dislike for Zheng. As recorded in Lin’s diary on October 1, 1953, when Qiu asked Lin to host Zheng, Lin declined and manifested his strong dislike: “Zheng Jiemin put on so much airs, so there is no need for me to host him (鄭介民排架子甚高，我無宴他之必要也).” The next day, an

---

83 Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang)*, 27 September 1953, Taiwan shi yanjusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History), Academia Sinica, last modified November 2015, http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-09-27.

84 Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang)*, 1 October 1953,
overseas Taiwanese in Japan, Jin Yide, offered to host Zheng in the name of Lin. Lin again declined and offered a reason that can be understood in terms of the pressure from Japanese authorities for him to remain in Japan under political asylum:

It is better not to come into contact with Zheng. He seeks to organise anti-Communist assemblies, and he would definitely enlist our support and ask us to return to Taiwan.

Once we meet, we would have to return even if we cannot and do not want to leave. This would put us in a dilemma (謂此人不可與之接近，將來欲開「反共救國大會」，勢必請我等歸去幫忙，至時欲歸不可，不歸不得，反為進退兩難).\(^85\)

In 1954, Lin Hsien-tang was seventy-four-years old and his health was deteriorating.\(^86\) He was under period treatment in a hospital in Tokyo for chronic conditions. Despite his health problems, he nevertheless continued to pay attention to Taiwan’s politics. For instance, he discussed the unresolved international status of Taiwan with his friend Yang Zipei and, in his diary, noted the repatriation to Taiwan from Korea of former Nationalist soldiers who had been captives during the Korean War.\(^87\)

---

85 Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* (*The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang*), 2 October 1953, Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History), Academia Sinica, last modified November 2015, http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-10-02.

86 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, *Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu* (*Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir*).

87 These Taiwanese soldiers were the Nationalist army before they became captives of People's Republic of China (PRC) during the civil war. They were later sent to fight in the Korea by PRC during the wartime. After the Korean War, they refused to be repatriated to PRC. Lin Hsien-tang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi liu, 1954* (*The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang, Vol. 26, 1954*), ed. Hsu Hsueh-chi (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica;
On January 31, 1954, Yan Lingfeng and Qiu Niantai came to visit Lin. During their meeting, topics regarding Taiwan’s politics, which Lin had studiously avoided in previous meetings with Nationalist officials, were openly discussed. Yan told Lin that he was going back to Taiwan on February 8 and consulted Lin about his views on Taiwan’s political affairs, such as the upcoming National Assembly meeting on February 29, the presidential election in March, and an anti-Communist assembly in May. Lin responded by saying, “To recover the mainland was not a very easy undertaking (余言反攻大陸，殊不容易也),”88 which accorded with his previous comments to Qiu in 1953. Then, Yan and Lin went on discussing the future status of Taiwan as well as the Nationalist government. Their conversation ended with Yan’s appeal to Lin’s return to Taiwan. But Lin declined on account of his poor health as usual. On February 8, Lin showed his determination to remain in Japan by asking Qiu Niantai to affirm his poor health to Yan on his behalf.89

When Zheng Jiemin and Yan Lingfeng’s efforts to urge Lin Hsien-tang to return failed, Lin’s family and friends came together in the task of urging Lin’s return. On March 3, 1954, Lin Hsien-tang received a letter from his son Lin Youlong. In terms of the content, Youlong wrote in two different ways. Firstly, he used the emotive language that accorded with his position as a filial son, and secondly, he implied the presence of the Nationalist participation in the letter-writing process:

My father is suffering from the recurrence of earlier illness and residing in a foreign country. I cannot imagine the hardships you went through and the homesickness you have endured during your stay. It breaks my heart when I think of you in the middle of the night. Fifth uncle is precariously holding onto life. Our family and friends are worried that if his time

---

88 ibid., 50.
89 ibid., 63.
comes in the future, we Lin family would have lost an important leader we can rely on. In regards to the government, Premier Chen Cheng and his officialdom are concerned about you. They all hope that you could pack your luggage and return to Taiwan as soon as possible. The Save the Nation assembly will be held soon to unite the strength at home and abroad to oppose the communists and to save the nation... Would that you could come back to Taiwan by the end of summer (謂吾父身體老病交侵，而又羁旅異鄉，風霜之苦，逆旅之愁，真有想像所不及者，中夜捫心肝腸寸斷矣。且五叔病狀危在旦夕，倘遭不幸，族中又失一大支柱，親友故舊莫不殷殷以此為念。政府方面，自陳院長以下各位官長均極關切，甚願大人早日整裝南旋，不久且有召開救國會議，以統一海內外反共力量，以資復國大計… 倘能於夏末成行，則幸何如也). 90

Lin Hsien-tang did not make any comment in his diary regarding Youlong’s letter and neither did he reply to it. In the days after receiving the letter, Lin was traveling back and forth to hospital due to his deteriorating health.

On March 6, Lin Hsien-tang responded to Youlong’s appeal, but he did not mention anything about the Nationalist government. Instead, he explained his health condition to Youlong, saying that “I cannot return to Taiwan easily because I will have surgery to address my underlying condition (欲根本治療非手術不可，未易歸臺也).” 91 In late March 1954, Lin Hsien-tang was admitted to a hospital in Tokyo to have his prostate removed. He was discharged from hospital in early May and remained in Japan.

