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The importance of social learning for non-market valuation
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Abstract
Neoclassical valuation methods often measure the contribution that non-market goods make to utility as income compensations. This circumvents Arrow's impossibility (AI) –a theoretical proof establishing the impossibility of social preferences – but those methods cannot be used in all settings. We build on Arrow's original proof, showing that with two additional axioms that allow for social learning, a second round of preference elicitation with a social announcement after the first, generates logically consistent social preferences. In short: deliberation leads to convergence. A ‘web-game’ aligning with this is trialed to select real world projects, in a deliberative way, with the board of an Australian Aboriginal Corporation. Analysis of the data collected in the trial validates our theory; our test for convergence is statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results also suggest complex social goods are relatively undervalued without deliberation. Most non-market valuation methods could be easily adapted to facilitate social learning.
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: | Grainger, D and Stoeckl, N |
Keywords: | social welfare, non-market valuation, deliberative valuation, deliberative institutions, cost benefit analysis, Arrow's impossibility |
Journal or Publication Title: | Ecological Economics |
Publisher: | Elsevier Science Bv |
ISSN: | 0921-8009 |
DOI / ID Number: | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.05.019 |
Copyright Information: | © 2019 The Authors. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
Item Statistics: | View statistics for this item |
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