CHAPTER 11

Administrative reform

In the mid 1850s pauper invalids were perceived as an undeserving social element, a group to be confined in secluded, isolated, penal establishments. By 1901, while a minority were still regarded as depraved, the dominant social perception of pauper invalids was that they were deserving of society's succour. This chapter examines, through a consideration of the themes of socio-economic change, classification, centralisation, specialisation and outdoor relief, the reasons for this reassessment of the position of invalids in colonial society.

From the mid 1870s onwards refined inmate classification, centralisation of inmates, concentration of administrative power and the development of a specialised bureaucracy associated with the administration of charitable relief were strategies increasingly used to control the lives of the aged poor. There was both a discernible centralisation in power and authority, as this related to charitable relief, and a concentration in the space allocated by the system to institutionalising paupers and invalids. By the late 1880s, a common strategic approach to the management of institutionalised persons was adopted, with a high level of cooperative interaction between bureaucrats responsible for invalids, lunatics and prisoners. Three major themes stand out as the guiding maxims for directing government action. They are classification, centralisation and specialisation.

The last quarter of the nineteenth-century witnessed significant socio-economic change which impacted upon the management of the aged poor.

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1 Andrew Scull has argued that 'The greatly increased emphasis on classification, both within and between institutions, amounted to qualitative change vis-à-vis eighteenth century institutions. . . . Internal classificatory schemes became a vital feature of the 'well-ordered asylum' of the period. And along with the specialization of the social control apparatus came its professionalization'. See A.T. Scull, Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant, a Radical View (Cambridge, 1984), p. 22.
From at least the early 1880s onwards, it was cheaper to subsidise the living expenses of paupers, including the aged and infirm, through outdoor relief than to maintain them in institutional space. Concern that the system of public charity was expensive, that it did not discourage mendicancy, and that it was being abused effectively increased surveillance and external intrusion into the lives of the poor. Hand-in-hand with increased surveillance came the requirement for improved record keeping procedures in order to enable local police authorities and managers of charitable bodies to utilise the information being amassed to better scrutinise applicants for relief and detect cases of abuse. The expansion of outdoor relief was to have two notable consequences. These were the need to apply more professional bureaucratic methods to the keeping of records, and increased official and general public surveillance of paupers and invalids. This latter development had the unforeseen consequence of clarifying in the community consciousness a more objective perspective of the plight of invalids and paupers. In particular, it is argued that both increased community awareness of the problems facing aged paupers and increased professionalisation of the bureaucracy managing them (and their associated records) aided the process whereby the aged poor eventually transcended the undeserving barrier. Recognition that invalids were not to be feared, at both the official level and the general level, but deserved benevolent assistance came from greater understanding. This awareness was only possible through increased observation, and a more thorough recording of those observations and the issues related to managing the aged poor.

Socio-economic change
The last quarter, and in particular the last decade, of the nineteenth-century witnessed broad social and economic changes throughout the Atlantic world. Michael Roe has described the period 1890-1914 as “an era of extraordinary

2 See AOT: CSD 7/51/107, Wilson to Tarleton, 22.5.1872; and, THAP, 23, 1872, Paper 54.
3 The major recommendation of the 1871 Royal Commission had been the establishment of a centralised charitable relief commission responsible for all aspects of the control, administration, inspection, and surveillance of the whole of the charitable system; taking
ferment for European culture and intellect — a ferment perhaps best labelled ‘the onslaught of vitalism’ (although ‘modernism’ would do well enough)." The Australian colonies, including Tasmania, were not exempt from these transformations which were to impact upon the management of the aged poor. Late nineteenth-century Australia evidenced profound social upheaval ensuing from the effects of the 1890s depression. A broadening of social horizons brought about the movement to federate the Australian colonies, which culminated in the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, the extension of the electoral franchise and the growth in organised political labour movements.

The great depression of the 1890s brought poverty to a significant number of Tasmanians and vividly exposed the inadequacies in the existing socio-economic system and, in particular, the inability of capital to meet the exigencies of labour. A significant component of society was forced to confront the prospect of having to rely on the charitable system, a system that proved to be inadequate in the face of widespread poverty and destitution. This oppressive economic crisis conspicuously challenged the then current social and political culture, and society demanded that there be change. Stephen Garton has argued that:

The 1890s depression was not only an economical crisis but also a social one. It threw into question established social relations and traditional solutions to social problems. It also highlighted deep-seated conflicts between capital and labour.  

The 1890s depression was an international event which created a crisis of faith in the existing social order. While there may have been some, especially amongst the elite, who were able to evade its consequences and remain relatively untouched, it is clear that there were a great deal more who were

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over those responsibilities then held by individual hospital and invalid depot boards. *TLCP*, 17, 1871, Paper 47, pp. xxxix-xl.


either profoundly affected or, at the very least, forced to make changes to the manner in which they conducted their lives.⁶

In Britain, North America, Europe and the colonies spawned by these expansionist nations, the latter years of the nineteenth-century were highlighted by political agitation to extend the franchise and to address perceived injustices in the structure of society. The 1860s and 1870s had seen a growth in liberalism within British political thought which spread to all its possessions. In the Tasmanian setting, liberalism was initially slow to take root, as the colony’s political and social atmosphere was interfused by a convict legacy which sustained a deep-seated conservatism. The 1880s were to witness a diminishing of the dominance of conservative political thought as liberalism challenged its prevalence as the leading political doctrine.⁷ Two related economic factors played a notable part in bringing about this change. The first was a significant improvement in Tasmania’s economic performance after spending much of the preceding three decades in fiscal despair. The second factor was the discovery on the west coast and in the north east of the colony of valuable mineral reserves which led to a mini boom in mercantile activity.⁸ At this juncture a reformist agenda was taken up in political and elite circles in Hobart, leading Henry Reynolds to comment that the town became ‘a liberal stronghold’.⁹ This flourishing of liberal thought throughout much of the Victorian world failed to meet the expectations of a number of groups. Throughout the last two decades of the nineteenth-century and the first decade of the twentieth a ‘new liberalism’ along with other reform movements, such as feminism and socialism, challenged perceived contradictions in classic liberal philosophy. If, as this doctrine propounded, all had rights and all were equal before the law, why were some groups

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marginalised and excluded from these rights? As the recognition spread that liberalism had failed certain groups, particularly workers and women, but also disadvantaged sectors of society such as the aged poor, reformist bodies pushed harder for increased state intervention to right perceived shortcomings.\(^{10}\)

It was this social climate which led to major changes in the manner in which society perceived the aged poor, and indeed paupers in general. The moral foundation underlying philanthropy and charity was increasingly scrutinised. Whereas, previously the middle class had been confident in its belief that Smilian and temperance virtues of abstinence, hard work, thrift and self-help would give a moral protection against social problems, such as crime and pauperism, the 1890s depression shattered this illusion. The ideology that moral failure was at the heart of social disorder could no longer be sustained. Thus, while this notion remained it was increasingly overtaken by a recognition that the socio-economic environment was the central factor contributing to social disorder and unrest. By the close of the 1890s, it was evident that the conservative doctrine of blaming social problems on moral weakness, and of isolating deviant individuals in built institutional space in order to contain the threat they posed and simultaneously educate them by instilling in them middle class virtues, had failed to eradicate the social malaises of the times. Pat Thane has argued that the recognition that ‘fault lay in the structure of the economy’ saw the perception of social ills move from a moral to an economic diagnosis.\(^{11}\) This change, she argued, resulted from the realisation ‘of the need for government intervention to support the poor in an economic situation over which they had little control’.\(^{12}\) As Martin Wiener put it a ‘moral discourse was giving way to administrative or welfarist discourse; . . . [p]rinciples were retreating before pragmatism, and long-term

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\(^{10}\) See Garton, *Medicine and Madness*, pp. 53-56, for an expression of this argument in the Australian context.


\(^{12}\) *ibid.*, p. 11.
considerations before shorter-term ones." There existed, in the 1890s, a social and political environment in which alternative means for addressing social issues could be explored and enacted.

In analysing the change of direction that social policy took in the 1890s Wiener has stressed the importance of the extension of the franchise, the democratising of the political structure. He argues that:

The ever-greater political power of the poorer classes stimulated in the governing classes ever-greater sympathy for the difficulties facing the weak and steadily diminished both the perceived justice and the practical feasibility of insisting on maximal personal responsibility and self-improvement. Deterrence was thus to play a steadily smaller part in social policy, and its place was to be filled by more direct methods of state intervention, regulation, and assistance.\(^{14}\)

Assistance, in the form of out-door relief measures were increasingly made available to the poor as public sentiment moved towards 'depauperizing the aged', and the granting of aged pensions gained greater support.\(^{15}\) Part of this change in opinion originated from the findings of social commentators and activists of the time, such as Charles Booth, who argued that outdoor relief neither discouraged or encouraged dependency.\(^{16}\) The great depression of the 1890s, however, reinforced the recognition that the individual was not always at fault and that the system contributed in determining the condition of its members. This was a powerful cognisance aiding the reform movement in shifting public opinion away from the conservative approach of institutionalisation to that of outdoor relief and the granting of pensions, particularly in relation to the aged pauper invalid.

Wiener also emphasises the important role that professionalisation and developments in record keeping and bureaucratic management played in encouraging social change at the end of the nineteenth century. He maintains that the increased capabilities and self-confidence of the state and its


\(^{14}\) *ibid.*, p. 185.

\(^{15}\) *ibid.*, p. 193.

\(^{16}\) *ibid.*
administrators permitted a reduction in the reliance upon deterrence and education in favour of direct administration.\(^7\) He has further argued that from the 1880s onwards a softening in the moral rigour of both state authorities and social welfare volunteer organisations can be observed.\(^8\) This change revolved around a new ideological debate that was taking place within the middle and elite classes, throughout the Atlantic world at this time, as to whether deviant elements represented a social threat, or whether they were merely social dregs.

Shayne Breen has argued that by 1900, the widening of the franchise altered the ideological demeanour of the Tasmanian parliament, and in particular that of the House of Assembly.\(^9\) The changing nature of the House of Assembly and the shift in social thought also brought about a sustained attack on the rectitude of the deeply conservative Legislative Council and its perceived failure to act in what was seen to be the common good.\(^20\) Breen postulates that:

The social and political changes that occurred in Tasmania in the final years of the [nineteenth] century underpinned a challenge to the ideology of landed privilege. This challenge, which occurred on a number of fronts, coalesced around the notion of the public good. In the immediate aftermath of the transportation era, the notions of individual liberty and property rights were ascendant; but as emancipist numbers declined and political reforms occurred in other colonies, the concept of the public good tended to displace those older notions.\(^21\)

The emergence of the common good as a significant issue in Tasmanian politics saw a public airing of attitudes regarding the role of social policy. This, in turn, was to see reformers advocate legal intervention in order to force reform on reticent conservatives who viewed the introduction of new social regulations as restrictions upon their capacity to exert their social and

\(^7\) *ibid.*, pp. 185-6.
\(^8\) *ibid.*, p. 305.
\(^10\) This argument is expanded upon in S. Breen, ‘Place, power & social law: a history of Tasmania’s central north 1810-1900’, unpublished Doctor of Philosophy thesis, University of Tasmania, 1997, p. 10.
political hegemony. It is important to note, that just as reforms associated with changes in the management of the aged poor were opposed by conservative factions of the middle class and the elite, so too were the deeper, more substantive social shifts of the 1890s ardently resisted by this group.