On June 18, 1955, the next year, Lin’s wife Yang Shuixin and daughter Lin Guanguan visited him in Japan. They originally planned to stay with him for two months. However, they

91 ibid., 96.
very soon had to change their itinerary as Lin’s second son Lin Youlong died of an acute illness in Taiwan on July 17, 1955. Lin described his shock upon hearing the news (如聞晴天霹靂), and noted that “Yang and I felt like crying but had no tears and could only face to each other with sorrowful faces (欲哭無淚，惟與內子相對悲哀而已)”. On July 22, Yang Shuixin and Lin Guanguan return to Taiwan. However, Lin Hsien-tang remained.

In neither the Lin Xiantang Nianpu nor Lin’s diary, are there references to Lin Hsien-tang’s explanation as to why he continued his stay in Japan instead of returning to Taiwan after Youlong’s death. However, the Lin Xiantang Nianpu noted that the death of Youlong was a severe emotional blow for Lin Hsien-tang, whose health just began to improve after the surgery the previous year.93

On July 26, 1955, Lin expressed his utmost sorrow for Youlong’s death in a poem entitled “Words for My Son (囑猶兒).” It said: “The news of your death came over across the vast ocean, and it was as if being struck upon a mountaintop. It would not be long for you to await me in the graveyard. You could secure places for your parents in advance (萬里重洋噩耗傳，如聞巨砲擊危巔；九原相待無多日，先為雙親覓一椂).”94

Two months after Lin Youlong’s death, none other than Cai Peihuo, who was a minister without portfolio (政務委員), was sent by the Nationalist government to see Lin in September 1955. During a meeting on September 15, Cai presented Lin with letters from the Nationalist

---

93 Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhuisilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir).
94 Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi qi, 1955, 358.
officials like Yan Jiagan and Qiu Niantai, who both again urged Lin’s return. Cai also made it clear to Lin that he would stay in Japan for two months and the purpose of his stay was to entreat Lin to return to Taiwan. Lin did not respond to Cai’s appeal on the spot, but instead delayed his response to a later time (約另日答復). 95

Lin Hsien-tang frequently mentioned Cai Peihuo’s visits to him over the following two months in his diary. 96 Hearing Cai’s strong rhetoric, Lin recorded that he only mustered limited responses. In Lin’s diary, he wrote that he “listened without answering (聽而不答),” or “declined with a smile (笑而辭之).” 97

On September 26, Lin visited Cai in his hotel as a signal of respect (答禮). During their meeting, Cai reiterated the purpose of his visit to Lin again. Cai brought up three points:

First, Mr. Lin was a respected elder in Taiwan. The Nationalist government’s inability to have Mr. Lin live happily in Taiwan signalled the absence of the Nationalists’ good governance. President Chiang is being much criticised for this. Second, Mr. Lin’s family and friends are all longing for your return. Your return would comfort them. Third, Taiwanese people are disunited and do not have a leader. If Mr. Lin could return to Taiwan, they would have someone to whom they could look up (一. 先生是臺灣長老，不能使先生安居臺灣，是臺灣無善政所致也，蔣總統受非難不少；二. 先生家族、親友甚盼望歸去，以慰懸念；三. 臺灣民眾泛而無統，若得先生歸去有所瞻仰). 98

Cai Peihuo’s statements demonstrated the way Lin Hsien-tang’s presence in Japan had become a political issue for the Nationalist government in their tenuous circumstances. Cai’s

95 ibid., 426.
96 After Cai’s first visit to Lin on 15 September 1955, he visited Lin on September 18 and 20, and October 6, 11, 14, 18, 22. Lin Hsien-tang, Guanyuan xiansheng riji er shi qi, 1955, 426, 428, 433, 434, 459, 468, 473, 477, 481.
97 ibid., 433, 434.
98 ibid., 442.
comments also express Lin’s enduring political and cultural capital in the way his absence undermined the Nationalist government’s legitimacy. On this basis, Cai’s statements suggest that the Nationalist government had reached the same conclusion as the Japanese colonial government did about Lin’s importance for the establishment of their authority in Taiwan in their different historical moments.

Responding to Cai Peihuo’s appeal, Lin Hsien-tang said:

After the surgery that took me back from death, I would like very much to return. However, I am afraid that I cannot come back [to Japan] once I return. I am also worried that I would be appointed to some position. If these things are not going to take place, I might return (余去年手術，致死之病已去，甚欲歸去，但恐一歸不能復出，又恐加一頭銜，命我做事。若無此二者，歸去亦可也).\(^9\)

Despite Lin’s reply, Cai Peihuo did not relent. In the following days, he kept visiting Lin and reiterating his request. Lin became impatient with Cai, saying “Cai’s insistence vexes me (其不憚煩真是人莫及).”\(^{10}\) On October 14, Lin eventually decided to make it very clear to Cai why he chose to remain in Japan and would not return to Taiwan:

