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Abstract

The traditional, intuitively appealing, test for causation in tort law, known as 'the but-for test' has been subjected to what are widely believed to be devastating criticisms by Tony Honoré, and Richard Wright, amongst
others. I argue that the but-for test can withstand these criticisms. Contrary to what is now widely believed, there is no inconsistency between the but for test and ordinary language, commonsense, or sound legal principle.

Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Coady, DA
Journal or Publication Title:	Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy
ISSN:	1440-4982
Additional Information:	© 2002 the Australilan Journal of Legal Philosophy and the Author
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