Change was also hastened by the waning influence of religion and the widening acceptance of science as the agency of knowledge. As Garton has put it, the 'late nineteenth century was the high point of Victorian positivism and empiricism.' In some respects the new secular faith in science can be viewed as resulting from a decline in the belief that philanthropy was capable of resolving social inequality. The philanthropic approach to pauperism was widely viewed as having failed to arrest the growth of poverty or alleviate its repercussions. In some respects the Australian colonies forged a pathway to a new social landscape in which reformers applied the principles of scientific endeavour to address social issues. Secularism, the new liberalism of the 1890s and socialism were all applied to foster social justice and social harmony, as evidenced in the implementation of interventionist social policy such as the enactment of female suffrage, factory and shop legislation, old age and invalid pension schemes and industrial arbitration and conciliation mechanisms. This placed Australia 'in the forefront of modern social experimentation', and the country developed a reputation as the 'social laboratory of the world'.

Garton has argued that as a means to ground social policy in science, the old 'dangerous classes' had to be transformed into 'defective classes'. This process exposed flaws in the older philanthropic and paternalistic dualism of deserving and undeserving, in which those elements considered most dangerous to society or most likely to violate the middle class code of virtue were either ignored, or else not considered, until they had descended into the

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22 Garton, Medicine and Madness, p. 54.
24 Garton, Medicine and Madness, p. 59.
mire of immorality. Science came to be perceived as a means of determining individuals at risk and thus a mechanism enabling the intervention of the state in preventing social disorder, as opposed to addressing its aftermath. As Garton put it:

The replacement of a discourse of 'badness' and 'morality' by one of 'deficiency' and 'illness' favoured the intervention of the state to prevent social problems, rather than having to wait until offences had been committed.

State socialism was a powerful political movement which, along with the development of organised labour and the vivid reality of the 1890s depression, played its part in transforming the social environment and policy direction for managing the aged poor. The new ideals, particularly those associated with working class political consciousness, were in part enhanced by the anxieties they created amongst the middle class. This anxiety was transferred into action by middle class reformers who, while advocating new liberalism, needed to balance this with retaining their social position. Middle class reformers desired to improve the lot of the working class and ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged elements of society but not at the cost of their status. In many instances the motivation for reform came from a sense that a failure to procure recognisable improvements could result in unstable and disorderly social relations. In Tasmania, in the early 1890s, there was a belief that the existing social order could not be sustained and that a new order was being ushered in replacing the stringent lines of post-transportation social demarcation. The process of change, however, also begot a sense of uncertainty. This sentiment was well expressed by James Backhouse Walker, who wrote in his journal on 2 October 1893:

25 Charles Van Onselen has argued that 'market economies erode paternalistic relationships'. (C. Van Onselen, 'The social and economic underpinning of paternalism and violence on the maize farms of the south-western Transvaal, 1900-1950', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 5, no. 2, p. 128.) By the 1880s, Tasmania had broken the shackles of economic impoverishment and depression resulting from the withdrawal of British capital and inter-colonial competition principally in agricultural production. A substantial and robust inter-colonial market economy was developing.

F. I. Young takes a very pessimistic — or, as he says, 'malistic' — view of the state of the world. He says that, in a very few years, we shall see the break up of the industrial system and have a social revolution. Certainly the troubles, the huge strikes — the last being the miners strike in England involving tens of thousands — the misery of the proletariat, the spread of socialistic views, and the general unrest, make everyone, who thinks, very apprehensive. There is no doubt that some very radical changes are impending, but whether we shall have a huge social catastrophe, or whether, as is more likely, the changes will take place by degrees, and more or less peaceably, it is impossible to predict. 

Brian Dickey, in particular, has argued that the emergence of organised labour played a pivotal role in the implementation of a new social agenda. He sees three factors, the development of an organised and politicised labour movement, the 1890s depression and serious conflicts between capital and labour, such as the shearer’s strikes of the early 1890s, as the basis of a rising apprehension of class conflict. As a means to alleviate the possibility of such an occurrence, the way was paved for the introduction of new social policy as a component of a strategy to contain and diffuse working class radicalism. As a consequence of the flow on effect of changes designed to improve the lot of unionised male workers, paupers and invalids witnessed an amelioration in their treatment and the introduction of an expanded outdoor relief policy which enabled many more to survive outside of an institutional setting. It also saw compassionate reform take precedence over deterrence in terms of the management of invalid depots, and, with the reconciling of these two conflicting goals, the way was open for charitable institutions to transform themselves into the old age homes of the early twentieth-century.

Ray Markey has argued that a vital aspect of changing social policy at the end of the nineteenth-century and beginning of the twentieth was the politicising of organised labour and the emergence of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The ALP is viewed by Markey as the prominent agency forcing social reform upon the old liberalism and conservatism of the political elite. Its ability to unite a potentially rebellious working class into a united front articulating...

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and actively pursuing a national social agenda is seen as crucial in averting social disturbance and delivering substantive economic and social reform. The capacity for political labour movements, like the ALP, to bring about social change rested upon two important developments: the expansion of the franchise and the development of a prescriptive social vision. By extending the franchise the ALP was eventually able to secure office and thus gain ideological hegemony. But before this was achieved in the years immediately following Federation, its social policy impacted upon liberal thought, directing where it should head in terms of social reform.

Another shift which took place in the social thinking of the 1890s was the growing belief that access to state supported relief was no longer a charity but a right. Relief could no longer be doled out by a paternalistic state or private benevolent agencies demanding acts of contrition by recipients. It became a social right and this thinking spread to other areas previously associated with the charitable system, such as hospitals. Beverley Kingston, for example, maintains that '[w]ith increasing levels of funding, both from government and through widespread public appeals, hospitalization came to be seen as a right rather than a charity.' In relation to the aged poor, she argues that during the 1890s the introduction of pensions, in various forms, demonstrated that 'the idea of assistance from the public purse [had] [o]verhaul[ed] an older, stigmatizing notion of charity.' The focal concept of welfare policy gradually shifted from pauperism ('the state of dependence') to poverty ('the state of deprivation').

The established ideology of individual responsibility was thrown open to question and with this the whole underpinning structure of selective charity for the deserving was challenged. Dickey has epitomised this as the choice

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31 ibid.
32 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 190.
between 'charity or universal entitlement.' Universalism, defined as
'collective responsibility for social welfare action' directly challenged
individual responsibility. This is what Thane has described as the change
from individualism to collectivism. Dickey argues that this contest arose out
of the disorder that the 1890s depression wrought on the economic system.
This turmoil is seen as stimulating four distinguishable social results. Firstly,
it created concern amongst the middle class political leadership and
intelligentsia that the economic system was at risk. Secondly, it greatly
enhanced the development of a political consciousness amongst the working
class and furthered the spread of unionism and formation of the ALP, which
in turn created an opposing response from conservatives. Dickey sees this
process of challenge and response in the development of party politics as
notable in affecting social policy. Thirdly, the severity and scope of economic
hardship challenged middle class notions regarding the achievement and
prosperity of their colonies. Many in the middle class were horrified by what
they witnessed and their conscience compelled them into action. Fourthly, it
focused intellectual debate on social policy. These four factors crystallised
political action with regard to social welfare issues. As a result, throughout
the Australian colonies (and the subsequent states) the period 1890 to 1910
witnessed 'a stream of legislation ... which addressed itself to a wide range
of social problems', including allowances for the aged and infirm. One of the
major concerns with the implementation of the new social agenda, however,
was that it should be delivered by a more humane and liberal
administration. Mounting pressure from social reform advocates in Britain
saw the development of a more humane approach to the treatment of the
aged poor and, in particular, improvements in institutional care. Matching
changes are also evident in the Tasmanian context and they appear to have resulted for similar reasons. Booth's 1892 sixpenny publication on pauperism,

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33 Dickey, No Charity There, p. 72.
34 ibid., p. 75.
35 Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State, p. 11.
36 Dickey, No charity There, pp. 75-6.
37 ibid., p. 73.
38 J. Brown, 'Social control and the modernisation of social policy, 1890-1929' in P. Thane,

which contained his argument for an endowment for the old aged, was widely available throughout the Australian colonies. In both settings reformers argued that old age was a significant cause of poverty and pauperism but that importantly, they maintained that:

it was often non-culpable since even the most respectable workers could not always save sufficient to provide for old age — a hazard which not all could expect to live to experience and whose length was uncertain.

This position was eloquently expressed at the time by Clementina Black, who argued that:

the sad truth is that thrift, like cleanliness, is a virtue which can only be exercised upon a certain level of prosperity ... you cannot save when you have barely enough money to keep shelter over your head and to get a reasonable average of meals during the day.

The 1890s saw a new generation vocalise their cognition of the world in which they lived. They were not burdened down with the 'baggage of convictism' which had so influenced their parents' perspective. Nor had they been party to the great European debates of the 1870s and 1880s between the social darwinists and the marxist socialists. They were vibrant and not at all pessimistic about what the future held. They were to initiate the progressive movement and were proponents of an ideology which believed that creating and nurturing a favourable social environment would allow nature to guarantee a favourable social effect. Wilfred Townsley has referred to this as a 'socialism sans doctrines'. It advocated investment in health, education and welfare, and in this there were favourable outcomes for the aged poor. This perspective ran counter, but very much inter-related, to a notion that 'chronic poverty was a threat to national efficiency.' This particular fear, that the physical and mental fibre of the human material of the state was in
decline, necessitated beneficial measures to improve the lot of the lower orders of society, including the aged poor, and it directed social policy to more precisely classify the various elements which made up the 'pauper classes'. A clearer distinction was required "between the 'respectable' working class and the causal residuum". As the image of the poor shifted and ideas of national deficiency took hold, the desire to address perceived pauper weakness took on greater importance. Henceforth the state took 'a more assertive hand in both preventing the deterioration of character and building it up among the weaker elements of the community.'

In terms of invalid management, concerns regarding national efficiency and national health impacted upon the institutions in a number of ways. For example, the issue of sanitary improvement was given increased attention. The stench of raw sewage and offensive effluvium had plagued many charitable institutions. While this had always been considered a nuisance, and in the context of the miasma theory a risk to health, authorities had not always been prompt in rectifying the sources of such contamination. By the late 1880s, as public health programs came to the forefront of government policy, aimed at ensuring both the physical and moral health of the population, inmates of charitable institutions also began to benefit from improved sanitation schemes. Not only were improved schemes for the removal of waste water and sewage implemented but the supply of fresh water was also enhanced. In mid 1885, for example, the government approved additional funds to meet the cost of improvements to the water supply of the NTCI. Concurrent with the upgrading of sanitation were new standards on the ventilation of buildings which also played a role in improving the conditions that inmates experienced.