Not entering a dangerous country and not living in a tumultuous country are the maxims handed down to us from our sages. I dare not to forget these maxims. Taiwan is a dangerous and tumultuous country, so how can I return and live there? In fact, Taiwan is more than a country of danger and tumult. It is a place without law, in which the Chiang regime have the power of death and plunder. I would be nothing but a chicken in a cage if I were really to go back (危邦不入，亂邦不居，曾受先聖人之教訓，豈敢忘之也。臺灣者，危邦、亂邦也，豈可人乎、居乎。非僅危亂而已，概無法律，一任蔣氏之生殺與奪，我

\(^9\) ibid.
\(^{10}\) ibid., 473.
Lin Hsien-tang’s declaration was emphatic. It expressed how Lin recognised the politics in Taiwan under authoritarian Nationalist rule. It also represented a rationalisation of his stay in Japan, and an explanation of his reluctance to return to Taiwan despite the increasingly urgent appeals from Nationalist officials and upon the death of his son Lin Youlong. Given his age and the needs of his family, Lin’s residence in Japan indicated the strength of his feeling with respect to the Nationalist control of Taiwan.

After hearing Lin’s statement, Cai Peihuo made no further attempt to persuade him and excused himself from Lin’s residence.

Following Cai Peihuo’s final attempt to persuade Lin, on October 22 Cai presented Lin with a letter he was going to submit to the Nationalist government. In the letter, Cai acknowledged Lin’s deteriorating health condition, and in this way tacitly acquiesced to Lin’s tactical responses to Nationalist authority. Cai wrote: “The illness is not the only reason that accounts for the postponement of Mr. Lin’s return to Taiwan. Mr. Lin in fact loves his country very much (先生之暫時緩歸臺灣，非僅為病，實兼愛國熱誠).” Cai also told Lin that he would inform the vice-president Chen Cheng that “If there would be reforms in Taiwan, Mr. Lin would be able to return (臺灣若將改革，先生則便欲歸去云云).” Lin Hsien-tang clearly acknowledged the seriousness of the statements Cai made. He cautioned Cai that “such statements could not be too extreme or otherwise they would cause misunderstandings (此言須慎重，不可過激，恐生誤解也).”

101 ibid.
102 ibid., 481.
103 ibid.
104 ibid.
In addition to the above statement that explained Lin’s remaining in Japan, Cai also drafted another statement on Lin’s behalf. This statement compiled by Cai indicated not only the Nationalist government’s growing concern about Lin, but also the enduring importance of Lin’s influence into the mid-1950s, especially as Lin became infirm. It said, “My attitude towards and position on the Communist Party has been consistent for years. Recently, the movements such as ‘Taiwan independence’ are merely a trifle to those who are wise. I would be never influenced by it (對共黨之態度與立場，多年來已有一貫之表現，最近有所謂 <臺灣獨立 > 運動云云，識者視為兒戲，獻堂絕不受其影響).”\(^{105}\) Lin Hsien-tang was asked to endorse the letter. In November 1955, Cai Peihuo brought the letters and returned to Taiwan. Lin’s letter to Zhang Yuejun was subsequently published in the front page of Xin Sheng Bao (Xin Sheng Newspaper) and Zhongyang Ribao (Zhongyang Newspaper) in Taiwan on November 18.\(^{106}\)

The dialogue between Lin Hsien-tang and Cai Peihuo represented the conclusion to years of the Nationalist government’s request to Lin’s to return to Taiwan. Successive Nationalist officials, friends and family members had sought Lin’s return, but Lin declined all of the entreaties without clearly disclosing his motivations. Neither did he openly question or criticise the authoritarian Nationalist government in Taiwan. It was not until the end of 1955 that he expressed his reasons for remaining in Japan to Cai Peihuo.

On this basis, Lin Hsien-tang’s insistence on remaining in Japan in his later years became a political act as a tactic of resistance to Nationalist power. In this way, the form of his resistance against the Nationalist government is consistent with the nature of his resistance against Japanese rule. As has been examined through the previous chapters, Lin was not politically


\(^{106}\) ibid.
radical, but engaged in political acts that mobilised his political and cultural capital in tactical moments against state power that operated over Taiwan.

Lin Hsien-tang’s diaries ended on October 31, 1955. In 1956, Lin Hsien-tang was seventy-six years old. In January that year, he suffered cardiac arrest, and he was admitted to hospital on a number of occasions over the subsequent weeks. After a discharge from hospital in mid-March, he continued to have doctor’s visits to his home. In June, Lin’s health condition deteriorated and on September 2, Yang Shuixin flew to Japan. On September 8, Lin, in the presence of Yang and Lin Ruichi, Lin’s personal assistant, and two doctors, passed away.

Lin Hsien-tang was cremated, and on September 21 his remains were returned to Taiwan and a public memorial ceremony was held at the airport. 107 President Chiang Kai-shek expressed his condolences by offering a classical Chinese saying, “Su wang yong zhao (A virtuous man respected forever, 宿望永昭)” 108 On October 12, 1956, Lin Hsien-tang’s ashes were interred in the family cemetery in Wufeng.

