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On the perceived objectivity of some moral beliefs
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ORCID: 0000-0002-0307-9012 2020
, 'On the perceived objectivity of some moral beliefs'
, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 33, no. 1
, pp. 23-41
, doi: 10.1080/09515089.2019.1696454.
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Abstract
This paper presents research in moral psychology and draws on this research to offer an account of the cognitive systems and processes that generate the perceived objectivity of some moral beliefs. It presents empirical research on the perceived objectivity of moral beliefs, compares different algorithms employed by human cognition in the context of model-free and model-based reinforcement learning, and uses concepts drawn from dual-system and modular theories of cognition. The central claim of the account is that belief in the objectivity of some moral beliefs results from certain ‘modular’ features of cognitive systems.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Authors/Creators: | Wood, G |
| Keywords: | moral psychology, metaethics, dual-process theory, modularity of mind, perceived objectivity of moral beliefs |
| Journal or Publication Title: | Philosophical Psychology |
| Publisher: | Carfax Publishing |
| ISSN: | 0951-5089 |
| DOI / ID Number: | 10.1080/09515089.2019.1696454 |
| Copyright Information: | © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical psychology on 7 December 2019, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09515089.2019.1696454 |
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