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45 ibid. Also see Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State, pp. 37-8.
46 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 191.
47 For a detailed portrayal of such a problem at the Cascades Complex See AOT: CSD 13/56/907, Coverdale to Smart, 11.2.1887.
48 AOT: CSD 13/17/188, Douglas to Treasurer, 10.4.1885.
The changing face of institutional populations has been used as a rationale to explain improvements in institutional conditions. As recently as 2001, Breen has argued that the demise of Tasmania’s charitable institutions was directly linked to the numerical decline of the emancipist paupers. He stated that ‘[a]s the old hands passed away, the institutions devised to control them died too.’ While it is difficult to disagree that the changing background of invalid inmates played its part in the selection of methods to be used to control the aged poor, this justification has been given too great an emphasis in the past. Emancipist invalids merely filled a place in society which, in other locales, was filled by different individuals. They shared a common status with these persons in that they were all on the lowest rung of the social ladder. Convictism merely gave local flavour to an international phenomenon. It is argued that the social and economic changes discussed above played a more significant role in determining the agency of assistance granted the aged poor at the end of the nineteenth-century.

Classification, centralisation and specialisation

In attempting to cope with the invalid crisis of the late 1850s and early 1860s, northern and southern Tasmania adopted different strategies. The south opted for classificatory restrictions on entry to its various charitable institutions, and thus effected a significantly greater degree of spatial classification amongst paupers and invalids than did the north, which pursued a generalised institutional approach. If these two propositions are viewed as experiments (intentional or not) then the results procured from southern specialisation were more favourably received by officialdom, the administrators and the wider community. Whatever the reasons (be it underestimation of ongoing numbers requiring aid, the duration of the invalid crisis, the continuing poor performance of the Tasmanian economy or falling community support for private charity), the approach adopted in the south worked. It was not long before arguments virtually identical to those used in

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49 Breen, Contested Places, pp. 166-7.
the south for institutional specialisation were being countenanced by their northern counterparts.

Prior to the opening of the LID, classification had failed in northern Tasmania. This was principally due to the numbers of invalids seeking institutionalisation and the inadequacy of the responses to this situation. The establishment of the LID permitted the LGH to initiate a spatial classification between chronic and acute patients. The LGH was able to remove from its wards chronic incurable male invalids, thus affording more extensive accommodation for male patients suffering from active disease.\textsuperscript{50} The criterion for the classificatory boundaries between patients and invalids, appears to have been that the former represented cases of 'acute medical and surgical diseases and accidents' while the latter comprised of those suffering from chronic diseases (such as cancer, chronic bronchitis and consumption) and infirmities of age (such as general senility, chronic rheumatism, chronic leg ulcers, paralysis and dementia).\textsuperscript{51} Doctors, such as R. S. Bright, of the HGH, believed that these latter cases did not require treatment within a hospital but could be equally well managed in an invalid depot, and 'with much greater economy.'\textsuperscript{52}

In the 1860s the emphasis of classificatory regulation was not between invalids and criminals but between invalids and acute medical patients. While this potentially had negative ramifications, in that it saw invalids segregated from a group perceived by the community as deserving, and placed in a closer association with the undeserving criminal, it highlighted the distinctiveness of invalids within the 'deviant whole'. This allowed for the development of a perception that invalids were a distinct group in society and that they had discrete problems which required specialised and unique solutions to their management. It further forced greater recognition of the specialised medical requirements of this group. In mid 1874, the LGH

\textsuperscript{50} TLCP, 15, 1869, Paper 3, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{51} TLCP, 17, 1871, p. 73; paragraph 418.
\textsuperscript{52} ibid.
forcefully proclaimed that invalids must not be sent to the hospital and requested that this be impressed upon police and municipal authorities who it implied were still forwarding invalid cases to the LGH as opposed to the LID. This push by the LGH to enforce rigid classification between 'hospital cases' and invalids resulted in the development of hospital wards within the confines of the invalid depot. By early 1871, the LID had a functioning hospital ward capable of accommodating 12 patients. It was always full. The development of such a ward within the LID meant that it was able to retain inmates which it would have previously sent to the LGH for treatment. It was a further justification for the LGH to take a hardline stance on its refusal to admit invalids, even those suffering from complaints requiring medical attention.

While classification was an obsession with nineteenth-century administrators and bureaucrats, it was not always put into practice. During the third quarter of the nineteenth-century paupers, lunatics, invalids and convicts may have, on paper, been separate units, but in practical terms they were often treated as interchangeable, or as parts of one homogeneous mass. What transpired in the mid to late 1870s was a change in both the theoretical and actual classification of invalids. While still part of a greater deviant whole, invalids increasingly had a greater classificatory association with lunatics and there was a weakening of perceived links with convicts. For example, an 1875 statistical return from the Port Arthur Penal Establishment directly linked paupers and lunatics as a single classificatory unit. A distinction was made between prisoners and invalids, but not between invalids and lunatics. Prisoners were one category, and invalids and lunatics another. An 1874 report of a select committee set up to investigate accommodation within existing prison buildings recommended that institutions for accommodating prisoners should be separate from those used to maintain invalids and

53 AOT: CSD 7/60/1463, Miller to Wilson, 16.6.1874.
54 TLCP, 17, 1871, Paper 47, p. 48; paragraph 71.
paupers. Invalids and paupers were not to be held in the same institutional space as criminals. The greater classificatory linkage which developed between invalids and lunatics helped to reinforce a perception that invalidism was not a moral failing but a medico-economic problem. It effectively freed invalids from the weighty baggage of criminality and allowed them to break free from the shackles of convictism. The intensification in the classificatory linkage of invalids with lunatics was therefore a factor in the process whereby invalids became deserving.

As invalids increasingly came to be perceived as a medical issue, as opposed to a criminal problem, linkages in space which developed between invalids and lunatics only reinforced a disconnection between invalids and prisoners in the minds of administrators. This can be seen in the actions which took place when finally Port Arthur was abandoned in April 1877. At that time the invalids, along with the lunatics, were relocated to the Cascades. The interesting point is that lunatics and invalids were located within the same institutional space, distinct from that used to accommodate prisoners, and a single administrator, initially Ringrose Austin Atkins and then John Coverdale, was given charge over them. The perception that invalid management was increasingly a medical issue was further demonstrated by the full title of Coverdale’s position. No longer was it merely Superintendent of the Cascades Invalid Depot, but ‘Surgeon Superintendent of the Hospital

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56 THAP, 27, 1874, Paper 79, p. 4.
57 It is worth noting that there was, at this time, a change in the perception of the standing of a number of groups in society who had previously been designated as part of a wider criminal population. For example, Barty-King has a chapter in his history of debtors entitled ‘No longer a crime’ referring to changes in British insolvency law at the close of the 1860s. He talks about the development of a ‘modish humanity’ in ‘violent reaction against the ancient severity’. See H. Barty-King, The Worst Poverty: A History of Debt and Debtors (Gloustershire, 1991), p. 141. The changes to society’s perception and treatment of debtors, was part of the same process which saw in Tasmania the emergence of social reformers with a humanitarian agenda and the de-stigmatisation of invalids as criminals.
59 AOT: CSD 10/58/1378, Fysh to Coverdale, 31.12.1877. Atkins took over as Superintendent of the Cascades, from A. H. Boyd on 1 April 1877. (TLCP, 26, 1878-79, Paper 9, p. 3.)
for the Insane, Cascades, and Superintendent and Medical Officer of the Cascades Invalid Depot for Males'.

In the late 1870s senior government officials initiated discussions aimed at rationalising and consolidating institutions related to the management of invalids, lunatics and prisoners. Initially, the government sought to develop a scheme whereby they could close some of the then existing prison buildings. By concentrating prisoners, both male and female, in the Campbell Street Establishment, the closing of other institutions became feasible. Centralisation of prisoners at Campbell Street freed up, or rather permitted a reallocating of, space in other penal institutions for use by other deviant classes. One of the problematic issues associated with the closure of Port Arthur was not so much where to send its invalid and prisoner inmates but where to forward its lunatic population. Transferral of the Cascade female prisoners to the Campbell Street Gaol would have made space available in that institution for confining the Port Arthur lunatics. The invalid-lunatic connection was to be strengthened at the same time as the invalid-criminal link was to be weakened. Instead of being combined with criminals, invalids were to be coupled with medical deviancy.

Classification and institutional specialisation resulted in government agencies recognising different requirements for distinct deviant populations. The classificatory system began to identify and segregate invalids, particularly aged invalids, from a previous amorphous mass of paupers. For example, the final abandonment of Port Arthur continued after the removal of the inmates, with the transportation of stores, provisions, fittings and the like from the

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60 AOT: CSD 10/58/1378, Fysh to Coverdale, 31.12.1877. (Emphasis mine.)
61 AOT: CSD 10/48/966, Reibey to Attorney General, 18.1.1877.
62 ibid.
63 Forty-two female prisoners and three children were transferred from the Cascades Female House of Correction to the Female House of Correction within the Campbell Street Gaol on 11 and 12 April, 1877. The spaces they formerly occupied were modified in preparation for the arrival of the paupers and insane inmates from Port Arthur. As part of these works a sick ward was established principally for men suffering from ulcers. (TLCP, 26, 1878-79, Paper 9, p. 3 and TLCP, 26, 1878-79, Paper 18, p. 3.)
settlement to Hobart Town. As part of this process Thomas Reibey, the Colonial Secretary, specifically highlighted the transporting of two or three of the settlement's dairy cows so that they could be used at both the Cascades and New Town to supply the invalid inmates with fresh milk. The emphasis that Reibey put on this action indicates an awareness that these inmates had special dietary requirements. That intra-pauper categorisation was crystallising in the minds of bureaucrats was exemplified by the manner in which various statistics were presented. Whereas previously different deviant groups within the same institution had appeared on the same generalised return, increasingly they were separated and presented in individual returns. For example, numerical returns for invalid and lunatic inmates at the Cascades in mid 1877 differ markedly in the mode in which internal categories were used to classify the inmates. Separate returns were used for each of these two groups. The insane were recorded firstly in terms of which government (colonial or imperial) was responsible for the cost of their maintenance and secondly in terms of their religious affinity (whether Protestant or Roman Catholic). Whereas the invalids were classified also in terms of their religious background, they were first and foremost identified in terms of their medical requirements.