Conclusion

The thesis has examined the story of Lin Hsien-tang, and used his story as a point of reference to tell the broader story of Taiwan. “Taiwan” as a signifier is distinctively unstable, traversing the Qing to Japanese and then Nationalist rule, with multiple identities as an imperial territory, colonial territory and then Chinese national territory. The thesis has drawn from detailed descriptions of particular events in Lin’s life as a way tracing one pathway through the story of Taiwan. Through the lens of Lin’s activism in politics, education and cultural life in Taiwanese society, across different periods of his life, Taiwan’s changing social experience and its shifting relationship to imperial, colonial and national power is revealed in specific ways.

107 Xu Zongmao, 133.
108 ibid, 135. Photo.
The first chapter of the thesis explored Lin Hsien-tang’s background. It described his family ancestry and identified his status as an heir to the Lin family in Wufeng in order to explore the establishment of the political and cultural capital that would be carried by Lin throughout his life. Lin Hsien-tang’s background explains the social status Lin had when he became the leader of the Wufeng Lin family at the age of twenty, five years after the start of Japanese rule. Although Lin was young and of limited political experience at that time, his social position still gave him a capacity to negotiate and contest Japanese power on the island, both symbolically and often literally in his dealings with colonial officials. In Chapter 2, the thesis examined Lin’s youth, and how he, the “Third Prince of Azhaowu” as he was known, and a wealthy landowner in central Taiwan, was inspired by Liang Qichao and liberal currents of thought from Japan and China at the beginning of the 20th century. Chapter 3 looked into Lin’s social activism in the Taiwan Assimilation Society, followed by Chapter 4, examining his educational movement of Taichung Middle School in the 1910s. Michel De Certeau’s notion of tactics of resistance and strategies of dominance were elaborated to understand the significance of Lin’s social and educational movements at that time. Lin rarely confronted Japanese imperial power directly, but resisted and co-opted it in tactical ways that, over time, were shaped by a view of the Taiwanese as a distinctive and identifiable people. Chapter 5 discussed Lin Hsien-tang’s political activism in the 1920s. His involvement in the petitions movement was highlighted in that decade as a way of displaying how his resistance acts had developed into crucial practices against the Japanese power. The thesis suggested that Lin was mobilising an emerging Taiwanese consciousness. Meanwhile, Lin’s position in a growing inter-generational conflict within Taiwanese literati and activist circles, created by the new modernising education system into which a new generation of Taiwanese were being socialised, was described to preface another recusal by Lin from Taiwanese political movements in the late 1920s. Chapter 6 highlighted the transition of Lin’s activism to Taiwan’s cultural realm, in
which he mobilised his classical Chinese education in ways that contended with hardening Japanese colonial authority but also the increasing forcefulness of activism in the name of “the Taiwanese.” An account of the Yixin Association in Wufeng was explored to describe the political implication of Lin’s Han cultural movement before and during the Second World War. Chapter 7 discussed Lin’s life in the post-Second World War period and his political marginalisation by the Chinese Nationalists. Chapter 8 examined Lin’s later years. It focused on his permanent retreat to Japan after 1949.

In examining Lin Hsien-tang’s political activism over these several decades, the thesis described it as constant adaptation to the world he inhabited in and tactics of resistance against the forms of authority to which Taiwan was subject. As a leader of an important Taiwanese family and a Taiwanese intellectual who espoused modernising and liberal ideas, Lin’s activism took specific forms, using his capital and seeking compromise and engagement with power rather than oppositional or radical activism.

Lin Hsien-tang’s lived experience of politics involved constant negotiations with power in Taiwan in its many forms. However, Lin’s modes of activism, while explicitly non-confrontational towards colonial and Republican structures of power, were nonetheless consistent as an expression of his identity as a liberal and moderate reformer in keeping with that late-Qing imperial impetus. It also accords well with Michel De Certeau’s description of tactics of resistance. Lin rejected radical politics over a complex negotiation with power, seeking to use institutions and policies against themselves to achieved liberal reformist aims. His negotiation of power became tactics with which he kept his activism within acceptable political limits. In this way, he developed a style of liberal and centrist political activism that tested the limits of colonial authority, and also achieved significant outcomes for Taiwanese people, while never fundamentally threatening imperial, colonial or national authority.
Lin Hsien-tang’s life story is a means to interpret Taiwan’s past and its history, including the mobilisation of Taiwanese identity in political movements and periods of resistance. From the mid-1910s and throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, Lin’s political movements were an attempt to challenge the Japanese authorities within the legal framework that came with colonisation. He participated in different organisations, which included the Qifa Association, the New People’s Society, the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament, the Taiwan Cultural Association, the Taiwan Popular Party, and the Taiwan Federation for Local Autonomy. Lin served in these organisations in different capacities, and he was actively involved in the Taiwanese political movements that were part of a complex negotiation of power between the Taiwanese and the colonialism in the name of Taiwan.

However, Lin’s political role in Taiwan’s politics became constrained as the political circumstance in both Japan and Taiwan began to rapidly change from 1930. In this context, Lin adapted to the new political circumstance. He diverted his activism from politics to the cultural realm as a way of expressing his tactical resistance. Through his instigation and support for the Wufeng Yixin Association, he reframed the nature of the politics through different tactics of resistance. Within the boundaries of lawfulness and the deployment of the notion of culture as a field distinct from politics, Lin mobilised an imperial Han cultural consciousness, which became a tactic, albeit limited, in the rapidly narrowing space for political action during Japan’s hardening military politics during its imperial expansion.

In October 1945, Taiwan was handed from Japanese to Chinese Nationalist rule. Lin Hsien-tang had welcomed the Nationalists, but he was soon confronted by the reality of their governance. In post-Second World War Taiwanese society, Lin retained social status and cultural capital as power in Taiwan was radically transformed under the Nationalists. But unlike the Japanese colonial authorities, the Nationalist administration itself did not see him as a political subject with genuine salience who could be co-opted or deployed in their interests.
Lin’s increasingly marginal status in Taiwan’s new politics suggested in a way that he himself either was unable to translate his political and social identity into the ways necessary to be accepted the new Nationalist system, or in the context of its authoritarianism, he was unwilling to make the compromises necessary. In the crisis of 2-28, Lin Hsien-tang expressed the core of his modern liberal values in giving refuge to the Nationalist official Yan Jiagan during the violence. He showed that both his acceptance of the Nationalists in the crisis and efforts to represent the voice of the Taiwanese were underpinned by a set of core values that aligned with those currents of modern thought in China and Japan from the late and post-imperial period that still endured at that time but which were rapidly being suppressed by the Nationalists, and also the Communists.

In September 1949, Lin Hsien-tang left his family and friends behind and retreated to Japan. At that time in response to the depredations of the Nationalist government, he transformed his mode of resistance into wordless silence. He never returned to Taiwan, even for his son Youlong’s funeral. In 1956, Lin died at the age of seventy-six in Japan, a country whose colonisation of Taiwan had shaped his political consciousness and impelled him in the political actions he took throughout his life.

Lin Hsien-tang passed away more than sixty years ago. However, there has been no official “end” to his story. As he had played an important role in constructing the history of a distinctive public life and civic Taiwanese resistance during different eras, his story has come to be viewed as part of a narrative trajectory for the development of Taiwan’s contemporary political and cultural life.

In 2016, a series of celebrations titled “Jinian Taiwan yihui zhi fu Lin Xiantang xiansheng 135 zhounian danchen (Commemoration of the 135th Anniversary of the Birth of Lin Hsien-tang, the father of Taiwanese Parliament)” were hosted by Mingtai High School as well as the

These commemorative celebrations echoed the activities undertaken by the Yixin Association in 1930s in its commemorations nearly eighty years earlier. There was a conscious attempt by the organisers to echo the activities that Lin had been engaged in during his life to express a continuing commitment his legacy of political and social engagement. For example, a music concert and a calligraphy contest occurred on October 6 and November 20 respectively. Then, a drawing contest and public lectures were held on December 17. The lectures were delivered by Liao Chen-fu, Li Qianlang, Hsu Hsueh-chi, Lee Yu-lan and Lee Xiaofeng. Topics of the day centred on Lin Hsien-tang and his life, including as his personality and principles, the heritage of his residence and his writings. The commemorations ended with a special tour in Lin Hsien-tang’s residence, Jin Xun Lou (景薰樓), which was opened to the public for the first time.

The commemoration was in a sense a combination of all of the history after Lin Hsien-tang’s death, including his family history and the broader history of Taiwan. In these commemorations sixty years after Lin’s death, the Lin family continued to prosper but also suffer the loss of other immediate members of the family. The thesis has noted the untimely death of Lin Youlong, who died of illness during his tenure as the president of the board of committees of Zhanghua Bank in 1955. Then, one year after Lin Hsien-tang’s death, his wife of fifty-eight years Yang Shuixin passed away in 1957. Lin’s other son Yunlong had assumed a post of the first Temporary Taiwan Provincial Councillor from 1951 to 1954. Then, he too died of illness in 1959.

The loss of the four family members within a short period in the 1950s was a challenge for
the rest of the Lin family. However, unlike the reversals the Lin family had suffered during earlier eras from the loss of family members, the Wufeng Lins in contemporary Taiwan rallied strongly. Lin Panlong became the leader of the Lin family and shouldered family responsibilities. He founded Mingtai Insurance Company in 1961, and in 1966, he was elected as the first president of Mingtai Shipping Company. Lin Panlong passed away in 1983.

In present-day Taiwanese society, the cultural legacy of Lin Hsien-tang’s social and cultural movements continued to be felt as they have been sustained by his descendants and many other Taiwanese. For example, Taichung Middle School, founded by Lin Hsien-tang and other Taiwanese as a secondary school for young Taiwanese in 1915, continues today as an educational institution. It is today the present-day Taichung Municipal Taichung First Senior High School, and has been “long-considered the top-ranking high school in central Taiwan.”

In another example, the Yixin Private School, which Lin established in 1932 and was forced to close down by the Japanese colonial government in 1937, was revived by Lin Hsien-tang in the post-Second World War period just few months before he left for Japan. In May 1949, renamed as the Lai Yuan High School, the school was restarted as a private school by Lin Hsien-tang and Lin Panlong in their hometown of Wufeng. Lin Hsien-tang was the chairman of the board, and Lin Panlong became the first principle of the school. The school’s annual anniversary of its founding was on May 15, the same as that of the Yixin Private School, as a way of expressing the continuity to the earlier incarnation of the school. The site of the Lai Yuan High School was moved to its namesake location Lai Yuan (the Lin gardens) in 1976. In 1987 the school was renamed as the Mingtai Business and Vocational School. Then, in 2001,

---


the School, chaired by Lin Fangying, Lin Hsien-tang’s granddaughter-in-law, was transformed into a comprehensive high school and renamed the Mingtai High School.