In early 1879 Reibey initiated a scheme to centralise and rationalise the various components which made up the institutional landscape of pauper management. There were several facets in the proposed plan. In broad terms it was proposed that pauper lunatics would all be accommodated at the New Norfolk Hospital for the Insane. Concurrent with this consolidation of lunatics, it was intended to accommodate all southern invalids, male and female, as well as the northern male invalids, within one 'super' institution at

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64 Port Arthur was finally abandoned in early October, 1877, after an occupation of 44 years. The last inmates to leave the settlement were seven prisoners and they were conveyed to Hobart, for transfer to the Campbell Street Gaol, via the government schooner Harriet, on 21 September, 1877. (The Tasmanian Mail, 22.9.1877, p. 14 c. 2.)
65 AOT: CSD 10/48/966, Reibey to Civil Commandant Port Arthur, 10.4.1877.
66 AOT: CSD 10/48/966, Atkins to Colonial Secretary, 26.6.1877.
67 ibid., 5.7.1877.
68 AOT: CSD 10/70/1722, Reibey to President Commissioners Cascades Hospital for the Insane, 24.3.1879.
New Town. The Queen’s Asylum for Destitute Children, New Town, had been used continuously as institutional space since 1828. While principally focusing upon the accommodation of orphaned and pauper children, this institution had added the function of invalid depot to its repertoire with the founding of the New Town Establishment for Indigent Females in 1874.69 By late May 1879, plans were put in place to transfer the male invalids from the Cascades to New Town and, as soon as feasible, to also relocate the invalids then residing at the Brickfields to New Town.70 The rationale behind this move was that it would cut administrative costs and maintain all the invalids in one establishment.71 The first of these perceived benefits would be resolving the economic constraints facing the government while the second benefit anticipated was an increase in its capacity to exercise control over both inmates and institutional staff (including administrators). Instead of having to keep track of the operations of several institutions, the Colonial Secretary and the government would need only to maintain a watchful eye on one, and thus not only were savings perceived, in terms of reduced staff salaries and wages, but also costs in terms of administrative time spent on managing a multitude of institutions. Such a development necessarily meant a rationalisation of staff.72 In this context, John Withrington was rewarded for his ‘long and efficient service’ in the management of the Brickfields, by this time in excess of 20 years, and was given the office of Superintendent of the proposed new institution.73 Frederick Seager, then the Assistant Superintendent at the Cascades, was appointed as Assistant Superintendent upon Withrington’s recommendation.74 Both Withrington’s and Seager’s appointments took effect on 1 July 1879.75

69 This charitable institution had been proclaimed in The Gazette on 28 July, 1874. (AOT: CSD 10/70/1717, Reibey to Minister Lands and Works, 3.6.1879.)
70 AOT: CSD 10/71/1765, Reibey to Withrington, 27.5.1879 and AOT: CSD 10/71/1765, Reibey to Scott, 23.5.1879.
71 AOT: CSD 10/71/1765, Reibey to Withrington, 27.5.1879.
72 AOT: CSD 10/71/1765, Reibey to Scott, 23.5.1879.
73 AOT: CSD 10/71/1765, Reibey to Withrington, 27.5.1879 and AOT: CSD 10/71/1765, Reibey to Scott, 23.5.1879.
74 AOT: CSD 10/71/1765, Withrington to Colonial Secretary, 29.5.1879.
75 AOT: CSD 10/71/1765, Government Notice, 30.6.1879.
The recurring problem of institutional overcrowding appears to have blighted plans for the swift centralisation of all invalids at New Town. In the push to close the Brickfields Withrington investigated the re-opening of the Cascades. The plan was that the Cascades would house the Brickfields' invalids on a temporary basis until space became available at New Town. Planning for this mooted transfer went as far as an assessment of costs. It was estimated that a sum of some £44 would be required to carry out the designated works. In the end the Brickfields' men were not sent to the NTCI via the Cascades but went directly to New Town. The majority were transferred sometime in late 1882 or early 1883, and the remainder, those presumably too ill to be accommodated at New Town, were removed to the HGH. In February 1883, a supplement of £1282, to cover the additional costs arising from the transfer, was made to the NTCI. Given the considerable cost differential between repairs and renovations to the Cascades and the sum required to accommodate the additional invalids at New Town, it is clear that the policy of centralising invalid accommodation in one institution took precedence over economic considerations. The final feature in the centralisation of southern invalid institutions took place on 28 April 1884. On this day The Gazette proclaimed the amalgamation of the male and female charitable institutions at New Town into a single establishment.

On 2 July 1883, William Pickett, a 94-year-old bed-ridden invalid suffering from an unspecified incurable disease, was transferred from the HGH to New Town.

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76 AOT: CSD 13/32/387, Moore to Coverdale, 18.7.1882 and TLCP, 32, 1882, Paper 8. Overcrowding was also noted by visitors to the institution at this time, as reported in excerpts from the Visitors Book, cited in the annual reports for 1880 and 1881.
79 AOT: CSD 13/32/387, Shield to Chief Clerk, 10.11.1882.
80 There is contradiction in the official record as to when the invalids at the Brickfields were transferred to the NTCI. Withrington states, in the 1882 Annual Report, that the whole of the Brickfield inmates were removed to New Town on 31 December, 1882. (TLCP, 34, 1883, Paper 10, p. 3.) The C.S.O.'s files unequivocally document this transfer taking place seven days later.
81 See file AOT: CSD 13/10/90.
Town. He died five days later. Even Withrington was sufficiently disturbed
that Pickett was not ‘permitted to end his days in peace at the Hospital’ to
formally submit a report on the incident to the Colonial Secretary, William
Moore.  

Longsdale Holden, the HGH House Surgeon responsible for
ascertaining that Pickett was healthy enough to bear the journey to New
Town, justified his actions along demarcation lines and questioned
Withrington’s capacity to make medical judgements. Whilst admitting that
Pickett was not expected to live much longer, he validated his actions based
upon differing functional roles for the HGH and the NTCI. He thought that
the HGH was an inappropriate institution for incurable and terminal cases.
These, he believed, were more fitting for a charitable institution.  

On this
matter he was unapologetic. Moore was outraged at this response and stated
that he found Holden’s justification to be of such an unsatisfactory character
that he was ‘compelled, in the interests of humanity . . . to take such action as
may prevent a recurrence of the course adopted in the case of the late William
Pickett.’ Moore spelt out what the function of New Town was, and it was
not ‘to be utilised as a receptacle for Hospital patients, hopelessly past
recovery, suffering from some loathsome disease, and . . . near death’. Given
that the HGH had failed to heed a previous warning on this issue, Moore
amended and formalised the bureaucratic process necessary to be
implemented in order for the HGH to transfer ‘invalid patients’ to the NTCI.  

These new rules removed the power of the HGH to transfer invalids to New
Town. The Board of the HGH came to the defence of their staff and blamed
Pickett’s death not on the imprudent judgement of their doctors, but upon
nursing and management at New Town. They saw no role for the HGH in the
care and management of invalids. The Board vehemently protested the
changes which had been introduced, fearing that they would result in the

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82 AOT: CSD 13/75/1396, Withrington to Moore, 19.5.1884.
83 AOT: CSD 13/67/1144, Withrington to Moore, 10.7.1883.
84 AOT: CSD 13/67/1144, Holden to Smart, 11.7.1883.
85 AOT: CSD 13/67/1144, Moore to Smart, 12.7.1883.
86 ibid.
87 ibid.
88 AOT: CSD 13/67/1144, Smart, Collier and Bright to Moore, 22.8.1883.
hospital again becoming inundated with pauper invalids. They requested that the new scheme be scrapped and that the previous practice be reinstated.

This dispute served to clarify the functional delineations for invalids between hospitals and charitable institutions. It forced Moore to reconsider the nature of the inmates in each of these institutions. As a result of this reflection Moore concluded that New Town was to be utilised for:

> the reception and maintenance of destitute persons, who have been permanently injured, or are suffering from such chronic diseases as can be treated in such an asylum, where there is no specialised nursing staff, and where the Medical Officer is not resident but visiting.\(^5\)

Such a definition allowed the HGH to continue to forward to New Town ‘cases of chronic infirmity, arising from extreme old age or other causes’ provided that they could be suitably provided for at New Town.\(^6\) The definition effectively enhanced identity for invalids through tighter classification and more rigorous demarcations between the various constituent groups making up the general pauper population. Similar demarcation disputes took place with regard to patients suffering from senile dementia.\(^7\) In relation to this particular question, the controversy resulted in the recognition of dementia as an age related condition. These debates represented a growing awareness of geriatric medical conditions and helped to pave the way for medical specialisation in this field. In terms of senility, they represented an understanding that care in a charitable institution (the precursor of old age nursing homes) was a preferred and prudent utilisation of resources when compared to treatment in an insane asylum.

Increasing numbers of non-emancipists entering charitable institutions gave prominence to the issue of how best to conduct internal classification. Internal divisions formed amongst invalids based upon earlier class affiliations. By the early 1880s, the disinclination to enter invalid depots was not only viewed

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\(^5\) AOT: CSD 13/67/1144, Moore to Smart, 30.8.1883.

\(^6\) ibid.

\(^7\) ibid.
the result of dislike of the confinement and discipline seen necessary for efficient management, but also an aversion, on the part of ‘respectable [poor] persons’, to indiscriminate mixing and association with the lowest of the lower orders. This was a reaction that the elite could understand. For example, the Administrator of Charitable Grants wrote:

when the antecedents, character, and habits of a very large number of men and women generally to be found therein [charitable institutions] are borne in mind, it is, I think, hardly to be wondered at that people who have led honest and industrious lives should, when overtaken by adversity, shrink from such uncongenial companionship, and prefer to rely upon their own exertions to obtain food and shelter, such as it is, aided by the trifle granted to them in the shape of Out-door Relief.  

Erving Goffman has discussed this issue in terms of the inmate undergoing a psychological contamination of self as a result of forced physical contact with individuals they would have avoided in the world outside the institution. He argues that:

the inmate undergoes mortification of the self by contaminative exposure of a physical kind, but this must be amplified: when the agency of contamination is another human being, the inmate is in addition contaminated by forced interpersonal contact and, in consequence, a forced social relationship. (Similarly, when the inmate loses control over who observes him in his predicament or knows about his past, he is being contaminated by a forced relationship to these people — for it is through such perception and knowledge that relations are expressed.)

The HBS also recognised the need for better internal classification at the NTCI and advocated the separation of those who had known better times from those who had a penal background. Two groups, emancipists and free settlers, clashed within institutional space. For this reason it was perceived necessary that a scheme of internal classification based upon class should be pursued. The introduction of such a system would not necessitate any changes to existing regulations, nor would it have to interfere with internal

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91 For details on this issue see AOT: CSD 13/81/1662, Report of Commissioners of the New Norfolk Hospital for the Insane to Moore, 2.1.1885.
92 TLCP, 32, 1882, Paper 9, p. 4.
93 ibid.
routine, but it was felt that it would eliminate a prejudice which prevented many who required institutional care from seeking it and would improve the lot of those whose condition gave them no alternative but to ask for admission.