In the decades since Lin Hsien-tang passed away, Taiwanese society has changed beyond recognition. After the 2-28 uprising, Taiwan remained under martial law and the authoritarian KMT regime. In the period leading up to the lifting of martial law in 1987, there were a number of Taiwanese democracy movements and actions against the KMT regime. Over time, these anti-authoritarian protests, such as the Chungli Incident in 1977 and the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979, challenged the authority of the Kuomintang and created the conditions for political change.

In the late 1980s, Taiwan made the transition to democracy. The Democratic Progressive Party was founded in 1986, and in 1987, thirty-one years after Lin Hsien-tang’s death, martial law was officially lifted. Taiwan began the complex task of realising a stable and institutionalised democratic society. In the 2000s, Taiwan’s politics evolved into a political spectrum from “Blue” to “Green,” as exemplified by the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) respectively.

In reflecting upon Lin Hsien-tang’s political principles and practices in the context of Taiwan today, one might ask where Lin would stand on the political spectrum between the KMT as the more conservative “pro-Chinese” party and the DPP as a more progressive and “pro-Taiwanese” party. In some ways, Lin’s liberal beliefs in Taiwan’s contemporary politics could be perhaps located in somewhere between “light-green” and “light-blue”, reflecting the change over time in Lin’s political aspirations during his life. In looking at Lin Hsien-tang’s liberalism, such as his commitment to a Taiwanese parliament, and his pursuit of the

---

educational opportunities for individuals, these strongly echo the liberalism within the moderate sections of both the DPP and KMT. However, Lin’s liberalism was also interwoven with a certain social conservativism, and Lin would have rejected both the extremes of the Taiwanese political spectrum, as exemplified by the “deep blues” and the “deep greens”.

On the one hand, the liberal notions of social progress and modernisation within the DPP is connected in the thread of Taiwanese liberalism that Lin exemplified and flourished in the Japanese colonial period. However, Lin was not explicitly a Taiwanese nationalist, and did not campaign for Taiwan’s independence during his life. On the other hand, Lin, in ways that echo the Chinese liberalism that was contained within the broad movement of the Chinese Nationalists against the Communists, held a conservative political philosophy and was critical of proposals for radical social change. However, again, Lin did not actively seek an affiliation with China, in at least in a way that some elements of the KMT are comfortable with today, remaining committed to the people of Taiwan in their own name.

Lin Hsien-tang’s political stance in present-day Taiwan would be considered broadly centrist and perhaps a little elitist, but committed to a future for Taiwan in its unique place on the boundaries of geopolitical forces enacted by great powers, in other words, as in his own day, Lin would find a sympathetic audience for his views in contemporary urban Taiwan.

2016, as well as the 60th anniversary of Lin Hsien-tang’s death, was also a significant year in terms of Taiwan’s politics, welcoming Taiwan’s third transfer of political power after democratisation. In January 2016, the Taiwanese held presidential and legislative elections and the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen won the sixth direct election for President in Taiwan, displacing the eight-year presidency of the Kuomintang leader Ma Ying-jeou, and the DPP became the majority in the Legislative Yuan, the Taiwanese parliament.

Analysis of the 2016 elections, like all Taiwanese elections, fall towards party and partisan
politics and issues, voter preferences and the status of cross-strait relations. But more broadly, the elections exemplify Lin Hsien-tang’s liberalism and his commitment to a politics for Taiwan in which the Taiwanese people could be heard. As has been described through the thesis, the Taiwanese as a people did not have a voice in politics under Japanese rule nor did they have meaningful suffrage in the institution of a parliament. Therefore, the institutional process of Taiwan’s current election system and the space it opens for a public political life could be understood as a realisation of the liberal ideas that Lin had envisioned nearly a century ago.

The president elected in 2016 was Dr Tsai Ing-wen, and beyond Tsai’s policy positions, she exemplified a certain political persona for which in many ways Lin Hsien-tang was the model. The persona that Lin cultivated as educated, well-mannered and restrained in his political expression is one that still resonates in Taiwan today. Both Lin and Tsai promoted reformist and centrist politics rather than radical politics. In the statements by Tsai in her victory speech on January 16, 2016, she said that “our democratic system, national identity, and international space must be respected,” for example, making the modern case of Taiwan’s identity and its democratic notion of sovereignty in a way that built on the legacy of Lin’s political activism for Taiwanese self-determination.

In looking at Taiwan’s politics today, and the legacy of Lin Hsien-tang’s political activism in the 1920s and 1930s that was carried out in the name of Taiwan, it could be said that Lin’s had a form of Taiwanese national consciousness. However, Lin did not claim to speak from a position of authenticity as a Taiwanese national during his life. Neither did he articulate the sort of Taiwanese nationalism formulated in the late 1940s and 50s by activists like Thomas Wenyi Liao. Rather, through tactical resistance and constant adaptation, Lin Hsien-tang sought an improvement in welfare and a meaningful civic life for the people of Taiwan, and did so

---

ultimately in the name of “the Taiwanese.” In this view, his actions as well as his legacy have contributed an enduring meaning for people who call themselves “Taiwanese,” or “Taiwanren (臺灣人).”