The evidence that W. Catley, the Inquiring Officer for the HBS, gave to the 1888 Royal Commission indicates that there was a strong desire on the part of the 'better class of people' for improved internal classification such that they did not have to associate with emancipists. This was an issue which had been discussed in the parliament, in mid 1887, when it had been resolved that:

a system of classification should be introduced into the Charitable Institutions of the Colony by which the present objectionable plan now prevailing of herding sections of the inmates indiscriminately together may be remedied.

Indeed, Withrington did his best to 'keep the respectable men separate from the others.' Seager confirmed this but added there was little more that could be done without additional buildings. Given that ordinary wards at the NTCI accommodated 50 inmates, and hospital wards 32, it is difficult to see how any degree of classification based upon class could have been maintained. In Launceston, Alfred Jones, the LID Superintendent, had 'no means for classification' although he thought it necessary. It was, however, hoped that better classification could be achieved when a new building, capable of accommodating another 35 inmates, was completed. The evidence is that this relatively small addition to the institution was unable to

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95 TPP, 11, 1887, Paper 23, p. 3.
98 TPP, 15, 1888, Paper 50, p. 34.
99 *ibid.*, p. 40.
100 *ibid.*, p. 39.
101 *ibid.*, p. 58. The need for classification in Launceston, as well as an understanding of differing social groupings within the pauper population, had been recognised well before 1888. As early as 1880, Governor Lefroy had put forward the very urgent want of internal classification in Launceston, particularly for the female invalids confined to the Launceston Female House of Correction, when he wrote in the Visitors Book of the Launceston Penal Establishment: 'The mixture of prisoners and paupers in the sick ward is objectionable, and unjust to respectable poverty.' (*TLCP*, 30, 1881, Paper 24, p. 5.)
address the growing anguish related to internal class differentiation amongst the paupers, though some classification was implemented. When a reporter for the Launceston Examiner inspected the depot in early November 1891, he subsequently described the presence of a small ward for ‘the better class of inmates — for there are Whigs and Tories amongst the old people, and they are classified as far as the buildings will permit.’

In 1891, the editor of the Church News wrote to George Richardson, the Administrator of Charitable Grants, in relation to the case of a William ‘Bill’ Lone (or possibly Loane) who he believed had been treated harshly at the LID. In this letter he pushed for improved treatment and management of inmates, stating that there would ‘always be cases of hardship until there is classification and special treatment of some of our aged homeless poor.’ He did not believe in tarring all invalids with the same stigma of convictism stating instead:

The fact is that our refuges are designed for only one sort of person — that is the old man who has been brought to poverty by vicious living. For such, no doubt, they are good enough. But it is too terrible to think of the good honest, God-fearing old man compelled to associate with this herd and be one of them, subject to the same iron discipline, simply because he cannot otherwise get food and care to keep him alive.

Several proposals were put forward by evangelical Christians and the benevolently minded as to how to improve classification; or as they perceived it, the best means to segregate the respectable inmate from the debauched ex-convict. The Church News expressed an opinion that charitable institutions, such as the NTCL, were probably as well managed as such places could be but that this merely demonstrated the gross inadequacy of the colony’s provision for the aged poor. It expressed a view that it was ‘impossible to maintain the principle of Christian charity while treating all the poor alike and bringing all under the same [penal-like] discipline.’ They held the position that the lack

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102 TPP, 15, 1888, Paper 50, p. xxiii.
103 Launceston Examiner, 10.11.1891, p. 4 c. 3-4.
104 AOT: CSD 16/46/1358, Editor Church News to Richardson, 14.7.1891.
105 Church News 1.7.1891, p. 488.
106 Church News 1.8.1891, pp. 504-5.
of classification, between differing classes of aged inmates, compelled the more virtuous, the ‘good old homeless people’, to endure a trial ‘only a little less painful than starvation.” In a letter to the editor of the Church News, Claude W. Roberts, the Chairman and Honorary Manager of the Devon Cottage Hospital, asked the rhetorical question:

Have we a right to compel aged and worn out persons, simply because of their poverty, to herd indiscriminately with the lowest residuum of society, and to submit, in consequence of this admixture, to severe, almost penal, treatment?

Amongst the readership of the Church News there was a belief that the existing charitable institutions differed little from a gaol, inasmuch as in a depot invalids were confined for poverty in just the same manner as a gaol did for crime. This they saw evidenced by the fact that in Launceston the Governor of the Gaol and the Superintendent of the Invalid Depot were conjoined offices. In order to remedy this situation the Church News advocated the introduction of rigorous classification segregating differing classes of the aged and infirm poor to separate institutions and management regimes. It also recommended the classification of individuals on the basis of their prior class affiliations. In the first instance it identified as a separate group, deserving superior accommodation and treatment, those individuals and couples who had seen better days. These persons, they stated, often had fallen into poverty through no fault of their own. The second group they identified, and one also deserving of consideration, were ‘the good hard working old labourers, whose chief failing has been too great a open-handedness all through life.” Membership of this second category was not automatic. Acceptance was dependent upon a favourable outcome of an investigation of their worthiness. Temperance, honesty and good living had to be attested to by clergy, police, former employers and neighbours. A third class was to be made up of those who had ‘proved to have lived in drunkenness or other vicious habits’; while a final category was to be

107 ibid.
108 ibid., p. 508.
109 ibid.
110 ibid., pp. 504-5.
comprised of 'those who had been in prison several times or within a few years of their making an application for relief.' The *Church News* proposed that individuals in the first two categories 'should be provided with comfortable homes, and not subjected to any discipline', because they could be 'trusted to live honestly and respectably.' This congenial approach to the 'respectable' aged poor was not to be shown to the latter two groups, who could not be trusted to live upright temperate lives. For these groups, it was held that the existing system, with one or two modifications, would suffice. The *Church News* also urged the expansion of outdoor relief which they saw as an economically efficient and socially responsible means to maintain the more respectable aged poor in their own homes. It was unequivocal in its assertion that the government needed to do more. It placed the responsibility of the care and management of the aged and infirm poor not with private charity but with the government.

One way in which the authorities did attempt to exercise classification of invalids, based upon their former class association, was the allocation of certain individuals to certain institutions. This is well exemplified by the case of John Best, an old doctor resident in Deloraine. Best had arrived in Van Diemen's Land as a cabin passenger and free immigrant on the Sir John Byng, on 24 February 1842. In September 1889, Philip Fysh, the Chief Secretary, encountered him upon a visit to the LID. He had been admitted to that institution on 23 January 1889. Fysh very much regretted seeing a man of Best's social standing compelled to end his days in an invalid depot. However, the matter was not straightforward because in July 1886, Best had received a sentence of one month for stealing firewood to the value of sixpence from the Deloraine Railway Station. Apparently he had been caught in the act and a conviction and punishment were inevitable. He was in fact described as having a 'mania for stealing firewood'. There is an

111 *ibid.*
112 *ibid.*
113 AOT: CSD 16/10/27, Jones to Fysh, 17.12.1889; and, CSO 92/8 F. 67.
114 AOT: CSD 16/10/27, Jones to Fysh, 17.12.1889.
115 AOT: CSD 16/10/27, Fysh to Collins, 11.10.1889.
undercurrent in the letters that Fysh wrote to various administrators which
give the impression that Best was suffering some mental infirmity, possibly
dementia, but another rationale for his behaviour which was not explored
was that, although he might once have been a doctor, he had fallen on bad
times, and was merely poor, old and cold. Although opposed to the
maintenance of invalids in general hospitals, Fysh wrote to the LGH Board,
asking if it would be possible for Best to be maintained in the hospital.\textsuperscript{14} On
this occasion, the LGH did not bend to the wishes of the Chief Secretary and
Best died in the LID on 16 December 1889.\textsuperscript{15}

Ironically, at the same time that institutional administrators were attempting
to deliver class based classification, increasing medicalisation of the invalid
depots was seeing the introduction of a system of classification based upon
disease. In 1888, Withrington informed the Royal Commission that at New
Town there were separate wards for patients suffering from bad legs and
ulcers, and also those dieing from cancer.\textsuperscript{16} The cancer ward was, however,
grossly inadequate. There were, at that time, five inmates suffering from
cancer at New Town but the cancer ward was only capable of
accommodating three patients, thus two had to be placed in the ulcer ward.
These latter two cases were described by Dr Barnard as being ‘not so
repulsive as those in the small ward.’\textsuperscript{17} Despite them being ‘not so repulsive’
Seager believed, along with all the other witnesses to the Commission, that
cancer patients should be kept separate from ordinary inmates and that there
needed to be drastic improvements, particularly in quantity of space
allocated to accommodating such sufferers.\textsuperscript{18} The impression given in the
evidence is that ordinary inmates were distressed by contact with dying
cancer patients. The Commissioners were likewise shocked to find cancer
patients amongst the ordinary inmates at New Town and outraged at the

\textsuperscript{14} ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} ibid., p. 32.
\textsuperscript{16} TPP, 15, 1888, Paper 50, pp. 34 and 35. Note the change in terminology away from the
underserving penal connotations of inmate to the deserving medical terminology of
patient.
\textsuperscript{17} ibid., p. 32.
\textsuperscript{18} ibid., p. 40.
conditions to which these patients were subjected. The Commissioners recommended the establishment of a specialist ward for the treatment of all Tasmanian invalid cancer patients to be located at New Town.\textsuperscript{21}

By the late 1880s, centralisation and specialisation stand out as guiding maxims for directing government agency. These principles applied not only to inmates but also to the bureaucracy associated with the management of the charitable institutional system. At the same juncture that they were being implemented there was an analogous debate taking place between proponents of central state control and the advocates of local control. In many regards changes to the charitable institutional system mirrored similar controversies taking place in other areas of society and represented part of a complex process which was ultimately to see a change from a weak non-centralised administration to a strong centralised bureaucracy. For example, Petrow details just such a contention which took place in regard to control of the colony's police forces.\textsuperscript{12} From the mid 1870s onwards central state control was advocated by the government over municipal control. In the case of the police forces, centralisation was to win through in the end.

**Outdoor relief**

The criteria for receipt of outdoor relief had, by the 1870s, altered from that in place in earlier times. Initially, the program had been directed towards the support of families with children, but by 1871 this was no longer the case, and while families were still being assisted, the dominant group benefiting from the scheme were the aged and infirm. This can be seen in Table 11.1 which shows that 177 cases, virtually two thirds (65.6 percent), were by this time individuals whose poverty was based upon their old age and infirmity. Increasingly, outdoor charitable relief functioned as a de facto old age pension scheme for those persons who government officers perceived as being a

better class of pauper, or a more deserving invalid, than the ex-convict who had fallen upon difficult times in their later years. However, it would be wrong to suppose that the invalid depots had become the exclusive realm of emancipists. On 12 December 1870, for example, out of nine females accommodated in the invalid ward of the Launceston Female House of Correction, three, or one third, were free persons. At this same juncture there were seven free persons, out of a total inmate population of 112, accommodated in the LID. In the first six months following the transference of the female invalids from the Cascades to New Town, in 1874, there were 23 (or 18.55 percent), out of an average daily number of 124 inmates, who were either free immigrants or had been born in the colony. Further, in 1875, the government statistician reported that out of a daily average of 751 adults, maintained in pauper institutions, 95 (or 14.64 percent) had not been imperial convicts.

**TABLE 11.1:** Categories and number of cases in receipt of outdoor relief, March 1871. (Based upon a return in TLCP, 17, 1871, Paper 47, p. 69.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Relief</th>
<th>Nos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infirmido Widows</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infirmido Aged Men</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infirmido Married Couples</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widows with Children</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deserted Families</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husbands Under Sentence</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphans &amp; Deserted Children in Care</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increasing professionalism in the management of invalids and paupers, and increasing public awareness about the lives of this group, was to some extent associated with a growth in executive disquiet concerning the costs associated

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124 ibid., pp. 20-1.
125 TLCP, 21, 1875, Paper 2, p. 121.
126 ibid., p. xviii. For further detail upon the civil conditions of charitable institutional inmates see Appendix One on the civil background of inmates.
with relieving the poor. For example, the annual reports of the government statistician, for both 1871 and 1872, highlight a concern at the ballooning costs associated with public pauper relief, and in particular, the costs associated with outdoor relief. In regard to pauperism he stated that it was:

becoming a serious item in the expenditure of the Colony, and will soon force itself into a position of especial prominence. At the Brickfields there was an increase of 7 3/4 in the daily average number of Paupers, with a corresponding augmentation of expenditure of £1029 3s. 0 1/2d.; and in the disbursements of the Benevolent Societies there was an increase of £932 7s. 1d. But the most serious indication of the extension of Pauperism is furnished by the returns of Out-door Relief distributed by the Government, which show an increase from £5703 14s. 2d. in 1870 to £7056 17s. 11d. in 1871,— a difference of £1353 3s. 9d. From the Report of the Royal Commission on Charitable Institutions it appears that the sum disbursed on this account was, in 1862, only £48 14s. 6d., from which small beginning it has grown year by year to its present amount.

Relative to other Australian colonies Tasmania did have a high cost, per capita, for the relief of paupers and invalids. The estimated cost of this, for 1870, in New South Wales was 5s.9 1/4d., for Victoria 5s.10 1/4d., and for South Australia it was 4s.8 1/4d. By comparison the estimate for Tasmania was 7s. per capita. While this state of affairs was generally attributed to the colony’s convict past, the 1871 Royal Commissioners were, for the first time, prepared to concede that the causes of pauperism were complex and, in the case of Tasmania, could not be wholly attributable to the legacy of its penal past. They were prepared to acknowledge that pauperism was a feature of the economy and that its presence and growth could only be checked by addressing its causal economic and social agents. This represented a substantive shift in thought away from responding to the repercussions of poverty, to contemplating means to prevent pauperism in the first place.

In 1870 the amount expended on outdoor relief was £5679.5.6 and in 1878 it had risen to £11,743.15.5 (see Table 5.2). In early 1879, as a means of controlling growth in the outdoor relief budget, Reibey took measures to rein back the numbers of individuals receiving outdoor relief by cutting

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127 See TLCP, 18, 1872, Paper 2, p. xv; and, TLCP, 19, 1873, Paper 1, p. xvii.
128 TLCP, 18, 1872, Paper 2, p. xv.
government charitable funding to local government and centralising the authority to grant relief. Reibey was concerned that, particularly in the country districts, inappropriate cases were being approved for relief. To remedy this situation, Reibey centralised the authority and thus consolidated the power to grant relief approval with John O'Boyle, the Administrator of Charitable Grants. O'Boyle sent a circular to each district warden and stipendiary magistrate throughout the colony informing them that all outdoor relief payments would cease on 12 July 1879, unless they had been reassessed and approved by himself. While empowering the Administrator of Charitable Grants, this move led to bitter conflict with local authority. It did, however, further the development of more professional approaches to the management of paupers through an expansion and refinement of record keeping. This was because O'Boyle could only begin to consider a case if he was in receipt of all the circumstances related to the application. There was a focus on improved record keeping and the development of incipient case files as a means to aid the government in the management of paupers. A reduction in expenditure and the elimination of imposition was to be achieved through the centralisation of the assessment process and the centralisation of records which, in turn, led to a more accurate picture of the character and circumstances of pauperism.

At the end of 1879, Moore again acted to check the increase in outdoor relief costs by taking a hatchet to its budget. On 17 December 1879, Moore wrote to each of the officers in the urban centres and country districts, responsible for administering outdoor relief. In these letters Moore informed local authority that the government was not prepared to continue to disburse outdoor relief funds at their current level and that it intended proposing to parliament a reduction of at least 25 percent. It was stated that the reduction

130 ibid., p. xxxviii.
131 AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Reibey to Administrator Charitable Grants, 16.1.1879.
132 ibid.
133 AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Moore to Superintendent NTCI for Males, 17.12.1879 and AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Moore to Police Magistrate Hobart, Selby; Stipendiary Magistrate George Town, Emu Bay, Russell and Portland; and Wardens Brighton, Clarence,
would commence as of 1 January 1880. All districts were to share in this cost cutting measure and were obliged to find other means to maintain their own destitute poor, such as establishing local benevolent societies. Moore warned the local authorities that failure to comply would result in the government seeking its ‘enforcement by means of special legislation.’

The colonial government’s response to increasing costs was to pressurise local government to take on more of the financial burden. It attempted to shift responsibility for relief from itself to local authority. In a sense this was an antiquated approach which harked back to the days of Britain’s ‘old poor law’.

The response from local authority was unanimous. They ardently opposed Moore’s proposal believing that no further savings could be made without hardship to recipients. Arthur Willis, the Stipendiary Magistrate at Burnie, could not ‘see where any reduction could be made’ and the Brighton Municipal Council passed a resolution stating that it was their opinion that no reduction could be made ‘either on recipients or the accounts.’ These local administrators ‘closely scrutinised’ recipients and tended to be ‘most guarded in recommending the expenditure of moneys for charitable

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See AOT: CSD 10/75/1929 which contains the responses to Moore’s circular letters to various local authorities.

AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Walpole to Colonial Secretary, 30.12.1879.
purposes'. Particularly in country districts, where there may only have been three or four recipients, administrators had a detailed insight into the living conditions of their poor. For example, Burnie had only three cases on its books; Ross had only one recipient, 'a very old and blind man, who receive[d] a weekly allowance of three shillings'; and there were only four recipients of government aid on George Town's books. James Richardson, the George Town stipendiary magistrate, challenged Moore to detail how he should go about cutting back his relief funding. He presented a list detailing the circumstances of the four cases on George Town's books and asked Moore to judge the merit of their predicament. This listing is quoted in full as it presents a vivid image of the subjects we are discussing and clearly identifies the major factors which were likely to see a person seek either outdoor relief or admittance to a depot — age, infirmity and an inability to access family assistance. The recipients were detailed as follows:

1 Rosanna Ann Barrett [a Widow Receiving 5s/- per week] aged 80 years She has been blind for many years and she has not relatives in a position to help her. She resides at York Town West Tamar

2 William Sharland [receives 3s/6d per week] aged 90 years a decrepit old man arrived in the Colony a prisoner has no relatives or friends — and cannot stand up right— He resides in George Town

3 Amelia Brown [receives 7s/6d per week] aged 30 years a widow in delicate health has seven children the oldest being Eleven years of age — a Brother with a large family of his own is the only relative and he has to work hard to support his own family— She resides near Sidmouth West Tamar

4 Eliza Long [receives 3s/6d] a widow residing in George Town. Aged 70 years Her husband died at Beaconsfield West Tamar leaving her penniless — She has no relatives in a position to help her—

142 Although initially designated as a means to relieve families, by the mid to late 1880s there was a preponderance of aged persons receiving outdoor relief. Age became a primary factor in causing the poor to seek outdoor relief. For example, in 1886, the average of persons receiving outdoor relief in Hobart and its suburbs was 75 for males and 86 for females. (TPP, 11, 1887, Paper 23, p. 3.)
143 AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Richardson to Colonial Secretary, 26.12.1879. (NB: contents in square brackets were margin comments in original correspondence.)
Even a large municipality, like Launceston, only relieved 50 persons. These Launcestonian cases are representative of those receiving outdoor relief. They were described thus:

the first recommendation was made 12th October 1869 — and the last on 13th October 1879 — the smallest allowance 1s/6d — the largest (to a widow with five children) 18/- per week. The youngest is 20, a widow with three children, and the oldest a man 89 — the average age of recipients is 58 1/2 years.¹⁴³

The average age given for this Launceston sample supports a statement made by T. Cordell, the Warden of Sorell, that the recipients were ‘nearly all worn out old people’.¹⁴⁴ He further wrote that he could not ‘at the present time, find a single case where [he could] recommend reduction’ and added that the ‘sudden stoppage of their allowance would be a heavy blow to those poor people’.¹⁴⁷ This may be taken as a euphemism for potential starvation and death. Cordell was not willing to be a party to such a laissez-faire approach to the problem, and anyway, due to their age and infirmity, these people could not ‘long continue [to be] a burden on the state’.¹⁴⁶ This concept, that the aged invalid pauper problem was literally going to die out, seems to have been quite entrenched throughout the various government and philanthropic sectors of society. Indeed, it had been expressed as early as 1860 by the government in a joint committee report inquiring into the opening up of Tasman’s Peninsula. The members of this committee stated that they looked ‘forward to the time — which cannot be far distant — when, by the operation of natural causes, there will be no longer any necessity for this [invalid, pauper, and lunatic charitable] accommodation.’¹⁴⁸ In a subsequent communication Cordell beseeched Moore not to suddenly terminate relief funding because it would mean, for the predominantly ‘poor old people . . . starvation or removal to the Invalid Depots’.¹⁴⁹ This latter option was one which was dreaded by many of these people, with cases reported of persons

¹⁴³ AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Police Magistrate Launceston to Colonial Secretary, 22.12.1879.
¹⁴⁴ ibid.
¹⁴⁵ ibid.
¹⁴⁶ AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Cordell to Administrator Charitable Grants, 5.1.1880.
¹⁴⁷ ibid.
¹⁴⁸ ibid.
¹⁵⁰ AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Cordell to Colonial Secretary, 23.1.1880.
who were clamorous for relief’ who ‘refuse to accept Food and shelter in the Invalid Depots’. In evidence to the 1888 Royal Commission, W. Catley, the Inquiring Officer for the HBS, stated that ‘[t]he better class of people have a very great abhorrence to go into the Depot.’