In contemporary Taiwan, Lin Hsien-tang’s political liberalism is one important legacy amongst many currents that shape the nature of Taiwanese public life. His life story has also become one of the stories that have come to construct Taiwan as a nation with a distinctive history, collective memory and coherent identity. Therefore, in addition to his political legacy, Lin Hsien-tang’s life has itself become a part of the story of Taiwan that contemporary Taiwanese tell.

The Taiwan story that Lin Hsien-tang helped write, and is now written into, is very different to the modern story of China. The polity of China today would not be one which Lin would recognise. Lin Hsien-tang sought to maintain meaningful relationships with mainland China from as early as the 1910s, with a view to improving the political circumstances of Taiwan. However, after he was told that “China was unable to help Taiwan,” he pursued a political path independent of Chinese political activism and oriented towards imperial Japan. In this way, Lin’s political choices are a metaphor for the divergence of Taiwan and China through the 20th century.

The estrangement between Taiwan and China has only grown in the decades since Taiwan’s democratic transition. Politics in Taiwan has mobilised the liberal political ideas that has been passed down by Lin Hsien-tang as well as other important early civic Taiwanese leaders from the 1920s onward. On the other hand, China’s contemporary circumstance has diverged from those early opportunities for political liberalism since around the late Qing period and the founding of Republican China towards right-wing nationalism and then communism.

In speculating on Lin Hsien-tang’s views on Taiwan’s future, his centrist inclinations would perhaps forestall him from presenting a firm position on national independence or
unification with the People’s Republic of China. However, in reviewing his life, it is clear that Lin would consistently oppose any form of authoritarianism. Therefore, it is hard to imagine that Lin would be sympathetic to the direction the People’s Republic of China has taken since 1949 nor to the style of politics under Xi Jinping in China today.

Lin’s political life can be seen in the success of democratisation in Taiwan, and in a civic life in which a sense of Taiwanese identity has flourished. However, the international status of Taiwan remains unresolved. After the loss of the Republic’s UN seat in 1971, Taiwan has become progressively marginalised in the international system. Through the 2010s and especially after the election of DPP president Tsai, Taiwan experienced diplomatic reversals as several of its diplomatic allies recognised Beijing and ended recognition of Taiwan. In the context of a rising China under the assertive leadership of Xi Jinping and large-scale policies such as “One Belt, One Road”, Taiwan has found it increasingly difficult to be heard internationally. In this regard, the future of Taiwan remains uncertain and acts of writing about it, including in scholarly forms, take on an additional salience as political acts giving Taiwan a voice.

Under these circumstances, using Lin Hsien-tang’s life story as a point from which to tell a Taiwan story, as well as offering an account of its history, is a strategy to give Taiwan that voice. As the thesis has shown, Lin’s story not only acknowledges the changes of the late Qing, Japanese colonial and Republican eras, but illustrates the shaping of the nature of Taiwanese public life and the creation of ideals for institutions and politics that continue to be felt in Taiwan today. As Taiwan’s circumstances continue to change, his life story and his distinctive style of modern politics and cultural practices will endure as norms for Taiwanese public lives.
Bibliography


Cai, Peihuo. “Guanyu Taiwan jiaoyu zhi yi er sijian (My Perspective of the Taiwanese Education).” *Taiwan Youth* 3, no. 3 (1921).


-- *Taiwan minzu yundo shi (The History of National Taiwanese Movements)*. Taipei: Zili wanbao she, 1983.


Charney, Jonathan I., and J. R. V. Prescott. “Resolving Cross-Strait Relations between


Chen, Peifeng, *Tonghua de tong chuang yi meng: ri zhi shiqi taiwan de yuyan zhengce, jidaihua yu rentong (The Different Intentions behind the Semblance of “Douka”: The Language Policy, Modernization and Identity in Taiwan During the Japan-Ruling Period)*. Taipei: Rye Field Publications, A division of Cité Publishing Ltd., 2006.


-- “Riben zaitai junshi dongyuan yu Taiwanren de haiwai canzhan jingyan (Japan’s Military Mobilisation and the Taiwanese Overseas War Experiences).” *Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research)* 2, no. 2 (June 1995): 85-126.


Fan, Yan-chiou. “Lin Hsien-tang’s Practice of body Concept and Hygiene.” In *Diaries &


Fu, Xiqi. *Li she yange zhi lue (The History of Development of Li she)*. Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1963.


Huang, Deshi. “Liang ren gong you tai kao (Research on Liang Qichao’s Trip in Taiwan).” *Taiwan Wenxian* 16, no. 3 (Sep. 1965): 1-68.


-- “Taiwan riji yanjiu de huigu yu zhanwang (Diary Research in Taiwan: Retrospect and Prospect).” *Taiwanshi Yanjiu (Taiwan Historical Research)* 22, no. 1 (March 2015): 153-184.


-- *When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-pa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan.* Honolulu:
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005.