It may also not have been an economically judicious alternative. For example, within the Municipality of Sorell, which was not atypical, recipients were receiving an allowance equivalent to only about 6d. per day. The cost of their keep in an invalid depot considerably exceeded this amount. As Cordell put it ‘recipients receive[d] less than their maintenance would cost if they were removed to the Invalid Depot.’ No doubt this is one of the reasons why outdoor relief formed an integral component of pauper relief in Tasmania, and why it eventually came to dominate the state system of pauper relief. It simply was economically more efficient than institutionalisation and, in practice, it operated successfully. This was particularly the case for country paupers because of the associated transportation costs to the depot, which were avoided. Thus, country cases tended not to be sent to invalid depots from the mid 1880s onwards. Also, outdoor relief was an effective means to aid couples and sidestepped criticism associated with the forced separation of married couples when they entered a charitable institution. In 1885, the outdoor allowance amounted to approximately 6d. per case per day, whereas the cost associated with institutional care was 9d. per case per day. Expedience came to play a more powerful role than the desire to confine. This was happening at the same juncture that the charitable institutions were beginning to be perceived as an unfair form of punishment. Increasingly, amongst the reformists, such institutions were seen as necessary only for cases in which the invalid had no

151 AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Police Magistrate Launceston to Colonial Secretary, 22.12.1879. Indeed, O’Boyle observed this phenomena himself and reported it to Moore. He stated that: ‘The greatest disinclination has been evinced by applicants for outdoor relief to enter the Invalid Depots, many declaring they would rather starve in the streets than to do so.’ (TLCP, 29, 1886, Paper 56, p. 3.)
153 AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Cordell to Colonial Secretary, 23.1.1880.
154 AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Cordell to Administrator Charitable Grants, 5.1.1880.
155 TPP, 6, 1885, Paper 154, p. 17.
other means of survival. Thus, there were social pressures to direct charitable institutions towards becoming pauper aged care facilities. A medical and guardianship role was subsuming the previous custodial function.

A second issue of contention between local administrators and Moore over his planned cut to the outdoor relief budget was the impracticality of the small country municipalities establishing benevolent societies. With the two major metropolitan centres struggling to support viable benevolent societies, it was highly improbable that local government would ever have the means to support charitable operations. Only the state was in a position to tackle such issues as pauperism and management of the infirm aged with any likelihood of success. The Stipendiary Magistrate for the Huon, wrote stating:

I fear that, in so far as the Huon is concerned, the idea of a local Benevolent Society, or any similar mode of shifting the burden; is altogether impractical; and Parliament alone can deal with the subject in that direction.¹⁵⁶

Not only were district instrumentalities not in a position to support charitable relief but often whole communities were unable to take on such an obligation. In the case of George Town, for example, Richardson painted a picture of a comparatively poor community in which there were but a very few with the means beyond that needed to support themselves.¹⁵⁷ Whether this position reflected the reality of the situation or not is a moot point; what is important is that Richardson recognised that he would not be able to attract sufficient private capital to operate a local benevolent society. This was not fertile ground in which Moore could engender private charity to offset the cuts he was planning to public benevolence. Moore's proposal was ill-conceived. In particular, the short time frame between its announcement and the date of its proposed implementation gave local administrators powerful ammunition to fight its introduction. There was insufficient time given to local councils to develop any alternative means of supporting their paupers.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, they

¹⁵⁶ AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Stipendiary Magistrate Franklin to Colonial Secretary, 30.12.1879.
¹⁵⁷ AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Richardson to Colonial Secretary, 26.12.1879.
¹⁵⁸ See AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Cordell to Administrator Charitable Grants, 5.1.1880 and AOT: CSD 10/75/1929, Cordell to Colonial Secretary, 23.1.1880.
were in a strong position to request an extension of the current grant at least until parliament had had an opportunity to debate the issue.

Despite this, a significant reduction was achieved. In July 1880, O'Boyle predicted that the saving for that year would be £897.13s.6d. This had been achieved by reducing both the numbers of recipients and amount that those who received outdoor relief were granted. Of particular pleasure to the government would have been the fact that the substantial reduction in charitable grants had been made without any additional increases in the expenditure on the maintenance of invalids in charitable institutions. There was not a transference of cost from outdoor relief to indoor relief, and thus Moore’s cuts represented an unquestionable reduction in the overall cost of pauperism to the government. The economic thumbscrews on outdoor relief were maintained, with charitable grants only being approved in extreme cases of hardship, and then only after rigorous inspection and ongoing surveillance. Relief was conferred for strictly defined periods (not more than six months), requiring re-application and attenuated examination of circumstances upon expiry before any further payments would be sanctioned. The two essential grounds for the confirmation of relief were 'satisfactory proof of destitution' and proof of the 'inability of relatives to afford the aid'. A third requirement was the providing of 'a report of a satisfactory character' from a local warden or police magistrate. Grants could be cancelled at any time for 'the misappropriation of the money by the recipients, an improvement in their circumstances, or the discovery of relatives possessed of sufficient means to afford the aid needed.'

159 Part of the reason for this was that there was a decline in the institutionalised pauper invalid population at this time, both in terms of absolute and relative figures (see Table 11.2). (For example see TLCP, 34, 1883, Paper 2, p. lix.) In 1881 the ratio of institutionalised paupers to the whole population was 1:132, by 1887 this ratio had dropped to 1:172. Relatively, there were fewer invalids within the Tasmanian population at this time. The reason for this is undoubtedly related to increasing immigration to the colony and natural attrition of the emancipist population.

160 TLCP, 29, 1880, Paper 56, p. 3.
161 TPP, 23, 1891, Paper 26, p. 3.
162 TPP, 8, 1886, Paper 23, p. 3.
163 TPP, 14, 1888-9, Paper 23, p. 3.
TABLE 11.2: Relative numbers of institutionalised paupers to the whole population, 1881-87.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>1:147</td>
<td>TLCP, 34, 1883, Paper 2, p. lix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>1:155</td>
<td>TPP, 2, 1884, Paper 2, p. ix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1:163</td>
<td>TPP, 5, 1885, Paper 1, p. lxxi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1:170</td>
<td>TPP, 8, 1886, Paper 1, p. lxxii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>1:165</td>
<td>TPP, 11, 1887, Paper 2, p. lxxxv.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The maintenance of a close working relationship between the government and the benevolent societies was important, particularly in terms of their joint capacity to keep the 'deserving' poor out of institutions. Foucault would have argued that these were the very individuals who were likely to conspire to incarcerate paupers and invalids within institutional space; however, the reality was in essence the exact opposite. There does appear to have been collusion in institutionalising invalid emancipists, but overall private and public charity from the late 1880s onwards was working towards keeping people out of institutions. The reason for this was simple economics. Some estimates, such as that of the 1888 Royal Commissioner Henry Horatio Gill, put the cost of maintaining a pauper in the NTCI at three times that of outdoor relief, were exaggerated, outdoor relief nevertheless represented a significant cost saving when compared to institutional care. Given that the benevolent societies were maintaining, through the issue of rations and rent assistance, many paupers who would otherwise have been admitted to a charitable institution, and thus become a liability to the taxpayer, there was good reason for the government to maintain a cordial relationship with private charity. For example, if a person was able to be maintained outside an institution by the HBS on half rations, then this represented a considerable saving to the government. The cost to the HBS for half rations was 1s.6d. per week while institutional care at the NTCI cost three-and-a-half times this sum. Likewise, in Launceston, the LBS did not recommend or force old

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155 ibid., p. 10.
people into the depot who were of sober habits and had friends. They believed that if an invalid could earn enough to pay their rent, then it made economic sense to give them a ration at a cost of about 2s.6d. per week rather than send them to the depot where the cost of their maintenance was likely to be 8s. per week.166

In the latter half of 1894 the government came to a decision that it would change the administration of outdoor relief from the beginning of 1895.167 In consequence of these alterations to the administration of the Charitable Grants Department, O'Boyle retired and his position was subsumed under Richardson.168 Administration of the Charitable Grants Department and Superintendence of the NTCI were effectively combined at this time.169 As part of the changes made in 1895, the HBS and LBS were given charge for the distribution of outdoor relief in their respective cities.170 The LBS accepted its part in this new scheme, taking over from the Administrator of Charitable Grants the responsibility for 'affording assistance to distressed persons residing in the City of Launceston and Suburbs'.171 In a move diametrically opposed to the outcomes of the 1888 Royal Commission, James Andrew, Secretary to the Premier, wrote to the Reverend J. W. Simmons, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the HBS, proposing the transfer of the distribution of government outdoor relief back to the HBS.172 There were, however, some major philosophical differences between the government and the Society. For instance, the HBS did not believe that persons leaving, discharged from, or refused admission to the NTCI should be in receipt of

166 ibid., p. 53.
167 AOT: CSD 19/17/266, Braddon to Chairman Executive Committee LBS, 8.11.1894.
168 TPP, 33, 1895, Paper 22, p. 4.
169 Richardson held this position until being replaced by F. R. Seager on 1 January, 1899. (TPP, 43, 1900, Paper No. 25, p. 4.)
170 TPP, 33, 1895, Paper 14, p. 3; TPP, 35, 1896, Paper 25, p. 3; and, AOT: CSD 19/17/266, Braddon to Stephenson, 27.4.1894.
171 AOT: CSD 19/17/266, Braddon to Chairman Executive Committee LBS, 8.11.1894 and TPP, 33, 1895, Paper 15, p. 4.
172 AOT: CSD 19/18/355, Andrew to Simmons, 28.9.1894.
aid. The government, on the other hand, believed in providing relief to such cases where distress could be shown. It stated that:

as an item that is now, and has heretofore been, covered by the sum voted for Hobart Administration of Charitable Grants and the obligation to meet this should, in all justice, be accepted by your Society, together with the fund that provides for it.

This particular point of difference between the two bodies was indicative of how the government had come to accept that society was responsible for the maintenance of all its members, even when their 'moral values' differed from the established elite, but that the HBS had yet to make this transition. It was deeply rooted in conservatism, and held rigid, inflexible attitudes to those invalids who refused to enter, or left of their own accord, the depot. They saw a clear distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor, and had very little sympathy for the latter. This was an issue of power and control. By controlling the means to relieve the severity of poverty, the Society would effectively have the power to direct pauper behaviour. It was signalling an intention to do so and the government was stressing the need to exercise a more liberal approach if it was to be given the responsibility for administering public funds.