King, Edmund J. “Japan’s Education in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Education 22, no. 1, Special Number (9): Education in Japan (1986): 73-82.


Lee, Li-yung. “Riben diguo zhimin di zhanshi liangshi tongzhi tizhi: Taiwan yu Chaoxian de bijiao yanjiu (Grains Regulation System in Japanese colonial Empire: A Comparative Study between Taiwan and Korea (1937-1945)).” Taiwanshi Yanjiu


Liang, Qichao. Xin dalu youji jielu, Fulu er: You Taiwan shu du, di wu xin (Travel Notes of the New Lands, Appendix II: Letters Regarding the Trip in Taiwan, the Fifth Letter). Taipei: Taiwan zhonghua shuju, 1975.


Lin, Hsien-tang. “Gao zu kao Xun gong jia zhuan (Biography of my Great Great Grandfather Xun).” In Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), edited by Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 104-105. Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971.

-- Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang). 28 May 1952. Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History). Academia Sinica, last modified March 2015, http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1952-05-28.

-- Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang). 15 May 1953. Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History). Academia Sinica, last modified February 2018. http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-05-15.

-- Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang). 14 August 1953. Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History). Academia Sinica, last modified November 2015. http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-08-14.
-- Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang). 27 September 1953. Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History). Academia Sinica, last modified November 2015. http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-09-27.

-- Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang). 1 October 1953. Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History). Academia Sinica, last modified November 2015. http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-10-01.

-- Guanyuan xiansheng riji (The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang). 2 October 1953. Taiwan shi yanjiusuo Taiwan riji ziliaoku (Archive of Taiwanese Diaries from Institute of Taiwan History). Academia Sinica, last modified November 2015. http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98/1953-10-02.


-- “Tai gao zu Shi gong jia zhuan (Biography of my Great Great Great Grandfather Shi).” In Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), edited by Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 101-103. Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971.

-- “Xian bofu Wenfeng gong jia zhuan (Biography of my Uncle Wenfeng).” In Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), edited by Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 108-111. Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971.

-- “Xian kao Wenqin gong jia zhuan (Biography of my Father Wenqin).” In Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), edited by Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 112-114. Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971.

-- “Zeng zu kao Jiayin gong jia zhuan (Biography of my Great Grandfather Jiayin).” In Taiwan Wufeng lin shi zupu (The Family Tree of the Wufeng Lin Family), edited by Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 105-106. Taipei: Bank of Taiwan, 1971.


288


Mingtai High School. “Jinian Taiwan yihui zi fu Lin Xiantang xiansheng 135 zhounian danchen—huodong huaxu (Commemoration of the 135th Anniversary of the Birth of


Qiu, Niantai. “Zhuihuai Xiantang xiansheng (In Memory of Mr. Xiantang).” In Editing Committee of Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang, Lin Xiantang xiansheng jinianji—nianpu, zhusilu (Memorial Collections of Lin Xiantang—Chronological Biography and Memoir), 29-44. Taipei: Haixia xueshu Publishing, 2005.


Taiwan Diary Knowledge Bank. “About the Diary.” Accessed July 17, 2018. http://taco.ith.sinica.edu.tw/tdk/%E7%81%8C%E5%9C%92%E5%85%88%E7%94%9F%E6%97%A5%E8%A8%98.


Taiwan Min Bao. “Zhengzhi jieshe de taolunhui (Discussion on Political Association).” November 7, 1926.


-- *Taiwan no gakkō kyōiku (School Education in Taiwan).* Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1940.


Wu, Micha. “Taiwan zhimin di tongzhi zhengce yu waiguo guwen W. Kirkwood (The Colonial Rule for Taiwan and the Foreign Consultant W. Kirkwood).” In *Ri ji shiqi Taiwan shì guoji xueshu yantaohui luowen ji (Collected Essays on Taiwan’s History During the Japanese Colonial Period)*, edited by The History Department of National Taiwan University, 1-27. Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1993.


Wufeng Lins. “Guanyu Wufeng Lin jia (About the Wufeng Lin Family).” Accessed August 14, 2018. http://wufenglins.com.tw/%E9%97%9C%E6%96%BC%E9%9C%A7%E5%B3%B0%E6%9E%97%E5%AE%B6.

Xie, Chunmu. Taiwanjin no yōkyū (The Taiwanese Claims). Taipei: Taiwan xinmin baoshe, 1931.


Xu, Qianhui. “Rizhi shiqi tai ren lv wai youji xi lun—yi Li Chunsheng, Lian Heng, Lin Xiantang wei fenxi chang yu (Study of Taiwanese Travelogues—Based on the Writings of Li Chunsheng, Lian Heng and Lin Xiantang.” Master’s thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 2002.


Yang, Suxia. “Ri zhi chuqi Taiwan tongzhi zhengce luen de zai kao: yi <shi shi xin bao> dui hanren tongzhi yu tuo zhi wu sheng de wenti tao luen wei zhongxin (Re-examination of the Ruling Policy for Taiwan in Japanese Colonial Period: A Case Study of the Ruling Policy for the Han and the Ministry of Colonization).”  Yatai


Zhang, Zhengchang. Lin Xiantang yu Taiwan minzu yundong (Lin Xiantang and the Political Movement in Taiwan). Taipei: Yizhishu yanjiu congshu, 1981.