Despite these differences, the Society indicated that it was prepared to trial the proposal and, after a period of intense negotiations, the government and the HBS agreed to terms. The government must have been convinced that transfer of the administration of outdoor relief would result in a substantive cost saving to the state; for the devolution of the power to distribute public monies to a private organisation, characterised by high middle class moral values, was always bound to result in friction with government officers who tended to be influenced more by pragmatics than ethics. Overall, the government was pleased with the arrangement, but once again its bureaucrats resented the HBS's intrusion into what they saw as their area of

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173 AOT: CSD 19/18/355, Simmons to Braddon, 12.10.1894 and AOT: CSD 19/18/355, Braddon to Simmons, 12.10.1894.
174 AOT: CSD 19/18/355, Braddon to Simmons, 12.10.1894.
authority and responsibility. For example, in late 1896, Richardson, as Administrator of Charitable Grants, and James Pearce, Inquiring Officer, conversed and corresponded over inadequacies in the HBS’s management of the government’s charitable grant. They desired a return to the ‘old system’, believing that they could administer it at a rate less than that currently granted to the HBS. These bureaucrats envisaged a system whereby the government would take responsibility for caring for permanent cases of destitution (that is those requiring relief for more than three months) and non-government charitable organizations restricted to those who were facing only a temporary crisis. In keeping with professionalisation of bureaucracy, these public servants desired clearly defined boundaries of responsibility between the operations of the HBS and the functions of the Charitable Grants Department.

The 1895 changes also saw the authority to distribute outdoor relief funds conferred upon the wardens and stipendiary magistrates of the various municipal and police districts. On 11 January 1895, A. G. Dixson, the Police Clerk, Ulverstone, telegraphed Moore requesting permission to send a pauper, Joseph Leyendecker (or Beyendecker), to the LGH. As Leyendecker suffered from chronic ailments Moore did not approve of him being forwarded to Launceston. Instead he arranged for Leyendecker to make application to the stipendiary magistrate of the district for outdoor relief. Moore was prepared to subsidise rural paupers in their own neighbourhoods, using what was effectively government welfare assistance, or a primitive means tested pension, rather than place pressure on institutional space in Launceston. This strategy for dealing with rural paupers and invalids was

175 AOT: CSD 19/18/355, Simmons to Braddon, 12.10.1894.
178 TPP 35, 1896, Paper 25, p. 3.
179 AOT: CSD 19/9/60, Dixon to Moore, 11.1.1895.
181 AOT: CSD 19/9/60, Andrew to Dixon, 14.1.1895.
part of a wider scheme to control the flow of rural poor to the urban centres. There was concern that rural paupers were being encouraged to travel to main centres in order to seek charitable aid. The government sought to persuade local authorities to desist in any activities which might assist paupers in travelling to Hobart or Launceston, and one means at their disposal was to support paupers in their local community through the provision of outdoor relief.

As social attitudes changed opening up alternatives to institutionalisation, the aged poor took them up and thus the numbers confined to the depots began to significantly decline from the mid 1890s onwards. However, the economic circumstances that the colony found itself in stifled the introduction of changing values, precepts and alternatives to institutional space. This was most pronounced in relation to the management of rural cases. In 1898 the government cut the size of its charitable grant to local country administrators as part of a much wider cost cutting program. Although the cuts were relatively small they had a significant effect on the capacity of country municipalities to address the needs of their poor, given that the districts were already functioning on a minimum basis. The Municipality of Longford, for example, had its government charitable grant cut by £5. W. H. D. Archer, the Warden of Longford, protested against the cut, indicating that it would have a considerable effect on the lives of paupers in the Longford area. The government, however, considered the reduction to be nothing more than a ‘minor alteration’, forced upon it by economic circumstances it had little control over, and suggested that Longford could reduce the cost of its outdoor relief by:

transferring some of the cases which have been receiving aid for some time past, and which are likely to remain a charge on the funds at your disposal, to one of the Invalid Depots; and if you concur, I am to say that arrangements will be made accordingly. 352

352 AOT: CSD 22/12/39, Steward to Archer, 11.3.1898.
Thus, towards the end of the nineteenth-century, the government applied financial pressure on country administrators to force them into institutionalising their poor. This may seem highly contradictory given that institutionalisation of the poor, be they urban or rural, was cost ineffective when compared with the expense of outdoor relief. However, declining institutional numbers meant that the government had plenty of unoccupied, under-utilised, institutional space available for which it was already incurring recurrent costs. Once institutional buildings, stores, staff and administration were in place, the actual expense of additional inmates, up to the normal carrying capacity of an institution, was relatively minor and unlikely to effect overall running costs. Therefore, the government was prepared to advocate institutionalisation for so long as this did not impact upon the overall outlay of maintaining its charitable institutions.

An excess of accommodation in the government charitable institutions at the close of the nineteenth-century meant that it was rational for the government to pursue a policy of confining what it perceived to be less deserving cases in institutions and to employ the threat of indoor relief as a means to discipline those receiving the government grant. In mid 1897, for example, J. W. Burt applied to Moore for a weekly outdoor relief allowance of 2s.6d. Burt had been an inmate of the LID but, sometime in 1893, had discharged himself and gone to live with one of his four sons. His other sons were unwilling to assist in his support and, despite applying to both the Launceston and Campbell Town courts for summonses to compel them to provide for him, he had been unsuccessful. He had then approached the Member for Selby, F. Archer, who had personally spoken to Moore about the possibility of Burt receiving a government allowance but had been told that, as he had four sons, the government was unwilling to lend any assistance. Economic circumstances, however, forced the Beaconsfield son to give up supporting his father. Burt, therefore, was applying for a grant to enable him to return to the home of this

183 AOT: CSD 22/8/232, Burt to Moore, 22.5.1897.
son who said he would accept him back on the receipt of 2s.6d. a week. Burt begged Moore to:

kindly procure a compassionate allowance of such sum for me, & trust that there may be some law in existence enabling the Government to sue my other three sons & compel them to contribute this amount through the proper department.\(^{184}\)

Evidently Burt was very familiar with the operations of the Charitable Grants Department for such a law did exist and it was regularly employed by its officers. However, possibly because space was available at the LBA which the government was already providing and paying for, and also in order to demonstrate its authority over paupers, Moore rejected Burt's application. The reason given was that Burt's case had been investigated and it had been found that he was already in receipt of 'some temporary assistance from the Launceston Benevolent Society, and that you have refused accommodation offered to you by that body in the Asylum.'\(^{185}\) This case exposes, despite their differences, a close working relationship between government bureaucrats and Benevolent Society officers. It also reveals an unofficial government policy of refusing aid to paupers who had family they deemed capable of supporting them, even when such family refused to do so. Further, it disclosed a government unwilling to support on outdoor relief those who were unwilling to comply with offers of indoor relief. A refusal to enter a charitable institution was almost a guarantee that outdoor relief would not be forthcoming.\(^{186}\) Given the circumstances in northern Tasmania at this time, with the government paying the LBS for the provision of 200 inmates at the LBA, and there being considerably less than that number, it is understandable from both the government and LBS' perspectives that there were puissant justifications to increase the numbers of inmates in this institution. Therefore, Burt was pressured to enter the LBA. While a few years earlier, it had been cost effective to maintain paupers on outdoor relief as opposed to sending

\(^{184}\) ibid.

\(^{185}\) AOT: CSD 22/8/232, Stewart to Burt, 8.6.1897.

\(^{186}\) For example, see the case of John Gough in AOT: CSD 22/3/46.
them to a depot, the reverse was now the case. The government had effectively already paid the bill for their accommodation at the LBA.

However, a double standard existed as to how persons from differing social backgrounds were treated in relation to outdoor relief and institutionalisation. The elite worked together to keep ‘respectable’ old people out of the depots, whereas those seen as originating from the lower ranks, despite having the support of an elite person, inevitably were denied the opportunity of outdoor relief. This is well evidenced by two applicants for relief in 1899. B. S. Bird, Member of the House of Assembly, wrote to Moore in support of the first of these cases, J. Webb, who was seeking a weekly allowance of 2s.6d.167 Webb was an old man, living in the Upper Huon, who, while he could still do a little work, was unable to earn enough to support himself. He was favourably known by the local residents and the district police officer, Constable Lisson, was prepared to vouch as to his good character. Initially, Moore was going to accede to this request but then he was supplied with information that Webb had been an inmate of the NTCI on two previous occasions. Given the connotation this had as to Webb’s background, Moore could ‘see no alternative but to again urge that he be sent to the Charitable Institution where he will receive every possible care.”@ The hypocrisy of the system was exposed when comparing Webb’s treatment to that given our second case, Catherine Pearson, an 86-year-old resident of Sorell who had worked in the service of a number of powerful families in that neighbourhood. Like Webb, Pearson had an elite advocate in no other person than Alfred Dobson, the Solicitor General, as well as a number of other respected persons. It was important to have reputable men of standing vouch for one’s reputation. Applications, like this one of Pearson’s, were unlikely to receive support without personal endorsement of character by a member of the elite. In this particular case, Dobson described Pearson as ‘an eminently respectable old lady.’168 The Chief Secretary wrote to the Administrator of

167 AOT: CSD 22/21/9, Stewart to Administrator Charitable Grants, 21.2.1899.
168 AOT: CSD 22/21/9, Moore to Bird, 17.3.1899.
169 AOT: CSD 22/21/9, Stewart to Seager, 14.4.1899.
Charitable Grants on Pearson's behalf in a letter which he stated had to
remain unofficial. In this letter he remarked:

It does seem a pity (sic) that such an estimably old body as this should have to
pass the remain-few (sic) years of her life in the Depot, and Mr. Dobson and I
are of opinion that hers is a case which could very well be helped outside the
Institution, and I now beg to ask you to be good enough to see what you can do
in the matter. 190

Pearson's pity was clearly an advantage, for the established elite had the
power and discretion to intervene in how paupers were to be relieved and
they used this power. This had the effect of personalising class relations and
reinforcing the importance of patronage. Some paupers were seen as being
more deserving than others. For these persons, institutionalisation was not
perceived as an appropriate means of relieving them of their poverty. As
more and more of these cases came to make up the pool of those requiring
relief, it was inevitable that an institutionalised solution was going to be less
and less well received by both the applicants and their elite advocates.

By 1901, fewer and fewer invalids were maintained in institutional space.
Instead, the aged poor tended to be supported outside of institutions by
outdoor relief schemes. Increasingly, institutional confinement was viewed
by the wider community as inappropriate and, as ever, politicians were
sensitive to this change in social perception. The depression had brought
many families and individuals tantalisingly close to just such an
institutionalised fate. 191 The wider community came to recognise that the
capacity for self-support had been drastically diminished. The depression had
caused 'great anxiety . . . effecting all classes of the community.' 192 It taught a
harsh lesson that self-help was not always a sufficient means to keep one
outside of institutional space or indebted to a benevolent society. It had
forced society to consider alternative solutions to that of the invalid depot,

190 ibid.
191 For example, the LBS reported for 1895 that continuation of the depression had brought
about cases of acute distress amongst the better stationed in life. See TPP, 35, 1896, Paper
13, p. 3.
192 TPP, 31, 1894, Paper 7, p. 3.
such as outdoor relief. It was also clear that pauperism was a problem which was not going to ‘die out’ as had been predicted by the likes of Nowell. This realisation may also have played its part in motivating society to seek a more enlightened response to the management of the aged poor.